

Social or Political Revolution? The Pattern of Revolutionary Developments in Iran and Georgia

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Abstract

In 1979 and 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Georgia underwent revolutionary transformations. However, there are significant differences between the two revolutions, including ideology, the scope and extent of revolutionary developments, the nature of social forces and movements, the heart of the former and post-political regimes, and their new foreign policy direction. The country has been very influential in both domestic and foreign arenas. With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to investigate why the Iranian revolution in 1979 became social, whilst the Georgian revolution in 2003 was confined to the political realm. It appears that Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, in response to the Pahlavi period's quasi-modernism and inspired by cultural and identity components, resulted in the formation of a discourse known as self-return. It recognized that such a possibility could not be realized without changing political, social, economic, and cultural factors. But the colour revolution in Georgia, under the influence of components of historical memory resulting from the suppression of nationalist and independence-seeking tendencies, saw a change in the ruling political structure as sufficient to achieve this goal. The present study has used documentary (library) and the analytical-comparative method., this comparative study, to examine the above question and hypothesis, first takes a brief look at the background of the formation of the two revolutions and then examines their possible differences and similarities.

Keywords: Social Revolution, Political Revolution, Iran, Georgia, Pseudo-Modernism, Independence.

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Introduction

In the typology of revolutions, we mention two types of political and social revolutions. The commonality of both is changed, but the amount of these changes is different. The most crucial element influencing the extent of change is the role and importance of the ideology.

Ideology in social revolutions has three functions: criticizing the status quo, drawing the desired situation, determining how to achieve the desired position, and providing appropriate tools.

The Georgian revolution and other colour revolutions, included in the general category of political revolutions, are based on nationalism. Nationalism cannot be regarded as an ideology, like socialism, liberalism, or Islamism. The Georgian revolution took place when communist elites were still ruling the Soviet Union despite the collapse of the Soviet Union because of its exclusive situation for adversaries' power who were seeking to extend their ideological boundaries to the place of Soviet heritage.

But the social revolution, particularly the Islamic revolution of Iran, which had a strong orientation of independence and exodus from the domination of others, was understood in the form of a grand ideology that we have witnessed since the 1940s, and it gradually developed becomes a discourse. It could marginalize rival ideologies and become a hegemonic discourse in the political and social life of Iran. Of course, the message of political Islam was not confined to independence but meant in other contexts such as justice and freedom.

Given such differences between the two revolutions, it seemed that the experience of the two revolutions with their specific elements and features would help us understand these two. For this reason, this article seeks to examine why the 1979 Iranian revolution became social, whereas, in Georgia, the revolution was confined to the political sphere. In other words, the causes and factors that led to the two types of revolutions in the two countries are the most important concert of the present article.

To answer the above question, we first deal with the conceptual framework of the distinction between the two categories of revolutions. Then discusses the formation of the discourse of political Islam in Iran through the pseudo-modernist policy of the Pahlavi regime and then will draw to the Georgian revolution and the factors that affect it.

1. Research Method

The research method in this article is the comparative method. Today, this method is widely used to study societies, systems, phenomena and political policy developments. The importance of this method is especially evident

when the researcher compares the events of another country with its own. For this reason, some political scientists have considered that the scientific nature of the study of a political phenomenon is depends on its comparison method (Harsij, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 8). According to Sartori, comparing systems, policies and societies, and political developments means identifying similarities and differences in the comparative approach. In other words, there is no point in comparing cases that are similar in all respects or different in all respects. Because in the first place, the study of two things is the same, the study of one is equal to the study of the other, and in the second place, the study of conflicting and contradictory cases that are incomparable. Therefore, similar issues include only similar examples and differences in some respects (Sartori, 1991: 246). In Iran and Georgia, we witnessed a similar event called revolution, but of two different types. Social revolution in Iran and political revolution in Georgia. Recognizing the similarities and differences between these two revolutions and mainly the reasons for the differences is the most critical issue facing this research, which is done using a comparative method.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Research Framework: Ideology and Revolution

The twentieth century was full of ideologies in many ways. Doctrines such as Marxism, Nationalism, Liberalism, Fascism, and Anarchism, although rooted in the nineteenth century, such as liberalism, Marxism, and Fascism, were able to create their own political and economic systems in the twentieth century (Ghaderi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 1-5). Ideology can more or less be seen as a correlated set of ideas that provide the basis for political action. Therefore, all ideologies describe the existing order, usually in the form of a worldview, a model of a promising future and an image of good society; and they determine how a change can be brought about (Hood, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12).

For Brinton, revolution and revolutionary transformation do not occur without spreading new ideas and ideologies (Brinton, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 45). Ideologies have played a significant role in the establishment and sustainability of the revolution. Reductive views have usually overlooked the part of ideology, while ideology is not merely a factor that adds to the cause of revolution but is an inherent characteristic of revolution. Ideology gives a state a distinct revolution from the usual struggle for power or class difference (Moaddel, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 280-300).

The establishment, maintenance, and supremacy of a particular ideology must be understood within the context of the specific historical context of

that ideology. An ideology causes people to act and is a hierarchy of values that drives revolutionary activists. The effectiveness of an ideology depends on how much it is internalized (Moaddel, 2003 AD/1383 SH: 280-300). The term cultural framework is used to express the ideas, values, myths, stories, and symbols behind society's subjective context, reflecting the dependence of ideology on cultural contexts. In the meantime, an ideology is built with a clever and selective, unlike cultural framework, and it is the values, arguments, and judgments most strongly associated with it. The most efficient ideologies are based on dominant and fundamental cultural frameworks and are updated to fit older images based on new circumstances. For example, the belief in the millennia of celebrations in Chinese Buddhist sections reinforced some of the revolutionary ideas of Chinese communism. Thus, any cultural framework can provide revolutionary or counter-revolutionary ideological foundations (Goldstone, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 401-404).

There may be several competing ideologies in a revolutionary situation, each offering a different picture of the future. It seems that the coordination of doctrine with the cultural context can have an impact on its success. The other purpose of ideology is to give a new interpretation of history for the movement's advantage and glorify the movement's past (Bashirieh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 82). In Johnson's view, different groups are unable to unite, and after the revolutions, an ideology is influential in building a new system and its legitimacy (Johnson, 1984 AD/1363 SH: 88-93).

Political Islam and nationalism shaped the Iranian and Georgian revolutions. The difference between the two led to two types of revolutions in these countries, the social revolution in Iran and the political revolution in Georgia. The rate of change in the Iranian revolution was very fundamental compared to the Georgian revolution, and it is not irrelevant to the differences between political Islam and nationalism.

Contrary to political Islam, there seems to be serious doubt about considering nationalism as an ideology. Nationalism is seen more as a political doctrine or a political goal than a political ideology.

The central point of nationalism as a political goal is that nation is the states only natural and a constituent unit. At the same time, other ideologies such as liberalism and socialism are a complex set of interrelated ideas and values. Second, nationalism, more than a theoretical, profound concept, is a psychological reflection of one nation's hatred or loyalty to other countries and is, therefore, a temporary and fleeting phenomenon. Nationalism also makes sense in its association with different ideologies, including socialism (National Socialism), liberalism (liberal nationalism), and political Islam.

In this way, nationalism has been able to give other ideologies more impetus and power (Haywood, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 276).

Although there are some fundamental differences regarding the relationship between religion and ideology, political Islam can be regarded as an ideology based on a common understanding. At the heart of political Islam is an Islamic government or creating a state based on Islamic principles. The basic premise is that Islam implies a comprehensive theory of government and politics and is superior to other political ideologies because it relies on Islamic sources and revelation. Those who believe in this ideology believe that Islam, as a universal ideology, encompasses the human world and the other world and has clear rules and commands for all fields of life. It contrasts all modern and traditional discourses that do not integrate religion and politics (Hosseinizadeh, 2010 AD/1389: 195- 237).

Nationalism and political Islam have evolved in response to contextual ideology, whose simplicity or complexity can influence the simplicity or complexity of competing doctrine. According to Moaddel, the nature of ideology's power underlies its context and position it in the socio-political space of the political or social orientation of the new doctrine. Because the new ideology production requires an ideology critique of the context and a review of its institutional foundations (Moaddel, M. 1992 AD/1371 SH: 15), the relationship between the two ideologies can be characterized by the social and political revolutions. According to Huntington's theory, the social revolution is a rapid, fundamental, violent domestic change in a society's dominant values and myths in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and governmental activity and policies (Huntington, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 264).

Such a definition implies significant and structural changes in society. Skocpol, who first described the meaning of social and political revolution in the book of *State and Social Revolutions*, believes that social revolutions begin with a class-based revolt from the bellow, which is very rapid and causes radical changes in class and social structure. While political revolutions change the form of government, they do not change the social system and are not necessarily caused by class conflicts. For Skocpol, social revolutions simultaneously lead to fundamental changes in political and social structure. These changes occur through intense political and social battles in which class forces play a crucial role (Skocpol, 1979: 21-32). Emphasizing the role of structures in shaping revolution, Ms Skatchpole believes that different groups with different motivations participate in multiple and complex struggles in historical revolutions. These conflicts occur in the existing economic, social, and international conditions and are

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not controlled by a particular class or group. Nor are all the consequences of the revolution naturally predictable with any other group. (ibid) Thus, the main characteristic of Ms Skocpol's definition is the attention to structure versus the agent and the role of revolution formation based on social systems. Although the indicators of social revolutions vary in definitions, theorists still agree on a few key points below;

The social structure of society is changing;

Social revolutions are necessarily violent;

Social revolutions are pervasive and are interfered with by the majority of the people.

Social revolutions lead to changes in the cultural, political, and economic structure of a society.

Opposite to the social concept of revolution, which encompasses maximum changes, is the concept of political revolution, which involves minimal changes. From this point of view, the political idea of revolution means the transformation of political and governmental institutions. The political revolution changes the nature of government power and its personnel. Stan A. Taylor views the political revolution as an attempt to change the structures and institutions of politics and change the personnel of regimes and government policies (Shafi'ifar, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 37). An essential component of Taylor's definition is the restructuring of government and political institutions, which involves minimal changes to realise the phenomenon of revolution.

Anthony Giddens also argues that the seizure of the state power through violent means by the leadership of the mass movement where the ruling power subsequently initiates a broad process of social reform leads to a political revolution. Thus, in political circles, the most significant change is taking place in the political regime.

In the above definition, violence is also one of the common aspects of social and political revolutions. At the same time, some current theorists speak of the diminishing effect of violence on new political revolutions. John Foran argues that widespread civil disobedience or even electoral methods (Tudoroiu, 2007: 317). Such revolutions, which are considered a type of political revolution by the change in the political system, are known as colour revolutions. Colour revolutions, velvet, or muddy revolutions refer to the set of developments that have taken place in the republics of the former Soviet Union that have led to a change in the political system in power. Such developments in post-communist countries have led to the abandonment of pro-Soviet regimes and the rise of Western-oriented governments. The main features that lead to the distinction between social

revolutions and colour revolutions are:

In colour revolutions, violence is generally less severe than in social revolutions.

The intensity and scope of mass intervention are less in the colour revolutions, and the revolutionaries are merely content with political change. They do not want change in the social and cultural structures of society.

In these revolutions, the leaders' ideology is merely democracy, and communist thought is firmly rejected.

In the colour revolutions, the role of the mass media and the student and the middle class is high.

Colour revolutions necessarily occur in countries where state and government are weak (Mitchell, 2012: 10).

The most critical time for colour revolutions is the time near an election. During this period, with the support of domestic and foreign media and peaceful gatherings of the opposition, the opposition protests the government's performance in the election. It determines the election results in its favour before the official announcement. The spreading of the protests has led to the government's move to hold re-election, which eventually seizes control of the opposition without resorting to conflict and violence. Such a process was repeated in the revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

3. The Iranian Revolution, Pseudo-modernism and Political Islam

The developments of modernity are not confined to Western geography. The triple intellectual, scientific, and industrial revolutions completely transformed the face of post-medieval Europe. There have been relations between Iran and the West since the Safavid era. Still, the west of the Safavid era - the 16th century - was not yet aggressive and reliant on the nineteenth century's industrial revolution, and the extent of the Iranian-Western trade was not sufficiently influential for Iran. This relationship continued until the nineteenth century, when its form and content changed dramatically. On the one hand, there was the industrialized West, or, as Hobbess Baum said, the West "After the Industrial Revolution" the West was well-equipped, advanced, armed, and, on the other hand, a helpless, backward, ignorant, and weak Qajar era (Zibaklam, 2000 AD/1379 SH (a): 204).

The unequal confrontation between Iran and various representatives of the European civilization, including England, started to raise serious questions in the minds of the Iranians; a new crisis seems to have arisen, and the first and foremost question for the Iranians was 'what to do in such circumstances?' (Spragens, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 28-37). This question can

be seriously addressed in Abbas Mirza's question from Joubert. In this question, he asks Joubert, "O foreigner, tell me what to do" (Jaubert, 1968 AD/1347 SH: 127- 133). Although this question illustrated the Iranians' efforts to get out of this critical situation, it did delay understanding the nature of developments in the West. But understanding the nature of products in the West has historically been lagged. In other words, in a logical process, the heart of this transformation had to be recognized first and then decided what to do. However, the question of what to do creates a wave of action, including reform to revolution.

3.1. From Reform to Revolution

The nineteenth century was full of events for Iranians. Military defeats by Russia in 1813 and 1828 and Britain in 1857, the inability to maintain internal order and stability, the widespread interference of foreigners in the country's affairs, and the unprecedented concessions exhibited some of the most important developments of this period. Nearly three centuries before the formation of the Qajar government, the Safavid era, as Foran described, was emerging as a significant power outside the world system but gradually became a peripheral and then dependent state (Foran, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 75-89). Responses to the growing weakness of the Qajar government can be summarized as reform, uprising or rebellion, and ultimately revolution. Accuracy in these developments reveals a general pattern of prioritizing governmental actions and their failure to transmit these changes to society. The government initiated a reform process by elites such as Abbas Mirza, the crown prince of Fath Ali Shah, Ghaem Maghams, Amir Kabir, and Mirzah Hussein Khan Sipahsalar and Nasser al-Din Shah. Government elites put numerous reforms first on the agenda to regulate financial, military, political, and foreign policy issues. These reforms did not succeed because of the resistance of the oligarchic body of power and only had little effect on the short-term (Nabatian, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 63).

The failure of the reforms brought about another kind of change that, this time, began from the community level. The most significant developments were the various uprisings around the country, especially the big cities, the tobacco protest, and, ultimately, the constitutional revolution. If the tobacco movement remained limited to a public demand to abolish the tobacco concession, the constitutional revolution would pursue larger goals, reform the ruling political structure, and legalize it. The constitutional revolution failed to consolidate its goals and achievements (Rahbari, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 75-96). The cause of the failure can be seen from the perspective of internal problems, particularly the internal sabotage of the former faithful, the ideological divergence between the influential constitutional streams

and the problems and economic crises on one side and the role of external factors on the other side. Unfortunately, the constitutional revolution coincided with the historical reconciliation of the two great powers of Russia and Britain over their interests in Iran, and other international events, including World War I, prevented the blossoming of the constitutional seedlings (Zibaklam, 2000 AD/1379 SH(b): 210).

3.2. Pahlavi Government and the Imperial Modernity

The Failure of the constitutional revolution creates two fundamental transformations between constitutionalist forces; first, the resignation of the religious spectrum from the constitution that sought to justify its religiosity, and second, moving the intellectual stream to a different alternative - to support the rule of law and the dictatorship of the peacemaker (Cf. Afshar, 1923 AD/1302 SH: 139-140). Of course, it would not have been possible for a state to get into power without regard to global change and the influence of the politics and relations of the great powers in Iran. In other words, the lack of alternatives and external support are the two major factors in forming a new order in Iran (Tajik, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 85). If the reforms failed in the Qajar era and were unable to bring about the development process, and the constitutional revolution was unable to establish a new order, the Pahlavi government, as a modern absolutist state, had the tools and facilities to make such a change and took the path to renovation and modernization (Vincent, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 35; Afzali, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 34- 47).

Scholars who have studied the early Iranian conception of modernity agree that this phenomenon has different concepts (Haeri, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 15; Vahdat, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12-15; Mirsepasi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 320-328)

It seems that there are inevitably multiple interpretations of this phenomenon for some reason; the dual nature of the phenomenon in its original geography (Haeri, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 15-30). Modernity has had two main dimensions from the beginning to the present: the critical intellect that manifests itself in the increasing autonomy and freedom of the subject. The other is an instrument shaped by rational and scientific-technological domination of the world (Jahanbegloo, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 47). Depending on which dimension to consider, it can differentiate the notion of modernity (Vahdat, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12). The second point is the existence of different paths and forms of modernity that seem to have been ignored by the Iranians in the early days; for example, Iranian intellectuals were close to the French reading of the highly secular relationship between religion and state (Mirsepasi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 323- 350). The third

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point is the characteristics of the Iranian world or, in other words, the Iranian understanding and translation of this phenomenon. In Ajudani's words, the new concepts that flowed from Western culture to our culture were essentially concepts that had developed in the context of another history and culture. These concepts had no precedent in our culture; there was also a problem with the meaning of Iranian human history and subjectivity. So, the human mind was well thought out in the Iranian language and history, was unfamiliar with those concepts. The Iranian man with such sense and language and history, when he got acquainted with new ideas, because he did not have the linguistic and historical experience of those concepts (which were two sides of a coin), interpreted and reconstructed them with his understanding, his historical conception, and through his linguistic experience (Ajudani, 2003 AD/1383 SH: 7-8).

Therefore, it can be said countries must embark on the process of modernization, whether or not it conforms to their spiritual and metaphysical traditions and heritage. In other words, the question is how the Pahlavi government looked at modernity and how the effects and consequences of this attitude changed the political and social formulation in Iran and led to the formation of a discourse of resistance. However, the dominant approach during the Pahlavi era was to adopt a linear pattern of modernity, regardless of the origin of modernity and its incorrect and inappropriate application in different geography. A kind of superficial conception that emphasized the full realization of modernity, expressed by Sayyed Hossein Taghizadeh, one of the intellectuals of the constitutional era who said that We must be westernized from head to toe (Taghizadeh, 1961 AD/13 40 SH: 417-429). Thus, the Iranian modernity in the shadow of imperial despotism (Atabaki, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 20-35) became apparent to the West and Westernization, resulting in the formation of a caricature of modernity and the creation of heterogeneous combinations of what can be mentioned as pseudo-modernism.

One Iranian scholar defines pseudo-modernism as the unintentional and uncritical application of theories, methods, techniques, and ideas derived from the experience of advanced countries or a superficial understanding of European modernism by intellectuals and political leaders. In his view, the simple performance was both of his society and history and Western ideas and their conformity, rooted in the left and right groups (social democrats and liberals) and among state and non-state groups. It was not, in his view, European ideas and techniques that disrupted the social fabric of Iran in this way. Still, first, the ignorance and criticism of these methods in their primary European context and, second, the imitation rather than using those ideas and

techniques were practical (Katouzian, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 151).

3.3. Pseudo-modernism and Its Effects

The path of modernization in Iran in the Pahlavi era changed Iranian society's foundations and had various impacts on different fields, which affected the formation of social movements, including the Islamic Revolution. As a modern government, the Pahlavi regime laid the foundation stone for the first development in Iran. The way they were laid out in the political and social formulation and their alteration had significant effects.

1) Political

In Iran, pseudo-modernism in the political sphere has shown itself in returning to tyranny and a rapid increase in the state's power and weakening of political freedoms. Tyranny and state dictatorship are meant to be lawless governments, and they act beyond society, and as one may refer to Reza Shah, a one-person regime. Mehdigholi Khan Hedayat points out in his memoirs that Reza Khan said that every country has power and that ours is a single person (Hedayat, 1965 AD/1344 SH: 386). The development of the authority and exercise of state sovereignty has resulted from the rise and administrative concentration and military institutions and the creation of an extensive and centralized network of bureaucracy.

The loss of budding civic institutions such as parties and the press and the establishment of legal and judicial powers resulted from the consolidation and concentration of power. The Independent Representatives of the parliament were removed, and the parliament was first filled with the desired representatives of the Shah and the court. Traditional centres of power in Iran, including the tribal ones, are oppressive, and sedentary policies transform their livelihoods and economies.

The parliament was not closed during the reign of Reza Shah, as opposed to the power of Mohammad Ali Shah, but it lost its proper function. Abrahamian wrote: from the sixth to the thirteenth parliamentary periods, the king himself determined the results of the election and the composition of the parliament. Therefore, the parliament was not a valuable and influential institution but an impersonal entity that covers the naked body of the curfew (Abrahamian, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 172).

2) Economics

Economic and social development has been a top priority for developing countries. No matter how rational and economical it is to prioritize the economy, economic development has tangible effects. Pseudo-modernism in the economic field has shown itself to be overly military. More than a quarter of the state budget was spent on rebuilding the military. While the Ministry of War alone accounted for more than 40 per cent of the total budget, other high-priority areas were the Post and Telegraph and Telephone,

Education, and Justice. Katouzian says that after 1931, industry and agriculture had been abandoned (Katouzian, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 158). The military was modernized for the first time, but despite spending a great deal of money and widespread propaganda on the occupation of Iran, it collapsed in World War II. The Iranian economy became a dependent and petroleum economy, neglected by traditional production and dependence on oil revenues, and the process of the reliance of the Iranian economy on major economies intensified. Foran refers to this period as the period of dependency. In his view, this was mainly due to three mechanisms: British control over Iranian oil, unequal trade with the Soviet Union and Germany, and trade fluctuations due to the marginal supply of raw materials (Foran, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 373). Lack of prioritization of infrastructure investment, for example, railway, costly plans, slow growth in imports, renewal of Darcy's unfair oil contract, were all wrong paths in the Iranian economy and had an impact on its future.

3) Legal and Judicial

Ali Akbar Davar reformed the legal and judicial system of Reza Shah. He played a crucial role in administrative reform, the reorganization of justice, and establishing the local registry. However, the modernization of Iran's legal and judicial system and cultural context did not receive much attention, leading to legal opposition such as Mossadegh's (Katouzian, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 150-190). The legal and judicial system was not, of course, an obstacle to abuse. Still, with the formation of the Documentation Register, the power-holders became great owners, Reza Khan himself was a clear example in this regard. Ali Akbar Davar, a high-ranking law graduate from the University of Geneva and close to the Reza Shah regime's advisory circle, presented the first volume of the civil law and judicial reform bill, which included a hierarchy of courts. The first part of this law was the precise and complete translation of French civil law. The final version of the Criminal Code, adopted in 1940, also followed the model of the 1930s Mussolini era in Italy (Shaygan, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 9-11). Most law professors and advisers to the Ministry of Justice were European professors. Eight French and two Italian professors taught for 16 years at Law School at the University of Tehran.

4) Cultural and Social Area

Iranian pseudo-modernists strongly favoured the tendency to create social cohesion between Iranians and Westerners. Therefore, Iranians had to change their appearance, dress, and clothing to distance themselves from their traditional clothing, look like Westerners, and throw away their ancient garments to renew their ideas. With these changes, Iranians were not

considered "Others" in the West and underdeveloped countries. Changing caps and hats, unveiling, releasing Iranian women from tents, kerchief, arresting and imprisoning and even executing opponents of unveiling (Asadi Governor of Khorasan) for those who did not make these changes were a cost the Iranians had to pay to look like another people. In this regard, Iranian traditions and customs, especially Islamic culture and religion, were seen as symbols of backwardness and opposed development. If the medieval and part of traditional and Christian values were opposed to development and modernity, the same stereotype would be applied to Iran and Islam. Uniformity in ethnic and dress and ethnic humiliation to create a nation-state, returning too much attention to the era of ancient Iran, the revival of pre-Islamic Iran's glory, and the emergence of some form of old nationalism and opposition to religious rituals and ceremonies were all aimed at westernizing the Iranian society. Being similar to others included even other elements of identity, such as race and language (Adibzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 21). In other words, by establishing a similarity between the Iranian "Us" and the Western "Them," Iranian civilization is part of an old family that includes Western civilization. Iranians are part of the American and European race in another part of the globe and come together in one family (Pahlavi, 1976 AD/1355 SH: 8-9). Edward Shales says that the first generation of political leaders in most underdeveloped countries was more or fewer Westerners (Shils, 1963: 18- 55). As can be seen from the process of Iranians' dealing with modernity, the stage of imitation and similitude begins after the period of amazement and silence.

The simple and caricature implementation of modernity in Iran did not lead to the modernization of Iran but also brought about significant changes in social, economic, and political formulation. The emergence of opposition and resistance was another phase of Iranian confrontation with modernity, known as the stage of the crisis, wandering, and returning to the original Islamic discourse (ibid.). The roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran must be seen as a reaction to pseudo-modernism, particularly its cultural effects. The closest meaning to pseudo-modernism is the discourse of resemblance to the West or Westernization or Pahlavism. The emergence of the antithesis of the Western similarity is more common in countries with strong religious and metaphysical traditions. In the 1940s, the indigenous identity resurgence and the returning discourse to selfhood exhibited the antithesis first traces of the likeness to the West. The third generation of Iranian intellectuals should be regarded as a generation that refuses to be astonished and imitated, seeking an indigenous alternative to modernity. To this tremendous intellectual capacity must be added the growing transformation of non-intellectual and

religious currents that discredited the discourse of resemblance to the West by turning to cultural activities first in the 1920s and then to political movements in the 1940s, offering another alternative that not only avoided the problems of pseudo-modernism but also had credibility.

As the common denominator of this alternative, political Islam, despite various readings, created the last great revolution of the twentieth century (HosseiniZadeh, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 151; Boroujerdi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 39-72).

4. Georgia and the Nation-State Building Process

The Republic of Georgia has experienced several difficulties since its independence in the nation-state building process. The national identity crisis and ethnic minorities have created a weak government that has allowed the penetration of great powers and the creation of a colour revolution due to its geopolitical position. Most theorists have analyzed domestic and international causes or combinational factors influencing the revolution in analyzing the Rose Revolution in Georgia. This article also explains the revolution's impacts on both domestic and international factors.

4.1. Internal factors

One of the central policies of the Soviet Union to create a homogenization of nations was the policy of Russianization and the unity of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic state formed by dominant ethnic groups. Soviet policy was based on creating republics centred on a particular ethnic group and incorporating other ethnic groups within the republics, which always kept the fire of ethnic independence in the minority (Basiri et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 13). The intense nationalism of the Georgian people in protest against the Sovietization and nationalization policies of the Soviet Union began in 1956. It increased after the new Soviet constitution, which weakened the Georgian language.

The Georgian language was the core of Georgian national identity, and Georgian leaders, especially in the post-war period, were more autonomous than Moscow's (Mitchell, 2012: 20). Such protests were intensified after the Glasnost policy and the increase in freedom of expression in 1988. Anti-Soviet sentiment and ethnic conflict were heightened in 1989, following Abkhazia's attempts to secede from Georgia and Soviet support. It resulted in the abolition of Article 6 of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution, based on which Georgian law prevailed over all Soviet laws. After the parliamentary elections, the Free Georgia Union and the pro-independence parties won two per cent of the vote. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was thus elected as a prominent politician and leader of

the Free Georgia Union in the parliament. Although the election was conducted by a significant majority of the population and was free and fair, Gamsakhurdia was, in many ways, an undemocratic leader. He did not tolerate the opposition and often called political opponents a traitor. Effective institutions such as courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies did not evolve this year (Mitchell, 2013: 22). The Soviet policy of dominating an ethnic group over the minorities also led to continued discrimination in the post-independence years by rejecting other ethnic minorities in the process of administering affairs, leading to divergent actions between ethnic groups and their conflict with the central government (Basiri et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 14). In this regard, the Gamsakhurdia government, without regard to ethnic heterogeneity and the background of ethnic conflicts between Georgians and other minorities, adopted the Georgian nationalist approach in the extreme, with the slogan "Georgia for Georgians." Such a policy renewed ethnic wounds and created divisions and separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, leading to civil war by government intervention. Eventually, Georgia lost control of Ossetia with Russia's intervention and failed in this conflict (Amir Ahmadian and Asgari, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 25). Gamsakhurdia's extremist policies led to a military coup and his ouster and then his assassination. Georgia's inability to provide services, maintain infrastructure, and enforce the law has led to the destruction of infrastructure and the economic downturn in Georgia. Gamsakhurdia's extremist policies led to a military coup, his ouster, and then his assassination. Having complex relations with Russia, Georgia's largest trading partner, quickly destroyed tourist markets and foreign products (Mitchell, 2013: 22). Following Gamsakhurdia's dismissal, former Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze was elected as the chairman of Georgia's Supreme Council. After relative political stability and national reconciliation in 1995, he won the presidency with 75% of the vote. As Shevardnadze got into power, diplomatic relations with the West resumed along with economic restructuring. Georgia's international recognition accelerated as Shevardnadze was internationally recognised and used his robust global network and personal relationships. He was able to improve the infrastructure of the community to some extent during this period. Although Georgia was significantly freer than many former Soviet states, in these years, democracy did not prevail. There were no free elections; the rule of law or bureaucracy and corruption was rampant. In addition, while stronger than Gamsakhurdia's presidency, the government was still fragile (ibid.). He came up with the claim of restoring territorial integrity and improving relations with the West but proved unable to solve the

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fundamental issues of territorial control and government functioning. During this period, the Georgian parliament failed to pass an essential law on national and linguistic matters.

Overall, although the government's biased attitude towards national minorities changed over this period, the Shevardnadze government did not develop any coherent policy for the federal integration process. During this period, however, efforts were made to create a comprehensive national identity and safeguard the rights of all ethnic groups. A citizenship law passed in March 1993 guaranteed unconditional citizenship to all residents of Georgia. Georgian lawmakers also adopted UN conventions such as the Convention against All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Council of Europe's Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A parliamentary committee on human rights and a national special investigator were also set up to protect the rights of minorities (Bashiri et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 24). But all this was not enough against the will of the separatist regions for autonomy. The Shevardnadze government attempted to suppress and seize control of separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazian armies but failed. In other words, the Georgian government has never been able to show its superiority overall political and ethnic groups. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and Adjara for more than a decade) were entirely outside the circle of central government sovereignty. In South Ossetia and Abkhazia, self-proclaimed governments claimed independence and rejected the central government's authority (Zargar, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 51-52).

The structure of Shevardnadze's government was, in fact, the legacy of the communist Soviet Union and semi-authoritarian. Even though such a system was established in Georgia when the Soviet Union collapsed and called for independence, it remained authoritarian in the lowest levels of government.

The same was true for government elites who had a management background during the Soviet era. In other words, although trying to enforce the law and hold a health election, the government elites did not change their authoritarian policy. Thus, with the independence of Georgia, only the appearance of the state changed, but the ruling political culture remained unchanged. Such a process led to the preservation of apparent democratic aspects. Still, the circulation of the elites was not free, and the participation of the people, especially the ethnic minorities, who were angered by the central government, was weak. It led to the escalation of corruption and political inefficiency during the years of Shevardnadze's government.

Schneaker believes that the main reason for the increase in inefficiency

in Georgia was the weakness of the public administration, the lack of a well-regulated program, and the failure to enact and implement laws between parliament and the executive branch. The parliament also had little leverage to enforce laws, and in addition to ineffective law enforcement, there were not enough staff (Shaban, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 150). Enforcement of regulations in Georgia after independence has always been a mystery. The lawlessness and widespread administrative corruption have brought the government into a crisis of legitimacy, which has hampered the regime's political stability.

Shevardnadze did not want to change the Soviet model of individual rule with political corruption. His decision prompted the Security Council to intervene and cheat widely in the 2000 election and declared 79.8 per cent of the vote favouring Shevardnadze (Sardarnia, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 56). 2000-2003 were not good years for the president. Shevardnadze failed to provide any meaningful economic development for Georgia, unemployment continued, foreign investment did not grow, and tourism and trade with neighbouring countries did not return to their former routine. His government was also unable to exert Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It failed to return internally-displaced persons to the region, who were numbered about 250,000 in the late 1990s. He made no serious effort to reduce corruption so that growing crime damaged the economy and undermined the education system. It frightened foreign investment and made it very difficult for Georgians to live in general (Mitchell, 2013: 32).

In general, Georgia was sixth among the countries in the world in 2003 in terms of corruption in state institutions. According to reports in the local press, 10% of the Georgian rich held 80% of the country's income and wealth, reflecting a sharp class divide (Porfard and Tofiqian, 2015 AD/1395 SH: 132). In the years before the Rose Revolution, the central government's influence was only a few miles outside of Tbilisi. Even in the capital, ordinary citizens often lived without electricity or water. Georgia's per capita national income was lower than Swaziland, and more than half lived below the poverty line (King, 2004: 16). Sardinia divides the Georgian economy from 1991 to 2003 into three periods: 1. 1991 to 1994, when the government ignores the economy. During these years, the rate of recession and inflation was very high, and the value of the national currency declined rapidly. 2. The years of relative reform from 1994 to 1998, when the government sought to control unrestrained inflation and prevent uncontrolled debt to the central bank. During these years, the parliament approved the national budget, and the Russian rouble went out of the Georgian currency cycle. 3. Years of economic crisis and corruption from 1998 to 2003.

During these years, the value of money declined due to the economic crisis, and the government lost control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in economic and political terms. The smuggling of cheap Russian goods increased (Sardarnia, 2011AD/1390 SH: 53-54).

Overall, the government's apparent weakness in building national identity and integration during Shevardnadze's second term, the economic crisis, the inability to rebuild infrastructure. Most importantly, the severe lack of will to fight corruption is among the most critical internal factors that have fuelled public discontent and civil society's efforts to effect change.

4.2. International Factors

The post-Soviet collapse of the Caucasus region has always been a source of conflict. Being in the transit belt of goods and oil and gas to Europe and crossing the northern and southern neighbours has made the region susceptible to influence and intervention. Georgia's geographical location in the Caucasus region and the 800-km-long border with Russia to the north, in the form of the Greater Caucasus Mountains and on the route to connect the South Caucasus to the Black Sea and having strategic ports with the possibility of exporting oil and gas and transit of goods, are from the most geopolitical features of this country that lead to the sensitivity of this region and its profound impact on Russia. It has led to the creation of various Russian military bases in different parts of the Caucasus. It has finally become one of the main points of conflict between the two countries.

Despite its claims to integrate with the soviet republics, Russia, to support the sovereignty of these countries against the West, seeks to strengthen its dominance (Pilerood, Zarmehri, 2015 AD/1395 SH: 45).

After the Soviet collapse and Georgia's declaration of independence, Russia refused to evacuate its military bases in Georgia by presenting vital strategic interests and the military support of Russians stationed in Tbilisi; Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first president was ousted during a bloody coup. Russia thus sought to maintain its supremacy despite Georgia's independence. Russia views the republics of the South Caucasus and Georgia as its strategic depth. It sees any impact that foreign intervention might have on the region as a threat to its national security (Ebrahimi and Mohammadi, 2011: 5). Thus, the most important strategic goals of Russia in Georgia are:

- 1) Tying Georgia's security with Russia;
- 2) Control over their traditional sphere of influence;
- 3) Controlling and sharing energy transmission lines;
- 4) Countering the influence of foreign powers, including the United States;
- 5) Preventing Tbilisi's Link to NATO (Yazdani et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 269).

On the other hand, the political goals and economic benefits of Georgia's geopolitical position determined the United States to influence and dominate Asian and Caucasian states after the Soviet collapse and the annexation of Eastern European countries by NATO to play the role of absolute hegemony. In "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives," Brzezinski writes that since superpower Political Interaction, Eurasia has been the centre of world power. This region has dominated the rest of the world. Because Eurasia is the largest region globally, it is geopolitically the most central and the power that dominates Eurasia can control other advanced, dynamic economies. Brzezinski outlines the geopolitical features and values of Eurasia for America and seeks ways to control America in this region as an essential factor in the survival of the American hegemonic power (Asgari, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 86). The American presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus at the turn of the twenty-first century, according to Brzezinski, can be described as follows:

- 1) Strengthening the economic and military power of these countries in pursuit of their complete independence;
- 2) Exploiting their underground resources and reserves, in particular, oil and gas energy and location utilization;
- 3) If these countries can achieve complete political-economic independence in a united body and become strong, they will not return to Russia (Amir Ahmadian and Asgari, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 88-89).

In this regard, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States pursued Russia's policy of containment as a strategic priority to weaken its geopolitical, geopolitical, and even geo-economic position in addition to restraining the demands and capabilities of the Moscow First World. The US-Russia game in the Caucasus region has been orbiting the Cold War pattern of the zero-sum game. Russia has always wanted to continue expanding its influence in the area. Its leaders have considered the South Caucasus "Part of the Near Abroad" and a sphere of their security interests (Hazi Nia, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 162-163). On the other hand, the social crisis caused by ethnic heterogeneity (about 70% of Georgians and 30% of different ethnicities) and ethnic conflicts and separatist tendencies of non-Georgians led to a constant fear of Georgians being threatened by Russian threats and interventions. So, the ethnic subconscious tends society towards America's superior power. Such a historical background made the Georgian government more inclined to the US, despite Russia's tendencies. The United States has also used the issue to support newly independent governments and made Georgia the largest recipient of US funding in the 1990s. Such

assistance, however, did not prevent a widespread economic crisis in Georgia. Although the government tended toward the United States during the Shevardnadze era, the United States did not support it at the height of the problem.

5. Conclusion

A comparison of the two above revolutions shows that the Islamic Revolution in Iran with the idea of political Islam as an ideology was able to provide a platform for political mobilization and pave the way for sweeping change in Iran. The emergence of political Islam as an ideology and discourse was in response to the pseudo-modernist actions of the Pahlavi government. As a superficial reading of modernity, Pseudo-modernism sought to create a kind of discourse similar to that of the West and sought to provide an alternative to Iran's backwardness that formed an essential part of the political agenda. Because of the resistance of identity and cultural elements, Pseudo-modernism created another option that was defined not along this path but by returning to identity and cultural roots. For this reason, as a central concept, Islam was able to provide the necessary background for the social revolution in Iran in the wake of the failure of other alternatives and the lack of interest in them.

In the Georgian revolution, however, the place of the element of ideology was empty. The increasing problems of state-nation-building as a legacy of the former Soviet Union in many Central Asian and Caucasian republics intertwined with foreign intervention led to the formation of the Georgian revolution with ethnic nationalist tendencies. Of course, the influence of economic factors and variables can also be seen as a facilitating and accelerating variable in the Georgian revolution. For people who have been accustomed to the communist state economy for many years, the West and models based on free economics have become more attractive. The communist-era elites seemed to have become a significant obstacle to economic reform in this country. It is precisely why a kind of transition from this elite to economic change was also seen in the revolutionaries' demands.

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