

## **Evaluating the Amount of Consensus and Prioritizing the Components of the Soft War Officers Role in Advancing the Goals of the Revolution's Second Phase**

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### **Abstract**

The soft war to weaken the intellectual and cultural circles ruling the society and the instability of the socio-political system has a broad scope against Iran, and the role of the soft war officers is essential. Accordingly, with the descriptive-analytical method and qualitative approach, the present study has a development-applied aim to formulate the soft war officers' position in advancing the goals of the revolution's second phase. The study's statistical population includes experts and thinkers in the Islamic Revolution, and the sample size has been done through purposeful sampling (judgmental). Based on interviews with the elites, there are 31 components to the soft warfare officers' role in advancing the goals of the revolution's second phase. The most common consensus is acceptance of the Vilayat and defence of it (2 scores), formulation of budget deficit strategies (1.98 scores), establishing a think tank to formulate an operational plan of the "We Can" discourse in society (1.97 scores), demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption (1.96 scores), demanding from officials regarding justice spread (1.95 scores), formulation of strategies for improving people's livelihoods, increasing the value of the national currency and improving the purchasing power of the people (1.94 scores).

**Keywords:** Soft War, Soft War Officers, Revolution's Second Phase, Consensus, Priority.

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## Introduction

Today, simultaneously with the world becoming smaller and more complex, the increasing growth of mass media such as the Internet and satellite. New equations have replaced the old equations regulating relations between countries. Instead of using force directly, the powers focused on using soft power and changing peacefully by using new methods of interfering in countries' internal affairs. In addition, in this era, the media is used as an essential tool to implement the policies of authoritarian powers, and global competition has emerged in the media battle.

Soft warfare plays an essential role in weakening societies' intellectual and cultural circles to capture the nation's thoughts and ideas (Mah Pishaniyan, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 4).

In other words, in the age of information and communication technology, countries with more tools share and power in using data better achieve their internal and external goals. The United States and the West, by having communication-information facilities, take action to destroy and marginalise their cultural-civilizational rivals in the world (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 151).

Today, soft war is one of the most dangerous, critical, efficient, and least costly battles against Islamic countries' values, culture, and national security (Naeni, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 149). In this regard, global arrogance, led by the United States, have sought to overthrow the regime since the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. After their disappointment with the brutal overthrow, they have changed their approach to soft war (Habibi and Sabouri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 31).

The Islamic Republic faced cultural invasion from the second decade of the Islamic Revolution and after experiencing combat, assassination and boycott of enemies. Gradually, this cultural invasion became a cultural ambush and a soft threat. The main goal of this war was to delegitimise the Islamic system based on the centrality of Velayat-e Faqih in the social space (Bigdelou, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 126).

Soft warfare, targeting culture and ideology, focuses on the intellectual deviation of society and seeks to create intellectual passivity and then passivity. It will weaken the support and cooperation of the people as the most crucial source of the system power and the direct support of the political system based on religious democracy. As a result, the enemies provide a suitable ground for implementing their policies (Bigdelou, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 92).

In soft warfare, using its superior cultural, civilisational, scientific and technical aspects, it tries to influence the enemy's thoughts and change his behaviour. Using modern communication tools (such as satellite, Internet, etc.) and sophisticated psychological and sociological techniques, emphasising the strengths of its soft power elements and the weaknesses of the enemy's soft power elements, disarm it intellectually and changes his political, social and cultural behaviour in his favour. As

a result, it peacefully puts its desired political current or political system in place to secure its maximum interests (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 51).

Also, the phenomenon of soft war in the form of creating economic unrest, shaping dissatisfaction in society, establishing large-scale non-governmental organisations, media war, psychological operations to make the administrative and executive apparatus of the government ineffective, weakening Iran's sovereignty appear through civilisational methods and creating cultural NATO (Maleki and Hatami, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 70).

Therefore, the need for protection against soft war is felt by presenting a comprehensive model and instructions (Hatami et al., 2013 AD/1392 SH: 85). On the other hand, the Supreme Leader has proposed a comprehensive doctrine confronting the enemy's soft war. In such a way, students have been introduced as officers and university professors as commanders of the enemy's soft war front (Labaf, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 104).

In the meantime, they have a particular emphasis on the position of soft war officers. Soft warfare officers play a significant role in countering the enemy's soft warfare by forming jihadist, intellectual, and cultural nuclei throughout the country.

Today, the dimensions of soft warfare have become broader and more complex than before in a way that includes various cultural, social, economic, etc., sizes.

Therefore, recognising the central strategies of soft war is necessary. It consists of accepting the existence of soft war, enemyology, avoiding internal differences and maintaining unity and cohesion, setting up free-thinking seats, increasing insight as a compass against soft war, cultural engineering, boosting self-confidence, self-confidence and strengthening social capital.

We should not neglect the ruling force's training and principles, i.e., commanders, officers, and soft war experts, so that the commanders and officers of soft war are revolutionary and creative managers who, while maintaining readiness to protect and promote religious culture, are always defending culture and scientific jihad. They, with Basiji thinking, are pattern and model-making in society (Soleimani and Maleki, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 85).

Accordingly, the present study aimed to identify the role of soft warfare officers in countering it.

## **1. Theoretical Foundation**

### **1.1. Multidimensional Conceptual Soft Warfare**

The foundation of soft warfare was first proposed scientifically by Joseph Nye. He defines soft power as the ability to shape preferences. He believes hard power is for coercion and soft power is for attraction and persuasion (Soleimani and Ahmadi, 2019 AD/1398 SH). He believes that: "Soft power is the ability to achieve what we want to attract rather


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than coercion." According to him, soft power is equivalent to the indirect way of achieving the desired results without tangible threats or rewards (Shamoli et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 150).

According to Nye, soft power is the ability to absorb, which leads to satisfaction. Soft war is a war of ideas. Regarding some experts such as Goldstein and Keohane, ideas are considered one of the guides of actors' strategic behaviour. According to them, ideas in conditions of uncertainty as one of the characteristics of the current strategic environment led actors to strategies carrying out the goals and achieving their interests. Thoughts can draw roadmaps for achieving utility for actors (Jalalpour et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 132). The material of soft war is neither force nor money, but investing in people's mentality and creating attractiveness to create shared values (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 155).

According to Sanders, soft warfare is a kind of cold war that ultimately leads to cultural transformation. From Fazio's point of view, soft warfare is a deliberate attempt to influence governments, groups, and peoples of different countries through propaganda, media, political, and psychological tools and methods to change attitudes, values and behaviours (Rezaei and Tajeri Nasab, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 37).

John Collins, a theorist at the American National War University, defines soft warfare as follows: "The designed use of propaganda and related tools to infiltrate the enemy's intellectual coordinates by methods that improve the national security goals of the executor" (Collins, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 487). Figure 1 shows the forms of soft warfare.



Source: Author's drawing with deformation by Jafarzadeh et al., 1393: 168.

In soft warfare, instead of explicitly and heavily investing in culture, the actor activates side areas such as economics, law, politics, trade, etc., and in this way, slowly enters his norms in the community (Eftekhari, 2012 AD/1391 SH; Khatibi, 1394: 74). Soft power refers to those capabilities of a country that indirectly affect the interests, behaviour, or

existence of other countries by using tools such as culture, ideals, or moral values (Maleki and Hatami, 2013 AD/1392 SH).

According to Supreme Leader, "What is now called the soft war in the world is that the enemy comes to the spiritual strongholds to destroy them. The enemy seeks the beliefs, knowledge, determination, foundations and pillars of a system or country to destroy them and turn their strengths into weaknesses in their propaganda. They try to turn the opportunities of a system into a threat" (Quoted by Soleimani and Maleki, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 65).

The most important statements of the Supreme Leader regarding soft war are: "War is the will and determination, policies and tactics; soft war means creating doubt in the hearts and minds of the people; it is warfare by today's advanced cultural tools and war by influence, lies and gossip. Soft war is the invasion of religious, ideological and cultural boundaries. It is a war to disappoint people from the struggle" (Eyvazi et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 30). In soft warfare, at least in the early stages of the war, there is no physical or brutal conflict. Soft war is a kind of cultural war. The tools of this war are cultural, intellectual, and behavioural and not military. Enemies in soft war seek to conquer the beliefs and values. The main goal of soft war is to capture hearts and brains; in this case, they have turned the opposite front into their front (Sharifi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 26).

It is best reflected in Sun Tzu's remarks in "The Art of War" book: "You can fight, but the most important thing is that you win a battle without a war." (Purkaveh Dehkordi and Salavatiyan, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 121)


According to Jane Sharp, director of the Albert Einstein Institute, soft warfare is an option used instead of complex, armed warfare to confront governments. In soft warfare, action must bring about social and political change. The most critical issue in the transition from idea to measure is choosing the appropriate mechanism or process to influence the attitudes and behaviours of rulers and people (Seif and Khojasteh, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 8). Soft warfare is a set of actions that seek to change people's cultural identity and behavioural patterns in any political system and seek a kind of domination in various dimensions (Amiri, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 22).

Thus, soft warfare consists of any psychological action and propaganda that, without military conflict and war, leaves the target group inactive and, by weakening its intellectual and cultural circles, seeks to destroy thought and the thinking of the target society and finally, the injection of instability and in the political and social system (Bigdelou, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 82).

In other words, soft war is a set of deliberate cultural, political and social measures and actions of countries that target the views, attitudes, motivations and values of the target audience, including governments, government affects foreign groups, groups and people. It causes a change

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in their individual and social character, behaviour, and actions (Elyasi, 2008 AD/1387 SH). In addition, Figure 2 lists the essential features of soft warfare.



**Figure (2): The essential features of soft warfare**

**Source: Author's drawing with transformation by Ghazizadeh, 1390; Zabetpour and Qorbi, 1391:14.**

Soft war has been the strategy of the dominating countries to destroy the beliefs, values and virtues of a nation. Contrary to the Cold War, it goes without the need for mobilisation and the provision of troops and soldiers to achieve its goal. To achieve this, the people of the target country use changing things, values and culture (Shahin, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 46). Soft warfare includes any psychological action and media propaganda that targets the questioned community or group and forces the opponent to passivity or defeat without military conflict and opening fire (Eyvazi et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 26). The main tools of this war are soft power, especially the power of persuasion and accompaniment of public opinion. It mainly tries to use modern communication tools, computer warfare, internet warfare, soft subversion, launching of radio and television networks, networking (Gandomgoon and Ganje, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 2) and psychological knowledge to create doubts in intellectual, ideological and cultural identities. The action scope of this thoughts war is the thoughts, ideas, social and cultural customs, feelings, inclinations, behaviours and intellectual characteristics, beliefs, values, interests and tendencies of the target community that the attacker plans to occupy. Finally, capturing the thoughts, minds and hearts of the target

country people occurs a change in structures (Khalili Dehdezi; Kiyani Ghale Sardi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 1). Soft warfare engineered the message. In other words, by producing and distributing honest news (white letters) that have the most negligible impact on public thoughts, behaviours and beliefs, they prepare a beautiful and deceptive platform for publishing and transmitting black messages. These messages are produced, disseminated and distributed, for a destructive effect. In this tricky process, the enemy makes the most of black literature and black (false) or grey messages (a combination of true and false statements) in the direction of its sinister goals (Ameri, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 43).





Figure (3): Soft War Message Engineering  
Source: Ameri, 1395: 45.

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This war is not inside the fronts but the hous hearts and decision-making complexes. Therefore, the primary basis of soft war is based on a cultural and intellectual campaign and the context of culture as the cornerstone of any society or regarding the Supreme Leader, "The Soul of the Body of Society." It is also known as the systematised face of aggression and cultural ambush, which focuses on creating internal disruption and influencing the actors, structures, beliefs, and epistemological systems of Islamic society to weaken and eliminate the steely will of the nation. In this way, it attacks the faith, insight, morality and piety of the people and spreads various dangerous spiritual viruses (Jazayeri, 2011 AD/1390 SH; Sobhanifar, 2020 AD/1400 SH). To achieve this focuses on multiple components of problem-making and inducing despair and hopelessness, sowing the seeds of doubt and misunderstanding, creating doubt in the hearts and minds of people, highlighting internal and external differences, promoting corruption, the humiliation of the achievements of the Iranian system and capabilities, inducing inefficiency and instability in various fields and arenas to attract elites and disappoint them and replace Western culture, standards and values (Jazayeri, 2011 AD/1390 SH). In addition, Figure 4 reflects the goals of soft warfare.





**Figure (4): Soft warfare targets**  
**Source: Writers' Drawing, 1400.**

Soft war has various economic, social, political and cultural dimensions and is very complex. Because it is the product of the elite mental processing and its measurement and diagnosis, regarding its non-objective and intangible nature, has many complexities (Rezaei and Tajeri Nasab, 2013 AD/1399 SH: 37). Soft warfare is a set of psychological and propaganda actions of the media invading the beliefs, values and beliefs of the people, which seeks a fundamental change in the cultural identity and behavioural patterns accepted by a political system. they seek a kind of domination in the three dimensions of government, economy and culture (Shamoli et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 150). With the advent of new technologies and communication sciences, the source of mass media and various new media, soft warfare has become more complex and widespread and has taken on different dimensions mentioned in the table.

**Table 1: Dimensions of soft warfare**

Dimension	Concept
Cultural	<p>It is considered the most crucial dimension of soft war, and cultural invasion is regarded as the prelude to quiet war.</p> <p>Because the perpetrators of soft war seek it through the mechanisms and methods of culture on the fundamental values of society (including God-centeredness, Vilayat-oriented, anti-enemy, justice-seeking, self-belief, etc.) and basic attitudes (such as attitudes toward foreigners, attitudes toward the type of government, attitudes toward the kind of social relations) have a devastating effect.</p>
Political	<p>In this dimension, the goal of the perpetrators of soft war is to manipulate the attitude, stance and action of the citizens of society against the government and its political institutions to incite them to protest movements such as marches, demonstrations, strikes and so on. In other words, to lead the citizens of the society to the opposition to gradually change the government's behaviour or even the type of government, and finally, challenge the legitimacy, acceptability and efficiency of the existing political model.</p>
Social	<p>One of the most critical components of the social dimension of soft warfare is the social actions of relationships and interactions, customs and collective behaviours. The goal of the</p>

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	perpetrators of soft war is a profound and destructive effect on the identity of the people of the society, social cohesion, national spirit, social capital, behavioural patterns and national attachment.
Economic al	In this regard, they use economic tools such as sanctions, confiscation of property, severing trade and non-trade relations, and severing monetary transactions by the planners of soft war and their allies to pressure the country.

Source: Lotfiyan Karim et al., 1400

### 1.2. Soft Warfare Officers

In his orders, the Supreme Leader referred to students as young officers in soft warfare and university professors and researchers as commanders and designers in fighting the enemies' soft war. He explicitly confirmed in the statements dated 1388/06/08:

"If in the social issues, political issues, country issues, things that need open-mindedness, our young student is a young officer, you who are his teacher, you are a higher rank of a young officer. You are a commander who has to look at the big issues." Among these, the critical role of professors is to enlighten them for students and transfer the appropriate perception of the current situation to their students (Shariati, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 2). Also, by training elites and advanced indigenous forces, playing the role of a civil institution and promoting the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, they can produce soft power for the country (Zabetpour and Ghorbi, 2011 AD/1390 SH). Soft warfare officers are young people who have the excitement of the youth and spend more time with mass media, satellite, Internet, computer games and entertainment such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, etc. (Mohammadi Najm, 2009 AD/1388 SH). The duties of soft warfare officers are significant for two reasons:

1) Global conditions in the age of the invasion of communications and information, the formation of a global village and community and economic inequalities and political inequalities;

2) The current situation of Iranian society as an influential political and cultural power in the West Asian region (Khatibi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 70).

Therefore, the role of soft warfare officers in the revolution second phase is vital, and they must act as determined, alert, motivated, hopeful, hard-working, thoughtful, brave and self-sacrificing human beings. From the Supreme Leader's point of view, if the officer would be bold, rational, kind, faithful, hopeful, determined and motivated, he can create a solid and inviolable barrier against the enemy's strategies in soft warfare. The analysis of the content of the Supreme Leader's words indicates that the

officers of the soft war should prevent the realisation of the enemy's goals in several main areas (Table 2).

**Table (2): Duties of soft war officers**

Component	Explanation
Reduce potential damage	Students' and professors' degrees of awakening and vigilance are directly related to the damage that enemies may inflict. In case of negligence, becoming emotional, acting recklessly and staying asleep, the wear and cost of the enemy's actions will increase.
Protection of scientific progress as an essential pillar of national security	In small and insignificant political cases, the university's atmosphere and the university's scientific work should not be affected, and the closure, convulsions and various disorders in the university should be prevented. In fact, by protecting the dynamism of the country's laboratories, classrooms and research centres, care must be taken to maintain the scientific movement of universities. Because in the long run, the enemy seeks to reduce the country's scientific potential and thus weaken its security.
Keep the university atmosphere calm and rational.	In cultural, political and security wars, the enemy's movements are not visible. Therefore, students and professors should be conscientious not to be the enemy in the puzzle of one hundred or two hundred pieces in their movement, stances, and comments. Because the enemy for perfection seeks to issue his word by academics.
Cultural work at the university	Artistic work at the university is an original and extracurricular work that focuses on acquainting minds with the culture of the revolution and the culture of Islam.
Avoid creating parallel lines.	Creating parallel lines means making a competitor for Basij. Prevention must be strictly avoided as this will cause soft warfare officers to neglect their primary objectives.
Increasing insight	Today, the most crucial task of the enemy is to anxiety in the country's political space through loud propaganda and its modern and highly advanced methods. In a way that with propaganda methods, creating controversy, by sending a lot of untrue words, they try to change and influence the atmosphere of societies. Soft warfare officers must discern the truth themselves, have insight into their surroundings, and make matters clear to the public.
Increasing religious knowledge	Through their familiarity with the Qur'an, the officers of the soft war, with the writings of the Martyr Motahari, and the great scholars of the seminaries in the present age must raise the amount of their knowledge.
Religious education method	The officer of soft war in the Islamic Republic of Iran relies on religiosity, innocence, purity and avoidance of instincts extremes. The structure of the identity and personality of the young Islamic is formed of loyalty, hope, cheerfulness, activism and initiative.
Declaration of the revolutionary position	Student organisations must have a physical, intellectual, and expressive presence in the country's main issues as both the friends and the enemies of the revolution should know the positions of the organisations on the critical issues of the country.
Decisiveness against encroachment, aggression and undermining national independence	Masters as commanders of soft warfare must, by their behaviour, statements, expression of opinion in various fields, method and character, the spirit of decisiveness against encroachment, aggression and undermining national independence in the young educated generation of the country, induce and inject and create. As successful commanders are ahead of the common element on the battlefield and the front lines, so must the master be present in the middle of this deep, vital, and sacred battle - what we call "Soft Warfare," which is a holy defence.

**Source: Writers' Studies Based on Content Analysis of the Supreme Leader's Statements, 1400.**

## 2. Research Method

The present study used the descriptive-analytical method with the development-application aim. The research approach is qualitative and uses the elites' opinions. Documentary-library and experimental methods have been used to collect research data. The consensus and priority index model has been used to analyse the data and information collected. There is no solid and explicit law on selecting and the number of specialists. Their number depends on the factors of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the sample, purpose or extent of the problem, quality of decision, the ability of the research team in study, internal and external validity, time gathering available data and resources is the scope of the problem and the

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acceptance of the answer. The number of participants is usually less than 50 people and most often 15 to 20 people, and inhomogeneous groups, it is usually 10 to 15 people. Therefore, the statistical sample size using the available sampling method, from 20 experts with non-random method of purposive sampling, includes university professors, researchers and experts related to the subject. The sample size includes faculty members, doctoral students, experts and research managers related to soft war and the second phase of the revolution. Criteria for selecting the sample size consists of the number of internal scientific-research articles associated with the soft war and the revolution second phase, the number of approved research or scientific projects conducted with the relevant field, the number of books (authored or translated) or review articles related to the appropriate area and resume with related institutions to the second phase of the revolution. To evaluate the internal consistency of the questionnaire questions, using the technique of measuring the reliability of Cronbach's alpha coefficient, which according to the value of this coefficient ( $\alpha = 9.0$ ), the reliability of the questionnaire was confirmed. In the following, explain the method of consensus and priority model.

### 2.1. How to Calculate the Consensus Index (Agreement)

This indicator confirms the agreement of experts and thinkers on the components and indicators in question. To achieve this consensus was designed the following five options were. Completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, intermediate opinion. After collecting the data at this stage, the consensus index is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Number of replies to option A} \times 2 + \text{Number of responses to option B} \times 1 + \text{Number of responses to option C} \times (-1) + \text{Number of responses to option D} \times (-2) + \text{Number of responses to option E}$$


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The total number of answers to options A to E

The proximity of the consensus index to zero indicates the votes dispersal to measure the desired dimension. The distance of the consensus index value from zero indicates the agreement on the subject. In this study, the value of the consensus index is shown on the vector "from +2 to -2" to determine the degree of consensus of experts fully.

### 2.2. How to Calculate the Priority Index

This index was used to prioritise each of the components and indicators of the model. At this stage, Delphi participating members were consulted to prioritise the elements and hands of the model by selecting one of the options, "High Priority, Medium Priority, Low priority." The priority index is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Number of responses to high priority option} \times 100 + \text{Number of responses to medium priority option} \times 50 + \text{Number of responses to low priority option} \times 25$$


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Total number of replies

The proximity of the "Priority Index" to 100 indicates a higher priority of these topics. The tendency of the index score to zero means lower stress of the issues considered by experts.

### **3. The Role of Soft War Officers in Advancing the Goals of the Revolution Second Phase**

The results of the interviews with the elites indicate the most crucial role of soft war officers in advancing the goals of the revolution second phase:

“Establishing a think tank to confront economic issues; establishing a think tank to produce soft power in the Islamic education; demanding from the authorities regarding the rejuvenation of the government; forming a think tank to organize cyberspace; developing soft war indicators; developing strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increase the value of the national currency, improve people's purchasing power; demanding from the authorities regarding justice; holding free-thinking chairs; developing creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities; Vilayat-accepting and defence of Vilayat; trying to recognize national identity and increase self-confidence; demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption; improving the business environment and the banking system; developing strategies to curb rising inflation in the country; establishing a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society; establishing a think tanks in universities with a focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism; developing budget deficit strategies; observing the promises of the officials and demanding from them; developing indicators of public trust; developing indicators of popular lifestyle, unassuming behaviour, avoiding aristocracy for the officials of the system; strengthen faith and unity; the relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution; introducing the characters of the first Tsar of the Islamic Awakening to the younger generation; creating a software movement; increasing the power of foreign media analysis; clarifying and removal of doubts; forming a young student organizations; gaining awareness and insight; promoting hope and optimism for the future in Islamic society; originalizing the study of science on cross-cutting political activities and finally confronting the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy”. Table 3 shows the elite consensus on the soft warfare officers' components in advancing the revolution's second-phase goals.

The results of the interview with the elite about the highest consensus are as follows:

“Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat (2 scores), the development of budget deficit strategies (1.98 scores), the formation of a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society (1.97 scores), demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption (1.96 scores), demanding from officials regarding expanding

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justice (1.95 scores), formulating strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increasing the value of the national currency, improving purchasing power people (1.94 scores), the establishment of a think tank confronting economic issues (1.93 scores), formulation of strategies to curb increasing inflation in the country (1.92 scores), promotion of hope and optimism for the future in the Islamic society (1.89 scores) ), face the intrigues and conspiracies of the enemy (1.88 scores), improve the business environment and the banking system (1.86 scores), development of indicators of popular lifestyle, unassuming behaviour, avoidance of aristocracy for the officials of the system (1.85 scores), development of people's trust indicators (1.82 scores), strengthening of faith and unity (1.81 scores), creating a software movement (1.76 scores), formulating creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities (1.75 scores), holding free-thinking chairs (1.74 scores), demanding from the officials regarding the rejuvenation of the government (1.72 scores), monitoring the promises of the officials and demanding from them (1.69 scores), trying to recognize the national identity and increase self-confidence (1.68 scores), the establishment of think tanks in universities with the focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism (1.67 scores), increasing the power of foreign media analysis (1.62 scores), clarification and removal of doubts (1.57 scores), the relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution (1.52 scores), the introduction of the first tsar characters of the Islamic Awakening for the younger generation (1.43 scores), establishment of a think tank to produce soft power in the Islamic education (1.32 scores), development of soft war indicators (1.30 scores), formation of young student organizations (1.28 scores), formation a think tank for organizing cyberspace (1.25 scores), gaining knowledge and insight (1.25 scores) and authenticating the study of science on cross-sectional political activities (1.22 scores)".

**Table (3): The amount of elite consensus on the components of the soft warfare officers' role in advancing the goals of the revolution second phase**

Row	Component	Consensus
1	Establish a think tank to deal with economic issues	1.93
2	Establishment of a think tank to produce soft power in the field of Islamic education	1.32
3	Demanding from officials regarding government rejuvenation	1.72
4	Forming a think tank to organise cyberspace	1.25
5	Compilation of soft war indicators	1.30
6	Demanding justice from the authorities	1.95
7	Holding free-thinking seats	1.74
8	Develop creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities	1.75
9	Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat	2
10	Trying to recognise national identity and increase self-confidence	1.68
11	Strengthen faith and unity	1.81
12	The relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution	1.52
13	Introducing the characters of the first tsar of the Islamic	1.43
14	Awakening for the younger generation	1.76

15	Create software movement	1.62
16	Increase the power of foreign media analysis	1.57
17	Clarify and dispel doubts	1.28
18	Formation of young student organisations	1.25
19	Gain awareness and insight	1.89
20	Promoting hope and optimism for the future in Islamic society	1.22
21	Originalization of science education on cross-sectional political activities	1.88
22	Faced right with the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy	1.85
23	Compilation of indicators of popular lifestyle, unruly behaviour, avoidance of aristocracy for the officials of the system	1.82
24	Develop indicators of people's trust	1.69
25	Observing the promises of the officials and demanding from them	1.98
26	Develop budget deficit strategies	1.67
27	Formation of think tanks in universities with the focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism	1.97
28	Establishment of a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society	1.92
29	Develop strategies to curb rising inflation in the country Improving the business environment and the banking system	1.86
30	Demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption	1.96
31	Develop strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increase the value of the national currency, improve people's purchasing power	1.94

Source: Authors' Calculations, 1400.

In addition, in Table 4, based on the results of interviews with the elite, the highest priority, respectively, are as follows:

“Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat (100), formulation of strategies to improve the livelihood of the people, increase the value of the national currency, improve the purchasing power of the people (100), demanding from officials for justice (100), facing the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy (100), demanding from the officials regarding the rejuvenation of the government (100), formulating strategies to control the growing inflation in the country (97.48) ), promoting hope and optimism for the future in the Islamic society (95.21), developing budget deficit strategies (94.12), demand from officials regarding anti-corruption (92.03), improving the business environment and the banking system (90.45), developing indicators of popular lifestyle, unpretentious behaviour, avoiding aristocracy for the officials of the system (88.10), forming a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society (85.71), establishing of a think tank confronting the economic issues (83.33), trying to recognize national identity and increase self-confidence (81.22), strengthening faith and unity (80/11), forming thinking room for organizing cyberspace (80.05), observing the promises of officials and demanding them (80.05), developing indicators of public trust (80.01), developing creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities (76.19), gaining knowledge and insight (76.19), compiling indicators of soft war (73.81), forming a think tank to produce soft power in the field of Islamic education (73.62), creating a software movement (72.15), clarification and elimination of doubts (71.13), increasing the power of foreign media analysis (71.02), forming think tanks in universities with a focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism (70.76), holding free-thinking seats (70.16), forming young

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student organizations (70.11), originalizing the study of science on cross-sectional political activities (67.86), the relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution (67.86) and introducing the characters of the first tsar of the Islamic Awakening to the younger generation (86.67)".

**Table (4): Prioritizing the components of the soft war officers' role in advancing the goals of the revolution second phase**

Row	Component	Priority
1	Establishing a think tank to deal with economic issues	83.33
2	Establishing a think tank to produce soft power in the field of Islamic education	73.62
3	Demanding from officials regarding government rejuvenation	100
4	Forming a think tank to organise cyberspace	80.05
5	Compilation of soft war indicators	73.81
6	Demanding justice from the authorities	100
7	Holding free-thinking seats	70.16
8	Developing creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities	76.19
9	Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat	100
10	Trying to recognise national identity and increase self-confidence	81.22
11	Strengthening faith and unity	80.11
12	The relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution	67.86
13	Introducing the characters of the first tsar of the Islamic Awakening for the younger generation	67.86
14	Creating software movement	72.15
15	Increasing the power of foreign media analysis	71.02
16	Clarifying and dispelling doubts	71.13
17	Formation of young student organisations	70.11
18	Gaining awareness and insight	76.19
19	Promoting hope and optimism for the future in Islamic society	95.21
20	Originalizing of science education on cross-sectional political activities	67.86
21	Facing right with the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy	100
22	Compilating of indicators of popular lifestyle, unruly behaviour, avoidance of aristocracy for the officials of the system	88.10
23	Developing indicators of people's trust	80.01
24	Observing the promises of the officials and demanding from them	80.05
25	Developing budget deficit strategies	94.12
26	Formating of think tanks in universities with the focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism	70.76
27	Establishing a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society	85.71
28	Developing strategies to curb rising inflation in the country	97.48
29	Improving the business environment and the banking system	90.45
30	Demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption	92.03
31	Developing strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increase the value of the national currency, improve people's purchasing power	100

**Source: Authors' calculations, 1400.**

### Conclusion

Soft warfare seeks territorial domination by managing public opinion and dominating the hearts of the elite and the masses. In this process, the enemy is not directly involved in occupying the land or destroying a country's critical facilities and points. Instead, it focuses on immaterial goals, namely, the thoughts and beliefs of the people and the destruction of spiritual strongholds, especially their faith and knowledge, because the occupation of the ideas and dedication of a nation is a prelude to the easy and lasting occupation of their land. Accordingly, soft warfare officers must neutralise the enemy's goals in soft warfare by accelerating the



scientific movement, progress and keeping alive the ideals and values of the revolution.

According to the research results, the highest consensus is related to indicators such as Vilayat-accepting, budget deficit, operationalisation of the "We Can" discourse, demands for anti-corruption and expanding justice, improving people's livelihoods, increasing the value of the national currency, improving the purchasing power of the people, curbing inflation, creating hope, recognising the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy, improving the business environment and the banking system, avoiding the aristocracy of the officials, building trust and strengthening the faith and unity of the people.

Their scores are between 2 to 1.80. The highest priority is given to components including Vilayat-accepting, people's livelihood, the value of the national currency, the purchasing power of the people, expanding justice, recognising the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy, rejuvenating the government, curbing inflation, promoting hope, deficit budget, anti-corruption, business environment and banking system. Their scores are between 100 and 90.

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