

Military Structure in Imam Khomeini's Political Thought and Action (Emphasising on Army)

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Abstract

The passage of about four decades since the Islamic revolution is not enough to know a great revolution. Revolutions can be analysed based on the roots, trends and consequences. "Systemization" is related to the process or transition stage level from the old system to the revolutionary one. The present study, with the qualitative and analytical-descriptive method, aimed to analyse the thought and political actions of Imam Khomeini in military systemisation. The results indicated that Pahlavi's military-security structure under Imam Khomeini's management was based on inciting national pride and the army sentiments; not insulting and speaking ill of them; and encouraging, honouring and emphasising their dignity that changed to a new situation. On the one hand, the former military foundations remained; the Islamic Republic Army was reproduced based on the same Pahlavi army and prevented the military vacuum for the collapse of the post-Pahlavi regime. On the other hand, the management structure of the Iranian military changed slowly. Therefore, the restoration of the old and pre-revolutionary authority was impossible, and it was completed by forming three institutions, the Revolutionary Committee, the Revolutionary Guards and the Mustazafin Mobilization.

Keywords: Army, Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, Pahlavi Regime, Systemization.

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Introduction

Every government needs a strong, powerful and organised armed force to maintain its independence, security and territorial integrity. Still, in countries where revolution or transformation has occurred, the military force is either entirely or partially destroyed, and the revolution faces crises, insecurities, etc., in those conditions. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a surprise for the world's politicians, As the "Defense Intelligence Agency" of the United States announced in the intelligence assessment of September 28, 1978, that the Shah was expected to be in power for another ten years. The CIA estimated in August of the same year (Mordad 1357) that Iran was not in a state of revolution or even pre-revolution (Ledin and Lewis, 1981 AD/1361 SH: 37). With the joining of the army to the people and forming other military institutions such as the Basij and the Revolutionary Committee was created a surprising revolution.

The present study aimed to answer the following question by thinking about the political transition of military-security power in Iran:

‘How could the powerful military structure of Iran in the Islamic Republic of Iran not collapse despite its strong dependence on the West in terms of manpower and military infrastructure, and the military not restore the old regime after the victory of the Islamic Revolution?’

The hypothesis is that the military structure of Iran, under the management of Imam Khomeini, changed to a new state in such a way that the Islamic Republic Army was reproduced based on the foundations of the Pahlavi Army, and a military vacuum was prevented for the collapse of the post-Pahlavi regime. With the slow change in the management structure of the Iranian army, restoring the old and pre-revolutionary regimes was impossible. Since the first years of the movement in 1342, there were three strategies at the same time:

- A) Inciting national pride and soldiers’ emotions;
- B) Not insulting and slandering them and not blaming the army;
- C) Encouraging and honouring and emphasising their dignity.

Finding a scientific answer to the mentioned question caused some hidden aspects of the Islamic Revolution more visible, especially the greatness and importance of Imam Khomeini's strategic management. The continuation of the Islamic revolution in the post-Pahlavi period and even after Imam Khomeini is significant regarding Imam Khomeini's systemisation, especially in the military-security field. So far, some research has been done on the topic of this article.

Saeedeh Lotfiyan has done extensive research on "Army and the Islamic Revolution," the central part of which is focused on the forming

Pahlavi Army, and parts of it are devoted to the emergence of the Islamic Republic Army (Lotfiyan: 2001 AD/1380 SH). Another research topic examines the relationship between religious soldiers and religious and revolutionary forces and the context of joining the army during the Islamic revolution. None of the mentioned research has covered the hypothesis of this article, despite the similarity of the subject, and they have not addressed this issue from the perspective of systematisation; therefore, this article by a descriptive-analytical method is new research.

1. Research Background

- Mahdi Marandi in the book "Army according to Imam Khomeini," Imam Khomeini's publishing house (1383) in the Imam Khomeini's views and statements about the army, are compiled in eight chapters:
 - 1) The characteristics of the imperial army and the necessity of its cleaning;
 - 2) The characteristics of the Islamic Republic army;
 - 3) The goals and missions of the army;
 - 4) Order and organisation in the army;
 - 5) The army and the people;
 - 6) The army's role in supporting the Islamic Republic;
 - 7) Guidelines and warnings;
 - 8) Imam Khomeini's orders and appointment of army commanders.
- Sayyid Nasser Hosseini, in his article "Imam Khomeini, Army and Islamic Revolution of Iran" (1388-1389), *Historical-Military Studies Quarterly*, second year, number 5 (6 in a row, winter 1388 and spring 1389), refer to the Imam's attention to the army.
- Ali Mokhtari et al., in the article on the "Role of the Army in the Forming Coalition of Political Forces in the Islamic Revolution" (1400), believe that the Shah's neo-patrimonial and aggressive behaviour led to the deprivation of independence from the army, control of its equipment and facilities, creating an atmosphere of distrust, channelling the ways of promotion, and ultimately making everyone, both soldiers and commanders, obedient and submissive. Consequently, the relationship of submission of the army to the Shah, the deadlock in the Shah's relationship with the elites, and the Shah's bid to America destroyed the desire and encouragement of the moderates for a conflict within the discourse. They prepared them for an alliance with the revolutionaries.
- Zacherl, Donald, in the article on the "Impact of the Islamic Revolution on the Iranian Army" (1389), tries to examine the characteristics of the army resistance of the Islamic Republic during the imposed war.

2. Conceptual Framework; Systematisation

The transition and management of developments after the Islamic Revolution victory and the role of Imam Khomeini can be analysed in light of several theories and concepts. The present study tries to explain the mentioned transition using the native idea of "Systemisation." However, 'what is systematisation?'

Political systems change and evolve in various ways. In their true meaning, revolutions completely transform the established political system in political, cultural, and social dimensions. Systemisation means shaping society and specifying the influential centres in the society's political, cultural, economic and social situation, as well as their interaction and relationship with each other (Majidi and Iqbal, 2013 AD/1393 SH: 140).

Systemisation is a prerequisite for state building. Revolutionary governments try to reproduce military-security structures according to their ideology. Systemisation is an interconnected set of software and hardware components that make the nature of the new political system different from the past. Ayatollah Mohsen Araki is one of the few researchers who raised the issue of systemisation. According to him, Islamic movements have three stages: birth and awakening; intellectual-ideological construction; revolution and government formation; or systemisation. Sayyid Jamaluddin Asadabadi, Sayyid Muhammad Baqer Sadr and Imam Khomeini are the prominent representatives of these three stages. Imam Khomeini started the process of Islamic systemisation in the process of several decades. He designed and established the political system of the Islamic Republic in the two phases of the revolution and the construction after it by giving originality to the plan of the Islamic government and Velayat-e Faqih and a particular image of the desired political system (Araki, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 184-185). After Shahrivar 1320, with the writing of "Kashf al-Asrar," Imam entered the field of intellectual and political reflections and sought to find a way out of the critical situation of Iranian society within the framework of Islam. According to the *Kashf al-Asrar*, it is impossible to fulfil the ideal Islamic society within the framework of conventional mechanisms. Based on Sharia, the theory of a theocratic society is called the primary basis of Islamic systemisation. In "Tahrir al-Wasila," he rejected separation and broke between religion and politics. In a different approach from previous mujtahids, he took another step in Islamic systemisation and took a big step towards the theory of Islamic government (Mollaei Tawanaei, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 419).

From the very first moment of the Islamic revolution victory, Imam Khomeini started to form the Islamic state's institutions and establish the infrastructure of the Islamic system on an Islamic and indigenous basis (Araki, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 170). In conclusion, systemisation is a process that includes all aspects of the political system, and the military-security sector is only one of its aspects. Imam Khomeini started and implemented to formulate an Islamic systemisation beyond the nation-state system (Mawlana, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 464).

3. The Process of Military Systemization by Imam Khomeini

The present study focused on the military systemisation part; therefore, other parts of the systemisation are assumed by Imam Khomeini. Military systemisation was a long process that started years before the revolution. These steps can be checked as follows.

3.1. Development of pre-Revolutionary Military Structure

The Pahlavi army was an essential part of the political system and played a vital role in the Pahlavi discourse. The army brought both Pahlavi kings to power, and the basis of their abilities was seen in two coups in 1299 and 1332. Regarding the lack of political legitimacy, the Pahlavi considered strengthening the military forces and maintaining their loyalty their most important duty. Along with the court and the bureaucracy, the army formed the three sides of Reza Shah's power (Abrahamyan, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 169). He carried out a part of the state-building process through the military, primarily in provincial taxation. By creating a national conscription system and suppressing transnational identities, he completed a part of the nation-building process in Iran.

Following his father, who called himself the son of the sword, Muhammad Reza Shah said: "I am a soldier by profession, and it is a privilege for every king." (Blanche, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 136) After coming to power, Muhammad Reza took the side of the military to compete with the forces of civil society and built the foundation of his system on the military. He kept the army in his hand and gave them privileges to maintain the officers' loyalty. The Shah prevented the trial of the senior commanders who had left their posts in Shahrivar 1320 by speeding up the promotion of officers; he increased the number of colonels and high-ranking commanders within twenty months to the number that his father had reached within twenty years. He also took measures to maintain the military budget and increase officers' salaries (John Foran, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 409). The Pahlavi army allocated an essential part of the country's budget directly and indirectly. The allocation of the Ministry of War in 1307 included 40.4% of the country's budget

(Taqawi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 90). Military forces were so crucial for Muhammad Reza Shah that when the country's budget became critical in 1322, he preferred to stop the funding of the agriculture, education and public health departments, but not reduce any amount from the army's budget (Zonis, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 190).

The structure of the army was reproduced in the Pahlavi political system centred on the slogan "God, Shah, Motherland," and created the machine of repression and suffocation, including police units (Dezhbani, Shahr bani, Imperial Guard and Imperial Gendarmerie) and intelligence units (SAVAK, Rokn 2, Military Intelligence, Imperial Inspection and a particular office) (Holiday, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 84). The Shah was personally responsible for the promotion of officers higher than Major. In the Air Force (popular force), he checked the qualifications of all candidates entering the training course in advance; therefore, the Shah's exceptional control over the army was formed (ibid., 76).

In his political will on the 1st of Azar 1352, in a spontaneous speech for senior political and military officials, the Shah assigned the first topic to the duties of the armed forces and emphasised that the army should not interfere in politics. However, he considers it as the protector of the constitution. He stresses that the military is under the complete authority of the king or under the power of someone who performs the king's duties according to the constitution and must obey "Blindly." Indeed, none of the commanders will be so foolish as to agree with the other for Personal goals or leagues with politicians. Lest anyone in the country's armed forces thinks they can dominate the country by leagu ing with domestic or foreign troops. This illusion is false, and the army family will remain when everyone is united (Alamuti, Mehr, 1996 AD: 401-402). However, the Pahlavi political system was formed and continued by relying on multiple military-security organisations. In that system, the primary function of the military organisation was to maintain the king's rule. An American senator said in the American Congress: "You know what the commander of the Iranian army said to one of us: he said that because of the American aid, now the Iranian military has found the best [situation], now he can get along well with the people of Iran (Haliday, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 83).

3.2. Imam Khomeini's Policies to Disorganize the Pahlavi Army

Imam Khomeini, who, from the perspective of thought, laid the foundation of the Islamic system with the theory of Velayat-e Faqih, faced the Pahlavi army, which has been described above. Therefore, the separation of the military from the Pahlavi regime was one of the first negative actions for systemisation intended by Imam Khomeini, which began years before the revolution. This

process can be examined under the concept of "Disorganization," that is, the process and actions in which the military forces are not loyal to the regime and do not participate in the process of its stabilisation and continuation, and even act against it (Ahmadi Manesh and Ahmadi Manesh, spring 2014 AD/1394 SH: 87). So, the word "Army" is one of the most frequent words of Imam Khomeini before and after the Islamic Revolution, which is evident in his works. He has used this word and its derivatives nearly 2000 times. Imam Khomeini, temporal, had the most addresses and conversations with the Iranian army in three separate periods: in the early forties, before the exile (Farvardin 1342 to Aban 4, 1343); in the last year of the Shah's regime (Aban 1356 to Bahman 1357), and finally after the victory of the revolution and the period of the Islamic Republic. By reading and examining them, it is found that he had a particular policy in facing the military forces of the Shah's regime, especially the army. From the very first years of the movement in 1342, he had taken three strategies at the same time with speeches, messages and in the form of famous slogans:

A) Inciting national pride and soldiers' feelings; in the year 42, the Imam said: "By Allah, I want your good. I am afraid that one day you will open your eyes and they will destroy your existence." (Khomeini, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 1/389) Therefore, addressing the army, he says that by approving the capitulation bill, the government "Insulted the honourable Iranian army and its officials and noncommissioned officers." (Khomeini 1994 AD/1373 SH: 1/409) Therefore, the army should not allow such disgraceful acts in Iran. They must, with every instrument, tear up this document of colonialism and overthrow this government (ibid.,1/412). He further warns that by doing this, they "Undermined the greatness of the Iranian army." (Khomeini 1994 AD/1373 SH: 1/415) So, "O Iranian army, I declare danger!" (ibid., 418) The army's recruitment and the Pahlavi army's gradual collapse began at this stage. The forces that separated from the Pahlavi army organisation in this way intellectually and not necessarily militarily, on the one hand, deprived them of the possibility of a military coup, and the army could not carry out a union coup; that is, a coup in which the army acts as a union group (Broker, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 112). On the other hand, the last bricks formed the building of the Islamic Republic Army. While the Shah was trying to strengthen his military security organisation as much as possible, Imam Khomeini understood the necessity of separating the military sector from the Shah's regime, despite being in exile. Contrary to some groups who had taken an armed

approach, they aimed at the army's heart and used gradual and extensive measures to separate the soldiers, layer by layer.

B) Not Insulting and Slandering Them and not Blaming the Army

Imam Khomeini, in the message on the occasion of his son Mustafa, on 21 Aban 1356, addressing the scholars and the nation of Iran and expressing his general duty towards the Shah's regime, also mentioned the army and considered them prisoners in the hands of foreigners who work against the interests of their nation and country. Therefore, they should wake up and save the country from destruction and collapse (Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 3/262).

Accordingly, Imam not only does not consider the army and its leader oppressors of the Shah's regime and foreigners but also the saviours of the country and the nation; of course, if they wake up and are not humiliated (Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 3/309). Otherwise, it will be an army like a parasite and a burden on society and the nation. They will be useless except as a tool for foreigners and the dictator king (Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 3/308).

In the following, while appeasing the army, he cleverly provoked and said:

“ ‘Do you think the army is happy with these?’ Someone who gives the command of the entire military to the hands of four Americans, the American advisor who has all the directions in their hands, these poor people are all under pressure, ‘do they have a happy heart?’ Unless they are zealous; if someone is jealous, he cannot have a happy heart. They should not be silent either... They destroyed our army, destroyed the dignity of our military” (Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 3/414-417). In his successive messages and speeches, Imam Khomeini never directly accused the military of violence and killing people. He tried to separate them from the Shah and the Shah's regime. Even at the height of the revolution, he said:

"Iran's army and respected officials should know that the crimes and massacres that the Shah imposes on them have no result but infamy and shame for them. ‘How long will the officers of Iran's army, city police and gendarmerie continue to commit fratricide by some uninformed officers without any authority?’ ‘To protect who?’ You Muslim and free officials of the Iranian army! Pay your debt to Islam and Muslims; do not be humiliated." (Khomeini 1997 AD/ 1376 SH: 3/442)

Imam Khomeini was looking for an excuse in the inflammatory and bloody days of Shahrivar 57 to thank and console the army and bring the nation and the military together. Therefore, in a message to the Iranian nation, he writes about the necessity of continuing the movement: "I am grateful to the respected Iranian army for not setting fire to their patriotic

people, who have survived fifty years of oppression by the Pahlavi dynasty, during the huge march in Tehran and other cities, and they did not contaminate their hands with the great crime that is the usual work of rulers." (Khomeini 1997 AD/1376 SH: 3/ 456)

"Patriotic Army of Iran! You see that the people are your friends and shower you with flowers. You know that these marauders have made you a tool to kill their brothers to continue their oppression; join your other army brothers who abandoned the king and attacked the enemy in support of the people, and stand up and do not let your nation perish. Inscribe yourself in history, which will continue for the benefit of the Iranian nation, as soon as possible and remove the roots of betrayal and oppression." (Khomeini 1997 AD/1376 SH: 3/ 459) On the fourth of Aban 57, which was also the Shah's birthday, in a message, he addressed the three forces of the army and considered them as servants of Islam and the country and said:

"Give my greeting to the respected heads of the army and the land, sea and air forces; then, say Iran is your country, and the Iranian nation is your nation; join the nation. I know that many of you are loyal to the nation and country of Islam and are saddened by these killings and lootings by the traitor Shah and his relatives and international criminals. Sometimes your reports reach me. God Almighty helps those who serve Islam and the country." (Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 4/156) He had a particular interest in military personnel. He considered them his own, believing that with their support, especially the air force and some other sections of the army, thank God this movement reached its conclusion and cut off the hands of the oppressors from our country (ibid: 6/382). Therefore, with closing the revolution's victory, Imam's efforts intensified to disorganise the Pahlavi army. It was a strategic approach because the more political regimes see the possibility of their downfall, the more they resort to force. At the end of the Pahlavi period, the more suppression orders were issued, the more the Imam called the military, and the level of disorganisation intensified.

Following the Imam approach, the masses tried to separate the army from the Pahlavi regime in street battles. They, with slogans such as "The soldier is our brother; an army brother, why do you kill your brother, gave flowers to the soldiers. The issue of people's intimate relationships with the soldiers had become a problem for the army chiefs. In the commanders' council meeting on Dey 25, it was ordered that the soldiers are prohibited from taking flowers from the people and that they are brainwashed at night in the barracks that there may be explosives in the flowers (We will melt like snow, 1987 AD/1366 SH:54 -59). The Imam had not only influenced

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the conscripts and noncommissioned soldiers but also aimed at the heart of the army so that he had inclined the most loyal military forces towards him. He addressed the army chiefs during a declaration on the 4th of Azar 1357 and said: "Iran is your country, and the nation of Iran is your nation. Join the nation. I know that many of you are loyal to the nation, the country, and Islam, and you are saddened by these killings and looting by the traitor king, his relatives, and international criminals. Sometimes your demand reaches me. Your nation is going through sensitive moments, and you are more responsible to the great God and brave nation and future generations than others. Be brave, break the chains of captivity, do not give this traitor to Islam a chance, and ensure pride for yourself and your nation. God Almighty helps those who serve Islam and the country." (Khomeini 1997 AD/1376 SH: 4/157)

With this method, the Imam could gradually take the management and command of the army from the hands of the shah and the American advisors and take it to the revolution leadership, according to the height of the people uprising and the Islamic movement in Iran.

C) Encouraging, Honoring and Emphasizing Their Dignity

After the revolution's victory and the Islamic Republic's establishment, Imam Khomeini considered the military forces inseparable elements and parts of the revolution and the system. He was always their supporter and protector (Khomeini 1997 AD/1376 SH: 6/130, 133, 147). Undoubtedly, this interest was two-way, and in the last forty years, the Islamic Republic Army has shown that it was the most loyal and honest force towards the Imam's ideals and thoughts. In the very first days of the victory, more than a dozen supporters of some political parties and groups came to Imam Khomeini's service; with every goal, they asked him to disband the army and deal severely with the leaders and commanders of the military. However, the Imam did not accept it at all. Even in the face of their insistence on disbanding the army, they were upset and angry (Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 6/151-157) and said: "We want an army; we want a gendarmerie, we want a policeman; We want all these. We [must] keep this army in one form. Now we cannot say that an army that has been organised and disciplined will leave; we want an unorganised army! This cannot be done. I am asking you to put aside the sharpness of your youth for a while. I was young myself! Young people expect that they want all issues to be solved overnight because of the energy they have, because of their power." (ibid.)

In the pre-revolution period, a significant part of the military organisation of the established regime collapsed, and one of the main reasons for the

collapse of the repression apparatus was this issue. Many soldiers and noncommissioned officers followed Imam Khomeini as an authority more than their military superiors; this dual command system and the predominance of legal command over the military led to disorganisation. In other words, dual sovereignty occurred in the army more than in any other institution, and the structure of the Iranian military intensified this disorganisation. 75% of the army forces were conscripts. They refused to shoot at the crowd of people, including their families. Their awareness increased when they were ordered to suppress the demonstrators (Samti, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 165).

In his confessions, Timsar Qarabaghi interpreted the events of Bahman 22 and the lack of suppression of the people by the army as a result of the soldiers' refusal to the army commanders; the power of resistance was taken away from the armed forces by the religious propaganda of the clerics (Qarabaghi, (n.d.): 98).

The disbelief of the army body in the ruling system, their disobedience, and even their escape (according to the Qarabaghi interpretation, an average of 1200 people per day) showed itself in the days before the revolution. It was confirmed according to the statements of the police chief in Bakhtiyar's government: "Several police personnel have written reported that we are Muslims and followers of Ayatollah Khomeini and cannot act against his orders and instructions." (Qarabaghi, (n.d.): 121-122 and 136) As the first stage of Imam Khomeini's military systemisation, the disorganisation process ended with the announcement of the army commanders in neutrality, which was an act of surrender.

4. Military Systemisation after the Victory of the Islamic Revolution

As a result of Imam Khomeini's strategies, the extensive cooperation of the Iranian people, and the opposing coalition of all the Iranian societal forces, the completely armed Pahlavi regime collapsed without any external defeat. A regime that, according to General Tufaniyan, collapsed, "When the revolution happened, we had 800,000 rifles. We were making a hundred million bullets." (Tufaniyan Diaries, 1984 AD/1363 SH, Tape No. 3: 19). With the revolution victory, the process of military systemisation entered a positive stage. Military systemisation at this level was very difficult because there was intense competition for the post-Pahlavi army structure. In general, there were four strategies in this field, and fulfilling each would create a different future for the revolution. The mentioned strategies are as follows:

4.1. The Strategy of Army Disbanding

The strategy of army disbanding was started from the moment of the

Islamic Revolution victory by the Tudeh party and Marxist leftist groups such as the organisation of Iranian People's Fedaian and People's Mojahedin (Monafeqin) organisations. According to the ideology governing these groups, they sought to realise the Marxist revolution in Iran. Exposure and strong media attacks in the leftist newspapers against the army and police forces as imperialistic and planning a coup to dissolve them immediately and create the people's army entirely and police (Bazaregan, 2011 AD/1389 SH: 200) are among the actions of the mentioned groups. In its numerous statements, the Monafeqin organisation clearly stated that the revolution must start with the dissolution and reorganisation of the army and then not talk about the revolution (Bagherzadeh, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 35). 13 days after the revolution victory, Masoud Rajavi announced: "Our revolution will be incomplete and will decline unless the mercenary army and the remnants of the Shah are fundamentally dissolved and reorganised in a revolutionary way. 'What plans have the imperialists and their agents drawn for us?' Plans to preserve this army and reorganise it. This army is the remnant of the king. In other words, it maintains the king's army without the king. The issue is not that we have enmity with individuals in the army; the problem is the basis and system of the military. This system destroys people and takes them with it. As soon as this system left, we saw what our heroic military brothers did (Keyhan newspaper, 06/12/1357 /1979 AD).

In the continuation of his speech, he wanted to create the People's Guard. He warned against forming the revolutionary committee forces and the disarmament of the Monafeqin. In addition, a large gathering was held in Ahmadabad during the commemoration ceremony of Dr Mosadegh on Esfand 14, 1357(1978). Rajavi vigorously attacked the army and demanded forming of a monotheistic classless army. Rajavi first proposed the army's dissolution (Tabatabaei, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 3/266). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the trial and execution of the heads of the military and SAVAK, Rajavi, while not participating in the prosecution of the leaders of the military in the first days, proposed a plan based on which the SAVAKs would be placed under the supervision of the Mojahedin Organization in the Olympic Village to come under the control of the organisation in the retraining and reconstruction camps under the pretext of preventing violence and revenge (Harvard University, n.d.: 152-154). In his oral memoirs, he admits, "We did not let the forces of Shah and [Imam] Khomeini fill the void," "We were able to organise the Mujahideen militia, but they did not let us and they disarmed us." (ibid., 175 and 160)

After the revolution victory, the Monafeqin strengthened its militia, equipped them with training and weapons looted from barracks and weapons factories, and prepared them in team houses for particular conditions. In addition, the Monafeqin quickly formed "Councils" and appointed people for military positions throughout the country. They saw themselves as the military core of a new political system (Lotfiyan, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 422). In Ordibehesht 1360, Imam Khomeini wanted the Monafeqin to hand over its weapons (Khomeini, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 14/342-343). However, this organisation had long-term plans and every day took a step towards implementing its strategy.

The Organization of Iranian People's Fedaian also strongly opposed the disarmament of the people and announced: "With the disintegration of the army, the armed people can launch a mass armed revolution towards the rule of the working class, and in this way, the anti-imperialist struggle will be smooth. The army, which was the main tactic of imperialism and its servants, was crushed by the glorious military force of the masses, and it is leaving until the People's Army is established tomorrow." (Ismailzadeh, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 56-57)

4.2. Army Downsizing Strategy

The second strategy for the army after the Islamic revolution's victory was army's downsizing compared to the Pahlavi period. The so-called nationalist forces pursued this strategy. In his memoirs, the last American ambassador, referring to his talks with members of the Freedom Movement about the army's future, says that they stated that many of the senior commanders were rejected by them. According to him, a list of more than a hundred senior officers was prepared who should resign after the Shah departed from Iran (Sullivan, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 156). Before the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, the American ambassador had clearly expressed his interest in the armed forces remaining intact and cooperating with the future government in negotiations with the merchants (*ibid.*, 167). The National Front and the Freedom Movement believed that the army should become a professional and small force like other western countries. The arguments of this approach supporters originated from the liberal attitude of the interim government towards politics and the historical experience of the Pahlavi dynasty. The interim government carried out a series of actions aimed at quantitative and qualitative downsizing. Abbas Amirentezam, the interim government spokesman, announced that Iran would cancel all its military contracts with other countries and the activities of the military forces will be limited. This attitude of the interim government was aimed at countries and great powers to reduce their sensitivities towards Iran

because avoiding violence-seeking would create a safe environment for the Islamic Revolution of Iran (Aghaei, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 83).

In continuation of this approach, the interim government took several measures, including the announcement of the withdrawal from the Sento Treaty on Esfand 22, 1375, the dismantling of two US wiretapping bases near the Soviet border, the cancellation of the defence treaty of March 5, 1959, between Iran and the United States on Aban 12, 1375, and the cancellation Principles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Iran-Soviet Treaty on the same date (Dehghani Firouzabadi, 2007 AD/1389 SH: 302). At this point, the military period was reduced from 24 months to 12 months, and even recruitment was stopped for a while (Lotfiyan, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 206). In addition, contracts worth 12 billion dollars for purchasing weapons from the United States were cancelled, and an attempt was made to replace the purchase of six submarines from West Germany with agricultural equipment. The country's military budget decreased to less than half the previous year in 1358 (Dehghani Firouzabadi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 309).

Bazargan, the head of the interim government, after the left insisted on the necessity of disbanding the army and creating a people's army, defended its position and considered its weakening as a cause of foreign interference (Barzin, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 302). In line with his policies regarding the army structure, he felt that only the removal of the high-ranking army commanders was sufficient. He never accepted extensive changes and replacements at the middle and lower levels. He believed that the army men, minus its senior commanders. They were revolutionary, friendly, and at the service of the people (Bazargan, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 93). Bazargan appointed the deputy commanders of the Shah's army, many of whom were arrested during the revolution, to high positions in the new government. The Provisional Government's policy towards the military led to protests by soldiers, especially among the Air Force, who wanted democratically elected commanders through the Soldiers' Council. Of course, this movement was against forming other military institutions (such as the IRGC) alongside the army.

4.3. The Strategy of Strengthening and Stabilizing the Army

Abulhasan Bani-Sadr's view of the position of President and Commander-in-Chief of the Army differed from theirs, despite similarities with the Provisional Government. In the short term, he wanted to strengthen the army. Although he had more connections with left-wing groups like the Monafeqin, he did not want to dissolve the army and wanted the military to be strengthened so it could stand against revolutionary institutions and forces. One of Bani-Sadr's measures to enhance the army was to create a

special presidential guard to confront the new revolutionary institutions. He accused the Islamic Republic Party of disbanding the military and digesting it in the IRGC and claimed in this context: "The plan of Beheshti for the Revolutionary Council was that to prevent the coup d'état of Mordad 28, 1332, a board of directors would be formed in the country with the participation of representatives from the Revolutionary Committee, Revolutionary Guards, Revolutionary Courts and Revolutionary Council. To completely clean up the army, this board will be completely under the control of the Revolutionary Guards, and all the civilians of the army will also be under the regime's control." (Ahmadi, 2002 AD/1380 SH: 304-305)

Bani-Sadr put the strengthening of the army on the agenda under the pretext that the army received several orders from various channels and numerous centres of decision-making and civilian power. It is the weak point of the army (Bani-Sadr, 1980 AD/1359 SH: 21). In his letter dated Khordad 13, 1359, he analysed the strengthening of revolutionary institutions under the title of the aristocracy over the army and the weakening of the president (Banisadr, 2006 AD: 27). Under the title of creating a coherent leadership in guiding the armed forces, Bani-Sadr requested the Imam to hand over the overall command to himself (Banisadr, 2006 AD: 29-30).

Imam appointed Bani-Sadr as the commander of the general forces on the 30th of Bahman 1358 and emphasised the concentration of forces on Islamic standards in military and country affairs (Khomeini, 2006 AD/1385 SH, 167). By maintaining the main structure of the army, Bani-Sadr even tried to maintain its connection with America. After the start of the war, by adopting the strategy of symmetrical confrontation and classic war, he prevented the entry of popular forces and their organisation to monopolise the military power. Of course, this trend was against forming other military institutions (such as the IRGC) alongside the army.

4.4. Gradual Transformation Strategy; Imam Khomeini's Strategy

The military systemisation, which was started by Imam Khomeini years before the revolution, entered a positive stage by overcoming the three mentioned strategies. In most countries with changes or a revolution, the above three stages dissolve their army, which failed the revolution, rebellion, war, insecurity, etc. An example was the Libyan revolution (2011). The Marxists dissolved the former Soviet army after the October Revolution of 1917. Also, the Algerian army, which was trained in a way by the French, lacked military cohesion and function after the revolution. In contrast, the army was supported by Imam before and after the revolution, and the body of the army entered the systemisation of the Islamic revolution.

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This course caused the transition of the Pahlavi Army to the Army of the Islamic Republic, both in terms of organisation and content. The set of actions taken in this step can be reviewed as follows.

1) Emphasis on maintaining the army with frequent visits; Imam Khomeini had many meetings with the military in the days after the revolution's victory. The military forces pledged allegiance to the revolutionary leader; these meetings also showed his attention to maintaining the army in the revolutionary system. While the issue of disbanding the army was raised, he emphasised the preservation of the army in unambiguous terms: "Weakening our army is weakening Islam." (Sahifah Noor: 6/275)

Whoever opposes you opposes the independence of the country and opposes Islam. I declare that if anyone opposes our army today, he has opposed Islam and the Prophet of Islam. Today, the army is not a Taghout army but a Muhammadan army (ibid: 7/25). "There is no country without a military force and an army, but the army must be the guardian of the country's independence and security, not the protector of an autocratic dictatorship, and the outcast of the entire nation; and the officer of the massacre of the country's children." (Khomeini: 5/384) Now this army is the army of Islam, and the Islamic army has respect, and no one has the right to destroy this respect (ibid: 6/244).

2) Maintaining order and hierarchy; one of the indirect ways the leftists dissolved the army was the plan to disrupt the hierarchy in the army. Imam Khomeini neutralised this trick with the following statements: "A mistake exists some deviant people among the police personnel or the high-ranking army or gendarmerie and force the young people to do some inappropriate things, and tell them that now the revolution has taken place and the Taghut has been destroyed and the Islamic Republic has come, the monotheistic society has no more ranks, officers and soldiers. It is a mistake. Monotheistic society, as they say, means a society of chaos. The basis of the army, the gendarmerie, and the system in the world, not just here but for the first time, was preserving the orders. The difference between an Islamic and a non-Islamic state is that it should not be oppressed from the top down, nor not that no command is given. Obedience should be done, and oppression should not be done. During the prophet era, everyone obeyed him, and he was the ruler. However, no one was oppressed by him. Army personnel are obliged to maintain order, hierarchy and rules within the army. Not paying attention to these issues will weaken the Islamic army and destroy the system. Soldiers, high-rankings, and officers must maintain

- and observe the hierarchy." (ibid: 6/24)
- 3) Declaration of general amnesty; after the opposition groups, especially the leftists, took various actions to weaken the army, including holding demonstrations and even assassinating some soldiers, including Major General Muhammad Amin Biglari, the successor of the Eternal Guard, and Lt. Gen. Badrei, the commander of the army's ground forces, on 23 Bahman (Lotfiyan, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 373), Imam Khomeini issued a general amnesty decree on Esfand 28, 1358 to protect the army. After explaining the situation, he said: "I feel the danger and prevent this sinister plan and protect the dear country and the great Islam, all the strata whose hands have not been stained with innocent blood and who have not ordered the killing of souls and have not been torturers and who have not ordered torture leading to murder I did not abuse the treasury and people's property, I amnestied on the threshold of the new year; whether the military or other law enforcement forces, whether Savaki or pseudo-clerics are affiliated and connected to the former regime. From this date onwards, no one has the right to attack anyone, neither the responsible authorities nor the irresponsible group." (ibid: 12/16)
 - 4) Cleaning and purification; military systemisation where the Pahlavi army structure remained intact required targeted refinement. In the first days of the Islamic Revolution victory, one of the first measures was the arrest and trial of several army leaders who killed people. The reason for the trial of these people was to prevent the organised actions of the army against the revolution, especially considering the hierarchical structure of the army and the insistence of some of their commanders on their positions. Imam Khomeini said: "weakening our army is weakening Islam. Do not weaken. Of course, it is refined; all offices will be purged, and all ministries will be purged. Thieves go out; traitors go out, but no one is a traitor; trustees remain; they are dear" (ibid: 6/275). During this period, commanders such as Nasiri, the former head of SAVAK; Mahdi Rahimi, the former military governor of Tehran; Amirhossein Rabiei, the former commander of the Air Force; Inayatullah Muhagheghi, the commander of the Shahrokhi base in Hamedan, Parviz Amin Afshar, the head of Lashkar Guard, Brigadier General Hamedaniyan, the head of SAVAK in Kermanshah, were tried and executed (Lotfiyan, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 374-379). Later, this physical elimination continued at 404 officials of the Shah's government were executed, of which 85 were military personnel, and 153 were members of SAVAK and police. One of the other systemisation measures in the

first months after the Islamic Revolution victory was the forced retirement of senior military personnel not aligned with the revolution. On the second of Esfand 1357, seven lieutenant generals and 32 significant generals working in the Gendarmerie retired (Lotfiyan, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 380-382). This action aimed at changes in the structure of the army. In the first years, the process of cleansing the army continued. With forming the ideological political organisation, the nature and identity of the army transformed fundamentally. The purge process in the army continued until Shahrivar 1359, 12 thousand soldiers were purged (Latfiyan, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 399). This was the way to reduce the possibility of a coup and change the pre-revolutionary army.

- 5) Proclamation of Army Day: by declaring Army Day on Farvardin 29, 1358, Imam Khomeini took a strategic step to protect the army. In the Imam's five-point decree, there were various things, such as the emphasis on amnesty for military personnel who committed frequent mistakes in the previous regime, re-emphasis on hierarchy and maintaining order, which can be called the form of military systemisation in the army after the revolution. In a part of Imam Khomeini's message, we see: "Wednesday, Farvardin 29, will be declared Army Day." On this day, the honourable army should parade in the big cities with ceremonies and announce their support for the Islamic Republic and the great nation of Iran and their presence for sacrifice in the path of independence and protecting the country's borders. The people of Iran are obliged to welcome the Islamic army and show them brotherly respect. Now the army is in the nation's service and Islam. The army is Islamic. The honourable nation must recognise it officially and declare their support for it. It is not permissible to oppose the Islamic army, which is the protector of independence and the guardian of its borders." (Khomeini: 7/20-21) In this era, when this action of Imam Khomeini is compared with how America did after occupying Iraq and disbanding that country's army, everyone understands what power and authority the Imam had and the depth of his power and influence. There is an understanding between the people and the army.

At that time, many thought that maintaining the army's organisation could lead to a revolution against them. However, by calling the army to the streets with all its military equipment, the Imam showed everyone how much the revolution could control the army organisation, and there was no longer any possibility of planning for the Americans and the remaining agents of the royal regime from the army. The Imams were so sure about the army condition that they did not choose even one person

from outside the army to be the commander of any rank. Simultaneously, they were managing the army through the army members. Now we understand what a great help the army did to the country at that time. We also understand that those who raised the slogan of disbanding the army wanted to destroy the country's military power with the hands of the nation itself so that Saddam could attack the lands of Iran and the Islamic revolution with a more straightforward idea. When America could not prevent the victory of the Islamic revolution and the overthrow of the regime in the country through the uprising of the people against the Pahlavi regime, with Saddam's attack on the Islamic revolution and through a neighbouring country, he decided to punish the people of Iran who had taken the government out of the hands of America.

- 6) Changing the nature of the army; one of the significant actions of the Imam was to create a mechanism to change the quality and nature of the army. In this regard, he says: "The army is the basis of a nation; it is the protector of a nation; if the army and its thinking become Islamic, it will bring the country to the desired perfection." (Khomeini: 10/47) hence, the ideological political organisation of the army was created to create an army following the system of the Islamic Republic. Imam Khomeini, fully aware of the situation, issued a decree and appointed Gholamreza Safaei as the head of the political and ideological department of the army. He also issued a ruling to the head of the Joint Staff of the Army. He stated that the ideological political organisation in choosing its policy is only subject to the Velayat-e Faqih and only to the Joint Staff of the Army regarding humaneness, preparation and support. Then, the first table of the political and ideological administration of the army was approved on 25/03/1360. Subsequently, Sayyid Ahmad Khomeini announced in a letter to the Imam's consultation office in the army that, according to the Imam, this table will be sent to all organisations and departments affiliated to the Joint Staff of the Army, the Tripartite Forces and other relevant bodies. Moreover, to emphasise its implementation (www.aja.ir).
- 7) Establish new military institutions; while maintaining and strengthening the army, Imam Khomeini issued decrees to establish new military and revolutionary institutions. In this regard, the Islamic Revolution Committees, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and the Basij Mustazafin were also established. These institutions within the army were formed into the military organisation of the Islamic Republic. Examining these institutions is beyond the scope of this article.

Conclusion

By processing the hypothesis of the article, the following can be mentioned. These cases explain part of the Imam's management in the secure and institutionalised transition of the Islamic Revolution.

- 1) Every government needs a strong, powerful and organised armed force to maintain its independence, security and territorial integrity. After its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also provided armed forces to maintain itself and repel internal and external threats, including the General Headquarters, the Islamic Republic Army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the police force, and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Support.
- 2) The transition of revolutions to the post-revolutionary situation significantly affects the fate of revolutions. The Islamic revolution was the result of a broad coalition of social forces. Since 23 Bahman 1357, the political forces have fulfilled their desired system to direct the revolution's future path. The referendum's result determines the type of post-Pahlavi system that showed the social weight of political forces. The religious forces under Imam Khomeini's leadership had the revolutionary current's decisive leadership. However, without a proper strategy and revolutionary systemisation, this majority might have led to other results. Imam Khomeini, knowing the strong support of the Iranian nation, organised and military systemisation that they had started several years before the revolution, and in the stage after the victory and organisation, especially in the military security, they managed strategically.
- 3) If the strategy of the left movement in the military systemisation had been realised, two ways for the Islamic revolution could have been envisioned. First, the People's Army replaced the Pahlavi Army, and by preventing the formation of the revolutionary and Islamic army, a minority group gained power through the means of violence and repression. Then, with the large-scale dismissal of army forces, maximum recruitment did not occur, considering that other military-security forces were not yet institutionalised, and ethnic conflicts led to civil war. The occurrence of ethnic riots is a part of the disbanding of the army process, and at the same time, it is also considered a part of its consequences; the army was disbanded. Considering the historical experience, building an army was a long-term process; therefore, the Islamic Revolution faced a military gap that was very difficult to fill. The interference of foreign powers to achieve their interests also

aggravated this unstable situation.

- 4) If the strategy of strengthening the army, which Bani-Sadr desired, were fulfilled, the Pahlavi army, especially with foreign support, would have succeeded in a coup. He would change the revolution's destiny by committing a violent coup and relying on foreign support. Although the army could not stage a coup before the revolution, this ruling should not be extended to the post-revolution period. The failed coup attempt in Nojeh in Tir 1358 is the most crucial reason to prove this claim.
- 5) If the strategy of weakening the army had continued, the coup could have been prevented. However, the weak national military structure would not last against the leftist opposition groups with powerful militias, and the revolution would fall into the hands of the leftists. In addition, the construction of political power in the neighbouring countries of the Islamic Republic is such that the military weakening of Iran after the revolution was considered as the loss of balance of power and equilibrium, and Iran was attacked. Part of the reason for Iraq's attack on Iran was based on Saddam's government's perception of Iran's military situation, especially after the Islamic Revolution victory, and the military systemisation strategy of the interim government.
- 6) Imam Khomeini with the gradual approach of changing the military structure at quantitative and qualitative levels, which was carried out during a long process in negative aspects - before the revolution - and positive aspects - after the revolution. They both prevented the restoration of the pre-revolutionary regime and preserved Iran's military structure. The extensive and people-based military structure managed the longest and, simultaneously, the unequal of the 20th century. With the establishment and self-sufficiency of the army, after 38 years, Iran has become one of the critical regional powers, which has drawn its security borders far beyond the geographical borders and has become a factor in maintaining the security of the region.

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