An Inquiry Model for Explanation of Seeking Honor and Self-Esteem in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Revolution (1980-1998)

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Abstract

With the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it is questionable whether a theoretical framework can provide for the components of foreign policy called the Islamic Revolution's self-esteem. Those who believe in "Dignifying Foreign Policy" find that in the foreign policy of the Islamic Revolution, the "Motive of Dignity" has a special place and position, so that during the eight-year war, the priorities of the national interests of Iranians are not economy nor welfare but religious and national honor. On the other hand, all disputing theories of international relations based on modern mono-dimensional anthropology have diminished the importance of self-esteem as an independent human stimulus, and there is no theory based on the stimulus of the soul and human need for self-esteem. The present study by the hypothesis that other concepts (like self-esteem) can explain to clarify the disputes of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the imposed war by using the idea of self-confidence; To this end, this concept divided into three components: "Voluntary Limitation in Disputes," "Priority of Identity" and "Honor Seeking" and explains the foreign policy of the Islamic Revolution from 1980 to 1988.

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Introduction

It seems that those political paradigms whose ontological depth leads to the diminishing of man to "Reason" and "Desire" have a materialistic (desire-centered) and rationalist view of the security nature in international relations, and their epistemological propositions do not go beyond. In contrast, paying attention to the approach of the soul or self-esteem (the thymus) and explaining the different position of man in the security paradigms of material and immaterial international relations is a significant issue in the one-dimensional and single area contemporary world.

From this point of view, the disputing theories of international relations are all based on one-dimensional material man, consisting of two elements of "Desire" and "Reason," free from any spiritual and immaterial dimension (a component of thymus or self-esteem). Therefore, modern man is a one-dimensional being who is aroused by the three motives of the Greek man in the era of Plato and Aristotle (the desire for "lust," thymus "Self-Esteem" and "Courage," and "Reason") with only one of the motives of reason or hope.

These three individual drivers and motives can extend to human groups and societies such as the city government and the nation-states, and all three drivers create different logics in terms of cooperation, dispute, and risk-taking. But what is right is the oblivion and marginalization of the element of the thymus (self-esteem) in modern anthropology and, consequently, theories of international relations. Theories of liberalism, realism, neo-realism, Marxism, and even structuralism are rooted in the motive of desire (appetite and lust) or the purpose of reason.

As a result, none of the leading security paradigms and theories of international relations based on the element of the thymus (self-esteem). These theories reduce the importance of honor and dignity as an independent human stimulus, and no argument based on the stimulus of the human soul and the need for self-esteem. It is also noteworthy that the soul may have separated from the lexicon of words in the theories of international relations. Still, it has not abandoned playing the role of a "Fundamental Human Stimulus."

Also, in the history of contemporary Iran, the emergence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran with its significant coordinates is a great event. The question is whether it is possible to provide a theoretical framework for the components of foreign policy called the Islamic Revolution's self-esteem.

Believers in "Dignified Foreign Policy" believe that in the history of Iran's foreign policy from the past to the present, the "Stimulus of Dignity" has had a special place. The Iranian myths and the Shiite Imams have all become dear and enduring in the historical Iranians memory, as they resisted the rulers of the time and the oppressive powers and have been martyred in this way. Iranian strategic culture is based on National-Shiite dignity and prejudice, which can be seen in foreign policy.

This culture of seeking self-esteem existed before the Islamic Revolution. Still, after the Islamic Revolution, it was strengthened, stabilized, sustained and perfected, so that the priorities of the national interests of Iranians are yet determined not by the economy and welfare but by religious and national dignity.

In this regard, the era of the Islamic Revolution, especially the eight-year period of the Holy Defense, which is the period of recovery of Iranian-Islamic identity based on Shiism and the restoration of the country's lost power, is an example of the profound presence of Iranians seeking their dignity in their strategic culture. All the ups and downs of international developments are still at the heart of foreign strategy development.

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran, from its inception until today, has been embroiled insignificant and sometimes long-term disputes. During this period, it has acted based on "Honor-seeking," and the culmination of this strange behavior of honor-seeking has been witnessed during the holy defense and nuclear dispute in Iran.

"Dignity" of the leading decision-makers of the government has been useful in the formation and continuity of the Islamic Republic of Iran disputes with the world. And this honorable and dignified behavior has principally been rooted in soul-centered or honor-oriented or "Thymus-Centered" of Iranian-Islamic anthropological foundations.

Thus, the central question of the present study is based on whether other concepts except for the acquisition of "Power" and "Security," such as "Seeking Dignity and Honor," have the potential to explain Iran's foreign policy during the Holy Defense. In other words, 'has the determination of the principal decision-makers of the Islamic Revolution been useful in the formation and continuity of Iran's disputes during the holy defense?

Therefore, the present article using the analytical concept of "Seeking Self-Esteem and Honor," seeks to show the hypothesis that besides gaining power and security, other ideas such as "Seeking Honor and Dignity" can explain Iran's foreign policy during the holy defense.

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In the present article, we first try to formulate and present a theoretical and general framework for explaining dignity in foreign policy and then tell the era of holy defense with such a conceptual framework.

1. Research Method

The data collection method in this paper is entirely library based, with the priority of first-hand data such as legal, historical, and diplomatic documents, memories, lectures, memories of witnesses of behavior and speech, and thoughts of the leading activists and decision-makers. And the general method of the research is derived from the analytical-descriptive process.

2. The Method of Proving the Hypothesis

In order to prove the hypothesis, first of all, if it can show that the decisions of the activists in adopting each of the stages of an international dispute during the holy defense are due to the components of dignity, the role of honor can achieve at that stage of the difference. To this end, it should examine whether "Voluntarily Limitations on the Dispute," "The Importance of Identity," and "Honor Seeking" have been useful in the formation of each of the three stages of dispute in the era of the Holy Defense. These components are sought in the statements and behavior of key decision-makers.

3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of the present study derived from the academic topic "Operational Definition of Honor-Seeking Characteristics." Therefore, the author tries to explain the characteristics of self-esteem (voluntary limitation on the dispute, the importance of seeking identity and dignity) and give life to these characteristics by examining the external developments of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Holy Defense).

4. Operational Definition of Variables
4.1. Definition for Seeking Honor

In the above lines, we saw that self-esteem, as an independent variable and the most critical concept examined in this article, means behavior intending to gain dignity. Dignity can show in two types in the activist's action. First, it becomes the ultimate goal of the activist, and second, it becomes a guide to behavior, and thus the activist's expression is somehow limited by dignity. Taking a look at the two roles of pride, the

components of the concept of dignity are also voluntarily restrictions on the dispute, the importance of identity, and seeking honor.

In the following, it intends that the nature of these components be determined, analyzed, and opened based on the contents described above so that the purpose and examples of each are known, and in the next part, their objective examples are found in the history of Safavid Iran.

4.1.1. Voluntarily Limitation on Dispute

But 'what does such a restriction include?' The voluntary limitation of the dispute includes the limitation means of dispute, the rules on the dispute, and the objectives and goals of the dispute (Lebow, 2008: 149).

The limitations of the tool of dispute can easily explain the fact that the activist, despite his ability to use a particular combat tool, and despite knowing that using this tool improves his position in the dispute, refuses to use it.

According to the literature in question, the limitations of dispute rules can define as follows: First, to limit oneself to agreeing on the time and place of the dispute (Lebow, 2008: 20). Then, the limitations because of hospitality (Lebow, 2008). And, the restrictions arising from previous contracts, or in other words, fidelity to the covenant and the finally, limitations arising from manhood.

Restrictions on dispute goals are setting goals other than the usual and conventional purposes in the dispute. If we see common goals in conflict as conquering or increasing strategic depth to gain wealth or security and survival, to achieve dignity, the purpose of dispute is self-expression in the form of competitive performance of courage, bravery, and warfare, or restoration of prestige (Lebow, 2008: 162-164).

4.1.2. The Importance of Identity

We first define identity as something in which the activist identifies himself with and distinguishes himself from other activists by attaching himself to it and claiming ownership. Here the element of "Difference" is a key one. Any obstacle to the formation of identity, or an attack on it, is considered an attack on the activist himself. And will provoke a disputing reaction from that activist and can be defined in two types: the first is to prioritize ontological security over physical security, and the second is to follow decision-making elites from other elites and the masses.

The importance of identity, in dignifying societies, linked to the lack of purpose for survival. In these societies, the "Priority of Survival and Security" is lower than the "Priority of Identity." It can say that in such a society, "Ontological Security" is more important than "Physical Security." In other words, if a political entity prefers its ontological

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security over its physical security, it seeks to maintain its status through its identity.

The other effect of identity in dispute is to follow the decision-making elites from among other elites and the masses. In some cases, the impact of threat or insult on personality is not felt by the decision-making elites or is not given importance. Instead, either the non-decision-making elites or the masses push the decision-making elite with their pressure on the government, despite reluctance. Their inner desires force them to react and eliminate the threat or insult to the identity, or the opportunists find power outside the pit and ride on this wave of public opinion, both taking over the government and also saving the character (Lebow, 2008: 529-531).

4.1.3. Seeking Dignity

The third component of seeking dignity means to find honor and follow its role in the formation, continuity, and end of the disputes. If we consider the meaning of fame loosely closed to dignity, the two concepts of pride and honor would be related to each other by the idea of reputation.

With these abstract explanations and to further objectify the concept of honor, using the idea of fame that came in these explanations, we turn praise into two more scientific theories of "Identification" and "Restoration of Credibility" and explain than in the following.

4.1.3.1. Identification

Identification means admitting the activist members of a particular circle to accept an activist outside their circle but interested in attending theirs. Since the purpose of this activist was to enter the ring, fulfilling this goal will cause a sense of honor and dignity for the new activist. Identifying an activist is done in two separate processes. The first process uses the three concepts of admiration, imitation, and acceptance for identification, and the second process uses the three concepts of criticism, deviation, and helpfulness for identification.

In the first process, the activist, by admiring (Steele, 2008: 69, 93, 96) and imitating (Lebow, 2008: 15, 19, 452-543) the identity of a circle, try to somehow attach himself to that identity by observing the hierarchy. The success of this method depends on the acceptance of the current members of the circle. Next, the activist, for not being accepted in the loop, or opposing the identity of the ring that contradicts its norms, criticizes the character of the rival circle. Deviates from the principles of the rival circle identity by choosing different beliefs, and then with the

help of indecisive or dissatisfied activists in the rival circle, builds his circle (Lebow, 2008: 544).

4.1.3.2. Restoration of Credit

Restoration of credibility happens when the reliability of the activist is lost. The activist tries to revive it. The process of restoring credibility depends on the activist's perceptions of the causes and reasons for the loss of the primary credibility and is of two types. The activist considers the loss of his credibility due to humiliation and insult (Onuf, 2009: 147) by other activists or due to the shame (Bowman, 2006: 27; Steele, 2008: 41) of losing a historical position and credibility. Credibility restoration happens in the first type through the process of humiliation-anger-revenge and in the second type from the process of shame-reparation.

Humiliation happens due to special conditions for a superior or better activist, such as getting hurt (Lebow, 2008: 534) or hearing a voice of competitiveness by an inferior activist (Lebow, 2008: 69). Or happens due to general cases for all activists such as breach of covenant, being threatened, receiving the promise of inappropriate rewards (Lebow, 2008: 552-553), the existence of barriers to self-expression (Lebow, 2008: 19) and questioning of independence Is (O'Neill, 1999: 87-88; Lebow, 2008: 15).

Anger, in Libo's view, with the two concepts of pain and hope, mediates the two primary and final thoughts of the process; the pain of humiliation and insult that diminishes one's dignity and creates the desire of revenge. For the Greeks, anger is scarce, and only a few numbers of people bear, those who have the power to take revenge (Lebow, 2008: 130-131). In the realm of foreign policy, weak governments experience humiliation, not powerful states.

At the international level, when a pro-power activist prevents from being identified, he or she will experience anger that will lead to revenge. Governments in the lower hierarchy of power, which compete with the superior authorities, inflict wrath on that activist, due to their humiliating feeling on the part of the inferior activist (Lebow, 2008: 69). Subsequently, the activist becomes angry in a state of being humiliated and eventually takes revenge (Bowman, 2006: 21 & 27).

We should say the attitude towards taking revenge is all rooted in self-disrespect of man (Lebow, 2008: 15). Attack, which in its purest form is a dispute of violence, requires that the restoration of credibility requires participation in force (O'Neill, 1999: 91). Humiliation must eradicate and the shame factor punished in public so that everyone can witness and

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comprehend this revenge. Spending money for these purposes is worth doing it (Bowman, 2006: 27).

It can say that in addition to humiliation, shame also destroys credibility. Shame is the result of the credibility loss of the activist role or the gradual reduction of activist historical credibility. O'Neill sees the ability of activists to be a component of embarrassment or shame (O'Neill, 1999: 14). This argument is because the more capable the activists are, the more embarrassed they are in the two situations of losing that ability or not using it properly. The embarrassed actor tries to make up for it by regaining or redefining his reputation.

5. Islamic Republic's Seeking Honor During the Imposed War

The present section tries to show the role of seeking honor in disputes persistence during the Islamic Republic of Iran.

5.1. Voluntarily Limitations in Dispute

In the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, at the level of international social accumulation, there have been several instances of the author's preference for voluntary limitations in dispute. Here, the Islamic Republic of Iran had accepted voluntary restrictions on the tools and objectives of the difference, as well as normative restrictions.

5.2. Restrictions on Dispute Tools

Restrictions on tools can be attributed solely to the Islamic Republic's non-use of chemical weapons and even its refusal to retaliate against Iraq's use of such weapons. The Islamic Republic's response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons was an internal debate, and ultimately a threat policy. First, of 1984, a discussion between the officials of the regime was about whether or not to use this weapon. "Islam and the Qur'an allow us to use chemical weapons in retaliation, but we prefer not to do so, and we hope the United Nations by putting pressure on Iraq, force this country to stop using chemical weapons" (Hashemi, 2006: 54).

5.3. Restrictions Arising from the Rules of the Dispute

Magnanimity should mention when it comes to accepting the limitations of rules. Evidence of the kindness and fairness role in restricting the war goals is Imam Khomeini's initial reluctance to retaliate against Iraq's invasion of uninhabited areas, which ultimately for the insistence of the regime's supreme officials, was allowed on the condition that the residents of target cities be aware beforehand.

Following the refusal of cities in participation in the war until 1981, the delegates had a private meeting with Imam Khomeini, during which Imam Khomeini announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran could not

invade Iraqi cities. Until the middle of 1983, there was this gentle limitation in the war. "After the Iraqi missiles hit Behbahan and Masjed Soleyman, we went to Imam's office with the president, the head of the Supreme Court, and Mr. Ahmad, he did not agree on hitting residential areas in Iraq. And said it is contrary to the religious and political fatwa" (Hashemi, 2002: 352). Eventually, in the middle of the winter of 1983, Imam Khomeini's view changed with the hope that a general declaration of Iran's retaliation to Iraq, might dissuade Iraq from invading Iranian cities.

When Iran's declaration did not stop Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities, the retaliation was conditional to a 24-hour announcing opportunity to the attacked cities. However, Iran did not fully retaliate against the attack on its towns, causing that in 1984, a year after Imam granted the conditional permission to retaliate, Japan issued a letter of thanks to Iran because of not targeting Iraq's cities (Hashemi, 2006: 311).

5.4. Limitations on Dispute Goals

'What were the boundaries of the goals?' Firstly, the slogans of the Islamic Republic of Iran beginning of its establishment was the issuance of the revolution. Secondly, Iranian territory targeted by the Iraqi invasions, the war define for the Islamic Republic in such a way that instead of common goals in battle, such as conquering an aland to maintain security or promotion of interests or even 12establishment of peace, goals such as introducing and judging the aggressor, eliminating the Ba'ath party, overthrowing Saddam and establishing of an Islamic state, fighting Israel and supporting the Iraqi people defined as the goals of the war.

Thus, we are witnessing the fulfillment of the goal of "Determining and Punishing the Aggressor" and replacing it with conventional war objectives, such as maintaining and ensuring territorial integrity. Any plan, program, and resolution for a ceasefire or peace will only be valid and worthy for the Islamic Republic when it guarantees and fulfills the preset goal of the war.

In the early winter of 1981, Iranian troops entered Iraq for the first time. In this situation, at the request of Iraq for peace, the United Nations offered mediation. "But Iran's conditions for accepting this, in addition to Iraq's withdrawal from Iran and receiving compensation for the war, were also trial of the aggressor" (Hashemi, 1999: 457).

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran, meanwhile, did not reject the mediation in general but believed that peace was not a suitable solution until Saddam's admission of defeat: "Mediation is not the right solution.

We put a lot of emphasis on three conditions: unconditional withdrawal, compensation, and the punishment of the aggressor" (Hashemi, 1999: 498). According to the Islamic Republic, the proposal of the mediation board of the Organization of the Islamic Conference is the same as Saddam's proposal, which states "Ceasefire, Negotiation and then the Withdrawal of Forces" (Hashemi, 1999: 506).

Despite the victory of the Iranian military in the war, which eventually led to the seizure of Faaw, the Islamic Republic's response to mediation efforts for ceasefire and peace was based on the determination of aggressors, the payment of compensation, and the withdrawal from the occupied territories. "The essence of their words is to examine the satisfaction of both parties, identify the aggressor and then talk about the damage" (Hashemi, 2001: 155).

Even Iraq's step forward in proposing peace and maintaining peace and implementing a ceasefire without the condition of determining an aggressor did not cause the Islamic Republic to forget its goal of war. In the summer of 1982, Iraq unilaterally announced that it was retreating. Also, in an open letter to the Iranian officials on August 3, 1986, Saddam proposed a five-point plan to declare a ceasefire and establish peace. In Hashemi's notes, implicitly, the lack of "Mentioning the Punishment of the Aggressor" in this proposal, is the cause of the lack of attention to this point (Hashemi, 1999: 201). So, near the end of the war, more or less, the talk of a ceasefire and peace was postponed to the aggressor was determined.

The issuance of Security Council Resolution 598 in late July 1987 marked a turning point in the war, and the first tolerant actions in accepting the ceasefire by the Islamic Republic of Iran, as mentioned, date back to the time when the issue of determining the aggressor included in this resolution. Paragraph 6 of Resolution 598 raised contrary to Resolution 598 on the determination of the aggressor from Iran's point of view, and this caused Iran to neither reject nor accept Resolution 598, contrary to previous resolutions that it immediately dismissed. Then it focused his efforts on prioritizing the determination of the aggressor committee to a ceasefire (Zarif, 2013: 78 and 80).

During the negotiations, the difference between the view of the Islamic Republic and the United Nations was identified. During the talks of Security Council Resolution 598 at the end of July 1987, "the basic point of Iran's will or the will of the other side and the Security Council was clear; They insisted on a ceasefire before any action and Iran insisted

on the determination of the aggressor and the initiator of the war before the ceasefire" (Hashemi, 2010: 17).

Despite the fundamental problems in war preparations, Imam Khomeini (r.a.) finally accepted the ceasefire before the determination of the aggressor; three points show the importance of determining an aggressor for the Islamic Republic of Iran: First, accepting ceasefire was like "Drinking a Cup of Poison" for Imam Khomeini (r.a.), Second, insistence on the determination of the aggressor even after taking the ceasefire; and Third, considering victory in the war by the realization of this goal (Mesbah, 2014: 182).

After the end of the war, the Islamic Republic forced the international community to implement paragraph 6 of Resolution 598 in any circumstances. Most of these efforts were through direct negotiations between the Iranian delegation to the United Nations and the United Nations on the release of American hostages in Lebanon. In the margins of these negotiations, Iran stated that the United Nations must do its part in determining the aggressor of the Iran-Iraq war (Zarif, 2013: 111).

Another example that shows a lack of priority given to conventional war targets goes back to the Imam's view of the loss of areas occupied by Iranian military forces. However, with the fall of Faaw, the situation of the Iraqi army forces improved significantly in terms of morale and initiative (Hashemi, 2011: 139). In response to the loss of Faaw and Shalamcheh, Imam said that "we should not pay much attention to the loss of Faaw and Shalamcheh" (Hashemi, 2011: 144).

6. The Basis of Identity and Its Role in Disputes
6.1. The Priority of Ontological Security
The identity basis in the Islamic Republic government is formed around the jurisprudential conception of the Shiite religion. Unlike the Pahlavi government, whose identity did not play a role in building disputes, the development of character and its protection during the Islamic Republic has played a role in the formation or continuation of disputes. This role can be found in the eight-year war with Iraq, and to a lesser extent, in the nuclear conflict. Clarification of this role is possible by demonstrating examples of the priority of ontological security over physical security, as well as the pressure of non-decision-making elites to participate in the dispute.

Pieces of evidence that show the prioritization of ontological security over physical security in sources of our research are scarce but illustrative. Imam Khomeini's statement that "War Is a Blessing for Us"

(Hashemi, 2008: 422) is the most obvious example of prioritizing ontological security over physical security. The second case is Ayatollah Khamenei's statement that "War Is not Always Bad," which was said during a meeting with the President of Guinea and the head of the Peace Conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and its secretary-general. The saying goes on: "A war initiated to prevent oppression and aggression is a great thing" (Hashemi, 2001: 70).

6.2. The Pressure of Non-Decision-Making Elites on Decision-Making Elites to Enter into Disputes

More evidences are showing the pressure of non-governmental elites to participate in the dispute. These pieces of evidence further illustrate how non-decision-making elites, such as volunteer warriors, the families of martyrs and veterans, Iraqi dissidents and the members of parliament, oppose any ceasefire or peace attempt or are even impatient to enter into Iraqi territory, and 'what they think in plans about ending the war?' (Mesbah, 2014: 172). Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hassan Rouhani, also mentions in his memoirs the existence of these pressures in the war and the influence of these pressures on decision-makers (Rouhani, 2011: 55).

For instance, Hashemi, in his notes in late April 1982, repeatedly announced the arrival of a mediating delegation from the Islamic Conference and its reaction to it. The announcement of the mediation of the Islamic Conference has upset some warriors and extremist forces. Many references make to express concern about the acceptance of the ceasefire. Mr. Ahmad says that Imam Khomeini's house is also under pressure (Hashemi, 2001: 56-57).

These pressures created by the marginalized institutions of the regime also put on someone like Hashemi Rafsanjani. "The officials of the cultural department of the Martyr's Foundation had received a message from the martyrs' families that the ceasefire is to trample the blood of their loved ones and the blood money of the martyrs is ruling the religion of Islam in Iraq" (Hashemi, 2001: 65). Eventually, the mediation was concluded with the proposal of a gradual withdrawal of Iraq and with Hashemi's writing. That "The high expectations of the people, especially the warriors, are such that they ridicule such proposals and believe that immediate and conditional withdrawal is insufficient and criticize the war officials" (Hashemi, 2001: 67).

The rise of non-decision-making elites even caused the least opposition to the war. In early 1985, when the UN Secretary-General arrived in Iran, Mehdi Bazargan wrote a letter to him opposing the war. Following this letter, academics and students marched in support of the

war from the University of Tehran to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, urging the UN Secretary-General not to pay attention to Bazargan's letter stating that the war was over (Hashemi, 2008: 77).

Concerns about overall and popular reactions to the ceasefire have even hampered Japan's grateful resolution on Iran at the United Nations. In the decision, Japan thanked Iran for not attacking Iraqi cities and called for maintaining security in the Strait of Hormuz and for not using chemical weapons in the future. Imam Khomeini (r.a.) opposed this argument, stating that the resolution "created a negative effect on the morale of the people" (Hashemi, 2006: 386 and 311).

The pressure of non-decision-making elites to take part in the dispute in 1982 also led to oppositions on delay in military operations. Both Iraqi allies protested in front of the parliament against the non-entry of Iranian military forces into Iraqi territory. Also, the volunteer fighting volunteer forces were dissatisfied because of the delay in the operation (Hashemi, 2001: 176).

7. Seeking Dignity

As the third most important component of self-esteem, honor represents the identification and restoration of credibility in the following, each of these two dimensions of dignity discussed.

7.1. Identifying

There are two notable and noteworthy points about "Identification" during the rule of the Islamic Republic. First, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, by adopting the principle of separation, has used both possible processes to determine the identification. Second, the Islamic Republic shares these identities by entering the circle of advanced units to be identified.

In the following, the indirect facilitation of the Iraq war formation and continuation with the Islamic Republic of Iran is rooted in efforts to identify through the process of criticism-deviation-integration, which will be briefly examined and, of course, separately from this process. To this end, Imam Khomeini's literature and discourse used to identify cases of criticism, deviation from those cases, as well as his guidelines for integration, and also limited evidence of instances of integration provide from Mr. Hashemi's notes. Finally, the evidence of indirect facilitation in the formation and continuation of the Iraq war with the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded from these cases.

7.2. Criticism-Deviation-Assimilation

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Analytically, in relation to the West and the superpowers, it can be said that the identity of the Islamic Republic must have been formed by criticizing the Islamic Republic from the integrity of the West and the communist bloc. In Imam Khomeini's words, this stage of identification can be criticized by firstly criticizing the totality of the superpowers; secondly, his criticism of concepts such as freedom, human rights, democracy, development, secularism, and international organizations, and thirdly, his critique.

He found governments following the powers that be Evidences of Imam Khomeini's general criticism of the superpowers are as the following: Imam Khomeini's belief in America's crimes and oppressions (Khomeini, 2006: 171), reminding the dangers of the United States and International Communism for the world and the region in the second anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution (Khomeini, 2006: 77-76), mentioning Islam's opposition to capitalism and communism (Khomeini, 2006: 302) and the introduction of great powers as the source of the world's convulsions (Khomeini, 2006: 240) and the source of of the world corruptions (Khomeini, 2006: 238), believing that the path of progress of the superpowers goes through entering fear in the hearts of others (Khomeini, 2006: 301), the perception of the Iranian revolution as a revolution not against the Shah, but against the superpowers (Khomeini, 2006: 466). Also, in various cases, it introduces the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as equals and without preference to each other (Khomeini, 2006: 35and 340-339).

On the other hand, the shreds of evidence for Imam Khomeini's criticism of Western concepts such as freedom, human rights, democracy, development, secularism, and international organizations are as follows: Perception of Western freedom as corruption (Khomeini, 2006: 19), questioning the concept of human rights (Khomeini, 2006: 89), the lack of democracy in the West and the impracticality of its implementation in the world (Khomeini, 2006: 89), perception of progress in the West as a move towards "Savagery" and "Predation" of man (Khomeini, 2006: 99-100), perception of secularism as a trick (Khomeini, 2006: 14-15), the dependence of international organizations on the great powers (Khomeini, 2006: 476, 48), and the inhumane feature of the power of veto (Khomeini, 2006: 431).

The stage of deviation from the identity of the West can be witnessed in Imam Khomeini's advice to Muslims in factors such as: self-return (Khomeini, 2006: 392), lack of intellectual dependence (Khomeini, 2006: 229), not allowing the superpowers to interfere (Khomeini, 2006: 113-

114), establishment of unity (Khomeini, 2006: 391-390, 250, 485, 392), and finally aggressive action (Khomeini, 2006: 302, 305, 485, 340, 369).

Pieces of evidence in the integration phase are the need to set the Iranian revolution as a model for other Muslims and the oppressed, as well as the Islamic Republic's financial assistance to governments and freedom-seeking movements. Integration through modeling the Iranian revolution is done in three ways: its explicit policy, its generalization to the whole world, and its comparison to early Islam.

Examples of setting Iran revolution as model clearly is the need for Muslims to "Follow" Iran (Khomeini, 2006: 339), Islamic Movement of Iran as "Role Model" for all the oppressed (Khomeini, 2006: 499), introducing Iran as the "Origin and the First Point and Pattern" for all the "Oppressed" nations (Khomeini, 2006: 292) nations not pinning hope on Iran (Khomeini, 2006: 507).

The examples of not allocating the revolution to Iran solely is introducing the "Iranian Movement" as "The Movement of the Oppressed Against the Arrogant" (Khomeini, 2006: 532), introducing purely Islamic and not national goals for Iran (Khomeini, 2006: 198-197), Introducing Iran as the country of "All Islamic Lands" (Khomeini, 2006: 485) and pointing out that the "Iranian Movement" before being Iranian is the "Movement of the Oppressed Around the World" (Khomeini, 2006: 110).

This multi-faceted criticism, deviation, and integration of Iran have influenced the formation and continuation of the Iraq-Iran war. First, criticizing the governments following the great powers, along with recognizing the opposition groups and the providing spiritual and financial assistance to them, was considered a threat by these governments and, of course, in this situation, their support for Iraq created a kind of balance of power.

Second, the deviation from the essential identity of the superpowers by adopting active and aggressive activism against them, whose leading example was the capture of the US Embassy in Tehran and giving help to Afghan warriors, led these two superpowers and their allies to a kind of apparent neutrality to the war and then impartiality to Iraq. This evident neutrality and then impartiality, along with the official sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic on the issue of hostage-taking, led to an imbalance in attracting the resources needed for the war (Mesbah, 2014: 188).

Third, the material costs of integration also upset the balance of resources needed in the war. Although the last two cases eventually limited the Islamic Republic so severely that it has forced to accept the

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ceasefire. But lack of attention to the war material requirements and the need to identify through the process of criticism-deviation-integration instead shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran was seeking dignity in the process of the war. Fourth, the nature of such identification required a dispute to reproduce the stages of criticism, deviation, and integration.

7.3. Restoration of Credibility

Regarding the restoration of credibility during the rule of the Islamic Republic, two examples of the war with Iraq and the nuclear issue can be mentioned. The Iran-Iraq war and its efforts to restore its credibility can be part of the process of insult-anger-revenge. On the other hand, the formation of the nuclear dispute is part of the process of shame-reparation through the restoration of credibility, which cannot be explored fully in this article.

7.3.1. Restoring Credibility During the War With Iraq: The Process of Insult-Anger-Revenge

In the Iran-Iraq war, there are cases of decisions by the Islamic Republic that are consistent with the process of restoring the credibility raised by the feeling of insult. In terms of form, these decisions of the Islamic Republic are reactionary and short-term. In terms of essence, they are from an activist that hierarchically the Islamic Republic regards as inferior, and epistemologically, we can see the components of anger in action, or better to say the reaction of the Islamic Republic.

The emphasis of this section is on showing the impact of the insult-anger-revenge process on anger and its components, namely the quick reaction and misinterpretation of the documents. Cases of insults, which often stemmed from being hurt from the inferior activist, are shown in Hashemi's notes with the word "Evil." Here is just one example: "Staggering has been a major cause in the failure of some of the previous operations, and as people see Iraqi atrocities in the cities daily, there is a great need for a successful operation on the fronts and staggering can cause problems" (Hashemi, 2008: 53).

The following are indications of the to-the-time response of politicians and the opposition groups forced by the military, and some of the results of to-the-time response. These cases are about the less attention of war decision-makers to the requirements, facilities, human resources needed for the war, and instead are focused on speeding up operations.

In the summer of 1981, meetings of the Supreme Council of Defense held on a major operation. In these meetings, the military spoke about the lack of time and facilities and called for the right time and facilities to achieve the desired results. Politicians' pressure, in some cases, led to the

military's disengagement. Still, the operation was eventually held in mid-September, and most casualties happened on the fronts where the army's ground force was opposed to maintain the transaction.

In the late winter of 1981, Hashemi wrote about how to operate without wasting time and with facilities lack. His article points to "Strong Hope" despite a lack of workforce, meaning that weapons and ammunitions need time and money, and the country's political and financial condition does not allow for the supply. Regional and international pressures will not allow much patience, and they may take away our opportunity. The morale of our forces is secure, and the confidence of the enemy is weak. This fact, along with the need to upset the enemy's balance, requires us to use the opportunity faster and better (Hashemi, 1999: 486).

In any case, there are cases on this point that indicate ignorance or distortion, meaning that not lagging and quick reaction and unrestrained movement is before providing the requirements of the workforce in war. For example, Hashemi wrote in his notes in 1987: "If one million volunteer warrior goes to the front every year, we can organize four significant attacks in one year" (Hashemi, 2010: 249-248).

There are also cases in which holding operation explicitly define as revenge for an insult. For example, a process was successfully carried out in March 1985 in Iran, which Hashemi in the parliament called "revenge for the crash of our plane and mass martyrdom of members of parliament and the judiciary, etc., and introduce as our reaction to the weak resolution of the Security Council". "It was decided to name the operation Valfajr and hold it with the aim of revenge for the evil atrocities of the Ba'athists in Iraq"(Hashemi, 2008: 431-430).

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic of Iran's disputes has been Iraq's eight-year war with Iran, as well as the conflicts on the nature of the nuclear program with the West. The end of the dispute with Iraq resulted in the resolve of these international disputes. Efforts to resolve this dispute began at the beginning of the war, but after eight years, the Islamic Republic of Iran finally adopted Resolution 598 by the Security Council.

The mediation efforts of regional and international political units over the past eight years to establish a ceasefire have always been a reminder of the original goal of the Islamic Republic's dispute that ceases fire must be operated after determining and punishing the aggressor. During the

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eight years of the war, the Islamic Republic of Iran repeatedly turned away from the common goals of such a dispute and limited its means of warfare to seek dignity, reduced the purpose of the discussion for the determination of the aggressor, and relatively opposed civil war with honor.

The identity of the Islamic Republic also played a significant role in the continuation of the dispute by prioritizing ontological security over physical security, as well as the efforts of non-governmental elites to continue the discussion. Attempts to determine identity after the revolution through the process of criticism-deviation-integration laid the ground for Iraq to invade its territory with a positive and ready mindset for regional and international political units, and also created obstacles to obtain the necessary resources for the continuation of the war. On the other hand, at sections in this dispute, it sought self-esteem by engaging in the process of insult-anger-revenge. In short, the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran's defense policy in recent years has shown how it seeks to honor and dignity in this dispute.

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