

**Futurism: Structuring and Configuration of Political Movements
in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

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Abstract

Apparently, the most common debate in post-revolutionary Iran is the debate between "Tradition" and "Modernity," which ultimately has manifested in the two fronts of "Traditionalism or Fundamentalism" and "Reformism or Moderation." These two fundamental dichotomies have shown themselves in every crisis and transformation, and political parties and movements in Iran have grown and been able to attract public opinion and create a social base on the basis of this general rift in Iranian society. The present study aims to answer the main question of 'How the future structuring and configuration of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran will be?' And 'What scenarios can be envisioned in this regard?' To this aim, a qualitative document analysis method was used and data collected using the tool of fishing from various sources. Additionally, by employing the scenario-writing method, it delves into examining the future structuring and configuration of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, three scenarios or configurations in the arrangement and structuring of political movements in the form of fundamentalism and moderation, reinterpretation and reconstruction of the principles and discursive elements of political movements known as fundamentalist and reformist and formation of a new arrangement and configuration.

Keywords: Futurism, Political Movements, Islamic Republic of Iran, Fundamentalism, Moderation.

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Introduction

According to many sociologists, social cleavages determine the types of desires of forces and various groupings and political movements. In other words, political parties and movements are considered as interpreters of existing cleavages in any society (Darabi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 10).

Therefore, Iranian society has been structured and characterized by a complex set of social cleavages as a semi-traditional, semi-modern, or transitional society. On one hand, national, cultural, and regional cleavages related to the traditional society are more active, while on the other hand, cleavages of the modern society have emerged. In fact, Iranian society, besides these two categories of cleavages, has a deeper and more fundamental cleavage stemming from the same dichotomy that is studied under the title of the cleavage between renewal and traditionalism. This cleavage has various manifestations in recent Iranian history, economically, culturally, and politically, usually referred to as "Dual Economy" or subsistence economy (production for consumption) versus commodity economy (production for sale). Socially, in the contemporary political history of Iran, the confrontation between pre-capitalist classes versus capitalist-related classes is a manifestation of this cleavage. From this perspective, aristocracy, clergy, market, and petite bourgeoisie are juxtaposed against the new bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and working classes. Culturally and politically, the confrontation between conservatism or traditionalism and reformism or modernism is also a manifestation of the same fundamental cleavage. In summary, political life in Iran during the twentieth century has been heavily influenced by conflicts arising from the cleavage between tradition and renewal (Bashirieh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 14).

These fundamental dualities have manifested themselves in every crisis and transformation, and political parties and movements have also grown on the basis of this general cleavage in Iranian society, attracting public opinion and creating a social base. Therefore, understanding the current and future status of groupings and configurations of political movements in any political system and related transformations is of great importance. Therefore, given the importance of futurism as an interdisciplinary field for studying issues and phenomena and the necessity of understanding the existing political movements, the present paper aims to answer the main question of 'How the future structuring and configuration of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran will be and what scenarios can be envisioned in this regard?'

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1. Data collecting and Research Background

The present study has been utilized documentary analysis to provide an accurate description and ultimately achieve a valid analysis; by using this technique, we will delve into studying and extracting data from all books, articles, and other printed sources that have been written about the structure and configuration of political movements in Iran, as well as their components and discursive elements. Additionally, all discussions related to the political sociology debate in Iran and the backgrounds of forming the fundamentalism and reformism will be addressed. Since this research aims to identify the future, it does not rely on hypothetical testing strategies. Furthermore, we will also utilize the method of scenario writing. Scenario planning is a common method of future studies that creates plausible and internally consistent images of the future based on information about probabilities and future trends (Lindgren and Bandhold, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 36).

No independent work has been done or published on the existing writings on this topic (future studies on the structuring and configuration of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran). Most have focused on examining the movements themselves, and no research has been conducted regarding their future. There are articles such as "Analysis of Divergence of Political Movements in Iran after the Islamic Revolution Using Layered Analysis Method of Causes and Leading Scenarios in the Horizon of 1402-1415" by Maliheh Ramezani, Mohsen Boyuk, etc., published in the Iranian Journal of Future Studies. They answered the question of 'How the factors of divergence among political movements in Iran after the victory of the Islamic Revolution can be analyzed and what scenarios lie ahead for political movements in Iran from 1402 to 1415?' The research findings indicated that this divergence can be analyzed for a wide range of reasons, from the level of fundamental systems of institutional power construction to the formation of parties, as elitist initiatives, worldviews, and discourses of charismatic political power to the political culture of supporter-follower (from myth to metaphor) individualism in Iran to the belief in a strong government - weak society.

The article "Evaluating the Future Scenarios of Political Movements in Iran in 1404", wrote by Maliheh Ramezani, Javad Emamzadeh, etc., in the Strategic Quarterly Journal in the summer of 1396. The authors have utilized the method of uncertainty matrix to write scenarios. The research findings indicated that considering the two important uncertainties of leadership and people, four scenarios can be considered for the future of political movements in Iran. The first scenario, as the most desirable future, involves ignoring the unifying

elements of the people in the system for political movements and neglecting challenging factors, both internal and external threats, can challenge the realm of political movements and the future of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran system, failing to achieve a desirable future in the realm of political movements.

Four conceptual frameworks of future studies and social gaps in Iran:

2. Future Studies

Some futurists define future studies as understanding the future by studying possible and desirable futures of a society, while others use the term strategic foresight. Therefore, the future is the cause of the present and the past and is a way for everyone to control their future. In other words, the goal of thinking based on foresight is to illuminate current and past choices in the light of possible futures (Moradipour, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 46).

Wendell Bell, as one of the pioneers in the field of future studies, believes that future studies are a growing research field that encompasses systematic and explicit thinking about alternative futures. He says: "Examining perspectives and systematically studying alternative futures to help people choose and create the most desirable future. Futurists use various combinations of past knowledge, present knowledge, imagination, desires, and needs to achieve this goal. In addition, futurists try to discover unforeseen, unintended, and unrecognized consequences of social activities." (Mir Khalili, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 24)

Futurists, because the future has not yet happened, are forced to use some methods that are somewhat different from scientific and traditional methods for studying the present and the past in order to analyze the future. Among the various methods of future studies, scenario writing is one of the methods used in the space of ambiguity and uncertainty (Ramezani et al., 2017 AD/1396 SH: 135).

This method consists of organized and structured information related to possible events and occurrences in the future based on different perspectives of the future. It, especially for helping understand events that seem to involve a combination of unrelated information, is useful. The most crucial advantage of this method is the integration of ambiguities and uncertainties existing in different perspectives. This method can effectively articulate various possibilities in future events, but at the same time, the problem of scenario writing, which is considered a limitation of the method, lies in the dependence of scenarios on the thoughts and policies of the scenario writer (Mardoukhi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 96).

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"Wendell Bell" in the book "Foundations of Future Studies" believes that scenario writing is an activity through which one can distinguish professional futurology from amateur and non-professional futurology. Scenario writing brings a cognitive unity to futurology because all futurology methods can be transformed into scenarios or futurology methods can be a prelude to scenario writing. In fact, a scenario is the ideal product of futurology (Abdul Rahim, 2017 AD/1392 SH).

The rise of political movements in Iran can be attributed to the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the opening of the country's political space, which, as a result of discussions and debates, is known among various intellectual spectrums in society as a suitable ground for party activities and the stability of political movements. However, the trends and events that have occurred in the Iranian political system and society over the past four decades have prevented the formation of stability and institutionalization of political movements in Iran. For example, the split of the Combatant Clergy Association from the Society of Combatant Clergy and the suspension of the activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Party in the first decade of the revolution, as well as the changes and developments in the leftist movement, such as the emergence of the modern leftist movement against the traditional left and its transformation into reformism after the presidential elections in 1376, and the changes in the right-wing movement, its split into modern right-wing and its transformation into fundamentalism from the late 1370s onwards and in recent years into neo-fundamentalism, reinforce this belief. Therefore, the present paper, with a futurology approach and using scenario writing, which is one of the common methods in the science of futurology, seeks to examine the future structuring and configuration of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the form of three scenarios:

- 1) Continuation of the configuration and structuring of political movements in the form of fundamentalism and reformism;
- 2) Reinterpretation and reconstruction of the ideological elements and discourses of political movements known as fundamentalists and reformists;
- 3) Formation of a new configuration and structuring.

3. Social Gaps and Political Groupings in Iran

Social forces and groups are not sudden phenomena but have roots in interests and various tendencies within the social structure. In other words, identifying the roots of group formation around important social gaps becomes apparent in society. When examining social gaps,

geographical and historical variations must be considered. The type, number, and method of structuring social gaps within a country may vary from one society to another and from one time to another regarding the various factors. Based on these diversities, social gaps can be categorized as active or dormant, structural or historical. A social gap becomes active when political grouping, action, and political awareness take root in it. This class division's external appearance (grouping, action, and political awareness) can be seen as party alignments, electoral struggles, or armed conflicts considering the factors such as less or more political development in a country (Peipanuris, Keddie et al., 2009 AD/1388 SH: 16).

On the one hand, gaps are the raw material of political struggles. In the broad sense, the researcher deals with something that separates "Us" from "Them." In fact, all societies have gaps and differ only in the degree of tension and stability among each other. Therefore, based on the aforementioned points, social gaps can be defined by the following criteria:

- 1) Regarding the structural conflicts that lead to division, alignment, and grouping in society;
- 2) Having fundamental differences on key societal issues;
- 3) Difficulty in easily reconciling different perspectives (Rajabi Gharah Gheshlaghi; Ahmadvand, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 20).

Various social, cultural, and ethnic gaps and contradictions have existed in Iranian society. However, the most common dispute in modern Iran has been the conflict between "Tradition" and "Modernity," which ultimately led to the formation of two fronts: "anti-Modernity" and "pro-Modernity." This fundamental duality has manifested itself in every crisis and transformation; even during the time of Amir Kabir and Naser al-Din Shah, this conflict existed, and for example, one of its most famous manifestations is the dispute between "Constitutionalism" and "Absolutism," which immediately emerged from the heart of the Constitutional Revolution. In fact, at present, these are the same two huge entities that have faced each other in all periods of modern times, nothing new! Yes, there is no doubt about the antiquity of this contradiction, but the new fundamental point is that these two forces have equal magnificence and power for the first time. In summary, it can be said that the political life in Iran, as a society halfway between tradition and modernity or in a tough transition phase, is under the influence of conflicts arising from the gap between tradition and renewal.

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4. Formation Backgrounds of Fundamentalism and Reformism Movements

From the Constitutional period until now, we have witnessed the emergence of political currents and spectrums with different approaches and conflicting tendencies in Iranian society. The Islamic religious movement, Marxist leftist movement, reformist movement, nationalist movement, and monarchist movement can be considered the most vital political currents from the Constitutional period to the present. Among these currents, the Islamic-oriented movement or the discourse of Islamic jurisprudence was able to eliminate all other currents and become the most influential in the country's political arena. In fact, the ability to access and communicate with the masses, broad support, religious credibility, and intelligent strategies of leaders, along with skillful use of historical conditions, are considered the main factors of its success (Ramezani and Nikounahad, 2022 AD/1401 SH: 26).

The shift towards religion, spirituality, and martyrdom, which had engulfed Iranian society, especially the youth, in the early 1360s, was a sign of the complete and unparalleled hegemony of the political Islamic jurisprudence discourse. The success of this discourse in shaping the Iranian society's identity and repelling rival identities was such that, as Imam Khomeini repeatedly pointed out, it remained more of a miracle (Hoseinizadeh, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 256).

Therefore, by solidifying the Islamic-oriented discourse, internal discord and divisiveness within the Islamic-oriented movement were avoided. However, the three fundamental factors that delayed or prevented the intensification of this internal discord and divisiveness within the Islamic-oriented movement were: The comprehensive leadership of Imam Khomeini and his charismatic personality, the war with Iraq, and confrontation with the United States. The first signs of discord were found in the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, where with the martyrdom of Motahhari, the only representative of the Imam in the party and his followers who did not agree with some of the leftist ideas.

The scope of the discord extended to the Islamic Republic Party, the largest supporter organization of political Islamic jurisprudence. This party, like the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Revolution, was divided into two wings known as left and right. Gradually, this discord expanded beyond the party and divided the country's political arena into two rival factions. The right-wing, consisting mostly of first-class clerics and members of the Islamic Coalition Party, believed in reducing government intervention, increasing market freedom, strengthening the private sector, and aligning laws with traditional jurisprudence. On the

other hand, the left-wing defended state economy and recognized the possibility of legislation beyond traditional jurisprudence by relying on the concept of "Dynamic Jurisprudence" and "Secondary Commandments." Government penalties, labor laws, land reforms, direct taxes, foreign trade, and methods to combat inflation were contentious issues in the early years of the 1360s (Shadlou, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 195).

After the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party, the Society of Militant Clergy of Tehran and the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, which had traditional right-leaning tendencies and were considered part of the political currents of that period, formed the Assembly of Militant Clerics on the eve of the third parliamentary elections. The rifts and internal disagreements within the dominant right-wing discourse became more pronounced in the fifth parliamentary elections. In these elections, while left-wing groups withdrew from the competition to the benefit of their rivals and practically marginalized themselves, disagreements emerged between some ministers and government officials with the Society of Militant Clergy, leading to the formation of the Construction Worker's Party. Emphasizing people's political participation, expanding political relations with other countries, and development and prosperity, this party became famous for its modern conservatism. Nevertheless, as the presidential election approached in the second half of 1375, competition and challenges intensified.

The Assembly of Militant Clerics, the Construction Worker's Party, and the Organization of the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution introduced Sayyid Mohammad Khatami as their candidate, while the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, along with a group of right-wing factions, emphasized the competence of Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri. Thus, a tight competition began, leading to the rise of the Reformist Political Islam movement, which became famous as the "Second of Khordad." (Jamshidi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 35)

This movement played a fundamental role in three important areas at the beginning of the 1370s:

- 1) Religious reforms, represented by Dr. Soroush;
- 2) Economic reforms, represented by Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani;
- 3) Political reforms followed by the newspaper "Salam," the weekly magazine "Asr-e Ma," and the members of its Strategic Research Center.

From the late 1370s, as reformists labeled their rivals as conservatives and authoritarian, the term "Fundamentalism" found its way into the country's political literature. Undoubtedly, this discourse was based on

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delegitimizing the reformist discourse that had undermined some of the principles and foundations of the revolution and the Islamic system. It aimed to place fundamentalism as the essence and text of the revolution and the Islamic system, and to base it on the main goals of the revolution, Imam Khomeini, and the Islamic system. On the other hand, the fundamentalism proposal was also aimed at refuting accusations of conservatism and authoritarianism (Darabi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 99).

Therefore, from 1378 onwards, with the societal transformations and tensions arising from the extremism of the reformists and their policies of tolerance and leniency, which had led to the weakening and deviation of the values and principles of the revolution, a group of revolutionary and ideological forces, along with parties, groups, and associations known as the "Convergence of the Society of Clergy," under the Coordination Council of Revolutionary Forces, took steps to reorganize. In their political-electoral struggles from 1380 onwards, they used this title to introduce themselves in opposition to the reformists (or, in a more negative term, the Second of Khordad revisionists) (ibid.).

5. Elements and Components of the Fundamentalism and Reformism Discourse

The concept of fundamentalist discourse is a mode of thinking that, in the face of new and modern phenomena, considers its understanding and thinking of religious texts as the criterion for opinion and action, and does not accept the achievements of modern rationality theoretically in the realm of the state. According to them, religious teachings, considering their comprehensive and complete nature, can guide humans in the modern world. Religion, in their view, is a comprehensive and complete matter and each system that seeks to govern humanity (Maleki, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 82). In contrast, the concept of reformist discourse is a discourse that not only benefits from the institution of religion in political relations but also pays attention to modern achievements in this regard; therefore, this discourse is a synthesis of political teachings of religion and modern political achievements. In this discourse, there is an empirical-historical interpretation of religious texts that accepts aspects of modern rationality in the realm of the state (ibid.).

6. Freedom

In the reformist discourse, freedom is one of the prominent concepts that seeks to find it in a modern nature, or at least compatible with the modern world. The Islamic Revolution, within this discourse, and the

Imam's uprising took on an anti-authoritarian and freedom-seeking nature, and for this reason, the Islamic Republic system must be contrary to the past regime that did not allow people to express their beliefs and thoughts and had eliminated the space for the clash of opinions and ideas. It should be a system where people feel freedom and participation in the scene of the country's activities. Therefore, in this discourse, several points regarding the concept of freedom are noteworthy (Hosseini Zadeh, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 404).

- 1) The definition of freedom in this discourse aligns closely with the definitions of this concept in modern discourses;
- 2) Freedom of thought in this discourse is highlighted as a factor in the growth and evolution of society;
- 3) Freedom is perceived as one of the most valuable assets in a way that any conflict between religion and freedom will end in favor of freedom and not religion.

The fundamentalism approach to freedom views it as a privilege granted by the government to the people. This approach emphasizes individual freedom to the extent that it does not harm the rights of others and the fundamental values of the Islamic society and does not violate Islamic laws and regulations (Qasemi, Aqareb Parast and Shafi'i, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 61). Humans are essentially obligated to obey divine commands in this discourse, and although humans are free until they believe, once they have faith, their freedom is only within the boundaries that God has ordained for them (Mesbah Yazdi, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 84). Freedom is specifically interpreted in this discourse as internal freedom and freedom from non-divine servitude, while social and political freedom is practically marginalized, and modern freedom is more associated with lawlessness and excess (Mesbah Yazdi, 2010 AD/1388 SH (b): 1, 200 and 243).

7. Foreign Policy

The inclinations of the fundamentalist current in the field of foreign policy have roots in an anti-foreign culture. The concerns of the fundamentalist current about foreigners and aliens stem from worries about changes in traditional and religious culture, which are considered the mainstay of this current. In relation to the United States, this current rejects any direct or indirect contact with this country. For example, the Combatant Clergy Association in its newsletter warns against those who try to open direct or indirect negotiations with America, stating that "America is the number one enemy of the Islamic Revolution" and will not withdraw from any "Conspiracy" against the Islamic Republic (Darabi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 125-126). This approach considers itself

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committed to adhering to the principles of foreign policy outlined in the constitution, rejecting domination and submission, preserving the country's comprehensive independence, and considering how to interact with non-belligerent countries as the basis of its strategic plans in the field of foreign policy.

On the other hand, in the reformist current, which emerged during the period of normalization based on development-oriented political and cultural reforms, stress reduction and dialogue among civilizations, advocating for negotiation and relationship with America, criticizing Western civilization rather than negating it, building trust, peace-building, and the necessity of interaction and relationship with Western culture are believed to be essential. This current believes in globalization as an unavoidable process (Dehghani, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 450).

8. Role and Position of the People

The fundamentalist approach considers the presence and continuity of the people on the scene as a necessary condition for the survival of the system and regards the people as the fundamental pillar and sustaining element of the government (Shafi'ifar, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 12-23).

Additionally, within the fundamentalist current, there is no place for people's political participation as citizens who can determine the legitimacy of the political system themselves. The people, as believers in a specific religion, fulfill their duty in elections as a religious obligation, and the people's satisfaction does not affect the legitimacy of the government but enhances the efficiency of the government (Mesbah Yazdi, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 32).

In the reformist approach, people are seen as individuals with rights and freedoms who can coexist peacefully by following the law as the basis of social order in society. Reformists believe that the government should arise from the will and consent of the people and are accountable to the people (Khatami, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 2).

In this approach, people have the right to sovereignty. The title of the Islamic Republic implies that the people's opinions play a basic role, so human governance does not contradict divine governance: "The governance of God over life and the governance of humans over their destiny are intertwined." (Khatami, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 150)

Furthermore, in addition to the people's opinions, the criteria stated in religious texts also play a role in the legitimacy of the government, meaning that both the criteria set by religion and the people's opinions influence the legitimacy of the rulers (Khatami, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 18 and 115).

9. Women

Fundamentalists, while defending women's rights, believe that the similarity of rights between men and women does not secure women's interests and that attention should be paid to the natural differences between these two genders (Motahhari, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 24).

The solution to the problems and inconsistencies in the field of women's rights lies not in abolishing or changing Islamic laws but in understanding these laws correctly and striving for their proper implementation (Shafi'i Sarvestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 115).

Prominent figures in this movement include Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Mesbah Yazdi, Javadi Amoli, and Ne'matollah Salehi Najafabadi (Zibaei Nezhad and Sobhani, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 183).

Reformists, regarding women's rights, do not solely refer to religious doctrines and believe that religion fundamentally cannot be a guide in this area. They argue that human experiences in contemporary times should be consulted, and the culture of the era should be the criterion for judging the correctness or incorrectness of values and ideals (Shirazi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 68-69).

They also believe that the social laws of Islam were legislated in accordance with the Prophet's era and the Arabian Peninsula and can only be implemented in the modern era if based on justice (Saeidzadeh, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 41-42).

Legal provisions related to women are not exempt from this rule. Azam Taleghani, Shahla Sherkat, Mohsen Kaddivar, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Ayatollah Sanei are among the supporters and advocates of this approach.

10. Explanation and Examination of the First Scenario

The political ideologies in the framework of fundamentalism and reformism in the Islamic Republic will continue:

As discussed earlier, the main divide in Iranian society is between tradition and modernity, and other divides such as ethnic, religious, and class divides cannot polarize Iranian society. The rift between tradition and modernity emerged during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, and these two elements, tradition and modernity, have stood in opposition to each other. Several important points are crucial for the continuity and development of the political currents of fundamentalism and reformism.

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11. The Continuity of the Gap between Tradition and Modernity

There is an undeniable gap in Iranian society that is not related to race, language, religion, or subculture. This gap is the gap between tradition and modernity. Part of society deeply and strongly believes in traditional values, while another part distances itself from these values and exhibits modern behaviors. The age range of these groups cannot be determined. Iranian society, however, is in transition. Some have moved beyond the traditional stage, while others resist. Just as with the martyrdom of Shaykh Fazlollah, modernity triumphed in Iran and reached its peak with the establishment of the Pahlavi regime. However, with the victory of the Islamic Revolution, traditional forces prevailed and formed the government. Yet, this gap persisted and became evident in the conflict between the Bazaar and the revolutionaries. This conflict continued even after the removal of Bani-Sadr. The traditional (right-wing) and modern (left-wing) factions clashed over tradition and modernity. The traditional faction (right) seeks to uphold principles and adhere to traditions, while the faction (left) seeks to adapt to global conditions and accept modernity. This conflict between tradition and modernity existed even in the 1370s in the form of fundamentalists and reformists. Therefore, based on historical experiences and the conflict between tradition and modernity, even if one of these factions were to disappear one day, leaving only the fundamentalists, according to this analysis, the gap between tradition and modernity would still manifest among the fundamentalists, and the conflict would continue (Shafi'ifar, 2021 AD/1400 SH).

12. The Social Base of Fundamentalist and Reformist Movements

The main origin of the fundamentalist movement can be traced back to the remnants of the members of the Islamic Republic Party and revolutionary institutions, including the Revolutionary Guards, Basij bases in mosques, Basij in government agencies and administrations, security and revolutionary institutions, and ultimately independent political forces purely following the Leader of the Revolution's directives and having a perspective close to his office. Various segments of the population, including clerics, students, scholars, workers, professionals, teachers, employees, etc., who consider obedience to the leadership as one of the most crucial values of the revolution and see religious adherence to the leadership or in some way following him as part of religious duties, are considered part of the social classes inclined towards right-wing fundamentalism. Therefore, it seems that considering the origins and social classes inclined towards this movement, the preservation of traditions and Islamic and

revolutionary values in the form of fundamentalism will continue (Shadlou, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 136).

Furthermore, considering the origin of the reformist movement, which mainly consists of the intellectual and educated segments of society, journalists, university professors, etc., and the classes that this party focuses on, including students, cultural and political intellectuals, scholars, mid-level managers in organizations, employees, and the middle and lower classes of society (ibid.), it appears that based on the origins and social classes inclined towards this movement, the reformist movement is seeking a future horizon in society. Although we have passed the generational gap and are moving towards a generational confrontation characterized by a negative approach from one generation to another, in Iran, regarding the entrenched nature of religion in the people's institutions, the orientation towards modernity does not mean the end of the religious and ethical era and the elimination of values. Many believers in this movement believe that in the current conditions of society, the only possible solution is neither the interruption nor submission to tradition, but rather the solution lies in overcoming crises and advancing society by rejecting radical thinking and focusing on sustainable development, in other words, giving importance to the economy, social issues, etc.

13. Explanation and Examination of the Second Scenario

Serious changes in the principles and discourses of the political movements of fundamentalism and reformism will occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The current conditions in the country sometimes indicate a paradox or a cognitive gap between the past generation and the new generation. The past generation, or the traditional one, is based on religious values and beliefs, revolutionary spirit, adherence to traditions, and a spirit of imitation, while the new generation is strongly politically averse, advocates individual and social freedoms including freedom of expression and dialogue, and generally seeks rationalism, peace, and interaction with the outside world.

Therefore, factors that will cause a shift and a change in the dual discourse of fundamentalism and reformism will play a crucial role. Several factors can play a fundamental role in these changes. The first point is the construction of power in Iran and the fact that power in our country does not have a clear and defined structure that would help the growth of the reformist and fundamentalist movements and find changes that are compatible with themselves. The second point relates to the transformative logic that has occurred in Iranian society. The

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Iranian society is not fundamentally simple, calm, and weak, and if we look at the history of Iranian society, we find that Iranian society has moved from a simple and weak state to a diverse, complex, and powerful state, and such a situation in society has led to a multiplied power in political movements and helped these movements to advance society with their ideas in a diverse manner (Armaki, 2020 AD/1399 SH).

Basically, the main concern of the fundamentalist movement is the discussion of religion, justice, ethics, and order, which combines these four concerns to gather a wide spectrum of fundamentalists. However, representatives of fundamentalists have only represented one of the concerns of various spectra of this movement at different historical junctures. For example, in one period, they have come to power solely with the slogan of expanding ethical or religious issues and have not paid attention to the issue of justice. A similar pattern has also prevailed in the reformist movement. In such a way that for activists in this spectrum, issues such as tension reduction in foreign policy and engagement with the global community, democracy, development, and social and political equality have always been the main concerns. However, generally, the spectra representing the reformist movement have only prioritized one of these concerns in their work. For example, Mr. Rouhani's government introduced tension reduction with the West as the basis of its domestic and foreign policy, and Mr. Khatami also focused on issues of democracy and social and political equality. If we were to define Mr. Hashemi's spectrum within the reformist movement, this spectrum also prioritized the issue of economic development (ibid.).

Therefore, fundamentalism and reformism can be two dominant and influential movements in the political arena that can act as a spectrum and represent a large population, while usually, considering the fundamental intellectual weaknesses, reformism and fundamentalism can only represent one of the existing concerns within themselves. Therefore, if these two movements intend to continue their existence, they must seriously reconsider within themselves. But if there is no will for introspection within these two movements, we must be moment by moment waiting for the emergence of different arenas and spheres of these two spectra.

Therefore, several other factors are also important in the dual discourse changes of fundamentalism and reformism, including:

- **The prevalence of problems and their unresolved nature:** It means that various aspects of people's lives have become problematic or issues. Life has become complicated or faced with difficulties and

obstacles. The social system at various levels is facing disruption and dysfunction, and therefore, life is becoming harder. In people's own words, "life has become hard." In fact, from tensions and conflicts over parking spaces to air pollution, traffic, cultural and social policies like women's dress, music concerts, from economic conditions to unemployment and rising prices, from foreign policy to urban policies, from economic corruption to administrative corruption and inefficiency, increasing violence, divorce, addiction, and more, every year has not improved, but has worsened (Goudarzi, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 48).

In a better expression, the reformist and fundamentalist movements, 'Which are prominent political currents in the country, firstly: do not have the ability to defend their theory in society?' Secondly, they constantly get involved in trivial and marginal issues and do not have an idea for organizing the country's problems, especially in the economic field. Therefore, there is a need for reconsideration to solve the above-mentioned issues.

- **Decline in the credibility of political forces:** Considering that factions and political figures have lost their credibility, and even critical political figures do not have past credibility. Many individuals in society do not define their political identity in the two main factions of fundamentalists and reformists and consider themselves alien to them. Alienation from tendencies and fictionalization of society means that a large part of society does not find its voice in this political space. Movements and personalities do not represent the demands and desires of this group of society and therefore feel voiceless. In other words, official institutions and political movements have lost their power of persuasion for a large part of society. Therefore, they need to reconsider the elements and components of the discourse (ibid: 49).

Ultimately, in this scenario, it must be said that the result of this reconsideration is that we need a new social and political season in the country where strong and powerful parties that represent all classes (lower, middle, and upper classes of the country) take shape. In other words, we need parties with different ideologies and different classes. So if Iranian society has a class nature, it needs political movements that address the needs of different classes in the governing institutions and seek to fulfill these needs.

14. Explanation and Analysis of the Third Scenario

A new arrangement and formation will take place in the political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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In a period of Iranian political history after the revolution, the "Left" and "Right" dichotomy represented the political spectrum of the country; however, with the change in the scene and especially the evolution in the intellectual atmosphere of the country, especially after Khordad 1376, the dichotomy of left and right gradually gave way to the dichotomy of "Reformist" and "Fundamentalist." The distinction between reformism and fundamentalism can be understood within the framework of the conflict between "Tradition" and "Modernity." Fundamentalists sought to address the country's challenges within the framework of "Jurisprudential-Interpretive," while reformists had a special focus on "Religious Enlightenment."

It seems that currently, with the change in the country's political atmosphere, the division between fundamentalists and reformists does not reflect the political will of the people, and economic concerns in various sectors of society have strongly prevailed to the extent that the conflict between tradition and modernity has largely faded for them, and the issue of "Efficiency" has become more prominent.

In recent years, the justice-seeking movement has also gained power in the arena of political developments in the country and has moved beyond the dichotomy of reformist and fundamentalist in internal transformations. The reason the importance of this issue lies in the fact that political parties and movements should meet the demands of various segments of society and go beyond these demands to influence them. In such a pattern, the gap between the people and the ruling class widens, and the national security index increases.

Therefore, we are witnessing the emergence and rise of a third movement in the form of justice-seeking, which has gained power in the country's political transformations and has narrowed the space for the reformist and fundamentalist dichotomy. Also, with the widespread use of social networks and their availability, this movement has the opportunity to easily convey its voice to the body of society, especially with the emergence of the coronavirus, which legitimizes activities in the virtual space and the entry of various segments of society into social networks.

The justice-seeking movement is divided into two categories: exemplar justice-seeking and demand-oriented justice-seeking. Exemplar justice-seekers aim to revive justice through disclosure, while demand-oriented justice-seekers seek to reform laws, regulations, and structures. However, what is important about this movement is that:

1) They lack a clear discourse and even feel independent of theoretical discourse in the field of discourse;

2) They exhibit opposition characteristics regarding the absence of an imperative discourse and resort to a negative discourse, lacking a function other than opposition (Marandi, 2021 AD/1400 SH).

Undoubtedly, the lack of acceptance of all active political forces in the country is not desirable because the elimination of identified forces leads to the emergence of unidentified forces that use people's frustrations and emotions solely to gain power and secure their personal interests. It seems that to improve this negative atmosphere, "Political Activists," "Government," and "Youth" can play an important role.

Conclusion

The present study aimed to answer the question of 'How the future structuring and composition of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran will be and what scenarios can be envisioned in this regard?'

Regarding the knowledge of various influential factors was used a qualitative document analysis and scenario writing method. The research focuses on the future structuring and composition of political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the form of three scenarios or formations of political forces mentioned in Iran, which include:

- Continuation of the structuring and composition of political movements in the form of conservatism and reformism;
- Reinterpretation and revitalization of the principles and elements of political movements known as conservative and reformist;
- Formation of a new structuring and composition.

Therefore, considering the analyses and issues raised in the areas, forming the conservative and reformist grounds, as well as the elements of discourse and the explanation of the formulated scenarios, it seems that a significant change in the principles and elements of discourse of conservative and reformist political movements in the Islamic Republic of Iran will occur. According to the above-mentioned, given the power structure in Iran and the complex and powerful situation of the society, along with economic problems and the decline of the credibility of political movements (dual fundamentalist and reformist), their persuasive power has been lost for a large part of society. Hence, there is a need to reconsider the elements and components of discourse.

It should be noted that the result of this reconsideration is the formation of strong and powerful parties that represent all classes (lower, middle, and upper classes of the country). This means the need for parties with different ideologies and various classes. Therefore, if

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Iranian society is class-based, it requires political movements that address the needs of different classes in the governing institutions and seek to fulfill these needs.

However, it must be acknowledged that the justice-seeking movement lacks a clear discourse and even feels independent of theoretical discourse in the field of discourse. They exhibit opposition characteristics considering the absence of an imperative discourse and resort to a negative discourse, lacking a function other than opposition and cannot create a new structuring and composition in political movements.

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