Geo-Cultural Pattern of Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding to Arabic Uprising in Middle East (2011-2014)

Mohammad Valee Modarres[1], Abolhassan Safinejad[*2], Najmeh Naseri[3], Habiballah Golmohammadi[4]

1. Assistant Professor, Department of International Relation, Kharazmi University, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Ph.D. Student of International Relations, Kharazmi University, Tehran, IRAN.
3. M.A. Quran and Hadith, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.
4. M.A. International Relations, Azad University, Tehran, IRAN.

Abstract

Since 2011, the region has been a profound socio-economic change originated from n Tunisia, and AMP; spread to Middle Eastern and the former power structures affected. The management and direction to these uprisings is the key question of this paper. The key question, is the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran how answer to these Middle East public uprisings in the years 2011-2014? The answer to this question is, Islamic Republic of Iran through the promotion of revolutionary Islam in the region of Middle East, In fact, Iran᾽s strategy towards these developments combined to promote dialogue of resistance against hegemonic and strengthen geopolitical forces aligned with Iran. Thus, on the one hand, Iran has tried to promote revolutionary positions that contradict the intervention of regional powers (Saudi Arabia) and trans-regional (America) and the other hand, Iran, by spiritual support, encouraged the aligned forces to dialogue of resistance to effective involvement in changes. This paper use the method of explanation-analysis.

∗. Corresponding author: asafinejad79@gmail.com

Introduction

Dominance over Middle East, due to its unique geopolitical position in military, political and economic terms, brings a significant position to superpowers. Halford Mackinder, an eminent geographer of the early 20th century, states in his "Heartland Theory" that dominance over Middle East and, subsequently, through seas indicates creation of a global empire. In Manuel Castells belief, with the beginning of the new millennia, Middle East is going to be responsible for most of the public crises (Shirazi et al, 2011: 110). Accordingly, reactionaries consisting global hegemonies, Middle Eastern governments and social movements are struggling over materialistic benefits of power, land and resources, and are consecrating opposite ideologies (Buzan et al, 2011: 47).

An increase in the number of regional threats and pursuit of Middle Eastern initiatives aligned with Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History Theory" and replacement of Islamic ideology with that of Liberalism resulted in strengthening of Axis of Resistance, which had started with the Islamic Revolution of Iran armed with an anti-hegemony ideology. In reality, America's failures in Iraq, Hezbollah's victories in Lebanon and Hamas victories over the Zionist regime of Israel led to uprising against liberal-democratic ideology in the Middle East.

Changes starting in Tunisian since 2011 and their widespread dispersion through other countries of the region created a unanimous response of internal and external hegemonic forces, all of which were consequences of sociopolitical reforms in these countries. Eruption of these reforms are, on the one hand, responses to pent-up requests in Middle Eastern countries, and, on the other hand, under effect of regional and trans-regional superpowers interference to manage the situation. For this very reason it was why governments were not stabilized in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, albeit the democratic essence of the uprisings.

Of utmost significance, these uprisings have been for Islamic Republic of Iran since the roots of them with the Islamic Revolution are common and Iran's increasing hegemony in Middle East is thus strengthened. Middle East, in this paper, comprises of countries in the southern border of Persian Gulf namely Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan and Iran. The primary focus, meanwhile, is set on the countries in which sociopolitical changes have occurred or are happening.

We now turn to the response to this main question that how Iran's foreign policies led to changes in Middle East during 2011 to 2014. To respond the assumption mentioned in the abstract, at first, theoretical frameworks of political Islam with an emphasis on revolutionary Islam in

the eye of Iran's foreign policies is presented. Next, description of regional structure of Middle East regarding ideologically-aligned forces of Iran is discussed. In other words, the pattern of revolutionary Islam in Middle East in link with the changes mentioned previously will be analyzed. With regard to regional changes, consequently, Iran's geographical pattern of culture will be anatomized, and in conclusion, a clear image of Iran's geo-cultural pattern will be presented.

1. Notional Framework (Revolutionary Islam)
1.1. Political Islam
Political Islam is chiefly a sort of relation considered by non-Muslim thinkers as a way of consecrating governments executed by their rulers (Ansari, 2006: 5). However, advent of political Islam mainly originates in the individual and collective identities of Muslims, which resulted in a defensive mode due to the Western ideological forces. In fact, legitimacy crisis of West-oriented thinkers, collapse of tyrannical structures, advent of social discrimination and establishment of cultural crises based on reconstruction policies resulted in reproduction of identity and former sociopolitical civilization of Muslims (Doqjamian, 2011: 68).

In the view of Middle East being a cultural term (Shirazi et al, 2011: 7), in this region, the trans-national identity of Islam is more necessitated for people than that of the governments (Heniehboosh and Ehteshami, 2011: 69). In the late 1960s, Islamism was on the rise in response to incompetence of Iranian and Egyptian nationalism. In this period and before that, Islamism was solely a terminological function, known as the First Wave (Ganji, 2009: 59) Eqbal and Sayyed Jamal can be considered as two prime vanguards of this ideological wave.

In the late 1970s, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was considered as the second wave. This period in Middle East is regarded as the touchstone of establishment of a regime based upon structural values and emergence of political Islam to foreign affairs (Karimi and Safinejad, 2014: 112). Imam Khomeini and Sayyed Quotb are regarded as the chief leaders of the second wave. Political Islam, in the viewpoint of some authors, is regarded as a reaction to modern hegemony since its disciples believed that their identity and morality were invaded, thus their protection (Fax and Sandler, 2004: 165). Despite this fact, it must be stated that the major mainstream of political Islam does not solely possess a reactionary essence and its emergence has not been limited only to the modern era. Islamic thinkers, accordingly, linked Islam to political and social fields since they are convinced that no other ideology, from the range of

Socialism to Capitalism, can sufficiently respond to human needs; therefore, the only solution is Islam (Ansari, 2006: 14).

One of the concepts put forth, particularly in international relations amongst Muslim thinkers, is "Jihad" whose main emphasis is on fighting with non-Islamic symbols, and is regarded as an identity of Resistance. The anti-hegemonic aspect of this concept arises from the 141th verse of An-Nisaa in Quran stating "… and never will Allāh give the disbelievers over the believers a way [to overcome them]". This concept is realized in the form of government establishment through political and social arenas, and is known as Systematic Identity, which has officially entered the Islamic World and Middle East through the creation of Islamic Republic of Iran (Karimi and Safinejad, 2014: 114).

After the stabilization of the Islamic Revolution and continuation of Iran's political system, three major Islamic ideologies could be identified in Middle East:

A) The first group who were Shia aligned with Iran's strategies comprised mainly of Resistance groups,

B) The moderate Sunni group who attempted to modelize Iran's pattern of revolution in their countries with a compromising approach chiefly comprised of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and other minorities in Egypt and Turkey,

C) Radical Wahhabism supported by Saudi Arabia, which has had hostile strategies towards Iran.

In this paper, the Iran's pattern will be referred to as "Revolutionary Islam," that of Saudi Arabia as "Wahhabistic Islam," and that of Turkey and Egypt as "Brotherhood Islam." Regarding different Islamic minorities, it must be mentioned that the political Islam manifested in the region are nationalized the instant they are affected by ideological and social characteristics. This political Islam alters in various forms, henceforth not a homogenous and consistent mainstream (Barzegar, 2012: 252). This paper, however, will discuss various issues within the framework of Revolutionary Islam.

1.2. Pattern of Revolutionary Islam and the Geographical Culture of I.R. Iran

Before Islamic Revolution in 1979, theoreticians regarded Socialistic patterns as the only path to arise third-world countries to gain political and economic independence, but analysis of Iran's revolution rejected this assumption (Ehteshami, 2006: 181). The chief trait of this revolution lies in preaching of Islam and its principles, which are closely connected with Islamic universality. Applying this universality in advancement of

policies, however, does not indicate Iran's domination, but it proves the ascendancy of Islam and Islamic principles (Esposito, 1990: 75). On the other hand, Iran's foreign policies are not in pursuit of a military lodgment in other countries. Political Islam produced by the Islamic Revolution is affected by ideological and social characteristics. This political Islam alters in various forms, henceforth not a homogenous and consistent mainstream (Barzegar, 2012: 252).

Islamic Republic of Iran, as a result, is in interaction with Middle East and simultaneously heeds ideological, economic and security issues, which is an indication of Islamic universality in Iran's foreign policies. In the view of Iran's position amongst countries located in geo-strategic regions of Middle East and numerous military, political, economic threats executed by a trans-regional superpower, policy-making and strategy-devising in regard to clarifying relations and their extension remain vital (Afshourdi and Madani, 2009: 139). The pattern deployed in a situation like this is named as Geographical Pattern of Culture. The cultural and religious environment in Middle East, in fact, has paved the way for countries to strengthen their strategic dominance based on identity similarities. For this reason we have adopted Geographical Pattern of Culture as a descriptive framework of superpowers policies and strategies.

Henceforward, the description of the target zone will be based on religious notions, especially Holy Quran. Some groups, accordingly, emerge in the region of Geographical Pattern of Culture which are in truth catalysts of Iran's Geographical Pattern of Culture, otherwise known as Geopolitics of Resistance. In the Principle 11 of Iran's Constitution it is stated that all the Muslims are of one nation, and Islamic Republic of Iran has duties to set its general policies based upon unification of Islamic Countries so that economic, political and cultural unity in the Islamic World are achieved (Yaghmaiee, 2010: 10).

With attention to Islam's major impact throughout Middle East, realization of a unified nation has utmost priority in Iran's foreign policies; at a level wherein trans-national agents possess paramount importance and governments attempt to enact a unified constitution, like a Confederate, based on Theism and Allah's Oneness in which Capitalism and Socialism hold no place (Dehshiri, 2001: 282). A movement in this mainstream, in Imam Khomeini's view, is a continuum of prophets path (Barzegar, 2011: 208). Following this pattern by Iran, also known as Iran's Soft Power, unlike the US whose dominance in the region is a result of a long period, is a trend with respect to geographical

proximity, historical annals and cultural, religious similarities as a response against the West's attention to Muslim countries (Harsij and Tuyserkani, 2009: 172).

Overall, Iran's strategy towards regional changes in Middle East is a version of collective control of Middle Eastern countries without the interference of any superpower (Salehi, 2012: 93).

Realization of this strategy is pursued by OPEC, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab Union, Axis of Resistance, Non-Aligned Movement and other favorable groups. Islamic Republic of Iran, in fact, is executing its foreign policies based on converging capabilities of resistance with emphasis on cultural, historical, social, economic and security similarities so that the cultural anti-hegemonic side is strengthened against hegemony of foreign superpowers. Consequent to realization of an Islamic united nation, negation of cruelty creates another aspect of revolutionary Islam, which can be found in the verse 141 of An-Nissa in Quran.

This notion is also mentioned in the verse 124 of Al-Baqarah in Quran. Imam Khomeini, accordingly, states "our relations with other foreigners are based on the principle of respect, and in this regard we will not surrender to any cruelty nor will we apply oppression to anyone, doing what we consider fit". From this view we can witness the two aspects of Iran's foreign policies which, on the one side, consists of fighting against hegemony of anti-revolutionary forces and, on the other hand, exportation of Islamic Revolution and helping the destitute along with defending them (Poor Ahmadi, 2010: 534).

In order to execute its policies in Middle East, Iran, therefore, has devised a geographical culture for itself wherein anti-hegemonic forces favored by revolutionary Islam remain in its canon.

2. Regional System of Middle East and Iran's Geographical Culture

Countries located in the southern border of Persian Gulf such as Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan and Iran form Regional System of Middle East. The political system of Saudi Arabia mainly consists of two groups as (a) traditionalists opposing Western culture and (b) modernists favoring Modernism. The former propels the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia. A big consumer market, vast oil sources and religious influence by Mecca and Medina have granted Saudi Arabia a special position. Shia minorities settled near oil-rich areas of Saudi Arabia have always been a great concern for this regime since this concern can alter into a menace if Shias from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain,

who has got more organized since Islamic Revolution of 1979, unify (Heshmatzadeh, 2007: 99). Houthi movement in Yemen which is in high proximity to Saudi Arabia, moreover, has shown positive inclinations towards Iran's approach in this region.

It must be stated that Yemen, which is a result of unification of southern and northern Yemen in 1990, has always been under dominance of Saudi Arabia. From one perspective, long history imperialism and rivalries of Cold War has prevented Yemen from prospering, increasing America and Saudi Arabia's dominance through subordination of this country. Yemen today is a source of tumult as a result of tribal ethnic disputes. Bahrain, a country even smaller than the smallest province of Iran, is a member of Arab Union and Gulf Cooperation Council. The United States Fifth Fleet has dominance over this country and the Kingdom is faced with a challenge of Shias favorable by Iran's approach.

Lebanon, also, is located on the western geographical borders of Middle East whose stability depends upon the agreement among all the tribes, minorities and religious groups that are aligned with the whims of the regional and trans-regional superpowers. In this aspect, the highest amount of benefits rest with Iran since the biggest minority in Lebanon consists of advocates seriously championing policies of Iran. Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman are countries of borders of Persian Gulf, which have no influence over the changes of the region except in terms of OPEC. Qatar, in recent years, has been dimly regarded as mediator in the midst of regional crises, but lack of sufficient land and human force has prevented it from playing an integral role.

Iraq with its dependent economy similar to Saudi Arabia is still suffering from chasm between Shia and Sunni as well as Secessionist groups. The interference of regional and trans-regional superpowers has considerably affected this trend. Majority of these groups have shared interests with Iran and their increased influence after Saddam Hussein's death have extended the depth of Iran's Geographical Culture, making Iran as a mediator for disputes of Iraq and Syria. Syria considers itself as the pioneer of nationalism in Arab World, and its position near Mediterranean area creates a unique geopolitics for it. Since Syria is in close proximity with the Zionist Regime and is attempting to free Golan Heights, playing an integral in line with the Axis or Resistance, it has vital importance for Israel's security. In reality, Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese groups of Axis of Resistance have created a strong belt by which Iran's policies are dominated, and Iran's role in regional equations cannot be denied.

Kingdom of Jordan, for its weaknesses in its economic infrastructures and its vulnerability, has toxic relations with the Zionist Regime and is highly dependent upon the US. Egypt has always been under influence of superpowers for its location on their path. This country, furthermore, is the most populated Arab country, possessed of an ancient civilization and runs al-Azhar University. Nationalism, Secularism and Islamism are competing in Egypt and, on the one hand, its economic troubles and, on the other hand, its identity traits have put it in dependency. Of course Egypt nationalism today is disparate with the past and religious beliefs, especially Islamic ones, are major factors of its emergence (Heywood, 1998: 268).

With the success of Islamic Revolution and defeat of Egyptian Nationalism, in fact, Muslim Brotherhood moved toward organization by the influence of Imam Khomeini's *Islamic Alternative* (Esposito, 1990: 150). Another branch of Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey strengthened Islamist political parties and has gained remarkable political influence in the political system of Turkey (Heshmatzadeh, 2007: 220).

3. Pattern of Revolutionary Islam and Arab Changes in Middle East

Following failure of the USA in realization of the Greater Middle East Initiative, a new face of the region was created with two major aspects. The first one is of compromise with American foreign policies and the second one is of the Axis of Resistance which includes countries and movements in line with Islamic Republic of Iran. Syria, groups of Resistance in Lebanon, in Palestine, especially in Iraq, comprise this axis. Creation of this axis has been with the innovation of Shia Crescent and power-seeking governors of countries around Persian Gulf (Jamali, 2007: 10).

Previously, Saudi Arabia founded Gulf Cooperation Council as a response to the threat-called Islamic Republic by Saudi Arabia so that America's interests are protected against anti-hegemonic approaches of Iran (Shouri, 2003: 163). In this regard, Iran's foreign policies have followed regional and global frameworks so that geo-cultural pattern of Revolutionary Islam continues. Since the third wave of Islamic Awakening, which was coincided with Islamic Revolution, Iran has attempted to influence the World of Islam and Middle East by groups of Axis of Resistance. In addition, defeat of Arab Nationalism in 1948, 1967, 1973 and 1982 Wars as well as Hezbollah's victory in 2001 and 2006 with that of Hamas in 2008 contributed to dissemination of Revolutionary Islam. This experience has constantly prevented any

notion of compromise with policies of the US in Middle East and indicates Iran's upper hand in the peace equations of the region (Ganji, 2009: 179). What is significant in these changes is the strengthening of non-Shia groups of Resistance like Hamas through election, which signifies the Islamic Universality and Iran's Soft Power.

Alterations of 2009 were important opportunities for Iran to advocate its pattern of Revolutionary Islam based on its foreign policies. According to American Republicans, these changes are results of Iran's foreign policies (Niakuiee, 2011: 241).

Leaders of Iran consider these happenings as support of their foreign policies (Lynch, 2011: 12). The Supreme Leader of Iran, in his speeches, regarded systematization as of paramount priority and Religious Democracy as the best model. Religious Democracy, unlike the Liberal Democracy, possesses a divine purpose (Hosseini, 2001: 15), and this fact is considered as the most important reason why major thinkers in Middle East unanimously do not regard Liberal Democracy as viable (Khan, 2011: 122).

Changes by the Islamic Awakening, in fact, have reproduced a sort of political literature, which can lead to political homogenizing and matching in Middle-Eastern countries, opening interactions among closed societies (Khani, 2010: 89). Lack of converging and uniting leadership is another factor; therefore, a powerful and decisive leader with inclinations of Revolutionary Islam can be a great lesson for Arabs these days (Eisenstadt, 2011: 10). Establishment of Secretary of the Islamic Assembly and holding conferences related to regional changes by the Islamic Republic of Iran are in line with informing nations of Middle East; changes which started from Tunisia and arriving at Middle-Eastern Egypt are topics of this research papers.

3.1. Egypt

Foreign policies of Iran towards Egypt emphasize on foundation of different political parties in Egypt's political system, which are not dependent on the US, and Israel since independence from superpowers and prevention from their interference are commonalities of Muslim Brotherhood. With the spread of Islamic Awakening from Tunisia to Yemen and Egypt, the Supreme Leader of Iran issued a speech in Arabic on February 4, 2001, stating, "Public uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are results of Islamism and dependence of Tunisian and Egyptian governments to superpowers which have condescended people, arising a sense of liberty-seeking in them".

Uprisings like April 6 Youth Movement were of pioneers in reforms

of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, ultimately, gained authority and even opposed Iran's approaches. These approaches were chiefly affected by Syria's reforms, which even influenced Iran-Turkey relations (Hajiyousefi, 2013: 103). Iran, however, adopted a cautious approach since Mohamed Morsi gained power democratically. Moreover, Morsi's optimistic inclinations toward the US and Saudi Arabia indicated truce of Iran's approaches. Prevention of Muslim Brotherhood's systematization by Saudi Arabia and pursuit of peace talks by America's Foreign Minister, coincided by weakening of Syria and Egypt, held Iran persistent with its strategies; particularly when Saudi Arabia's dominance, by surpassing Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood, was augmenting by support of the US in changes of Syria and Egypt.

The oil-rich countries of Gulf Cooperation Council, with use of interference in the process of power transference as well as granting loan, attempt, on the one hand, to direct authoritarian regimes on their own whims and, on the other hand, militarize the situation with the help of the US and related groups. Financial aids (5 billion dollar) of Saudi Arabia to the temporary government after Morsi and interaction of Wahhabi party of al-Noor clearly indicate this point. A more intricate analysis of Iran's foreign policies toward Egypt shows more inclinations to Islamist groups like Muslim Brotherhood who, later on, distanced from principles of compromising with Israel, although other groups of Liberalists and Nationalists co-exist as well. Even after their removal Iran did not welcome the situation due to the fact that Iran had policies mostly similar to those of Islamists.

The purpose of Iran in Egypt was expansion of Political Islam and strengthening of Islamist movements against any compromise with the Zionist regime. Considering systematization as the most significant priority, the Supreme Leader of Iran requested Egyptians not to let Liberalist, Nationalist or Marxist patterns be dictated upon them and the new book of constitution be written based on Islamic system of values. He also regarded influence of Extremist movements as the Achilles heel of Egypt, rejecting this sort of government (Masoudnia and Khani, 2012: 50).

In reality, the fall of Morsi was planned by these Wahhabi groups, which were supported by Saudi Arabia and Liberalists under wings of the US (Furting, 2013: 12).

3.2. Yemen and Bahrain

Iran has the same view regarding the changes in Yemen and Bahrain. Governors of these countries have not responded clearly to the civil

rights of the protesters yet, and the US or Saudi Arabia's efforts have prevented global human rights organizations to act. Considering Iran as its regional opponent in Middle East, Saudi Arabia attempts to frame Houthi movement in Yemen and Bahrain as internationally dangerous (Sadeghi and Ahmadian, 2010: 271)

Saudi Arabia did its best to frame Houthi movement against moderate Sunni groups of Yemen; yet contrary to the plan, Houthi movement gained remarkable influence in the presidential palace without any serious dispute of moderate Sunnis. Iran's official have always placed emphasis on participation of all political parties and sociopolitical groups of Yemen in the political processes and national talks as a comprehensive document (Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of I.R. Iran, 2014).

Iran, like Syria, wants to maintain territorial integrity of Yemen; yet Iran has sustained its relations with the opposing groups. This policy of Iran is exactly opposite that of Saudi Arabia in terms of consolidating Wahhabi groups in Yemen, which prevented democratic transference of power, and sending countless troops to Syria by Saudi Arabia for its expansionist plans.

This approach of Saudi Arabia is even in contrast with that of the United Nations, and Jamal Ben Omar's emphasis as the special envoy of the UN on the political solution to tumults in Yemen indicates the closeness of Iran's approach with UN's strategy.

Changes of Yemen imply that Iran, after Syria and Hezbollah, is seeking a strategic ally that ideologically champions the principles of Hezbollah and creates another line of Iran's Geographical Culture in the strategic area of Gulf of Aden. Resistance of the Houthi movement and Omen's attempts for moderating, which has given legitimacy to this movement, in the Arab area reveal the persistence of these impacts in the future equations of Yemen. What is seen in Yemen, in fact, is similar to what could be witnessed in Syria regarding the depth of Iran's strategy.

Anti-hegemonic policies of Iran in Bahrain can be identified clearly. One of the officials of Iran urged the importance of readiness of Iran's military against any probable invasion of Saudi Arabia. This declaration resulted in imprisonment of Ali Salman, Secretary-General of the al-Wefaq political society, which is the major opposing mainstream against al-Khalifa regime. It must be stated that Saudi Arabia highly strived to make trans-regional superpowers suspicious of Iran's plans in Middle East.

Against this policy, Iran has attempted to enrich countries nearby

Persian Gulf such as Oman and Kuwait so that its impacts can be realized in the region.

3.3. Axis of Iraq-Syria-Lebanon-Palestine

Foreign policies of Iran towards Syria indicate its strategies regarding the Levant. This strategy consists of two aspects. Concerning this field, Iran, firstly, has endeavored to sustain its confederacy with Syria, extending its relations with Shias in Lebanon inasmuch as Hezbollah's foundation and control over it are regarded as the highest success of Iran in Lebanon. The second aspect, as far as Iran's strategy regarding the Levant is concerned, consists of Iran befriending with Arab groups who support issue of Palestine (Haniebush and Ehteshami, 2011: 519). Since 2005, with the adherence of Iraq to Iran, Iran has turned into regional superpower, convincing other countries to recognize its power. The strategic point realizing Iran's policies has been Syria during these years. The countries opposing the Axis of Resistance are trying to accuse Iran's approach of duplicity and duality concerning changes in the region so that a chasm is created. From Iran's point of view, what is happening in Syria is not in line with the interests of Syrians but to weaken the Axis of Resistance and enforcing Palestinian groups to compromise with the Zionist regime.

Accordingly, the promulgated policy of Iran concerning a solution to tumults in Syria is a political one based on Syrian-Syrian line without the interference of foreign powers. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in reality, believes that crises in Syria possess non-Socialist origins, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, and the peaceful demands of the people have been distorted by the military groups dependent on foreign superpowers.

Continuing the reforms in Syria, insist of Russian on maintenance of Bashar al-Assad and close inclinations of Russia to Iran and China indicated the truce of Iran's approach which resulted in veto of anti-Syrian statement of the Security Council by Russia and China. Iran openly emphasizes on the importance of territorial integrity of Syria, no interference by the foreign superpowers and sustenance of regional position of Resistance. Despite this fact, Iran implicitly has highlighted political reforms in the political system of Syria. In order to execute Iran's approach, accordingly, Hezbollah utilized its pattern of cooperation with the Quds Force to equip some Shia militia in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad. These groups include Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Abolfazl al-Abbas Squad, Kateab Sayyed al-Shohada, Zolfaqar Squad, Ammar ibn Yaser Squad.

Some of these groups assisted the foundation of National Defense

Forces of Syria, consisting of more than 50 thousand skillful Shia militia. Based on this study, Abolfazl al-Abbas Squad is the most prominent of other four militia groups. Operations performed by these groups are mainly focused in the south of Damascus where Shia fighters protect the Holy of Shrine of Zaynab bint Ali (Levitt and Zelin, 2013). High factors in relations Iran, Syria and Hezbollah indicate that protection from political system of Syria is a great responsibility for leaders of Iran and Hezbollah since it is not exactly clear what might have occurred if Syria had fallen (Ospina and Gray, 2014: 33)

Conclusion

Changes of 2011 provided Iran with another opportunity to expand geopolitics of Resistance despite the threatening hegemony of the USA. In accordance with this fact, Iran named these changes as Islamic Awakening due to its anti-tyrannical, democratic, Islamic and anti-Imperialistic traits.

Continuation of these changes could waver hegemony of Saudi Arabia and the USA. Changes in Syria, in this regard, provided a suitable chance for the sleeping ideology of the Saudi Arabia to send Wahhabists from all over the globe to Syria, commencing a full-scale war against political system of Syria.

They removed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt with use of civil coup and attempted to use inaction of non-Shia groups of Resistance against reforms in Syria, extending the fight to Iraq. Against this strategy, Iran strengthened the groups of Resistance in this region. It was done in a manner that ideological points have been maintained in the region, distributing groups of Resistance in the areas with importance of anti-hegemonic ideology preaching. As a result, groups like National Defense Forces in Syria and Badr Corps in Iraq were created to fight back against ISIS.

Amidst the pressures on Iran, Ansar branch of Hezbollah in Yemen was an unforeseen shift for Saudi Arabia. With the assistance of this group Iran could achieve a unique position in Yemen and supports from other in-line groups such as al-Wefaq political society caused insecurity for Saudi Arabia and its borders. Saudi Arabia, in a retaliatory action, supported anti-Iran groups in the region and manipulated oil as an economic weapon against Iran so that its influence does not disseminate.

From a different perspective, we can witness poles of power based on the pattern of Geographical Culture in Turkey as the profounder of

Brotherly Islam, Saudi Arabia as the supporter of Wahhabism and Iran as the proponent of Revolutionary Islam. On Iran was the main focus of this paper. With the help of descriptive-analytical approach adopted in this research paper it can be seen that the Geographical Culture of Iran regarding Islamic Awakening is based upon two axes. As for the first, the Geographical Culture approach of Iran has been against Imperialism (anti-hegemonic), for supporting public forces regardless of their essence and advocating Islamism. This approach has proved successful in terms of evaluation. Factors showing the truce of Iran's approach as follows: (a) friendly inclinations of Morsi until midway, (b) defeat of Morsi after betraying Iran despite the serious disputes concerning the issue of Palestine and (c) return of Syria to Iran amidst its tumults.

As for the second axis, referred to as Geopolitics of Resistance, strategic benefits of Geographical Culture of Iran are executed. Proponents and pioneers of these strategies are forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar and Houthi Movement in Yemen as well as Iraqi and Palestinian groups responsible for the geopolitics of power in Middle East. In the establishment process of these groups we must heed the lack of strategic geopolitics in Middle East with the emergence of the first wave of Islamic Awakening.

By the second wave of Islamic Awakening Hezbollah in Lebanon and by the third wave Ansar joined Iran's pattern of Geographical Culture In conclusion, extension of Geopolitics of Resistance can be witnessed from a strategic point of view.

Figure 1 shows Iran's pattern of Geographical Culture:

Figure 1

Geographical Culture Pattern of Iran under a Strategic Level

Geographical Culture Pattern of Iran under Level of Approach

Environment of Geographical Culture of Iran in Middle East

References

Afshourdi, M; Madani, S. (2009). *The Structure of the Regional Power System in the Middle East*. Vol. 13, pp. 114-141.

Ansari, M. (2006). "Political Islam: Backgrounds and Pioneers." *Matin Magazine*. Vol. 9, no. 35, pp. 5-28.

Barzegar, E. (2012). *Theories of Global Reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran*. Tehran: Imam Sadeq University.

─────────── (2011). *Imam Khomeini's Political Thought, Politics as Righteous*. Tehran: Samt.

Busan, B; Halliday, F; Bush, H. (2011). *The New Middle East, Theory and Practice*. (A. Ghahremanpour, Trans). Tehran: Amir Kabir.

Dehshiri, M. (2001). *An Introduction to Imam Khomeini's Political Theory*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documents Center.

Dokjamian, H. (2011). *Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World*. Tehran: Keihan.

Ehteshami, A. (2006). *Past the Succession Crisis*. Tehran: Qumes.

Esposito, J. L. (1990). *The Iranian Revolution: its Global Impact*. (n.p.): Florida International University press.

Eisenestadt, M. (2011). *Iran Islamic Revolution: Lessons for Arab Spring of 2011*? (n.p.): Institute for national strategic studies. National Defense University.

Fax, J; Sandler, S. (2004). *Bringing Religion in to International Relations*. (n.p.): Palgrave Macmillan.

Furtig, H. (2013). "Iran and Arab Spring: Between Expectation and Disillusion." *German Institute of Global and Regional Studies*. Vol. 5, no. 241, pp. 1-22.

Fulton, W; Holliday, J; Wyer, S. (2013). *Iranian Strategy in Syria.* A joint Report by AEI's critical threats project and Institute for the study of war. (n.p.).

Ganji, A. (2009). *Third Wave of Islamic Awakening*. Tehran: Noor Studies Institute.

Jamali, J. (2007). "Shia Crescent and American Hegemony." *Shia Logy Magazine*. Vol. 5, no. 20, pp. 7-31.

Haji Yousefi, A. (2013). "Islamic Awakening and Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Islamic Awakening and Regional Changes*. Vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 95-11.

Hanieh, B; Ehteshami, A. (2011). *Foreign Policy of Middle East Countries*. Tehran: Imam Sadeq University.

Harsij, H; Tuyserkani, M. (2009). "Comparison of the Soft Power of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States in the Middle East." *Political Studies Magazine*. Vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 169-203.

Heshmatzadeh, M. (2007). *The Impact of the Islamic Revolution on Islamic Countries*. Tehran: Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought.

Heywood, A. (1998). *Political Ideologies: an Introduction*. London: Macmillan press.

Hosseini, S. (2011). "The Pattern of Religious Democracy and Its Relation to Islamic Awakening." *Contemporary Political Research Magazine*. Vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1-17.

Karimi, Gh; Safinejad, A. (2014). "A Comparative Study of New West Asian Regional Patterns." *Islamic Revolution Studies*. Vol. 11, no. 36, pp. 111-130.

Khan, M. R. (2011). "Political Islam, Democracy and Arab Spring." *Air Power Journal*. Vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 107-125.

Khani, M. (2012). "Islamic Awakening in the Middle East and North Africa and its Effects on Regional Convergence." *Islamic Awakening and Regional Changes*. Vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 81-94.

Levitt, M; Zelin, Y. (2013). *Hezbollah's Gambit in Syria*, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/hizballahs-gambit-in-syria, The Combating Terrorism Center, (is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of social sciences at the United States Military academy, West Point).

Lynch, M. (2011). *U.S. Policy toward Iran in a Changing Middle East*. (n.p.): Center for new American security.

Lych, D; Morgan, P. (2002). *Regional Disciplines; Security in the Modern World*. Tehran: Strategic Studies Research Center.

Masoudnia, H; Khani, A. (2012). "Islamic Awakening in North Africa and the Middle East from the Perspective of the Supreme Leader of Iran." *Islamic Awakening and Regional Changes*. Vol. 2, no. 7, pp. 95-111.

Niakooie, S. (2011). "Recent Developments in the Middle East and North Africa: Different Origins and Consequences." *Foreign Affairs Magazine*. Vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 239-276.

Ospina, M; Gray, D. (2014). "Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah: A Strategic

Alliance." *Global Security Studies*. Winter 2014, vol. 5.

Poorahmadi, H. (2010). *Islam and International Relations*. Tehran: Imam Sadeq University.

Shouri, M. (2003). "Conceptualizing the Post-Cold War World, Hegemony and Anti-Hegemony." *Rahbord Magazine*. Vol. 10, no. 27, pp. 145-167.

Shirazi, H; Ghorbani, A. (2012). *Politics and Government in the Middle East*. Tehran: Samt.

Sadeqi, H; Ahmadian, H. (2010). "Transforming Yemen's Regional Position: Opportunities and Challenges." *Rahbord Magazine*. Vol. 19, no. 56, pp. 253-270.

Salehi, H. (2012). "Islamic Awakening and the Emergence of a New Regional Order in the Middle East." *Rahbord Magazine*. Vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 80-102.

Yaghmaiee, S. (2010). *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Tehran: Negah Bine cultural research center.