

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

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Abstract

The Iranian society in transition, which has been confronted with far-reaching social, cultural, economic and political changes in recent decades, has been subject to considerable divergence in terms of the values and behavior of the new generations. Such changes require the special attention of policy makers and state planners. The present study aims to clarify the extent to which key policy makers are paying attention to generational change in development programs. The theoretical framework of this paper draws on Bourdieu's theory of intergenerational conflict and focuses on the unequal distribution of power and wealth between generations. Using an institutional approach, this study examines the regularities of development programs and assesses the extent to which development programs focus on the transmission of values to reduce intergenerational differences. It also examines the extent to which development programs pay attention to a balanced distribution of resources and facilities in order to prevent a deepening of the generation gap. The research findings show that development programs have formulated and adopted different strategies in relation to both aspects, the communication of values and the pursuit of equitable distribution of resources and the creation of social justice.

Keywords: Generational Changes, Development Programs, Generational Gap, Values.

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Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

Introduction

The term generational difference refers on the one hand to strong differences of opinion and perspective as well as explicit and implicit psychological, social and cultural differences within a society and on the other hand to significant semantic differences in the insights, awareness, beliefs, perceptions, aspirations, value orientations and behavioral patterns between two or more generations within a society at the same time. The phenomenon of the generation gap is not thought to have played a major role in the past, particularly until the twentieth century. There were no obvious signs of this divide and its conflict as it manifests itself today in the form of constant rebellions and confrontations between young and old generations.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War, countries around the world experienced a series of changes such as wars, movements and social revolutions, which led to the emergence of a wide and deep divide between older and modern generations in dealing with the crises of modern life, and the inefficiency and lack of skills and abilities of the adult society in dealing with similar issues.

Also, one of the crucial aspects and manifestations of this gap can be attributed to the inefficiency of traditional institutions such as family, educational system, and cultural institutions in adapting to the complex and constantly changing new world. This gap and distance have been exacerbated with the growing influence of mass media and their penetration into the minds of the audience, increasing the power of choice of the young generation in selecting their communication channels and using the content of their choice for transmitting messages or any other use in areas such as work, politics, leisure, etc., to the extent that it has become a turning point in the difference in conditions and cultural and experiential differences between old and new generations (Tavakkol, Ghazizadeh, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 9).

From then until today, the situation changed. In modern conditions, we no longer see natural differences. We don't see them as normal or small. The reality is that the generation gap today is deeper than ever before. This is because the current generation has seen new technology and social changes. They have seen more of these changes than any other generation in history. In recent decades, the culture has changed. This has made an environment that is good for changes in the values and attitudes of social groups. This is especially true for the new generations of Iranian society. So, we see the rise of a growing split between past and present generations. This split creates generations. They have different abilities, experiences, knowledge, ideas, and

desires. These differences often lead to serious conflicts. Social analysts call this split generational divides. So, we can acknowledge that the generational gap is a common problem today. The world is changing.

Iranian society has seen many civil movements. Understanding generations and their social changes requires consideration. These movements exist and can impact society. They suggest to the country's planners: Address the needs of all generations. These include the Constitutional Revolution. They also include the movement to nationalize. There are also the Islamic Revolution and post-revolutionary social movements. So were the mass protest movements between these major changes. At first glance, the intervals between these movements are regular and suggest a role for generations. The Constitutional Revolution was in the 1280s. The nationalization movement of oil was in the 1320s. The movement culminated in the Islamic Revolution in the 1350s; after the Islamic Revolution, more movements have taken place in the Islamic Republic. Its proponents say these intervals are common to many movements in Iranian society. They provide a chance to cultivate a new generation that fits it with new cultures and values; but, progress has been so rapid. It made new styles possible after each movement. In general, proponents hold three different positions on this issue. Globalization, urbanization, and new tech are changing the world. They are changing its values, norms, and culture. It's fair to say that the new generation faces this new world (Moosavi Fard and Forati, 2023 AD/1401 SH: 91-92).

So, knowing this issue in modern Iran is vital. Iran has had ups and downs. It has seen revolution, war, and sanctions; but, it has also seen efforts to rebuild and strengthen society. This knowledge matters at home and abroad. So, attention to development programs is part of the government's plan. The plan is a roadmap for many sectors. Thus, this attention is essential. In our country, the leadership announces the general policies of development programs. They do this after consulting with the Expediency Discernment Council.

The leadership also communicates the policies as the executor of the programs; rather, ministries and government agencies also state their needs, programs, and proposals. They do this for five years; so, based on these, attention to the young generation as the force of society in many fields is a key point. This paper will explore it and will look at how development programs aim to teach values. They do this to reduce the generational gap; it aim to divide resources and facilities and will prevent the generational divide from growing.

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

1. Research Background

Since the topic of the present research is quite new and innovative, not much research has been conducted on examining generational changes in development programs. However, in this section, we will discuss some of the researches that have been done on generational changes or related policies.

Moghtadai and colleagues (2018), in their article titled "Cultural Policy and Management of Generational Gap in Iran," addressed the issue of generational gap in Iran and how policy-making can manage it. They presented solutions while examining the causes of generational gap within the framework of Jones' policy cycle model. Their research findings indicate that the interaction between religious, governmental, and familial institutions has a significant impact on reducing or exacerbating the generational gap. They also highlighted how urbanization and population growth, along with the information and communications revolution, have exposed the new generation to a new world, which changes their values, norms, and culture. The research concludes the existence of a generational gap in Iran and emphasizes the necessity of attention and policy-making in this regard.

Moradi (2021), in the article "Analysis of Family Cultural Policies in Iran after the Revolution," seeks to answer the question of what the cultural policy in the family sphere has been based on and to what extent these policies have achieved their goals. The author, using a qualitative approach and document analysis, delineates the desired family of cultural policymakers. The investigations show that the desired family of cultural policymakers is one that meets the needs such as addressing material and non-material needs, proper upbringing of children, a center of warm and intimate relationships, and most importantly, the fundamental foundation of society. Existing realities indicate that the Iranian family, like other societies, has undergone changes and has not fulfilled the expectations of cultural policymakers in achieving the desired form.

Tavakkol and Ghazizadeh (2006), in their article "Generational Gap in Sociological Approaches: A Review and Critique of Historical Assimilation Approaches and Contradictions with Reference to Mannheim and Bourdieu's Theories," aim to recognize the theoretical foundations and roots of the issue of generational gap and conflict by introducing and criticizing two main approaches: Historical assimilation generation with a focus on Mannheim's generational theory and the structural contradiction approach with reference to Bourdieu's generational contradiction theory. The Mannheim approach considers the generational gap as an inevitable result of the unique experiences of

different historical generations, while the second approach considers the main source of generational conflicts as the unequal distribution of resources, power, and capital among generations in various social spheres.

The examination of the above articles shows that none of the studies have focused on the extent of attention given by development programs to generational gaps and changes. Therefore, the present article addresses this novel topic.

2. Theoretical Foundations

It is one of the oldest major theories about the generational gap and conflict. Bourdieu expounded the theory. According to Bourdieu, now, the generation gap is horizontal. In many social spheres, young people clash with the elderly. They have different power and wealth (Tavakkol, Ghazizadeh, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 106-107). Bourdieu thinks that the age split into old and young is not quite right. Splitting people into youth and old age within or between generations creates tension. In his view, during the Middle Ages, adults justified and enabled the use of power. They did this by attributing a set of traits to young people. They saw these traits as distinct from those of adults. These traits include recklessness, violence, and less use of reason in behavior. They keep power for themselves and do it by pretending these traits are maturity, wisdom, and rationality. According to Bourdieu, these divisions put everyone in their place; so, being young or old is not a real matter for others in society. It is a made thing. The two groups' conflict has taken shape in many parts of society. It's in politics, the economy, and culture.

Continuing his discussion, Bourdieu brings up the issue. Generation comes from conflicts over economic and cultural interests in a specific field. These come from class structures and education. Family and schools support some young people, he says. Others lack such chances. He raises the question of whether we can use the concept of "Youth" for both these classes. He believes that free education in modern societies caused the real conflict. It made clear the divisions between young people from different classes. After discussing youth and old age as social structures and divisions, Bourdieu also talked about their different conditions. He talked about the opportunities for young people. These differences vary by social class. Then, he dives into the recent spread of education. Education has a key role in the growth of awareness and generations. This is especially true in lower classes. It leads to generational gaps and conflicts. They come from spreading education and each generation becomes more aware of their position compared to the last. They also become aware of their demands from it.

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

Bourdieu writes that demands from both parents and children create the structure. The demands are in different situations; they create opportunity and status. These demands differ by generation. It was a great privilege for parents. But, it has become common for their children. For example, during a period when parents were twenty years old, only some of their peers owned a car. Now, owning such a vehicle is very common. Many intergenerational conflicts come from conflicting demands of different generations. These demands take shape across generations.

Bourdieu also refers to the placement of trained individuals. They have received training in various positions but maintain similar social statuses. For example, in an office, a person with a degree has a position. They work alongside a younger person with a higher degree. The younger person considers themselves competent due to their higher degree. The older individual claims expertise based on their experience. They relate their experience to their history and time spent active. These two individuals find themselves in competition and conflict over valid academic credentials. Often, we see generational tensions. They arise from the different relationships that generations have with the education system. These relationships create social positions based on it. Bourdieu thinks that even in capitalist systems today, there is tension between generations. This is partly because the time for generational replacement is long. Parsons, from a functionalist perspective, has also noted this. This is because people live a long time. It takes a while for them to retire and for young people to replace them. As a result, people distribute wealth and power. The present generation has monopolized many resources. This causes conflicts with other generations. We can reform how wealth and power are distributed to find a way out. It is to end the monopoly on material and spiritual capital held by the present generation. This will establish intergenerational justice (Tavakkol, Ghazinajad, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 120-122).

Iranian society has changed from the past. Reference groups have shifted. So, the generational gap has become more important. New social and political changes emerged in the 1370s. The Reformist government was a big part of this. The Reformist Government (cf. Jalalipour, 2003) led it. These changes made the issue of generations and youth more serious. Currently, three perspectives on the status of generations in Iran exist. Intellectuals, politicians, and social planners hold them: Generational gap, generational solidarity, and simultaneous competition and interaction (Bengston and Jennifer, 1986 AD/1364 SH: 685-698). But only two views on the generations in Iran matter. They are for or against change and discontinuity. One view sees new

generations not passing on culture. They see this as evidence of a gap between generations. This perspective has a structural view of contemporary culture. It sees what new generations produce as incompatible. They clash with the values of past ones. The second view disagrees. It says that Iran today has a gap between generations. It is not a gap between cultures, but a gap between generations. According to this view, this gap has always existed between generations. It is a key part of human history. This gap comes from the growth of information and the rise in the power of storing it. Social progress depends on this process. It is due to the growth of information and knowledge. It is also due to progress in technology and thinking (Abdollahian, 2003 AD/1381 SH: 252-253).

Bourdieu's theory forms the basis of the article. It looks at the reformist nature of the theory of structural contradiction. It examines development programs on reducing the generational gap. It focuses on actions that could reduce the gap. This includes balanced wealth distribution and intergenerational justice. This article's research method relies on an institutional approach. It starts by looking at each development program. It then extracts the level and method of attention to the transfer of values. This aims to prevent a bigger generation gap. It aims to achieve fairness by sharing resources and facilities. Next, we identify the main discourse of each program. We do this using interpretive analysis. We then explain it in tables.

3. Development Programs and Generational Changes

In response to the main question of this article regarding the examination of the attention of development programs to generational changes and gaps, in this section, we first focus on the explicit and direct attention of development programs to generational changes. Then, to investigate governmental policies regarding the moderation and reduction of generational gaps, we pay attention to sections of development programs that address intergenerational justice and wealth redistribution.

3.1. Development Programs and Strategies in the Field of Generational Changes

At first, it may seem that programs have not focused on generational changes (Hosseini et al, 2023 AD/1401 SH: 32). But, further examination shows that programs are not adapting to generational changes. The country needs to address these changes. This is especially true for transferring values to the next generation. Development programs show the needs of the time. They reveal the attention and necessity that society needs paying attention to this point. Fixing the

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

gaps in each program shows what areas society needed then. Next, we look at each program's special focus. They focus on policies to address this issue.

3.2. Second Development Program

The first development program focused on entering the economy after the war. It aimed at economic moderation and fixing war damage. But, it somewhat neglected the culture. We focus on the policies of the second to seventh development programs. Development programs address a special point. It is the deepening and spread of Islamic and Revolution values. Future generations inherit them. Almost all programs exhibit this focus after the second. The second development program pursues the transfer of values. It does this through direct education. In this regard, the second part of the program is paragraph 14 of its policies. It promotes both counting and improving culture. It also supports the transfer of Islamic Revolution values. This includes promoting the Imam's personality. It also means improving radio and TV programs and, it means expanding moral education for different age groups. The program aims to foster contentment and thrift. It provides good life models. It also aims to build national solidarity and respect for the law. It also aims to preserve family dignity and strengthen youth's sense of responsibility. It promotes sports and PE for all. This is especially for spiritual and physical growth and fun.

Furthermore, in this section, the government pays special attention to the young generation in various areas, including special attention to education and upbringing and appropriate modeling for the young generation to prevent their attraction to foreign cultures and providing necessary facilities for employment and marriage, which is detailed in clause 60.

The provisions stated in this program indicate that the cultural policymaking perspective during this period is based on an education-centered discourse. In other words, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution considers the transfer of values to the next generation through direct education as effective. Therefore, most clauses related to this issue are based on direct education.

3.3. Third Development Program

Article 159 of the Third Development Program requires relevant organizations to research. They must do so to strengthen the ideas of the Islamic Revolution and the culture of jihad and martyrdom. This is especially true for young people. They must also run educational programs. The programs must engage people; besides, relevant agencies must make programs. The programs are to educate managers about Islamic and Iranian values. They will also introduce the Imam's

personality and leadership. This will happen through the media and various ministries. Article 162 is part of the third development program. It shows the legislature's special focus on generational changes. In this article, the Ministry of Culture must do studies. They must define cultural indicators that fit the goals of the Islamic Republic. The legislature also mandates the government. It must create a HQ to supervise and check. It will be under the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. It will assess broad cultural changes. It will find cultural challenges and crises. It will report them to the responsible agencies. Article 163 has measures to raise the position of mosques. It aims to promote faith, and cultural and spiritual values among various groups. This is especially true for young people and adolescents.

The policymaker's perspective in the third program shows that the transfer of values solely through direct education has not been entirely successful. So, the need for research on the effectiveness and deepening of values becomes apparent, and understanding societal cultural transformations and determining indicators becomes necessary. Therefore, the discourse gradually shifts from an education-centered approach to a management and planning discourse. The cultural gaps and transformations in the young generation necessitate the assessment of cultural transformations and the establishment of a supervisory and evaluation headquarters by development programs.

3.4. Fourth Development Program

Article 97 of the Fourth Development Program says the government must prepare a plan. The plan must control social harms by improving mental health. It must also promote enthusiasm and deepen religious values and social norms. Also, in Article 106, the government must take steps to deepen values. These values include beliefs and spiritual culture. They must also maintain the Islamic-Iranian identity and raise religious knowledge. They will do this through activities to promote enjoining good and forbidding evil.

They will also use media to counter-cultural invasion and promote prayer culture. It also has a plan to expand religious spaces and mosques. It includes media ads, better textbooks, and laws to protect the Islamic-Iranian identity. It aims to strengthen families based on Iran's spiritual heritage and it has more plans. The fourth program's provisions relate to cultural and generational changes. They show that managing culture and planning need to change now. Policymakers aim to pass more social and Islamic norms to future generations. Education is still on the agenda; but, focus on collective reactions. These include enjoining good and forbidding evil, and controlling social damages. They show that policymakers are focusing on cultural engineering.

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

They are trying to move values between domains. Internal and external knowledge systems form the basis of the domains. They will do this through specific management mechanisms and processes.

3.5. Fifth Development Plan

Article 1 of the fifth development plan emphasizes this. Iran should base its Islamic model on Islamic and revolutionary values. Iran's Islamic model says this. Additionally, the government must support non-governmental sectors. This is to deepen Islamic values and beliefs. It will strengthen cultural and social norms. In Article 15, the government must review textbooks and educational content. We must base these values on religious and revolutionary ideals. The needs of the job market come first. Article 19 also highlights such programs. They aim to transform the education system. Article 195 aims to optimize the use of public services. They are to promote knowledge and skills. They also aim to elevate social status and advance Islamic and revolutionary values. Article 196 helps defend the country and the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. It does this by supporting Basij culture and student initiatives.

These initiatives align with the ideas of Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader. The fifth plan's provisions show that globalization caused a shift in lifestyles. The shift was regarding the internet and satellite access. This shift has caused cultural invasions and clashes, especially among the young. Hence, scattered policies are inadequate, and comprehensive policymaking is necessary. Accordingly, two major frameworks for transmitting values are being developed. One is in education and training. It takes the form of fundamental change documents. The other is an Iranian-Islamic model. These two major documents represent a return to cultural control. This control is through education and lifestyle change.

3.6. Sixth Development Plan

The sixth development plan follows past policies. But, it is supportive and defensive. It is against programs that undermine values. In Article 106, the plan explicitly states, "Defense of the ideals and foundations of the Islamic Revolution and the development of the culture of enjoining good and forbidding evil through deepening the values of the Islamic Revolution and fostering a Basiji culture using educational nuclei and..." The sixth plan focuses on the family and its values. It aims to preserve its original functions and transfer values. Article 102 has many provisions. It includes active and smart confrontation with soft war in the family arena. It aims to stop the spread of anti-values programs. It also calls for planning. It needs education, research, and promotion by all relevant bodies. They will strengthen the family.

3.7. Seventh Development Plan

The seventh development plan, in Chapter 15, amends the mission, structure, duties, and organizations of cultural institutions to promote genuine Islamic values and the Iranian-Islamic lifestyle and the Islamic Revolution. Additionally, it outlines programs to support content production in the virtual space with the aim of deepening Islamic culture and confronting psychological warfare and cultural invasion. Furthermore, the legislature assigns Chapter 16 to women and population, aiming to strengthen the family institution, removes obstacles to the growth and flourishing of women, empower women heads of households, and develop women's employment programs under the relevant authorities.

4. Solutions of Development Programs Regarding Generational Changes

Development Plan	Summary of Legal Provisions	Dominant Discourse
Second	Deepening values and efforts to transfer them to the next generation	Education-centric discourse
Third	Examination of increasing effectiveness and deepening values	Management and planning discourse
Fourth	Deepening values, transferring them, and preventing the acceptance of foreign cultures	Cultural engineering approach
Fifth	Iranian-Islamic model advancement and fundamental transformation in education	Cultural control approach
Sixth	Combination of previous policies with a supportive and defensive stance against destructive value programs	Cultural control approach

4.1. Inter-Generational Justice and Wealth/Power Redistribution in Development Programs

As Bourdieu considers generational conflicts arising from differences between generations in accessing resources, wealth, and various forms of capital, this section examines the extent to which development programs address the redistribution of different material and symbolic resources.

4.2. Second Development Plan

The second development plan pursues wealth redistribution and social justice through distributive policies. Financial assistance and subsidized goods for vulnerable groups are emphasized during this plan. The government, to ensure social justice, poverty reduction, and employment creation, is obligated to support low-cost banking facilities according to clause 10. Clause 11 mandates the government to create regional balances through infrastructure projects, social programs, and

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

employment generation in deprived villages. Additionally, clause 12 allocates funds for direct monthly allowances to low-income groups.

4.3. Third Development Plan

This plan includes policies aimed at providing subsidies and assistance to create employment for youth and reduce inequalities:

Article 36 of the third development plan approves the formulation and implementation of a social security system to promote social justice. Article 155 emphasizes expanding social justice and providing fair access to cultural, sports, and artistic goods and services for different segments of society to create balance and reduce inequalities. Continuing the policy of providing subsidies for essential goods is addressed in Article 46, while Article 50 proposes policies to create employment in underdeveloped areas.

4.4. Fourth Development Plan

In Article 3, the government is obligated to implement compensatory policies and provide direct assistance to vulnerable groups to create social justice. Article 11 mandates banks to provide facilities for job creation. Article 19 focuses on rural and tribal development, while Article 27 approves policies to motivate investment and employment in less developed areas. Article 30 outlines a comprehensive housing plan aimed at sustainable development, social justice, and empowering low-income groups. Article 50 introduces policies for achieving educational justice, equal educational opportunities, and improving the student population. Additionally, Article 52 outlines measures for equal educational opportunities in underdeveloped areas, especially for girls. Furthermore, in Article 95, policies for poverty alleviation, reducing inequality, and bridging income disparities are considered to promote social justice and stability (Keshvardoost, 2019 AD/1397 SH: 230).

4.5. Fifth Development Plan

As mentioned earlier, the fifth plan, in the first chapter, outlines the framework for Iranian Islamic development. In Article 19, the government is tasked with drafting a comprehensive transformation plan for the education system to promote educational justice, gender equality, and address educational deprivation. Article 39 mandates the government to design a graded system of supportive services to empower individuals and needy groups. Article 80 authorizes the government to take measures for sustainable employment, entrepreneurship development, and regional balance. Article 172 introduces preventive regulations to improve environmental conditions by preventing unauthorized settlements. Furthermore, Article 194 focuses on rural development, while Article 234 addresses reducing

income disparities and redistributing incomes (Keshvardoost, 2019 AD/1397 SH: 230-233).

4.6. Sixth Development Plan

Under Article 4, the government is mandated to implement employment and skills development policies and support small, home-based, and knowledge-based businesses. Additionally, in the fifth section, regional balance, rural development, and empowering vulnerable groups are addressed. Article 26 approves the formulation of national and provincial development plans and allocates one-third of the income from oil and gas exports to oil-rich and gas-rich provinces, and two-thirds to less developed areas. Article 39 aims to promote social justice by adjusting the prices of water and energy carriers and providing income support to needy families; Articles 70 and 78 focuses on ensuring healthcare justice, expanding relief and insurance coverage, and reducing social harms. Article 112 addresses the backwardness of operational areas.

4.7. Seventh Development Plan

While the seventh development plan in Iran has not yet become a final law and is awaiting approval by the Guardian Council, the draft includes several important policies related to social justice. These policies aim to increase economic opportunities, promote educational justice, develop a skilled workforce, achieve resource and facility balance, and promote social participation. With a focus on these issues, the seventh development plan in Iran seeks to strengthen social justice and reduce generational gaps. These policies and programs can help achieve the goals of social justice and reduce generational gaps in society.

Development Programs and Generational Justice

Development Plan	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth
Program Components	Financial assistance and provision of bank loans	Payment of subsidies and support for youth employment in underdeveloped areas	Compensatory policies and direct assistance to vulnerable groups, comprehensive housing plan, and job creation	Iranian Islamic development model and fundamental transformation of education	Employment creation, skill development, support for small and home-based businesses and knowledge-based enterprises, national and provincial development plans, and addressing backwardness in operational areas
Dominant Discourse	Distributive policies	Distributive policies	Distributive policies	Educational justice and alleviation of educational deprivation	Creation of justice and equal distribution of opportunities and resources

Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

Conclusion

The gap between generations in Iranian society is growing. This is due to big social, political, cultural, and international communication changes. It is also due to the influence of media and social networks. This gap shows up in many forms. It affects the attitudes, values, and behaviors of the young. It threatens the unity and cohesion of the country. Thus, development programs have been the main government response. They aim to address these issues after the revolution. The government created them by analyzing and facing modern issues. Then, the authorities made and led their implementation. The article is based on Bourdieu's theory of generational conflict. It attributes the gap to social and historical changes. It also blames differences in access to power, wealth, and symbolic positions. The article has looked at how well programs have filled the intergenerational gap. A close look at development programs after the revolution has shown that the legislature's focus on them is questionable. This is true in two ways. First, lawmakers have seen preventing the generation gap as preserving Islamic values. They also see it as transferring them to the next generation and as part of the Islamic Revolution. So, careful look at development programs has shown the second plan aims to deepen values and efforts. It aims to pass them to the next generation through education. In the next decade, the third development plan will focus on education. It will also examine efficiency and deepen values. So, we need research to understand cultural changes in society. We also need it to find indicators in management and planning. In the fourth plan, the legislature sees an increasing gap between generations. It believes that planning and education alone are not enough. So, it aims to deepen values. It also seeks to stop accepting foreign cultures through cultural engineering.

Governmental efforts in the plans have been somewhat effective. But, the fifth plan's legislature sees the society's need as greater than the old plans. So, it adopts the Iranian Islamic development model. It also makes the fundamental transformation plan for the education system. This plan will address educational justice and gender balance. It aims to end educational deprivation. The sixth plan follows the previous policies. It adds a cultural engineering document to achieve development that fits cultural needs. It is based on preserving and promoting Islamic, revolutionary, and national values. It also focuses on the family and its values and the transfer of values. The second approach focuses on creating justice. It strives to balance access to resources and facilities. Bourdieu's theory of intergenerational conflict forms the basis of this approach. It examines how development

programs pay attention to moderating resources and facilities. A close look at development programs has shown they all aim to create justice. They do this by using resources and facilities. They have addressed related policies. The second plan prioritizes distributive policies, financial help, and bank facilities. The third plan focuses on policies to pay subsidies. They also help create jobs for young people in less developed areas. The fourth plan focuses on compensatory policies. It also includes direct help for vulnerable groups. It has full housing plans and job creation. The fifth plan adopts the Iranian Islamic development model. It makes the fundamental transformation plan for the education system. The plan aims to achieve fair education, gender balance, and end educational deprivation. The sixth plan continues the previous policies. It formulates and approves the national and provincial development documents. These will make up for the backwardness of provinces in operational areas. The seventh development plan highlights efforts to strengthen social and educational justice. The research shows the legislature has paid attention. They have drafted laws to transfer values and reduce the gap between generations. Even so, an examination of the implementation of these laws requires independent research. In conclusion, future plans should address intergenerational justice. They should include specific measures to achieve it.

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Analysis of Generational Changes and Social Justice in Development Programs of Post-Islamic Revolution in Iran

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