

*In the Name of God*

***Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic  
Revolution***

**Vol. 3, No. 9, Summer 2021**

**Editorial Board:**

**Bahram Akhavan Kazemi**, Professor, University of Shiraz, Iran

**Saeed Nazari Tavakoli**, Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Principles of Islamic Law, University of Tehran, Iran

**Mohammad Reza Hashemi**, Associate Professor, University of Ferdowsi, Iran

**Alireza Sadra**, Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Ali Asgariyazdi**, Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**International Editorial Board:**

**Maniraj Sukdaven**, Associate Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa

**Mohd Roslan Bin Mohd Nor**, Associate Professor, Academy of Islamic Studies, Malaysia

**Sayyed Ali Mohammad Naqvi**, Professor, Aligarh Muslim University, India

**Waris Mateen Mazhari**, Department of Islamic Studies, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jamia Hamdard, INDIA

**Nina M. Mamedova**, Head of Iranian Department of Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Associate Professor, MGIMO-University.

**Advisory Board:**

**Ahad Faramarz Gharamaleki**, Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Gholamreza Jamshidiha**, Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Abbas Ali Kadkhodayi**, Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Manoochehr Mohammadi**, Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Mohammad Jafar Javadi Arjmand**, Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Editor-in-Chief:** Mostafa Malakoutian, Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Managing Director:** Mahmood Vaezi, Assistant Professor, University of Tehran, Iran

**Executive Director:** Pouran Mirzaei, Assistant Professor, University of Quran and Hadith, Iran

**English Editor:** Sedighe Maleklu, Ph.D., Quran and Hadith Sciences, Iran

**Graphist & Designer:** Mohammad Reza Haji Mohammadi & Mostafa Saffari

**Publisher:** University of Tehran

**Higher Studies Center of Islamic Revolution**

Iran, Tehran, Enqelab Square, St. Kargar Shomali, St Forozanfar (Rahnama) No. 16.

**P.O.Box:** 1417943473

**Tel-Fax:** +98-21- 66413467

**Email:** Jcirir@ut.ac.ir

**Website:** <http://Jcirir.ut.ac.ir>

## **About Journal**

The journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution is a peer-reviewed journal of the Center for Islamic Revolution Studies at the University of Tehran and publishes manuscripts in interdisciplinary fields of humanities related to the Islamic Revolution. Manuscripts can be submitted in the following subjects:

- Political philosophy and political thought
- Sociology and future studies
- Welfare and social justice
- Foreign policy and Islamic Ummah
- New Islamic civilization
- Constitutional law and jurisprudence

## *Table of Contents*

Title	Page
<b>■ Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War</b> <i>Salman Ghasemian, Mahmood Arab Ismaeili, Hassan Ashtari</i>	1-22
<b>■ Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions</b> <i>Ali Badrkhani, NasrinBahrainy</i>	23-42
<b>■ Imam Khomeini's Strategic Management in the Imposed War</b> <i>Hadi Qeisaryan Fard, Mohammad Sadiq Salehi Manesh</i>	43-62
<b>■ Investigating the Effects of the Imposed War on the Islamic Revolution Exportation</b> <i>Mohammad Takaloo, Farhad Darvishi Se Talani</i>	63-77
<b>■ Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense</b> <i>Shoeyb Yari, Vahid Shalchi</i>	79-97
<b>■ Iran's Tactical Deterrence During the Holy Defense</b> <i>Ibrahim Mottaqi, Yaqoub Zohdi</i>	99-116
<b>■ Israeli Lobbies and Their Influence on the E.U. Foreign Policy</b> <i>Javad Sharbaf</i>	117-149
<b>■ Non-physical Combat Ability Components of Iranian Islamic Revolution Armed Forces with Emphasis on the View of Imam Sajjad (a.s.) in the Prayers of "MARZDARAN"</b> <i>Hossein Rezaie, Ramin Azhdari, Mahmood Vaezi, Hady Baghbani</i>	151-167
<b>■ The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation</b> <i>Hossein Aslipour, Sara Mohammadi</i>	169-191
<b>■ The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics</b> <i>Hadi Abdolmaleki, Leila Majdani</i>	193-211
<b>■ Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View</b> <i>Aida Bagheri Beheshti</i>	213-235



## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

Salman Ghasemian\*<sup>1</sup>, Mahmud Arab Ismaeili<sup>2</sup>, Hassan Ashtari<sup>3</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.1.5

1. Assistant Professor, Department of History, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IRAN.
2. Ph.D. in the History of Contemporary Iran, Department of History, Payame Noor University, Tehran, IRAN.
3. Ph.D. in Futurology, Department of Management, Postgraduate and Doctoral Studies Center, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 3 August 2021 - Accepted: 1 September 2021)

### Abstract

Evaluating the role of some Western-affiliated factors in the imposed war, especially the colonial identities of the Persian Gulf, in the formation and continuation of this war, reflects the inadequacies caused by the British colonial heritage in the periphery of Iran. The slogan of independence from the East and the West and the sheiks' reaction to the Persian Gulf region showed their reliance on supra-regional powers. The formation background of these colonial identities back to the weakness of the central authorities of the Islamic world in the 19 AD/13 AH century. Therefore, the survival continuity of these sheikhdoms formed based on the weak conditions of the Islamic world depends on the continuation of the same conditions. It is the behaviorology principle of some of Iran's neighbors in response to the independence and freedom slogans of the Islamic Revolution. Hence, the behavior and performance of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms during the imposed war indicated their connection with Western colonialism. By examining historical documents, library studies, and analytical methods, the present study aimed to answer the fundamental question of 'what role did the colonial identity of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms play in their behavior and action in the front of the imposed war?' The requirements arising from the colonial conditions in the contract of 1820 AD / 1235 AH, the continued formation of affiliated sheikhdoms, including Kuwait, in Iraq's relationship with the Persian Gulf, the sheikhdoms' economic and political dependence on Western nations played a decisive role in their policy toward the imposed war. These colonial conditions caused these sheikhdoms, with the direct and indirect support of Saddam Hussein, to practically expand the scope of conflict and insecurity in the Persian Gulf region.

**Keywords:** Imposed War, Iran, Iraq, Colonialism, Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.

---

\*. Corresponding author: s.ghasemian@ikiu.ut.ac.ir

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

### Introduction

The Iran-Iraq war was rooted in border issues, regional developments, and global politics; this conflict was due to uncertainty at the borders and Saddam Hussein's exploitation of the situation in Iran. The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran had crucial effects, such as fundamental changes in the countries' policy in the region and the policy of the United States in the Persian Gulf, the fear of the regional governments from the export of revolutionary ideology and the consequent threat to their monarchical political system. On the other hand, the concern of the United States necessitated the exigence to prevent the finding power of revolutionary Iran in the front of the monarchical regime's security of the Persian Gulf.

The direct and indirect effects of the war on the Persian Gulf situation and grounding the gap strengthen between Iran and the Arab sheikdoms were rooted in the apparent conflict between the colonial policy of the sheikdoms and the anti-colonial policy and slogans of the Islamic Revolution. The competition prompted sheiks to help Iraq confront the illusion of an Iranian threat during the eight-year war. Sheiks believed that ending the war where Iran had military-politically superiority was considered surrender to the Islamic Revolution. This matter led to political developments and the behavior of Persian Gulf sheiks towards revolutionary Iran.

So, far, no comprehensive research has been done on the political-military developments in the Persian Gulf region during the imposed war. The importance of the Persian Gulf in Iran's foreign relations and the historical significance of the eight-year war require evaluating the historical roots of the relationship between the war and the historical conditions of this region and presenting the historical process of the actors' developments of this region in the war. The data is collected from historical sources with analytical and library methods and gathered from first-hand sources and research. After studying and reviewing the authorities, we took notes on the necessary materials. Then, we concluded by historical analysis on different theories on a subject. The questioned geographical area is the Persian Gulf, which traditionally includes the waters between the Iranian plateau and the Arabian Peninsula. Still, the place territory in question is the Arab sheikdoms and the waters of the Persian Gulf from Hormuz Strait to the Arvand mouth from 1980 to 1988 AD / 1358 to 1367 SH.

### 1. Research Background

Persian Gulf developments in the Iran-Iraq war have been extensively studied in historical research. Access to a comprehensive study requires a thorough review and investigation of various documents and sources. Fewer Persian studies have comprehensively examined the impact of war on Persian Gulf issues. Most of the data is in unpublished manuscripts. The book "A Journey into War (Beginning

to End)" by Muhammad Droudian is about the general situation in the Persian Gulf during the imposed war. The book "Geography of Sustainable Sacred Defense Operations" by Pourahmad and "Soviet Strategy in the Persian Gulf Region" by Babak Naderpour do not analyze the subject of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms; they generally refer to the Persian Gulf during the war. Anthony Cordesman's book "Lessons from Modern Warfare" examines the evolution of war in general. Mahmoud Yazdanfam's book "Fiftieth Day of War Book, Escort of Oil Tankers" researches the Persian Gulf developments and Iran's foreign relations. The author has a macro view on the subject of war. There are significant shortcomings in this book regarding the political situation in the Persian Gulf during the war and the general trend of regional and international issues.

Velayati in the book "Political History of the Iran-Iraq Imposed War" and Seif Al-Reza Shahabi in "Perspectives of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council" and the book "Persian Gulf Cooperation Council" by Ali Asghar Ghasemi Naraghi provide general and scattered information to researchers. The "Secret Case" by Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent examines the events of the Persian Gulf War from a journalistic perspective, and Avigdor Hassel Korn's book "Endless Storm" examines the consequences of the Iran-Iraq war and its impact on Saddam's decision to attack Kuwait.

No independent research has been done on this subject, and most studies have examined the onset of war and military operations or a brief period of war. The distinguishing feature of the present article is in the approach focused on finding the colonial roots of the imposed war and paying attention to the colonial issues arising from British policies in the 19<sup>th</sup> century AD / 13<sup>th</sup> AH and its role in the emergence and continuation of the regional problems in the Islamic world. In this article, the issue of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war was considered as a historical example. Examination of historical causes and contexts of the imposed war, no works published, have studied the role and impact of policies and the legacy of colonialism in this regard.

We will examine the colonial roots of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms' identity and survey the critical causes and factors in the behaviorology and performance of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms in front of the imposed war of Iraq against Iran.

## **2. The Formation Process of Political Identities on the Southern Shores of the Persian Gulf**

The Arab countries of the southern Persian Gulf after the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire established, compared with many countries in the region, lack outstanding components and vital elements from national identity and historical background. According to historical sources, a brief history of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, especially the two sheikhdoms of the United Arab

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

Emirates and Kuwait, results from the British colonial period developments in West Asia. It means that with the advent of the new era and the technical superiority of Europe, the centers of power and wealth gradually transferred to this region, and the Islamic world was far from historical capabilities such as the power of global and continued influence of the area. This apparent weakness disrupted the Islamic lands integration and the exploitation of European states, especially the United Kingdom, by these conditions (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 84-87).

Contract 1820 AD/1235 AH, which many scholars in the history of the Persian Gulf region have paid less attention to, is considered the first contract of British political representatives in the disintegration of Islamic lands and the first factor in the formation of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms (Ghasemian, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 141-143).

This agreement had contents that its implementation guaranteed the continuation of the weakness and dependence of the powers of the Islamic world on Europe.

As a result, a deep connection formed between Britain as a representation of the Christian world and Europe with fake identities in the heart of the Islamic world and the periphery of the two central powers of the Islamic world, namely Iran and the Ottoman Empire (Elahi, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 116-119; Imami, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 32-38).

Regarding the content of the 1820 contract, the Saudis, after two extinctions by Iranian and Ottoman forces between 1811 and 1870, within the acceptance of contract content while the Saudi fugitives in Kuwait were refugees from the British political representative Shakespeare could be re-positioned in the Arabian Peninsula in 1902 by the help of the British (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 89).

It means that Al-Saud has an essential contradiction with the unified interests of the Islamic world. Then, any re-empowerment of the Islamic was an alarm for the dependent structures to Western power that are opposed to the Muslims' interests. It means sheikdoms' identity conflicts with the general interests of the Islamic world. The dependent sheiks saw their survival in a substantial contradiction with the Muslims' interests and the continuing weakness and dependence of the Islamic world on the colonial powers. These marginalized and dependent identities could not influence the Islamic world. Still, the discovery of oil in the 1920 AD/1299 SH and 1950 AD/1329 SH caused the beginning of a new era in Britain's relations with the Muslim world. Apart from the economic benefits of oil, the position of these false identities in the future developments of the Islamic world becomes apparent by evaluating the content of the sheikdom-sponsored contract. Hence, the conflicting identities of affiliated sheikdoms caused many changes in the Islamic world over the past few decades. This effect appeared in two different ways and



two distinct periods. In this regard, the main goal of Britain in establishing the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms was the economic impact on the two powers of the Islamic world, namely Iran and the Ottoman Empire (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 31-35).

The role of the UAE was debilitating the economic and commercial power of the ports of southern Iran and the Sultanate of Oman, which did it right. During the last years of the Qajar era, many prominent Iranian merchants migrated to Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah under the direct support of the British naval security system and a large fleet. The establishment of the Bahrain-UAE line of communication with India and Europe destroyed the Persian Gulf-Oman trade line to the East and West, and the steamship performed this task well. The British, about Kuwait and Bahrain, with the concentrating Iraq trade and the Ottoman West in Kuwait, while the historical power of Basra and Khuzestan ports is declining in East and West trade, created a geographical bottleneck for any political power in Iraq (Jafari Valdani, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 16-18; Ghasemian, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 406-408).

### **3. Britain Withdraws from the Persian Gulf and Western Policy in Maintaining Dependent Sheikhdoms**

In a report describing the dangers of communism for the United States, Dr. Truman advised the US government to deploy allied forces in the Free Zones (Western Bloc and its environs) to confronting the communism influence. Also, prevent the former Soviet Union from gaining access to the free world by building a fence around the Eastern Bloc (Elahi, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 115).

In his 1947 speech, then-President Truman declared that the United States should financially support the countries at risk of communism (Imami, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 34).

With the proclamation of Truman and the growing commitment of the US government to the balance of power in the Middle East, the hostility and traditional rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United Kingdom became hostility to the Soviet Union and the United States (Zakeri Marvast, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 24).

Following the fall of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the 1958 coup in Iraq, and the growth of leftist movements, then-President Eisenhower proposed his theory in this regard (Imami, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 36).

After criticizing Soviet policy in the Middle East, Eisenhower wanted Congress to grant economic and military assistance to all or some countries in the region who wished to do so if those countries allowed the US armed forces to use their territory in return (Chomsky, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12).

Eisenhower's proposal reinforced the theory that the coastal states of the Persian Gulf should fill any gaps themselves and protect their security (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 96-98).

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

Therefore, they accepted the Nixon proposal. According to this theory, in the Persian Gulf region, two affiliated semi-independent regimes with economic power and human resources, namely the Pahlavi government as a "Military Pillar" and the government of Al-Saud as a "Financial Pillar and Support" to protect the dependent sheikdoms from communism influence have played a role. It means aligning seemingly independent states in line with Western colonial policies. The choice of two semi-dependent regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain fake and dependent identities was accompanied by solid reasons.

Iran had the most extensive coastline with the Persian Gulf, the most populous country, with a dependent and trained Western army. As the largest producer and supplier of oil to Europe and the United States, Saudi Arabia had considerable financial power with substantial political influence among the sheiks of the Persian Gulf. These Pahlavi and Saudi regimes had close relations with the United States (Elahi, 1986 AD/1365: 65).

Iran would have a more authentic place in this theory because of its more outstanding military capabilities than Saudi Arabia, its location between the Persian Gulf and the former Soviet Union, and more appropriate geopolitical contexts. Therefore, as a "Regional Gendarme or Police," this country should play a key role in preserving the colonial heritage and a critical factor in preventing the formation of independent identities based on national and Islamic interests in West Asia (Asadian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 31).

Part of the Cold War was the Soviet-American rivalry in confronting independent identities in the Islamic world and revealed one of these contexts of rivalry in Oman. The separatist movement of the People's Front for the liberation of Dhofar, which sought freedom from colonial influence, was eliminated in several operations in 1353-55 (Halliday, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 176-214).

The process of turning Afghanistan into a communist country in 1978 AD/1357 SH was faced with a strong reaction from the United States and the region's countries (Zakeri Marvast, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 78; Vosoughi, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 456-457).

The new American regional approach involved combating Soviet expansionism. In response to the US demands to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf region, Iran demanded increased US military advisers to train the Iran army and more authority to purchase military equipment and US avoidance of interfering in Iran's domestic politics. The United States agreed to all of the Shah's demands. At a critical historical moment, the Pahlavi government placed the Iranian nation as the provider of colonial interests in the Persian Gulf, a region that Iranians have always considered part of their historical identity. The happen was not even at the height of the weakness and rhetoric of the Qajar government. The agreement to apart from Bahrain was the

culmination of an alliance with foreign interests by an Iranian government that was unprecedented in Iranian history. Richard Holmes, the then US Ambassador to Tehran at the National Defense University in February 1976 AD/1354 SH, described the Persian Gulf region as a vital region for the West and all countries of the world. He added that this region's stability and security are among the most critical priorities of American foreign policy (Rubin, 1984 AD/1363 SH: 135).

As part of the historical identity of the Iranians, the Persian Gulf has become part of the colonial identity and West interests, and the king of Iran, Willingly or unwillingly, supplied the goods of colonialism and preserved these interests. While the Persian Gulf had increasing importance and played a vital role in providing energy for the sustainability of the world's industrial life, and was known as a geopolitical and geostrategic region (Mahdavi, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 268-269).

In any way, the governments of non-national and against their nation's interests, namely the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and Al Saud in Saudi Arabia, wanted to play a role in this ostensibly serving civilization. However, Iraq, realizing the extensive damage caused by the British colonial policy in creating a rift between Iraq and Kuwait, sometimes warn the end of the British mechanism of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms (Mojtahedzadeh, 2002 AD/1381 SH:195).

While stimulating geostrategic competition in the region, this situation caused regional power such as Saudi Arabia to think about getting rid of the geostrategic impasse. According to Saudi Arabia and its Western allies, this strait derived from Iran's proxy dominance over the Strait of Hormuz. However, Saudi Arabia was heavily dependent on the channel's security (ibid: 195-196).

#### **4. The Kuwait Sheikdom and the Geographical Strait for Iraq**

Regarding the natural borders in the Persian Gulf, Iraq has been unfavorable compared to all the coastal countries in the region, including Oman and Bahrain. It has always sought to get out of this situation. The annexation of Kuwait or at least the sovereignty acquisition over Khorramshahr and Abadan or Bubiyan and Warbah islands have been proposed to solve this problem. Iraqi leaders saw the achievement of one of the regions of Khuzestan and Kuwait as a solution to the geopolitical problem of overcoming the status quo. Several attempts to occupy Kuwait in 1961 AD/1340 SH with British intervention were unsuccessful, and the West's reaction prevented serious action against Kuwait. From its formation, especially after independence, Iraq has claimed sovereignty over Kuwait and Iran's land and sea borders in the southwest. Even if ideologically, Iraq considered the Persian Gulf countries as allies and subjects of imperialism and at the time of independence of the Iraqi emirates were

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

willing to manipulate and interfere in the internal affairs of these countries, they all have historical backgrounds and, most importantly, geographical and geographical causes. The cause is the political and geographical bottleneck of Iraq (Seifzadeh, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 268).

Iraq can only reach the Persian Gulf via Iran and Kuwait. Basra and Umm al-Qasr ports are in a geographical and security strait with the demarcation of the borders along the Talug line. Umm al-Qasr is surrounded by the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan in Kuwait. With their historical background, the Iraqi people consider themselves the inheritors of world civilization and now have to get permission to cross the waters of Kuwait, which is controlled by the Western countries, to reach the outside world. Part of the influence and strengthening of extremist nationalism in Iraq during the Ba'ath party's existence was the imposition of colonial policies on the Iraqi people. Like the happen was imposed on the Germans after World War I and caused the rise of Nazism. British colonial policy caused some irrational deviation for some Iraqi officials. Under the pretext of imposing a geographical bottleneck on British colonial heritage in the Persian Gulf, they pursued an aggressive policy to the detriment of neighboring countries (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 141-143; 2009 AD/1388 SH: 329-336; 2011 AD/1390 SH: 495-510).

At the same time, all the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf region were dependent on the West and regarded any change in the status quo as a field of disruption of their dependent identity. There was this situation from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. Most countries were led by affiliated governments that recognized the British heritage (Jafari Valdani 1992 AD/1371 SH: 13; Seifzadeh, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 267-268).

Iraqi leaders offered another way out of the impasse in claiming absolute sovereignty over the Arvand River and part of Khuzestan; the fulfillment depended on the strength of Iran's central government. Fear of an Iranian reaction caused the return of Iraqi governments to the issue of Kuwait. In 1951, the Iraqi government blocked the make border with Kuwait, claiming ownership of the Warbah island. In 1954 AD/1333 SH, during negotiations to divert the Arvand River to Kuwait, Iraq demanded four square kilometers of the Kuwaiti Sabah estuary west of the island of Warbah and Bubiyan (ibid:191). This issue led to conflicts between Al-Sabah and Abdul Karim Qasim and the Ba'ath party (Jafari Valdani, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 288).

According to Abdul Karim Qasim, Kuwait was part of Iraq. Therefore, at the request of Sheikh Abdullah Salim Ale Sabah, Emir of Kuwait, on July 1, 1961, British troops entered Kuwait. The Arab League convened a meeting and Kuwait's application for membership in the Arab League was quickly considered and accepted (Parsa Doust, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 204).

This plan was adopted to maintain the status quo regarding the British request and with the direct support of the dependent states, including Al Saud and the Egyptian government. Kuwait refused to cede the two islands at the insistence of Britain, which saw any concessions to Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf as a stroke to its interests. All regional powers played a role in the colonial land; increasing hostility and border disputes regarding the decisions of England in the 19/13 century had an impact on neighborly relations in the 20th century (Jafari Valdani, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 214).

In Kuwait, Sheikh Al-Sabah tried to defuse the Iraqi threat by diverting Iraq's attention to Iran's borders. It was the most critical reason for Kuwait's comprehensive support for Saddam during the eight-year war with Iran. Iraq's expansionist claims mainly were within the Gulf Coast. Border clashes with Iran intensified in 1971 AD/1350 SH, and the restoration of Iranian sovereignty over the three islands, which resulted from the encroachment of Western sheiks on Iran's borders, intensified differences. In December 1971 AD/ Azar 1350 SH, several border clashes took place between Iran and Iraq (Jafari Valdani, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 44) .

Thus, the first direct effect of the formation of sheikhdoms in the future developments of the Islamic world appeared. The establishment of the seven sheikhdoms emirates of the United Arab Emirates and the installing the fake Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah flags on the Iranian islands caused the essential Iranian-Arab disputes under the direct leadership of the United Kingdom.

Consequently, in connection with the geographical strait of Iraq, according to the establishment of the Kuwait sheikhdom, it affected the relations between Iran and Iraq (Ghasemian, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 480-516).

The combination of the two phenomena of the 19th-20th /13th-14th centuries caused the creation of a new mechanism in the relations between Muslim states. They included establishing affiliated sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula as the territories around the central core of the Islamic world in West Asia in the 19th century. Then, the establishment of modern and semi-independent governments in the major countries of the Islamic world (Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, etc.).

The common denominator of both the 19th and 20th-century phenomena was a sense of Western superiority. However, the recent phenomenon was formed in the heart of traditional lands with a conventional identity, economic power, and significant human resources, and tried to dismantle the mechanism of conventional colonialism in the 19th century.

The alignment of the political identities interests of the 19th century and the new identities of the 20th century prevented the emergence of fundamental differences and disturbances in the status

## **Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War**

quo unless a revolutionary movement changes the basis of this colonial mechanism and contrary to the public interests of the Islamic world (Ghasemian, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 341-348; 2008 AD/1387 SH: 407-410).

### **5. The Islamic Revolution and the Collapse of the Colonial Mechanism in the Persian Gulf**

The consequences of the fall of the Shah in the Persian Gulf and the region were far-reaching and detrimental to the United States. According to Brzezinski, Iran is the biggest defeat of the Carter administration. Regardless of its influence on the Camp David peace and the normalization of relations with China and its firm stance against the Soviet Union, the overthrow of the Shah was considered strategically catastrophic for the United States and Carter himself (Brzezinski, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 496).

Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran's foreign policy in the region and the world underwent a fundamental change. The real fear of the Islamic wave spread everywhere in the area. This wave could seriously threaten the region's stability and the western oil reservoirs (Tirman, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 161).

Thus, the revolution at the most critical Western base in the Persian Gulf upset the balance of power and announced the main framework of Iran's foreign policy; consequently, they proposed a new pole based on the dominant political ideology in the contemporary world.

The Islamic Revolution caused the revelation of the true identity of the Islamic world and Iran and the political, cultural, and economic conflict between the genuine interests of Muslims and affiliated political identities as the provider of Western interests in the region. Such a transformation began during the return and reliance on Islamic and Iranian identity and confrontation with the pro-Western current. The significance of this development was related to the Persian Gulf and its future impact on the colonial search mechanism.

The common interests and characteristics of the Iranian Shia and the coastal settlers, who had less interest in the new Western instrument, gave rise to a kind of essential conflict between the revolutionary system in Iran and the political structures governing the Arab sheikdoms. This process has added to Western concerns about disrupting their vital interests in the region. The most important consequences of the Islamic Revolution of Iran were the questioning of the legitimacy of the ruling regimes in the Persian Gulf countries. Reducing the legitimacy of the ruling governments in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf as a legacy of old and new colonialism meant reducing their domestic and foreign political authority and their regional and global supporters (Asadian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 48).

The Islamic Revolution had a great reflection outside the borders of Iran, and it was Islam's victory (Kadivar, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 9).The

achievement of the Islamic Revolution ended the apparent and practical dependence on the United States. The revolution had a religious nature, and the slogan of neither Eastern nor Western was the basis of foreign relations (Kayhan newspaper, 9/1/1982 AD/1361/6/10 SH: 4).

The spiritual and popular characteristics of the Iranian revolution and the fall of the Shah's regime as a strategic ally of the United States and the West caused the Iranian revolution to be analyzed based on the four concepts of religion, people, and the nature of the fall of the Shah and the impact on American interests. Therefore, rebuilt Iran's foreign relations foundation (Khomeini, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 4, 249).

The Islamic Revolution worried the West and Communism equally. The reaction of the region's people and the demonstrations in Khartoum, Cairo, Tripoli, and the slogans of death to the Shah and end to Sadat showed a new uprising (Tirman, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 161).

The revolution put the support of liberation movements on its foreign policy agenda (Bashiri, 1383: 453; Halliday, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 326) and crystallized as a model in activities (Droudian, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 743; Thani Nejad, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 215).

Before 1979, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two political and financial pillars, were regional stability, and the balance in the Peninsula and the Persian Gulf region was one of the common interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia. It led to normal relations between the two countries, although there was rivalry and fear between them. The Islamic Revolution victory revived the hope of restoring the greatness of the past and liberation from the domination of the dominating powers (Ebrahimifar, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 43; Droudian, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 1, 732).

Reducing the legitimacy of the regimes governing the Arab states of the Persian Gulf meant reducing the authority of these countries to create security. The common religious and ethnic interests and characteristics between the Iran Shias and the Shias of these countries add to the concerns. In Iraq and Bahrain, Shias make up about 60% of the total population of these countries (Asadian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 48).

The sheiks and rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, along with Israel, became the Western military and strategic base in the region with a variety of reinforced equipment (Buye, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 47; Brzezinski, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 191-192).

Since the 1980s, Saudi Arabia has become one of the mainstays of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and a variety of military equipment from artillery, tanks, armor, aircraft, radar, missile systems, and warships is given to the sheiks (Sohrabi, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 340-341).

## 6. The Occurrence of War and the Colonial Interests of the Persian Gulf Sheiks

From 1979-1980 AD/1357-1359 SH, the political and military situation in Iran and the Persian Gulf region caused Saddam to achieve easier his goals. At the same time, the Arabs needed Iraq to contain the Islamic Revolution and to spread moderation in the area. In return, Iraq needed the diplomatic and economic support of the Arabs to carry out its actions against Iran and advance its goals of gaining leadership in the region (Freulich and Levy, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 127).

It caused the temporary resolution of the issue of Kuwait and the precaution in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council on how to deal with Iran and interact with Iraq. The council had two negative and cautious tendencies. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait favored intensity of action to keep Iran and Iraq involved in the war. The UAE and Oman favored maintaining minimal relations and not blocking all avenues of confrontation with Iran. Of course, these two countries also supported the united positions of the council in the continuous condemnation of Iran during the imposed war (Yazdanfam and Jamshidi, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 29, 52).

The role of colonial policies in the emergence of differences and lack of convergence and cooperation within the region during the imposed war was significant. Some sheiks even spent millions of dollars to show that peace and reconciliation plans in the area were ineffective. It meant the necessity of continuing security unrest to save the lives of the sheiks and especially the Ale Saud (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 142; Ebrahimifar, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 385).

The purpose of establishing the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 was economic, cultural, political, and social cooperation between the members. But from the first, there was no symmetry between the members' demands, which caused this so-called regional organization not to play an essential role in the Persian Gulf. The council was created to counter the illusion of the Islamic Republic's danger (Borono, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 45).

To guarantee future developments towards Iran, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council declared that the council is not an alliance against a country and is merely a covenant (Olivia, 1387 AD/1366 SH: 118).

With the change of the war scene and the beginning of a new phase, the Kuwaiti government became more determined to support the Iraqi regime and, in addition to increasing its material and financial assistance to Iraq, called for peace and a ceasefire. The amount of financial aid to Iraq was increased. Obstacles to Kuwait's financial aid to Iraq in late 1982 due to the need for the Kuwaiti parliament to approve the help were removed by shifting the balance



of power on the fronts to the detriment of Iraq. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in support of Iraq, pursued a concerted diplomatic effort. However, the sheikhdoms have no historical identity components (Ghasemian, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 393-395; 407-409).

While the monarchies of the Arab Gulf countries were concluding reciprocal security agreements in the summer of 1979 (Freulich and Levy, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 127; Droudian, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 1, 306), Saddam, because of the need for practical assistance, defended the sheikhs' positions and, along with the Saudis, played a prominent role in countering the threat of the Iranian revolution (Roshandel and Seifzadeh, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 81).

Simultaneously the Eight-Year War, the West realized the colonial identity of the sheiks of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Still, the two non-colonial countries of Iran and Iraq, which were capable of independence based on their indigenous and national identities, were seen as opposing the life of colonial identities.

Hence, they tried to maintain the status quo, the balance of power between the two sides, and weaken Iran and Iraq during the war. The sheiks wanted to continue the fight, but these public efforts to weaken the Iranian people's revolution could harm the general opinion of the sheikhdom residents and create a kind of discontent among the masses living in the region. Scholars refer to this issue with terms such as the uncertain situation for the sheiks of the Persian Gulf (Cordesman, 2003 AD/1382SH: 570-572).

Although they had an apparent inclination towards Iraq in the imposed war, they were always afraid that the victory of one side would lead to the superiority of the other side in the Persian Gulf region. So, they took advantage of every opportunity. At the 11th Arab Summit, the Emir of Kuwait called for a common strategy to stay out of international conflicts. In February 1981, the Riyadh Summit paved the way for the formulation of the organizational structure and objectives of the Cooperation Council with the participation of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (Naimi, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 31).

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided the most financial, intelligence, and military support to Saddam during the eight-year war. This aid was often offered in the shadow of the fake Western alliance for the sheikhdoms in the form of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Other Arab countries, although not members of the council, nevertheless moved alongside member states to provide political and economic support to Iraq during the war. Saudi Arabia allowed US vessels and aircraft fleets to refuel in its waters. Bahrain provided medical and fire services during the attack on the USS Stark and its repair after being hit. American helicopters typically used Bahraini soil for training and loading. Bahrain had allowed US fleets to load

## **Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War**

continuously. At the height of the US deployment in the region, a supply ship was unloaded every week and unloaded several US Air Force planes in Bahrain each day. Bahrain de facto accepted the deployment of American forces on its territory and leased several large platforms for the deployment of American troops (Cordesman, 2003: 571, 671-763).

This direct and indirect access and assistance of the council were reinforced simultaneously as Saddam's dissatisfaction with the bits of help. Until the recapture of Khorramshahr in May 1982/Khordad 1361, members of the Cooperation Council had no comment on the end of the war. Without mentioning the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the occupied territories, they emphasized the necessity to increase efforts to find a final solution to the conflict. The council tried to link the war and the revolution's victory to the threats of the Arab nation (Naimi, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 86).

### **7. Recapture of Khorramshahr and Direct Entry of Sheiks into the War in the Persian Gulf**

Following a created calm in the war that followed the conquest of Khorramshahr and Saddam's demands for peace, the army and IRGC forces decided to launch an offensive and demonstrate their power to Saddam. Therefore, carried out the Ramadan operation to strike the Iraqi positions on July 13, 1982 AD/ Tir 22, 1361 SH, to capture the Basra.

The goal was to separate Iraq from the Persian Gulf completely, and it was imperative in the battle. Ramadan operations changed the war process in the following years in the form of a serious entry into the sea and an attempt for tactical and armor superiority (Cordesman and Wagner: 1994 AD/1373 SH: 2, 214; Zakeri Marvast, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 78).

Late autumn 1361, the leaders of the sheiks, while expressing concern, declared that the developments of the war are dangerous for the security of the Arab world and called for a change in the situation (Ghasemi Naraghi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 135).

In March 1981 AD/Isfand 1359 SH, the declaration of neutrality by the countries south of the Persian Gulf prevented Iran from invading their territory. Still, they wanted to carry on their help in Iraq. In practice, they increasingly provided Saddam with military equipment and financial resources to strengthen his military machine (Cordesman, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 571).

In addition to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which openly provided financial support and equipment to Saddam, the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Bahrain, and Qatar indirectly offered assistance to the country (Qasimian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 143-146).

With the spread of the war to the Persian Gulf waters by Iraq and attacked oil facilities and ships bound for Iranian ports, the council's

member states felt that there was no threat to the region's security in the no-go zone declared by Iraq (Islamic Republic News Agency, 1987 AD/ 1366 SH: 6).

Kuwait maintained a neutral position in the official and public places less than before in the periods after Iran's victory in the conquest of Khorramshahr and the defeat of the siege of Abadan. Sometimes, in interviews and comments, they acknowledged their help to the Iraqi regime or were trying to justify their support for Iraq (Mousavi, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 91).

Officials of this country on various occasions implicitly and explicitly reiterated their support for Iraq (Islami, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 264-268; Asadi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 63).

Sheikh Saad Abdul Salem Al-Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait, stated that "Iraq should not be left alone in this war. Invading Iraqi territory is considered an invasion of the Arab world" (Jomhuri Eslami newspaper, July 21 1987 AD/Tir 30, 1366 SH: 3; Zakeri Marvast, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 63).

Kuwait's ambassador to the United States, Massoud Nasser al-Sabah, called for the implementation of the Arab Defense Pact and the prevention of arms exports to Iran to prevent a crisis in the Persian Gulf and praised the Security Council's arms and oil sanctions on Iran (Islami, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 269). Saudi Arabia did the first military action of the council members against Iran (al-Khalij, 1/16/1982 AD/1360/10/26 SH: 1).

The process of transferring goods and weapons from Kuwaiti ports to Iraq intensified. In one year, 6 million tons of goods and weapons were unloaded from Kuwaiti docks to Iraq. One of the Kuwaiti government's main pillars for Iraq was economic, financial, and logistical assistance. In contrast, the Ba'athist government was in an unfavorable situation due to the continuation of the war. The economic crisis in Iraq was inevitable as the cost of war and oil prices plummeted (Islami, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 269).

Under these circumstances, he continued the war only with the military and financial assistance of the Iraqi sheiks. Only the Ale Saud in Saudi Arabia and the Ale Sabah in Kuwait had open support for Iraq during the first war. They launched their propaganda machine against the Iranian revolutionaries.

Kuwait considered it necessary for the Iraqi authorities to divert attention to Khuzestan and tempt and persuade the Iraqis to dominate and abandon their historical claim to Kuwait to survive. Ale Saud saw revolutionary Iran politically, economically, and religiously as opposed to its colonial identity. Subsequently, under pressure from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, other Arab sheiks secretly act against Iran, all in the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, diplomatic action can sometimes be more effective than a military operation on the ground. During the war, the countries bordering the

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

Persian Gulf played the most diplomatic role in strengthening morale, attracting international support, and further weakening Iran (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 143-144).

Therefore, following Kuwait, other Council countries also announced that they had strengthened their reconnaissance military activities to end the aggression. Diplomatically, the council member sought to condemn the attacks by Iran and sent an Arab League delegation to Japan to urge the country to cut its economic ties with Iran. Saudi Arabia secretly allowed military equipment to pass through its territory to Iraq, increased oil exports, established a pipeline from Al-Zubayr in Iraq to the port of Yanbu, and deployed AWACS warning aircraft to Iraq. Numerous actions of the sheiks demonstrated their hostile stance in support of Iraq and the threat to the security of Iranian shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf (Mousavi, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 85-87). Since the beginning of 1983, the annual financial assistance of the Persian Gulf countries to Iraq has been fifteen billion dollars (Kuzichkin, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 49-51).

After the changes made in the battlefield and the conquest of Khorramshahr, the Iranian forces threatened Basra during the Ramadan operation, the decision-making process of the regional governments also changed (ibid: 52). The Emir of Kuwait, not in the Cooperation Council but the Persian Gulf countries in the Arab League and the United Nations, tried to further weaken Iran in the Persian Gulf region and put pressure on Iran. Nevertheless, their official statements always wanted to show themselves as defenders of the Muslims' rights and benevolence on both sides of the war (Asadi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 113).

The imposed war exposed the colonial policies of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms regarding the politicization of the Tri-Island issue and the symbolism of the Iranian-Arab conflict in the Persian Gulf region (Schofield, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 148-150).

With the end of the war, this issue remained as one of the most important symbols of the conflict between the legacy of British colonialism and revolutionary Iran.

Thus, the war was the field of many regional problems in West Asia over the past few decades, derived from historical issues arising from the colonialism's emergence and antagonistic role, especially British colonialism. One of the most critical colonial tools for the continued presence of Western countries in West Asia and other parts of the world has been to create obstacles to the empowerment of nations that have sufficient opportunities for empowerment and independence. It has been the case with Iran, Iraq, and other countries around the Persian Gulf over the past two hundred years. Meanwhile, the sheiks of the Persian Gulf region, which did not have the minimum necessary facilities to gain relative independence throughout their history, have been of particular interest to Western

countries. Based on a colonial identity, the sheiks of the southern coasts of the Persian Gulf consider the continuation of their life as the continuation of insecurity and unrest within the axis countries of West Asia and the continuation of maintaining their dependence. Understanding this dependence during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, they played their role in securing the interests of Western countries (Ghasemian, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 163-167).

### Conclusion

The Iran-Iraq dispute over Arvand played a direct and essential role in the outbreak of the war. But the historical legacy of colonialism in the Persian Gulf, which manifested itself in the formation of the sheikhdoms, caused significant developments during the war. Kuwait's exceptional geographical location for Iraq's entrance and its access to the Persian Gulf was an intolerable issue for the newly established country of Iraq, especially its millions, given the ancient history of Mesopotamian relations with the Persian Gulf.

The leaders of Iraq saw the achievement of the Khuzestan and Kuwait as the solution to their country's geopolitical problem. On the other hand, the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fall of the Pahlavi government caused fundamental changes in the countries' politics of the Persian Gulf region. Saddam Hussein's expansionism had potential effects on the developments in this region.

The Persian Gulf, which has played an important role in Iran's regional policies, witnessed extensive developments in various political, economic, and military fields after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Islamic Revolution shattered all Western colonial equations in the Persian Gulf, and it was a significant blow to the United States. To contain Iran, they realized that Iraq was thought to have the military and political power to counter the Iranian revolution.

The war mobilized the sheiks of the region, and these countries, on the one hand, helped Iraq a lot, and on the other hand, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council emerged as one of the results of the war, which is still active. The Iran-Iraq war was one of the essential factors in accelerating the alliance between the sheiks and strengthening the Ale Saud-led Cooperation Council.

Subsequently, due to the false propaganda of Iranophobia, the Arab sheiks in the Persian Gulf became frightened, and the Western propaganda machine significantly intensified this fear. As a result, aid from Arab countries and Western intelligence and equipment aid to Iraq strengthened. Although Iran and Iraq were the most critical countries in the Persian Gulf, they were not present in the most crucial political union between the countries of this region, namely the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. The most critical factor in the

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

18

Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution | Volume 3 | No.9 | Summer 2021 | PP. 1-22

conservatism of the countries in the southern part of the Persian Gulf has been the fear of the two countries gaining power.

### References

Al-Khalij, 1/16/1982 AD/1361/10/26 SH.

Archive of the Center for War Studies and Research, File No. 532, Document No. 16052 (6/30/1982 AD/1361/4/10 SH); Document No. 066478 (1984/7/3 AD/ 1363/4/12 SH).

Asadi Tumar Aghaj, H. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Khorramshahr Liberation Gulf* 598. Under the guidance of Dr. Muhammad Baqer Vosoughi. Tehran: University of Tehran.

Asadian, A. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *US Security Policy in the Persian Gulf*. Tehran: Institute of Strategic Studies

Bashiri, A.; Hashemi Rafsanjani, A. (2003 AD/1383 SH). *Records and Memoirs of 1979 AD/1357 SH and 1980/AD 1358 SH (Revolution and Victory)*. Tehran: Maaref-e-Enghelaab Publishing Office.

Borono, R. (1985 AD/1364 SH). *Oil, Politics and the United States in the Middle East*. (Rabiezadeh, M. Trans). Tehran: Heydari.

Brzezinski, Z. (1983 AD/1362 SH). *Secrets of the Shah's fall and Hostage-taking*. (Ahmadi, H. Trans). Tehran: Naraghi.

Brzezinski, Z. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Power and Principles*. (Saqian, M. Trans). Tehran :Office of International Political Studies.

Buye, C. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "Geopolitics and War Strategy of Iraq." *Negin Iran Magazine*. Vol. 10, no. 37, pp. 35-56.

Chomsky, N. (2016 AD/1395 SH). *Deterrent Democracy*. (Gholami, M. Trans). Tehran: Ettelaa't.

Cordesman, A; Wagner, A, (1994 AD/1373 SH). *Lessons from Modern Warfare*. (Yekta, H. Trans). Tehran: IRGC Center for Strategic Studies and Research .

Cordesman, A. H. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Westport: Center of Strategic and International Studies.

- Droudian, M .(1997 AD/1376 SH). *A Journey into War (Beginning to End)*. Tehran: IRGC War Studies and Research Center
- Ebrahimifar, T. (1999 AD/1378 SH). "Investigating the Causes of Divergence in the Persian Gulf region." *Foreign Policy*. Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 379-396.
- Elahi, H. (1986 AD/1365 SH) *The Strategic Importance of Iran in World War II*. Tehran: University Publishing Center .
- Foreign Ministry Document Publishing Unit (1989 AD/1368 SH). *Selection of Iran-Iraq Border Documents*. Tehran :Office of Political Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Freulich, J. S. and Levy, M. (2011 AD/1390 SH). *The Causes of the Iraq-Iran War*. (Nemati, Y. Trans). Tehran: Ettelaa't Newspaper, no. 27895.
- Gcc Foreign Ministers (6/1/1982 AD/1361/3/16). *Meet in Riyadh 30-31 May*, Daily Report. Middle East & Africa [Microform] / FBIS ,V. 82-105.
- Ghasemian, S. (2009 AD/1388 SH). *Threat to British interests and Lord Karzen's trip to the Persian Gulf. A Collection of Lectures and Articles on Iran and British Colonialism*. Tehran: Political Studies and Research.
- Ghasemian, S. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "A Critique of the Historical Issues of the Book: Al-Jazaer Al-Thalath Al-Mohtallah Li-Dawlah Al-Imarat Al-Arabiyyah Al-Muttahidah." *Persian Gulf Research Journal* (First and second Book).Tehran: Khane-Ketaab, pp. 480-516.
- Ghasemian, S. (2020 AD/1399 SH) *Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Historical Identity* .Qom :the Center for Book Publishing.
- Ghasemian, S .(2008 AD/1387 SH). *Grounds for concluding the 1820 contract and its results*. Proceedings of the Persian Gulf Conference. Tehran: University of Tehran.
- Halliday, F. (1981 AD/1360 SH) *Saudi Arabia Without Sultans* . (Afrasiabi, B. Trans). Tehran: Roozbehan.
- Holy Defense Documentation Center of the General Staff of the IRGC. Document No. 40052 and 40053: Dating 1980/1/5 and 6 AD/ 1358/10/15 and 16 SH.

## Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War

- Imami, M. (1994 AD/1372 SH). *Review of the Persian Gulf Security Plans*. Proceedings of the Third Seminar on Persian Gulf Issues. Tehran: Foreign Office, Office of Political and International Studies.
- Islami, M. (1991 AD/1369 SH). *Finding the Roots of Kuwait's Positions and Performance in the Iraq-Iran War*. Tehran: Hamrah Publications.
- Islamic Republic News Agency, (8/30/1987 AD/ 1366/6/8 SH). "Special Reports." no. 163, Tehran.
- Jafari Valdani, A. (1990 AD/1368 SH). *Historical Study of Iran-Iraq Border Disputes*. Tehran: Office of Political and International Studies.
- Jafari Valdani, A. (1993 AD/1371 SH). *Crisis Center in the Persian Gulf*. Second Edition. Tehran: Kayhan Publications.
- Kadivar, J. (1995 AD/1373 SH). *America and Facing the Islamic Revolution*. Tehran: Ettelaa't.
- Kayhan newspaper, 12/27/1982 AD/ 1361/10/6 SH.
- Khomeini, R. (1990 AD/1368 SH). *Sahifa Noor*. Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
- Kuzichkin, V. (1997 AD/1376 SH). *K. G. B. In Iran, Myth from Reality*. (Zand, I; Abutorabian, H. Trans). Tehran: Hekmat.
- Kurdzman, A; Wagner A. A. (1994 AD/1373 SH). *Lessons from Modern Warfare*. (Yekta, H. Trans). Tehran: IRGC Center for Strategic Studies and Research.
- Mahdavi, A. (1997 AD/1376 SH). *Iran's Foreign Policy during the Pahlavi Era*. Tehran: Markaz Publishing
- Mojtahedzadeh, P. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Countries and Borders in the Persian Gulf Geopolitical Region*. (Malek Mohammadi Nouri, H. Trans). Tehran: The Office of Political and International Studies.
- Mousavi, S. M. (2004 AD/1383 SH). "Study of Kuwait's Position and Performance in the Face of the Iran-Iraq War." *Negin Iran*, Vol. 2, no. 8, pp. 75-92.



- Naimi Arfa, B. (1991 AD/1370 SH). *Behavior Principles of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council towards Iran*. Tehran: Office of Political and International Studies.
- Olivia, V. (1987 AD/1366 SH). *Persian Gulf Storm*. (Mobasheri, A; Moayedi, M. Trans). Tehran: Ettelaa't.
- Parsa Doust, M. (1990 AD/1369 SH). *Iraq's Role in Starting the Imposed War against Iran*. Tehran: Enteshar Company.
- Roshandel, J.; Seifzadeh S. H. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *Structural Conflicts in the Persian Gulf Region*. Tehran: Scientific Research and Strategic Studies of the Middle East center.
- Rubin, B. (1984 AD/1363 SH) *The War of Powers in Iran*. (Mahmoud Sharafi). Tehran: Ashtiani Publications.
- Schofield, R. (1997 AD/1376 SH). *Border Disputes in the Gulf: Past, Present, and Future, The Persian Gulf at the Millennium. Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion*. London: St Martin's. pp. 127-165.
- Seifzadeh. S. H. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Crisis Centers in the Persian Gulf*. Tehran: Middle East Studies Center.
- Sohrabi Ismail (1990 AD/1369 SH). *America's Strategic Interests and Goals in the Persian Gulf, Persian Gulf Collection of Articles*. Tehran: Office of Political and International Studies.
- Thani Nejad, G. (1994 AD/1373 SH). "Rooting out the Iraqi invasion of Iran." *Quarterly Journal of Military Studies*. Vol. 4, no. 14, pp. 209-217.
- Tirman, K. (1994 AD/1373 SH). *Death Merchandise (The Untold Stories of the Iraq-Iran War)*. (Tadayon, A. Trans.). Tehran: Rasa Publishing.
- Vosoughi, M. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *History of the Persian Gulf and Neighboring Countries*. Tehran: Samat.
- Yazdanfam, M; Jamshidi M. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Iran-Iraq War Diary, Recent Efforts in the South, Consequences of Operation Karbala 5 in the Region and the World*. Tehran: IRGC War Studies and Research Center.

**Colonial Roots of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms' Action in Front of the Imposed War**

Zakeri Marvast, G. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Iraq Invasion of Kuwait*. Under the Guidance of Dr. Zarifian. Tehran: University of Tehran.

## Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions

Ali Badrkhani\*<sup>1</sup>, Nasrin Bahrainy<sup>2</sup>

**DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.2.6**

1. M.A. in International Relations, Azad University, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Assistant Professor, Department of English Language, University of Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 7 August 2021 - Accepted: 4 September 2021)

### Abstract

Any political unit's development, strength, and subsistence, especially in critical situations, rely on people's participation and social resources. Similarly, in costly and threatening crises like war, reliance on the masses and their responsibility leads to social advancement and solutions to state problems. The main question of the present article is 'whether popular participation in the imposed war and Western sanctions could be a pattern for solving the country's future problems?' People's presence and participation have been of most crucial factors of victory, persistence, and maintenance of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The findings declare that although we can find examples of this kind of national partnership in some nations, Iranians' successful model of unity and participation during the eight years of unequal war and sanctions is unique. Using this model can lead to the solidarity of the government and nation in rapid development and ensure the country's progress in the future. The study employs a library-research method for data collection in a descriptive-analytical approach.

**Keywords:** Pattern, Peoples Participation, Sanctions, Support.

---

\*. Corresponding author: marbadrkhani@gmail.com

## Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions

### Introduction

By reviewing the worldwide social events, we can find that people play an influential undeniable role in political, social, economic, and cultural ups and downs in each country. As in the Islamic Revolution and imposed war, in the unstable economic conditions caused by the oppressive sanctions, the novel Islamic system was revived and sustained thanks to participation and popular support. During the imposed war, popular aid and gifts played an essential role in the economy of the war. Since the West sanctions had been started and the government alone was unable to provide all facilities for war fronts, the extensive link of the state and nation caused people to help the war. They played a crucial role in defending the newborn Islamic regime by providing all supplies for war fronts and sending their youth to the forefront as volunteer fighters and Basijis.

Given that the popularity of the imposed war is one of its most outstanding features, introducing this indigenous pattern following the Islamic-Iranian culture will play a significant role in the evolution of administrating practices in the country. Unlike many standard administrating methods that have been a blind imitation of non-native management models, today, our country's need in administration is to design systems and structures according to Islamic-Iranian culture.

Nowadays, our government has introduced itself to the world with a unique identity; however, some of the dimensions have remained unknown to many people. Economic support and human resources during the period of war and sanctions with the participation of the people are the essential parts of this identity. The present study is significant in explaining and examining this new pattern to today's young generation and its considerable effects in the field of crisis management of the country.

### 1. Statement of the Problem

The pattern of popular participation in economic support and human resources in the context of the imposed war and Western sanctions is an outstanding achievement based on the teachings of Ashura.

The pattern of people's participation in economic support and the provision of human resources in the conditions of the imposed war and Western sanctions is an outstanding achievement based on the teachings of Ashura. It has had substantial effects in the country and the region, so today, we observe its impact in Lebanon under the name of Hezbollah. In addition to their military duties, a famous group helped the Lebanese government with social contributions such as providing drinking water to the southern suburbs of Beirut, establishing an Islamic health community, a treatment center, and founding an Islamic charity relief committee (Ghasem, 2005:114).

In Nigeria, the famous group of Sheikh Zakzaki, modeled on Islamic Iran, gives significant services to the Nigerians in the form of

a Scholars' Association, a Physicians' Association, and even a film production and publishing unit (IRIB News Agency, 2021 AD/1400 SH).

These models are also known today by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine and the popular uprising (HashdoShaabi) in Iraq and Syria. They have been able to contribute to solving social problems through their voluntary contributions.

The pattern of peoples' participation that was able to break the complex situation of the imposed war and the pressure of sanctions and then rush to the government's aid in other social, cultural, economic, and political crises is a valuable experience in construction and active citizen participation. Therefore, we want to know whether peoples' participation in the conditions of the imposed war and Western sanctions can be a pattern for solving the country's future problems.

As in the post-war situation, the elected governments reached out to the people to resolve some issues and concluded; it is assumed that this pattern can be a less flawed model in managing the affairs of society. This research investigates the successful, experienced, and, of course, nearly forgotten local model in the country's management.

Some research has been done on various aspects of public participation, such as: Designing a social resource model based on religious teachings (Purbehruzan and Rezaeemanesh), modeling citizen participation in state management based on Nahj al-Balaghah (Khan Mohammadi et al.). He presents a model of citizen's participation insensitivity to public issues based on ethics (Abbasi et al.). However, there are related subjects in all the mentioned research and similar cases, some express people's participation. In contrast, others point to the importance of the social resource. However, the present article describes the people's participation in a new space in a particular historical period as a necessary model for solving the country's future problems.

## **2. Research Method**

The present study attempted to collect data in an organized and step-by-step process, employing a library-research method with a descriptive-analytical approach. In the end, it is supposed to explore and analyze the influential role of public participation in the war and sanctions; a new model is presented as research achievements.

## **3. Conceptual and Theoretical Issues**

The persistence and survival of governments is a long-standing phenomenon of concern of all schools: Islamic and non-Islamic. Due to the extensiveness of today's affairs and the weight of the duties of governments, they will not be able to perform their burdens alone. As a result, governments will lose their legitimacy due to citizens' distrust

### Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions

and lack of participation. One of the ways to create stable security in society and the survival of governments is to strengthen social resources. Putnam argues that social resources encompass a set of concepts, such as trust, norms, and networks that causes create optimal communication and participation among members of a community and ultimately serve their mutual benefits (Dehghani et al., 2017 AD/1396 SH: 2).

The concept of social resource has been introduced in recent years in social sciences, economics, and, more recently, in political sciences (Baker, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 13).

Thus, the concept has no long history. Its function has gradually increased since the 1990s in theses and academic papers with individuals such as Coleman, Bourdieu, Putnam, and Fukuyama. According to Bourdieu, the social resource is a collection of real or virtual resources belonging to individuals or groups due to the stable value of networks, solid organizational relationships, and mutual understanding and awareness. In other words, for Bourdieu, social resource arises from a social structure that is organized and formulated in direct connection with the habits of individuals in the field of cultural activities raised from social functions (Abbasi, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 58).

In general, social resources include information, ideas, tips, business opportunities, financial resources, power and influence, emotional support, benevolence, trust, and cooperation. The word social implies that these resources are not personal property. They are at the heart of relationship networks. Coleman puts it this way: Social resource is an achievement of relationships between individuals and groups without which the achieving would be impossible (Field, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 32).

This vital resource has a solid mutual interrelationship with physical, economic, and human resources, accelerating economic, cultural, and informational development and the growth of society; it creates a sense of participation and cooperation between members of the community. Such social resource plays a significant role in the organization in the absence of which other investments will not be very profitable, fruitful and effective (Pourbehroozan and Rezaeemanesh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 88).

Public participation is one of the most critical factors of social resources. Before the Islamic Revolution, there was a deep gap between people and the regime regarding the lack of solidarity. People not participated in government projects and opposed many of them in

many cases<sup>1</sup>. The Islamic Republic of Iran was able to provide the capacity to use the social resource of the country.

After the Islamic Revolution, whenever the public potentiality was referred to, things accomplished well because being democratic has been one of the basic principles of forming the Islamic system of Iran. The appearance of Basij Mostazafin (The Mobilization of the Oppressed) and the Jihad Sazandegi (Constructive Jihad) are just two examples of these successes that could have attracted the attention of other nations, especially among neighboring countries. Today, Basij Mostazafin, as a non-governmental organization, is not just a military organization.

This institution has helped elected governments in all social affairs, from politics to economics and even healthcare. Its plans and responsibility have offered and implemented low-cost solutions to crises while reducing suffering and pain.

### 3.1. Pattern

Birnbaum introduces patterns as a conceptual lens that draws our attention to specific dimensions of the phenomenon and provides a perceptual framework to organize the world and decide what he wants to do as one sees fit (Birnbaum, 2003: 87).

Some define a pattern as a set of logical propositions put together in connected networks and express the performance of a theory in real space (Hasanifar, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 49).

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution has defined the pattern as follows: "The pattern is a means and a measure for human beings to match their deeds to it." (Mirmoezzi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 64)

### 3.2. Participation

Participation is an ancient concept. People with organized activities seek to achieve specific goals, and social actions called participation (Sarukhani, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 131).

Conceptually, participation means acting with each other, sharing something, and social interaction in a group (Manuchehri, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 2, 1361).

In a standard definition, participation means valuing the role and opinion of people in political decisions and their access to sources of power (Oakley and Marsden, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 86).

Involvement, helping, and taking responsibility are three essential characteristics of participation. The most fundamental idea of the infrastructure for developing popular participation is accepting people's equality. Whenever people experience equal importance and value in

---

1. The Story of Breaking Hookahs in the Tobacco Movement or Opposing the White Revolution during the Pahlavi era is an Example of this lack of Popular Participation.

## **Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions**

Connection with each other, then their participation can provide a lot of benefits for everyone.

From a participatory point of view, all people feel responsible for matters related to them and have the right to think about them and express their thoughts freely (Feyzmandian, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 104).

### **3.3. The Role of People in War**

In the hierarchy of military systems, at least nine persons should support a combatant to shoot at the front line against the enemy. When people's fate is inextricably linked to the future of war, it enjoys their full support, whether religious, political, informational, or material, and leads to mass participation in all fields (Karami, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 40). The use of the term "People's War" probably became familiar when the emergence of mass armies during the Napoleonic era, but it was emphasized and became popular in the middle of the twentieth century after the victory of the Chinese Revolution. In his strategy of struggle against the Kuomintang forces of the invading Japanese army, Mao emphasized the "People's War" theory, a war in which the active participation of people was one of its fundamental characteristics (Ruhi, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 18).

The Maoist doctrine emphasized the basic principles of mobilizing the masses to fight in a long war and the superiority of politics and the people over armaments. The successful use of this doctrine led to the victory of the Chinese revolution (ibid. 37).

One of the first to introduce the People's War as part of a new military ideology, Clausewitz joined the Prussian army at 12. He believes people's war is the right way; if a nation uses it as a rule and wisely, it will gain advantages over others (Karami, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 47-49). Lenin emphasized the role of the Communist Party as the organizer of the working class for the revolution and the urban uprising. For Lawrence of Arabia, the support of the people and the psychological factor were essential to motivate the guerrillas and the people and weaken the enemy's morale.

In Muslim societies, civil wars, influenced by religious and social elements and special conditions in each period of the struggle, have taken a particular form. From Omar Mukhtar's wars in North Africa to the Algerian revolution, the Palestinian guerrillas, and finally the Afghan combatants, the concept of people wars has been seriously raised and activated. In this area, especially the victories of Afghan and Ahmad Shah Massoud fighters and the Lebanese Hezbollah's expulsion of the Russian and Israeli occupiers are exemplary (ibid. 66).

### **3.4. Sanctions**

According to Barry E. Carter, economic sanctions mean coercive measures against one or more countries. Economic sanctions, a means of promoting a country's foreign policy interests, are among the most



severe coercive measures and the use of military force (Alikhani, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 32).

In the twentieth century, the greater integration of the world economy caused sanctions to become the concern of international powers to impose their will on other countries. In 1919, the then President of the United States proposed economic sanctions as a financial, peaceful, and deadly solution for the administration of the world community by the League of Nations. In this way, sanctions are imposed by a government, a group of governments, or an international organization as a form of power to influence the conduct or policy of other states, which necessarily do not involve violations of international rights (Nikugoftarsafa and Radadi, 2015 AD/1394 SH:77).

Regarding objectives, there are two types of economic sanctions: First, economic sanctions are aimed at destabilizing the political regime of the target country and changing it. Second, economic sanctions aim to change the political or economic behavior of the target country, which is much milder than the first type. Economic sanctions are imposed in two ways, trade sanctions and financial sanctions. Trade sanctions are accompanied by the restriction or termination of all kinds of import and export relations. However, in monetary sanctions, restrictions and pressures are practiced on economic ties, including investment, financing, and financial transactions of the target country (Adeli, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 21).

The first cost of sanctions is time and energy to change business and financial relations, imposed on both sides and according to the situation. When the purchasing market changes due to sanctions, similar goods are inevitably bought at a higher price, so the purchasing power of money also decreases. For the sanctioning country, too, the cost of sanctions is the loss of the sales market and the provision of financial services. Another cost is the psychological aspect that makes investors look at investment opportunities with hesitation (ibid).

#### **4. Voluntary Presence of the People in the War and Providing Manpower**

The presence of the people spontaneously and voluntarily in any war plays a significant role in facilitating the economic affairs during the war. All Iranian combatants who volunteered for the war did not receive salaries and benefits. If their wages were to be paid, the government could not pay that exorbitant cost in those particular circumstances. The origin of this presence goes back to our religious teachings.

At the time of the rise of Islam and the formation of the government by the Holy Prophet (PBUH), the consistency and continuity of the fledgling Islamic government required the possession

### **Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions**

of a human force to counter threats and repel aggression. Therefore, verses were revealed to the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), who instructed him to mobilize Muslims to battle against the enemies<sup>2</sup>.

This mobilization was initially carried out voluntarily. However, after the Prophet's (PBUH) time, the supply of human resources could not be limited to volunteer forces due to the expansion of borders and conquests. Therefore, issued laws and regulations to let some people join the corps during the war, and others were to serve the government as a permanent military force. (Ghaedan, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 1).

In general, there are four ways to call for personnel in the armed forces in the world: compulsory system or public service, voluntary service system, selective service system, and military-civilian system (Nuraee, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 54). In Iran, the first two services exist.

The role of people in wars as a combatant has long been the concern of all societies and nations. Each organization needs to provide the necessary forces to deal with external and internal threats, provide security, and sometimes expand its military and political domination, the different methods and types in each society (Ghaedan, 2004 AD/1383 SH:1).

In people's wars, all nation members have the right and duty to be considered combatants and the right to use weapons against the enemy and participate in the scene of national resistance against the enemy. This resistance will only be achieved if all the mentioned members fulfill their responsibilities (Saed, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 91).

The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq is one of the rarest wars in the history of Iran, which involved the masses seriously. They regard it as something beyond a social and national necessity. Many political and military analysts considered this presence as "Human Waves." In a defense war, all people must fight in defense of the soil beyond the social and even national necessity. The very presence of the masses of people, in any possible way, is highly discouraging and destructive for the aggressor enemy (Sarhangi, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 16).

Regarding the role of the people's forces in imposed war and sanctions, it can be said that their presence strengthened the combatants' morale. In addition, they played a significant role in feeding and preparing the front, digging trenches, delivering ammunition, constructing bridges, patrolling, obtaining information, and providing the human needs of the acts (Mansuri Larijani, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 284-287).

The formation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah Pasdaran) and The Popular Mobilization (Basij Mardomi) with lasting

---

2. For example, Verse 71 of Surah An-Nisa' in the Holy Qur'an invites Believers to be Vigilant and Ready and Encourages Them to Jihad.

religious and national unity and beliefs and obedience to Imam Khomeini took place spontaneously and in a short time. Were it not for the people's trust in the regime's leadership and the officials; this mobilization would not have taken place voluntarily.

Of the 213,255 martyrs during the imposed war (Khajehsarvi & Farhadi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 72), only 25% of them, i.e., about 54,000, were members of the military and law enforcement forces, and the rest were from the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards and popular resistance groups. Over 155,000 were single people and aged only 32,000 of them over 32(ibid).The main point about the importance of providing human resources during the war was sanctioned, which could harm the regime's support. It has been repeated many times in history. The West tried in various ways to overthrow the fledgling Islamic system by reducing popular support, but what happened in the war was a new experience that strengthened the bond between the government and the people.

### **5. People's Aids and Economic Support in the Conditions of Sanctions**

The most significant point before the voluntary presence of the people on the front was their economic support of the war when the country was confronting both oppressive sanctions and low oil revenues, which were difficult to obtain. People and state ministries have endured the support of many combatants who have been on the fronts for a long time. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the amount of these aids. But, all factories, schools, mosques, religious organizations, government agencies, and private companies have played an active role in this critical issue. Reliance on popular aid, whether in cash or goods and war supplies, resulted from the war's economic experience (Mansuri Larijani, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 294).

Regarding the sanctions, the people's forces in the cities also played an essential role in preparing for the front, issues related to the struggling with the anti-revolutionaries and corruption centers, etc. In other parts, institutions connected to the war were established, such as the Economic Mobilization Headquarters, the War Victims Foundation, the Continuing War Relief Staff, and the Irregular Warfare Headquarters (ibid. 284-287).

They undertook the most complicated military and industrial systems. They successfully repaired and rehabilitated the damaged units, so that did not stop oil export even for one day. In the management and operation of the war economy system, the economic mobilization headquarters of the country could meet the basic needs of the people with appropriate control and rationing so that raw materials, fuel, and food were distributed and consumed without any crisis in society. In the medical section, the physicians and paramedical sectors carried out a great deal of treatment for the

### Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions

wounded of war and the enemy's city hospitals and chemical attacks. They proved themselves in this field by performing the greatest and strangest emergency surgeries. The armed forces were able to carry out heavy repairs and reconstruction of military machinery, including air, land, and naval, establishing self-sufficiency jihad units. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the army and Jihad-building forces and Basij, hand in hand, were able to manage and organize in every spot of the fronts effectively (ShabaniSaruli, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 141).

Whether rich or poor, all the people had an essential role in sending aid to the fronts and contributed as much as they could. During the war, the collection and management of public donations developed excitingly and wasted. With its extensive reliance on popular aid, the Islamic Revolution could provide a vital source of financial resources for its long-term and popular war (MansuriLarijani, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 294).

In the meantime, Western countries imposed oppressive sanctions on our country, especially the United States. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been subject to economic sanctions after the Revolution, and these sanctions have often been imposed unilaterally by the United States. In different periods of the US presidency, the sanctions against Iran also changed. During Carter's presidency, Iran was banned four times; these sanctions included a ban on oil imports, a freeze on Iranian properties, exports to Iran, and imports from Iran. These four sanctions were imposed after the capture of the USA embassy and the pre-Algerian agreement. Three of these sanctions were lifted following the Algerian deal, and only the second one continued (Adeli, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 21).

During Reagan's presidency, Iran was re-sanctioned several times: The first embargo was in 1983, limiting international aid to Iran, and US envoys were tasked with getting a negative vote in global organizations to help Iran, which was only partially successful. In 1986, approved a ban on weapons export to Iran, followed by a ban on imports from Iran in 1987(ibid).

During the imposed war, due to the economic conditions, most people adapted their personal lives to existing needs and lived on contentment, rationing, and saving, and even donated part of their rations to frontlines. Another experience during the war gained in the economic field was the fair distribution of goods. There is so much financial pressure and inflation in large-scale military battles that public discontent causes frequent alteration of governments. The limitation of the necessary goods in wartime could impose heavy inflation on the people. Still, the fair distribution of the goods could provide the essentials and necessities of life to the majority of the people at a reasonable price. In this way, commodities like gasoline, sugar, rice, oil, and other essential things were rationed according to

particular systems. Another experience was the austerity policy in all respects. This policy in times of war was able to help billions of Rials (Iran's currency) in the country's budget, which could control the budget deficit to some extent. Preventing the import of unnecessary luxury goods, maintaining the country's foreign exchange supplies, and expanding government revenue sources through taxes, products, and exports, are among others.

The extraordinary and warlike conditions of the country, pressures, and needs were some of the best opportunities for the growth of industries and production units of the government, which encouraged young people with a minimum of resources and facilities to be creative in a wide range of activities to meet the daily requirements of society. Numerous innovations in the procurement of logistics equipment (such as the construction of Kheibar and Arvandrud bridges) played a specific role in the victory (Mansuri Larijani, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 283-294).

## **6. Social Resource, Utilization of the Abilities and Internal Capacities of the Society**

In addition to human and economic resources, another one called social resource has also been considered. Social resource, or the spiritual dimension of a community, is a historical heritage that, by encouraging individuals to cooperate and participate in social interactions, can solve much more community problems and move toward rapid economic, political, and cultural growth and development possible. Without social resources, no society can achieve any resource, so that many groups, organizations, and human communities have been able to succeed without economic resources and relying solely on human and social resources. Still, no human group can achieve practical actions without social resources (Haghshenas, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 6).

Changes and complexities of science, technology, politics, economics, society, etc., as a permanent process, always involve the community as a system with problems, solving of which is necessary for maintaining the balance of culture, of course, with the participation of people due to their capabilities (Keshtkar, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 41).

To achieve its goals and knowledgeable and experienced people and facilities, every social network needs trust, commitment, responsibility, etc., which are the same as a social resource. Even a group of criminals (Such as Thieves or Smugglers) need social resources and norms such as ethical behavior, the rule of law, risk-taking, and mutual trust among group members to succeed in their work (Haghshenas, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 6).

The Islamic Revolution of Iran as a macro system, always and following different conditions and situations, has inducted the use of capacities and capabilities of the people in the best form of

## Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions

participation with the wise leadership of Late Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader.

The fact is that the principle of the Islamic Revolution has continued in the same way with the responsible and constructive participation of the victorious people. The theory of the formation of the Islamic government before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the shape of non-governmental organizations after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution are great examples of religious participation and democracy in the contemporary era (Keshtkar, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 41).

Concerning state-nation relations, inflexible and obligatory government mechanisms instead of moderate ones could be an influential factor in non-compliance with government instructions, lack of political participation in line with government demands, and finally, the distrust of different generations towards the government (Mohsenitabrizi, et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 42).

In this respect, to continue public participation and benefit from the capacity of the country's human resources, more should be planned so that the power of initiative and creativity of individuals in society can flourish by eliminating marginalization. An essential feature of the social system in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the expansion of indexes of social resources, which is unique. In Iran, after the vital institution of the family, religious gatherings, mosques, national and spiritual solidarity, Basij, Jihadi volunteer forces, etc., are considered a double social resource, which along with human resources, enormously have increased the national power of the country.

Despite realizing this capacity after the revolution's victory, unfortunately, this excellent resource has been neglected to some extent by post-war governments. So, considering the people participating in the imposed war as a successful example in the proper use of social resources to control the crisis, we can introduce this reliable model, legacy, and experience to solve the country's current problems and encourage the decision-makers of the country to benefit more from it.

### 7. Analysis

Regarding public participation, first of all, it is necessary to take a brief look at the theoretical and functional origins of the right to participate in policy-making. This study is helpful because it identifies the intellectual and operational themes of democratic and participatory systems. The authors consider people's participation in the imposed war so meaningful that they refer to it as a model, legacy, and achievement for solving the country's current problems.

#### 7.1. First, the Theory of the Right to Self-Determination

According to Immanuel Kant, the self-commanding human being has the power of self-control (Mohammadaghaee and Rahmatollahi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 78), makes others respect him, and has the characteristic of being effective to intimidate others. In Kant's view, humans are the only beings in the universe that can make their destiny.

Accordingly, the right to determine fate can be considered a right that originates from human beings' inherent dignity and honor. Therefore, we can enumerate human beings as the only beings endowed with powers such as intellect, will, independent and creative thought, ability of measurement, and selection. According to the epistemological foundation, human beings are rational and active agents who can actively participate in determining policies, macro-executive, political, and judicial programs and are perfectly qualified to manage their affairs and govern their society. By this definition, human dignity requires that the decision-making process be guided by the participation and consultation of the people (ibid).

### **7.2. Second, the Theory of the Right of the People to Rule**

In addition to analyzing the theoretical roots of participation, understanding the practical basis of this idea will clear up many ambiguities and challenges. Therefore, by examining the history of political views, it seems that the exercise of the right to participate is rooted in the theory of the people's right to sovereignty. It generally means that the nation's ruler is the nation itself and the people themselves have only the right to rule.

Their will is the highest power, and no other authority is equal to or higher than it. In an old and straightforward definition of this theory, the structure of public decision-making is introduced as a pyramid, below which, to a large extent, direct democracy exists in the form of local communities such as local neighborhood groups and workers' associations (ibid. 83).

According to the above theories, it can be concluded that nations in democratic systems are not and should not be separate from the design of government. They play an essential role in determining their destiny and government and this influence requires their participation in all social affairs as the assets of society.

By investigating the people's participation in the era of Holy Defense (The Imposed War), this article is reminiscent of a model that has been neglected over the years despite its effectiveness in post-war social conditions. All over the world, when people's fate is tied to the future of war, and all people see themselves in danger, they stand up to defend and form social solidarity.

However, Iranians' participation with its Islamic and Iranian characteristics introduced a unique type to the world that could mobilize all the country's social resources in the most challenging conditions.

### **Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions**

During the Holy Defense, the Iranian government could not meet the needs of the battlefield due to the sanctions and the enemy's attacks on the economic infrastructures. In these circumstances, people tolerated this heavy responsibility of support which, if there were no popular support, would not have been successful from the very first years of the war.

Hence, in all Iran cities, without government's request and regardless of any expectations, and only because of their human and religious duty and patriotism sense, people rushed to help the government. This spontaneous popular role-playing continued after the war, but it was never considered an effective model for various reasons.

#### **Conclusion**

With the advent of the third millennium, new issues and concepts have emerged in the management of societies that governments alone cannot analyze and solve. People's participation is considered a social resource and should be considered for the development of any organization. The experience of the Holy Defense with the widespread involvement of the people is a complete model in the use of social resources in all fields. The following table shows these fields:

<b>Some of the most important examples of people's participation in the imposed war and the conditions of Western sanctions</b>	
<b>Political participation</b>	Political accountability and participation in elections
	Maximum trust in the authorities and interaction with the government in the conditions of war and sanctions
	Attending marches and supporting the Islamic system
	High national solidarity against arrogant conspiracies (rejection of humiliating ceasefire plans, support for the Basij and the IRGC despite the hypocrisy of the enemies, national unity against ethnic division ...)
	Executing the founder commands of the Islamic Revolution during the war and maximum support for the decisions of the officials
<b>Economic participation</b>	Voluntary financial assistance to the fronts
	Voluntary military presence on the fronts without pay
	Financial assistance to individuals and families affected by the war
	Interaction in the production of necessary goods in the conditions of sanctions
	Buying and sending free medical items for combatants



	Meeting the needs of the people and the market by traders in times of war and sanctions
Cultural participation	Resistance against arrogant media lies
	Encouraging and honoring the presence on the fronts (using the tribune of mosques, schools, religious gatherings)
	Avoiding gossip and encountering the rumors of the fifth pillar of the enemy
	Participation in military-cultural propaganda (publications, anthem making, eulogy)
	Honoring the families of devotees (holding a welcoming ceremony for veterans, the commemoration of martyrs)
Civil participation	Contribute to war-torn debris
	Responsibility in rebuilding damaged public places, such as schools, mosques
	Voluntary participation in repairing equipment and machinery on the fronts and the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development in remote areas by technicians
	Voluntary presence of personal construction vehicles on the fronts (participation in the construction of bridges, roads, dams, fortresses for combatants)
	Voluntary assistance to build urban and rural houses damaged in the war and to carry out constructive Jihad
Social participation	Participating in settlement of displaced persons and the transfer of wounded from airstrikes and bombings to medical centers
	Adoption of orphans in war
	Satisfaction and saving the consumption of goods and public services
	Maintaining the national spirit in hardships and encouraging the families affected by the war
	Participation against the terrorist acts of the hypocrites (announcing their hiding place, non-cooperation in selling information)
	Respect each other's economic rights by accepting the quotas
	Toleration of high unemployment, inflation, declining national per capita, declining domestic production, and sanctions
	Free transportation of combatants and goods to the fronts
	Voluntary participation in medical centers behind the front lines and battle lines
	Proper distribution of goods and essential items by public institutions, religious groups, mosques

This model contains three levels of requirements to be met. As was the case of the present study, the first level dealt with explaining and introducing people's participation in the conditions of war and sanctions to get this model out of isolation and oblivion in the field of

### **Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions**

thought, mentality, and theorizing. In the second level, observance of some points in connection with social resource use is considered. After recalling the heritage of the past, at this level, stated the necessity of using social resources to solve society's problems.

Successful examples of people's participation in the post-war period were given to extending its ability to solve other social issues. The third level is related to the duties of governors and authorities towards society and the participation of people and social resources in territorial administration. One way to get out of trial-error procedures for governments in national macro-management is to use past experiences.

Although there are no accurate and documentary statistics on the amount of public assistance in the war, Iranians had a salient role in participating and supporting the imposed war. It can be a complete and adequate model for solving the current and future political, cultural, economic, and social problems.

This pattern, using social resources and war crisis management, controlled the country's domestic affairs. Using the people's capacities and participation was a successful experience even in the post-war years. In eradicating polio, the people determined to rush to the aid of the statesmen. In Manjil and Rudbar earthquakes, the people's participation could be a healer to that human catastrophe.

In solving natural disasters such as earthquakes or floods; in inviting people to philanthropic affairs; in celebrations such as the Feast of Emotions, in asking school-building donors to build and renovate schools, in using cooperatives to produce and distribute goods, and in using the multifaceted capacity of mosques and hundreds of other examples, the power of this potential can be seen.

Although this dynamism, the presence, and participation of the people, could have continued with much more strength in the post-war situation and reached the desired prosperity, unfortunately, a large part of it has been hidden and, in some cases, removed from the administrative system. Common sense should be formed between people and governments to consider themselves to belong to the same family.

Suppose the distance between the people and the state is minimized as in the time of the Holy Defense. In that case, it will facilitate the support and control of the market and the administrative affairs of the society. For example, in today's economic sections, one of the government's biggest concerns is the distribution of goods; in the meantime, with the diminishing role of people, the government encountered difficulties in the proportionate and fair distribution of goods. If urban and rural cooperatives and even mosques and Basij were considered in the distribution of goods, we would no longer see the corruption of agricultural products in one region and the shortage and high cost of the same products in another area. In the culture and

mental health section, the government, with the help of radio and television and of course without people's participation, could not achieve artistic goals in the production of works and indigenous modeling so that children and adolescents today are influenced by myths of the arrogant world.

They prefer imported computer games and buy cultural products with foreign brands. At the same time, there is the ability to make computer games and introduce indigenous myths through NGOs, syndicates, unions, and domestic knowledge-based companies. In civil engineering and construction, the people's volunteer forces in Jihadi forces, by participating in deprived areas and rebuilding urban and rural residential areas, have helped post-war governments construct bridges, roads, and public transportation routes. But they have not been well supported by the statesmen, and so the reconstruction work is slow.

Therefore, by managing the vast potentialities of the people, providing the conditions for creativity, strengthening the sense of responsibility, and cooperation of individuals, we can use the maximum power and capability of the aspirant people and their support in any field. So in the shadow of divine blessings, will smooth the country's path of progress and development by overcoming severe crises. In other nations and countries, governments usually spend a lot of money stimulating a sense of popular participation. Rereading people's support in the Holy Defense shows that the culture of the involvement is rooted in Iranians' social structure. Even the foundations of popular associations and non-governmental organizations have been provided in the country. Elected governments after the war could have decently benefited from it without the least cost.

### References

- Abbasi, M. (2019 AD/1398 SH). "The Analysis of Levels of Social Resource with Post-composition approach." *Quarterly of Cultural Sociology*. Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 55-79.
- Adeli, MH. (2006 AD/1385 SH). "What is Embargo?" *The Monthly Economic Process*. Vol. 15, no. 19, pp. 19-22.
- Alikhani, H. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Boycott of Iran, Failure of a Policy*. (Motaghinejad, M, Trans). Tehran: Publication of the Office of Political and International Studies.
- Baker, V. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *The Management and Social Resource*. (Alvani, SM; Rabiee, MR, Trans). Tehran: The Publication of Industrial Management.

**Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and  
Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western  
Sanctions**

- Birnbaum, R. (2003). *How do Universities Work?* (Araste, HR, Trans). Tehran: The Institute of Higher Education Research and Planning.
- Dehghani, M. et al. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "The Study of Elements of Social Islamic Resource in the Document of Fundamental Reformation of Education and Training." *Biannual of Educative Sciences from Islam Standpoint*. Vol. 5, no. 9, pp. 2-31.
- Feyzmandian, P. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "Culture and Development of People Participation." *Quarterly of Psychology, Social and Educational Sciences*. Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 100-112.
- Field, J. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *Social Resource*. (Motaghi, J, Trans). Tehran: The Institute of Research of Social Provision.
- Ghaedan, A. (2004 AD/1383 SH). "Basij and Provision of People in Islamic Time." *Quarterly of Basij Studies*. Vol. 6, no. 18-19, pp. 1-17.
- Ghasem, N. (2005). *The Lebanon Hezbollah*. (Shariatmadar, MM, Trans). Tehran: Etellaat Publication.
- Haghshenas, M. (2005 AD/1384 SH). "The Concept of Social Resource and its Dimensions." *Journal of Life Story*. Vol. 5, no. 27, pp. 6-14.
- Hasanifar, A. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "The Model of Islamic- Iranian Development Based on Farabi's Views." *The Scientific Journal of Contemporary Political Researches*. Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 49-73.
- IRIB News Agency. News ID: 3178321, Published Date: 21 July, 2021 AD/07 Mordad, 1400 SH.
- Karami, J. (2006 AD/1385 SH). "Reformation of the Concept of People War." *Quarterly of Basij Studies*. Vol. 9, no. 30, pp. 40-66.
- Keshtkar, M; Hatami, H.R. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "Conceptual Model of Organized People Participation for Fulfillment the Strength of Internal Structure of Regime." *Quarterly of Basij Studies*. Vol. 18, no. 69, pp. 39-67.

- Khajehsarvi, GH; Farhadi, A. (2018 AD/1397 SH). "The Elements of Political Trust in IRI." *Quarterly of Political Sociology of Iran*. Vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 52-80.
- MansuriLarijani, E. (2010 AD/1389 SH). *Acquaintance With the Holy Defense*. Fifth edition. Tehran: Khademo Reza Publication.
- Manuchehri, A. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *University Dictionary*. Vol. 2. Tehran: Amir Kabir Publication.
- Mirmoezzi, H. (2014 AD/1393 SH). "The Concept of the Model of Islamic-Iranian Development." *Quarterly of Islamic Humanities(Sadra)*. Vol. 3, no. 10, pp. 61-79.
- Mohammadaghaee, E; Rahmatollahi, H. (2013 AD/1392 SH). "Introduction to the Role of State in the Process of People Participation." *Journal of Legal Studies*. The University of Shiraz. Vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 67-107.
- Mohsenitabrizi, A. et al. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "Study of the Social Trust with a Look at the Society." *Journal of Applied Sociology*. Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 41-70.
- Nikugoftarsafa, H.R; Radadi, A. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "Analysis of Imposed Sanctions on IRI." *Quarterly of Basij Studies*. Vol. 18, no. 67, pp. 75-96.
- Nuraee, M. (1995 AD/1374 SH). *National Basij*. Second Edition. Tehran: Publication of the University of Strategic Sciences.
- Oakley, P. and Marsden, D. (1991 AD/1370 SH). *The Approaches of Participation in the Rural Development*. (Mahmudnejad, M, Trans). Tehran: The Publication of Research Center of the Ministry of JihadSazandegi.
- Purbehruzan, A; Rezaeemanesh, B. (2018 AD/1397 SH). "Designing the Model of Social Resource Based on Religious Teachings." *Quarterly of Islamic Management*. Vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 87-103.
- Ruhi, N. (2006 AD/1385 SH). "The People War and China Defensive Doctrine." *Quarterly of Basij Studies*. Vol. 9, no. 30, pp. 18-37.
- Saed, N. (2007 AD/1386 SH). "The Frame of Doctrine of People War in the Light of Standards of the Humanitarian International Rights." *Quarterly of Basij Studies*. Vol. 10, no. 35, pp. 81-110.

**Elucidation of Pattern of People's Participation in Economic Support and Providing Manpower in the Context of the Imposed War and Western Sanctions**

- Sarhangi, M. (2001 AD/1380 SH). "People Defense, Appearance of the Real Heroes." *Jame Jam Newspaper*. July 27, 2001 AD/Mordad 5, 1380 SH, pp. 16.
- Sarukhani, B. (1991 AD/1370 SH). *The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*. Tehran: Keyhan Publication.
- ShabaniSaruli, R. (1991 AD/1384 SH). "The Strategy of People Defense and its Identity Effect." *Journal of National Studies*. Vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 123-143.

## Imam Khomeini's Strategic Management in the Imposed War

Hadi Qeisaryan Fard<sup>\*1</sup>, Mohammad Sadiq Salehi Manesh<sup>2</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.3.7

1. Ph.D. in History of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini and Islamic Revolution Research Institute, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Hawzah graduated (level 4) in Islamic Jurisprudence, Seminary of Qom, Qom, IRAN.

(Received: 8 August 2021 – Accepted: 3 September 2021)

### Abstract

One of the essential and fundamental issues as an effective management model for officials and managers of today's society is to identify and explain Imam Khomeini's strategic management and thinking during the imposed War. With descriptive-analytical and documentary and libraries methods, the present study aimed to answer the 'What are the critical management features in the Imam's manner and behavior during the imposed war?' And designing and explaining a practical model of Imam Khomeini's management strategies and modeling its behavior for the country's managers. According to the hypothesis, Imam Khomeini's management characteristics are based on his personal and organizational behavior and Islamic values. The results indicated that Imam Khomeini's leadership and management model in the imposed War was a combination model based on three levels of the individual (personality), behavior, and society's needs.

**Keywords:** Imam Khomeini, Imposed War, Strategic Management, Leadership, Command.

---

\*. Corresponding author: h.gheisarian@yahoo.com

## Introduction

Management has a special place in human life, and human beings want optimal use of available facilities and resources with the help of management. Man's view of the universe determines his method and direction. According to thinkers, management has five principles: planning, decision-making, organizing, directing, supervising, and controlling. Leadership is the primary duty of managers and one of the essential discussions in management. They should use proper human resources to implement organizational plans and achieve organizational goals (Schermerhorn, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 45).

The Islamic Revolution of Iran and its rapid developments prompted researchers and thinkers to study this great event's dimensions and angles and explain and analyze why and how it occurred. According to scholars, the Islamic Revolution of Iran had three essential elements: ideology, leadership, and people; the leadership role was more prominent. For example, Michel Foucault, a witness of the Islamic Revolution, points to the essential role of Imam Khomeini's leadership in targeting the collective will of Iranians for the revolution (Foucault, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 57).

Imam Khomeini was one of the prominent leaders of contemporary history globally with unique characteristics in leading society. The Imam's religious and Islamic thought, dominant in his practice and behavior, distinguished his leadership style in other world revolutions. Today's society needs a proper management model to overcome the leading crises, so re-reading their leadership and management ideas and introducing them to today's generation is an undeniable necessity. Iraq's eight-year War with Iran was a vital historical moment that showed the importance and position of society's political management and leadership. During this period, as the leader, Imam Khomeini drew, explained, and supervised implementing the country's strategic policies.

Imam Khomeini's management and leadership at the individual, group, and organizational behavior with the indicators proposed in this study is a suitable model for managers. Given the above, understanding Imam Khomeini's leadership and management model and its influential components during the imposed War is the main issue of this research.

The present study aimed to create a behavioral model for the country's leaders based on Imam Khomeini's leadership model during the imposed War, which was based on Islamic beliefs and values. The characteristics of Imam's management are expediency-oriented, duty-based, constructability, faith in the battle continued until the victory of right over wrong, crisis management, populism, anti-arrogance, etc.

## 1. Research Background



A book about Imam Khomeini's leadership is "Fundamentals of Political Decision Making from Imam Khomeini's Perspective,"<sup>1</sup> written by Ebrahim Barzegar. The author refers to the basics of the Imam's political decision-making and the variables affecting the process of such decisions. The present study analyzed the leadership and management of the Imam based on the existing characteristics at three levels of individual, behavioral and organizational, especially during the imposed War.

The article "Imam Khomeini and Crisis Management"<sup>2</sup> by Sayyed Hossein Akhavan Alavi is another work that has been written in connection with Imam's management method. This article has examined eleven significant crises during the leadership of Imam Khomeini and managing them based on Quranic and Islamic views. Crisis management is the only topic that the author has considered in this article. However, in the future research, the author has studied the different aspects of Imam Khomeini's management during the War.

Another work is Azam Abdali Cheraghani's dissertation entitled "Inspiring Imam Khomeini's Uprising and Struggles from the Qur'an and Hadith."<sup>3</sup> This work describes and narrates Imam Khomeini's struggles and political activities and attempts to prove the theological and religious roots of Imam Khomeini's thoughts, ideas, and actions.

The author has considered Imam Khomeini's management methods. In the present article, the writer focus on Imam Khomeini's management practices. In general, the explanation of Imam Khomeini's management and leadership model during the imposed War, which is one of the most essential and crucial periods in the history of the Islamic Revolution, shows the fundamental difference between this article and this article other works.

## 2. Concepts Definition

### 2.1. Imposed War

Klausutis believes that War uses the highest level of violence in the service of the state or country. (Bouthoul, 1995 AD/1374 SH, 21). However, all wars' aims are not the service of the government and the nation. Tard says: "War is a tragic and eternal method of social controversy. War is the product of two collective conflicting

---

1. Barzegar, Ibrahim (1994 AD/1373 SH); *Fundamentals of Political Decision Making from Imam Khomeini's Perspective*, First Edition, Tehran: Islamic Propaganda Organization.

2. Akhavan Alavi, Sayyed Hossein (2012 AD/1391 SH). *Investigating and Explaining the Crisis Management Model from Imam Khomeini's Perspective*, Management Quarterly, No. 4, Tehran: Islamic Azad University.

3. Abdali Cheraghani, Azam (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Inspiration of Imam Khomeini's Uprising and Struggles from Quran and Hadith*. Thesis in Quranic Sciences. Supervisor: Ali Muhammad Fallahi, Shahid Ashrafi University of Isfahan.

analogies, the will of the two nations caused the fight against each other” (Ibid, 24).

## **2.2. Command**

The term command has four military uses in English: individual authority, the issued order, dominated organization or region, and implications of weapons on the superior position. The Pentagon's defines command: “The power of senior commander in the military legally exercises over his subordinates by rank or position” (Ardestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 45).

According to the Islamic Republic Army, Command is an option by which the commander acts on the subordinates (Habibi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 101).

## **2.3. Strategy**

Strategy is derived from the Greek word "Strategos," meaning "Army Commander" and is defined as "the art of commanders, tactics and military tactics." (Randall, J. 2002 AD/1381 SH: 14; Solhjoo, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 22). It is usually classified into four levels: national, military, operational, and tactical, which are used to achieve national, military, functional, and tactical goals. Today, strategy is defined as: “The science and technology of using the nation's political, economic, cultural and military power during war and peace. It aims to provide maximum support for national policies and increase the achieving results for maximum victory and minimum defeat” (Ibid, 23). By “strategy” in this research, we mean Imam Khomeini's strategies and tactics to achieve the War's goals.

## **2.4. Leadership**

2.5. A leader Influences the behavior of one or more people, who consciously tries to force his followers to do what they want (Fidler and Shamers, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 18).

## **3. A Brief Look at the Background to the Formation of the Imposed War**

The causes of wars are variables generally involved in the national environment of two countries and appear in the international arena and arise from conflict or opposition of interest or the decrease and increase of power. Thus, the reduction of national violence, political instability, global power reduction, competition for more appeals, etc., are the reasons for the War (Ardestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 57). Regarding the reasons for the Iraqi government to begin the War, some points are considerable:

- 1) Saddam came to power in a situation where he regarded the national crisis in Iraq, Iran, and the international system as favorable for achieving his goals;
- 2) The historical and structural contexts between Iran and Iraq caused the military invasion of Iraq;

3) In a press conference with the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, Saddam accused Iran of violating the Algerian agreement and interfering in the country's internal affairs (State Department Documents, Document No. 18534, Code s-1986);

4) In invading Iran, Iraq had long-term and comprehensive goals, the most obvious of which was to fill the power vacuum in the region. By upsetting the balance of power in the vital area of the Persian Gulf, Saddam tried to play an essential role in power relations in the future and take the position of the regional gendarmerie. Therefore, achieving some sensitive and strategic regions of Iran, such as Arvand River, was his goal (Rezaei, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 71).

Regarding Iraq's military and political goals at the beginning of the War, Saddam Hussein said: "War is the will to achieve specific goals using the means of struggle. In the military phase, the main goal in the first phase is to remove Iranian artillery from their positions in the border areas that hit our villages and cities on September 4, 1980. The second was to withdraw the Iranian army from strategically border essential parts to prevent the Iraqis from Iran militarily. But in the political phase, our goal is to recognize Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatta al-Arab region and adjacent territories that Iran had forcibly usurped under the 1975 Algerian agreement. Iran must also acknowledge the rights of Iraq to the three islands of Tonb-e Bozorg, Tonb-e-Kuchak, and Abu Musa, and not interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq" (State Department Documents, Document No. 3865, Code S-1986).

Thus, to achieve these goals, the Iraqi government, by adopting a strategy of rapid and short-term War, began its offensive against Iran on September 22, 1980 (Cordesman, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 178).

These goals are as follow:


- 1) Solving the geopolitical problem of access to the Persian Gulf by occupying large parts of Khuzestan;
- 2) Cancellation of the 1975 Algerian agreement with the occupation of Khorramshahr and Abadan and the rule of the Arvand River;
- 3) Consolidation of the obtained results and adoption of a defense strategy in the occupied areas (Study Center, 2001AD/1380 SH: 4; 2001AD/1380 SH: 22).

Thus, the Iraqi army launched its military offensive against Iran in September 1980, and in the first quarter of the War, achieved almost most of its intended objectives (Babaei Abarquei, 2011 AD/1390 SH, 54). Of course, Sardar Hussein Alaei believes that "Iraq did not commit any of its goals, except for the unfinished occupation of Khorramshahr and several border cities, which included 15,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory. Because the morale management of the Imam at that time caused unity and harmony among the Iranian warriors and thus prevented the fulfillment of Iraq's goals in attacking

Iran” (Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense, interview with Sardar Hossein Alaei, 8/16/2013).

**4. Model of Imam Khomeini's Management in the Imposed War**

As the commander-in-chief of the forces during the imposed War, Imam Khomeini was able to resolve the fundamental issues of the War by using his unique management methods and measures and aroused the astonishment and surprise of politicians. Imam's management model is a combination of personality, behavioral and contingent attitudes that has essential indicators. These indicators are not limited to a specific time and place; instead, they can use by today's officials and managers of society. We see Imam Khomeini's management model at the interpersonal, individual, and organizational levels in the following.



According to Imam Khomeini, noticeable issues about War are as follow: Crisis management, duty-oriented, expediency-oriented, unity-oriented, law-oriented, Islam-oriented, populism, anti-arrogance, enemyology, strategic thinking, giving delegation, belief in consultation, the principle of punishment and encouragement, peace of mind, supervision, Controlling and directing affairs (Khomeini, 2007 AD/1386 SH, Several Pages).

**5. Critical Management Indicators of Imam Khomeini**

**5.1. Foresight and Strategic Thinking**

Due to the current situation in the country and the study of Iran's military situation before the War, officials did not predict the occurrence of War. They expected one series of border clashes from Iraq. As Hashemi Rafsanjani writes in his memoirs about the War: "Simultaneously with Tehran's Mehrabad airport bombing, we immediately sent a group of delegates there, although it was against our expectations that Iraq would attack Tehran. We considered this event very unlikely" (Bashiri, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 220).

Yaghoub Zohdi<sup>4</sup> says: "About two weeks before the War, the Supreme Defense Council was formed at the headquarters of the 81st Armored Division of Kermanshah with the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the IRGC Commander, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Commander and the IRGC Commander of the west. At that meeting, Muhammad Boroujerdi announced in a report that Iraq intended to attack Iran.

According to Boroujerdi's report, a mechanized armored division had been deployed by the Iraqi army in the border areas of Qasr Shirin. The president analyzed no war would begin to start a fight in the region until the balance of power between the Soviets and the United States was upset during the Cold War. Army commanders also did not believe at the beginning of such a war. Zahirnejad, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that Iraq did not dare to attack Iran and that the Revolutionary Guards wanted to seize army equipment under the pretext of war" (Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense, interview with Sayyed Yaghoub Zohdi, 9/17/2017).

Such statements show the ignorance and surprise of the Iranian army at the beginning of the War. Few officials notice these reports, so they have no evaluation about a possible war. Only at that time did Imam Khomeini react in protest of the Iraqi border actions on 1358/3/24: "We don't expect of Iraqi government officials on the border would behave contrary to good neighborliness" (Khomeini, 12/246).

When Iraq's border movements on Iran's borders increased purposefully, Imam Khomeini this time implicitly stated the possibility of an Iraqi invasion of Iran in a speech on 1359/1/28: "This army, which has now prepared bayonets, artillery, and tanks and is opposed to the people, wants to fight the Islamic State of Iran, which is a war against Islam, the Qur'an and Prophet" (Ibid, 246).

This prediction by the Imam at a time when the War had not officially begun reflects the Imam's strategic thinking. Because, he as

---

4. One of the military commanders of Iran during the imposed war.

an intelligent manager, recognized and planned for opportunities and environmental threats.

### **5.2. Invite to Keep Calm and Message to the People**

The Iraqi government attacked Iran when Iran was under its revolution and had several crises. Under such circumstances, fighting with a country with strong military power and supported by world superpowers intensified the problems of the post-revolutionary and put the revolution in grave danger. But all the military and political equations of Iraq collapsed in the first days of the War.

The Islamic Republic was able to maintain and stabilize the revolution despite the foreign War. Undoubtedly, the management and leadership of Imam Khomeini breaking the equations and predictions of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. One of his management characteristics was to keep the people calm and cheer. For example, when Iraqi fighters first bombed Iranian cities, including Tehran, Imam Khomeini calmed them down in a meeting with the country's commanders and officials and said, "A thief came, threw a stone and fled" (Khomeini, 2/58).

He inspired the officials and the people. Also, with the beginning of the invasion of the Iraqis forces on the borders of Iran, Imam Khomeini, in numerous radio and television messages addressed to the Iranian nation. At the same time, warning of the Iraqi military aggression called on everyone to remain vigilant and calm (Khomeini, 13/212-226).

### **5.3. The Principle of Giving Authority**

The breadth and specialization of war affairs caused the Imam to delegate some executive and expert experiences to the country's officials and draw and manage the strategic policy of the War. To this end, he commissioned some responsibilities to the persons concerned with the start of the imposed War.

The political sphere caused to done giving authority. In this regard, Imam selected Bani Sadr as Commander-in-Chief was, but some time later, Imam removed Bani Sadr due to his weak management in command of the War. The crucial positions of authority and councils that were delegated or formed by order of the Imam were:

- 1) Supreme Council of Defense and Khatam al-Anbiya base and replacement of the General Command of the Armed Forces in military plans;
- 2) Establishment of the High Council for War Support to recruit and provide facilities;
- 3) Formation of the headquarters of the bombed areas;
- 4) Determining the country's foreign policy and electing a foreign minister to pursue diplomatic issues in international forums;
- 5) Establishment of the Supreme Council for the reconstruction of War zones;

6) Elected Commander of the Armed Forces at the beginning of the War (Bani Sadr and then Commander Fallahi, Mohsen Rezaei and Sayyad Shirazi and then Hashemi Rafsanjani) and also appointed (Ayatollah Khamenei and Mustafa Chamran) as their representatives in the War (Cf. Sahifa Imam Khomeini, Documents and National Library of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Document No. 25/340).

#### 5.4. Anti-arrogance

One of the managerial characteristics of Imam was anti-arrogance that was documented with verse "قُلْ إِنَّمَا أَعِظُكُمْ بِوَاحِدَةٍ أَنْ تَقُومُوا لِلَّهِ مِثِّيَ وَفُرَادِي" (Al-Saba/46).

Therefore, the Imam's arrogant view had a long history, and he always emphasized it as an essential principle in his struggles. With the slogan of returning to pure Muhammadan Islam (PBUH) and re-reading the Islamic-Iranian identity, he tried to gradually restore the lost "Dignity" of the Iranian nation. And in this way, in the first phase in the 1340s, they resisted the American "White Revolution" and the discriminatory "Capitulation." The Imam referred to the capture of the US embassy in Tehran as the Second Revolution, and it implies the anti-arrogance feature of the leadership. But we want to examine the Imam's anti-arrogance during the imposed War.

Regarding resistance against the superpowers during the War, he said: "Stand against the superpowers that want to rule and oppress you" (Khomeini, 16/38). Another point was the attention and trust in the power of internal forces. Imam was aware of the role and position of the internal troops and always encouraged the officials and people to rely on their ability and distrust of foreign forces. According to Imam, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union's policies during the War were the same. He always asked the people and the warriors to hope in God and not fear the superpowers (Khomeini, 1/420).

Another fundamental principle was the "Continuity and Permanence" of the struggle. Imam Khomeini's view of War was religious and Islamic. He believed that the battle of belief and truth against false impressions is a constant battle and always continues. According to Imam Khomeini, "Our war with the global arrogance is a war of ideas and does not know geography and borders" (Khomeini, 21/88).

#### 5.5. Duty-oriented

Imam was duty-oriented during the eight-year War. It did not mean seeking apparent victory, but he believed the primary triumph is to perform a task, and the divine duty is the "Happiness Key" that reached us ideal goals. In this regard, Ayatollah Khamenei said: "Imam word that "we act for the task, not for victory" did not mean that he did not want to win. Undoubtedly, victory in all great goals was the will of the Imam. However, the Imam preferred to achieve the

goals through acting on the divine task over the result." (Khamenei, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 237)

Another characteristic that had historical and doctrinal roots in the society was the concern for the principle of duty-oriented and the model of "Ashura War." Imam's doctrinal-political teachings during the imposed War had some framework such as: "Blood Is Victorious Over the Sword," "War of Islam and Infidelity," and "War of Truth and Falsehood." He called victory or martyrdom "One of the Two Goodness" in that achieving either was desirable.

This view of War was, was the central core of task-oriented thinking and its precedence over consequentialism. Therefore, based on Imam Khomeini, the result is connected with the task, but the result is a subset of the duty. Imam Khomeini considered this duty a divine and religious matter and believed that: "Sayyed Al-Shohada determine our responsibility" (Khomeini, 19/271).

Accordingly, after the liberation of most of the country's occupied areas and introduced the conquest of Khorramshahr in June 1982, the concept of the Ashura war. In comparison, there was no clear vision for victory over Iraq and the end of the War. In such circumstances, the emphasis on the Ashura war was raised under the concept of Imam's duty-oriented, focusing on the war continuation, regardless of any consequences.

After the conquest of Khorramshahr, the great powers, to maintain the rule of Iraq and put pressure on the Islamic Republic, sought to impose the terms of their negotiations on Iran, regardless of Iran's demands. But Iran continued the War by following the example of the Ashura school and acting on the divine duty, irrespective of any outcome (Ardestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 26).

#### **5.6. Punish the Aggressor and Encourage the Warriors**

During the War, one of the Imam's management principles was the punishment of the aggressor and encouraged the warriors on the fronts. Before its defeat in 1980, the Iraqi government sought to achieve outstanding achievements such as capturing Khuzestan and access to the open waters of the Persian Gulf. Still, after several consecutive defeats by Iranian forces in 1981 and 1982, the Iraqi strategy changed.

On June 20, 1980, Saddam Hussein announced in a radio and television speech in Baghdad: "The Iraqi government will withdraw all its forces from Iran within ten days from June 20, 1982, to show its goodwill in ending the War. He also declared its readiness to fight Israel" (Center for War Studies and Research, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 6/20/1982).

Saddam Hussein's goal in adopting a defense strategy and retreat tactics was the inability to maintain military superiority and impose new political conditions on Iran. On the other hand, Imam Khomeini, given his historical background and knowledge of Saddam Hussein's



character, did not accept peace without a guarantee because he had no confidence in the Iraqi government.

Iranian political decision-makers and military commanders were also reluctant to sign the end-of-war agreement without achieving the minimum concession to punish the aggressor and receive reparations. They feared that public opinion and the future would interpret their decision as irrational (Rezaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 34).

Therefore, decision-making had become very complex and challenging for officials. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, announced: "We have no territorial ambitions, but we are determined to fulfill our rights. Iran will not relinquish any of its rights, we will get all of our rights, and our greatest right is the fall of Saddam" (War Documents and Research Center, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 5/26/1982).

Mir Hossein Mousavi, the then Prime Minister of Iran, stated: "The war will end when all our conditions are accepted" (War Documentation and Research Center, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 5/11/1982).

Given these considerations, Iran had three solutions:

- 1) Regardless of its demands and only under international pressure, it accepted the ceasefire as a precondition for any other action and pursued its needs through political negotiation;
- 2) Leaving the conflict without ending the War. It means that Iran will not accept the ceasefire but at the same time refuse to enter Iraqi territory and settle on its borders;
- 3) The military effort to ensure a dignified peace (Droudian, 2012 AD/1391 SH, 250).

Iran had no choice but the third solution. Imam, who was in charge of managing the War, explained the intention of this solution as follows: "If we release the culprit today, that we have power, it is not a ceasefire and peace" (Khomeini, 16/235).

#### **5.7. The Principle of Belief in Consultation**

The opinions of political and military advisers had great importance to Imam Khomeini. In critical military decisions, while paying attention to the requirements and conditions of the country, he paid attention to the opinions of political experts and military commanders. One of the turning points in the war was the negotiations on the adoption of Resolution 598. It determined the war and the years of struggle and self-sacrifice fate.

He accepted the Resolution based on the principle of consultation and awareness of warlords' and advisers' opinions. Perhaps one of the most important reasons for adopting this Resolution, which he refers to as "Drinking the Cup of Poison," was the opinion of the commanders and the reports of economic and military experts that disagreed with the continuation of the war. Imam Khomeini

recognized the adoption of Resolution 598 in favor of the regime and the revolution.

### **5.8. Enemyology**

One of the managerial features of Imam Khomeini during the war was his enemyology. During the imposed war, Imam repeatedly advised the Iranian nation to be vigilant against the enemies' conspiracies (Khomeini, 18/187).

He assessed the occurrence of the imposed war as an American conspiracy and believed that "This war is a war with the United States" (Khomeini, 13/212).

Imam's revelation of the conspiracies of the gangs in the imposed war, and warnings to the countries that participated in the Taif Conference showed the Imam's high vision in recognizing the Islamic Revolution enemies (Khomeini, 14/163).

According to Imam last will, his concerns were about the conspiracies and plans of the enemies, that done after the revolution victory to disappoint the nations and especially the Iranian government from Islam (Khomeini's political-divine will, 2014 AD/1393 SH, 9).

### **5.9. Populism**

According to Imam Khomeini, people had no preference for each other in class and social affairs. Simultaneously with the revolution, he always advised the authorities to serve the people and with the people. While the ratification ceremony of President Raja'i and Ayatollah Khamenei, asked them to be with people.

The Imam himself avoided anything that caused him to distance himself from ordinary and weak people. Fatemeh Tabatabai, the Imam's bride, quotes the Imam's reaction to the possible bombing of Jamaran in the book "Imam Khomeini and Political Behavior" as follows:

In those days when there was bombing, Mr. Ansari came one day and told the Imam that a letter had come from Mr. Rey Shahri that we had reliable information that here (Jamaran) wanted to be bombed tonight, so please change your place tonight. The Imam said to him, laughing, 'What are these words?' with bombing possibility, I am in my chair and room unless everyone is in the shelter or guard standing in our alley, he is standing there, and I am going to the ceiling! I never go there, I want a rocket to hit me, and I become a martyr (Tabatabai, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 316).

### **5.10. Command and Decision-Making Power**

Ethnicity and separatism were critical issues in the early revolution, with the support of hegemonic countries. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan crisis was the most acute and dangerous.

The reason was the lack of control of the central government over the Kurdistan region. Hashem Sabbaghian, the then Minister of Interior, said: "We had the same dangers in other parts of the country,

such as Sistan and Baluchestan and Khuzestan, but we did not feel threatened in any of these places, such as Kurdistan. Because the central government had power in other places, but the central government did not have power” (Perspective, interview with Sabbaghian, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 19).

Unfortunately, from the very beginning of the revolution's victory, war and bloodshed began in the Kurdistan region. The first significant example was the attack on the Mahabad garrison. In this invasion, weapons were looted, and the regiment was set on fire. Hundreds of conspirators surrounded the Sanandaj garrison on 1357/12/27 with weapons stolen from Mahabad.

They entered the barracks without firing a shot from inside the barracks, killing 21 soldiers and capturing several inside buildings. Then they went to Naqadeh and Marivan and from there to Paveh, and for a few weeks, they prepared their equipment and personnel for the great war in Paveh.

When Imam heard the news of the riots in Paveh, ordered to resolve the uproar Paveh quickly, the army sent. On the morning of 1358/5/27, Imam Khomeini issued a historic and decisive statement that changed the fate of Kurdistan and Iran. The army must reach Paveh within 24 hours and suppress the counter-revolution (Khomeini, 9/379).

Also, another case that the Imam dealt with decisively and asked the commanders to resolve the matter quickly was breaking the siege of Abadan. After the military invasion of Iraq and the capture of Khorramshahr, which was the most important port city of Iran, the enemy tried to occupy Abadan through the east of Karun and north of Bahmanshir, which put Abadan under a 330-degree siege. In those circumstances, Imam Khomeini, on October 27, 1960, said to army forces: "The siege of Abadan must be broken." I am waiting. I [warn] the guards, the police, and the commanders of the police must break the siege. Do not neglect it. Do not let these people come to Abadan. Take them out of Khorramshahr. Get aggressive (Khomeini, 13/333).

Based on the Imam message, one of the four primary and prominent operations in the history of the war, which is mentioned as a turning point in the transfer of the war strategy, was carried out. Also, following his order, the IRGC and the army formed joint plans to defeat the Abadan siege.

It should be noted that after Fallahi's martyrdom, the level of war command changed, and did the control of the operational status of the war jointly. During this war period, Mohsen Rezaei was appointed commander of the IRGC, and Ali Sayyad Shirazi was appointed commander of the army's ground forces.

One of the crucial features of the Joint Command, which is known as the golden age of war, was the establishment of regular coordination and acceptance of joint responsibility for managing the

battle at the strategic level (Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense, interview with Abdolhossein Mofid, 1395/8/25 SH)

### **5.11. The Principle of Expediency-oriented**

There are many examples regarding the Imam's belief in the principle of expediency-oriented during his leadership. The story of the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the position of deputy leader, accepting the resignation of Bazargan at a particular stage of the revolution, agreeing to the removal of Bani Sadr, or most importantly, the adoption of Resolution 598 to end the war in 1988. The focus here is on the imposed war, the acceptance of Resolution 598 by the Imam.

In 1988, Imam Khomeini finally accepted the Resolution to end the war and referred to it as drinking the cup of poison. An interpretation that later caused the adoption of Resolution 598 was regarded as imposed. However, this view did not correspond to reality because the Imams decided to accept the Resolution based on the reports received from the situation on the battlefields and the principle of expediency in maintaining order.

It should be noted that Mohsen Rezaei, in that period, in a report on the operational status of war zones and the number of necessary facilities and equipment, expressed his views on the continuation of the war. He states that if provided the required military conditions and facilities during a 5-year plan, we will wone; otherwise, in the absence of sufficient facilities, more costs on the nation and the country (Rezaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 231).

Therefore, given the current situation, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as the commander of the war, concludes that it is not possible to achieve a decisive military victory in the short term with the current situation in the country. Due to these factors, the Imam evaluated the country's capacity and facilities as insufficient to change the war significantly. According to Hashemi Rafsanjani: "What convinced the Imam the most to end the war was to explain the tragedy of the chemical bombing of Halabche and Sardasht.

It was predicted Ba'athist regime in the future use the mass destruction weapons with the green light of the superpowers and even its repetition in cities such as Tabriz, Isfahan, Qom, and Tehran. We certainly are not involved in such crimes and counterattack against the Iraqi people" (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2011 AD/1390 SH, 18).

Imam Khomeini also said in a letter to the officials of the time: "Now our military officials, including the army and the IRGC, who are experts in the war, explicitly acknowledge that the Islamic Army will not achieve any victory soon. Considering that the sympathetic military and political officials of the Islamic Republic do not consider the war is not to the country's interest, and firmly say that they have given one-tenth of the weapons given to Saddam by the arrogance of the East and the West.

It can not be produced in the world in any way and at any price. According to the shocking letter of the Revolutionary Guards commander, which is one of the dozens of reports that have reached me after the recent defeats, and due to the widespread use of chemical weapons by the enemy and the lack of neutralizing equipment. I agree with the ceasefire” (Khomeini, 21 and 74).

Therefore, given the country's internal situation and the reports related to the last year of the war and international support, the ambiguity of the imposition of the adoption of Resolution 598 is not relevant. This issue shows the practicality of Imam Khomeini regarding the preservation of the system and the lives of the Iranian people in that sensitive historical period.

#### **5.12. Crisis Management**

One of the managerial characteristics of Imam Khomeini during the eight-year war was managing crises and making strategic decisions to overcome those crises. For example, at the beginning of the war and in Bani Sadr's removal from the General Forces command and then his removal from the presidency, the Imam managed society well (Khomeini, 14/480).

During that period, due to the escalation of the dispute between Bani Sadr and Rajai's government, the Imam introduced a three-member committee<sup>5</sup> to reduce tensions between the parties to the conflict (Khomeini, 14/248).

The Imam's purpose in forming such a committee, known as the Arbitration Council, want to end Rajai and Bani Sadr dispute. At that time, regarding the sensitive situation in the country and the imposition of war by Iraq, the Imam did not want the government to face a new crisis. Hence, they still wanted peaceful coexistence between regime officials (Khomeini, 8/384).

It seems that Imam Khomeini did not want the experience of the revolution's first president to fail. However, after the removal of Bani Sadr in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, which had a tactical alliance with Bani Sadr, entered the military phase against the Islamic Republic, creating a new crisis in the country.

They aimed to strike at the main parts of the revolution figure and form an alternative government. Imam, realizing the recent internal turmoil in the country, while warning about the organization's actions, sent a message to their leaders that if the Mojahedin lay down their weapons, he is ready to talk to them as a student (Mojahedin Organization from emergence to end, 2006 AD/1385 SH; 526).

---

5. This Committee Consisted of Muhammad Reza Mahdavi Kani as the Representative of the Imam, Shahab al-Din Ashrafi as the Representative of Bani Sadr and Mohammad Yazdi as the Representative of Hashemi Rafsanjani (The Speaker of the Parliament).

Regarding the Imam's reaction, Massoud Rajavi, a leader of the organization, says: "When the Imam responded, we were in a state of passivity. Our idea and prediction were that the Imam would either allow us to march or would tell us not to come and would not accept us. But it was unpredictable for him when he said drop your weapons. I will come" (Ibid: 538).

Also, the decision to adopt Resolution 598 and the possible consequences could threaten the existence of the system and the essence of the revolution; the country needed a solid administration to save it. In other words, the Imam decision could once again rescue the system existence from the crisis. A strategic decision such as the adoption of Resolution 598 could have caused severe instability for the Islamic Republic.

Still, the correct and comprehensive management of the Imam could protect the system from these dangers. At that time, the Imam was able to minimize the negative consequences of that decision by profoundly understanding the possible implications of the adoption of Resolution 598 and establishing an emotional connection with the people, and refraining from adopting a dictatorial policy. In this regard, the Imam's management was not in a supreme jurist status who issued an enforceable decree, and people were obliged to accompany him. Instead, Imam knew himself as the companion and sympathizer of the people.

Therefore, he interpreted the Resolution's adoption as a poison cup that he drank for the system and Islam expediency. The people knew Imam as a companion leader, not as a person who sacrificed all the material and spiritual resources of the country for the war. They believe he managed the country well based on existing situations in contrast with the crisis. Therefore, we should note that the Imam's decision to accept Resolution 598 was not the end of the struggle but a change of strategy and the adoption of a new method of battle on the political front to prevent a major crisis.

### **Conclusion**

The present study aimed to analyze Imam Khomeini's strategic management in the imposed war based on his personality, behavioral and contingency characteristics. Insight and vigilance, courage, determination in decision-making, responsibility, peace of mind, and self-confidence were the most important personality traits of the Imam that made him an irreplaceable leader and manager. Also, determination in decision-making and the practical expression and words of Imam effectively strengthened his charismatic personality.

Accordingly, the first phase of Imam Khomeini after the invasion of Iran by Iraq was to manage public opinion and prevent the anxiety and psychological anxiety of the people. Imam Khomeini's morals and

personality traits had also spread to the people and fighters during the imposed war, making them brave, courageous, and martyrdom-seeking fighters.

After examining the personality traits and paying attention to the individual characteristics and behaviors, considered the group and organizational behavior of the Imam. The results of studies on the behavioral aspects of Imam Khomeini show that the Imam paid particular attention to the protection of public interests, the principle of serving the people, accepting consultation, and being duty-oriented. With the imposed war, the Imam tried to inform the people about the enemy's threats and their responsibility against these threats. Historical evidence indicates that the Imam was aware of and consulted with political and military experts and advisers during the war and emphasized it.

He believed in the consultation principle evident in critical war periods, such as the Khorramshahr conquest in 1361 and the adoption of Resolution 598. Another issue emphasized regarding the Imam's behavioral management in this study was the Imam's task-oriented approach to the imposed war. As a result, different people became the front-line fighters with all their hearts and souls and considered their struggle a battle between right and wrong.

The third part of Imam Khomeini's leadership model was paying particular attention to the conditions and requirements of society. Imam Khomeini emphasized the centrality of Islam in his management style and considered the interests of Islam and the preservation of the revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic. Imam Khomeini's expediency can be seen during the adoption of Resolution 598. Given the economic and military conditions, he assessed the expediency of the revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic in accepting this Resolution.

The adoption of the Resolution at the end of the war was contrary to their previous practice and views. Therefore, Imam Khomeini's model and management style in the imposed war was the crystallization of his individual, behavioral and policy-making abilities to maintain the system of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolution.

## References

Holy Quran

Abdali Cheraghani, A. (2008 AD/1387 SH). Inspiring Imam Khomeini's Uprising and Struggles from Quran and Hadith, Thesis in Quranic Sciences, Supervisor: Ali Muhammad Fallahi, Shahid Ashrafi University of Isfahan.

- A Collective Effort of Researchers. (2006 AD/1385 SH). *Mojahedin Khalq Organization*. Tehran: Institute of Political Studies and Research.
- Akhavan Alavi, H. (2012 AD/1391 SH). "Investigating and Explaining the Crisis Management Model from Imam Khomeini's Perspective." *Management Quarterly*. Vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 555-576.
- Ardestani, H. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Analysis of the Iran-Iraq war*. Tehran: Revolutionary Guards War Studies and Research Center.
- Babaei Abarquei, M. (2011 AD/1390 SH). *Research in Holy Defense*. Tehran: Hoda Publishing.
- Barzegar, I. (1994 AD/1373 SH). *Fundamentals of Political Decision Making From Imam Khomeini's Perspective*. Tehran: Islamic Propaganda Organization.
- Bashiri, A. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Revolution in Crisis 4 (Records and Memoirs of 1980 AD/1359 SH to 1988 AD/1367 SH Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani)*. Tehran: Maaref Enqelab Publishing.
- Butol, G. (1995 AD/1374 SH). *Sociology of War*. (Farkhojasteh, H. Trans). Tehran: Scientific and Cultural Publishing Company.
- Center for War Studies and Research, Iran-Iraq. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *War Day; The Global Invasion and Major Progress in Iraq*. Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research Publications.
- Documents in the National Library of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Document No. 25/340.
- Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Document No. 18534, Code s-1986 AD/1365 SH. Archive of the Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense.
- Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Document No. 3865, Code s-1986 AD/1365 SH. Archive of the Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense.
- Doroudian, M. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War*. Tehran: Holy Defense Documentation Center.



- Fiedler, F; Shamers, M. (1998 AD/1377 SH). *Effective Leadership*. (Khalili Shorini, S). Tehran: Islamic Azad University Press.
- Foucault, M. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Iran the soul of a soulless world*. (Sarkhosh, N; Jahandideh, A, Trans). Tehran: Ney Publishing.
- Habibi, N. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Commander of Military Leadership*. Tehran: Nahaja Strategic Publications.
- Hashemi Rafsanjani, A. (1988 AD/1367 SH). *End of Defense and Beginning of Reconstruction*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Education Publishing.
- Interview With Brigadier General Abdolhossein Mofid. (2014 AD/1393 SH). <https://iranhdm.ir>.
- Interview With Sardar Hossein Alaei. (2013 AD/1392 SH). <https://iranhdm.ir>.
- Interview With Seyed Yaghoub Zohdi. (2017 AD/1396 SH). <https://iranhdm.ir>.
- Interview With Hashem Sabbaghian. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Perspective, Socio-Political Monthly*. No. 14.
- Khamenei, A. (2009 AD/1388 SH). *Pajhwok Velayat, a Collection of Speeches by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution at the Anniversary of Imam Khomeini*. Qom: Maaref Publishing Office.
- Khomeini, R. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *Sahife*. Tehran: Imam Khomeini Publishing House.
- . (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Imam Khomeini's Political and Divine Will*. Tehran: Imam Khomeini Publishing House.
- Cordesman, A. (2010 AD/1389 SH). *Lessons of Modern Wars: Iran-Iraq War*. (H. Yekta Trans). Vol. 1. Tehran: Marzoboom Publications.
- Randall G., Budish (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Military Strategy; Theory and Concept*. Tehran: Higher Defense University Press.
- Rezaei, M. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *Speech Lesson of the High War Period, High War Period*. Tehran: Research Institute of Sacred Defense.

- Schermerhorn, John R. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Management and Organizational Behavior*. (Irannejad Parizi, M, Trans). Tehran: Managers Publishing.
- Solhjoo, A. (2007 AD/1386 SH). "What is Strategy?" *Journal of Revolution Hope*. Vol. 27, no. 361, pp. 22-25.
- Tabatabai, F. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *Imam Khomeini and Political Behavior: Summary of Imam Khomeini Political Life*. Tehran: Qadr Velayat Cultural and Artistic Institute.
- War Documentation and Research Center. (1982 AD/1361 SH). *Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports of War Documentation and Research Center, 1982/20/6 AD/1361/3/30 SH*. Tehran: War Documentation and Research Center.
- War Documentation and Research Center. (1982 AD/1361 SH). *Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports; 5/11/1982 AD/1361/2/21 SH*.
- War Documents and Research Center, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 5/26/1982 AD/1361/3/5 SH.
- War Studies and Research Center, World Press Review Bulletin, No. 425, 12/6/1983 AD/1362/9/15 SH.

## Investigating the Effects of the Imposed War on the Islamic Revolution Exportation

Mohammad Takaloo\*<sup>1</sup>, Farhad Darvishi Se Talani<sup>2</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.4.8

1. M.A. in Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Imam Khomeini University, Qazvin, IRAN.
2. Associate Professor, Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Imam Khomeini University, Qazvin, IRAN.

(Received: 5 August 2021 – Accepted: 4 September 2021)

### Abstract

The Islamic Revolution victory of Iran in February 1979 has been the source of significant changes in the region and the world and has had a tremendous international impact. Concepts such as the revolution exportation from the beginning of the revolution became the strategy of the Islamic Republic. Undoubtedly, the eight-year Iran-Iraq war had an impact on this policy. The present study aimed to express the effect of these imposed factors on exporting the revolution based on a theoretical framework on the theory of Hagerstrand's diffusion and examining the impact of the imposed war at the domestic and international levels. Based on the results, in contrast to the Islamic Revolution, this influence for governments, especially those that consider it a destructive factor for their government, is prolonged or stopped. And the imposed war became a factor for governments' resistance against the revolution exportation. In contrast, the revolution values have particular importance to the nations that noticed the justice-seeking and anti-arrogance of this revolution. Defense and resistance in the imposed war symbolize oppressed nations' resistance against global arrogance as a desirable pattern of behavior. The primary questions are 'What effects did the imposed war have on the future of Iran?' 'Did these effects play a positive and accelerating or negative and deterrent role in the export of the Islamic Revolution?' According to the hypothesis, some influences had a deterrent role in exporting the Islamic Revolution by those conditions. They caused the change of idealistic to realistic views. On the other hand, the Iranian nation's voice was a symbol of the government defending the oppressed, so it has caused the export of more and more values of this revolution.

**Keywords:** Islamic Revolution, Eight-year War, Export of Revolution, Regional Countries, International System.

---

\*. Corresponding author: mohammadtakaloo84@gmail.com

### **Introduction**

The great revolutions of the world are essential and influential phenomena of history. Revolutions are international phenomena not due to the military conflict between countries but, more importantly, their ideas and goals that spread worldwide. Spreading Revolutionary Ideas to other countries attracting nations to advance revolutions helps create new revolutions with similar destinations. Therefore, exporting the revolution experiences to the surrounding countries and the whole international community becomes relevant. Revolutionary systems are faced with exporting revolutions in diplomacy. Revolutions like the French 1789, Russia 1917, China 1949, and Iran 1979 are examples (Safataj, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 75).

Based on Muslim revolutionaries, the theoretical idea of exporting revolution goes back to the Islamic Revolution nature. From this point of view, the basis of the process is the change of carnal conditions, relations, individuals' behavior, and the systems of society. It is subject to the current of culture-making and acculturation under which a transcendent human being can help others to sublimation by a guide, encourage and "Testify to the Truth." The Islamic government and the revolutionary ummah can also help the people outside their borders through guidance, speech, propaganda, and encouragement to enable or accelerate their excellence. Therefore, "Issuance of Revolution" is interpreted as "Invite to Islam" according to the Holy Quran and Imams (Farsi, 1989 AD /1368 SH: 402), refers to people destroy a weak world (Davari Ardakani, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 18).

In contrast, some consider the issuance of the revolution as a plan, action, or policy adopted by those involved in the revolution to influence other societies (Mohammadi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 501). One of the critical and influential phenomena in the procedure of Islamic Revolution exportation is the Iraq-Iran war. It began with the Iraq invasion on September 22, 1980, lasted for eight years, and finally ended after Iran adopted Resolution 598 on August 18, 1988. This war, like other wars, had different and severe effects and consequences in the region and the international system. Regarding the imposed war impact on the Islamic Revolution issuance, proposed various theories. Some consider it is preventing the revolution exportation, and some as a factor accelerating the revolution issuance. The main question is 'What role did the Iraq-Iran war play in the export of the Islamic Revolution in the region and the world?' based on the assumption, the war had played a deterrent role in the Islamic Revolution exportation in some fields and changed the ideological to the realistic view. In contrast, the Iranian nation's sound as a symbol of the government defending the oppressed caused more and more revolution values issuance.

The present study aimed to examine the role of neighboring countries in the export policy of the Islamic Revolution and the effects

of the imposed war. They were compared in two separate categories with the positive and negative impact on the export policy of the Islamic Revolution.

### **1. Theoretical Framework (Diffusion Theory)**

Diffusion theory is the most common theory on how to spread innovations, ideas, and thoughts. This theory was invented and introduced in 1953 by the Swedish geographer Hagerstrand. Although the starting point for applying this theory was in agricultural phenomena and diseases, its use spread to other cultural areas (Jordan and Ravanry, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 316).

Another concept is spatial diffusion. It is the process that changes people's attitudes and behaviors. Spatial diffusion is the spread of a phenomenon from the center or main centers among the people who are ready to accept that phenomenon. Therefore, in spatial diffusion, distinguish two issues: The existence of a phenomenon or phenomena and the expanding the movement of the phenomenon from its primary origin, which causes spatial diffusion (Shokouei, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 301).

#### **1.1.1. Factors of Diffusion Theory and its Application in the Islamic Revolution of Iran**

##### **1.1.2. The Spread Origin of Cultural and Political Innovation**

Simultaneously with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, neighboring countries and the Middle East and the Islamic world in particular, and the world in general, were affected by the greatness of this event and its regional and global messages.

##### **1.1.3. Scope, Destination, and Place of Diffusion**

The destination for disseminating the Islamic Revolution innovations was 53 Islamic countries members of the Islamic Conference or 20 Arab countries of the Middle East or the Greater Middle East or other regions of Central Asia and Southeast Asia. So, these broadcasting areas sometimes have a receptive and sometimes unacceptable environment (Rafipour, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 88).

##### **1.1.4. Time**

According to Morrell's research, the more time passes since the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the acceptance of its effects decreases. Therefore, the impact of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 is different from 2002. However, evaluating these effects from February 1979 and even shortly before, until now, is our study issue.

##### **1.1.5. Diffusion Issue**

The subjects of the Islamic Revolution diffusion constitute a diverse and wide range of influences types, such as Islamic awakening and political self-confidence, Islamic unity of Muslims, creation of Islamic society, and establishment of an Islamic state. Political Islam is the name for all of these (Kadivar, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 130-140).

##### **1.1.6. Routes, Channels, and Diffusion Tools**

At least people should behave after that; the process of automatic propagation continues, like a snow mass that turns into an avalanche (Rafipour, 1997 AD/1378 SH: 88).

## **2. Islamic Revolution and Imposed War; Share Discourses**

The discourse relationship between the Islamic Revolution and the imposed war is found in Imam Khomeini's speech act. For Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution of Iran was a space for formulating and seasoning the components of the Islamic discourse. The imposed war became an arena for him to establish his hegemony. Accordingly, the imposed war was the greatest threat to the Islamic Revolution, and the resulting discourse became the most significant historical opportunity for its survival through the speech of Imam Khomeini. He, through it, changed "Obstacle" into "Means." (Poursaeid, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 49-50)

The imposed war was the origin of the spread of public emotion with a sense of unity, empathy, and the cultivation of a desire for sacrifice and martyrdom. The feeling was like the revolution period. The particular and ideal situation that Imam Khomeini praised and considered it a reason for releasing a weakness and attention to God (Kashi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 326).

## **3. The Facilitator Countries to Islamic Revolution Issuance and the Extent to Fulfillment of This Issue**

Some Muslim countries can play a facilitator role in exporting the Islamic Revolution. However, this has been done under some circumstances or has interrupted this role. Some of these countries are as follow:

As an essential Arab country with a Shia majority and oil power, Iraq is a good channel for the presence of the revolution in the Arab world. If the developments of the Islamic Revolution affect Iraq, the non-Arab color and its repulsion will decrease among the Arabs and spread throughout the Arab countries. Such a capacity is a reason that caused Saddam Hussein to attack Iran through various channels.

Afghanistan was also an essential factor in reflecting the Islamic Revolution in Central Asia. In the first decade of the revolution, the country was occupied, and soldiers from Soviet-Asian countries were fighting in Afghanistan who had contact with the Mujahedin. In the second decade, simultaneously with the Soviet Union collapsed and independence of those countries with specific weaknesses and disadvantages had been high their impact ability by the Afghanistan developments and the religious ideas of the parties and the Mujahedin. The rise of the Taliban almost cuts off the facilitator role. (Heshmatzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 296).

Turkey was the factor of political Islam influence and Islamism in the Caucasus and the Balkans because of its geographical proximity

and ethnic, linguistic, and religious commonalities. In the summer of 1980, a few weeks before Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, a military coup took place in Turkey. The symmetry and sequence of this about the Islamic Revolution can reinforce the hypothesis that the Turkish army coup was part of the strategy of restraining the Islamic Revolution and binding one of the facilitators. Turkey's major political issues are evaluated from the above perspective. Some reasons, including the entry and exit of Arbakan and the Islamist Refah Party into the political scene, are a neutral response to the pressures caused by the Islamic Revolution's impact (Ibid: 296-297).

Pakistan is the gateway to the Indian subcontinent and even to Southeast Asia. It has the most prominent Shia population, and Sunnis are interested in Iran for cultural and historical reasons. These nations have typically taken their Islam from Iranian mystics and merchants and know the Iranians cause of their acquaintance with Islam and respect them. Persian language, poetry, poet and literature are deeply rooted in that land. These are almost the opposite of Sunni Arabs statements about Iranians (Heshmatzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 297).

Lebanon is the channel of the Islamic Revolution presence in the whole Arab world and the most important medium for influencing Quds, Palestine, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This factor is still active and dynamic. With the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon after 22 years, Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance have played a significant role in this.

The imposed war of Iraq against Iran is one of the critical and influential areas in the relations between Iran and Lebanon. Analysts interpreted Iran's victory over Iraq caused the unbridled power of Muslims, mainly Lebanese Shia. After the Khorramshahr liberation in 1982, Zionists attacked Lebanon, so a new front opened against Iran. The entry of the Revolutionary Guards into this country and the formation of militant groups converging with the Islamic Republic, led by Hezbollah, became one of the components of Iran's power in the face of other domestic, regional, and international actors in Lebanon (Tahmasebipour 2014 AD/1393 SH: 81).

In the second decade of the Islamic Revolution, Omar al-Bashir came to power in Sudan and showed similar Islamic actions and tendencies like Iran. Based on news and information, Sudanese society had a high capacity and acceptance of the Islamic Revolution. It became a pretext for Egypt and the United States to warn about the revolution issuance danger, jeopardize their interest, and justify some of their propaganda and pressure on Iran. However, with its unique national identity and geographical location, this country is an essential factor for spreading the Islamic Revolution ideas among the regional Arab countries to the depths of Black Africa (Heshmatzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 298).

#### **4. Consequences of the War and Its Impact on the Revolution Issuance**

The war effects have always been broader and more dynamic than during the active period of the war. The Iraq-Iran war is no exception. The consequences of this eight-year war are still going on inside the warring countries and the whole region. These effects, in line with the revolution exportation policy, have two deterrent and accelerated aspects. Some of those are as follow:

##### **4.1.1. Deterrent Effects on the Revolution Issuance Policy**

We first examine the effects that have slowed down or halted the revolution issuance policy.

##### **4.1.2. Priority of Maintaining Territorial Integrity**

The imposition of war was the culmination of the regional and international system's response to the revolution exporting and the policy of creating samples like Iran in the outside world. The war, in effect, forced the Islamic Revolution to reconsider its foreign policy approaches. Of course, the victories of the Islam warriors sometimes provided a window of hope for pursuing an idealistic policy and the continuation of the revolution issuance policy in the hearts. But events of the end of the war did not indicate it but imposed a situation of "neither War nor Peace" on Iran was not favorable to Iran, and did not help Iran export the revolution (Fallahnejad, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 150-151).

This war seriously threatened the existence of country's system and the revolution. The most critical task and goal were "Existence Preservation," and the expansion and issuance of revolution was subordinate and overshadowed. They propagated that the invasion of Iraq, at all costs and damages, was the result of the enthusiasm and rhetoric of the Iranian revolution issuance (Heshmatzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 35). Thus, Iraq's invasion of Iran caused the aspirations of the Iran fledgling government to break up, and Iran abandoned its cross-border policy about revolution issuance and supporting liberation movements and sought only to preserve its territorial integrity (Amin, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 166). However, this impact was not absolute but relative.

##### **4.1.3. Reconstruction After the War and the Revolution Issuance**

Numerous domestic and international factors strongly influenced the policy-making system process, how thinking and decision-making and implementation way of the elites on the country's major issues. Those are as follows the adoption of Resolution 598, end of the war, revision of the Constitution, the election of Hashemi Rafsanjani as President, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its impact on the international system. The war damage, the resulting material and spiritual problems, the issue of immigrants and prisoners of war, the destruction of production centers, the reduction of the national capital, the economic blockade and economic turmoil, and domestic political



bottlenecks severely threatened the existence of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, the pursuit of politics and disregard for international arrangements during the eight years did not meet Iran's revisionist demands. Influenced by these factors, the government gradually reluctantly and compulsively accepted the realities of the international system and the internal and critical conditions. To regulate the internal situation and rebuild the country, put economic reformism at the top of its agenda.

The central element of this discourse was pragmatism in formulating and implementing foreign policy following Islamic values. Thus, economic reconstruction and defense-security modernization became a priority on the agenda of Iranian leaders. The procedures such as revolution issuance and helping Islamic and liberation movements became the following priorities (Fallahnejad, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 130-131).

#### **4.1.4. The Effect of the Forming Persian Gulf Cooperation Council on the Revolution Issuance**

The collapse of the regional security system due to the Iranian revolution led the Persian Gulf region countries to create a new security system. They regarded the latest trend as a far-reaching measure against regional order and stability. Also, they considered the Iranian revolution as more far-reaching than other radical models in the Middle East. They hoped that their consensus could create a strong front against Iran's foreign policy behavior. Therefore, one of the main factors in establishing the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council is the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the prevention of its effects and consequences in the region (Ibid: 152-153). The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council acted to contain the Islamic Republic of Iran by assisting Iraq and preventing its defeat. In this regard, the massive volume of the Council's financial assistance to Iraq, including loans and grants, is estimated at 35 to 45 billion dollars (Heydari, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 31).

Establishing an Islamic system in Iran and the leaders' insistence at the beginning of the victory on the need to export it and select an Islamic government in Muslim countries was a great help to the United States. It gave him an excuse to introduce the revolution issuance as a severe threat to the Persian Gulf countries' rulers and make them strongly afraid of continuing their rule (Parsadoust, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 347). Their genuine concern about internal security and its connection to the Iranian revolution was the fear of increasing Shias' self-confidence in the Persian Gulf countries, lest they follow their counterparts in Iran and thus endanger the internal security of these countries (Kadivar, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 112).

#### **4.1.5. The Issue of Pan-Arabism**

The Iraqi regime found a great initiative during the war with Iran. To gain legitimacy, war with Iran, Arab world leadership, and winning

the war, the Iraqi government proposed "Pan-Arabism" and the ancient subject of Arabs and non-Arabs. It aimed to mobilize the Arabs, especially the Arabs of the Persian Gulf, against the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran's system and ideology. Of course, Saddam raised Arabs and non-Arabs for the first time during the country's political and social crises following the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Fallahnejad, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 147-148).

During the war, he constantly reminded his soldiers of Qadisiyah and the victory of the Arabs over the Iranians. In the Arab world, it intensified after the conquest of Khorramshahr on May 24, 1982; Iran did not accept the peace offer and continued the war to punish the aggressor. The Arabs hesitated of Iran's universal claims based on Islamic unity and solidarity, supported Iraq, and prevented Iran from winning (Fallahnejad, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 148).

#### **4.1.6. Accelerating Effects on the Revolution Issuance Policy**

In this section, we discuss the effects that have accelerated the process of the revolution issuance.

#### **4.1.7. The Impact of War on the National Security Discourse of the Islamic Revolution**

The imposed war practically had a dual effect on the concept of system "National Security." On the one hand, the war and the struggle for homeland salvation mixed with the people's religious interests and thus profoundly affected the system's ideological nature. On the other hand, countering the Iraqi forces' invasions inevitably changed the revolutionaries' mentality about the many elements of power that were regarded as security factors.

The war created many limitations in pursuit of the ideal goals of the system. Still, it was not a factor in changing the system's nature from ideological to non-ideological.

In its war strategy, the Islamic Republic of Iran was obedient to the general principles of the revolution and the design of various slogans in the war based on the revolution's ideal goals. Adherence to the general principles of the revolution, acceptance of many war limitations, and the evolution of some system security issues crystallized in all the system's policies.

Thus, the two periods of expansion-oriented and conservation-oriented discourse are different. In the period of conservation-oriented discourse, because of confronting a wholly objective and physical threat, the system accepted some of the developments and procedures to answer external defiance; without giving less value to the ideal goals of the revolution inherently. Many of these goals were pursued vigorously during this period. For example, the Iran assistance to the Lebanese Hezbollah group or the efforts of the country's political and military officials to turn the war from a classic and national-patriotic war into a popular-ideological war relate to those goals.

In prioritizing the system's goals, maintaining the system and the effort for the country's physical security during this period were first, and all the military issues during the eight-year of the imposed war overshadowed. The design and explanation of the theory of "Umm al-Qura" have been in this time. The bottom line in the idea of Umm al-Qura is that if a country becomes the Umm al-Qura and Dar al-Islam, its defeated or victory is regarded as defeated and the achievement of the whole of Islam therefore prefer the preservation of Umm al-Qura over other things. We can cancel the initial verdicts and the like (Valipour Zarumi, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 70-74).

However, the emphasis of the Imam and other officials indicates the high importance of maintaining order in this period. Imam said: "Today war is at the top of affairs." (Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 17/154) Or, maintaining the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the essential obligations. Hence, he called for a more comprehensive people presentation in the scenes of revolution and war. System policy-making was also a function of the general principle of the war (ibid).

#### **4.1.8. The Effect of the Negation of International Powers in the War on the Revolution Issuance**

The non-joining of the Islamic Republic to the two blocs of East and West during the Iran-Iraq war caused the country to not receive financial assistance from either bloc in defense of its invasion of Iraq. At the same time, Iraq was benefiting from the arms and financial aid of both blocs. This aid was not the importance of Iraq but the extent of threatening the Islamic Revolution for the two blocs. There is no doubt that if another neighbor invaded Iran instead of Iraq, the great powers would still support the country because of this threat. Therefore, Iraq had no role in attracting aid. After the end of the war and reducing this threat, the West did not help Iraq invade Kuwait and pushed its political system to the brink of collapse (Ghahramanpour, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 58).

Iraq's attack on Iran could be a new opportunity for revolution issuance. Because all Muslims and fighters throughout the Islamic world witnessed the unity of East and West and the Arab reaction to overthrow an Islamic country, the warnings were given by the Iranian revolutionaries about the dangers and threats of the world system were fulfilled. Therefore, it could better pursue the revolution issuance and the demand for unity and Islam revival (Heshmatzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 35).

#### **4.1.9. The Effect of Stabilizing the Islamic Republic of Iran**

The Islamic Republic of Iran won the eight-year war with unjust conditions. Therefore, many concerns about the growth of Islamic-revolutionary thought and ideals in Iran were redoubled, and in practice, this thought showed its capabilities to the world. This power expanded after several months of the war, especially after the defeat of

the siege of Abadan, and increased the concerns of the opposition political circles day by day. Coinciding with the collapse of the war in its early years, the American magazine *Armed Forces* writes:

"There is a deep horror at the terrible strategic mistake that Iraq has made. They are fighting a revolution in which there is no sign of oblivion, and no Iraqi military action can bring about fundamental changes in the Iranian political policy, and this is the most fundamental lesson of this war." The continuation of the eight-year war and its end without achieving the predetermined goals put ended many erroneous analyzes about the inability and weakness of the new revolutionary country of Iran (Farajollahi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 177). The power of maintaining and stabilizing the system provides a ground for revolutions issuance to those countries and motivated and freedom-loving nations by becoming a practical model in government.

#### **4.1.10. The Effect of War on the Evolution of the Revolution Issuance Pattern**

##### **4.1.11. The First Period of the War (1981-1984)**

Iraq's blatant invasion of Iran and the start of the eight-year war played a decisive role in changing the pattern of the Islamic Revolution. Thus, in the first half of the war, the policy of revolution issuance didn't stop, but it was strengthened and intensified in the form of spreading the model of the Islamic justice government. The invasion of Iraq significantly strengthened the position of the idealistic Islamists on the necessity of spreading the values and ideals of the Islamic Revolution within the framework of the expansionist security strategy. Because they argued with the Islamic Revolution limitation within Iran's borders, the revolution's enemies would have ample opportunity to invade Iranian territory.

Therefore, according to the preventive defense strategy, ideological aggression is necessary, and the process is defensive. Iran's extensive victories in the Fath al-Mubin and Beit al-Muqadas operations, which led to the liberation of large parts of the country, including the Khorramshahr, played a significant role in adopting the model of valuable export of the revolution by spreading the model of Islamic government in other countries (Dehghani Firoozabadi and Radfar, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 69-70).

##### **4.1.12. The Second Period of War (1984-1988)**

The pattern of exporting the Islamic Revolution in the second period of the war was cultural export by spreading the values of the Islamic Revolution and not the formation of Islamic government in other countries by creating a continuous revolution in them (Dehghani Firoozabadi and Radfar, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 77). Therefore, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, states, "We will continue to export our revolution, but culturally." (Ramezani, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 71)

##### **4.1.13. The Impact of Resistance in War on Islamic Awakening**

The Islamic Awakening is a great uprising that has destroyed the walls of tyranny and arrogance and defeated their guard forces. Stability, continuity, and establishment of the Islamic Republic are among the most critical factors that have hoped the region and Muslim nations. It has played an influential role in creating the Islamic movement and awakening in the area (Shahabi 2011 AD/1390 SH: 51).

For centuries, Islamic countries were invaded by foreigners. The Crusades, the invasion of Timur Mongols, European and Western colonizers such as the Dutch, the French, and in recent centuries the British, Americans, and international Zionism dominated the geopolitical and geostrategic region of the Middle East and Islamic countries, enslaving Muslim nations that caused their independence. By examining the developments of the last three decades in countries such as Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, Kashmir, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Central Asia, we can see the direct and indirect effects of the Islamic Revolution on the people, the government and their Islamic movements their Islamic awakening (Shahabi, 2011 AD/1390 SH:57). Some elements have placed Iran not as the initiator of the Islamic Revolution in the region but as an inspiration source for Muslim nations (Eivazi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 165).

These are resistance in the eight-year war with Iraq while supported by the West and the East and the reactionary powers in the region, opposition to widespread political, economic, and media pressure from the West, the role of Hezbollah as the birthplace of the Islamic Revolution and Iran in liberating Lebanon from Israeli occupation, the support of Palestinian people in the last 32 years by Iran, especially the intifada and resistance of the people of Gaza, the cut between Iran and the United States, the acquisition of nuclear enrichment technology despite severe opposition from the West, etc. (Ibid).

#### **4.1.14. Increasing Women's Political Participation**

Women's political participation in any society will find sense within that society's social and political structure. According to this view, women's political participation is formed with the structures of society and its sustainable relations and is influenced by social, economic, political, and social change systems. Different social, political, and economic structures cause differences in women's political participation in other societies and different periods (Darvishi and Emami, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 48).

The art of the Islamic Revolution was transforming the women of our community and guiding them to Islam and religious values. It saved them from the ignorance, restraint, and vulgarity that were the souvenirs of the West and led to self-respect, purity, understanding of personality and perfectionism, intellectual and spiritual transformation. A dynamic presence on the scene of the Islamic Revolution is one of the great honors of Muslim women in Islamic

## Investigating the Effects of the Imposed War on the Islamic Revolution Exportation

74

Iran. In the first days of the revolution, they entered the battlefield and helped the Islamic Revolution step by step with their jihad.

The active participation of Iranian women in the Iran-Iraq war is a new experience in the collection of popular participation and a rare phenomenon in the history of Iran. Given the background of approaches to the presence of women in Iranian social spheres-based on the women's isolation and the confinement of their activities within the home-the spontaneous and active participation of women during the war was the result of essential developments following the Islamic Revolution.

Simultaneously with the imposed war, their limited participation changed into active participation. Looking at the performance and influence of women in this historical period, we find that the values revived by the Islamic Revolution were the most important reason for women's political participation in that period (Ibid: 37). With the women involved in social affairs, the Islamic Revolution turned her into a model of a pleasant woman. Rejecting the women's isolationist view has provided a platform for their acceptance and absorption in society and has accelerated the revolution issuance policy.

### Conclusion

In its war strategy, the Islamic Republic of Iran was subject to the general principles of the revolution. The design of various slogans in the war was entirely based on the ideal goals. Adherence to the whole revolution principles, the acceptance of many war restrictions, and a change in some of the system security issues were crystallized in the system policy-making. Thus, the distinction between the two periods of expansion-oriented and conservation-oriented discourse is in the age of conservative-oriented speech; the system was forced to accept some of the developments and policies that could respond to this external struggle without underestimating the ideal goals of the revolution. Many of these goals are being pursued vigorously during this period. For example, the Islamic Republic aid to the Lebanese Hezbollah group was all during this period, or the efforts of the country's political and military officials to transform the war from a classic and national-patriotic war to a popular-ideological war was in this direction.

The consequences of the imposed war in the region and the international system have had many positive and negative aspects of exporting the Islamic Revolution values, some of which still affect the revolution issuance. This influence in the states, especially those against the Islamic Revolution, considers it a destructive factor for the institution of their government, is progressing very slowly or has stopped. The imposed war has become a factor for governments to oppose the revolution issuance policy.

On the other hand, among the nations that listened to this revolution's call for justice and anti-arrogance, the revolution values have particular importance. In this regard, defense and resistance in the imposed war are recognized as a symbol of resistance of oppressed nations against global arrogance as a desirable behavioral symbol. Imam Khomeini wrote in a famous message to the Charter of the Clergy in February 1989 about the war achievements, especially in the field of revolution issuance:

Every day, we have a blessing in the war that we have enjoyed in every scene. We have exported our revolution in the battle to the world. We have proved our submissiveness and the oppression of the aggressors in the war. In the war, we removed the veil from the hypocrisy of the cannibals.

We defeated the greatness of the two superpowers, East and West. We showed the world's people in the war, especially the region's people, who can fight all powers and superpowers for years. We aid Afghanistan and will lead to the conquest of Palestine. Our war awakened Pakistan and India and, most importantly, fulfilled the continuation of the spirit of revolutionary Islam in light of the war.

### References

- Amin, H. (2008 AD/1387 SH). "The International System and the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Research Letter*. Vol. 3, no. 12 and 13, pp. 143-180.
- Darvishi, F; Emami, A. (2010 AD/1389 SH). "Women's Political Participation in the Iran-Iraq War (1978 AD/1356 SH-1988 AD/1367 SH)." *Negin Quarterly*. Vol. 8, no. 32, pp. 37-50.
- Davari Ardakani, R. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *The Islamic Revolution and the Current State of the World*. Tehran: Mehrniusha.
- Dehghani Firoozabadi, J; Radfar, F. (2009 AD/1388 SH). "The Evolution of the Pattern of Exporting the Revolution During the Holy Defense." *First Line Quarterly*. Vol. 3, no. 11, pp. 57-82.
- Eivazi, M. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *An Analysis of the Future Study Framework of the Islamic Revolution of Iran*. Tehran: Aftab Tose'e.
- Falahnejad, A. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *The Policy of Exporting the Revolution*. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documentation Center.
- Faraj Allahi, Gh. (2009 AD/1388 SH). *Sacred Defense and Regional and International Powers*. Tehran: Training and Assessment.

**Investigating the Effects of the Imposed War on the Islamic Revolution  
Exportation**

76

- Farsi, J. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *Philosophy of the Islamic Revolution*. Tehran: Amirkabir.
- Ghahramanpour, R. (2000 AD/1379 SH). "Reasons and Roots of Turkey's Stance in the Iran-Iraq war." *Negin Quarterly*. Vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 49-59.
- Heshmatzadeh, M. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *The Impact of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on Islamic Countries*. Tehran: Publishing Organization of the Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought.
- Heydari, M. (2002 AD/1381 SH). "The Iran-Iraq War and its Impact on a National, Regional and International Dimensions." *Negah Monthly*. Vol. 3, no. 26, pp. 44-27.
- Jordan, T; Raventry, L. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Introduction to Cultural Geography*. (Tulaei, S, Trans). Tehran: Research Institute of Culture and Communication.
- Kadivar, J. (1993 AD/1372 SH). *Encounter; The Islamic Revolution and America*. Tehran: Ettelaa't.
- Kadivar, M. (1999 AD/1378 SH). *Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence*. Tehran: Ney Publishing.
- Kashi, Gh. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *The Magic of Speech: Cultural Mentality and the System of Meanings in the Khordad 2 Elections*. Tehran: Ayandehpooyan Cultural Institute.
- Khomeini, R. (1999 AD/1378 SH). *Sahifa Noor*. Vol. 13 and 19. Tehran: Payam Etrat.
- Mohammadi, M. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Global Reflection of the Islamic Revolution*. Tehran: Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought.
- Parsadoost, M. (1992 AD/1371 SH). *The Role of the United Nations in the Iraq-Iran War*. Tehran: Sherkat Sahami Enteshar.
- Poursaeid, F. (2010 AD/1389 SH). "The Relationship between the Discourse of the Islamic Revolution and the Imposed War in the Speech Action of Imam Khomeini." *Negin Quarterly*. Vol. 9, no. 33, pp. 47-62.



- Rafipour, F. (1997 AD/1376 SH). *Development and Contradiction: An Attempt to Analyze the Islamic Revolution and Social Issues in Iran*. Tehran: Sherkat Sahami Entshar.
- Ramezani, R. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *Exporting the Iranian Revolution, Politics, Goals, and Means*. Tehran: Ney.
- Safa Taj, M. (2015 AD/1394 SH). *The First Wave of Islamic Awakening After the Islamic Revolution*. Tehran: Afagh Roshan Bidari Publications.
- Shahabi, M; Salehi, J. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "The Impact of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on the Islamic Awakening in the Middle East." *Two Quarterly Journal of Islamic Awakening*. Vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 51-61.
- Shakoei, H. (1998 AD/1377 SH). *New Ideas in the Philosophy of Geography*. Tehran: Gita Shenasi Publications.
- Tahmasebipour, A. (2014 AD/1393 SH). "Study and Analysis of the Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon During the holy Defense." *Journal of Sacred Defense*. Vol. 3, no. 11, pp. 71-105.
- Valipour Zarumi, H. (1998 AD/1377 SH). "National Security Discourses in the Islamic Republic of Iran; From the Following of the Revolution to the End of Mr Rafsanjani's Presidency." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 61-82.



## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

Shoeyb Yari<sup>\*1</sup>, Vahid Shalchi<sup>2</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.5.9

1. M.A. in Social Research, Kharazmi University, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 3 August 2021 – Accepted: 7 September 2021)

### Abstract

Simultaneously with the Islamic Revolution victory, the Iranian people, by denying the previous value system, sought the Islamic culture themes as the new social capital of the country and its expansion from personality systems to various structures of society. The richness of this capital will give the community additional soft power that its importance is equal to hard power. The present study aimed to explain social capital and its impact on soft power and evaluate the country's situation during the holy defense to use social capital resources as a powerful defense against enemies. The descriptive method uses a documentary (library) study on the indicators of productive resources and conservation elements and dissemination of social capital. It then collected data and comparative evaluation of these indicators' status in the holy defense. The mechanism of social capital's impact on the soft power amount depends on the resources such as education and science, religion and ideology, civic institutions, and the media. After the Islamic Revolution, the data show their quantitative and qualitative growth to promote soft power during the holy defense. The results indicated that after the Islamic Revolution, despite the significant dependence on software and hardware resources of Western countries, Iranian society, by using the factor of religious ideological's beliefs to promote its power against foreigners in the holy defense to gain a lot. These beliefs enlightened the people and fought against the corruption of the Pahlavi regime. It used from its progressive basis to respect science and education, religious value resources, and cooperation of the ummah to reform society and spread it, use the best communication methods, and convey meanings to people.

**Keywords:** Social Capital, Soft Power, Management in Sacred Defense.

---

\*. Corresponding author: Shoeyb.yari@yahoo.com

### Introduction

Compared to other revolutions and popular movements in recent decades, the characteristics of the Islamic Revolution give it a unique distinction and prominence. The quality of leadership and its cultural nature are two prominent aspects of the Islamic Revolution. The Leader of the Islamic Revolution at various times in his speech emphasized the importance of cultural change, which is the foundation of social capital: "The issue of culture and education is at the top of the country's agenda that solving the cultural and educational problems according to the country demand, will solve other problems easily" (Asadi Moghadam, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 23).

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution as a manifestation of a great desire for sweeping change, especially cultural change in society, a kind of cultural revolution emerged with a return to the Islamic foundations of Iranian culture. This great event played a significant role in shaping the resistance spirit and ability in contrast to foreigners and seditionists during the holy defense. On the other hand, after the revolution, Iran has been under constant cultural invasion and attempted to introduce religion in contradiction with the new world requirements and developments. The cultural aggression aimed to turn people away from Islamic culture as an anonymous and alienated being, accept the West's cultural domination, and be under the values of the West in the cultural, economic, social, and political system in thought and action. Politicians and thinkers have always emphasized the young generation, especially as the most influential strata in society. Young people have a significant impact on society. They cause a change in various dimensions of society because of their accessible indicator, type of concerns, and pursuing their demands. Politicians try to control young people's intellectual and cultural well-being and direct their actions to dominate the movement and development of societies. Indigenous culture's values and norms emerge in cultural feedback, beliefs, and insights, not merely through education. Suppose we want to create an idea and a mixture of genuine artistic feelings and actions. In that case, we must consider society's elements, the content of cultural messages, and the methods of conveying the message simultaneously.

The consequence of the social capital richness is giving personality to the individual and bringing society to the pinnacle of overall development. The benefit of the community from intellectual, scientific, and value foundations in the cultural system and their gradual crystallization in personality systems and social structures shows the success of education and socialization of artistic principles and foundations and cultural authority and influence in other intellectual-cultural systems. Emphasizing the amount and quality of social capital shows that the demands of the country's defense force are in line with the soft power of the Islamic Republic, despite the

hardware capabilities and increasing the level of regional and global political and diplomatic control in the war when the need for a comprehensive and robust defense. The present study is used the descriptive method with a documentary (library) study on the indicators of productive resources and elements of conservation and dissemination of social capital and then collected data and done a comparative evaluation of these indicators status in the war.

Muhammad Janipour, in his research entitled "The Use of Soft Power; an Analysis of the Strategic Aspects of the Sacred Defense," claimed that the Islamic theory of soft power, in addition to abstract aspects and heart belief, has an objective and strategic value. He examined the life of the Islam religious leaders, the theoretical framework of soft power, analyzing the content of written and oral works of the leadership, and the wills of martyrs, survey the decisive role of the Islamic Republic soft power in the war (Janipour, 2012 AD/1391 SH).

"The Study of the Factors Directing Social Capital during the Holy Defense" is the title of a study by Molaei Arani and Bagheri Kani. Researchers have emphasized the factors that direct the social capital of the holy defense era due to the increase and decrease of the different groups of people's attention to participate in the imposed war fronts. Using the qualitative method of basic theory, they interviewed several commanders and fighters of the holy defense and extracted 11 categories as guiding elements. The most critical factors are Imam Khomeini's leadership and guardianship, the people's belief principles, spiritual qualities, and the state of war and political space (Molaei Arani and Bagheri Kani, 2016 AD/1395 SH).

Gholamabbas Rahmani and his colleagues, in a study entitled "Social and Spiritual Capital of the Holy Defense," hypothesized that the holy defense influenced by Ashura culture caused the production of high social and spiritual capital against arrogant powers. While analyzing the components of social capital, using document research, they have extracted examples of following the Ashura culture at this time (Rahmani et al, 2017 AD/1396 SH).

Another study is written by Garine Priest Circus entitled "The Impact of Social Capital on National Security in the Age of Sacred Defense." Through documentary and library methods, he studied social capital with components such as trust, participation, cohesion, and values corresponding to its examples in the era of sacred defense. He evaluated national security components in five areas, military security, political security, economic security, social security, and environmental security. The results indicated direct and significant relationships between social capital and national security, especially in the internal dimension during the holy defense (Keshishian siraki, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 60)

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

Based on background study, significant researchers have enumerated the examples of social components capital and its reproduction in the sacred defense and examined its consequences. Still, less attention has been paid to the sources of social capital and its impact on promoting soft power in religious protection by focusing on their objective data.

### 1. Research Theories

Security as a social phenomenon has particular characteristics and requirements and manifests as a social issue with damage or non-damage to the main elements of the social system. To this aim, the government establishes security by dominating human and material resources. Order in society guarantees security, which means that citizens are safe from the dangers of the social system. Therefore, theoretically, social norms in controlling deviations, moral, ethnic ties, and the strength of identity are discussed (Ebrahimbai Salami, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 31).

By expanding the concept of security, Müller considers it the ability to maintain internal acceptance conditions for the evolution of traditional language patterns, culture, associations, religion, national identity, and customs. Hence, social security becomes a challenge to national identity or a threat to national security. He cites, for example, the situation of Pakistan against India, how Islam, as the religious identity of the Pakistani people, is a threat to Pakistan's national security, with any threat from India (Moller, 2000: 25). Increasing the amount of available social capital in any society plays a crucial role in countering these threats. Establishing a sufficient reserve of social capital depends on various factors, including creating direct social investment in education, an internship in cooperation skills, and teaching a set of norms that make them interested in collaboration and creating a sense of group identity. Many of the most important networks of trust and social criteria for the individual's participation, which is rooted in the community's social behaviors, will be completely exogenous. The provision of social capital is made by mediating a set of institutions as large as the society. Families, schools, temples, voluntary and specialized associations, public culture (media, press, mass media, etc) are among them (Alvani and Shirvani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 69).

In any country, social capital management benefits those in power; therefore, political forces will control or influence its quality in their target environments.

The use of soft threat in new security approaches against opposing political systems and culture-building and institutionalization within the framework of thought and patterns of liberal and democratic systems behavior. Therefore, the most complex and vital component of national security in any country is cultural security. Mild threats are

complicated, and the production of elite mental processing, so challenging to measure. Therefore, it uses the method of induction and persuasion, and the purpose of influencing choices is the decision-making process and behavioral patterns, and ultimately the deprivation of cultural identities. The security concept in soft approaches includes the security of values and social identities. It references the international and transnational environment (transnational and global identities) (Hejazi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 59).

The ups and downs of soft threats are closely related to the confrontation parties' actions and reactions. Undoubtedly, the determining variable of this action-reaction is the level of empowerment. But this power has a software dimension. One of the software aspect dimensions is the national ability to institutionalize social ethics in society (Alamdari, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 89).

As part of public culture, social ethics is transmitted through learning, cultural acceptance, and socialization. Behavior patterns of perceptual, emotional, and practical (behavioral) resulting in the transmission of social ethics and general culture that may be etched in people's minds. The process of transmitting social ethics involves different effects on the individual throughout life. The most important is the effect of socialization factors (agents), i.e., influential individuals, groups, and institutions that provide structural conditions for the socialization process to occur within them (Khoshfar, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 3).

Specifically, the family institution is the first social unit that, in its early stages, had all the significant tasks that human beings needed, such as security, politics, economic production, education, generation, and so on. However, in the historical and institutional separation process, some of these tasks were separated from the family and assigned to new social institutions (Babaeian, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 47).

The concept of social capital is a pillar of soft power. One of the most influential theorists in the field of social capital is Robert Putnam. According to Putnam, social capital defines dimensions of social organization such as norms, social networks, and mutual trust, which enable the integration of individuals in society to shared interests (Putnam, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 11).

In this way, teamwork is the most effective tool for maintaining cooperation and collective action. Civic participation networks embody successful past collaborations that can serve as cultural models for future collaborators (Putnam, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 4). Fukuyama believes religion and ideology; science and education are sources of social capital. Anthony Giddens and Tajfel also refer to civic institutions as tools for the spread of social capital. These elements are tools to identify, continue and promote or maintain and transfer the social capital of society (Coleman, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 99).

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

84

Based on the Fukuyama and Giddens, we examine a theoretical review of social capital sources and the means of disseminating their impact on increasing the soft power of society.

### 1.1. Science and Education

Soft and hard technology is the most common classifications of technology offered by scientists in recent years. The impact of soft technology on hard technology is essential. Soft technology is related to the mind, and hard technology is associated with the matter. In other words, it is connected to other parts of the body, and the dominance of soft technology over hard technology is fitting to the supremacy of the mind over other human forces. Soft technology (derived from indigenous culture) is a collection of human and unnatural knowledge accompanied by moral components such as knowledge and belief in theoretical contents and consequently effort and perseverance in preserving and applying it (Hassani Ahangar and Bazmshahi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 61).

Joseph Nye, one of the pioneers of the soft power plan in 1989, states that a country achieves soft power when using "Information and Knowledge" to end disputed issues (Nye, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 127).

Education is one of the essential processes in societies to create social capital. Completion of public education at all levels and university education plays a significant role in creating social capital. The functioning of educational systems strongly influences cultural components at the community level. In the present century, given the issue of globalization, governments are trying to plan with emphasis on national and territorial identity for sustainable development to establish a particular education system. On the one hand, the formal education system, by raising and flourishing the individual's talents and latent abilities, has helped him realize and grow his powers.

On the other hand, enabling the social system transmits the desired values and norms of society. So, investing in the education and training of interested, committed, and patriotic people with a national identity guarantees the progress and pride of the country and promotes the cultural, social, and economic growth of the society. Suppose a country's education system fails to bind individuals to their national identities. In that case, it may endanger the alienation of the new generation and cause them to become attached to foreign identities, resulting in macro-national security. Ensuring national security requires efficient education (Shah Hosseini, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 4).

### 1.2. Religion and Ideology

Ideology is another factor in building national power. Ideology is a domestic source of national power and supports the country's prestige, influence, and control in international relations. Each country forms the three structures of identity, security, and benefit friend and foe in foreign relations based on its ideology. And based on the type of identity that he expresses and the perception others have of him, he



identifies his friends and enemies. As a result, security is relative and perception-based (Bakhshi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 141).

Ideology can also create social capital by imposing on the individual they desire to benefit something or someone other than himself. It is evident in the effects that religious ideology has on forcing individuals to consider the interests of others. The indirect and relatively surprising effect of comparing religious schools (despite their more flexible disciplinary criteria) and non-religious schools has been observed in a much lower dropout rate of religious school students. It depends partly on the school and the parents; each individual is essential to God through the religious community and religion. One consequence of this principle is that due to the religious ideology of the school principal, staff, and adult members of the religious community associated with the school, signs of alienation and withdrawal are responded to more quickly. So, young people are much less likely to be lost through administrative negligence (Rahmani Saed et al., 2012 AD/1391 SH: 106; Alvani and Shirvani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 72).

One example of soft power at this level (micro and personal) is the image of Max Weber from the undisputed influence and authority of ideological and charismatic personalities:

“The exceptional quality of a person is a supernatural or at least an extraordinary power, so gather around him, followers or supporters. Charismatic behavior is not specific to political activity. It is in other fields such as religion, art, ethics, and even economics. The basis of this domination is emotional, not rational because all the power of such domination rests on unquestioning trust” (Freund, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 244).

One of the main factors in establishing and expanding power and security is individuals' adherence to religious orders and inclination to religion. Giddens believes that religion is a means of organizing a sense of security in several ways. The gods and spiritual forces provide reliable providence support for believers, as do religious agents. The most crucial task of religious leaders is usually to instill a sense of calm and security in the face of events and situations. Rituals are often obligatory, but they are also profoundly soothing because they give a certain ritual quality. In short, religion and tradition are fundamentally involved in existential security (Giddens, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 139).

For Luhmann, the distance from religion makes sense of danger in the new world. In principle, the threat arises from accepting the view that the most excellent probabilities that affect human activity are the product of man and not God or nature (Giddens, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 84).

### 1.3. Medias

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

86

Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution | Volume 3 | No.9 | Summer 2021 | PP. 79-97

According to Adorno, the role of the media in creating culture is to provide a framework that directly or indirectly affects the construction and preservation of culture or moving towards a specific worldview (Lal, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 57). Countries need to use new tools or information-communication technology to participate in or counter psychological operations. Today, relations between countries are defined as public diplomacy, specifically in communication technologies such as media diplomacy (Alamdari, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 94).

The media also play an essential role in institutionalizing a culture of "Self-control" in society and reducing regulatory costs; because it leads to a constant state within the individual, during which he is guided to perform his duties and responsibilities correctly without the use of coercive tools. According to the "Planting Theory," with a soft influence between families, it attempts to institutionalize the values and norms of society in the minds of the audience (Delavar Pourakhdam, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 81).

Regarding the role of the media in increasing soft power and the production of its security, Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital emphasizes that in society and its various spheres, the position of individuals and groups is determined by the amount of money they hold. Symbolic capital uses symbols to legitimize belonging to different social levels and inevitably assumes an ideological function. Bourdieu states: "Symbolic capital has an epistemological origin, relies on being known (that is, aware of it) and recognizable (that is, validates it)" (Bourdieu, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 142).

Symbolic capital has a significant presence in religion, science, and the media. Due to their widespread influence on public opinion, the media can increase or decrease individuals or organizations' legitimacy and social status and play an essential role in increasing soft power and security. The end of the Cold War, the events of September 11, 2001, the increasing role of the mass media, the prevailing soft and positive security discourse in the security environment of the global participation system, trust and loyalty to the government, and increasing political legitimacy and social capital has played a significant role in ensuring national security and countering security threats. Thus, creating satisfaction, gaining people's trust, and increasing political legitimacy have the primary role in national security and confronting security threats (Mah Pishanian, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 41).

Science and knowledge are mainly responsible for building trust in society, which are created through education and mass media. Social communication has three types: fundamental, interpersonal, and generalized trust. Absolute trust or ontological security is the assurance of the continuity of one's identity, which is one of the functions and capabilities of the mass media (Giddens, 2020 AD/1399

SH: 216). Examining the social capital can clarify the perspective of its impact on strengthening or weakening social capital. Pierre Bourdieu, a contemporary sociologist, believes that the mass media effectively supports social capital to providing the conditions and space for the actor to make "Rational Choices." Rational choice strengthens interpersonal trust and increases public participation (Bourdieu, 2014 AD/ 1399 SH: 94).

#### **1.4. Civic Institutions**

Undoubtedly, ensuring the individual and collective security of the people is one of the definite duties of governments in any political system. Therefore, this mission's sensitivity, importance, difficulty, and complexity double the need for people's participation. The most critical governments actions to strengthen social capital are:

Encourage and enhance the formation of civic institutions and enrich public education, ensure the citizens' security to participate voluntarily in social institutions, avoiding ownership of various cultural and social sectors, and handing over to public institutions to attract their participation in activities, laying the groundwork for creating and strengthening social institutions and trust networks between people different sections (Alvani and Shirvani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 79).

Non-governmental organizations are small groups interested in solving a problem (addiction, social harm, citizenship rights, etc). They do commercial activities to fulfill their goal, so they voluntarily engage in non-governmental, non-political, non-profit in a legal and coherent structure. Participation increases and raises social awareness by relying on the training that members receive on their own and being in the NGOs' system. This participation leads to the socialization, culture-acceptance of human beings, self-reliance and self-belief, the crystallization of people's involvement to achieve a common goal, and the fulfillment of human needs in the field of security. On the other hand, the expectations and control of mass movements regulate the people by preventing the destructive effects of mass movements. For example, whenever people feel dissatisfied with an issue, they should naturally express their dissatisfaction somehow. The presence of intermediary institutions in the society warns of deviations and causes the transmission of these dissatisfactions based on laws and ethics by playing its role correctly (Babaeian, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 52).

## **2. Discussion and Analysis**

In this section, the objective status of resource indicators and elements of social capital dissemination corresponding to the aforementioned theoretical issues are discussed in the form of data collected during the holy defense era. Awareness and learning development as one of the main cultural elements was manifested after the revolution and during

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

88

Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution | Volume 3 | No.9 | Summer 2021 | PP. 79-97

the sacred defense. People's compliance has helped to create internal security. The various dimensions of this process are:

Creating a culture of science production, promoting scientific power and courage, cultivating and flourishing talents, denying the imitation of Western civilization, creating scientific developments and advances within the framework of religious values, promoting the spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance and self-thought and will, the use of indigenous scientific capacities, the denial of petrification and dogmatism, and the imported Western thought and culture. In the holy defense, about 36,000 martyred students and 4,000 martyred teachers are among the honorees of this region. Many martyrs from various technical and engineering fields during the war specialized and general missions in the imposed war, and the active participation of 23,000 aid workers and 2300 female physicians in the holy defense fronts are among them. The Islamic Revolution brought the beating student's character to winning the World Olympiads and commanding the fronts. Because what happened was the departure of American and foreign military advisers and the reliance on the internal system of the internal forces, and subsequently the sending of advisers to foreign countries during the Holy Defense.

In the field of religion and ideology, the contribution of victory in wars from soft power, including spiritual power, soldiers' will, and faith in the goal, is now being studied by the world's military academies, and the soldiers' morale has become more effective and valuable today. The study of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and the Zionist regime's 33-day war with Lebanon fully demonstrates softening in the military arena. The superiority of soft power over the power of weapons technologies has been well proved. During the war, the spirit and thinking of the Basij, called a soft super-technology, showed its function well. At various stages of strategic warfare planning, operations planning and tactics selection, individual combat, creativity in engineering, support and logistics, and other areas, this spirit excelled over the complex powers known as the war machine of Saddam and his masters East and West. This soft technology (derived from indigenous culture) is a collection of human and unnatural knowledge accompanied by components such as patience, effort, perseverance, faith, and learning. This technology used the small number of weapons in the country in a miraculous way against the well-equipped and extensive front of the enemy. During the war, it miraculously changed the fate of the war, disrupted all previous calculations of the enemies, and survived the preservation of the Islamic Revolution. The study of these technology components in the military field requires a detailed opportunity. But what is essential is its success in sacred defense with minimal hardware capabilities, as a human and social concept with a social and human function, using a new management method. Its strong religious beliefs and social

behaviors prove soft technology (Hasani Ahangar and Bazmshaei, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 61).

At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, the opponents of the political system of the Islamic Republic inspired that the Islamic Revolution is a Shia revolution, and they expected the country Sunnis not to accompany the Islamic Revolution. In response to a foreign reporter's question about the Shia nature of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini said: "Our revolution is Islamic" (Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379 SH, 8: 142).

The Sunnis, before the revolution, lived in remote areas, so they were deprived of the minimum welfare facilities, and the government concentrated on the capital. They observed the preservation and expansion of their religious freedoms and benefiting from social blessings in revolution. Hence, they participated in strengthening the political system of the Islamic Republic. one of the most important signs of their active participation was in the battlefields during the holy defense alongside Shia citizens. So, the presence of Sunnis in the IRGC, army, Basij, and other volunteer forces as Kurdish peshmerga, especially in Kurdistan, and confronting the members of Komala and sacrificing more than 11,000 martyrs for the Islamic Revolution is proof of this claim.

After denying the contents of the mass media during the Pahlavi era and promoting it, it strengthened the people's religious beliefs by using valuable content and disseminating revolutionary and religious beliefs. During the war, making serials, animations, and films about holy defense, composing epic poems and songs about resistance (such as Sadegh Ahangaran, group songs of teenagers, etc) had a profound effect on the warriors' morale. They encouraged the religious and defensive feelings of the people and the Mujahideen.

Mass participation as one of the civil institutions of our society during the revolution was an essential factor in the revolution's victory because the goal was to change the country's political system. However, in the same mobilization phenomenon, levels of organized participation in mosques and religious organizations played an important role in mass mobilization. But in any case, the predominant aspect was mass participation. The mosques trained people for fronts. Every night after the prayers, the relevant officials in the mosques taught the people to use all kinds of weapons. According to statistics provided at the time, more than 3 million people had received military training in mosques and other centers. Also, 97% of the martyrs of the imposed war were sent to the front from mosques (Aghapour, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 94).

On the other hand, the mosque could mobilize the people. The mosque was a reliable medium for conveying the needs of the front. The role of scholars and clerics (such as Shahid Madani, Ayatollah Malakouti, and Moravej) in supporting the fronts by using the mosque

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

90

tribune and Friday prayers to send large amounts of public aid to the front and presence in the battlefield has been significant (Mansouri Larijani, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 76).

Mosques also played a pivotal role in producing, distributing, and consuming cultural-artistic works that promoted the culture of self-sacrifice and martyrdom.

During the war and the first decade of the revolution, there was less time to pay attention to institutions appropriate to the conditions and situation after the revolution. For various reasons, including lack of awareness needing intermediary institutions and the problems of the beginning of the revolution, we could not properly and in multiple dimensions to organize public participation. Of course, only in the face of an issue and crisis, namely, war, created popular participation. The Basij was very similar to these voluntary institutions. People were organized to defend the country and the system through these organizations. This authority in any organization belonging to the intermediary institution is only at the beginning of the entry. The individuals' actions within these organizations are regular (Babaeian, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 58).

Jihad Sazandegi is one of the revolutionary institutions to mobilize the facilities and talents of the people to cooperate in the preparation and rapid implementation of construction projects. It formed the "Provincial and Jihad Sazandegi War Support Staff of the Province and the City" during the eight years of the war to collect, send and distribute public aid to the fronts. The tasks assigned to the constructive Jihad during the war aimed to support the front's engineering affairs and rebuild and renovate the war-torn areas. The design and construction of the longest floating bridge in the world (Khyber Bridge) with a length of fourteen kilometers, which enables the connection between the Majnoon islands and the coast of Hoor, is an example of a significant Jihad Sazandegi operation.

When Imam Khomeini command to form a Jihad Sazandegi, it influenced all society. Jihad started helping the villagers and began its activity by building and rebuilding the country. With faithful, self-sacrificing, and low-expectation youth, it sent the first teams from all over the country to the western and southern fronts 15 days after the start of the war. It stationed them on the front lines and behind the front, and from the moment of deployment, he began his continuous and hostile activities. The presence of Jihad generous had a tremendous effect on strengthening and supporting the fronts, opening new ways in defense, and shortening the hands of the aggressors. Gradually, with the organization of the forces participating in the war, Jihad Sazandegi on the battlefields became complete, more precise, and sensitive dimensions. Given the extent of the activities of the Jihad Sazandegi generous, it is impossible to provide specific and accurate statistics of these activities. The massive and victorious

Valfajr 8 operation was an unprecedented amphibious operation and a full-scale engineering war. The victories achieved in this unique operation had several essential factors: Careful and calculated planning, the use of committed and specialized forces, continuous and round-the-clock efforts, unwavering service of war support, and engineering services of Jihad with the coordination and unity and integrity of the combat forces. The construction of the big "Besat" bridge on the Arvand River was an initiative of Jihad, which was of extraordinary technical and strategic success.

Jihad Sazandegi war support and engineering battalions were stationed in the area. Before the operation, they prepared the site for the procedure by doing some work, such as the movement of combat forces, repair and expansion and sanding of transportation routes, the construction of hundreds of trenches and dozens of headquarters and bases for the deployment of operating forces and artillery trenches, equipment, emergency, etc. During the operation, the Jihadists of the Jihad Sazandegi war support and engineering battalions, under the heaviest fire of the enemy, extended the roads in the flooded to the enemy's front line and connected the supply roads of the Ba'athist forces for the troops' vehicles and facilities. In this operation, martyred the best and most experienced soldiers. This action was very effective in advance of the country's forces.

Jihad Sazandegi has played an enormous role in the eight years of holy defense. The most important measures are:

Establishment of more than six command posts, four brigades and 40 support and war engineering battalions, 25 support headquarters with complete equipment and machinery, accepting responsibility for war engineering in all operational axes of the south and west, dispatching 540 thousand Jihadist force, donating more than 3100 martyrs and 21 thousand devotees and 1100 freedmen.

The actions of Jihad Sazandegi during the holy defense are shown in the table below.

number	actions	number	Action	
25710m	Create a personnel channel	77325 km	Operational-intrusive and mountainous road construction	1
100000km	Sanding	94732m	Create a water channel	2
370300 m <sup>2</sup>	Landscaping and creation of tactical bases and battalion headquarters and barracks	28100	Construction of different types of bridges (personnel, barrel, pipe, aluminum, capacity, concrete)	3

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

92

15700	Jihad - IRGC - Army Road construction equipment repairs	22500	Car trenches, ammunition, tanks, and personnel carriers	4
664	Creating Artillery Positions - Artillery Headquarters	151281	Individual and social strongholds	5
540km	Strong fortress	903	Missile site, military equipment platform and air defense	6
1470	Construction of earthen dam - earthen pier	520	Construction of hospital and field emergency	7
44	Construction of observation tower	56	Construction of a helicopter runway	8
15000	Construction of Hosseinieh, prayer hall, and Salavati station	15000	Ammunition transportation, water supply, road sprinkler	9
26	Drilling deep and semi-deep wells	1270	Construction of free bath	10
-	-	15000	Establishment of an operational checkpoint to provide security	11

Involvement of social participation in the war was not limited to specific institutions and male fighters. The active involvement of the women's community and the 7,000 martyrs and 5,000 female devotees is the privileged role of women in the sacred defense. Findings of research in the status of indicators of social capital resources in the holy era show that:

"The proper organization of the social system did not occur, especially in the first years of the war. But the management or bias of the country's policy in the development of science and education and the promotion of awareness by the elites of society and civil institutions based on ideological beliefs (religious and revolutionary) and the use of elements and tools of cultural dissemination, led to the production of social capital. This capital was made by forming social networks commensurate with the country's needs and finally caused the increase of the soft power of the Islamic Republic during the holy defense."

### Conclusion

The present study examined the objective situation of views and theories about the sources of social capital and its impact on the soft productive power in society during the holy defense. According to Müller and other experts, in political systems whose theoretical



foundations are based on religious beliefs and ideology, any damage to the social belief system is considered to undermine the country's national security. The level of capability in the software dimension will reduce the threats. The extent of empowerment is another expression of the richness of the society's cultural teachings. Since the principles of Islam and Shia, with the most cultural themes such as self-sacrifice, martyrdom, kindness, justice-seeking, etc, were highly promoted during the war. Many soft powers from the definition of norms provided new values (in terms of conflict with Western culture advertised before the revolution) in line with the common goals of society.

Revolutionary concepts such as anti-arrogance and the realization of the poor rights, justice and equality, freedom, etc, which were explained in the country, and social networks based on values have achieved intersubjective understanding and mutual trust, guaranteed the basis of future coherence cooperation in the war. Unlike the opposing front in the imposed war, it was very efficient in producing soft power.

The necessary actions of governments to strengthen social capital, the formation and strengthening of civic institutions, public education, and encouraging the voluntary presence of people in social institutions were mentioned. In the war, based on the ruling system policy, managed many affairs and responding to many social needs through social institutions such as the mosque and the Basij, etc, and estimated its effectiveness at a high level. The widespread presence of people in these institutions increased their social awareness and guaranteed their activation and use of social learning mechanisms and culture-acceptance. In contrast, most Front's fighters consisted of volunteer forces organized in social institutions such as the mosque. The Iraqi Ba'athist army's human resources were primarily based on legal obligation and coercion, and therefore the use of power from the learning process on both fronts was very different. The view of Joseph Nye and other thinkers is based on the influence or dominance of soft technology on hard technology to produce soft power. Therefore, despite the country's limited budget and military equipment, compared to the hardware capability of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq, soft technology originated from religious and revolutionary foundations and was taught by elites in the media and civil institutions that dominated hard technology. Hence, it covered the weaknesses of the hardware field or took over its management and orientation. This issue is explained by diligence in training in the war, from eliminating illiteracy to other training appropriate to different audiences and learners, even warriors in the imposed war.

Another point is the strengthening of identity foundations and its impact on soft power. A component that in the war, by expanding its definition or redefining from the sub-national to the transnational field

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

94

(Islamic world, the front of right against wrong, the poor against the arrogant, etc), its importance and position is limited to language, ethnicity, religion or subcultures. Therefore, the confrontation with the enemy was located in the broader area and much more critical. This issue has effectively raised people's motivation, especially the holy defense fighters and high society's soft power.

In summarizing, we cannot ignore Weber's approach to soft power based on charismatic leadership and Imam Khomeini's religious leadership in explaining the country's defense during the imposed war.

Producing soft power in the war seems complicated because social actors focus their attention on the developments and inflammations caused by the war. Therefore, the existence and strength of cultural meanings in the social system as sources of social capital will play a decisive role in producing and using soft power. The Islamic Revolution and its victory over the forces rely on the domination system were more centered on the design of new cultural meanings required in that period, which provided the source of the society's soft power for the social revolution. After the Islamic Revolution and regarding the expansion of religious and political freedoms in the country, explained new cultural meanings by religious elites in society and greater use of social capital resources derived from the political power of revolutionary forces, double soft power throughout the holy defense.

Based on the results, civil structures or institutions and social bodies promoted cultural meanings and values. Such as committees, Basij, mosques, etc, and academic and religious elites opponent the domination system and its affiliated powers in explaining science and education in the mentioned institutions with the use of media (radio and television) or cultural tools and goods (books, tribunes and laments, etc). Promoting cultural meanings and values along with the great extent of cultural consumption in society (widespread presence of people in mosques, making religious programs such as films and series with revolutionary and religious themes, etc), in addition to strengthening the foundations of legitimacy and acceptance of ideological political system led to an increasing social and political participation of the people in various fields, especially defense. The presence of ethnic and religious minorities in the imposed war, the voluntary presence of different classes and groups such as educated people, seminary and university elites, the widespread presence of youth and even adolescents, particular guilds such as heavy vehicle owners, doctors, and nurses, the extensive financial support of the upper economic classes, such as the bazaars, etc, can be explained by this approach.

**Reference**

- Aghapour, M. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *The Crossroads of Movement and Foundation in Sacred Defense: A Research in the Sociology of War*. Tehran: Jihad Daneshgahi.
- Alamdari, S. (2008 AD/1387 SH). "Soft threats; The Model of Strategic Confrontation between the United States of America and Iran." *Islamic State Letter Quarterly*. Vol. 2, no. 26-27, pp. 81-99.
- Alvani, M.; Shirvani, A. (2004 AD/1383 SH). "Social Capital, the Axis of Development." *Tadbir Quarterly*. Vol. 6, no. 147, pp. 65-83.
- Asadi Moghadam, K. (1996 AD/1375 SH). *Imam Khomeini's Cultural Perspectives*. Tehran: Zikr Publishing and Research Institute.
- Babaeian, A. (2004 AD/1383 SH). "The Role of Intermediary Institutions in the System of Social Control." *Quarterly Journal of Disciplinary Knowledge*. Vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 42-59.
- Bakhshi, A. (2009 AD/1388 SH). "A Framework for Developing a Human Security System in West Asia: Presenting Solutions from Africa." Proceedings of the International Conference on Human Security in West Asia. First Edition. Tehran: Research Institute for Social and Cultural Studies, pp. 128-149.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986 AD/1365 SH). *The Forms of Capital.* *Handbook of Theory and the Search for the Sociology Education*. (J.G. Richardson). Greenwood: Westport.
- . (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Theory of Action*. (Mardiha, M, Trans). Tehran: Naghsh va Negar Publications.
- Coleman, J. (2018 AD/1397 SH). *Foundations of Social Theory*. (Sabouri, M, Trans). Tehran: Ney Publishing.
- Delavar Pouraghdam, M. (2010 AD/1389 SH). "Soft Threats and Security Crisis Management." *Pegah HozeH Monthly*. Vol. 11, no. 283, pp. 72-89.
- Ebrahimbai Salami, A. (2007 AD/1386 SH). "Geopolitical Situation and Social Insecurity." *Geopolitical Quarterly*. Vol. 9 no. 3, pp. 22-41.
- Freund, J. (1989 AD/1368 SH) *Max Weber Sociology*. (Nikgozar, A, Trans). Tehran: Raizan Publications.

**Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in  
the Sacred Defense**

96

- Giddens, A. (2013 AD/1392 SH). *Consequences of Modernity*. (Thalathi, M, Trans). Tehran: Markaz Publishing.
- . (2020 AD/1399 SH). *Fundamentals of Sociology*. (Chavoshiyan, H, Trans). Tehran: Ney Publishing.
- Hasani Ahangar, M; Bazmshahi, H. (2009 AD/1388 SH). "Applying soft super-technology strategy." *Basij Strategic Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 13, no. 42, pp. 55-68.
- Hejazi, H. (2008 AD/1387 SH). "The Soft Power Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Countering the Soft Threats of the United States." *Quarterly Journal of the Islamic State Letter*. Vol. 2, no. 26-27, pp. 49-65.
- Janipour, M. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *Application of soft power; An Analysis of the Strategic Aspects of Sacred Defense*. Tehran: Imam Sadegh University Press.
- Keshishian Siraki, G. (2021 AD/1400 SH). "The Impact of Social Capital on National Security during the Holy Defense Era." *Scientific Quarterly of Sacred Defense Studies*. Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 54-73.
- Khomeini, R. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Sahifa Imam, Collection of Imam Khomeini's Works*. Vol. 8, Tehran: Imam Khomeini Publishing House.
- Khoshfar, G. (2008 AD/1387 SH). "The Study of the Mass Media Effect on Adolescents' Social Ethics." <http://mayyar.blogfa.com/post/13>.
- Lal, J. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Media, Art, Culture, Global Approach*. (Nekodoust, M, Trans). Tehran: Iran Publications.
- Mah Pishanian, M. (2009 AD/1388 SH). "Soft Security and the Genesis Face of Media." *Resane Scientific Journal*. Vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 35-51.
- Mansouri Larijani, I. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *Achievements of the Holy Defense and ways to preserve and publish it*. Qom: Khadem al-Reza Publications.
- Molaei Arani, M; Bagheri Kani, M. (2016 AD/1395 SH). "A Study of the Directions Factors of Social Capital in the Period of Holy

Defense." *Journal of Islamic Management*. Vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 58-76.

Moller, Bjorn (2000), *The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction*, n.p. IPRA Secretary General.

Nye, J. (2004 AD/1383 SH). *Soft Power; The tool of success in international politics*, (Rouhani, M and Zolfaghari, M, Trans). Tehran: Imam Sadigh (AS) University Press.

Putnam, R.D. (1995). "Bowling Alone: America's Declining social capital." *journal of Democracy*. Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 65–78.

———. (1996). "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life." *The American Prospect*.  
<http://www.prospect.org/print/v4/13/putnam-r.html>.

Rahmani G. et al. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "Social and Spiritual Capitals of Sacred Defense." *Bi-Quarterly Journal of Sacred Studies and Holy Battles*. Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1-37.

Rahmani Saed, H; Bigdelou, M; Ashouri, Z. (2012 AD/1391 SH). "Components that threaten and stabilize soft security in the orders of the Supreme Leader." *Security Research Quarterly*. Vol. 11, no. 40, pp. 95-117.

Shah H., S.J. (2007 AD/1386 SH). "The Role of Education in Strengthening National Security." *Roshd Analytical Site*.  
[www.roshd.ir/24](http://www.roshd.ir/24).



## Iran's Tactical Deterrence During the Holy Defense

Ibrahim Mottaqi\*<sup>1</sup>, Yaqoub Zohdi<sup>2</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.6.0

1. Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Associate Professor, Department of Security, University of Imam Hossein, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 3 August 2021 - Accepted: 1 September 2021)

### Abstract

Tactical deterrence was one of the main bases of Iran's defense strategy during the war. Iran used mechanisms of tactical action, optimization of human resources, and maximization of instrumental capabilities to counter enemy threats. The formation of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980 indicated that revolutionary countries were more exposed to regional and international conflicts than any other political entity. The present study aimed to analyze tactical deterrence, which has social, tactical, and practical indicators and signs. Iran tried to create the necessary field for optimizing the power equation. The primary basis of Iran's tactical deterrence in the war was: arms purchases, diversification of instrumental power sources, and cooperation with marginal actors.

Therefore, the imposed war process has been a structural reaction by the great powers. Tactical deterrence has been Iran's organized effort to balance power against Iraq's aggression. The coalition of the Western world countries and the great forces to confront Iran was a sign of the world system's efforts to limit Iran's power. Since any structure tends to be balanced, revolutionary governments form imbalances in international politics. The primary question of this study is 'What tactical and practical mechanisms has Iran used in the war against threats?' The hypothesis is that Iran has used deterrent tactical action mechanisms to counter enemy threats and maximize its social role in socializing war. The present study has used the structuralism approach. In the structuralism approach, the imposed war has reflected the agreement of the great powers and regional actors.

**Keywords:** Holy Defense, Tactical Deterrence, Socialized Defense, Strategic Coalition Against Iran.

---

\*. Corresponding author: emottaghi@ut.ac.ir

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

### Introduction

Tactical deterrence was the central basis of Iran's behavioral action in the war. We can analyze and explain the Iraq war against Iran with the structure of the international system, rather than based on social, political, historical, and identity signs. David Singer believes that the choice of "Level of Analysis" is a matter that relates solely to the research method or issue. The second axis of Iran's tactical action in the war was using community-based mechanisms. Constructivism aimed to examine the cause of events such as the Iran-Iraq war in ongoing political, cultural, and identity differences in the historical context. Therefore, they try to link "Crisis Escalation" processes between countries and different perceptual, cultural, and behavioral patterns (Linklater, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 45).

Community-based defense can create a new form of tactical deterrence linked to strength, security, and resilience indicators. Examining the level of analysis in international relations, David Singer says that the micro or macro level of analysis is only related to the research method or theoretical framework, which is often difficult to choose. Most probably, it can be the cause of decisive differences in the discipline in question.

The complexity and importance of these decisions at the level of analysis basis are on the long-standing differences between social psychologists, sociologists, cultural and personality anthropologists. According to the "General Systems Theory," we can discuss different perceptual and analytical formats. In crisis management, the systematic methodology influences rival actors (Singer, 1961 AD/1340 AH: 78).

Simultaneously with the formation of the revolution, its effects and consequences remain in the regional and international spheres. The great powers responsible for explaining the political and structural processes in the global system strive for "Actors Control" and "Incident Control." In addition to previous components, the great powers need severely "Control of Sources." The existence of such necessities leads to the formation of an interventionism process.

The pattern of structural action of the great powers during the imposed war is quite evident. Despite declaring neutrality, they, directly and indirectly, supported Iraq in the war. The implementation of sanctions on Iran was another form of significant power political and strategic support in Iraq. As Iraq and the major powers sought to manage the crisis to gain a comparative advantage over Iran, Iran sought to use the signs of crisis management to delegitimize Iraq and its international support.

### 1. Structural Factors of the Imposed War

Structural factors mean the role of great powers in political and international processes. The part of the great powers in supporting



Iraq in the military invasion of Iran is one of the central and fundamental factors of structural components in the formation of the imposed war. International policy theorists have defined a significant relationship between the structure of the global system and the resulting security relations. They explain the factors of stability, instability, and change in the international system based on configuration.

People like Hadley Bull emphasize the basic rules. In this regard, Hadley Bull believes the structural features of the international system have three principles. First, the lack of superior authority does not mean complete chaos. It means that countries defend their sovereignty based on their nature and desirability. Then, there are many ways in which governments can maintain their existence beyond the will of the prominent actors. Finally, in some international structures, there is more stability and balance than in other formats.

It means that some international structures, such as the bipolar system, are more balanced. Equilibrium is created when the great powers and the main actors have the necessary agreement and coordination to deal with threats. Thus, there is a balance between countries' "Structural Stability" and "Behavioral Equilibrium." In this regard, Hadley Bull knows the bipolar structure more stable and effective than other international structures (Bull, 1977 AD/1356 SH: 29).

Others like Kenneth Waltz endorse such an attitude. The bipolar structure makes a condition that neither of the two great world powers was willing to dominate all spheres of influence. In this situation, create cooperation, agreement, and balance between them. Simultaneously with such signs, naturally the international structure will be more stable and balanced. The main reason for balance and stability is an agreement between the actors.

The main actors in international politics have had the necessary coordination to establish rules, manage the crisis, limit Iran's power, and enhance Iraq's capabilities in the war. They used their structural ability to limit Iran's influence, which is crisis management by transnational actors in front of Iran's strategic power. They want to explain political, regional, and international behaviors based on the rules of each structure (Hall, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 165).

According to Morton Kaplan, the system is considered interconnected variables that include structure, process, actors, nature, stability, and balance. In other words, each of the international systems has six components that interact with each other. On the other hand, the relations between the mentioned components are done regularly and systematically. In this regard, Kaplan's variables interact with each other (Kaplan, 1962 AD/1341 SH: 34).

In a bipolar structure, each of the two powerful actors can create their own "Bloc" as well as their own political and strategic "Polarity."

Polarization means the sphere of influence and actors' authority. The great powers, through their political bloc, can intervene in the regional environment. In a bipolar structure, each actor tries to expand his influence sphere. It means that the strategic boundaries of countries, especially in the periphery, are constantly changing.

According to Morton Kaplan's approach, the great powers in the bipolar structure have more crisis management capability. They can persuade each other, so if centrifugal actors emerge in the international system, there is a basis for a collective reaction. In other words, the two great world powers in a bipolar structure can cooperate or collude through crisis management.

The type of action of the international system influential actors and other regional and international actors is the main factor of balance and environmental control. Holsti emphasizes the crisis management model of the great powers in dealing with high-risk global and security conditions. It is a function of the extent to which the great powers have a vested interest in controlling regional developments. Actors with a more effective structural position will be more impressive in the crisis management approach of the great authorities (Walker, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 791).

In this regard, Holsti says: "The bipolar framework, which forms the totality of the main aspects of power, influence, and patterns of communication and interaction, there was in China, parts of the warrior states period in Europe during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, in the pre-World War I era, and the post-World War II period. This type of system created a military and diplomatic power around the leaders of the two blocs" (Holsti, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 153).

Each structure of the international system considers a particular form of military, defensive, and strategic guidelines. Guidelines influence doctrines. Iran's defensive strategy against Iraq has been a function of social, economic, and international policy necessity; so, the military directive has three political, technical, and military aspects. The political and military leadership organizes the main ideas and beliefs of the military guide regarding the social and political system, economic level, scientific development, equipment, and capabilities of the armed forces and the enemy (Zohdi, 2015 AD/1384 SH: 44).

## **2. The General Reaction of the Iranian Government and Society to the Imposed War**

The main focus of Iran's strategic action during the war was to counter the Iraqi military invasion. Just as military forces play a military role on the front lines, so do diplomats who try to pursue such a pattern through diplomacy. Thus, we can evaluate Iran's behavioral practice during the imposed war based on systemic action. The characteristics of the systemic theory indicated the success in regional battles through

multilateral action. Propaganda, diplomacy, and expansion of Iran's international field of interaction provide a platform for crisis management (Kodi and Gazyurovsky, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 226).

Crisis management has diverse and changeable nature in regional countries such as Iran. In this process, Iran tried to organize various options confronting the threats of the Western world. Each of these options is part of the reality of Iran's strategic behavior to reduce hazards. In other words, each international structure has a specific function and behavioral orientation. In this regard, we can refer to the "Pattern Variables" proposed by Talcott Parsons.

Iran used changing model variables to convince transnational, regional, and international actors. Behavioral functions indicate that 'What are the benefits of bilateral and multilateral cooperation?' In what areas will conflicts arise, and in what process will they be managed and controlled?' The primary purpose of explaining these issues is to describe and analyze the conditions of the international environment (Parsons, 1949 AD/1328 SH: 79).

Iran knew the need for a bipolar structure. Therefore, it made a comprehensive effort to take advantage of the crisis management model based on signs such as "Stimulus" and "Response." The pattern variables of the bipolar structure indicate that the "Effective Stimulus" in the formation of the international event that is organized based on the role and the behavioral pattern of the great powers. At the same time, regional units and forces involved should play a role in the "Reaction Space."

### **2.1. Regionals Coalition-Making of Iran's Against the Imposed War**

Most regional countries during the war supported Saddam Hussein. In the process, a significant portion of the Arab world was Saddam Hussein's leading supporter in the fight against Iran. They tried to provide the grounds for confronting and limiting Iran's revolutionary identity. Iran's geopolitical capability during this period was changing through its influence in the countries of the region.

Iran could influence the conflict process by creating the necessary grounds for secession in the Arab world. Iran's diplomacy to reduce the intensity of the conflict has led to strategic desirability. In the process, Libya and Syria were Iraq's primary opponents in the war against Iran. Iran's diplomatic action was for countering the threats posed by the great powers and the Arab world.

Under these circumstances, Iran wants to pave the way to acquire missile equipment to counter Iraq's missile policy. If Iran were more responsive, faceless offensive restrictions. Iran sought to explain to the Arab countries of the Middle East that Iraq's invasion of Iran was part of the Western "Proxy War" strategy against the revolutionary countries. The evidence used by Iran showed that the Iraqi military offensive against Iran was based on the influence and "Encouragement" of the great powers. Therefore, it provided the

necessary grounds for increasing Syrian and Libyan support for Iran (Cottam, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 67).

International actors in a bipolar structure agree on the "Type of Conflict" and the "Intensity of Conflict." It means that actors are given the tools to enable influential countries to lead the conflict. The direct and indirect support of the great powers in the war is organized based on such signs of approval or conflict. Iran countered this pattern of extraordinary powers by creating divisions and distinctions between actors in pro-Iraq regions (Sick, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 26).

### **2.2. Iran's Low-Intensity Challenge to the Behavioral Patterns of the Great Powers**

One of the behavioral patterns of Iran in front of the supportive policies of the world system influential countries from Iraq is the use of mechanisms related to the lesser challenge. The great powers were Iraq's prominent supporters in the war against Iran. Iran must also limit their interests. In other words, if Iran had used the model of confrontation with the mentioned actors, in those circumstances, it could have created the ground for reducing the support of structural actors against the Iraq violent actions.

In the 1980s, when the war started, the great powers were gradually declining. They faced emerging security bottlenecks. Iran was aware of the difficulties. For this reason, it tried to provide the necessary grounds for confronting their regional interests. Chalmers Johnson and Charles Kopchan argue that interventionist structures generally face security bottlenecks in regional areas due to pervasive interventionism mechanisms. Under such circumstances, they will not implement all their planned goals and achieve the desired result.

Kopchan evaluates the decline of the great powers in an environment where interventions have one-sided nature. According to him, whenever political units distrust their allies, they do all actions individually. This trend has emerged in the post-bipolar structure of American foreign policy. Still, in a situation where the international system had a bipolar configuration, the Americans only intervened militarily and in certain areas of security and strategy (Kopchan, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 347).

### **2.3. Reproduction of the New Balance and Resolution Building**

The settlement of the conflict took place when Iran was ready to face the threats of Iraq. In other words, trying to balance was made possible through strategic power. According to Iran's view, crisis management is Iran's role and mobility in the regional sphere. Simultaneously, Iran's achievement of a regional balance showed its readiness to agree, resolve the conflict, and cooperate with international institutions (Freedman, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 73).

In the context of conflict resolution, the major powers in the bipolar structure reach an implicit agreement on the future of regional security. Naturally, creating a "Balance of Weak" is the goal of these

actors. It means that in any conflict, not the challenging actors are in a state of weakness and control, but the other actors are in equilibrium power. Whenever the main actors are in a state of instability and imbalance, they try to control the influential regional forces through "Regional Conflict" and "Crisis Management."

Balancing the bipolar structure is one of the behavioral patterns of Iran in regional crisis management. Processes of imbalance lead to the spread of war. Therefore, Iran tried to provide the necessary grounds for balancing the bipolar structure through models based on crisis management. Making balance in the framework required the production of power, regional cooperation, and a role in the interests of the great powers. Iran's pattern showed that if it threatened Iran's national interests, it would counter the strategic capabilities of the major forces in the region.

### **3. The Effectiveness of the Islamic Revolution Discourse in the Sacred Defense**

Simultaneously with the Iraq-Iran war, many regional and international actors believed that the "Balance of Power" was shifting toward Iraq and Arab nationalism. During this period, Saddam Hussein acted as a symbol of solidarity with radical Arab identities in the Middle East. Conservative Arab countries were also concerned about the consequences of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Because of this approach, they supported Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran.

The characteristics of Iran's political culture that significantly impacted the Iran-Iraq war have varied, and each has reproduced manifestations of power and resistance. In other words, many indicators of Iranian political culture have been identity-oriented, justice-seeking, and foundation-breaking nature. Therefore, the Iranian revolution created manifestations of international deconstruction against the authority of the dominant international actors and great powers. The Iraq-Iran war reproduced such a process.

#### **3.1. The Role of Normative and Religious-Based Components in the Resistance Discourse**

We can explain the connection between the discourse symbols of the Islamic Revolution and the holy defense in the concept of "Resistance Discourse." Religion and religious components have played a decisive role in the mythology of war. In other words, many of the myths of the Iran-Iraq war have been shaped by cultural, religious, and historical factors. Using the words such as "Karbala Conquest" is one of the main transmission components of spiritual values and indicators in a conflict between the two countries.

Resistance in the sacred defense had religious signs and a comprehensive and endless connection with Iran's political culture teachings. Such terms facilitated the motivation of Iranian youth and citizens to take advantage of religious forms and transfer them to

political and military action. Therefore, the Iran-Iraq war moved the components of social culture that have been purely religious and social nature over the years to the military and strategic spheres.

Diverse cultural symbols have played a decisive role in the sacred defense. Still, some of these components had more practical effects on forming the "Resistance Power" of the Iranian military in the imposed war. In this regard, we can mention the characteristics of the Ashura epic, the myth of Arash Kamangir, ideological martyrdom, hereafterism, and the romantic spirit of Iranian society for resistance and hereafterism. Each of these components is one of the indicators of resistance strength (Nafisi, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 32).

The processes of influencing and role-seeking the revolutionary forces in the sacred defense indicate that religion and cultural-value components have been influential in forming "Constitutive Factors" of the political culture of resistance in Iran. Religion and forms of religious activity in the Islamic Revolution are part of the regulatory rules that have gradually improved and played their role in the developmental regulations related to the sacred defense. Just as constitutive rules are formed based on socio-cultural components, international developments and security incidents link to "Regulatory Rules." Regulatory laws are structural, while developmental practices and elements reflect the culture, value, and thought hidden in societies (Risse, 2000 AD/ 1379 SH: 15).

### **3.2. Populism in the Political Action of Iranian Society**

One of the main features of the Islamic Revolution that left its mark on sacred defense was the populist cultural and social mechanisms. The populism of Iranian society highlights the role of the social world in political action. The resistance in the imposed war indicated that culture-oriented human activity is influential on the rules of the material world and even regulation rules. In this process, the dynamics of political culture can create a new form of human interaction.

Normative populism means the role of the social world in shaping the characteristics and trends of the material world, such as the processes of revolutionary action or resistance in the sacred defense. Social and cultural processes play a unique role in time, place, or some political events. Wendt refers to the social components as "Social Kinds" that depend on human practices, cultural symbols, and value patterns. In such a process, the nature of social consciousness arises, and any political action appears based on signs of social consciousness (Wendt, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 77).

In the resistance of Iranian social forces in the imposed war, there are manifestations of social consciousness in values and religious-historical myths that these components play a decisive role in shaping political and strategic developments. All the evidence and analytical signs of Constructivism emphasize that the "Cartesian Duality" focused on combining object and mind in explaining social and

international events. Words, concepts, myths, and social emotions influence events and create the context for resistance-oriented action in processes like the Iran-Iraq war.

### **3.3. The Obligation-Oriented of Iranian Society in the Process of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense**

Obligation-oriented was one of the hallmarks of Iranian society's political and religious culture, affecting the sacred defense. Simultaneously with the Iranian revolution victory, the norms embedded in Iranian political culture became more diverse. In other words, social components inspired by the Shia political culture in the post-revolutionary period became decisive. In such a process, historical landmarks were linked to political realities, making the ground for Iranian society to react to the great powers and Iraqi military forces in the war.

"Graham Fuller" emphasizes that: "The psychological characteristics of Shia Islam believes that the price of commitment to true faith is suffering and injustice. This suspicion reinforces historical xenophobia. Thus, fear and arrogance towards the outside world have been formed with a serious decision to gain independence and not associate with foreign powers in a world often dominated by destructive foreign forces that have tried to subjugate other troops. Using the traditional Iranian political culture is one of the essential tools necessary for continuing survival" (Fuller, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 11).

How governments interact reflects their value and ideological patterns about the external political and international environment. Increasing the activism motivation among social groups increases the impact of such components on domestic, regional, and international structures. Social identities and norms can be formed and changed through institutionalized relationships. People's desires are related to the degree of their dependence on interaction with the type of person, group, or country. The independence of individuals or actors on the group's perceptions of legitimacy leads to the acceptance of policies and decision-making procedures that have a more appropriate legality or social nature (Moshirzadeh, 2005 AD/ A38A: 354).

## **4. Sacred Defence Discourse**

The Iran-Iraq war linked the perceptual-cultural forms of Iranian society with ideological cues and perpetuated them through the political structure. In this process, it is possible to form the power of resistance based on the signs of political culture. Ideological and ideal components have influenced Iran's opposition to the sacred defense. As a result, such elements existed in Iranian political culture, but with the victory of the Islamic Revolution, it has become more functional and desirable.

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

108

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which played a pivotal role in the holy war and defense, was based on ideological necessities. One of the ideological components that inspired the revolution leaders to organize the revolutionary defense institutions was the Islamic analysis of the international system. Accordingly, the threat will be accurate, endless, and permanent. On the other hand, based on such an approach, the world system reproduces manifestations of the conflict structure. This structure is based on the separation of "Dar al-Islam" and "Dar al-Kufr." Countries in Dar al-Kufr's realm and conflict with Islamic goals and structure is "Dar al-Harb." Therefore, Dar al-Harb is a real issue in the Islamic thought of the Iranian revolution and the Iranian political-historical experiences (Ramezani, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 45).

### 4.1. The Discourse of Self-Reliance and Self-Sufficiency in the Sacred Defense

One of the main features of the sacred defense discourse is self-reliance and self-sufficiency. "Park and Park" believes that if the ideology of belief and ideal system affect all aspects of social life, create a ground for building a self-sufficient trust. The essence of self-sufficiency is a belief system that explains a particular type of life philosophy. The doctrine of self-sufficiency has specific importance in expanding the role of political systems, especially during the defense of territorial and ideal areas (Park and Park, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 148).

Revolutionary ideologies shape self-sufficiency as one of the countries strategic necessities. Self-sufficiency is an organized effort of revolutionary countries to compensate for the lack of technological and instrumental capabilities. The idea of self-sufficiency leads to increasing and enhancing the role of countries in the regional environment. Whenever a country is in the atmosphere of revolutionary action or faces signs of threat, the field is made for promoting the role of the components influencing self-sufficiency.

Self-sufficiency increases the resilience of countries in conflicts and threats. The power of resistance in the imposed war reflects how Iranian society perceptions foreign threats. In regional and international threats situations, increase the motivation for innovative action based on normative and ideological frameworks. In the political atmosphere of the 1980s, "Revolutionary-Identity Signs of Iranian Society" emerged in the face of such threats. If "Identical Framework" is combined with "Structural Symbol" and "Revolutionary Approaches," create the ground for the formation of a situation that makes it possible to deal with threatening forces in an unequal strategic position (Farson and Mashayekhi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 36).

### 4.2. Empowerment in the Sacred Defense Discourse

Iran's primary goal of empowerment is to achieve balance because the balance has the nature of elemental power. In the sacred defense, Iran reached a strategic balance in front of international pressure and the



unwavering support of the world's most powerful nations for Iraq. Saddam Hussein's foremost tool in the war against Iran was the use of material power. Iran needed other signs of national power to balance. The Iraqis used various military and strategic tools to continue the war against Iran and support the great forces.

Iraq had a lot of instrumental power. In such circumstances, Iran must take action against Iraq based on its domestic needs and capabilities. The comparative advantage of Iran during this period was using ideological indicators, national stances, and cultural symbols. These components are the main factor in continuing Iran's resistance against Iraq and the great powers. It was possible based on the use of the infrastructure of Iranian culture and Islamic ideology.

Countering the military aggression of the enemy is a function of strategic and geopolitical necessities. Iran's internal capabilities and structure prepared the possibility of Iraq's temptation and the United States to invade militarily. We can comprehensively examine the impact of each country's internal situation on defense policy. In times of inner turmoil, economic and social problems, the military industry did not have the opportunity to invest and support. The military also faced issues such as the cheap social status and exclusion from the decision-making circle regarding the influence of liberals and Westerners (Zohdi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 131).

Confronting the threats required using latent ideological and social capabilities. Such signs in Islamic-Iranian culture provided grounds for resistance against Iraq and other great powers. Some of the Iranian cultural-ideological characteristics with emotional emotions consider prejudice and the spirit of confronting the sinister forces. Ideological indicators influence some other cultural and behavioral components of Iranians and, in conclusion, are the main factor of resistance during the Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts believe that the war provided the ground for linking religious, ideological, and doctrinal components to nationalist teachings. In this process, Iran spread xenophobia, establish missionaries, and counter Iraq's threats (Esposito, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 79).

#### **4.3. The Development and Discourse of Sacred Defense**

One of the main features of the sacred defense discourse is promoting the country's economic, social, and strategic development. Development in the address of the Islamic Revolution was based on the thought of "We Can." Such an idea emerged during the Islamic Revolution and reproduced during the holy defense. While some Iranian political agents believe in political mechanisms to end the war, some revolutionary forces stressed the need for confrontation and the Ashura approach.

The Ashura approach's central axis should be considered a proposition that later became a discourse of self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and developmentalism. Simultaneously with the beginning

war against Iran, the revolutionary forces stressed the need to develop capabilities. They analyzed any defense and resistance through indigenous mechanisms based on social self-reliance. King and Karsh believe that: "The war with Iraq was a crucial element in the political development of revolutionary Iran. This war has had beneficial results for the Iranian political system. It is known as a flexible symbol of the Iranian revolution. When the Iraqi forces are expelled from the territory of Iran, this force can be considered a symbol of the lasting power of the Iranian revolution"(King and Karsh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 52).

The Iranian revolution was one of the modern political developments in which the social forces reproduced their identity through participation in the war. The eight-year war transformed revolutionary identity into organizational identity. After the war, the ideological framework for dealing with threats did not diminish in the social spirit of Iranians but manifested corporate identity. Therefore, it stabilized Iran's power structure on a larger scale. Iran's political and security orientation changed from a "Conservation-Oriented Strategy" to a "Development-Oriented Strategy" from 1998 onwards (Katzman, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 81).

#### **4.4. Mobilization of Social Forces and Expansion of the Resistance Network**

The infrastructure of the Islamic Revolution of Iran is the use of mechanisms that make possible the necessary grounds for resistance. The social forces of Iran were able to adapt themselves to the necessities of revolutionary action gradually. Iranian political culture considers manifestations of organized effort in the colonial resistance against Iraq. In general, Iranian society's socio-political behavior and activity pattern focus on mass movements to counter the threats.

The Iranian Basijis have played a very influential role in conducting military operations against Iraq, and their political orientation has been focused on countering foreign threats. They organized Basij forces among religious and deep groups in supporting the revolution and countering foreign threats, especially the imposed war. On the other hand, the Basij has characteristics such as emotional action derived from the age conditions and the tragic atmosphere caused by the Iraqi military invasion of Iran.

The slogan of the Basij forces during the Iran-Iraq war was the continuation of the war until victory. On the other hand, they used ideological terms such as the mythology reproduced in connection with the uprising of Imam Hussein and the Karbala incident. Lamentation promoted the emotional soul of these people and prepared them for human-centered military operations during the war. The laments were associated with epic war slogans. The text of requiem presented manifestations of the oppression of Imam Hussein

and was associated with signs of the submissiveness of the Iranian revolution in the sacred defense.

Each Basij force was an ideological symbol of defending the revolution and confronting foreign invading forces. Therefore, they formed the "Karbala Paradigm" as the foundation of their martyrdom. In this way, their participation in the war became discursive-ideological. Then it provided the ground for an action that caused their martyrdom in resisting front of regional and international threats (Farzaneh, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 86).

## **5. Asymmetrical Resistance in the Sacred Defense**

Social forces can resist threats with the proper and effective organization. The forces mobilized in the revolution and based on Islamic thought had the necessary capability to fight asymmetrically against threats. Thus, the Basij created "Asymmetrical Resistance" manifestations in defense against regional and international threatening forces. The formation of the asymmetrical resistance pattern is a reflection of Iran's strategic behavior. In a situation where there is no military and armaments balance between Iran and Iraq, organized social forces play a role solely through inclusive social action and action in the asymmetrical resistance (Global Security.org, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 4).

### **5.1. The Karbala Paradigm in the Discourse of Asymmetrical Resistance**

The Karbala paradigm was one of Iran's main axes' tactical actions during the holy defense. It is based on martyrdom, idealism, and promised-oriented. Iranians considered all of these components in the teachings of tactical action during the war. Any identity action requires a particular form of discourse that was effective in political and strategic conflict. Iraq used the speech of confrontation with Shia and Iranian nationalism to confront their revolution.

The Karbala paradigm is important because it reflects signs of "Socialized Defense" and "Revolutionary Warfare" against the "Structural Threats of the International System." Influenced by religious elements, the Iranian social forces adapted themselves to the necessities of the Islamic Revolution and the holy defense. It shows that the Basij forces in the war have engaged in emotional actions. In parallel with such concepts and formats, they have placed political and ideological discourse manifestations in support of military operations and organizational mobilization.

The Karbala paradigm is one of the central and fundamental features of the sacred defense discourse. The social forces mobilized in the holy defense supported the ideological values of the Iranian political system. This period formed the dominant discourse of the Islamic Revolution within the framework of "Martyrdom and the Myth of Karbala." The lesson of Karbala is an influential factor in

shaping the resistance and the continuation of Iran's defense war. Such forces were the central basis of public confidence in social power to confronting the threats.

The ideological loyalty of the volunteer forces in the war reproduced a process based on the conceptual and discourse formats of the "Karbala Epic" and the "Ashura Myth." They used the term "Sacred Defense" because "Territorial Defense" was crucial. In the process, organized the inner motivation of the sacred defense activists based on signs of the Karbala epic and the myth of Ashura. The love of pilgrimage to Karbala and the expression of devotion to the humility of Imam Hussein in Karbala motivated a wide range of volunteer forces to the defense of Iran.

### **5.2. Linking Territorial and Ideological Concepts in Asymmetrical Resistance**

Tactical deterrence is essential in Iran's defense policy because it used manifestations of the power and tactical action of the community-oriented Iran in the process of sacred defense. The slogan "For the Conquest of Karbala, Forward to the Fronts" was a preference for another saying, "War, War to Victory." So, the central slogan of the Basij when going to war was "To Conquer Karbala, Go to the Fronts."

The actions of the Basij forces were based on ideological teachings, especially the Karbala paradigm, based on a sense of self-sacrifice. In this process, nationalist concepts aimed at preserving territorial integrity were linked to ideological symbols. They caused the protection of the revolution and the political structure of Iran. Ernest Gellner points out that the combination of these two components has played an influential role in maintaining the territorial integrity of Iran. With their religious symbols and religious beliefs, Basij forces could create one of the turning points in Iran's political and military history during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war (Gellner, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 1).

### **Conclusion**

Tactical deterrence was one of the leading indicators of Iran's defense strategy during the holy defense, based on military power, operational action, and social mobilization to defend the structure of the political system during the war. Iran's defense strategy during the imposed war using the mechanisms that existed in Iran's social and cultural construction. The Islamic Revolution of Iran changed the equation of political and social power in the Middle East.

One of the principal pillars of tactical deterrence has been using the "Karbala Paradigm" and the "Ideology-making of Social Groups" in the atmosphere of sacred defense. When the Karbala paradigm was introduced as a motivational and ideological factor in the war, the participation of social groups increased. Based on the discourse

mechanisms of the resistance, Iran could resist the military invasion of Iraq and international pressure.

The ideology of the Islamic Revolution, the Karbala paradigm, and the resistance idea caused the socialization of the war. The Iraq attack on Iran occurred when the revolution had a social and strategic impact on the war. The Karbala paradigm created signs of "Resistance-Oriented Developmental Rules." Simultaneously with the political and strategic role of ideological and value concepts in one geographical area, its effects and consequences in other geographical areas will be significant. In this process, "Value Concepts" acted as "Strategic Indicators" in the war.

The idea of resistance provided the infrastructure for tactical action in the Iranian social space. The socialization of the sacred defense has been Iran's behavioral tactic for continuing to resist threats. In the war, formed a new consciousness based on the discourse of the Islamic Revolution. Concepts emerged that reproduced the speech of resistance. Normative and constructivist realities indicated that meanings and concepts are not independent of time and place. The Karbala paradigm was formed in sacred defense, but its effects have been restored in the geographical areas of neighboring Iran. Iran turned the Karbala paradigm into an "Asymmetrical Defense Strategy."

The Islamic Revolution of Iran has an ideological nature, and the slogan "neither East nor West" is a symbol of its political ideology. Simultaneously with the stabilization of the revolution prepared the ground for the intervention of the great powers in Iran's internal affairs. Along with the great powers, the countries of the region, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia, played a more decisive role in confronting Iran. Iraq was Iran's geopolitical rival, and Saudi Arabia played a different political and ideological role than Iran in the Middle East. Therefore, a regional war against Iran was made with the U.S. leadership, Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries' support, and finally, with the Iraqi agency.

During the war, all political, intellectual, and analytical groups believed that the actions of the Iranian military and paramilitary forces were defensive. They believe that these forces replaced "Classical Defense" with "Popular Defense" and thus supported the necessities of "Justice War" in the sacred defense. In this process, different social groups and various intellectual-analytical collections emphasized the forms of "National Identity." They considered it a combination of the concepts of Iranian political culture with ideological forms. So, national symbols such as "Anthem O! Iran" with the laments of "Sadegh Ahangaran" and "Gholam Kuweitipour" had a joint and complementary function.

One of the critical points of the Shia religion is justice; it is a social issue fulfilled in activism. Of course, a political force that lacks the

## Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense

114

motivation and spirit of activism cannot be the bearer or creator of political justice. In this process, there is an organic relationship between concepts such as "Justice war," "Sacred Defense," and "Political Justice." Political justice had different signs during different periods of the war. In the first phase of the war, when Iraqi military forces occupied Iran's geographical area, justice was seen as an organized action to expel the occupying forces. The second stage was named "Prosecution of the Aggressor" based on the idea of justice.

The different discourse approaches of Iran and the Western world have significantly impacted Iranians' attitudes toward political justice. Iran believed that the international system was unjust, so international politics was also unfair. Therefore, the one-sided global approach must be confronted through the discourse of resistance and its reproduction in regional power and influence. Under such circumstances, the reaction of the great authorities to justice was focused on drastic regional and international change.

### References

- Bull, H. (1977 AD/1356 SH). *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cottam, R. (1988 AD/1367 SH). *Iran and the United States: a Cold War Case Study*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Esposito, J. (2007 AD/1386 SH). *The Iranian Revolution and Its Global Reflection*. (Modir Shanehchi, M, Trans). Tehran: Islamic and Iranian Recognition Center Publications.
- Farson, S; Mashayekhi, M. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Political Culture in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. (Khaleghi, M, Trans). Tehran: Publications of the Center for the Recognition of Islam and Iran.
- Farzaneh, M. (2007 AD/1386 SH). Shi'a Ideology; Iranian Secular, Nationalism and the Iran-Iraq War. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 86-103.
- Freedman, R. (1982 AD/1361 SH). *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East: Since 1970*. New York: Pareger.
- Fuller, G. (1993 AD/1372 SH). *Qibla Alam: Geopolitics of Iran*. (Mokhber, A. Trans). Tehran: Markaz Publishing.
- Gellner, E. (1983 AD/1362 SH). *Nations and Nationalism*. New York: Cornell University Press.

- Hall, S. (1992 AD/1371SH). *The Hard Road to Renewal*. London: Verso.
- Holsti, KG. (1994 AD/1373 SH). *Fundamentals of International Policy Analysis*. (Mostaqimi, M; Taromsari, B, Trans). Tehran: Office of Political and International Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Kaplan, R. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Iranian Influence*. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Katzman, K. (1993 AD/1372 SH). *Iraq Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.
- King R; Karsh, E. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Iran-Iraq War: Political Consequences of Military Analysis*. (Hosseini Damabi, S, Trans). Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research.
- Kodi, N; Gazyurovsky, M. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Neither East nor West*. (Mottaghi, E; Kolaei, E, Trans). Tehran: Islamic Revolutionary Documentation Center Publications.
- Kopchan, Ch. (2004 AD/1383 SH). *The End of the American Age*. Tehran: Cultural Foundation of Western Studies.
- Linklater, A. (1994 AD/1373 SH). *International Relation & Large Scale Historical Change*. London: Rutledge.
- Moshirzadeh, H. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *Evolution in Theories of International Relations*. Tehran: Samt Publications.
- Nafisi, R. (1992 AD/1371 SH). *Education and the Culture of Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. New York: Routledge.
- Park, H; Park, K. (2000 AD/1379 SH). *Ideology and Security, National Security in the Third World*. Tehran: Research Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Parsons, T. (1949 AD/1328 SH). *The Structure of Social Action*. New Jersey: Englewood Gliffs.
- Ramezani, R. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Analytical Framework of Iranian Foreign Policy*. (Tayeb, A, Trans). Tehran: Ney Publishing.

**Investigating the Impact of Social Capital on the Promotion of Soft Power in the Sacred Defense**

- Risse, T. (2000 AD/1379 SH). "Communicative Action in world Politics." *International Organization*. Vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 1-39.
- Sick, G. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *All Fall Down: America's Fateful Encounter with Iran*. London: Tauris.
- Singer, D. (1961 AD/1340 SH). *The Relevance of the Behavioral Science to the Study of International Relation*. New York: Boyce Gibson.
- Walker, M. (1990 AD/1369 SH). "The U.S and Persian Gulf crisis." *World Policy Journal*. Vol. 7, no. 31, pp. 791-799.
- Wendt, A. (1995 AD/1374 SH). "Constructing International Politics." *International Security*. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 71-81.
- Zohdi, Y. (2015 AD/1394 SH). *Defense Policy*. Tehran: Strategic Defense Research Center.



## Israeli Lobbies and Their Influence on the E.U. Foreign Policy

Javad Sharbaf\*

**DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.7.1**

Assistant Professor, Department of West Asian, University of Tehran, Tehran,  
IRAN.

(Received: 20 February, 2021 - Accepted: 14 April, 2021)

### **Abstract**

Israeli lobbies increasingly seek to transform the U.S. and E.U. approaches in the Middle East in favor of Israel's interests. In cooperation with their American counterparts, Israeli lobbyists struggle to strengthen their political presence in the E.U. states to ensure their political aims. This article tries to explore these lobbyists' objectives and activities in recent years across Europe. Findings indicate that they are committed to fighting anti-Semitism in Europe, inhibit the growth of the BDS movement and deviate the peace process in the Middle East from its standard path and toward Israel's interests. They also try to persuade E.U. leaders to take strict measures against Iran and delegitimize Iran and Hezbollah in E.U. institutions and provoke E.U. states to recognize Hezbollah terrorist organization.

**Key Words:** Israel Lobby, European Union, Middle East, Palestine, Zionism

---

\*. Corresponding author: sharbaf@ut.ac.ir

## Introduction

The significance of interest groups in domestic politics in the U.S. and E.U. countries is an undeniable fact. As a kind of interest group, lobbies play a crucial role in shaping the foreign policy of western countries. Among these lobbies, the Israeli ones seek to transform the U.S. and E.U. approaches in the Middle East in favor of Israel's interests. Concerning Israel's geopolitical and political predicament in the region, Israeli lobbies are willing to persuade E.U. countries to concentrate their attentions on the security of West Asia. In cooperation with their American counterparts, Israeli lobbyists struggle to strengthen their political presence in the E.U. states to ensure their political aims.

This article seeks to explore the reasons behind Israelis' efforts to establish Jewish lobbies across Europe. A case study of Israeli lobbies, established by influential Jews in the E.U. countries, is conducted to answer the research question. Data is collected from primary and secondary sources, including lobbies' websites, statements, and publications about their objectives and activities. Throughout the study, we will introduce almost all Israeli entries in Europe to explore how they influence E.U. politics at different levels in favor of Israel's interest.

## 1. Theoretical Framework

Contemporary academic scholars have attempted to explain the lobbying process by introducing various theories. First, there is a simplifying assumption that interest groups are actors whose prime goal is to influence public policy. Valerie Hudson (2014), for example, refers to a list of domestic forces trying to control the foreign policy of a state. Explaining lobbyists' behavior, she argues that the following sources of political and societal power and different groups get involved in influencing policy-making:

- 1) The executive branch of government;
- 2) The legislative branch;
- 3) The judicial branch;
- 4) Political parties, their factions, and wings;
- 5) Businesses and business coalition;
- 6) Political action groups;
- 7) Domestic interest groups;
- 8) The Media;
- 9) Unions;
- 10) Influential individuals such as the foreign minister;
- 11) Epistemic communities;
- 12) Religious groups and 13) Criminal and terrorist forces (Hudson, 2014: 144-145).

Interest groups, like political parties, form a link between the government and the governed in modern states. In contrary to political

parties, interest groups are not concerned with winning the election, but they want to reflect and satisfy the aspiration and values of the people they represent. An interest group is a political organization that aims to influence the policies and actions of the state (Heywood, 2019: 270-272).

As a collection of influential individuals, interest groups impact public policy decisions (Janda, Berry, Goldman, Hula, 2007: 182). Lobbyists are people who advocate for the interests of others against government officials. However, they do not have a good reputation with ordinary people. Journalists often humiliate lobbyists, blaming them for most of the flaws in the political system and insisting that lobbyists always corrupt legislators.

For this reason, even lobbyists do not like to be called lobbyists. Instead, they are interested in being known as "Advocate," "Liaison Officer," "Legislative Director," "Government Affairs Associate," or "Government Relations Specialist." (Holyoke, 2014:160) In another definition, lobbying is described as activities undertaken to influence public authorities decisions and represent an essential part of good democratic life. The participation of outside interests in policy-making corresponds with input and output legitimacy (Nastase & Muurmans, 2020: 238).

Many individuals and organizations try to communicate with lobbies and influential groups to achieve their own political goals. When special interests of influential groups are involved, only the political concerns of wealthy families, large corporations, and various economic and commercial sectors are addressed.

These influential groups focus on congressional committees, ministries, and government agencies through lobbyists, corporate lawyers, and business associations. Lobbyists usually include former elected officials, former political assistants, and advisers to elected officials. These lobbyists are highly paid because of their vast information and extensive connections to politicians and political institutions, which is why they are highly valued by wealthy families and corporations (Domhoff, 2014:7).

Domestic interest groups and policymakers strive to interact with each other in two ways: amplification and persuasion.

On the one hand, policymakers can motivate similar interest groups (allies) to amplify their shared policy goals when communicating with other relevant stakeholders. On the other hand, policymakers may seek out interest groups with opposing views (opponents) to persuade them to transform or soften their position (Lucas, Hanegraaff, De Bruycker, 2019: 408-409).

Moreover, Influential groups can communicate with legislators through precise and pre-determined planning to get them on track. These communication methods are:

**A) Entertainment:** Lobbyists provide the possibility of entertainment for legislators so that legislators feel comfortable and relaxed, and the conditions for recognition and trust-building between the two are provided;

**B) Lobbyists provide a platform for friendship and trust by arranging multiple trips for hunting, fishing, or shooting. But, of course, in the current era, these trips are rare. Therefore, they are not welcomed by lawmakers;**

**C) Gifts:** Lobbyists try to attract legislators to a favorable opinion on a particular issue by giving various gifts. But, of course, some lobbyists try to provide exceptional services to lawmakers instead of giving them as gifts;

**D) Holding Thanksgiving;**

**E) Recommending:** Lobbyists who specialize in a particular field try to influence the legislative process by providing advice and legislators' advice. Of course, if the lobbyists' advice is effective and efficient, there will be a lasting friendship between the lobbyist and the legislator (Rosenthal, 2001: 111-117).

Recent research and polls show that lobbyists use various methods to influence decision-making. These methods include: Face-to-face meetings with legislators; face-to-face meetings with state officials; coalitions with other organizations; assistance in drafting legislation, and; face-to-face meetings with state agencies staff; testimony at Legislative Committee hearings; conversations with the media; use of correspondence; telephone calls and e-mails to communicate with legislators; registration of written comments on the proposed laws and regulations; assistance in drafting regulations and instructions; informal communication with state legislators; publication of press releases; informal communication with officials of executive agencies after being informed of the laws and regulations being passed; personal meeting with the governor; writing newspaper editorials; serving on advisory committees; testifying at executive agency hearings; fighting for or against a "Request to change state law" or a referendum; participation in legislative discussions; to "Benefit" legislators and support them; holding press conferences; using correspondence, telephoning and sending e-mails to communicate with executive agency officials; appearing on radio programs; requesting legislation; appearing on television; suing; advertising in the mass media; giving gifts to legislators and; participating in appearances and protests (Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009: 435-436).

It is worth noting that strategies used by E.U. lobbies in the foreign policy arena do not significantly differ from those implemented by interest groups in E.U. domestic affairs. Contrary to the theory of "Two-Level Games," interest groups lobby both the E.U. institutions and member states. For example, the Council's reputation as 'the least accessible' E.U. institution extends to E.U. foreign policy too.

Primarily Brussels-based lobbies negotiate the Council and its thematic or geographic working groups and committees. In the absence of institutionalized mechanisms for consultations, lobbying the Council needs to establish relationships of trust with diplomats from E.U. member states' Permanent Representations in Brussels (Shapovalova, 2020: 428-429).

## **2. Lobbyism in E.U.**

The function of its political system to assess the mechanism of lobbies in the E.U. needs to be understood. According to political science theories, the governance of the European Union is based on a multi-level system. E.U. has seven official institutions, which can be categorized by their executive, legislative, judicial, and financial functions, including:

**A)** The European Council is a group of E.U. leaders, including the president or prime minister of every member-state. It sets the union's primary direction and deals with urgent high-level questions. Its members elect a president, who can serve up to two-and-a-half-year terms;

**B)** The European Commission is the chief executive institution and legal guardian of treaties. It suggests laws, manages the budget, implements decisions, issues regulations, and represents the E.U. worldwide at summits, negotiations, and international organizations. The European Council chooses the members of the commission, and the European Parliament approves them. The commission, particularly, considers interest groups to legitimize their involvement in decision-making processes as a potential link between European officials and the citizens. The Commission is sharply criticized for its democratic character, having looked for 'civil society organizations to advocate it through their participation or their consultation in decision-making processes and the enforcement of the various regulations, therefore, seeking to establish input legitimacy (Saurugger, 2010: 475);

**C)** The European Parliament is the only E.U. institution whose members are elected directly and are representatives apportioned by each member state's population. However, it is not allowed to propose legislation, but laws can't pass without its approval. It also negotiates and approves the E.U. budget and oversees the commission. Lobbies give legislators credible selective information on the anticipated effects of a policy, enabling organized interest groups to transform legislators' preferred policy options (Marshall, 2012: 1379). The legislative role of the E.P. has been increased and massively expanded lobby activity in Brussels between 1994 and 2005 and provided legitimacy for European integration. It has also put intense pressure on

the openness and transparency of E.U. policy-making, the creation of rules, and regulation of interest representation (King, 2016: 41);

**D)** The Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers, is another branch whose approval is also necessary for legislation to pass. This Council consists of the government ministers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, and so on) from all E.U. members. It has the authority to approve or reject the commission's proposals after consulting with the European Parliament;

**E)** The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the E.U.'s highest judicial institution, interpreting E.U. laws and founding treaties, resolving disputes, and ultimately creating new law;

**F)** The European Court of Auditors (ECA) examines whether the E.U. budget is appropriately spent. It also reports any fraud to the European Parliament, the E.U. Commission, and national governments;

**G)** The European Central Bank (ECB) manages the Euro for the nineteen countries that use the currency and carries out the E.U.'s monetary instruction (Jordan, 2001:195) (McBride, 2020).

Neil Nugent (2010) describes Brussels as the city of most lobbies. In his opinion, it is not possible to count accurately appointed lobbyists in Brussels, not because many of them engage in this activity, but because they do not look at it as a full-time job. Indeed, lobbyists work as lawyers, accountants, and people in business, and in part, those who are full-time lobbyists prefer to introduce themselves as consultants or policy experts (Nugent, 2010: 245).

Nevertheless, it is estimated that most lobbyists working in Brussels represent the interests of corporations and their lobby groups (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2020).

Three categories of lobby organizations are recognized in the E.U.: 1) European trade association; 2) Companies; 3) NGOs (non-governmental organizations) (Guéguen, 2020:100-101). Lobbies in the E.U. are interested in dealing with various subjects, including Green, Medicines, Energy, Farm, Digital Industries, and so on (Integrity Watch-commission Meetings, 2020).

The first non-governmental lobbying activity in the European Union was conducted by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). In April 1983, 17 leading European business leaders decided to launch ERT. They were then united by an argument that European cooperation between industry, policymakers, and all stakeholders is necessary to strengthen Europe's place in the world (About ERT, 2020).

Lobbying is a billion-euro industry in Brussels. According to Corporate Europe Observatory, a watchdog campaigning for greater transparency, there are at least 30,000 lobbyists in Brussels, nearly matching the 31,000 staff employed by the European Commission and making it second only to the U.S. By some estimates, they influence

75% of legislation. Generally, lobbyists give politicians information and arguments during the decision-making process (Tranor, 2014).

To increase the transparency in E.U. politics, the European Commission launched a project entitled "European Transparency" on November 9, 2005. This plan requires all natural and legal persons who intend to provide advice to the legislative and executive bodies of the European Union to register their activities legally (Eising, 2010:195).

Besides, there are approximately 2,500 lobbying organizations in Brussels, which are arranged in various groups such as industry associations, NGOs/interest groups, and regional representations (King, 2016: 2).

In this regard, the European Parliament approved strict rules and urged the commission to make the E.U.'s lobby register mandatory by 2017. These rules include:

- A) Restricting access to Parliament buildings for non-registered organizations;
- B) Asking MEPs to get lobbyists with whom they meet to sign up to the register;
- C) Providing information for registered lobbyists, allowing them to co-host events in parliament more efficiently and to participate in public hearings;
- D) Limiting the parliament's representation at events hosted by non-registered organizations (Cerulus, 2014).

Moreover, the European Parliament voted on January 31, 2019, demanding MEPs to publish their meetings with lobbyists and took this measure to ensure transparency in the E.U. parliament (Pearson, 2019).

All states would exploit from lobbying, mainly because they have no formal access and no formal power in the consultative phase of the Commission and the European Parliament. States with effective administrations that can rapidly produce national positions, which is necessary for getting active in lobbying in the first place, and states that have been in the E.U. for a long time, are lobbying E.U. institutional actors most often. Size matters, as well as large states, tend to lobby E.U. actors more often in general. However, this does not offer extensive conditions in lobbying the commission because of a neutrality norm in the commission's bureaucracy (Panke, 2012: 145).

Generally, non-state actors use national and E.U. channels to lobby in favor of their clients. Figure 1 below illustrates the level of their lobbying (Voltolini, 2013: 58):



Figure 1

E.U. Level
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- E.U. Commission</li> <li>- European External Action Service (EEAS)</li> <li>- European Court of Justice (ECJ)</li> <li>- E.U. Delegations</li> </ul>
National Level
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capitals of member states (government, parliament, national courts)</li> <li>- Council in its different formations</li> <li>- Permanent Representations</li> <li>- Embassies on the ground</li> </ul>

To pass a law, lawmakers and lobbyists need to find multiple sets of compromises: between conservatives and progressives; between north and south; between East and West; between big and small member states (Teffer, 2019).

It is astonishing that spent over €2 billion (\$2.3 billion) on lobbying the E.U. from the beginning of January 2017 through September 2018, primarily by entities located within the European Union. In the same period, spent €4.7 billion on lobbying legislators in Washington (Antypas, 2018). For instance, U.S. companies spent vast amounts of money to lobby the European Union and impact decisions (Figure 2) (Drozdiak, 2016).

Figure 2



### 3. Israeli Lobbies in Europe

In recent decades, the right-wing pro-Israel lobby groups have established a strong presence in European Union to protect Israel's national interest in Brussels and deflect severe criticism of Israel's treatment of Palestinians. In addition, Israeli interest groups in the E.U. demonstrate Islamophobia tendencies and support Israel's settlement industry. Yet, contrary to Israeli lobbies in the U.S., the Israel lobbies in the E.U. have not come under scrutiny. So, it is even



though they have increased their influence in E.U. politics over the past decades. These lobbies have launched a campaign against Palestinian causes, have sought to trivialize severe accusations of human rights abuses, and have ultimately tried to create a circle of friends in the E.U.'s policy-making loops (MacDonald, 2016).

Furthermore, Pro-Israel lobbies in the E.U. are less potent in decision-making than their counterparts in Washington because European Jews are less concentrated in Europe's economic, cultural, and political life. Therefore, they have been less well-organized and resourced. Additionally, decision-making is highly complicated in the E.U., and lobbying is a very daunting task in Brussels. Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that Israeli lobbies don't have any impact on E.U. decision-making (Burc Yildiz, 2014: 4).

It needs to be emphasized that Christian Zionists who lobby in European countries, especially in Brussels, are distinctive from the US-style Christian Zionist lobbying, often depicted as confrontational sophisticated (King, 2016: 11).

Meanwhile, as a Jewish scholar, Norman Finkelstein strongly criticizes Israel and does not believe that anti-Zionism is equal to anti-Semitism. On the contrary, it argues not only that the new anti-Semitism is non-existent but that the myth of the Holocaust provides a pretext for Israel to extort money from Europeans (Finkelstein, 2003: 33-38).

Israel uses lobbies as moral weapons to silence academic opponents. For instance, Israeli lobbies in Europe have sought to accuse Finkelstein of anti-Semitism. In this regard, Neoconservative and Zionist pressure groups, such as Honestly Concerned, advocate Israeli policies and defames critics of Israel as anti-Semites. BAK Shalom<sup>1</sup> was among the lobbies that tried to cancel Finkelstein's two planned lectures in Munich (Fathollahnejad, 2010).

Yet, despite Israeli lobbies' engagement in political activities to pursue the country's interests, it seems that European intellectuals and partly governments have recently made attempts to adopt an independent foreign policy toward Palestine and the Middle East. Nevertheless, there are numerous lobbies in Europe and the E.U. protecting Israel's national interests in this continent. It is noteworthy that the pro-Israel lobbies in the E.U. operate in a particular secular environment (King, 2016: 82).

#### **4. European Friends of Israel (EFI)**

Established in 2006, EFI is fronted by Michel Gourary and is now the most prominent organization of its kind in Europe, gathering nearly

---

1 . A Pro-Zionist Group Within the Left-Wing Youth Movement Links Jug End Solid, also With Close Ties to the Left Party in Germany.

1500 Parliamentarians and Policy Makers who are Friends of Israel, from the European Parliament and the 27 National Parliaments of the European Union. Michel Gourlay, Executive Director of EFI, was a UEJB (Union of Jewish students in Belgium) Board and Treasurer of the Belgian Federation of the Jewish Youth. Later, he began his professional career for 22 years as a project manager and specialist in municipal and community services development in France, Belgium, and Israel, focusing on developing and implementing different municipal and community services (EFI, 2017). The EFI was founded by Stuart Polak, the director of Conservatives Friends of Israel (CFI) between 1989 and 2015, along with Marc Cogen, a Belgian academic, and Jean-Pierre Haber. It was officially founded as a nonprofit organization. In recent years, Israeli diplomats cooperate with EFI to develop relations between Israel and the E.U. (Cronin, Marusek, Miller, 2016: 14-15).

Polak has spent 25 years as head of the CFI; the organization attracted 80 percent of Tory MPs. Since 2004, CFI has granted £377,994 to British Conservative Party to fund the trips to Israel for M.P.s fully. Robert Hayward, a Conservative peer and pollster, has acknowledged Conservative Friends of Israel was a "Very Influential Group" within Tory (Pickard & Wright, 2017).

Moreover, Polak has arranged the meetings between Priti Patel, Secretary of State for International Development (2016-2017), and Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (McElroy, 2017). As an indication of full support for Israel, he made a serious allegation against the United Nations because it is "Singling out Israel with Nauseating Frequency." (Harpin, 2020) In February 2011, 450 participants from 37 European countries arrived for its three-day policy conference at the Jerusalem International Convention Center (Binyenei Ha'uma). Michel Gourary declared in 2011 that most of the group's donors are from Western Europe, including "Businessmen and Women from the U.K., Greece, Spain, Italy, and Germany." He also stated EFI has "nonpartisan representations from all over Europe including Liberals, Social Democrats even the Green Party" (Stern SHEFLER, 2011). Such political relations demonstrate that EFI wants a strong alliance between E.U. countries and Israel (Voltolini, 2013: 123). In addition, the EFI coordinates its activities with Israeli Representation in Brussels, which lobby MEPs to persuade them to support the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA). As a liaising actor, the EFI has sought to guarantee the MEPs accommodate Israel's view on the ACAA. Furthermore, the EFI, as a media, publishes short articles on its website in support of the ACAA (Voltolini, 2013: 201).

EFI's mission is to make a strong connection between Israel and European countries. Its three main goals include creation of an environment to enhance Israel's political and commercial interests,

unification of all Israel Friendship Groups existing in the Parliaments of the E.U.'s 27 member states, provision of decision-makers and those who influence public opinion with well-researched and balanced information about the historical and geopolitical realities of the Middle East (EFI Policy Conference, 2020).

The organization has set up headquarters in Finland and maintains offices in Spain, Germany, and Belgium (Sheffield, 2009). It aims to become an AIPAC-type pro-Israel lobby in Europe (Eichner, 2006).

Meanwhile, its strategy is designed to concentrate on European decision-makers while intestinally "Ignoring the E.U.'s Complex Decision-Making Structure." The EFI has used its powerful tools to spark public debate and put general issues of EU-Israel ties such as foreign policy, Jewish culture, and Israel-Palestine conflict on the agenda (Gobel, 2016: 24).

The Steering Committee of EFI includes all the chairmen of the leading parliamentarian associations across Europe. In addition, The Steering Committee of EFI includes all the chairmen of the leading parliamentarian associations across Europe. The Members of the Political Board of EFI come from different political and geographical backgrounds. For instance, Helga Trüpel MEP (Germany | Greens)<sup>2</sup>, has declared: "I am a friend of Israel because after the crimes committed by Nazi Germany, I feel that the existence and security of the state of Israel is my political responsibility. I support a two-state solution, with a democratic Palestinian and a democratic Jewish state of Israel serving as the basis for peace in the Middle East". Moreover, Alejo Vidal-Quadras MEP (Spain EPP), Vice President of the European Parliament, has said: "As part of my work with the European Friends of Israel group inside the European Parliament, I recently had the pleasure of hosting a conference on Iran, the bomb and its implications not just for Israel, but also for the European Union" (Siwec, 2014). The political board of EFI is summarized in the following figure (EFI Political Board, 2007):

**Figure 3**

Name	Marek Siwec	Frederique Ries	Alejo Vidal	Helga Tripel	Hannu Takkula	Bastiaan Belder
Affiliation	Group of Progressive Alliance of Socialist and Democrats in the European Parliament	Group of Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrat)	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
Country	Poland	Belgium	Spain	Germany	Finland	Netherlands
Position	Chairman	Vice-Chairman				

2. The Vice-Chair of the European Parliament's Education and Culture Committee.

The EFI has endeavored to establish strong ties with the Israeli government and parliament. For example, EFI launched the European Forum of the Knesset, a coalition led by M.K. Yohanan Plesner (Kadima), with the blessing of Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin (Likud). In addition, the its lobby forged a political alliance with the Israel Allies Caucus Foundation, the Knesset's Christian Allies Caucus (Sheffield, 2009).

As previously mentioned, the EFI is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to endorse M.P.s and MEPs who have sympathy for Israel. However, the EFI does not advocate electoral campaigns because the structure of the E.U. is very different from AIPAC. Instead, it mostly invites parliamentarians for dinner and organizes trips to the regions to provide them with policy briefs (Voltolini, 2013: 111-112).

### **5. Friends of Israel Initiative (FOII)**

José María Aznar, former Spanish Prime Minister, took the initiative in a high-level group meeting in Paris in the middle of 2010 to launch a new project to protect Israel's interest. In close cooperation with leading figures such as David Trimble, Marcello Pera, John Howard, John Bolton, and Andrew Roberts, Aznar formed this group to fight against the increasing effort to delegitimize Israel (About Friends of Israel Initiative, 2020). Furthermore, one of its key aims is to counter the growing efforts of bodies like BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions). To gain its security and political objectives, FOII has endorsed a new High-Level Home Front Group (HLHFG), made up of top intelligence, counter-terrorism, and police officials from the U.S., UK, Spain, Netherlands, Australia, Italy, and Colombia (Teller, The Friends of Israel Initiative, 2018). It is weird to see support for Israel in Spain, where history has not been particularly friendly to Jews, and even it hosted massive public rallies in support of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, Aznar has admitted that "The Majority of Spanish are Extremely Critical of Israel." Although he knew that support for Israel is not a good political move in the country, he insisted that his organization would solicit the membership of non-Jews. With great regularity, its members care deeply for living in Israel. In the words of Aznar, the understanding of the Jews and Judeo-Christian values is essential to understand the history of the Western world and Europe (Smith, 2010).

Not surprisingly, the Middle East Forum, a think-tank founded by political activist Daniel Pipes, also had a crucial role in establishing FOII. James Zogby, Arab American Institute, depicted Pipes as "Obsessive Hatred of all Things Muslim." (MacDonald, 2016) John Baird, former Canadian Foreign Minister, is now the executive for the mission (O'Leary, 2020). The founders have mentioned three goals of

FOII: 1) To open a space in the public arena to talk about Israel; 2) to influence pro-Israel political leaders; and 3) to help all friends of Israel, primarily in Europe but also elsewhere (About Friends of Israel Initiative, 2020).

In July 2010, the British House of Commons launched FOII. Henry Jackson Society, a Neoconservative think-tank, supervised by Robert Halfon, a Tory MP, hosted the event. At that time, Halfon was a political director of Conservative Friends of Israel. Aznar, Marcello Pera as well as Roberts participated in the meeting. Jewish Chronicle has reported that Dore Gold<sup>3</sup> strongly endorsed the establishment of FOII (Cronin, Marusek, & Miller, 2016:17). FOII does many activities, including publishing "Working Papers" and "Dispatches and Alerts." It also organizes meetings and promotes op-eds written by its members. FOII sets up its headquarters in Madrid, Spain. The organization had over \$1.5 million in total revenues in 2012 in the United States alone. The main concerns of FOII are "Radical Islamism" and "Iran." (Militarist Monitor, 2014)

Unsurprisingly, the FOII has gained a little good and widespread publicity (Teller, The Friends of Israel initiative, 2018).

The source of FOII's funding is not revealed; however, Robert Agostinelli, its billionaire founder member, finances the group. Agostinelli amassed a vast fortune working in Mergers and Acquisitions in London in the 1980s and is currently Managing Director of private equity firm the Rhone Group. Agostinelli bankrolled the Presidential campaigns of John McCain and Rudy Giuliani and commended Silvio Berlusconi and Nicolas Sarkozy (Mills, 2010).

One of FOII's strategies is to show Hezbollah as the most dangerous threat to Europe's security. In this regard, it claims the Iranian-funded Lebanese organization has targeted Europeans for decades: from the 1983 bombing of French barracks in Beirut, killing 55, to a 1985 hijacking of an Athens-to-Rome jet, to more than a dozen bombings in Paris in 1985 and 1986 that killed 13 people. Moreover, FOII had a vital role in designing the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization by The Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2013).

## 6. AJC Transatlantic Institute (TAI)

The AJC Transatlantic Institute (TAI) was established in 2004 and set up its headquarters in Brussels. AJC seeks to reinforce the transatlantic bond and EU-Israel ties by engaging E.U. and NATO officials and diplomatic missions, journalists, think-tanks, and civil

---

3. An American born Israeli who is the Israeli Government Advisor and Heads the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He Was Formerly an Adviser to Ariel Sharon and is Currently an Advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

society leaders. According to its website, AJC's mission is to create an environment in which Europe, Israel, and the U.S. cooperate to fight terrorism, extremism, and anti-Semitism. Across Europe, it has several offices located in Berlin, Paris, and Rome. Currently, David Harris and Harriet Schleifer work as AJC chief executive and president, respectively (AJC, 2020). It was a diplomatic initiative of the American Jewish Community to open AJC's office in Brussels (Harris, 2004). Once E.U. membership increased from 15 to 28, AJC strongly supported the process.

Moreover, the institute engages politicians across the political spectrum in all three major European institutions-the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament-to achieve its goals (CISION PR Newswire, 2014). As a pro-Zionism group, it severely criticizes E.U. politicians who question the legitimacy of Israel. For instance, as Mick Wallace, a member from Ireland, described Zionism as a "Colonialist Project," it urged Wallace to withdraw his words (Abunimah, 2020).

TAI has sought to depict Iran and Hezbollah as severe threats to European nations, exaggerating the relations between the two as relationships between father and son. To provoke European states, especially France, it also accuses Hezbollah of establishing a totalitarian government in Lebanon. Shia clergy, who have ties with Iran, will dominate politics and society (AJC Central Europe Office, 2020). Regarding Iran, it warns Europeans that Iran will undoubtedly purchase Chinese and Russian advanced weapons not only to modernize its forces but to equip its proxies across the Middle East (Leemhuis, 2020).

### **7. European Foundation for Democracy (EFD)**

European Foundation for Democracy is described as a group strongly connected, "Both organizationally and through their funders, to the right-wing pro-Israel movement in the United States" (MacDonald, 2016). The European Foundation for Democracy is a policy institute that works with civil society, academics, government, and other stakeholders to prevent radicalization. Its members, based in France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, the U.K., and Ireland, continue to cooperate with the European Commission's Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) and co-chairs its Communication and Narratives (C&N) to counter extremism (The European Foundation for Democracy, 2020). The lobbying cost of EFD was 50, 000€ - 99, 999€ in the financial year between January 1, 2018, and December 1, 2018 (LobbyFacts, European Foundation for Democracy (EFD), 2020). The total budget of EFD is roughly 442, 974 €. Moreover, EFD receives money from various public and private sources, including foundations, individual philanthropists, and organizations (Europa, 2020). Furthermore, research indicated in 2009 that the Foundation for the Defense of



Democracy (FDD) provided a direct grant of \$478, 829 to EFD (Mondialisation, 2016). Not only Roberta Bonazzi, the EFD's current director, but several other members of its staff have direct ties with the Israel lobby in Washington (Cronin, Marusek, Miller, 2016: 38).

EFD is a think-tank closely linked with Neoconservative and Islamophobic activists (Cronin, Marusek, & Miller, 2016: 37). EFD has also forged strong alliances with like-minded individuals and organizations throughout the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and North America (EURACTIV, 2020).

Roberta Bonazzi, a political scientist, established EFD in 2005. The connection between EFD, based in Brussels, and Washington D.C.-based FDD, as a notorious Israel lobby, demonstrates that EFD is undoubtedly linked to Israel's advocacy groups. A sign of ties between EFD and Israel is the statement made by Valentina Colombo, EFD senior fellow, who argues that the "Muslim Brotherhood is Connected to Terrorist Organizations." (Bridge Initiative Team, 2019)

The EFD has adopted policies endorsed by Israel. Its experts have, for instance, proposed a ban on television channels tied to Hamas and Hezbollah. They argue that the E.U. should place both the political and military wings of Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations. EFD has also hosted events to mobilize for stricter action against Iran over its nuclear program (Cronin, Marusek, Miller, 2016: 38).

EFD has wrongly portrayed Hamas's ideology as belonging to a terrorist organization like ISIS and al-Qaida (European Foundation for Democracy, 2014). Concerning Hezbollah, EFD complains that E.U. is reluctant to place Hezbollah on the terrorist list due to security reasons, including Hezbollah's capability to launch a terrorist attack in E.U. countries (European Foundation for Democracy, a, 2013).

## **8. European Leadership Network (ELN)**

The European Leadership Network (ELN) is a so-called independent, non-partisan, pan-European network of nearly 300 past, present, and future European leaders focusing on European foreign, defense, and security issues practical solutions in the real world for political and security challenges. It was founded in 2011, and its headquarters set up in London. ELN seeks to create better security across Europe through its research, publications, events, practical policy advocacy, media reach, and high-level networks (European Leadership Network, 2020).

Several organizations fund ELN, including John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ploughshares Fund, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT), Polden-Puckham Charitable Foundation (PPCF), The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, German Federal Foreign Office, The U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Ministry for

Foreign Affairs of Finland and U.S. Russia Foundation (European Leadership Network, 2020).

Moreover, ELN received \$1, 579, 600 between 2018 and 2020, including four grants in Nuclear Challenge (European Leadership Network, 2020). In addition, there are close and strong ties between ELN and Israel organizations in the U.S. (MacDonald, 2016).

### **9. European Leadership Network (ELNET)**

According to shared values and mutual interests, the European Leadership Network (ELNET) was established to gather European and Israeli policymakers. ELNET carries out a range of programs, including delegations, dialogues, conferences, and roundtables, to strengthen political advocates of the Europe-Israel relationship (ELNET, About, 2020).

Since the beginning of the second intifada, ELNET has been seeking to counter widespread criticism of Israel in European countries (Guttman, 2008). American Larry J. Hochberg and Israeli Raanan Eliaz founded ELNET in 2007 (Cronin, Marusek, Miller, 2016: 40).

Larry J. Hochberg is a nationally famous leader who recently served as national chairman of the Friends of the Israel Defense Forces. In addition, Larry was a national director of AIPAC and occupied leadership positions with UJC and UJA. He is an international expert on Israel advocacy and is a significant contributor to many organizations that endorse Israel (JFNLA, 2020).

ELNET has set up a network of offices in France, Germany, Poland, Brussels (EU/NATO), and Israel and activities in the U.K., Italy, and Spain (IsraelGives, 2020).

Several government institutions, international organizations, and research institutes in Israel and Europe cooperate with ELNET, including IDC Herzlia, WARSAW Security Forum, Institute for National Security Studies, Hudson Institute, International Institute Counter-Terrorism, and so on (ELNET, About, 2020).

U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman, US Senator Mark Kirk, Former U.S. Congresswoman Shelley Berkley, Former U.S. Congressman Howard Berman, Former U.S. Senator Norm Coleman, and Former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Elliot Abrams are Advisory Board Members of ELNET (ELNET, Leadership and Staff, 2020).

In recent years, ELNET has collaborated with NATO by organizing a dinner roundtable on the topic "New Dynamics in the Middle East," featuring Gideon Saar, former Israeli Interior Minister (ELNET, Leadership Briefing, 2017).

Friends of ELNET (FELNET) consists of various institutes to fund ELNET. These institutes donated ELNET thousands of dollars from 2009 to 2013. For instance, the Middle East Forum gave FELNET \$10000 in 2013 (Conservative Transparency, 2020).



Moreover, the total revenue of FELET was \$4, 100, 756 in 2016 and \$4, 543, 253 in 2017 (Nonprofit Explorer, 2018).

FELNT warmly embraced the Deal of Century proposed by the Trump administration. It asserted the plan would be a golden opportunity for European nations to stabilize the Israeli-Palestinian scene. Having good relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, according to FELNET, enables the E.U. to persuade both sides to enter into a constructive peace process (ELNET Briefing, 2020).

It has been seeking to isolate Hezbollah politically and financially to convince all European countries to designate the entirety of Hezbollah as a terrorist entity. To achieve its goal, FELNET argues the political and military wings of Hezbollah reinforce each other, and therefore, Europeans do not have to distinguish between these two branches (FELNET, 2020).

### **10. European Coalition for Israel (ECI)**

As a Christian Zionist alliance, European Coalition for Israel (ECI) is willing to demonstrate its solidarity with Israel (ECI brochure - who we are, 2020).

ECI is a joint initiative by major international Christian pro-Israel institutes across Europe to meet challenges posed by growing anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the continent. ECI was formally launched in March 2003 in Brussels by Finnish journalist Tomas Sandell, though the partner organizations have worked together to form the network for several years. ECI informs members of the European Parliament and other political leaders in Brussels and other European capitals about the complex realities of the conflict in the Middle East by acknowledging the existence and legitimacy of Israel. In addition, ECI publishes issue briefs and other documentation on Israel, Europe, and the Middle East to achieve this goal. ECI also holds regular conferences and seminars in Brussels and other E.U. capitals to promote closer relations and understanding between Israel and the European Union (Press Club Brussels Europe, 2020).

The organization's first initiative, Churches against Anti-Semitism, will educate, empower, and mobilize churches and faith communities to counter anti-Semitism and support Jewish life worldwide (Oliere, 2020). The cost of its lobbying is roughly estimated to be 50, 000€ - 99, 999€ in the 2019 financial year (LobbyFacts, European Coalition for Israel (ECI), 2020). In 2012, ECI had a budget of €330, 000 (Cronin, Marusek, & Miller, 2016: 40).

ECI co-hosts with the European Jewish Congress (EJC) the annual Holocaust Remembrance Day to direct E.U. policy towards a pro-Israel path. By offensive lobbying, it concentrates most of the time on issues concerning the peace process. For instance, it has launched San Remo Initiative, a campaign taken to E.U. institutions, E.U. capitals, Japan, and the U.N., to convince the policymakers that the division of

Jerusalem is an illegal action regarding international law (King, 2016: 84-85).

Tomas Sandell, the founding director of ECI, has endorsed the Jewish state for almost two decades. He speaks at the European Parliament, repeatedly travels to the United Nations, and has spoken at several national legislatures worldwide (Glatt, 2017).

Tomas Sandell firmly believes that the E.U. has to condition financial assistance to Palestinian Authority to respect the Oslo Accords and accept the Jewish state. He has the firmly-held belief that “The E.U., as the Single largest Financial Contributor to the Palestinian Authority, can play a central role in promoting positive values that would undergird peace and understanding in the region” (European Coalition for Israel, 2020).

Regarding Israel itself, Sandell sharply criticized some E.U. states, especially Germany, because they are not interested in moving their embassies to Jerusalem. Nevertheless, he claims that most central and eastern European countries are inclined to move their embassies to Jerusalem (Weinthal, 2018).

### **11. Europe Israel Press Association**

Europe Israel Press Association (EIPA) is an organization in Europe to provide accurate information, briefings, and first-hand media trips about Israel and the Middle East. Its headquarters is located in Brussels, with offices based in Paris, Berlin, Rome, London, and Israel. EIPA aims to create positive media coverage about Israel in Europe (EIPA, 2020). EIPA was established by Yossi Lempkowicz (Free Speech on Israel, 2016).

It organizes the briefing for Israeli scholars to express their views about Israel-Europe relations. For instance, Eran Lerman, Vice President of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), talked to journalists in Zoom briefing planed by EIPA. He said, “Europe today to give up on opportunities to cooperate with Israel science in the context of Horizon 2020-2027 would harm first and foremost European interests” (Lempkowicz, 2020).

Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM) in London has provided some materials for EIPA to publish (Cronin, Marusek, Miller, 2016: 36).

It also supports journalists, editors-in-chief, reporters, bloggers, and opinion-makers to gain greater insight and knowledge concerning Israel. Its website produces material in English, French, and Russian to reach a wider audience across Europe. EIPA has forged a partnership with the European Jewish Association (EJA), a Brussels-based umbrella group active in various European domains including media, Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael-Jewish National Fund (KKL-JNF), the leading environmental organization in Israel, the World Forum of Russian-speaking Jewry (WFRJ), an organization representing

millions of Russian-speaking Jews in support of Israel, and "Face of Israel," an independent body active in public diplomacy (European Jewish Press, 2014).

### **12. Israel Allies Foundation**

The Israel Allies Foundation (IAF) collaborates with the U.S. Congress and parliaments worldwide to mobilize pro-Israeli politicians to persuade states worldwide to recognize Israel and Jerusalem as its capital (IAF, 2020). Pioneered by M.K. Rabbi Binyamin Elon in 2004, IAF received \$100, 000 from the Israeli government in 2019. It has also published the first annual list of the top 50 Christian leaders who have endorsed the Jewish State (Miami Meditation Center, 2020).

It works as an organization that coordinates 44 Israel Allies Caucuses in various countries (Lodema Tree Service, 2020), including the U.S., Uruguay, Brazil, South Africa, Finland, England, Australia, The Philippines, South Korea, and Canada. IAF deals with several issues, including moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital, addressing the Iranian nuclear program, making sure U.S. funding does not go to a terror organization, fighting against the legitimization of Israel, and holding the U.N. and UNRWA responsible (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020).

Andras Patkai, a Hungarian E.U. veteran, is the European Director of IAF (Appointed July 2013), who actively developed communication between European organizations, Christian communities, and the State of Israel last 20 years. He encourages cooperation and coordination between the eight Israel Allies Caucuses in Europe and the Knesset Christian Allies Caucus in Israel (Hoffman, 2013).

### **13. Jewish News One and the European Jewish Parliament**

Igor Kolomoisky and Vadim Rabinovich, Two Ukrainian billionaires, began Jewish News One (JN1), a new pro-Israel channel on YouTube, and the European Jewish Parliament (EJP) in 2011 to bring issues of Jewish concern to the European Union. According to Tomer Orni, CEO of the European Jewish Union, the EJP has offices alongside the European Parliament in Brussels and holds regular assemblies there. The European Jewish Union will provide EJP's budget, and the plan is determined by elected members (The Jewish News of Northern California, 2011).

EJP members' representing 7 countries are selected by over 400, 000 people from East, Central, and Western Europe who voted online (European Jewish Press (a), 2012). EJP, as a "Platform for Jews from all Corners of the Continent," was inspired by Israeli President Shimon Peres to act as a Knesset of the Jewish Diaspora (Axelrod,

2020). EJP, as in the Knesset, will comprise 120 members (Gedalyahu, 2011).

Joel Rubinfeld, as a lecturer at universities in Europe, Israel, and the United States and at the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress, is Co-Chairman of EJP and contributes to news reports produced by JN1 (European Jewish Association, 2020).

**14. European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre (ESISC)**  
European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) was founded in 2002 in Brussels to cooperate with European institutions, NATO, and numerous European multinational corporations. Since its beginning, ESISC has collected and analyzed all sources of intelligence (open and human) in the fields of security (terrorism, conflicts, piracy, organized crime, or social unrest), geopolitics (stability of states, actual decision-making, foreign influences, matches) and economy (markets, competition, and legal security). In 2005, ESISC started to lobby at European institutions, national authorities of several countries, and international organizations such as the U.N. (ESISC, Our Mission, 2020).

Its lobbying efforts go beyond the structures of the European Union, as it frequently exchanges ideas with the Council of Europe, various member-states (at the government level or the level of elected assemblies), the United States, the U.N., and various Arab, African or Asian states. Its lobbying aims to defend an industrial portfolio, open a new market, and guarantee the political interests of a state (ESISC, Lobbying, 2020).

Claude Moniquet is the co-founder and CEO of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre (ABC, 2015). According to Moniquet, ESISC has an annual budget of between €1 and €1.5 million (Cronin, Marusek, Miller, 2016: 45).

**15. European Jewish Congress (EJC)**

European Jewish communities established the European Jewish Congress (EJC) in 1986 as a regional affiliate of the World Jewish Congress (WJC). The goal of EJC is to protect the interests of Jewish communities and to cooperate with European Union institutions, including the Council of Europe (where the EJC has participatory status) and national governments and parliaments to defend the common interest of 42 national Jewish communities in Europe (European Jewish Congress, 2020).

These communities are located in 42 countries, including Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Turkey, etc. Even Jewish communities in Morocco and Tunisia are members of EJC (European Jewish Congress; Members, 2020).

Moshe Kantor, an international philanthropist, and scientist, has been elected as President of EJC several times. He has taken

significant steps to counter the rising anti-Semitism in Europe (Chemla, 2020). EJC spent 200, 000€ - 299, 999€ for lobbying in the 2018 fiscal year (Lobby Facts, 2020).

### **16. European Jewish Association**

As a federation of 15 European Jewish organizations, the European Jewish Association (EJA) is pursuing the goal of fighting against anti-Semitism across Europe. It also seeks to boost Jewish activities in the continent and preserve Jewish interests in European countries. To achieve these aims, EJA makes meaningful contacts with E.U. decision-makers in Council, Commission, Parliament, and various Israeli permanent representations and embassies to Europe to counter Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS). Fighting against bans on Shechita (Jewish ritual slaughter), promoting and supporting Jewish holidays and traditions, securing and safeguarding Jewish communities, schools, synagogues, and Mikvot are other objectives of this association (EJA, 2020). The cost of lobbying EJA was 200, 000€ - 299, 999€ in the 2018 fiscal year (Lobby Facts (a), 2020).

Rabbi Menachem Margolin is the chairman and founder of EJA. He was appointed as Program Director of the Rabbinical Centre of Europe (RCE) in 2004 (Hulya, 2020). He has appreciated Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for his government's position on Jewish settlements in the West Bank, its constant support for Israel, and the comprehensive agreement that the government signed with the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIH) (Hungary Today, 2019).

Similar to most Israeli lobbies in Europe, EJA is exceptionally determined to counter anti-Semitism across the continent. In a sustained effort, it introduced a plan at its annual conference in Paris. It urged all European states to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of anti-Semitism to choose a special envoy on fighting anti-Semitism in schools and public places (Magid, 2020).

### **Conclusion**

Israeli lobbies in Europe serve the interests of Jewish communities and seek to influence the policy-making process in European countries by adopting various methods. Noting that lobbies could be engaged in politics only in a democratic political scene, Israeli lobbies can work smoothly in European nations. Moreover, Israel has more or less close and good relations with the E.U., and this creates a golden opportunity for Israelis to establish interest groups to pursue Israel and Jewish societies' interests in the continent.

The presence of Jewish people across Europe has provided a pretext for Israel to influence European politics in different institutions, including the European Council, the European

Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union. In addition to these institutions, Zionists have made attempts to lobbies in certain European countries to impact their policies towards Israel.

The main priority of Israeli lobbies in E.U. is to counter all kinds of activities they identify as hostile towards Jews, labeled as anti-Semitism. The sensitivities of these lobbies to anti-Semitism are derived from the bitter experience of Jews living in Europe, especially over the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The second objective of these lobbies is to convince European states to deny the rights of Palestinians in the peace negotiations in case it launches.

Israeli thresholds are determined to impede the peace process in favor of Palestinians, regardless of its benefit to Israel. Finally, countering Iran's nuclear program and reducing the perceived threat of Iran are among the daunting tasks of these lobbies. To persuade European politicians to consider Iran a severe and difficult danger, they have plans to exaggerate Iran's capabilities and intentions. Regarding Hezbollah, EU-Israeli lobbies have concentrated on its activities on the E.U.'s soil to illustrate it as a terrorist organization.

Finally, it seems all of these lobbies, previously mentioned above, are seeking to forge a network and alliance to achieve those aims by adopting similar strategies, tactics, and plans. In other words, they coordinate their efforts to infiltrate into E.U. politics to change the course they have taken concerning Palestinians, Hezbollah, and Iran. In the real world, similar goals would bring them together to serve the interest of Israel in general and the European Jewish community in particular.

## References

- ABC. (2015). Interview: Claude Moniquet, Co-Founder and CEO of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security C. Retrieved from ABC: <https://www.abc.net.au/lateline/interview-claude-moniquet,-co-founder-and-ceo-of/6949944>.
- About ERT. (2020). About ERT. Retrieved from The European Round Table for Industry (ERT): <https://ert.eu/about>.
- About Friends of Israel Initiative. (2020). About Friends of Israel Initiative. Retrieved from Friends of Israel Initiative: <http://www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org/about/about-friends-of-israel-initiative>.
- Abunimah, A. (2020). EU Foreign Policy Chief Confronted Over Israeli Apartheid. Retrieved from The Electronic Intifada:



<https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/eu-foreign-policy-chief-confronted-over-israeli-apartheid>.

AJC Central Europe Office. (2020). *Briefing: Hezbollah in Europe*. Warsaw: AJC Central Europe Office.

AJC. (2020). Who We Are? Retrieved from Global Jewish Advocacy: <https://www.ajc.org/tai>.

Antypas, I. (2018). How non-EU actors are lobbying Brussels. Retrieved from DW: <https://www.dw.com/en/how-non-eu-actors-are-lobbying-brussels/a-46182626>.

Axelrod, T. (2020). Sacha Baron Cohen a Jewish parliamentarian? One Reason to Doubt New Euro Jewish parliament. Retrieved from Jewish Telegraphic Agency: <https://www.jta.org/2011/10/24/global/sacha-baron-cohen-a-jewish-parliamentarian-one-reason-to-doubt-new-euro-jewish-parliament>.

Bridge Initiative Team. (2019). Factsheet: European Foundation for Democracy. Retrieved from BRIDGE: <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-european-foundation-for-democracy>.

Burc Yildiz, U. (2014). "The Influence of the European Friends of Israel on the Members of the European Parliament." *ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*. Vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1-14.

Cerulus, L. (2014). EU Lobbyist Register to Become Mandatory by 2017. Retrieved from EURACTIV: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/public-affairs/news/eu-lobbyist-register-to-become-mandatory-by-2017>.

Chemla, S. (2020). Dr. Moshe Kantor Re-elected as European Jewish Congress President. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/dr-moshe-kantor-re-elected-as-european-jewish-congress-president-647202>.

CISION PR Newswire. (2014). AJC Transatlantic Institute to Celebrate Ten Years. Retrieved from CISION PR Newswire: <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ajc-transatlantic-institute-to-celebrate-ten-years-244001841.html>.

- Conservative Transparency. (2020). Friends Of Elnet. Retrieved from Conservative Transparency: <http://conservativetransparency.org/recipient/friends-of-elnnet>.
- Corporate Europe Observatory. (2020). Lobby Planet: Our Guide to the Murkey World of Corporate EU Lobbying. Retrieved from Corporate Europe Observatory: <https://corporateeurope.org/en/lobbyplanet>.
- Cronin, D; Marusek, S; Miller, D. (2016). *The Israel Lobby and the European Union*. Glasgow: Spinwatch.
- Domhoff, W. (2014). *Who Rules America?* New York: McGraw-Hill Education.
- Drozdiak, N. (2016). Apple Goes Without a Lobby Into European Fray . Retrieved from The Wall Street Journal: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-goes-without-a-lobby-into-european-fray-1474830160>.
- ECI brochure - who we are. (2020). ECI brochure-Who We are. Retrieved from European Coalition for: [www.ec4i.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=40&limitstart=4](http://www.ec4i.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=40&limitstart=4).
- EFI. (2017). EFI-European Friends of Israel. Retrieved from Matanel: <http://www.matanel.org/project/efi-european-friends-of-israel>.
- EFI Policy Conference. (2020). European Friends of Israel (EFI) is a Political Initiative Which Aims to Improve the Overall Relationship between the European Union and Israel. Retrieved from EFI Policy Conference: <http://efi-policy-conference.org/AboutUs.aspx>.
- EFI Political Board. (2007). Retrieved from European Friends of Israel: [https://web.archive.org/web/20160206072811/http://www.efi-eu.org/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=304&Itemid=146](https://web.archive.org/web/20160206072811/http://www.efi-eu.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=304&Itemid=146).
- Eichner, I. (2006). First pro-Israel lobby in EU set up. Retrieved from Ynet: <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3300374,00.html>.
- EIPA. (2020). About. Retrieved from EIPA: <http://eipa.eu.com/press-association/about>.



- Eising, R. (2010). Interest Groups and the European Union. In M. Cini, & N. Perez-Solorzano Borragán, *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- EJA. (2020). About. Retrieved from European Jewish Association: <https://ejassociation.eu/about>.
- ELNET. (2020). About. Retrieved from ELNET: <https://elnetwork.eu/about>.
- . (2020). U.S. Middle East Peace Plan. Retrieved from ELNET Briefing: <https://elnetwork.eu/country/united-states/u-s-middle-east-peace-plan>.
- . (2020). Leadership and Staff. Retrieved from ELNET: [elnetwork.eu/leadership\\_and\\_staff](http://elnetwork.eu/leadership_and_staff).
- . (2017). Leadership Briefing. Retrieved from ELNET: [https://electronicintifada.net/sites/default/files/2017-10/felnet\\_summernewsletter2017\\_r2\\_final\\_.pdf](https://electronicintifada.net/sites/default/files/2017-10/felnet_summernewsletter2017_r2_final_.pdf).
- ESISC. (2020). Lobbying. Retrieved from European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center: <http://www.esisc.org/our-services/lobbying>.
- . (2020). Our Mission. Retrieved from European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center: <http://www.esisc.org/about-us/our-mission>.
- EURACTIV. (2020). EFD-European Foundation for Democracy. Retrieved from EURACTIV: <http://jobs.euractiv.com/company/efd-european-foundation-democracy-427>.
- Europa. (2020). Transparency Register. Retrieved from Europa: <https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=70156146692-35>.
- European Coalition for Israel. (2020). Peaceful Dialogue, not Punitive Measures, is the Way Forward in the Middle East. Retrieved from European Coalition for Israel: <https://www.ec4i.org/peaceful-dialogue-not-punitive-measures-is-the-way-forward-in-the-middle-east>.

European Foundation for Democracy. (2014). Hamas Wants to See an Increasing Death Toll on its Own Side. Retrieved from European Foundation for Democracy: <https://www.europeandemocracy.eu/news/hamas-wants-to-see-an-increasing-death-toll-on-its-own-side>.

———. (a). (2013). Hezbollah's Time is up. Retrieved from European Foundation for Democracy: <https://www.europeandemocracy.eu/news/hezbollahs-time-is-up>.

European Jewish Association. (2020). Joel Rubinfeld. Retrieved from European Jewish Association;: <https://ejassociation.eu/team-member/joel-rubinfeld>.

European Jewish Congress. (2020). OUR HISTORY. Retrieved from European Jewish Congress: <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history>.

European Jewish Congress; Members. (2020). EJC MEMBERS. Retrieved from European Jewish Congress: <https://eurojewcong.org/communities>.

European Jewish Press (a). (2012). First Ever 120-Member European Jewish Parliament Inaugurated in Brussels, Event Hailed as 'Great Day for Jews in Europe'. Retrieved from European Jewish Press: <http://www.ejpress.org/article/56239>.

European Jewish Press. (2014). Journalists from Across Europe to get 'First-Hand' Experience of the Complexities and Challenges of Israel. Retrieved from European Jewish Press: <https://ejpress.org/journalists-from-across-europe-to-get-first-hand-experience-of-the-complexities-and-challenges-of-israel-6>.

European Leadership Network. (2020). Retrieved from MacArthur Foundation: <https://www.macfound.org/grantees/12665>.

———. (2020). About. Retrieved from European Leadership Network: <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/about>.

Fathollah-Nejad, A. (2010). Germany's Fear of Finkelstein. Retrieved from MR Online: <https://mronline.org/2010/03/01/germanys-fear-of-finkelstein>.

FELNET. (2020). Hezbollah in Europe. Retrieved from FELNET: <https://elnetwork.eu/country/eu/hezbollah-in-europe>.

- Finkelstein, N. G. (2003). *The Holocaust Industry; Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering*. New York: Verso.
- Free Speech on Israel. (2016). New Report: The Israel lobby and the European Union. Retrieved from Free Speech on Israel: <https://freespeechonisrael.org.uk/new/#sthash.l6NWGs9p.dpbs>.
- Friends of Israel Initiative. (2014). *ADDED VALUE: ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC WORTH TO THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES*. Friends of Israel Initiative and The Henry Jackson Society.
- Gedalyahu, T. B. (2011). First Election for European Jewish Parliament. Retrieved from Arutz Sheva: <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/149093>.
- Glatt, B. (2017). European pro-Israel Lobby Goes Into the Lion's Den. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/christian-news/european-pro-israel-lobby-goes-into-the-lions-den-489254>.
- Göbel, B. J. (2016). *The Israeli lobby for Research and Innovation in the European Union An Example of Efficient Cooperation in the European Neighbourhood?* Brugge: Colledge of Europe.
- Guéguen, D. (2020). *Reshaping European Lobbying: How to Be One Step Ahead*. In D. Dialer, & M. Richter, *Lobbying in the European Union*. Cham: Springer.
- Guttman, N. (2008). New European Pro-Israel Group Aims for Low Profile. Retrieved from Forward: <https://forward.com/news/13570/new-european-pro-israel-group-aims-for-low-profile-02010>.
- Harpin, L. (2020). Lord Polak attacks United Nations for 'singling out Israel With Nauseating Frequency'. Retrieved from the Jewish Chronicle: <https://www.thejc.com/news/uk/lord-polak-attacks-united-nations-for-singling-out-israel-with-nauseating-frequency-1.495340>.
- Harris, D. A. (2004). Rebuilding Trans-Atlantic Ties. Retrieved from Forward: [forward.com/opinion/6309/rebuilding-trans-atlantic-ties](https://forward.com/opinion/6309/rebuilding-trans-atlantic-ties).

- Heywood, A. (2019). *Politics*. New York: Macmillan International Higher Education/Red Globe Press.
- Hoffman, S. G. (2013). Hungarian EU Veteran Andras Patkai to lobby for Israel in Brussels. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/international/eu-veteran-to-lobby-for-israel-in-brussels-321288>.
- Holyoke, T. T. (2014). *Interest Groups and Lobbying; Pursuing Political Interests in America*. New York: Taylor & Francis.
- Hudson, V. M. (2014). *Foreign Policy Analysis; Classic and Contemporary Theory*. New York: Rowman&Littlefield.
- Hulya. (2020). Professional Seminars for European Rabbis, Belgium. Retrieved from Hulya: <http://www.hulya.lu/content/professional-seminaries-european-rabbis-0>.
- Hungary Today. (2019). European Jewish Association Head Thanks Orban for Supporting Israel, Jews. Retrieved from Hungary Today: <https://hungarytoday.hu/european-jewish-association-orban-israel-jews>.
- IAF. (2020). Who We Are. Retrieved from The Israel Allies Foundation (IAF): <https://israelallies.org/>
- Integrity Watch - Commission Meetings. (2020). Retrieved from Transparency International EU: <https://www.integritywatch.eu>.
- IsraelGives. (2020). European Leadership Network - ELNET. Retrieved from IsraelGives: <https://www.israelgives.org/amuta/580535672>.
- Janda, K; Berry, J; Goldman, J; Hula, K. (2007). *The Challenge of Democracy*. New York: Cengage Learning.
- Jewish Telegraphic Agency. (2013). EU Designates Hezbollah's Military Wing as Terrorist Organization. Retrieved from Jewish Telegraphic Agency: <https://www.jta.org/2013/07/22/global/report-e-u-blacklists-hezbollahs-military-wing>.
- Jewish Virtual Library. (2020). Jewish/Israel Organizations: Israel Allies Foundation. Retrieved from Jewish Virtual Library: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-allies-foundation>.

- JFNLA. (2020). Larry J. Hochberg . Retrieved from JFNLA: [https://jfn2013.sched.com/moderator/larry\\_j\\_hochberg.6917qb5](https://jfn2013.sched.com/moderator/larry_j_hochberg.6917qb5).
- Jordan, A. (2001). "The European Union: An Evolving System of Multi-Level Governance ... or Government?" *Policy & Politics*. Vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 193-208.
- King, E. (2016). *The Pro-Israel Lobby in Europe; The Politics of Religion and Christian Zionism in the European Union*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Leemhuis, R. (2020). Iran Is More Aggressive Than Ever Before. Retrieved from The AJC Transatlantic Institute: <https://transatlanticinstitute.org/analysis/iran-more-aggressive-ever>.
- Lempkowicz, Y. (2020). If Unilateral Annexation Goes Ahead, It Will Undermine Israel-EU Ties, Warns EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell. Retrieved from European Jewish Press: <https://ejpress.org/if-unilateral-annexation-goes-ahead-it-will-undermine-israel-eu-ties-warns-eu-foreign-policy-chief-josep-borrell>.
- Lobby Facts (a). (2020). European Jewish Association (EJA). Retrieved from Lobby Facts: <https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/c5f666400a824526bdbc477c7763185a/european-jewish-association>.
- . (2020). European Jewish Congress (EJC). Retrieved from Lobby Facts: <https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/a8cedda03d9a46d78ea06751a554cb1a/european-jewish-congress>.
- . (2020). European Coalition for Israel (ECI). Retrieved from LobbyFacts: <https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/00c97852e75940178656b39db075d1c0/european-coalition-for-israel>.
- . (2020). European Foundation for Democracy (EFD). Retrieved from LobbyFacts: <https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/d3176540a42c4b999899ebafab50da28/european-foundation-for-democracy>.

- Lodema Tree Service. (2020). Tree Services. Retrieved from Lodema Tree Service: <https://lodematreeservice.com/site/israel-allies-fd24a6>.
- Lucas, K; Hanegraaff, M; De Bruycker, I. (2019). Correction to: Lobbying the Lobbyists: When and Why do Policymakers Seek to Influence Advocacy Groups in Global Governance? <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057%2Fs41309-019-00050-3#article-info>.
- MacDonald, P. (2016). Report Claims links between EU Pro-Israel Lobby and 'Islamophobic' Groups. Retrieved from Middle East Eye: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/israel-lobby-eu-58715472>.
- Magid, J. (2020). European Jewish Group Unveils Plan to 'Beat Anti-Semitism' Amid Rise in Attacks. Retrieved from The Times of Israel: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/european-jewish-group-unveils-plan-to-beat-anti-semitism-amid-rise-in-attacks>.
- Marshall, D. (2012). "Do Rapporteurs Receive Independent Expert Policyadvice? Indirect Lobbying Via the European Parliament's Committee Secretariat." *Journal of European Public Policy*. Vol. 19 no. 9, pp. 1377-1395.
- McBride, J. (2020). How Does the European Union Work? Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-european-union-work>.
- McElroy, D. (2017). The Pro-Israel Peer Who Brought Down a UK Cabinet Minister. Retrieved from The National: <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/the-pro-israel-peer-who-brought-down-a-uk-cabinet-minister-1.674211>.
- Miami Meditation Center. (2020). Israel Allies Foundation. Retrieved from Miami Meditation Center: <https://www.miamimeditationcenter.org/blog/qdqj77.php?a5148d=israel-allies-foundation>.
- Militarist Monitor. (2014). Friends of Israel Initiative. Retrieved from Militarist Monitor: [https://militarist-monitor.org/profile/friends\\_of\\_israel\\_initiative](https://militarist-monitor.org/profile/friends_of_israel_initiative).
- Mills, T. (2010). Friends of Israel Initiative: The Neoconservatives' Eastern Front. Retrieved from PULSE:

<https://pulsemedia.org/2010/07/20/friends-of-israel-initiative-the-neoconservatives-eastern-front>.

Mondialisation. (2016). Billionaire Republicans and Professional Islamophobes: The Pro-Israel Lobby in Brussels. Retrieved from Mondialisation: <https://www.mondialisation.ca/billionaire-republicans-and-professional-islamophobes-the-pro-israel-lobby-in-brussels/5526349>.

Nastase, A; Muurmans, C. (2020). Regulating Lobbying Activities in the European Union: A Voluntary Club Perspective. *Regulation & Governance*. Vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 238-255.

Nonprofit Explorer. (2018). FRIENDS OF ELNET. Retrieved from Nonprofit Explorer: <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/452212393>.

Nownes, A; DeAlejandro, K. W. (2009). "Lobbying in the New Millennium: Evidence of Continuity and Change in Three States". *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*. Vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 429-455.

Nugent, N. (2010). *The Government and Politics of the European*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

OLEary, F. (2020). SMOKING GUN Secret Document ‘Proves Iran Was Building a Nuclear Weapon as far Back as 2002’. Retrieved from The U.S. Sun: <https://www.the-sun.com/news/276417/secret-document-iran-nuclear-weapons/>

Olire. (2020). The European Coalition for Israel Issue a Global Call to Fight Anti-Semitism. Retrieved from Observatory of Religious Freedom in Latin America: <https://olire.org/the-european-coalition-for-israel-issue-a-global-call-to-fight-anti-semitism>.

Panke, D. (2012). "Lobbying Institutional Key Players: How States Seek to Influence the European Commission, the Council Presidency and the European Parliament." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 129-150.

Pearson, L. (2019). Press Release: European Parliament to end Secret Lobby Meetings. Retrieved from Transparency International EU: <https://transparency.eu/press-release-european-parliament-to-end-secret-lobby-meetings>.

- Pickard, J., & Wright, R. (2017). Priti Patel Scandal Turns Spotlight on Stuart Polak . Retrieved from Financial Times: <https://www.ft.com/content/383e5caa-c4a2-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656>.
- Press Club Brussels Europe. (2020). Symposium European Coalition for Israel. Retrieved from Press Club Brussels Europe: <https://www.pressclub.be/miscellaneous/symposium-european-coalition-for-israel>.
- Rosenthal, A. (2001). *The Third House; Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Saurugger, S. (2010). "The Social Construction of the Participatory Turn: The Emergence of a Norm in the European Union". *European Journal of Political Research*. Vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 471-496.
- Shapovalova, N. (2020). *Lobbying and Interest Group Influence in EU Foreign Policy*. In D. Dialer, & M. Richter, *Lobbying in the European Union*. Cham: Springer.
- Sheffield, C. (2009). MKs Launch New Alliance With European Parliaments. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/International/MKs-launch-new-alliance-with-European-parliaments>.
- Siwec, M. (2014). European Friends of Israel-Bilateral Challenges in a Global Context. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/European-Friends-of-Israel-Bilateral-challenges-in-a-global-context-338658>.
- Smith, L. (2010). Friends, Indeed. Retrieved from Tablet: <https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/friends-indeed>.
- Stern SHEFLER, G. (2011). Common Values, a Shared Fight Against Terror. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Common-values-a-shared-fight-against-terror>.
- Teffer, P. (2019). How Corporate Lobbyists Steer EU Law-Making. Retrieved from EUobserver: <https://euobserver.com/institutional/147637>.



Teller, N. (2018). The Friends of Israel Initiative. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/the-friends-of-israel-initiative-569198>.

———. (2018). The Friends of Israel Initiative. Retrieved from A Mid-East Journal: <http://a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com/2018/10/the-friends-of-israel-initiative.html>.

The European Foundation for Democracy. (2020). About Us. Retrieved from The European Foundation for Democracy: <https://www.europeandemocracy.eu/about-us>.

The Jewish News of Northern California. (2011). European Jewish Parliament Off to a Semi-Comedic Start. Retrieved from The Jewish News of Northern California: <https://www.jweekly.com/2011/11/04/european-jewish-parliament-off-to-a-semi-comedic-start>.

Tranor, I. (2014). 30, 000 Lobbyists and Counting: is Brussels Under Corporate Sway? Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/lobbyists-european-parliament-brussels-corporate>.

Voltolini, B. (2013). *Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-Making Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Exploring the Potential of a Constructivist Perspective*. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science .

Weinthal, B. (2018). Merkel Urged EU Countries not to Move Embassies to Jerusalem. Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: <https://www.jpost.com/international/merkel-urged-eu-countries-to-not-move-embassies-to-jerusalem-due-to-iran-573452>.



## Non-physical Combat Ability Components of Iranian Islamic Revolution Armed Forces with Emphasis on the View of Imam Sajjad (AS) in the Prayer of "MARZDARAN"

Hossein Rezaie\*<sup>1</sup>, Ramin Azhdari<sup>2</sup>, Mahmood Vaezi<sup>3</sup>, Hady Baghbani<sup>4</sup>

**DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.8.2**

1. Ph.D. Student in Quran and Hadith Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Ph.D. Student in Quran and Hadith Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.
3. Assistant Professor, Department of Quran and Hadith, University of Tehran, Tehran, IRAN.
4. Ph.D. Student in Passive Defense at the National Defense University, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 5 February 2020 - Accepted: 5 October 2020)

### Abstract

The security of any country depends primarily on the strength of its military forces. If safety is established at the borders, it will be possible to create the necessary security in other areas. On the other hand, according to experts, since the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979) was involved in an imposed an unequal war, the non-revolutionary military knowledge in this war did not last more than three months. Instead, it affected other factors in this issue and the victory of the Islamic Revolution armed forces, referred to as "Non-Physical Factors of Combat Ability." The main question is, 'what are these factors', and 'what function did they play in creating the Islamic Revolution armed forces' combat ability?' The present study aimed, with descriptive-analytical and content analysis method based on library resources, to answer the above question and explain the non-physical components are affecting the combat ability of the Islamic Revolution armed forces by emphasizing Imam Sajjad's (AS) view in the twenty-seventh prayer of Sahifa Sajjadiah and the study of their function in creating the fighting power of these forces. Based on the research conducted, the mentioned factors are faith and will, knowledge and insight, prudence and solution, empathy and compassion, patience and perseverance, occult help, and martyrdom.

**Keywords:** The Islamic Revolution Armed Forces, Sahifa Sajjadiah, Combat Ability, Non-physical Factors.

---

\*. Corresponding author: hossein.reza.364@gmail.com

## Introduction

The national power of any country is influenced by military, economic, political, social, cultural, technological capacity. Among them, military force is significant because each country's safety and each nation depend primarily on that country's military power and government. If security is established at the borders and national level, it will be possible to create necessary protection in other fields and increase economic, political power (Ashtiani, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 69).

Therefore, among various organizations, the Armed Forces, as an institution that provides security, stability, tranquility, and protection of the nation's fundamental values and vital interests and the establishment of public order for society, in any system and era had been interested in countries and rulers. Imam Ali (AS) introduced the armed forces as the nation's stronghold and considered security the most important and tangible blessing that God Almighty has bestowed on human beings. Therefore, these organizations must be in the best functional condition and have the highest combat ability (Lotfi, 2018: 83). Thus according to God the Almighty and Imam Ali (AS), they can be the shelter of the people, a jewel of rulers, honor, and glory to religion in the way of safety (Makarem, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 667).

Regarding the Islamic Revolution armed forces, this issue is more critical, given that the existing threats to the revolution are made by the arrogant superpowers, especially the United States. In the highest estimates of US-affiliated institutions, the Islamic Republic of Iran spends a total of \$ 16 billion a year on security and defense expenses that is about 40 times less than the US military expenses. Compared to other countries in the region, Iran's total spending cost in this area is about one-fifth of Saudi Arabia (Sputnik, 2018 & Zarif, 2019 AD/1398 SH).

Therefore, the possible future war will be unequal and asymmetrical in military equipment and weapons (physical factors of combat ability). But the critical point is that the situation of non-physical aspects in the combat ability of the Islamic Revolution armed forces is different, and because of that, Iran has the upper hand in this field. In this regard, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution said: "Our enemies and their advanced equipment and war machines are ineffective against faith, love, and will of the people. The most modern equipment is useless upon a resilient and martyrdom seeking force"<sup>1</sup>.

It happened in the imposed war when non-religious and non-revolutionary military knowledge did not last more than three months<sup>2</sup>. Love, faith, and will of the Islamic Revolution armed forces

---

1. <https://Farsi.Khamenei.ir>.

2. Speech by Major General Jafari (Former Commander of the Revolutionary Guards): <https://www.Tasnimnews.com>.

played a significant role in the comprehensive defense of the revolution and the advancement of the country's military goals and forced armed to the teeth enemy to retreat. Therefore, paying attention to these factors (non-physical factors of combat ability), explaining, and strengthening them have particular importance.

Sahifa Sajjadiah is considered one of the most valuable Imams' collections, which has been viewed by various philosophers<sup>3</sup> in terms of high concepts, meanings, inspiring knowledge, eloquence, and rhetoric. According to some scholars, Sahifa Sajjadiah is the greatest treasure of divine truths and teachings after the Qur'an and Nahj al-Balaghah, Therefore, it has been called "Ukht al-Quran," "Bible of the Ahl Bayt," "زبور آل محمد" and "Sahifa Kamelah"(Agha Bozorg Tehrani, 1979 AD/1403 AH: 18). Imam Sajjad (AS) expresses many religious teachings in his prayers such as theology, cosmology, anthropology, moral virtues and vices, social and economic issues, historical references, etc. The twenty-seventh prayer of this precious collection, known as the prayer of the "مرزداران"، is arranged in 18 verses. Its principal subject is the prayer for the border guards.

In this prayer, Imam Sajjad (AS) draws man's attention to those who guarding and protecting them from the borders of the Islamic land and providing security and internal peace (Encyclopedia of Imam Sajjad (AS), 2014 AD/1393 SH: 453). In this praying, Imam Sajjad (AS) also expresses phrases about preserving Islamic boundaries that reflecting his views on the non-physical factors influencing the military's combat ability in overcoming the enemy. For this reason, this study aims to analyze and explain the non-physical aspects of the combat ability of the Iranian Islamic Revolution armed forces, emphasizing the view of Imam Sajjad (AS) in the twenty-seventh prayer of Sahifa Sajjadiah.

### 1. Research Method

This research is descriptive based on the data collection method and library resources. The research method in this research is a content analysis method that is used to examine the apparent content of the messages in a text. The most important application of this method is to describe a text's characteristics and deduce the message's cultural aspects (Sarmad et al, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 132).

This research method has two necessary steps: reviewing the material (note) and processing the results. The messages in this study are the phrases of Sahifa's twenty-seventh prayer that are processed and concluded. The community studied in this research is the Holy

---

3. Including Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei and Professor Anne-Marie Schimmel (Al-Zahra Society, 2018).

Quran, commentaries, and other researchers conducted on Sahifa Sajjadiah and combat ability.

## 2. Research Background

A review of the study's history records shows that it is new among them. However, in the meantime, researches on some non-physical factors affecting combat power in detail, such as "the impact of evolutionary leadership on improving combat ability" (Madani, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 32) and "human Resource Management Actions Affecting Organizational Identity to Improve Combat Ability were conducted".

Still, only one case was comprehensively explained the components of non-physical factors affecting combat ability. The subject of which is "defining the Theoretical Features of Non-physical Factors Affecting Military Forces Combat Power" written by Mr. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani and published in the Journal of Defense Strategy (2011). So far, no research has been done on the subject of this article. Therefore, explaining these components is the primary purpose of this research, which has been proposed as non-physical components of the combat ability of the Islamic Revolution armed forces with an emphasis on the view of Imam Sajjad (AS) in the prayer of the "مرزداران".

## 3. The Theoretical Framework of Research

### 3.1. The Islamic Revolution Armed Forces

The "Iranian Islamic Revolution" refers to the Iranian People's Revolution in 1979, which led to the Shah's departure from the country, the monarchy's collapse, and a religious democratic establishment. Islamic Revolutionary armed forces made of three separate institutions: army, IRGC (including Basij Organization), and law enforcement, all of them are under the General Staff of the Armed forces.

### 3.2. Combat Ability

There are several definitions of combat ability by experts; some of them are listed below:

- 1) Combat ability is a set of available physical and non-physical factors with the necessary efficiency that their combination and correct use is useful in the successful performance in mission (Ghanbari Jahromi, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 6);
- 2) Combat ability is the strength and power of a military unit during combat operations due to physical, non-physical, and advantageous factors (Khan Ahmadi and Miar, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 206);
- 3) Combat ability is the ability of military organizations to carry out the assignment mission, which is vital as an essential task of command in military organizations to improve it (Madani, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 32);

4) The International Defense-Military Encyclopedia has considered three factors of technology, professionalism, and combat efficiency components as justifying combat ability (Sobhi, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 7).

Of course, the concept of combat ability is also related to other concepts such as combat talent and readiness, but there are significant differences in these concepts. The idea of talent refers to physical factors that are quantifiable and countable, such as the number of people, warfare, equipment, etc. which cannot be counted to determine the ability of a military unit to carry out a mission. Combat readiness also means the power and countable quality of the military company to perform mission optimally. In other words, combat readiness creating the ability and skill of the relative strength elements, converts their use's quality from potential to actual (Madani, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 40).

On the other hand, the combat ability concept defines relative strength (quantity) and combat readiness (quality) affected by other environmental factors, which are referred to as advantageous factors. Due to ecological and time conditions, these factors can influence an increase or reduce in combat ability (Nozari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 1).

In most researches of combat ability, it is divided into three dimensions; physical, non-physical, and advantageous factors, which include:

### **3.2.1. Physical Factors**

Material and tangible factors that can be counted and with their quantity play a role in creating combat ability and talent for the mission. Physical elements in terms of amount include; Military forces, skill, and variety of warfare, military equipment, etc. Military units have; combat maneuvering units, combat support, and combat service support units (Nozari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 2).

### **3.2.2. Non-physical Factors**

There are immaterial and intangible factors that cannot be counted and accurately measured but can be determined using specific mechanisms and converting quality to quantity. These factors play a significant role in building ability and combat readiness of physical characteristics and increasing military units' combat ability to successfully carry out missions. Among the essential non-physical factors are faith, motivation, morale, leadership, training and combat readiness, hunger, etc (same).

### **3.2.3. Advantageous Factors**

These factors affect military units' movements and activities on the battlefield, increasing or decreasing combat ability. Therefore, these factors should be used appropriately to increase the company's combat ability on the battlefield. Instead, if these factors are used at the wrong time and place, it will reduce the unit's combat ability and cause irreparable damage to the company.

But the critical point is that non-physical combat ability factors are composed of a comprehensive and complex range, which is not easy




Figure 1: Dimensions of Combat Ability

to distinguish. If all physical or all advantageous combat ability factors are provided, all of them may be nothing with no efficient and robust human (Ashtiani, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 75). Thus, these factors constitute the most critical and sensitive part of combat ability and affect the other two dimensions (Khan Ahmadi and Miar, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 210).

### 3.3. Sahifa Sajjadiah and the Prayer of "مرزداران"

Since Imam Sajjad (AS) is a divine leader, he is responsible for his people and the Islamic nation, and preserving them is one of the most important duties that he is committed to doing. Therefore, he should take care of Islam's rituals, keep on its symbols, consider its general interests, and prioritize these interests over personal interests (Hosseini Jalali, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 221). So, he presents a whole school of thought in the form of needs and prayers with God, which contains what is needed in God's journey and a monotheistic society (Doaei, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 258).

Sahifa Sajjadiah, known as the Psalms of the Family of Muhammad (PBUH) and the Bible of Ahl Al-Bayt (AS), is one of the most essential and authoritative Islamic texts after the Holy Qur'an. Although the template of Sahifa is composed of prayers and supplications, this format has never limited the concepts. Sajjad (AS) has recognized many of his social needs in the context of prayers and supplications with God, including many religious, moral, social, etc., teachings.

This state of Sahifa has caused its prayers, preserving the spiritual spirit, and expressing parts of Islamic teachings (Koushki, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 148). The current Sahifa is a collection of 54 prayers narrated by Ibn Sakun with a series of documents linked to Abu al-Mofazel Shaybani (one of the famous narrators of the third century AH). About the paper of Sahifa Sajjadiah Aqa Bozorg Tehrani (a prominent bibliographer) says: "The first Sahifa which reaches Imam Zin al-Abedin (AS) is one of the successors [definitions] among the companions; because it has been allowed to narrate it in all classes and all ages" (Tehrani, 1981: 18). Although they claim that Sahifa



Sajjadiyya is consistent with the criteria of Rijal's knowledge, the collection of various pieces of evidence, especially in the cataloging, shows confidence in the issuance of Sahifa Sajjadiyah, which is known as complete Sahifa Sajjadiyah. Also, counterparts such as different documents for some prayers, compensating faint of the paper about the existence of Sahifa's five narrations and ways of Zeydis (Gholam Ali, 2013 AH/ 1392 SH: 31).

The twenty-seventh prayer of this precious collection is known as the Prayer of the "مرزداران" which Imam Sajjad (AS) has prayed in 18 segments for Islamic boundaries protectors. It means the importance of this issue from his point of view. By looking deeply at Sahifa Sajjadiyah, anyone can see defensive and security teachings expressed by the Imam in this prayer, which was presented to the border guards and troops of the Islamic frontier. It is also important to note that Imam has asked God for many of his defense and security strategies in the form of mystery and prayer. Still, this expression method fits the mystical and the choice of Imam in this vague language. While we know that will answer no blessing without God's accompaniment, can consider Imam's from God Almighty in this prayer as instructions. He also thought this achievement depends on Muslims' practical support by inferring necessary defensive and security teachings from it (Akhavan Kazemi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 134).

#### **4. Non-physical Components Are Affecting the Combat Ability of the Revolutionary Armed Forces based on the Prayer of "مرزداران"**

As mentioned, non-physical combat ability factors are the most critical and sensitive part of combat ability and affect the other two dimensions. In the words of Imam Sajjad (AS), the components of this dimension are:

##### **4.1. Faith and Will**

Faith in the word means acknowledging someone and trusting him with assurance (Farahidi, 1988 AD/1410 AH: 389; Ibn Fares, 1977 AD/1399 AH: 13). This word is from "Amena" root on the weight of "Salema" and synonymous with it.

The ordinary meaning of these two words is safety, peace of mind, and lack of fear and anxiety (Mostafavi, 1981AD/1360 SH: 137).

Accordingly, a believer protects himself from insecurity and anxiety by being attached to his faith (An'am, 82). In terms, it is a heartfelt acknowledgment of God, Prophet, and what the Prophet certainly brought. A true believer is one who believes in it with his heart (Miqdad, 1983 AD/1405 AH: 441).

Faith plays an essential role in the evolution of human personality; however, on the other hand, it also has a sign of people's spiritual character. Self-esteem and weakness necessitate the realization of various levels in it. Of course, it should be noted that you do not sow the seeds of faith in any land; the growth and boasting of loyalty

require the existence of internal and external causes and conditions. The external conditions mean environmental and social factors that provide the ground for the realization of faith. The inner conditions represent all the factors needed for completion as a voluntary act (Badakhshan, 2005AD/1384 SH: 5).

Faith has mundane and ethereal effects. It can discuss it every day results in both individual and social parts. Particular products of faith include honor<sup>4</sup>, fervor and chivalry<sup>5</sup>, peace<sup>6</sup>, hope<sup>7</sup>, and so on. Brotherhood and kindness<sup>8</sup>, social harmony<sup>9</sup>, etc., are also social effects of faith. Faith makes the believer not feel defeated or weak under any circumstances and be stronger than the mountain (Koleini, 1988: 503). Imam Sajjad (AS), in a segment of the twenty-seventh prayer, praying to God for warriors on his way, demands a great faith. With such confidence, hearts can see ethereal and eyes can feel Paradise and its blessings. Show the heavens in their eyes, and make clear what you have provided in Paradise. Confronting enemies with such faith causes mundane, wealth, children's thoughts, and all related things to go out of their minds. So, Imam Sajjad (AS) asks God for this and says: "in the moment of confronting enemy forget the deceptive world, and remove wealth and misleading thoughts from their hearts". Imam considered the lack of fleeing thought and turning back on the battlefield as one of the final effects of faith: "So turning back on the enemy does not enter their hearts and thought of running away from opponent does not pass through their minds".

Therefore, Imam (AS) explicitly states that if this happens, the faith and will of the border guards will be strengthened to win the war and advance to victory. They won't even think of escaping the battlefield in their minds. On the other hand, because faith is essential to warriors, Imam asks God not to allow the enemy troops to have such confidence: "God, shake their hearts". The Supreme Leader of the Revolution also introduced the faith of warriors as the main reason for victory and real factor of combat ability: "The (enemy) forces were armed to the teeth ... (but) our adolescents with empty hands and Faith in God, without having any advanced tools ... went into the middle of the battlefield and overcame all those factors"<sup>10</sup>.

---

4. (Monafequn, Verse 8).

5. (Payandeh, 2003: 587).

6. (Fath, Verse 49).

7. (Yusuf, Verse 87).

8. (Hujrat, Verse 10).

9. (Muhaddith al-Nuri, 140: 184).

10. <https://Farsi.Khamenei.ir> 3/3/84.

#### 4.2. Knowledge, Insight, and Necessity to Obtain Enough Information from the Enemy

Numerous verses with various scales invite the man to think and to be patient. God says in Qur'an: 'Tell me, are blind and not blind alike?' So why don't you think? '(An'am: 50)

In Wisdom 48 of Nahj al-Balaghah, Imam Ali (AS) says: "Victory comes with accountability thoughts, and accountability thoughts come with an intellectual endeavor, and academic endeavor comes with secrecy".

Imam Sajjad (AS) says in prayer 24: "Dear God, inspire me to know what is necessary, and provide me all duties without fail" (Shirvani, 2003:118).

This knowledge is essential and necessary in all areas, so Imam Sajjad (AS) asks God to ensure armies of Islam and Islamic frontiers know enough about the enemies on the battlefields. He asks God: "may God send blessings on Muhammad and family of Muhammad, and let them know what Islamic frontiers do not know". Because achieving full and accurate knowledge of the enemy's movements, measures, goals, and plans provide their relevant combat goals and preventive measures. It doesn't matter if some of them are about camouflage or war plans. Also, how to filling security gaps or be aware of those gaps to block enemy's infiltration into them, and find out boundaries and weak point of the enemy can be used to defeat them, as well as to know enemy goals and the consequences of his domination over the people, is very important in the success of the mission.

Imam continues: "teach them everything they do not know". It is necessary to obtain details of events, which have already been referred to as knowing what they do not know. Because knowledge is about more information when this kind of experience has been obtained, it can discuss the role of war knowledge too. Using general principles and rules, has the power of domination (Ameli, 2009: 26). After that, He points out a subtle and precise hint, which is that insight them about what they do not have insight into. God says: "you see them looking at you, but they do not see you" (Al-A'raf, 198). "Absar" is the same as a lot of research, precise and purposeful look, which is resulted in gaining knowledge and science. Achieving initiatives, through measures that the enemy may have prepared, are obtained with a careful eye.

By disrupting regional and global equations, the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979) has narrowed the field for arrogant countries; therefore, it is natural to use the most complicated methods to oppose revolution. For this means, "must recognize the enemy and the ways of the enemy".<sup>11</sup> Enemies in the military field also posed various

---

11. <https://Farsi.Khamenei.ir>. 19/10/95.

threats to the revolution, like sedition by Takfiri groups. Fortunately, the vigilance, hostility, and timely action of the armed forces, even beyond the borders, have ultimately repelled these threats.

#### 4.3. Planning and Finding a Solution

Well, planning plays a vital role in the success of a military operation; any disturbance in the plan causes a rift that the enemy can penetrate from it, so Imam Sajjad (AS) points out that in prayer: "you plan their work by yourself". If there is no strategy, there will be negative consequences, such as military weakness to response when confronting the enemy and lack of confidence in maintaining other sectors. Simultaneously, there is no choice but to preserve those parts to strike massive blows at the enemy with epic courage, foresight, and stability and without any worries or fear of infiltration (Mohsen Beigi, 2014 AD/ 1393 SH: 94).

An example of these measures and solutions is tricks and deceptions of war that Imam refers in the phrase to teach them how to repel the enemy plan. In action, there are maneuvers, planning, and new deceptions for the enemy, all of them require thought, careful consideration, discovery plans, invention new tools, and covert methods to surprise the enemy. It is narrated from the Prophet (PBUH) that he said: War is all about trick and deception (Sajistani, 1988:593; Bukhari, 1891 AD/1309 AH: 24).

The phrase "الطف لهم" refers to planning that is difficult to understand, and sometimes this subtlety reaches such a high level that it hides from the enemy in a way that cannot be understood. This indicates the strength and goodness of the planning. These practical measures and solutions kept the Islamic Revolution safe and sound from military threats, despite all restrictions, economic hardships, and comprehensive sanctions.

#### 4.4. Empathy and Compassion

In the Holy Qur'an, many verses can be found in the subject of empathy and compassion under concepts such as "واعتصموا، تعاونوا،" "اصلاحوا،" "الف بينهم،" "امه واحده،" Islamic unity is the only fundamental factor in Islam against infidelity, hypocrisy, and discord. The greatest scourge of hope for the enemies is Muslims' honor and independence (Turki, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 164).

By studying the Prophet's lifestyle, it becomes clear that he has always called on Muslims to unite and avoid disunity. He says: "don't disagree, because those who disagreed before you, were perished" (Hindi, 1979 AD/1401 AH: 177). In another narration, he says: "believers are like roots together that help each other".

Since compassion among the troops has a significant effect on victory, Imam Sajjad (AS) prays to God: "dear God, protect their perimeters, make their surroundings impenetrable, and unite them with kindness and affection bond". There must be a friendly and sympathy relation between border guards; because the nature of war evokes man the feeling that the enemy has targeted his body and soul. This segment is trying to say that expressing their friendship and affection to each other will lead them to think about each other, and with the power they have together, they will help each other whenever anyone needs.

But if there is no bond of affection between border guards, any one of them will think that he has been targeted alone against the enemy group, and he feels that if he is confronted with all enemies, none of them will have mercy on him. He will also think that he is incapable of facing them alone, which will lead to his failure, despair, and hopelessness. Then they will do their best to repel danger only from themselves, neither from the border nor from the nation (Mohsen Beigi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 41). It is evident that from this point of view, the Islamic army has gained more power with its unity. The enemy will no longer be able to weaken their honor and power by spreading hypocrisy and discord. (Akhavan Kazemi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 141).

Emphasizing the issue of armed forces unity, the Supreme Leader of Revolution described it as the fluid of national pride and said: "I emphasize unity between armed forces. Unity does not mean unification; Unity means harmony and empathy. The army, IRGC, and police organization must work well in their assigned duties, elevate themselves in terms of quality, acknowledge others officially, respect and value them, and empathize with them. It becomes the manifestation of the national authority"<sup>12</sup>.

#### **4.5. Patience and Persistence**

Patience and persistence are the saints' paths, and it's a command from God to get rid of arrogance and overcome them. Industry and its synonyms follow a truth: to stand up and stay on issues until goals have been reached (Islami, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 39). Qur'an considers Patience and persistence as one of the most critical factors of Islamic army victory against the enemy on the battlefield and says: "Prophet! Encourage believers to fight. Whenever there are twenty of you with persistence, they will overcome two hundred, and if there are a

---

12. <https://Farsi.Khamenei.ir. 1/28/80>.

hundred, they will be victorious over a thousand people who disbelieve ... And God is with patient people” (Anfal: 66).

These verses explicitly state that the condition for success and victory over the enemy is patience. Verses are in the position of duty and law, not informing, then the acquisition of patience and persistence is incumbent and necessary (Taheri Khorramabadi, 2001AD/1380 SH: 13).

Patience and persistence are considered as conditions of divine victory. In verse 125 of the Al-Emran, God Almighty refers to the holy triumph in Badr's battle. In the Battle of Badr, Muslims faced a small number of troops and equipment, but they waited and were blessed by the divine's help, and God sent down angels to help them (Taheri Khorramabadi, 2001AD/1380 SH: 182-183).

Imam Ali (AS) advises his son Muhammad Hanafiyyah before the battle of Jamal: “if mountains are shaken, be consistent ... and know that victory is for only God” (Makarem, 2005 AD/1384 SH, p.856). With this in mind, Imam Sajjad (AS) asks God for patience and persistence toward border guards in the twenty-seventh prayer of Sahifa Sajjadiah and says: “strengthen them with your victory and help them with patience”.

Patience plays an essential role in preparing oneself to endure physical abuse when hardships and sufferings increase. During the war, there are movement and effort, vigilance and thirst, danger, etc. also there are many wounds, the martyrdom of brothers in arms, and so on that all of them require patience. So Mujahid needs the patience to help him cope with these events, and it is undoubtedly necessary to implement effective programs to raise the level of human tolerance. There is no doubt that the pride of the Islamic Revolution armed forces in the imposed war resulted from their exemplary patience and persistence in the face of all difficulties and shortcomings.

#### 4.6. Invisible Blessing

"Blessing" in terms of the Holy Quran is from the root (ب ر ك), which is a kind of connected and continuous assistance and used in good and bad deeds (Ragheb Isfahani, 1990: 763). Blessing is divines help and grace that includes the whole universe.

From time to time, God Almighty shows his significant and noticeable aids, removes veils of negligence from the eyes of human beings, and completes his argument against them more than before. Undoubtedly, men's worthiness and their higher faith levels provide a better background for observing occult aids. From the perspective, Islam sacrificed warriors to go to the battlefields to promote the truth, so they have more outstanding merit to receive special aids (AsghariNejad, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 87). What is considered inevitable and confirmed by the Holy Quran's verses is God's support for the believers union in the fight against religion's enemies. God has made it obligatory for herself (Room, 47). Some parts of aids in the Holy Quran are related to Muslims' wars against polytheists and infidels at

the beginning of Islam. God helps Muslims against their enemies by natural factors and invisible armies. (Safaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 57). Imam Sajjad (AS) also asks God's occult help for border guards and says: "help them with groups of angels who come to aid them one after another". If warriors believe that they are on the right path, God will help them; they will have stronger motivation to protect borders and participate in the wars. Without saying, this occult help maybe to instill fear in the enemy's hearts or bring peace and tranquility to the warrior's hearts.

The role of occult aid, especially in the victory of the imposed war, is undeniable. Referring to the existence of these unseen aids in the imposed war, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution in the form of memory said: "you know that one of the divine aids in the battles of Holy Prophet (PBUH) was to make enemy forces less countable in the eyes of the Islamic armies".

Once, we had only one brigade in front of two and a half Iraqi divisions in the west of Ahvaz, and the brigade's talent was not even right as a battalion! The Iraqis did not come forward out of fear of this brigade ... Instead, our troops formed a small team of about fifty or sixty people from volunteer forces of IRGC or a mixture of both, somet the miracle of the early Islam wars stems from martyrdom's spirit and religious thought of devoted and loving men. In the Battle of Badr, when Abu Osama al-Joshami, a well-known warrior, was escorted by polytheists to identify the Islamic army, he said in his report that he supported the previous statement. He described Islam's army as follows: "swearing God, I have never seen such a man, weapons, horses and camels, but I have seen people who do not want to return to their families" (Hozeh Information Site, 2006).

The spirit of jihad and martyrdom was so prevalent among the Islamic army so deeply saddened believers whom some reason could not be present in the battlefield and, according to the Qur'an, their tears have flowed from their eyes (Tobe: 92).

Imam Sajjad (AS) also calls such spirit for warriors so that they can raise the flag of Islam on the horizon of the world and in this way they should not turn their backs on the enemy or escape thoughts to their minds, so Imam says dear God peace upon Muhammad and his family. When they have faced the enemies, erase deceptive world and lustful sedition of their hearts, so thoughts about turning back on enemy fade away in their hearts and forget about running away from their partner in their minds.

Undoubtedly, the Islamic Revolution fighters' martyrdom in the holy defense, which resulted from their faith and strong will in the fight against the wrong, can be considered the main factor for victory in the imposed war. The most modern equipment stops working when

facing a resilient and martyrdom-seeking force.<sup>13</sup> The Supreme Leader of the Revolution also mentioned the spirit of martyrdom and sacrifice as the main factors in standing up and eliminating threats; for example, he said: “advanced military weapons and equipment did not conquer Khorramshahr, but it happened by relying on God, courage, martyrdom, and sacrifice of the warriors and people of Iran” (Statement dated 3/3/82).

### Conclusion

The national power of any country is influenced by the military, economic, political, social, cultural, technological capacity, etc, among them, military force is significant. Therefore, among various organizations, the Armed Forces, as an institution that provides security, stability, tranquility, and protection of the nation's fundamental values and vital interests and the establishment of public order for society, in any system and era had been interested in countries and rulers. It is even more critical for the Islamic Revolution armed forces because possible future wars will be unequal and asymmetrical in military equipment and weapons (physical factors of combat ability). But one crucial point is that the situation of non-physical aspects in the combat ability of the Islamic Revolution armed forces is different, and Iran has the upper hand in this regard. Therefore, paying these factors (non-physical factors of combat ability), explaining, and strengthening them is incredibly important. For this reason, this study aims to analyze and explain non-physical aspects of combat ability of the Islamic Revolution armed forces by emphasizing the view of Imam Sajjad (AS) in the twenty-seventh prayer of Sahifa Sajjadiah. Related the results of the research to these factors:

1. Faith and Will;
2. Knowledge, insight, and necessity to obtain enough information from the enemy;
3. Planning and finding a solution;
4. Empathy and compassion;
5. Patience and persistence;
6. Invisible blessing;
7. Desired martyrdom.

In this article, each of these factors and its function to create combat ability is explained, examined, and analyzed. It is necessary that these factors, as before, be at the forefront of all actions of the Islamic Revolution armed forces.

---

13. <https://Farsi.Khamenei.ir>. 3/3/82.



## References

The Holy Quran.

A Group of Writers. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Encyclopedia of Imam Sajjad*. Qom: Ashura Specialized Base.

Akhavan Kazemi, B. (2007 AD/1386 SH). "Doctrine and Security Defense Policies in Sahifa Sajjadiah." *Journal of Defense Policies*. Vol. 16, no. 61, pp. 119-152.

Ameli, S. (2009). *Political Politics in the Prayer of the People of Al-Thaghur*. Beirut: Javad Center for Printing and Publishing.

Aqa Bozorg Tehrani, SH. (1983 AD/1403 AH). *Alzaria*. Tehran: Islamic Library of Tehran.

Asgharinejad, M. (2005 AD/1384 SH). "Invisible Blessing in Sacred Defense." *Journal of Preachers*. Vol. 7, no. 70, pp. 86-93.

Ashtiani, MR. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "Explaining Theoretical Components of Non-physical Factors Affecting the Combat Ability of Military Forces." *Defense Strategy*. Vol. 9, no. 32, pp. 69-102.

Badakhshan, N. (2005 AD/1384 SH). "Faith and Moral Virtues." *Religious Thought*. Vol. 5, no. 14, pp. 1-22.

Bukhari, M. (1891 AD/1309 AH). *Sahih al-Bukhari*. Egypt: Dar al-Hadith.

Doaei, M. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *AswaKamel*. Tehran: Ettelaat Publications.

Farahidi, Kh. (1988 AD/1410 AH). *Al-Ain*. Qom: Library of the School of Jurisprudence.

Ghanbari Jahromi, M. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Principles of War and Combat Power*. Tehran: Command and Staff College Publications.

Gholam-Ali, A. (2013 AD/1392 SH). "Validation of Sahifa Sajadieh." *Quarterly Journal of Hadith Sciences*. Vol. 18, no. 69, pp. 32-58.

Hosseini Jalali, M. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *Jihad of Imam Sajjad*. (M, Danesh. Trans). Mashhad: Qods Razavi Province Publications.

**Non-physical Combat Ability Components of Iranian Islamic Revolution Armed Forces with Emphasis on the View of Imam Sajjad (AS) in the Prayers of "MARZDARAN"**

<https://ir.sputniknews.com/Politics/201812184279203>.

<https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech>.

Ibn Fares, A. (1977 AD/1399 SH). *Dictionary of the Comparative Word*. Qom: Dar Al-Fikr.

Islami, A. (1985 AD/1364 SH). *Jihad*. Tehran: Besat.

Khan Ahmadi, I; Miyar, Y. (2013 AD/1392 SH). "The Role of Insight in Improving Combat Ability of Armed Forces." *Quarterly Journal of Defense Strategy*. Vol. 11, no. 44, pp. 187-221.

Koleini, A. (1988). *Sufficient Principles*. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Islamiya.

Koushki, M. (2002 AD/1381 SH). "Benefits from the political knowledge of Sahifa Sajjadih (Prayer of the border guards)." *Epistemological Studies in Islamic University*. Vol. 1, no. 14, pp. 147-156.

Lotfi, M. (2018 AD/1397 SH). "Identifying and Prioritizing Human Resource Management Measures Affecting Organizational Identification to Improve Combat Capability (A Case Study of a Defense Industrial unit)." *Military Management*. Vol. 18, no. 69, pp. 82-103.

Madani, M; Absalan, M. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "The Effect of Transformational Leadership on Improving Combat Ability." *Military Management Quarterly*. Vol. 15, no. 59, pp. 32-58.

Makarem, N. (2005 AD/1384 SH). *Nahj al-Balaghah*. Qom: Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib School.

Miqdad, F. (1983 AD/1405 AH). *Irshad Al-Talibin Ali Nahj Al-Mustarshuddin*. Qom: Ayatollah Marashi Library Publications.

Mohsen Beigi, M. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Translation of the Book Siyasaah Al-Harb Fi Dua'aAhl al-Thaghau*. Sabzevar: Sabzevar Teacher Training University.

Mostafavi, H. (1981 AD/1360 SH). *Research in the Words of the Holy Quran*. Tehran: Book Translation and Publishing Company.

Mottaqi Hindi, A. (1979 AD/1401 AH). *Kunz al-Amal fi Sunan al-Aqwalwa al-A'fal*. Qom: Al-Rasalah Foundation.

- Muhaddith al-Nuri, H. (1986 AD/1408 SH). *Almostadrek-o-Alvasael*. Qom: Ahl-o-AlBait Foundation.
- Nozari, F. (2010 AD/1389 SH). *Concepts of Combat Power and Principles of War*. Tehran: Faculty and Defense Research Institute.
- Ragheb Isfahani, H. (1990). *Al-Mufradat Fi Gharib Al-Quran*. Beirut: Dar Al-Alam.
- Safaei, H; Hosseini Qaleh Bahman, S A. (2012 AD/1391 SH). "A Comparative Study of the Blessing Tradition in the Holy Quran and the Old Testament." *Knowledge of Religions*. Vol. 4, no. 13, pp. 41-68.
- Sajistani, S. (1988). *Sunan Abi Dawood*. Beirut: Dar Al-Ahya Al-Sunnah Al-Nabawiyah.
- Sarmad, Z; Bazargan, A; Hejazi, E. (2006 AD/1385 SH). *Research Methods in Behavioral Sciences*. Tehran: Agah Publishing.
- Shirvani, A. (2003 AD/1382 SH). *Sahifa Sajjadiah*. Qom: Darolfekr.
- Sobhi, H. (1997 AD/1376 SH). *Leadership, Management and Military Command*. Tehran: Command and Staff College Publications.
- Taheri Khorramabadi, S. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Jihad in the Quran*. Qom: Book Garden.
- Tehrani, A. (1981). *Al-Dari'a al-Tasanif al-Shi'a*. Beirut: Dar al-Azwa.
- Turki, R. (2018 AD/1397 SH). "National Unity and Islamic Cohesion from Perspective of Islamic Verses." *Hadiths and Traditions, Research Journal of Nations*. Vol. 3, no. 32, pp. 1-18.
- Zamani Mahjoub, H. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "Impact of Spiritual Factors on the Victory of Muslims in the Early Wars of Islam." *Iranian Defense Security Research*. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 143-163.
- Zarif, J. (2019 AD/1398 SH). <https://factnameh.com%2Ffact-checks%2F2019-07-18-iran-militarybudget.html&usg=AOvVaw1L5mwEpr7qsAY9TJyIBxsv>.



# The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

Hossein Aslipour\*<sup>1</sup>, Sara Mohammadi<sup>2</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.9.3

1. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Allameh Tabatabaie University, Tehran, IRAN.

2. M.A. Graduate in Public Administration, Allameh Tabatabaie University, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 4 August 2021 - Accepted: 8 October 2021)

## Abstract

In today's cultural theories, the term "Representation" refers to the relationship between an artwork and the reality considered external to the artwork. The intended fact in this study is "Jihadi Management" in the sacred defense. Applying some managerial experiences simultaneously with the formation of the Islamic Revolution and the observation of tangible and significant achievements of these experiences, especially the experience of the sacred defense, has confirmed the existence of entirely indigenous (Islamic-Iranian) management models in Iran. One prominent example of such a management model is the theory or style of jihadi management. The present study is conducted to answer two main questions: First, 'What are the characteristics of a jihadi management model based on the experience of sacred defense?' And second, 'What are the implications of representing this model from the perspective of communication science?' In this regard, researchers based on a qualitative approach and using the "Content Analysis" research strategy have purposefully collected textual data and conducted semi-structured interviews. Findings indicate the formation of a conceptual model of jihadi management of holy defense under three categories of central themes of "Structural Dimension" (including four sub-themes), "Behavioral Dimension" (including six sub-themes) and "Contextual Dimension" (including five sub-themes) based on statements of the interviewees. Finally, the implications of representation of this model from the perspective of communication science are presented in three sections: the content, method, and tools of representation.

**Keywords:** Jihadi Management, Islamic Management, Representation Theory, Sacred Defense, Communication Representation

---

\*. Corresponding Author: aslipour@atu.ac.ir

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

### Introduction

The relation of Western management models with the indigenous values of other countries is one of the topics that has occupied the minds of thinkers and social reformers for a long time. Meanwhile, applying some managerial experiences simultaneously with the formation of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and observing tangible and significant achievements of these experiences, especially the experience of sacred defense, has confirmed entirely indigenous (Islamic-Iranian) management models in the country. The re-application of the mentioned experiences is one of the preconditions for achieving the goals considered in the second step of the Islamic Revolution. Hence, it can be claimed to be subject to the existing conditions and incomplete adaptation of Western management theories regardless of their theoretical and value-driven context. It has stopped the general management of the country from achieving the desired goals or at least created some essential obstacles in this direction. The statement of the second step of the Islamic Revolution addressed to the youth says: "Take advantage of past experiences and lessons, apply the revolutionary view and the revolutionary spirit and jihadist action, and make dear Iran a perfect model of the advanced Islamic system" (Khamenei. Declaration, 2018 AD/1397 SH).

On the other hand, in the forty-year-old history of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, there are phrases from the management of collective, extensive, and practical work that has been directly or indirectly derived from the teachings of pure Islam. In some institutions founded by the Revolution, including the constructive jihad, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Basij, as well as the unique experiences of the Islamic Revolution, such as the eight-year-old experience of the holy defense, patterns of administration and organization, were significantly different from the traditional organizational system. It means that the conventional centralist system no longer existed, but the structure and method of participatory management based on the guidelines and perceptions of the Islamic management system had created a new management model.

In such a context, constructing a theory in the realm of "Islamic Management" based on Indigenous values derived from Islam and national culture foundations is an issue for which a coherent and integrated answer has not yet been provided. The Supreme Leader has repeatedly emphasized such an issue: "National determination and jihadi management were used as a slogan in 1393, but this is not relevant this year; this is our identity, this is our dignity, this is our future, and this is the sketcher of our destiny. If we have national determination, if we have jihadi management, the economy would prosper, the culture would prosper. A nation with an advanced

economy and culture will be at its peak and will not be humiliated” (Khamenei. Statements in the meeting of Mapna industrial group, 1393/10/2). "It is impossible to proceed with normal movement; cannot do great things with normal movement and possibly drowsiness and numbness; a jihadist effort is needed. Jihadi mobilization and jihadi management are needed for this." (Khamenei. Statement at the meeting to explain the policies of the resistance economy, 1392/12/20)

The greatness of the forty-year-old advances of the Iranian nation can then be seen correctly that this time is compared with similar times in great revolutions such as the French Revolution and the Revolution of the Soviet Union and the Indian Revolution. The Islamic faith and belief inspire jihadist managements in the principle of "We Can" teach by Imam Khomeini to all of us, lead Iran to honor and progress in all areas (Khamenei. Declaration, 2018 AD/1397 SH).

Of course, the appropriate (native) management model cannot be derived by relying solely on the conventional management literature. The present study is conducted to answer two main questions: ‘What are the characteristics of a jihadi management model based on the experience of sacred defense?’ And ‘What are the implications of representing this model from the perspective of communication science?’ The present research is innovative compared to other research in this field in the following two perspectives: "Structural", "Behavioral," and "Contextual" dimensions; then, analysis of the implications of the representation of the jihadi management of the sacred defense through the lens of communication science.

## **1. Theoretical Foundations**

### **1.1.1. Jihad and Jihadi Management**

The word jihad comes from the root jihad, meaning to try and jihad (with e sound), meaning to try and fight "For the Sake of God." (Soltani and Salavatian, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 202)

Jihad is the source of action and means to try hard, and the name means "War." War is called jihad because the effort is accompanied by suffering (Latifi; et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 138). Jihad, in the term, is spending one's life, property, and power in the way of promoting the word of Islam and performing the rituals of faith (Latifi and Sa'dabadi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 96).

The term "Jihadi Management" has been used for the first time in the literature on management science in the article "Employee Participation and Its Role in the Development of Organizational Affairs" in Shahrivar 1377 and following administrative reform programs, which of course was not considered by the scientific community. Afterward, in early 90s (around early 2010 decade), this concept was emphasized by the Supreme Leader, paving the way for

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

numerous studies and researches on "Jihadi Management." He has repeatedly stated in his speeches that this issue that shows the importance of this issue. Among them, we can mention the statements in the meeting with the mayor and the Tehran City Council members, which were defined as follows: "Jihadi management is the same work and effort with divine intention and based on science and tact. There are other definitions in this case, which we will mention a few. Jihadi management is a process based on divine values, thinking and collective and participatory work to make the best use of resources and provide the most appropriate service or services to the target community" (Soltani and Salavatian, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 203).

Jihadi management is associated with self-sacrifice, an activity beyond the usual routine, proper planning, etc. here a member does not think of himself. He considers the group's benefit to performing his duty truly and honestly for the sake of God (Ghorbanizadeh et al., 2015 AD/1394 SH: 228). Jihadi management is also a holy struggle to eliminate exploitation and tyranny, which seeks to create a warm and value-based atmosphere based on Islamic principles for organization members and eliminate political, economic, social, cultural, and industrial deprivation. This management style aims to create a suitable environment for the growth of employees and, as a result, to reach nearness to God (Miri, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 39).

These definitions are essential because they express the ideology and attitude of jihadi management as a successful model and experience derived from the eight years of holy defense. For this reason, it has been considered by many scholars. In describing the sacred defense, the Supreme Leader likens it to a treasure from which many angles are still hidden. "I want to say that this war is a treasure," he said. "Will we be able to use this war? Those eight years of war must feed our history" (Khamenei. Statements in the meeting of the officials of the Office of Art and Literature of the Resistance, 1370/4/25).

### 1.1.2. Areas of Jihadi Management

Jihad and jihadi management are necessary for success and overcoming crises at any time, whether in the holy defense, which was a military war, or now that we are witnessing economic, cultural, and other conflicts. It is possible to provide indigenous solutions to the problems and issues of today's organizations by reviewing and using the managerial experiences of the holy defense era, which is a clear example of jihadi management (Bagheri and Moradi Rudbali, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 82). The Supreme Leader, while enumerating the numerous developments in the country after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, states that "These are part of the manifestations of the dignity of the Islamic Republic, which



could not be achieved except with the courage and wisdom of jihadi leaders” (Khamenei. Declaration, 2018 AD/1397 SH).

### **1.1.3. Military Jihad**

Defending the root of repulsion means to repel, detain, etc.; the term refers to the methods and measures taken by one or more allied countries to repel attacks or resist political, military, economic, social, psychological, or technological attacks (Baghi Nasrabadi and Sadeghzadeh, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 36). The successful administration of eight years of holy defense and war management should be considered the result of the religious worldview and Shia Islam. It should analyze the creativity of commanders and managers in various fields of holy defense with this attitude. Jihadi management is a relic of the sacred defense era, in which the equipping of material and human capital and planning took place in an Islamic and religious context (Moradi and Firoozabadi, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 61).

### **1.1.4. Constructive Jihad**

After the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and by order of Imam Khomeini on 6/17/1979, an institution called Constructive Jihad was formed, which was the result of Imam's revolutionary thought. The purpose of this mass-based institution was nothing but to fight poverty and deprivation and develop villages, independence, and self-sufficiency in general. The reason for this benevolent institution's reputation was its high performance despite low facilities, as well as the jihadists' good manners (Ghaed Ali and Ashouri, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 74-75). Constructive Jihad was an institution that emerged from the heart of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, had its values, and "Jihadi Management" also found meaning by maintaining such importance in the workplace (Ibid: 69).

### **1.1.5. Scientific Jihad**

Today, the establishment of the country's authority is the explicit goal of the Islamic Republic. According to the Supreme Leader, the component that has the most significant impact on establishing and consolidating the country's authority is the subject of science and scientific jihad. Some statements by the leadership have been made to explain this important point: “Now my public demand to you, young people, is to take this path with a greater sense of responsibility and as a jihad. Rise and remove the malicious and vindictive enemy, who is very scared of your scientific jihad” (Khamenei. Declaration, 2018 AD/1397 SH).

“Today, one of the most basic discourses of our country should be the discourse of the progress of science and technology; there is no turning back. Without us seeking scientific progress and scientific growth and increasing scientific power, and without bringing this scientific possibility to the level of our lives and elevating material

## **The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation**

life, it is not possible to confront the powers” (Khamenei. Statements in the meeting of elite university youth, 1387/6/5).

One of the successful examples of "Scientific Jihad" is the Royan Research Institute. This research institute was established in Khordad 1370 as a limited surgery center to provide medical services to infertile couples and research and education in reproductive and infertility sciences by Dr. Saeed Kazemi Ashtiyani and a group of researchers and colleagues in Iran University of Medical Sciences.

### **1.1.6. Political Jihad**

The jihadi management was mainly used in the military field during the holy defense, but now it can be extended to other dimensions such as economic, cultural, and political (Ghorbanizadeh et al., 2015 AD/1394 SH: 233).

Jihadi management is a comprehensive approach for all levels and areas of management. One of them is the field of politics, which affects other fields. Today, jihadi management in the political arena means resisting and not giving in to the imposed demands. In the words of the Supreme Leader, the same "Great Jihad" means disobeying the enemy's will and replacing the word of Islam instead. Creating the right motivation in the organization and the proper arrangement of incentives is the main factor in maintaining and promoting organizational authority. Some of the characteristics include independence, voluntariness, the rule of law, and so on (Rostami, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 54).

### **1.1.7. Cultural Jihad**

One of the most critical areas of jihadi management is the field of culture. The role of culture is significant in the interactions and communications of individuals and communities. Culture is one of the most widely used terms in social life and can set no specific limits for applying this concept. This concept's breadth of meaning and inclusion has caused many human affairs and social phenomena to be covered and dominated. "Cultural Jihad" means the struggle against the "Cultural Invasion" of the enemy. The Supreme Leader first used the term cultural aggression in early 70s (around early 1990 decade): Cultural aggression is when a political or economic group attacks the cultural foundations for its political purposes and to capture a nation. Such a collection also brings new things into that country and that nation; but by force; and to replace them with national culture and beliefs (Khamenei. Statements in a meeting with a group of cultural agents, 1371/5/21).

### **1.1.8. Economic Jihad**

One of the areas of Jihadi management is the field of economics. This area is so essential that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution stated in his speeches, I have declared this year the "Year of Economic Jihad." "It means that the Iranian nation's jihad at this

point of time is mainly in the field of the economy" (Khamenei. Statements in a meeting with the people and employees of Asaluyeh Oil Industry, 1390/1/8). Jihadi management in the economic field is contrary to consumerism, aristocracy, and technocratic methods that produce the culture of capitalism. Capitalist thinking leads society towards consumerism and deviation from the ideals of revolution and justice. It is a point that the loyalists of jihadi management have avoided and have tried to lead the society towards jihadi thinking. Jihadi management in economics can be considered an attempt to implement the model of "Resistance Economy." After reforming the consumption pattern, the second important step in realizing a resistance economy is jihadi management or economic jihad (Rostami, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 53).

#### **1.1.9. Administrative Jihad**

Jihadi organization is a tool for realizing jihadi thinking to govern the country and society. The purpose of forming a jihadi organization is to solve problems and help the Islamic government better manage the Islamic community and its prominent owners, the people, especially the oppressed. The jihadi organization does not have a policy-making role but pursues and implements the macro-policies of the Islamic system. The goal of each member of the jihadi organization is to get closer to God Almighty, who uses the tools and context of the jihadi organization to achieve this goal. The mere existence of a jihadist factor is not enough to form a jihadist organization; instead, these people need to interact constructively with their rules and value system (Latifi et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 74).

In this regard, the tenth paragraph of the second principle of the constitution, creating a proper administrative system and eliminating unnecessary organizations, is an essential requirement for achieving the Islamic Revolution's goals. In the theory of jihadi management, the concept of "Organization" is changed to "Institution" because, the institution is a set in which the role of values is prominent and has more stability and characteristics such as flexibility and need-oriented.

In comparison, organizations are tool-oriented and act in a calculated way. In jihadi institutions, the basis of actions is based on trust, and individuals cooperate. Still, due to the predominance of redundant administrative processes in organizations, the ground is uncertain, so jihadi management is closer to the concept of "Institution" (Aslipour et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 254-255).

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation




Figure 1: Seven Areas of Jihadi Management

### 1.1.10. Representation Theory in Communication Science

According to experts, the visual and textual representations of the mass media are significant for our lives. Therefore they have formulated their analysis of how these representations are in the framework of "Representation Theory." Conceptual representation is proper because it integrates things that, at first glance, seem like nothing more than a diverse and discrete set of conceptual idioms (Khashe'i and Mirhaji, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 167).

The term representation refers to a process in which signs manifest their meaning and refers to the product of this process. Characters are organized from languages, and the existence of common languages allows us to translate thoughts and concepts into words, sounds, and images. In this way, we can express meanings and pass on beliefs to others by using these translations, which act as a language (Hall, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 356).

Aristotle believed that there are three main factors in representation: object, method, and tool. The thing is what is represented. The technique is related to the representation method, and tools are mediums and devices used for representation. Tools can include language, color, materials, sculpture, and various forms of music (Gharebaghi: 2004 AD/1383 SH: 38).

Representation comes in many forms—linguistic, mental, artistic, and scientific representation. But in the meantime, artistic representation has a relatively long history, and visual representation has a special place among artistic representations. This representation is particular because if art is to be representative, the visual arts have more quality than any other art (Yaghmaei and Sheikh Rezaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 116).

Monroe Bradley uses three terms, "Illustration," "Characterization," and "Symbolism," to refer to different types of representation. The illustration is the representation of an object as a type. Characterization represents a character, and symbolism is represented through virtual and metaphorical meaning (Tabataba'i, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 63).

Various theories have been proposed about representation, which can generally be classified into three categories: "Cognitive" theories, "non-Cognitive" theories, and "Hybrid" theories. However, non-cognitive theories of representation have the strength to answer why representation also faces various problems. In many cases, the similarity is neither a necessary condition for representation nor a sufficient condition.

On the other hand, cognitive theories try to explain the orientation of the relationship by taking the mental aspect of representation seriously, especially intentionally, but what these theories fail to do is explain why everything does not represent anything else. By presenting a "Hybrid Theory" and combining the intent of cognitive factors with structural similarity, Ronald Giere tries to avoid the weaknesses of each of these theories and take advantage of their strengths. Combined representation implies that "The representation of R represents the purpose of T if there is a (structural) similarity between R and T, according to the intent of the cognitive factor S of the representation."

The purpose of representation theory is to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for representation. Although Giere's theory of hybrid representation satisfies our intuitions about representation by considering the similarity and intent of the cognitive agent and includes examples of representation, it also consists of the fundamental point that the role of the cognitive agent is critical according to his intention in representation (Yaghmaei and Sheikh Rezaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 130).

## 2. Research Method

Due to the exploratory nature and the nature of the research questions, the research method has been selected based on a qualitative approach and, in particular, the "Thematic Analysis" strategy. Since the thematic analysis method examines and analyzes qualitative and textual data, the data collection method is done in text extraction cycles. The researcher better understands the text by going back and forth (Patton, 2002: 94; Packer, 1989: 137).

The analysis of information in the content analysis method is based on the "coding" process. The theme expresses something important in the data concerning the research questions and shows the meaning and concept of the pattern in the data set. This method

### The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

analyzes textual data and converts scattered and diverse data into rich and detailed data (Braun and Ckarke, 2006: 88).

A theme is a pattern found in data that at least describes and organizes observations and at most interprets aspects of the phenomenon under study (Boyatzis, 1998: 4). The network of themes is based on a specific procedure based on steps such as "Seeing the Text," "Proper Perception and Understanding of Seemingly Irrelevant Information," and "Qualitative Information Analysis." It is obtained by classifying the themes into separate classes (primary and secondary articles) (Abedi Ja'fari et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 23).

In this study, based on textual data obtained from research on sacred defense and jihadi management, and interviews conducted by the researcher, the statements of relevant experts were coded and classified into three categories: "Military Commanders," "Scientific Experts," and "Executive Managers." The basis of the dimensions and components of jihadi management in the sacred defense has been extracted. The table below shows the distribution of features of 11 interviewees.

**Table 1:** Distribution of interviewees and experts

ID	age	Description	General classification
<i>F1</i>	64	The members of the Khatam al-Anbiya Base in the holy defense	<b>Military commanders</b>
<i>F2</i>	68	The Commander of the Division in Holy Defense - Revolutionary Guards Corps	
<i>F3</i>	65	Staff Commander of the Holy Defense - Revolutionary Guards Corps	
<i>F4</i>	58	Commander of the Unit in Holy Defense - Army	
<i>K1</i>	44	University Faculty Member - Business Management	<b>Scientific Experts</b>
<i>K2</i>	48	University faculty member - Public Administration	
<i>K3</i>	40	University faculty member - Political Science	
<i>K4</i>	38	University Faculty member - Islamic Studies	
<i>M1</i>	42	Executive managers in Tehran Municipality (1392)	<b>Executive managers</b>
<i>M2</i>	68	Director of the Islamic Revolution Committee (during the Holy Defense)	
<i>M3</i>	40	Manager in Knowledge-based Company with the subject of jihadi activity	

### 3. Dimension and Components of Jihadi Management in Sacred Defense

One of the well-known models in identifying different dimensions of a phenomenon with a managerial approach is the "Three-pronged" model. This model can be considered one of Iran's few wholly indigenous (rather than translated) management science models. Mirzaei Ahranjani believes that the factors of organization and management can be studied and analyzed in the form of three categories of factors: "Behavioral," "Structural," and "Contextual." The branch of organizational structure means all the elements, characteristics, and physical and inhuman conditions of the organization that forms the organization's framework, shell, body, or physical and material structure through particular order and rule. Therefore, all non-living factors of the organization (including financial resources, information, etc.), when considered with a unique composition in the body of the whole organization, are considered part of the structural branch of the organization (Mirzaei Ahranjani and Sarlak, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 29-32).

The meaning of the content or behavior of the organization is human and human relations in the organization, which are intertwined with behavioral norms, informal communication, and specific patterns and form the main content of the organization, which are considered as living organizational factors (Mirzaei Ahranjani, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 44-48).

Finally, the context branch refers to all the environmental and bedrock conditions and factors that govern the organization or its management conditions. This branch is the most important and main branch and not only causes the survival and growth of the other two units but also creates two other components. The overall survival and overall growth of the organization depend on it (Ibid: 55).

In such a relationship, structural, behavioral, and contextual factors are interacting in the form of continuous systemic relationships. The three branches are three species of one type - mainly the dominant kind of context - and there is no trinity between them. Therefore, the distinction and recognition of these three aspects of organizational life is purely theoretical and only analyzes the knowledge of managerial concepts and phenomena (Mirzaei Ahranjani, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 317).

The relationship between structural, behavioral, and contextual factors is that no organizational phenomenon or event can occur outside these three dimensions' interaction. Many organizational concepts, events, and sensations can be studied and analyzed in a three-pronged theory (Structure-Behavior-Context). Therefore, we can also review the phenomenon of jihadi management in the sacred defense in this theoretical model.

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

**Table 2:** Dimensions and components of jihadi management in sacred defense

Component (Sub-Theme)	Dimension (Central Theme)
1. Adherence to a common sacred goal	<b>Structural dimension</b>
2. Flexibility of structure and organization	
3. Decentralized and open decision making	
4. Evaluation system based on self-control	
5. Participatory good practice	<b>Behavioral dimension</b>
6. Conscious and wise homework	
7. Jihadist spirit based on sincerity	
8. Hard work and indefatigability	
9. Patience and perseverance in jihad	
10. Choosing a legitimate and ethical tool	<b>Background Dimension</b>
11. Definitive Sovereignty of Divine Traditions	
12. Jihadi culture	
13. Values derived from pure Islam	
14. Revolutionary and Ashura origins	
15. Knowing the enemy in struggle	

### 3.1. Structural dimension

Regarding the definition, the organization is a social phenomenon that is consciously coordinated and has relatively clear boundaries that work almost continuously to achieve a common goal or set of plans (K2).<sup>1</sup>

The existential philosophy of jihadi organizations is the same as the common goal. The only difference is that the nature of the plan in a jihadi organization (or rather an institution) has "Sanctity." "We are defending what our movement, our uprising has given us, and we are defending our Islamic goals and our Islamic country, and everything related to Islam and the country" (Mousavi Khomeini, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 239).

If we consider the goals of a jihadist organization, if these goals align with the objectives and needs of the people who work there, this group can succeed (F2). "Explaining the Sanctity of the Goal," another expert said: "A jihadi leader means accompany with values, that is, one who strives for God has a different intention than one

---

1. The Identifiers Specified at the End of the Interview Phrases are as Follows the Last Column in Table 1.



who has other motives for doing his work". Jihad means self-sacrifice, which means that the manager should use all his abilities to serve the people for the sake of God (K4).

Another theme in the structural dimension is "Flexibility of Structure and Organization. Jihadi management seems to be participatory management, so in terms of organizational structure, it is close to flat structures. Pyramid bureaucratic organizations are based on distrust because Weber has devised measures to prevent abuse, but institutions are based on trust. Therefore, jihadi management is closer to these institutions (K1).

This type of management and leadership itself has principles. The first principle is that the system has a holographic property<sup>2</sup>; each component has real property. Secondly, we do not have something called bureaucracy, and if we do, it is minimal; thirdly, people are the principle and not the structure and process. Another feature is that the formation of these organizations is very gradual and from the bottom up (K2).

"Shahid Beheshti used to say and point out that jihad must go on with itself and government regulations should not rule us to be a model for our local organizations." (F3)

This organizational look at jihadi management will turn it into a fast-paced organization where redundant rules and bureaucracy are meaningless because they are contrary to people's motivations. This organization does not have a long hierarchy, and this feature has led to the formation of a jihadist organization tailored to the needs. The next theme is decentralized and open decision-making. One interviewee puts it this way: "That kind of decision-making process speeds up decision-making, increases decision-making and member accountability, gives people more organizational growth, and distributes responsibility". In other words, the distance between decision and execution is not great (K2).

The last theme in the structural dimension is the "Evaluation System Based on Self-control," which is opposed to formal evaluation systems and completely from top to bottom. One the experts stated in this regard: In the jihadi system, first of all, the individuals themselves must monitor their actions, because there must be the principle of "*Hasibu Qabla an Tuhasibu*". (Get the accounts of your deeds before God accounts them) Then, in addition to individual self-control, there is also a collective self-control. That is, collective supervision in such a way that "Order to Goodness and

---

2. The holographic property means that any part or component of the system separately reflects the whole system. In this case, the well-known example of a broken mirror is used, each part of a broken mirror is like the whole mirror and has retained the basic system property, i.e., representing the image.

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

Prevention of Evil" prevails and they constantly monitor each other (M2).

As mentioned earlier, in general about the structural dimension, the jihadi system changes the concept of "Organization" to "Institution" because, in the jihadi institution, actions are based on trust, and individuals cooperate. Instead, due to the predominance of structural formalities, interactions are based on mutual uncertainty in organizations.

### 3.2. Behavioral Dimension

One of the issues in jihadi management and, in particular, the sacred defense is participation, which is classified under the theme of "Participatory Good Practice." One of the characteristics of jihadi management is a democracy, attracting meaningful involvement of the people, paying attention to the deprived and oppressed class (M3).

In a jihadist institution, people trust each other, work together, and exchange information, which leads to innovation and creativity (K2). Another expert has said in this regard: "I Consider the hardcore in jihadi management based on "Being Greedy." Greed to help each other along the way of God" (K4).

The next theme is "Conscious and Knowledgeable Duty," in the sense that the basis of the behavior of individuals in the jihadi system is the performance of the divine task: "If I want to define effectiveness in jihadist management, it is task-oriented and therefore the one who has done his best is successful. In that environment, everyone put the world behind them. Everyone was working on their responsibility" (F1).

Certainly, there has been no operation for us to succeed. There is no divine help. That is why we say the same sentence of Imam that "we are in charge of doing our task not achieving the result" (F2).

The next theme in the behavioral dimension is the "Jihadist Spirit Based on Sincerity." One of the experts stated in this regard: "In my opinion, the main element in jihadi management is intention and sincerity. Sincerity means working with the intention of closeness to God, no matter how much effort there is, no matter how much love and sacrifice, but if there is no sincerity and divine intention in it, it is not a jihadist act" (F4).

Jihadi behavior and spirit as an essential factor in improving performance in various parts of the organization experienced in the first decade of the Islamic Revolution at the community level and especially in constructive jihad, corps, and Basij, has some characteristics (M2).

In Operation of Karbala IV, when the forces were stationed at the headquarters, they realized that the operation was going to take place, everyone was happy. Even though they knew they might go to

the mine tomorrow, they were happy again that I think this spirit is one of the components of jihadi management (F2).

During the war, everyone's orders were verbal, and someone accepted something to do to the point of martyrdom; there was no doubt about doing the task (F1).

One of the key concepts in the jihadi spirit is the combination of jihadi action with martyrdom: "The spirit of martyrdom seems to be very important here, that the person must have made his relationship with the world and the attractions of the world clear" (F3).

Altruism is another category of behavior that in the language of the Qur'an has a different meaning of "Altruism:" "And they are altruism and prefer others to themselves; even though they need it themselves" (Hashr: 9)<sup>3</sup> (K4).

Sacred defense is full of examples of altruism. One expert gave an example: "One of the seminary students reaches a pit in operation with the army battalion, the pit was so wide that the soldiers could not jump over it. It was too deep to know what to do. Finally, they see that they can cross if a person goes in the middle of this pit and bows down and puts their feet on his back. This student goes down and takes a bowing position. All members of this battalion step on his back and pass by, making him injured or martyred" (F2).

Another critical concept in the "Jihadist Spirit" is "Courage in Action." Imam Khomeini described the tremendous effect of the warriors' courage in creating victory as follows: "In the fighting battle, there are warriors, who attack demonic powers like eagles, and their young men have no fear of any power and beat against the enemy so much that everything he had left and fled" (Mousavi Khomeini, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 188).

The next theme is "Hard Work and Indefatigability." One of the hallmarks of jihadi management is spending time and redoubled efforts to work with a careful scientific approach and collective wisdom. The harsh conditions of war required commanders and fighters to use all their existential capacity to defeat the enemy and then show their presence there for 24-hour hours (F2).

One of the experts described such an effort as follows: "A difficult effort so that one sleeps at work due to tiredness" (M2).

The next is following behavioral dimension, i.e., "Patience and Perseverance in Jihad." God Almighty has repeatedly emphasized perseverance and patience in the Holy Qur'an: "Lo! those who say: Our Lord is Allah, and afterward are upright"<sup>4</sup>. Of course, the subject of "Perseverance" in jihad is of much greater importance

۳. «وَيُؤْتِرُونَ عَلَىٰ أَنفُسِهِمْ وَلَوْ كَانَ بِهِمْ خَصَاصَةٌ» (حشر: ۹).

۴. «إِنَّ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ ثُمَّ اسْتَقَامُوا...» (فصلت: ۳۰).

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

because the hardship, unhappiness, and crises are much more significant in the war than in the ordinary course of life.

A clear example of the Holy Qur'an's attention to the issue of resistance is the Battle of Uhud: "Allah verily made good His promise unto you when ye routed them by His leave, until) the moment (when your courage failed you, and ye disagreed about the order..."<sup>5</sup>.

In addition, there are many traditions of patience and persistence in jihad. For example, Imam Ali (AS), in his 190<sup>th</sup> sermon (of *Nahjulbalagha*), addressed the army said: "Stand firm in your place and resist against calamities and problems". One of the experts explained this theme: "Patience and perseverance in jihadi management make sense because its manager sees the horizon over the organization and the vision that arises from the ideology" (F1).

The final theme in describing the behavioral dimension is the quality of using a tool. One of the experts explained the subject as follows: "Those who come to justify the means, using any means, may do great things, but because it is not blessed, it goes out of his way" (M2).

"The jihadi leader cannot ignore the smaller and more partial rights of this path because of the value of the great ideological perspective" (F3).

### 3.3. Background Dimension

The first theme in explaining this dimension is "the Definitive Rule of Divine Traditions." The system of creation in general and the jihadist system, in particular, operate under unchanging divine rules and traditions, and believing in this is a critical factor for jihadi leaders. One of the experts said in this regard: "When you ask God Almighty for help, the paths open to you" (And whosoever keep his duty to Allah, Allah will appoint a way out for him. And will provide for him from (A Quarter) whence he hath no expectation...)<sup>6</sup>.

This sustenance said in this verse and in other verses reaches me and you differently (F2). "God sent His victory over us when He saw our truth in the sacred defense. However, when we work with all our power, consider all aspects and do not be negligent, and at the end leave the result to God, then we saw His miracle" (F1).

The next theme in this field is "Jihadi Culture." The concept of jihadi culture was explained earlier in the section on theoretical foundations. "What the Islamic Revolution gave to our people was a jihadist culture. Jihadi culture is used in all scenes and arenas" (Khamenei, Statements in a meeting with a group of farmers, 1382/10/14). "Everything we learned from jihadi management and

٥. «ولقد صدقكم الله وعده اذ تحسونهم باذنه حتى اذا فشلتم وتنازعتم في الامر...» (آل عمران: ١٥٢).

٦. «و من يتق الله يجعل له مخرجا و يرزقه من حيث لا يحتسب...» (طلاق: ٢-٣).

culture during the holy defense was the culmination of this culture” (F1).

“Our view of jihadi culture is a set of values, beliefs, and characteristics arising from the behaviors and trends, processes, structures, laws, and relations of employees (jihadists), organization (jihad), management and jihadi managers” (K2).

One of the essential components in jihadi culture is "Denying the Demand for Worldly Exaltation" for individuals in the jihadi system. The Qur'an says: “As for that Abode of the Hereafter We assign it unto those who seek not oppression in the earth, nor yet corruption. The sequel is for those who ward off (evil)”<sup>7</sup>.

One of the experts explains this concept: “Basically, the system of motivations that is transcendental, in the sense that it is done to gain worldly supremacy (any worldly desire), is not relevant in jihadi management, that is, in jihadi management, you cannot tell your followers to go for booty” (M3).

The next extracted theme in this section is "Values Derived from Pure Islam." These values are rooted in Islam and the Qur'anic lifestyle, the most important of which are theism, asceticism, and guardianship. Experts have repeatedly emphasized these values. Here we will confine ourselves to just two examples. There were two rival ideas during the time of the Holy Defense.

When the first approach wanted to enter the battle, he joined with a rational calculation that, for example, you must have at least three times the enemy's material strength and capabilities to attack it; otherwise, you will fail, and with this approach, defeats occurred. The second approach said that we should gather our resources and forces as much as possible and then rely on God and pure intention and quite bravely attack the enemy. However, Qur'anic culture has told us that in the Battle of Badr, a small number wins over a large number (M2).

During the war, the enemy was very much in awe, and they heard and knew that all the Arab money in the Persian Gulf region was behind Saddam's army. Our soldiers saw these during the war, but in their hearts, they trusted in God, who said: “And if you help God, indeed He will help you”<sup>8</sup>.

The next theme in the background dimension is the "Revolutionary" and "Ashurayi" of jihadi management. We see the peak of jihadi management in Ashura when Imam Hussein and his companions sacrificed everything and their lives for the sake of God (M1).

7. «تِلْكَ الدَّارُ الْآخِرَةُ نَجْعَلُهَا لِلَّذِينَ لَا يُرِيدُونَ عُلُوًّا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فَسَادًا وَالْعَاقِبَةُ لِلْمُتَّقِينَ» (قصص: ٨٣).

8. «و ان تنصروا الله ينصركم».

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation

The experience of jihadi management is in the sacred defense, which arises from the basis of the Islamic Revolution. It is the school of Imam Khomeini, which is rooted in the culture of Ashura, Shia culture, Ahl al-Bayt, and the Qur'an (K4).

The Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeini broke the monopoly of two types of styles: Neither under the name of the religious management put away reason and justice, nor by the name of rationality, but the school underfoot, and the result is a new pattern. Jihadi management is a type of management that we recognized when the Islamic Revolution took place and the holy defense took place, and we want to codify it. The era of divine protection has played a role in the emergence of jihadi culture and management. It has itself been the product of jihadi culture and management (F1).

The underlying theme or absolute bedrock is "Knowing the Enemy in the Struggle." Jihad is not any kind of effort. Jihad is the effort made in the face of a hostile challenge from the other side (Khamenei. Statements in the meeting of university professors, 1394/4/11).

In other words, the prominent feature of jihad is that it is an effort against the enemy. "Jihadi management is against the enemy. It requires us to redouble our efforts. A management that deals with the obstacles and challenges of perfection are not Islamic" (K2).

### Conclusion

As mentioned in the review of theoretical foundations, Aristotle divides the elements of representation theory into three parts: "Subject," "Method," and "Tool" of representation. If we want to provide a representative model of the jihadi management in the holy defense from communication science, it is necessary to consider the mentioned components.

Now the question arises: 'What are the examples of these three components in the present study?' The "Subject of Representation" is the main content about which the representation takes place. For example, in representing a sacred defense film, concepts such as self-sacrifice, courage, martyrdom, and so on constitute the main content or subject. Earlier, the content of the holy defense, jihadi management, was explained in three sections: "Structural," "Behavioral," and "Contextual," but as mentioned, the point about the "Three-pronged Model" is its high ability to be extended to other areas.

In other words, this model is a universal analysis format. It can be used by all fields and branches of humanities, while in representing jihadi management of sacred defense, we are looking for unique content. The latter is related explicitly to "Management" (not general humanities).

To find this particular content, one must refer to the definition and concept of "Management." Gyolik divides the main tasks of management into six axes: "Planning," "Organizing," "Staffing," "Directing," "Coordinating," "Reporting," and "Budgeting." From his point of view, these tasks are called "Posdcorb" for short.


The results of the various definitions mentioned for management can be presented as follows: "Management is an effective and efficient use of material and human resources based on a value system through planning, organizing, resource mobilization and facilities, directing and controlling operations to achieve defined objectives". According to the above definition, the main content of management will be related to the tasks or "Functions" of management, and these functions form the conceptual boundary of "Management" with other similar and related concepts.

In other words, if we want to explain the distinction between "Jihadi Management" and "Jihadi Work," we will say that what makes us refer to a set of activities as "Management" is the existence of these functions. In jihadi work, there is not necessarily planning, organization, control, supervision, etc. Still, these are functions that must be present in "Jihadi Management."

The existence of these constitutes the nature of "Jihadi Management." The second pillar is the method of representation. In this section, following the theoretical foundations, the combinatorial theory, which has been proposed as the latest theory of the field of representation after two generations of "Cognitive" and "non-Cognitive" approaches, is considered. The central theme in the view of hybridism is the emphasis on correcting and completing the intent of the cognitive factor (in this study: the addressee of jihadi management). In other words, to better represent the jihadi management model of holy defense, we need to complete their mindsets and intentions before reflecting images, videos, etc.

Accordingly, it is necessary to explain the concept of management and special features of jihadi management and convey its basic ideas. It will analyze the main differences between jihadi management style and other conventional management models in Western organizations before their confrontation with theatrical, visual, etc., tools.

## The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation



**Figure 2:** Theoretical framework of the representation of the jihadi management of the sacred defense from the perspective of communication science

Third section is a representation tool that is considered following the theoretical foundations of Moaner and Bradley segmentation. According to their classification, representation tools are classified into three categories: "Illustration," "Characterization," and "Symbolism." What is very important in the "Tools" section is to pay attention to "Communication Channel Richness."

The Media Richness Theory was proposed by Trino, Langel, and colleagues in 1987. The main issue in this theory is the ability of a medium to transmit information. Different types of communication technologies have other effects on the content of the messages they convey. In this regard, organizational communication says that oral tools, including face-to-face conversations, meetings, voice or video calls are much richer for transferring the message of the managers to the employee, compared to written tools such as official correspondence, bylaws, and instructions and written organizational documents.

According to the recommendations of this theory, in the representation of the jihadi management of the holy defense, the use of verbal and interactive tools (such as film, oral explanation, narration and speech, dialogue, etc.) compared to silent tools (such as photos, visual tools, infographics, etc.) has more priority.

### References

Abedi Jafari, H; et al. (2011 AD/1390 SH). "Content Analysis and Content Network: A Simple and Efficient Method for



Explaining Patterns in Qualitative Data." *Journal of Strategic Management Thought*. Vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 151-198.

Aslipour, H; et al. (2016 AD/1395 SH). *An Introduction to the Theory of Jihadi Management*. Tehran: Tehran City Studies and Planning Center Publications.

Bagheri, M; Moradi Rudbali, S. (2016 AD/1395 SH). "Designing a Human Resource Management Model for Holy Defense Commanders (Case Study: The Life of Martyr Mohammad Ibrahim Hemmat)." *Basij Strategic Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 19, no. 71, pp. 81-111.

Baghi Nasrabadi, A; Sadeghzadeh, H. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "Capabilities of Jihadi Management in Sacred Defense at the Level of Sustainable Cultural Patterns." *International Conference on Humanities and Cultural Studies*.

Boyatzis, R.E. (1998 AD/1377 SH). *Transforming Qualitative Information*. Cleveland: Sage.

Braun, V; Clarke, C. (2006 AD/1385 SH). "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology." *Journal of Qualitative Research in Psychology*. Vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 77-101.

Ghaed Ali, H; Ashouri, M. (2014 AD/1393 SH). "Jihadi Management is a Method of Islamic Management (a Case Study of Constructive Jihad in the First Decade of the Islamic Revolution of Iran)." *Cultural Engineering Quarterly*. Vol. 3, no. 82, pp. 67-83.

Gharebaghi, A. (2004 AD/1383 SH). "Vocabulary and Idioms of World Culture, Description of the Word Representation." *Golestaneh*. Vol. 1, no. 58, pp. 37-41.

Ghorbanizadeh, V; et al. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "Content Analysis of Jihadi Management Style Texts." *Police Management Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 219-250.

Hall, S. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Excerpts from the Practice of Representation*. Collection of Communication Theories. (E. Shaghasemi. Trans). Vol. 3. Tehran: Research Institute for Cultural and Social Studies, Ministry of Science, Research and Technology.

**The Model of Jihadi Management in the Sacred Defense and Implications for Its Communicative Representation**

- Khamenei, A. (n.d.). *Statements*. Retrieved from: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir>.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (2018 AD/1397 SH). *Declaration of the Second Step of the Islamic Revolution*. Retrieved from: <http://farsi.khamenei.ir>.
- Khashe'i, V; Mirhaji, S. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "Representation of State Managers in Movies after the Islamic Revolution of Iran." *Journal of Culture and Communication Studies*. Vol. 16, no. 64, pp. 197-165.
- Latifi, M; et al. (2016 AD/1395 SH). "Identifying and Describing the Components of Jihadi Organizations." *Quarterly Journal of Islamic Management*. Vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 165-135.
- Latifi, M; Sadabadi, H. (2014 AD/1393 SH). "A phenomenological Research to Understand the Essence of Jihadi Management." *Culture Strategy*. Vol. 7, no. 28, pp. 92-122.
- Miri, M. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "Components of Jihadi Management from the Perspective of Commanders of the Imposed War." *Master Thesis*. Governmental Management. Allameh Tabataba'i University.
- Mirzaei Ahranjani, H. (1998 AD/1377 SH). "Analysis of Factors Affecting Work Conscience and Social Discipline in the Organization." *Master Thesis*. Public Administration. Islamic Azad University, Qazvin Branch.
- Mirzaei Ahranjani, H; Sarlak, M. (2005 AD/1384 SH). "A Look at Organizational Epistemology: The Evolution of Schools and Management Applications." *Peyk-e Noor*. Vol. 3, no. 11, pp. 69-78.
- Moradi, H; Firoozabadi, S. (2016 AD/1395 SH). "Doctrine and Goals of Jihadi Management from the Perspective of the Supreme Leader." *Quarterly Journal of Soft Power Studies*. Vol. 6, no. 15, pp. 160-190.
- Mousavi Khomeini, R. (1989 AD/1368 SH). *Sahife of Imam*. Vol. 12 and 20. Tehran: Institute for Organizing and Publishing the Works of Imam Khomeini.

- Packer, M; Addison, R. (1998 AD/1377 SH). *Entering the Circle. Hermeneutic Investigations in Psychology*. NY: State University of New York Press (SUNY Press).
- Patton, M. (2002 AD/1381 SH). *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. California: Sage Publication.
- Rostami, M. (2015 AD/1394 SH). "Identifying and Explaining the Dimensions and Components of Jihadi Management in the Field of Culture from the Perspective of Emam Ali (AS)." *Master Thesis*. Quran and Hadith Sciences. Shahed University.
- Soltani, M; Salavatian, S. (2017 AD/1396 SH). "Identifying the Characteristics of a Jihadi Leader by Meta-combination Method." *Islamic Management Research Quarterly*. Vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 199-230.
- Tabatabai, S. (2001 AD/1380 SH). "Cinematic Representation." *Book of the Month of Art*. Vol. 1, no. 41-42, pp. 63-58.
- Yaghmaei, A; Sheikh Rezaei, H. (2012 AD/1391 SH). "Scientific Representation." *Philosophy of Science Journal*. Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 134-115.



# The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics

Hadi Abdolmaleki\*<sup>1</sup>, Leila Majdani<sup>2</sup>

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.10.4

1. Ph.D. in Futures Studies, Supreme National Defense University, Tehran, IRAN.
2. Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA.

(Received: 5 August 2021 – Accepted: 10 September 2021)

## Abstract

As a treasure of revolutionary thinking, morale, and behavior in defense of religion and the country, the Sacred Defense, has a similarity and distinction function to distinguish insiders (friends) from outsiders (enemies), which has given it a unique feature. The Sacred Defense is the answer to who, what, and how we are in defensive arenas, telling the boundary between the civilization friends and enemies of the revolution and Iran. This article aims to explain the unique aspects of the Sacred Defense towards other Iranian and world wars in three cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions by using descriptive-analytical methods. The results show that in the mental dimension, revolutionary Islam and the theory of Velayat-e Faqih and convention of the Leadership of Velayat-e Faqih in the war with the title of "Commander-in-chief" is the exclusive feature of the Sacred Defense. In the affective dimension, the consolidation of the Islamic-Iranian identity bond is another unique feature that has created general mobilization in defense of the religion and land of Iran as a rendezvous for Velayi Islam. In the behavioral dimension, the accelerated growth of sacrificial behaviors, jihad, martyrdom, resistance, trust (in God), self-sacrifice, sincerity, etc., is another unique feature that has highlighted the Sacred Defense in the form of a civilization defense in Iran's history. Therefore, the Sacred Defense was a "Civilization Defense against the Enemies of the Civilization," which brought the enemies to their knees with an entire trilogy: 'Velayi leadership based on the admission of Velayat-e Faqih', 'mass mobilization based on Islamic and Iranian identity bond', and 'jihad and sacrifice based on the belief in the divine salvation.

**Keywords:** Sacred Defense, Defense Culture, Civilization Defense, Sacrifice and Resistance.

---

\*. Corresponding author: ha.abdolmaleki48@gmail.com

### **Introduction**

At the beginning of the days of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the civilization enemies of the revolution sought to overthrow the new Islamic system by choosing pressure on the revolution in addition to domestic sedition by imposing an early direct war. After a while, due to the nature and severity of regional and trans-regional hostility against the revolution, the people and the revolution leaders came to conclude that this volume of the enemy's pressure and conspiracy would not be inhibited except through the massive and active presence of people in the defense, sacrifice, jihad and resistance field. Therefore, doubled the leaders' determination and social strata for adequate attendance in the fighting and resistance field.

The Iranian nation stood up with the axis of Velayat and leadership to maintain its identity and existence against domestic sedition and foreign arrogance. The Supreme Leader says in this regard: From the first days of the victory, the Great Islamic Revolution of Iran faced the widespread and organized plots of the enemies of Islam. If you look at every achievement of the revolution, (you will see that) they could not have been achieved except through the sacrifice and resistance of the people against the sabotage of the enemies and opponents of the revolution (Khamenei. Message on the occasion of establishment of Basij, 1362/9/4).

As a result of this epic emergence, a new culture in the Iranian society, called "Sacrifice and Resistance," was formed in the domestic dimension, leading to the survival and sustainability of the Islamic system in eight years of war and over four decades.

Although the culture of sacrifice and resistance has a long history in Iranian culture, the wise leadership of Imam Khomeini enlivened the center of rejection and resistance in contemporary Iran, and the victory of the Islamic Revolution improved the hope of human liberation from the yoke of global arrogance. Among all the events of the Islamic Revolution, the Sacred Defense provided a situation to emerge and manifest the components and characteristics of this culture more than ever, the features that are not found in other Iran and the world's wars.

This national sacrifice model, known as "Treasure of Sacrifice and Resistance Culture" in the thick book of the Iranian Revolution and the eight-year Sacred Defense, gives the cultural system of the country light and heat like the brilliant sun.

Therefore, in this paper, the Sacred Defense's unique features have been considered a new civilization identity. Whether this new identity has the exact dimensions and characteristics not found in other Iran and world wars has been questioned. To answer this question, in addition to analyzing the characteristics of past wars in Iran and the world and comparing them with the eight-year imposed war as a scene of battlefield and real war, the whole dimensions of the Sacred

Defense have also been addressed in terms of ‘civilization defense theory’ in the perspective of defending the Islamic Revolution. So, while explaining the unique characteristics of the Sacred Defense in its "Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral" dimensions, its reflection is examined in the form of civilization defense theory.

In cognitive psychology, each phenomenon or subject has three components or essential elements (ABC)<sup>1</sup>. The combination and balance of these three components ultimately determine the nature and basis of its action. The cognitive component is information that a person has about the subject; for example, our recognition of the academic system of our country can include associate, undergraduate, master, and doctoral courses.

The affective component involves feelings that make the subject in a person; that is, the issue may be pleasant or unpleasant, creating pleasure and happiness or hatred and disgust. This practical aspect has a motivational role in behavior and emphasizes the importance of the affective dimension. The behavioral component is a readiness for action; it prepares the person to deal with the subject. If the person's tendency is favorable to the issue, they are ready to help, praise, support, or reward (Karimi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 6-7).



**Figure 1:** Sense of Belonging to the Sacred Defense (Abdolmaleki; et al. 2018 AD/1397 SH: 195).

Therefore, in addition to the attitude and tendency towards the Sacred Defense, identity belonging and the sense of identity are very important. Identity means an essential attribute, essence, existence, and aspects attributed to the object or person and identifies the person or something. The concept of identity is a relatively constant thought and impression of a person about who and what they are to others, formed through individual social interactions with others in the social and national process.

1. Affective, Behavior, Cognitive

### **The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics**

Identity has individual and social dimensions. One of the types of group and social identities is the concept of national identity. The national identity is material, biological, cultural, and psychological signs, making societies different. The national identity is a set of positive attitudes towards identifying and integrating factors, elements, and patterns at a country's level as a political unit (Nasrabadi, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 75-77).

The national identity is essential concerning the Sacred Defense because it has two functions of differentiation and similarity, which distinguishes the insiders from the outsiders. Furthermore, identity means regulating recognition, belonging, and defensive behavior in dealing with the insiders and outsiders; that is, the differentiation function separates one person from another. The similarity function strengthens the readiness and possibility of defense and sacrifice for the insiders against the outsiders.

Based on identity's differentiation and similarity functions, Imam Khomeini defines the protection and reproduction of identity as a process of struggle and defense of one's existence against foreigners in a general context called permanent and general mobilization with sacrifice. He says: We say that there will be fighting as long as there is polytheism and disbelief, and as long as there is a fight we will be there, and we are subject to God's command, and for this reason, we want martyrdom (Mousavi Khomeini, Message to the Iranian nation, 1367/4/29).

Subsequently, by reviewing the overall characteristics of the Sacred Defense from the viewpoint of the leaders of the revolution (Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader), the civilization aspect of the Sacred Defense throughout Iran's history is identified and recognized.

This study is essential. Identifying and explaining the unique characteristics of the Sacred Defense as a defense innovation not increases the recognition and awareness of the current and next generations of this defense but provides its promotion and recovery to maintain and survive these features. Supreme Leader has emphasized keeping it alive (Khamenei. Statements in the memorial of the martyrs of East Karun, 1393/1/6).


Moreover, addressing this issue is crucial because it has a civilization function and can unveil the characteristics of the Sacred Defense as a civilization treasure, features that enrich defensive and culture thinking. Therefore, this paper as a scientific and research review attempts to identify the unique and specific element of the Sacred Defense (imposed war) towards other Iran and the world's conflicts, introduce the most critical dimensions of this exclusive defense feature as a "civilization defense," and explain the features of civilization defense in the three cognitive, affective and behavioral dimensions.



## 1. Methodology

The paper is conducted with a combination of methods (documentary research and survey research) and in two steps. In the first step, after reviewing the literature and background of the subject, a table of features has been presented by examining and categorizing the history of Iran and the world's wars in purposefully extracting their dominant attribute as well as extracting and organizing the features of the Sacred Defense from literature, articles, memories, and manuscripts.

In the second phase, based on the two field surveys by the author in 1394 and 1396 SH (2015 and 2017 AD) at the statistical community of experts familiar with the subject of the Sacred Defense and visitors from the operational areas of the Sacred Defense in the form of Rahian-e Noor tour, and the analysis of cognitive, affective and behavioral dimensions of the Sacred Defense, the characteristics of the Sacred Defense are categorized and analyzed by using Lacatus methodology in the general form of the civil defense theory as the central core and protective belts (three cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions), which are responsible for protecting the center.



**Figure 2:** Protective layers of the Core of the Sacred Defense (Civilization Defense)

## 2. Sacred Defense from Imam Khomeini's Perspective

At the first reaction to the imposed war, Imam Khomeini, the divine Commander-in-Chief, wisely introduced the war as a divine blessing based on the philosophy and mission of the Islamic Revolution. The war strengthened the bases of the new Islamic Revolution, proved its legitimacy, and united the different strata of the Iranian nation. In short phrases, he says:

### The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics

- In every day of wartime, we've received a blessing of which we have taken advantage in every arena;
- In the war, we have revealed the hidden face of the world devours;
- In the war, we have concluded that we've got to stand on our feet;
- We have proved our state of being oppressed and the aggressors' oppression in the war;
- We have exported our revolution to the world in the war;
- In the war, we have secured the roots of our fruitful Islamic revolution;
- Our war led all the leaders of corrupt systems to be humiliated by Islam;
- Our battle was between the poor and the rich, the faith and the villainy, and from Adam to Khatam;
- This imposed war caused more coherence of our fighting nation;
- The imposed war published the glory and greatness of faith and Islam in the world;
- In the war, we have broken the arrogance of the two superpowers of east and west;
- We have fertilized the sense of brotherhood and patriotism in every one of our people in the war;
- It was only in the fight where our military grew significantly;
- Most importantly, the continuation of the revolutionary Islam morale happened in the light of war (Mousavi Khomeini. Message to the scholars of religion, 1367/12/3).

In addition, Imam Khomeini had a religious and national look at the war, and along with the need for religious dedication in defense of Islam, the immersive presence of people in the war was a national and patriotic duty that can be described in two dimensions:

#### 3.1. Religious and Quranic Dimension of the Sacred Defense, Including

- Dealing with the aggressor to the Quran's verdict;<sup>2</sup>
- Carrying out Islamic duty;<sup>3</sup>
- Divine support in defense.<sup>4</sup>

---

2. In terms of the ruling of Islam and the Qur'an and the wisdom, we cannot defend We will defend (Mousavi Khomeini. Statements in the summary of Bangladesh religious leaders, 1361/6/17).

3. We are a people who have defended for the sake of Islam, we have been attacked and we stand against the invasion, but we were peaceful from the beginning (Mousavi Khomeini. Statements in a group Students and authorities from the Official School and Women of Career Chambers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1361/7/11).

4. We greatly thank God that has supported and blessed the Islamic country and its committed warriors and granted us his great victory. I thank the children of Islam and the bravery armed forces. (Mousavi Khomeini. Message to the Iranian nation, 1361/3/3)

### 3.2. National and People-based Dimension of the Sacred Defense, Including

- National and immersive defense;<sup>5</sup>
- Defending the dignity of homeland and religion;<sup>6</sup>
- National Stand and Resistance;<sup>7</sup>
- Alliance of forces on the axis of Sepah and Basij in the war;<sup>8</sup>
- Continuing the defense to the punitive aggressor.<sup>9</sup>

As a religious reference and political leader in explaining the consequences of the war, Imam Khomeini has tried to meet the historical gap in the conversion of national defense to civilization by using historical and intellectual backgrounds of contemporary Iranian society and the fate of Qajar era wars as an "Establishment" of an entire religious, political system in the light of the "New Islamic Civilization."

Therefore, with the Islamic revolution, he has been able to change his position from the privative movement (anti-colonial movement) to the affirmative action (systematic training and the establishment of religious sovereignty) by relying on the power and ability of the people and bring people to brutal battles. Therefore, the essential feature of the revolutionary movement of Imam Khomeini is the conversion of "land Defense" to "Civilization Defense" with elements and components based on the progressive thought of the Velayat-e Faqih and religious (Islamic) democracy. Some of the essential features of this transformation are:

- 1) The evolution and advancement of religious thought from privative approach to affirmative approach of moving to the new civilization;

---

5. The war is at the top of all affairs; today all people should defend their cities and help the war-damaged cities. Today, it's a day that it is obligatory to cooperate with the soldiers and guards of Islam and Iran. Today is the day of unity. (Mousavi Khomeini, Message to the Sunni scholars and the MPs, 1359/7/5)

6. War is war and the dignity and honor of our homeland and our religion depends on these struggles, and the homeland that is dearer than our lives today is waiting for your children to battle with falsehood. (Mousavi Khomeini, Message to Sunni scholars and MPs, 1359/7/5)

7. And I hope that the Iranian nation with this Great Spirit will overcome all corrupt powers. Our country will be clean from these criminals, and our friends will return to their home. (Mousavi Khomeini, Message to the nation Iran, 1360/1/12)

8. Sepah on the fronts of the Sacred Defense of Islam and Islamic homeland with the unity and coherence of the Supreme Army and dear Basij and gendarmerie, and the nomadic and other military and police and people, such as an iron line and firm foundation, they all resisted and has created honors for themselves and dear Iran that history will not forget. (Mousavi Khomeini, Message to the Iranian nation on the third occasion of Sha'ban and the day of Pasdar, 1361/3/6)

9. We also want peace now, provided that the aggressor will be punished. and those who are competent recognize and punish the aggressor. (Mousavi Khomeini, Statements among the religious leaders of Bangladesh, 1361/6/17)

## The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics

- 2) The theory of Velayat-e Faqih as the central pillar of religious sovereignty and political system in creating civilization;
- 3) Institutionalization and highlighting the non-separation of religion and politics in creating civilization;
- 4) People's originality and formation of public formations emphasize basic concepts such as freedom, independence, justice, jihad, and public Basij in creating civilization;
- 5) An emphasis on Velayati and homeland loves in the revolutionary and romantic spirit in creating civilization;
- 6) Paving the way for realizing the Mahdavi utopia, the arrival of the infallible Imam (AS), and the liberation of humanity from ignorance on the horizon of the new Islamic civilization.

### 3. Sacred Defense from the Perspective of the Supreme Leader

We can review the Supreme Leader's viewpoint on the Sacred Defense from two perspectives. First, his role at the Sacred Defense as the representative of Imam (RA) in the Supreme Defense Council and the head of the government, which due to direct relationship with the events of the war, he had understood its nature and truth closely.

Then, as the leader of the Islamic system, he felt the necessity of recreating the Sacred Defense culture as a leading culture in constructing the future of the revolution with a civilization look.

Therefore, the Sacred Defense in the strategic thought of the Supreme Leader has a special prominence. Some of the essential features of this look can be categorized into two dimensions:

#### 3.1. Religious Nature and Beliefs of the Sacred Defense, Including

- Religious Jihad;<sup>10</sup>
- Divine leadership in war;<sup>11</sup>
- Faith and Belief;<sup>12</sup>

---

10. During the imposed war, our youth, whether in the armed forces - including the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - or in the great and popular Basij, managed to introduce such a kind of Iran which had not been introduced for, perhaps, decades or for two, three centuries. If you see that today, our people and our youth are present in arenas of science and technology with their great capacities and talents, a great part of it is because of Sacred Defense. It was during the Sacred Defense Era that the people of Iran became aware of their capacities and their power (Khamenei. Statements during Eid al-Fitr Prayers, 1388/6/29).

11. The reason that the Iranian nation in ten years after the revolution was able to stand against the various enemy's invasion - with all its problems - and resist them, and make more losses to them, is because of the blessing of religion and faith and the revolution and Islam and the Qur'anic and Islamic education, etc. (Khamenei. Statements in a meeting with a group of people, 1368/7/5).

12. Our base, in the Iranian nation's fight against global imperialism's bullying, was our culture. Our support zone was Islamic ethics, reliance on God, faith, and passion

- Sincerity of forces;<sup>13</sup>
- Jihadi and martyrdom sprite;<sup>14</sup>
- Resort and trust to God;<sup>15</sup>
- Protecting the Islamic system.<sup>16</sup>

### **3.2. National and Public Nature of the Sacred Defense, Including**

- National resistance;<sup>17</sup>
- National honor and promotion;<sup>18</sup>
- Emergence of Basij;<sup>19</sup>
- Creating a link between generations and strata;<sup>20</sup>

---

for Islam (Khamenei. Statements in a meeting with a group of cultural administrators, 1371/5/21).

13. An important point about Basij is that during the Sacred Defense Era, we could see that Basij enjoyed great purity. We should preserve this purity in Basij (Khamenei. Statements to Basijis, 1391/9/1).

14. The Iranian nation, with the leading martyrs and sacrifices and warriors, was able to protect his precious achievement by resorting to Islam and honest and smart faith, and bring it to the point of stability and strength (Khamenei. Message on the occasion of the celebration of the martyrs' day in the Fajr decade, 1377/11/5). If it was not the sacrifice of the youth of this land that led to these martyrdoms, all the days of this nation were turned into blurry nights under the black umbrella of oppression and the assault and involvement of the enemies of Islam and Iran (Khamenei. Message on the occasion of the martyrs' day in the Fajr decade, 1377/11/5).

15. How was the victory achieved? Dear brothers and sisters across the country! How did you win? Isn't it because of your faith, your trust in God, your decision to stand against the enemies of God, the unity of your word (Khamenei. Statements in Friday prayers, 1370/7/5)?

16. If there weren't sincere efforts and jihads that you the warriors of the armed forces and Basij did during the eight-year war ... and if there weren't pure blood that was spilled on the path of God; Certainly, today, there was no Islamic system anymore (Khamenei. Message to the families of the martyrs, missing on the eve of the holy defense week, 1368/6/23).

17. Our Sacred Defense Era, the adventurous eight-year era of war in our country, was the story of the resistance of the people of Iran and our youth against the malevolent and hostile acts of kufr and global arrogance (Khamenei, Statements in remembrance of martyrs of East Karun, 1393/1/6).

18. In each of these areas, certain events took place. If any of these events happen in another country, this is enough to give historical prominence to the people of that country (Khamenei. Statements in remembrance of martyrs of East Karun, 1393/1/6).

19. Defending the independence and grandeur of the country was one of the stages during which the members of the Basij were present. And had it not been for the presence of the Basij, the country's fate would have been different today (Khamenei. Statements to a group of Basijis, 1388/9/4).

20. It was a scene where students, teenagers, and even old people whose days of struggle had come to an end were magnetized. Everyone felt his thirst for spirituality

## The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics

- Resistance of the nation;<sup>21</sup>
- Winning the war and protecting the country.<sup>22</sup>

### 4. Sacred Defense has a Civilization Defense

With the end of the imposed war recorded a vast treasure of defensive, military, political, and cultural achievements in the Islamic Revolutionary under the title of eight years of the Sacred Defense, a catch and heritage that, according to the Supreme Leader, can provide the basis for the new Islamic civilization. Undoubtedly, the sacrifice of youth and warriors in the scenes of eight years of the Sacred Defense was full of creative thinking, powerful arms, and endurance of warriors, which satisfied the expectations of the Great Leader of the Revolution and the social expectation of the nation by protecting the Islamic country.

If the political leaders and the warriors of that time had shirked their responsibility, they would have brought the social disgrace and curse for the community and themselves, as it happened at some point in our history, resulting in the separation of parts of our country in various wars (such as Iran-Russian wars). Today, the Sacred Defense has become an identity package for us, which is an answer to the questions of who, what, and how we are in the field of defense and deterrence; that is, we know ourselves with it, we introduce ourselves to others with it, and we know how to defend ourselves in the future by using its teachings. In the defense, we identify the boundary between the insiders and outsiders.

Therefore, retrieving this massive treasure of resistance and endurance<sup>23</sup> and determining its key characteristics require the

---

would be satisfied by joining Basij and entering those difficult scenes. The Sacred Defense Era and the presence of Basij happened in such a manner (Khameni, Statements to Basij Members of Fars Province, 1387/2/14).

21. During the Sacred Defense Era, the east and the west formed an alliance against our nation. Our nation stood up against them. Our magnanimous Imam (RA) stood up against them in a firm manner and our people followed him. This resistance brought us success and victory in the difficult and long war which lasted for eight years. The enemy was deeply humiliated. All those evil powers which were behind the Iraqi Ba'ath regime had to acknowledge the power and greatness of the Iranian nation (Khamenei. Statements to Basijis, 1385/1/6).

22. After eight years of war, we do not need to swear that we have won the war. What is victory in war? Our nation, with the courage and faith and trust in their great leader, managed to stand against the United States and Europe and the Soviet Union of that day, and the East and West Empire, forcing them to confess to the victory of the Iranian people (Khamenei. Statements, 1370/7/5).

23. The eight-year Sacred Defense is not just a period of time in our history. Rather, it is a great treasure trove that our nation can invest on and benefit from for a long time (Khamenei. Statements to Sacred Defense Artists, 1388/6/24).

perception of this great epic as a civilization defense, a type of defense that has an identity like any civilization symbol. The cognitive, affective, and behavioral range of activists can determine its identity domain.

Dimension, Affective Dimension, and Behavioral Dimension




Figure 3: Dimensions of the Sacred Defense (civilization defense)

### 5. Sacred Defense Features in the Three Dimensions of Identity (Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral)

Reviewing the viewpoint of revolutionary leaders on the Sacred Defense gives features that revolution leaders see defense as a civilization epic. The Supreme Leader says in this regard: Defending territorial integrity, national identity, and dignity in the eight-year Sacred Defense is an absolute victory for the Iranian nation (Khamenei. Statements in the meeting with artists and cultural officials, 1379/7/6). Accordingly, the Supreme Leader calls the holy defense the mirror of the identity of the Iranian people: Preserving honors of the Iranian nation during the Sacred Defense as the identity of the country and valuable spiritual capital should always be serious (Khamenei. Statements in meeting participants at the Rahiyan-e Noor conference, 1380/12/5).

Efforts should be made to preserve the memories of the epic events created by the Iranian people during the eight years of the Sacred Defense for the present and future generations. So, the young and coming generations may know that the Iranian people, relying on Almighty Allah, stood up to wide-scale international aggression against their country empty-handed. They may recognize the grandeur and capabilities of our nation and follow the path of their previous generations with honor and dignity (Khamenei. Statements, 1384/6/31).

According to the Supreme Leader, the key to this continuity is to understand the nature of resistance and says: What prevents the

## The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics

conspiracy, war, and victory of the enemy is to stand out and be present in the resistance field. The Islam flag has been hoisted in Iran, attracted the Islam world and the heart of hundreds of people. Don't miss the flag (Khamenei. Statements in a meeting with Basijis and the commanders of the 25 Karbala, 1386/6/29).

According to Abdolmaleki; et al (2018 AD/1397 SH: 195), in the overall index (triple dimension), the culture of sacrifice and resistance in the Sacred Defense, studied by 47 items, 95.6% of the experts agreed and fully agreed. Only 2.2% disagreed, and 2.2% partially agreed. Triple dimensions, respectively, are the cognitive dimension, affective dimension, and behavioral dimension.

In the culture of the Sacred Defense, some of the significant indicators of the above dimensions are:

- 1) To maintain the Islamic values and norms, I am ready to sacrifice and resist;
- 2) The martyrs and sacrificers have a high position before God;
- 3) The martyrs, disabled veterans, and their families symbolize the Sacred Defense's sacrifice and resistance;
- 4) Ashura uprising is the foundation of the culture of sacrifice and resistance for the Iranian people;
- 5) The fight against an aggressive enemy to the country and the homeland is a public duty in the culture of sacrifice and resistance (Abdolmaleki; et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 214).

### 6. Field Research findings

Abdolmaleki and Sroori's (2017 AD/1396 SH: 149) results on the motivations of people and young people to travel to operational areas of the eight-year Sacred Defense show that people consider the Sacred Defense a civilized treasure and culture and celebrate this culture with their presence on particular days in these areas. The motivations in priority order are:

- 1) Honoring the position of Islamic warriors during the eight-year Sacred Defense;
- 2) Getting familiar with and increasing the recognition of incidents, events, characters, commanders, sacrifice, endeavor, martyrdom, and bravery of Islamic warriors in the eight-year Sacred Defense;
- 3) The sense of responsibility and interest in the country's fate and getting ready to attend and participate in scenes facing society in the future.

Important implications of traveling to war zones of the eight-year Sacred Defense in priority order are:

- 1) Getting familiar with war zones, effects of war, and the fate of commanders and martyrs;
- 2) Changing the behavior and modeling the martyrs and sacrifice of warriors, martyrdom culture, and following the martyrs;



3) Getting familiar with the culture of sacrifice and martyrdom, the bravery and courage of Islamic warriors, martyrdom, and self-improvement morale.

In addition to recognizing the motives and the consequences of familiarity with the Sacred Defense, the Sacred Defense experience as a prominent identity of Iran's history has made a profound connection between the past, present, and civilization horizons in the memory of the nation's history. Some of the features reflected in the form of Rahian-e Noor travel are:

**Table 1:** Indicators of Civilization Cognition in the Sacred Defense Experience

No.	Cognition and Awareness of the Sacred Defense	Average rank
1	The goal of imposing a war on Iran was to stop the progress of the country and the released energy of the Iranian nation's revolution	13.96
2	The Sacred Defense is a massive treasure of honor and pride for every Iranian	16.2
3	The people of war zones during the Sacred Defense had tolerated many problems	12.76
4	Commanders and military characters of the eight-year Sacred Defense are the honor of our nation and our country	15.57
5	Martyrs, disabled veterans, and their families tolerated the main load of war	14.81
6	The warriors of Islam, Sepahi, army, jihadists, and public forces (Basij) had a decent presence in the war	15.62
7	Jihad and martyrdom were the most critical code of our victory during the war	15.11
8	Martyrs and jihadists have a high position before God	17.02
9	The continuation of the war to punish the aggressor (Saddam) was the right thing	11.61
10	Iran could achieve its goals and punishment of the enemy by admitting ceasefire in the early war	7.42
11	The position of Imam and the authorities of the country against Saddam's peaceful claim during the war were correct and clever	12.15
12	The Iraqi army, without the support of Arab and American countries, could not resist the warriors of Islam	14.74
13	The help of God can be understood from the events of the Sacred Defense	14.79
14	The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic is more understandable in visiting operational areas of the eight-year Sacred Defense	12.48
15	Awareness of hostility history and enemies plots to penetrate the country is a scientific and political necessity	13.47

**The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics**

Table 2: Indicators of civilization affection in the Sacred Defense experience

No.	Emotional belonging to the Sacred Defense	Average rank
1	Today's security in our country is because of the bravery and courage of the warriors of the eight-year Sacred Defense	12.03
2	With martyrdom and jihad, divine dignity can be achieved	10.9
3	The sacrifices of the warriors during the war can be seen in visiting war zones	9.87
4	The past generation (sacrificers and martyrs) gave up their comfort, so we live in security	11.81
5	The people of war zones showed excellent resistance during the war	11.43
6	The warriors of the Sacred Defense are praised and respectful for me and all people	11.45
7	The warriors of the Sacred Defense are selfless and self-sacrificing	11.56
8	Ignoring the blood of the martyrs is a kind of ungratefulness	11.81
9	The war zones and the events of those areas belong to all Iranians, and they should be proud of it	10.07
10	War zones are like the rest of the country and are of no particular importance	7.89
11	The location of martyrdom and sacrifices of warriors should be respected and dignified	10.56
12	The Sacred Defense is a manifestation of Ashura and Hosseini passion and understanding of contemporary Iranian fronts	10.65
13	The people of the West and Southern war zones have played a more significant role in the eight-year Sacred Defense	9
14	The Iranian people should not forget the Arab countries and the world arrogance's support for Saddam in the war	9.73

Table 3: Indicators of Civilization Behavior in the Sacred Defense Experience

No.	Behavioral belonging to the Sacred Defense	Average rank
1	We must always be ready to keep the independence and freedom of our country	10.55
2	Fighting with arrogance and aggressors to the country is a public duty	10.96
3	If necessary, I can help with sacrificing life and martyrdom to realize the ideals of Islam and the revolution	10.12
4	We can defend martyrs and sacrificers by respecting their heritage	10.52
5	I will not tolerate disrespect to martyrs and sacrificers	10.91
6	I will follow the way of martyrs and warriors of Islam in the Sacred Defense	10.4
7	The Sacred Defense showed that we should be ready to fight the enemy, and I should also help its promotion	10.2
8	In case of any attack on my country, I will immediately go to the battlefield	10.8
9	We should try to maintain the warriors' message and Sacred Defense achievements and transfer them to others	10.47
10	The Sacred Defense experience can be the basis for jihadi management and revolutionary morale in other country affairs	9.76
11	To maintain national and religious identity, everyone should act like the Sacred Defense era	9.68
12	The companion, accompaniment, and meeting with sacrificers and survivors of the Sacred Defense are pleasant to me	9.76

Therefore, based on matching the literature of this area with the results of field reviews based on the measurement of the effects of the Sacred Defense on audiences, its content can be categorized in three dimensions as follows:

1) Cognitive dimension; it includes collecting knowledge, understanding, and information about cultural issues that have a civilization aspect. It is a general guide to regulating mood and behavioral identity of past, present, and future identity in the field of interactions between culture and individual in the context of the community.

Specifically, the cognitive dimension of the defense focuses on the historical and civilization background of knowledge, insight, and character of the culture of security and resistance;

2) Affective dimension; it includes a collection of belonging, spirituality, affection, and dependence on the components of the culture of defense in the historical and civilization background, which

forms and strengthens individual commitment and loyalty to the culture and the sense of belonging.

Specifically, the affective dimension of the defense culture and resistance focuses on individuals and groups beliefs who are underlined and introduced in revolutionary events and movements during the history of Shiite, the Islamic Revolution, and the Sacred Defense and are on the focus of the companions of the revolution in the formation and persistence of the Islamic Revolution;

3) Behavior dimension; it is a kind of defense of the practice, action, and behavior to defend the existence and is based on recognition and defense emotions that can also include defense activities.

Significantly, it contains sacrificial behaviors, such as martyrdom, the sacrifice of life, wealth, child, and a double effort in realizing the goals and cultural values, giving up material concerns and interests to learn the religion and revolutionary ideals, taking responsibility to help the country and revolution, encouraging the children, young people, and family members to bear the hardships of the revolution, trying to resolve problems in the path of revolution through jihadi moves and Basij management.

The Supreme Leader in the position of a civilization leader, with the view of the impact of the Sacred Defense in the civilization creation, says: The eight-year Sacred Defense was eight years in terms of time, but in terms of spiritual and cultural continuity, it may last for centuries; an epic that came in the Sacred Defense, the incentives behind this epic, the events that occurred during this period, are not the things that end in ten years or fifteen years or twenty years. (Khamenei. Statements in a meeting with a group of poets, 1390/3/25)

He also says: You should keep the memory of these lands alive. These lands, these deserts, the Karun Rive have witnessed the best self-sacrificing acts and the best efforts (Khamenei. Statements in remembrance of martyrs of east karun, 1393/1/6).

## **Conclusion**

The overview of the general features of the Sacred Defense indicates that the Sacred Defense in the aspects of military content and the form of defense has familiar elements and similarities with other classical wars in the world.

Still, in some ways, it has a unique and specific feature that has been seen less or limited to particular individuals in history. For example, one can find the religious leadership feature only in the early wars of Islam under the command of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) and Imam Ali (AS). Indeed, this link is also a unique feature of Sacred Defense.

With the Islamic Revolution victory under the command of the Great Leader of the Islamic Revolution of Imam Khomeini, a system

was formed in Iran, which, in addition to strengthening and linking the Islamic and Iranian identity, emphasized national independence and stopping the intervention of foreigners in the country.

A different pattern of rule in Iranian history was established by preserving Iranians' national and Islamic identities. It led to conspiracies and plots against this new system by Western arrogance and Arab countries, imposing an eight-year war on the land known as the Sacred Defense. The war has certain features compared to the wars in Iran and the world; a war that has a defense aspect, contrary to many Iranian battles that had an aggressive element. That is, defending the borders of Iran and the sanctity of Islam which were under attack.

Imam Khomeini (RA), as the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces, calls the nature of this war national and religious: The homeland that is dearer than our lives today is waiting for your children to battle with falsehood. (Mousavi Khomeini. Message to the scholars of Islam and Sunnis and representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 1359/7/5 SH)

These wise words and the battlefield led to a combination of Velayati love (religion, acceptance of the Velayat and the connection to God, the Prophet and innocent Imams and Imam Mahdi (AS) in the form of Velayi identity of the Islamic Republic based on the social thinking of Shi'ism) and homeland love (belonging to Iranian land and civilization, geography, race, ethnic, tribe, family and other essential features and symbols) in Iran's history.

Therefore, the Iran borders defense and the Ahl al-Bayt sanctity known as the Sacred Defense can be explained under 'Civilization Defense', which defended the new civilization created by the Islamic Revolution and attacked by the civilization enemies. In addition to maintaining Iran's homeland and territory as the hardware aspects of a new culture, the Civilization Defense finds its software attractions and civilization within the enemy. Therefore, in reviewing the unique characteristics of the Sacred Defense compared to other wars in Iranian history, the following features can be emphasized:

- Finding the unique identity of the Sacred Defense to maintaining the identity of the Islamic Revolution;
- Finding the unique identity of the Sacred Defense about maintaining national-Iranian identity, ethnicities, and minorities;
- Finding the unique identity of the Sacred Defense in relation with the connection and consolidation of Islamic-Iranian identity based on Velayat and Ahl al-Bayt (AS);
- Finding the unique identity of the Sacred Defense in promoting the eight-year war to a civilization defense against the enemies of the civilization. The Sacred Defense, which is still in the new areas of the struggle of the Islamic Revolutionary camp and liberalism camp, and

## The Unique Characteristic of the Sacred Defense Compared to Other Wars in Iran and the World Emphasizing the Civilization Defense Characteristics

210

its scope has also been widespread to the boundaries of Iran's civilization influence in the Middle East and North Africa.

Therefore, the Sacred Defense as a "Civilization Defense" requires focusing on protective belts and cognitive layers of the Sacred Defense, emotional belonging to the Sacred Defense, and behaviors based on the Sacred Defense. Accordingly, the Sacred Defense as an identity and civilization defense has dimensions that, based on lactating methodology, its central core and protective layers can be drawn like this: In the form of establishment, the theory of civilization as the leading center uses the civilization recognition, civilization belonging, and civilization behavior in two phases of civilization creation and civilization development to protect itself.

But in the form of civilization continuity, in the phase of civilization protection, it manages civilization behavior, belonging, and recognition from the external layers of civilization. Therefore, the proportion of the Sacred Defense with the Islamic Revolution is the experience of civilization protection. While on the contrary, the Islamic Revolution is civilization creation and civilization development in proportion to the Sacred Defense.




Figure 4: The civilization defense layers of the Sacred Defense

### References

- Abdolmaleki, Hadi; et al. (2018 AD/1398 SH). Basics of Designing the Sacred Defense Museums-collection of Articles of the Conference, Dimensions and Components of Sacrifice and Resistance Culture and Its Reflection Practices in the Museum of the Sacred Defense, Tehran, Publications of the Islamic Revolutionary Museum and the Sacred Defense, pp. 183-222.
- Abdolmaleki, H; Sroori's, M. (2017 AD/1396 SH). Measuring the Cultural and Social Effects of Rahiyan-e Noor, Noor Tour, Tehran, Rahiyan Noor Tour Organization.
- Karimi, Y. (2009 AD/1388 SH). Attitude and Attitude Change. Tehran, Virayesh Publication, Third Edition.
- Khamenei, A. (n.d.). *Messages and Statements*. The Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, <https://farsi.khamenei.ir/>.
- Mousavi Khomeini, R. (n.d.). *Messages and Statements*. <http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/page/210/?kind=279> (Derived from the Book of Sahifeh Noor).
- Nasrabadi, M. (2005 AD/1384 SH). War and Identity with a Sociological Approach to the Iran-Iraq War. *Journal of National Studies*, Sixth Year, Second Number, pp. 71-86.





## Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View

Aida Bagheri Beheshti\*

DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.9.11.5

Ph.D. in Urban Development, Department of Urban Development, Science and  
Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, IRAN.

(Received: 8 August 2021 – Accepted: 3 September 2021)

### Abstract

Townscape is an essential element in creating collective memories (i.e., memories people collectively share as a group in a city, affecting the identity of that city, the cultural continuity, and the relationship between generations). One of the collective memories -that have happened in different countries- in the war. A war that is fought to defend the homeland and preserve the identity, culture, and honor of a country is part of the valuable memories of a society. In various western cities, including Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow, the scenes of the collective memories of the war have been reconstructed. Still, in Iran, although fought in an imposed war, these scenes have been less regarded. The primary purpose of this study is to examine the views of Khorramshahr dwellers about the impact of war townscape on the revival of memories of that period. It seeks to find priorities in townscape criteria on war-based memories. With the descriptive-analytical method, the present study aimed to express the applicable standards of the reminiscent townscape and analyze them in Berlin, Moscow, and Warsaw (in World War II). Finally, to study the townscape impact on younger inhabitants' war idea -who has not experienced that war, the townscapes have been prioritized using a questionnaire analysis. The results indicated that battle scars on walls and beheaded palms have the priority and the Grand Mosque as the symbol of the city function has the second. The title, *Bloody City*, has the third one according to the dwellers' point of view. Finally, some solutions have been suggested to improve the townscape of Khorramshahr, emphasizing collective memories of the war.

**Keywords:** Townscape, Collective Memories, War, Khorramshahr.

---

\*. Corresponding author: ida.beheshti@gmail.com

### **Introduction**

"The Townscape" is one of the essential aspects of perceiving the environment. The environment is the leading cause of remembering events in the human mind. The remembering of events in mind causes the memory. After an event, it will record in people's minds, and over time, its image is the space and the place in which the event or incident occurred. One memorizes the events and happenings by seeing their physical elements and the environmental data. Shared and mixed memories or experiences of human beings form a collective memory. "Collective Memories" are among the most influential factors in creating the identity of any society.

Remembering and cherishing memories in cities are of great importance. One of them in the nation's mind is the war's memory. Conflicts cause damage and destruction in the land and people who have linked their dreams and aspirations to their residence. Some battles are of cultural, historical, or social values. Wars have taken place in different countries, but the one who wants to defend the homeland, especially in the imposed war, is part of the valuable memories of that society.

Therefore, considering and reconstructing these cities is a reminder of historical memory and the memories of the people who created them. These cities are part of the identity and civilization of a nation. Remembering wartime memories can be a reminder to the new generations, who have not touched these bittersweet moments. It can be full of valuable lessons for the people in the future. It shows that preserving a nation is essential since past experiences are the beacon for the people in the future.

The city's physical environment is a rich source of mental image cues and memories. The memories shared and remembered by a group of people forms the collective memory. As a part of past life and events that happened to different people in the past, collective memory can be displayed in townscapes as a medium for conveying those memories to people. In the past, city townscapes breathed new life into the cities and reminded people of the collective memories, but these townscapes are now fading.

In recent years, well-done researches about the townscape and proposed different views, while the townscape of war-torn cities and its criteria have not yet been studied. Also, the inhabitant's idea of a war-torn city (i.e., those related to the war) has not been discussed. One of the collective memories that occurred in Iran is the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. Khorramshahr is one crucial city that has witnessed valuable memories of the people during the eight years of war. The memories of people include defending their homeland, and it's being captured and retaken. On Shahrivar 31, 1359, Iraq attacked Iran. Despite all the people's resistance in this city, under the heavy artillery fire of the Iraqi army and the successive bombardments of the Iraqi Air Force,

the people had to leave the city through the Karun River, and Iraq occupied the city. However, with the outstanding efforts of the Iranian people, Khorramshahr was retaken on Khordad 3, 1361 (Jazini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 6).

This war is one of the most valuable collective memories of the Iranian people, and they can use this priceless memory to promote a unique townscape. The research method used in this study is descriptive. By implementing a statistical analysis, the effectiveness of war memory has been studied for the first time based on the criteria taken from Khorramshahr dwellers. Four cities have been looked after describing the concepts of townscape, collective memories, and memory-making townscapes.

The townscape criteria obtained from Berlin, Moscow, Warsaw, and then Khorramshahr were examined, and finally, a survey was designed to prioritize Khorramshahr townscape criteria over collective memories. So, distributed a questionnaire, and using the five Likert scale (very good, good, average, low, very low), scored the effectiveness of each perspective. Experts also checked the validity. The related scores were assessed and calculated their reliability with Cronbach's alpha, equal to 0.8. That confirms the reliability of the questionnaire.

Khorramshahr dwellers who have heard the war stories from others but did not live in the war era completed the questionnaire. This way examined the impact of memorable townscapes on new generations. Battle scars on walls, beheaded palm trees, the destroyed dome of the Grand Mosque, and the Karun River were of the priority. Next, the functions of Khorramshahr Mosque as a political headquarters and a shelter during the war were the second priority. The city title (Bloody City) was among the ones of the following importance. Finally, according to the criteria impact, described the entrance route of Khorramshahr to the Grand Mosque to be a critical memory-making area of this city and proposed Strategies to improve the townscape in this route.

## **1. Theoretical Foundations**

### **1.1. Research Background**

Hossein Parvin has studied the townscape of the war and designed a part of Khorramshahr to revive the memories and values of the imposed war. He considers the war memorials as symbols of the war event, which create memories and attachment to the war's fundamental objective and mental scenes. He also finds the war elements near the Khorramshahr Grand Mosque as public and historically essential points (Parvin, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 1-2). Celine Righi studies memory and identity in Lebanon and examines the relationship between collective memory, history, and identity in the social, cultural, and historical contexts after the war. He believes that exhibitions in war-

torn environments as symbolic areas are significant. He also emphasizes cultural and doctrinal issues, identity promotion, and historical representation in that atmosphere (Righi, 2014: 4). Petri Neuvonen studied the physical and cultural changes of the old town of Viipuri -which in 1860 was handed over to the local civilian authorities by the Russian military authorities- from 1856 to 1939, including fortifications, buildings, street views, and the scenes of the old city. He considers the protection of these areas to be essential and effective in attracting domestic and foreign tourists (Neuvonen, 2017: 8-9).

Elissavet Markozani studied the memorial architecture of the cities divided as a result of the civil war and believes that those monuments are effective in the cities after the war, since considering the complexity of a memorial, not as a place but as a system, it affects the social, historical, religious, economic, and morphological parameters. It is also a way to look and hope for the future (Markozani, 2019: 17).

Sama Farzan considers the economic, cultural, social, and physical factors in Khorramshahr to be essential for improving the environment and preserving the valuable features of the old texture. She believes them to be of significant importance to safeguard the city's war-torn buildings and prevent their demolishing and the return of the social activities to that city (Farzan, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 1-2).

It is essential to emphasize the effects of townscapes on the remembrance of the memories of the war era. Still, unfortunately, there has not been much research carried out into this area, and most of the research has done about the war elements and monuments. Hence, we studied the memorable townscapes of that city, especially from its dwellers' perspective, and expressed the strategies for the development and prosperity of the town by emphasizing the memorable war townscapes.


## **1.2. Concepts**

### **1.2.1. Townscape**

In the urban planning terminology, the word townscape means the physical elements of urban townscapes. It includes natural seats, street patterns, building arrangements, qualities like height, scale and color, wall types, and prominent views (Davidastson, 2004: 419). Gordon Cullen considers townscape as the art of visual and integral integrating the buildings, streets, and places that make up the city environment. It helps to communicate the various components of the city's physical environment (Cullen, 2008: 5).

The city view is important because it can be a source of people's satisfaction or ease the daily worries of life. With this approach, shaping and reshaping a city should be proposed with a controlled visual plan that includes criteria and recommendations related to the visual form (Nassar, quoted from Lynch 2014: 2).

To better understand the townscape should grasp the meanings expressed from it. Apprehending townscape involves seeing, smelling, tasting, hearing, and feeling, a symphony of complex harmonies. Each group and age interprets and narrates the townscape through its perceptual, valuable, instrumental, and functional perspective (Spearn, 2008: 30).



**Figure 1:** Cyclical interaction between people and city (Eraydin, 2014: 15)

Perception of a townscape is not random imagery of visual order. Seeing a scene for the first time, the observer may look at a particular object, think about its structure, or just enjoy its beauty. When a location has a weak physical system, it becomes confusing. The eye moves uselessly to find signs from one point to another (Bell, 2015: 74).

The townscape includes the entire external environment around the people. In the urban context, townscape acts as a treasure that shows the emotional, cultural and spiritual response and enriches the quality of urban life. Townscape is the product of the interaction between humans and the city's physical environment and is highly dependent on the visual perception of individuals.

### 1.2.2. Collective Memory

Simultaneously with reviewing memories, it repeats itself and comes to the present. Therefore, it no longer belongs to the past. Memory recall is associated with an event or happening. Memory is never imagined without an event, and when an event or incident ends and days and years pass, the only thing that remains in the mind is the space in which the event or incident took place, a distance of different forms, but full of meaning. Memories have familiar smells; the corner of an alley, a tree, a platform, a wall, a passage, a shop, etc., can all be part of a space. Still, in those collective memories, generations are connected (Habibi, 2008: 116).

Collective memory can form a city, its identity and deliver meaning to its citizens. Boyer sees collective memory as a way for citizens to present their images of the city as a work of art, townscape, and photography (Felasari, 2013: 19-20).

He considers memory as personal experiences connected to family traditions, religious beliefs and customs in certain places (Boyer, 1994: 6). Special places are historic buildings with different functions and styles that represent the historical scenes of each city. They create a rich cultural-historical atmosphere and are full of the flavor of life in cities (Zhou, 2016: 6). Haseman; et al. believe that memory continues by collective beliefs, behaviors, or physical artifacts (Haseman; et al., 2005: 59).

Those memories are also remembered through keeping their physical figure (such as monuments, architectural styles of buildings, mural notes, and place names). Memory is at first retrieved through objects, places, or terms (Mir Moghtadaei, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 14). Caroline Winter believes that one can recall memories at a point in time through seeing a remaining building or a specific function (Winter, 2009: 611).

### **1.2.3. Memorable Townscapes**

Townscape is a platform for the formation of collective memories of users. When an event is observed or some specific information or mindsets are displayed about it, they remain in people's minds. These memorable scenes can be divided into four categories: natural accidents, man-made accidents, ceremonies, and identity for future generations. Townscapes of extraordinary natural disasters include floods, earthquakes, fires, infestations, and the presence of insects and domestic and wild animals. These sights are reminiscent of many bitter memories in the minds of all Iranian citizens. Some events are held annually to commemorate and teach lessons for future generations, such as the one that displays the sacrifice and martyrdom of firefighters Plasco-building fire.

Other memorable sights include severe human calamities, such as wars. These human-made events are organized, armed, and often protracted conflicts between governments, nations, or groups. Another category of memorable townscapes is "Ceremonies" that are held in all countries in the form of festivals or street decorations and lighting. In Iran, this ceremony is very glorious. Some memorable ceremonies are the celebration of Nowruz, the national day, the national day parade, and the liberation of Khorramshahr. There are also religious holidays such as Ashura and Tasua, mid-Sha'ban and Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Ghadir.

The fourth category is the "Identity" reminiscent scenes. Identity is historical in the sense of different social characteristics. Scenes of memory-making identity are a symbol of the history and culture of the country. They divide into three categories with the features of historical, religious, and event-oriented bodies. In the historical part, we can mention Naghshe Jahan Square in Isfahan and Persepolis in Shiraz. From the spiritual perspective, Jamkaran Mosque in Qom and

the holy shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, and the perspective of event-oriented identity, Azadi Square in Tehran. Types of manufactured townscapes are shown in the chart below, and then "War" as a manufactured townscape is discussed.



**Figure 2-** Types of Memorable Townscape

#### 1.2.4. Memorial Townscape (Manufactured: War)

Unnatural disasters have a significant impact on townscape. What happens in any city creates a mentality for the people of the town. Depending on its extent, the happening may sometimes make a mentality for a whole nation or even foreigners. Townscape perception is a cognitive process, and it means that behaviors, feelings, desires, and fears are recorded for people living in a particular place. This recording of the townscape and reviewing it as a historical event makes memories in people's minds.

Wars are examples of manufactured memory-making townscapes in any country. War is a disaster that usually occurs without prior notice and happens unpredictably to human beings and habitats. Warfare has a lot of financial and human losses. It is of different types: limited or overall, cold or hot, regional or world war, controlled or uncontrolled, unpredictable or predetermined, conventional or nuclear, declared and undeclared, offensive or defensive, direct or proxy, civil or international, tribal or civilized.


Moreover, preventive, long, absolute, revolutionary, political, economic, social, imperialist, guerrilla, psychological, strategic,

**Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in  
Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View**

counterinsurgency, dynamic, ritual, instrumental, monarchy war, war of liberation, war of conquest, trade war, war of plunder, agonist war, holy war, instrumental war, and genocidal war are its other types (Dennen, 2005: 3).

War has always was a disgrace throughout history, as it is a phenomenon of which destruction is an integral part. Memories in the mind of people of war-torn cities that exhibit devastation, homelessness, war-torn scenes, displacement of people, valuable places of the city, refugee settlements, and so on. These are critical for the citizens during the war, and they have many memories that have been published. Their writings are guides to the memorable sights of any war city.

Nevertheless, some of these people have reached a high degree of Shahadat (i.e., honorable martyrdom), so there is no access to their memories and mentality of the cities. There have been numerous wars in the world, including the two World Wars and the Iran-Iraq war. Based on the concepts of townscape, collective memory, and war memorable scenes, the theoretical framework can be depicted in the following diagram. It's about the continuation of wartime memories:



**Figure 3:** Theoretical Framework for the Relation of Townscape with Collective Memory

According to the proposed framework, the measurable and analyzed criteria for the revival and continuity of the memories in the war-torn cities are "Signs and Symbol of War," "Collective Beliefs," "Names of People and Operations," "Function in War Era" and "Ceremonies During and After War."



Signs and Symbols are visual information conveyed to people through signs. A Collecting Belief is a state of mind in which a person thinks that a mentality is correct, no matter there is any supporting empirical evidence on it or not. Names have special connotations and create particular memories and images in mind. Names of people and operations are among the most important tools that introduce culture and history to people.

Functions in War Era are important factors that remain in mind after getting acquainted with an area. Therefore, the more suitable a place for different activities and functions, the deeper the collective memory is formed from its prevailing community. "Ceremony" is a type of human behavior. Ceremonies are often performed with religious origins in chorus. They are served with describing the religious issues to strengthen the beliefs, build identity, and ultimately strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of society.

In any city and country, special ceremonies and rituals evoke different memories for each individual. They can also be held for eliciting the memories of war. In the next part, war scenes in Berlin, Moscow, and Warsaw – which all witnessed the Second World War – are analyzed. Then, by discussing the memory-making scenes in Khorramshahr, as the capital of war, a clear symbolic set of people's resistance, oppression and persistence is addressed.

### **1.3. Memorial Townscapes of the War (In Berlin, Moscow, and Warsaw)**

There have been many wars in the west, one of which is World War II. Many countries of the world fought in the war, including all the superpowers of that time. It began with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany. Years after the war, a wall was erected inside Berlin as a result of the Cold War between two blocs. This wall divided the city into eastern and western regions for twenty-eight years. It was a symbol of the Cold War. However, the wall is now a memory-making war scene, and its history has been written on it. Moreover, destroyed parts are exhibited as a symbol (by flooring or rod-like elements). Also, a war museum has been built in this city, which reminds the war and its events.

Furthermore, the city's entrance point, which was then used as Checkpoint Charlie, has now become a place for tourists to take photos. Special ceremonies such as "War and Peace" are annually held in this city to continue the memories. Also, in places like the entrance gate of the town, color pictures are displayed (Adapted from Tolle, 2010: 352-355; Ayyash, 2013: 21-38, 72-79; Arandjelovic and Bogunovich, 2014: 2, 10, 11).

### Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View



**Picture(set) 1:** Berlin wall and the Monuments (Checkpoint, Alexander Square, Berlin Wall)

During World War II, a battle broke out in Moscow. Germans vigorously attacked Moscow, but Hitler's attempt to seize the city as the capital and largest city of the Soviet Union was in vain. There exist significant war scenes. Even the bullets that hit the city walls are dated. Names such as Lenin and Stalin can also be seen in the city. Also, the Kremlin Palace, the Wall of Grief, and the Red Square are among the townscapes that hold valuable memories of the war. The parades that annually take place in Moscow (at the time of the victory) are among the essential things to commemorate this memory (Adapted from Alexandrovskiy; et al., 2015: 583-539; Montgomery, 2011: 7-14; Jackson, 2017: 1-4; Kennedy, 2017: 131-132).



**Picture(set) 2:** Elements in Moscow Townscapes, as Monuments of the War (<https://www.atlasobscura.com/places>)

Warsaw is one of the cities that were severely damaged in the events of World War II. It was heavily attacked on land and from the air and the city burnt to ashes. However, many monuments are exhibited to keep the memories alive. The examples are Auschwitz camp, the biggest and best-equipped Nazi Germany concentration camp, the museum of the Uprising, which displays the history of the Warsaw Uprising, and the Warsaw Royal Palace in the Old Town Square with red bricks that were utterly destroyed and rebuilt (Adapted from Wozniak; et al., 2007: 134-140; McGilvray, 2019: 20-40; Niemczyk, 2019: 301-311, Correia, 2013: 7-8, Warsaw Tourist

Office, 2010: 12, 25, 46).



Picture(set) 3 - War in Warsaw, Poland (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki>)

The three cities mentioned above have similar memories of the war. There, collective memories in townscapes have been variously displayed as a remembrance of probably bitter -but instructive - memories for future generations. Moreover, the townscapes have attracted different people from all over the world. A summary of reminiscent war scenes in Berlin, Moscow, and Warsaw is arranged below.

Table 1- Memorial Townscapes of the war (Berlin, Moscow, Warsaw)<sup>1</sup>

	Sign	Ceremony	Names	Functions in War Era	Collective Beliefs
<b>Berlin</b>	Berlin Wall Alexander Square	War and Peace Festival Festival of Lights	Hitler	Checkpoint Charlie Brandenburg Gate	Holocaust
<b>Moscow</b>	Tsar Cannon Triumphal Gate Red Square	May 9 Celebration	Lenin Stalin	Kremlin Palace Victory Museum Cold War Museum Lenin's Mausoleum Novodevichy cemetery	Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Wall of Grief
<b>Warsaw</b>	Old Square Royal Palace Warsaw Barbican Museum of Uprising	Exhibition	-	Concentration Camp Old Town Market Palaces in Lazienki Park	Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Warsaw Ghetto

1. For More Information about the Mentioned Townscapes, Cf. "Townscape and Collective Memory," The Publication of the Islamic Revolution and the Sacred War Museum (in Persian).


## 2. Case Study—memorial Townscape in Khorramshahr (War Era)

The city is 120 km southwest of Ahvaz (the capital of Khuzestan province) and is bounded on the south by Abadan and on the west by the Iraqi border (Jazini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 3-5). It is located between the Karun and Arvand rivers. This region's most important natural elements are the Karun and Arvand rivers, Azodi canal, Bahmanshir river, Jian canal, and palm trees (Parvin, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 62-64).

The city was formerly a small village formed in the early 13th century by Haj Jaber Khan, the head of the tribes (during the Qajar period). In some history books, the Karun River is mentioned to become red sometimes, which is why Khorramshahr was previously called Mohamarah (i.e., the red) (Vajihi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 45). In the afternoon of 1359/6/31, Khorramshahr was under heavy fire from the Iraqi army. The western part of the city, including Taleghani alley, Railway, and Mowlavi, the poor and populated neighborhoods, was the target of the enemy's shells and artillery.

The city was burning in the fire, and the explosion's sound did not stop even for a moment. The Grand Mosque became a refugee camp and a place for anyone who wanted to catch up with the news. Following an airstrike, the Iraqi army attacked the border checkpoint and the main roads with its armored and unarmored forces. After crossing the border, they tried to block the main exit of the city and, by endangering Khorramshahr, break the resistance of the troops stationed at the border checkpoint (Habibi, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 38).

Khorramshahr is one of the essential spots of the war. In other words, it is the war capital. Iran's victory in the liberation of this city following the 35 days of resistance and the 545 days of occupation is considered one of the most important events of the war. That's why significant attention has been paid to the city in most books on the war (Jazini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 6). The figure below shows the process of occupation of Khorramshahr during this period.



**Figure 4** - Occupation of Khorramshahr (Drawing Diagrams, Analysis, and Presentation of Process by the Author, Adapted from Habibi, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 26-47)

Iraqi Ba'athists occupied the city on Aban 4 despite the people's extra efforts. The town became free after the unceasing efforts of the Iranian nation on Khordad 3, 1361, and the whole people of the country got happy (Jazini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 5). The courage of the people and the military operations carried out to free this city are very important. Khorramshahr, which has been famous for its beauty, contains stories of precious memories. History books on the war and



## Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View

226

the people's memories of the era indicate that the city is full of elements that can preserve the valuable memories of defending the country.

One of the memory-making scenes during the war in Khorramshahr is the picture of martyrs wrapped in white sheets killed to protect the country. Another scene is the old checkpoint, used as the ammunition depot. It was the city's most crucial defending zone. Another vital element is Khorramshahr's Grand Mosque, as the headquarters of the forces and the shelter for the homeless sitting next to the mosque's wall in heaps. Military bridges, which were built for various operations, are also among the unique elements in the city.

Hospitals such as Mossadegh Hospital, full of injured people and schools used by the combatants as a shelter to rest, can form other reminiscent scenes of the war. The people's attention to Quran at that time is a sign of their hope and faith. Other memory-containing scenes include the protective fortifications built in the courtyards of houses, beheaded palms, and the city's cemetery, called Jannatabad. Based on books and newspapers, some important city areas are chosen. These important urban points are named in many books.

The Content analysis based on war diaries proposes that could categorize them into five groups: Collective beliefs, names of people and operations, wartime functions, Wartime and Post-war Ceremonies, and Symbols of war.<sup>2</sup> Khorramshahr Grand Mosque had a notable role in that city during the war, according to the book "Az Khooninshhar ta Khorramshahr" (i.e., From the bloody city to Khorramshahr).

Also, local boats (Balam) and the Karun River were critical in that regard. The author of the book states: "In the second of Aban (October 24, 1980), the enemy advanced in a heavy fire, and despite the evacuation of the Grand Mosque from the defenders, its grandeur prevented the enemy from approaching. Afterward, it completely blocked the Khorramshahr Bridge, and not only was it impossible to enter the city, but it also blocked the exit from the city. In that situation, the defenders used Balams (local boats) and were still there, moving under the Khorramshahr bridge.

Following the bridge's closure, the enemy commanders named Aban 2 the day of the occupation of Khorramshahr, while the defenders were still resisting and the enemy had not been able to capture the whole city. The fall of the city was imminent, and therefore, the retreat order was prompted to the local forces and transferred wounded to Karun shores on the way to a safe area" (IRGC War Studies Center, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 49).

---

2. For further study, cf. Bagheri Beheshti; et al. (2018 AD/1397 SH). "Approach to the Role of Townscape in the Promotion of Collective Memories." *Journal of War Historic Studies*. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 37-60.

The emphasis on the palm trees' role and the defenders' collective beliefs during the war can be referred to in "The Book of Nouredine, the Son of Iran." He quotes: "The defenders spread rugs next to the palm trees. They accommodated everyone in the battalion; an incredible scene could be seen in this congregational prayer" (Sepehri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 376). Based on various books on the memoirs of the war, the memory-making scenes of the conflict can be categorized as follows (Table 2):

Collective Beliefs	Function in War Era	Names of People and Operations	Ceremonies during and after War	Signs and Symbols of war
Congregational prayer next to palm trees The sound Adhan Placing the Qur'an on the carpet when leaving	Rasaei School (Place for combatants' rest) Mosques (People's accommodation) Hospital Bazaar (Initiation of Bombing and war Attack) Kitchen for Refugees Jannatabad (Khorramshahr Cemetery)	Bloody City Shahid Sayad Shirazi Shahid Aviny Shahid Shamshiri Bait-ol-Moghaddas Operation	Rahian-e-Noor Tours (Khorramshahr Liberation)	Karun river Boat Arvand river Hoor Beheaded palm trees Barbed wire Haghghat Magazine Dugged Passages Suspended bridges/ Fortifications Destroyed Dome of the Mosque Overturned cars War-torn walls Smell of Gunpowder/Rubber Sound of Shells / Sirens


**Table 2 -** Memory-making Scenes of the War

Cochran's formula analyzed the effectiveness of memory-making townscapes, using the content of the ideas of 400 people (as the statistical population)<sup>3</sup>. In Khorramshahr, the sign has the most significant impact on the minds of the responders. 212 people out of 400 considered it the most crucial townscape criterion of promoting

3 -Khorramshahr's population was 133,097 in 1395. Based on Cochran's sample size formula for categorical data, the required sample size we estimated to be 384 people. However, due to the 5% error in this method and the lack of response from some people the survey was carried out using 400 questionnaires filled out by the dwellers.


**Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View**

collective memories of the war. The order of townscapes' priority is listed as following: Beheaded palms, the Destroyed dome of the Mosque, the Karun river, Mortar sound, the Arvand river, Hoor, Overturned cars, Barbed wire, Drugged passages, the Siren, the Suspended bridges, the Smell of gunpowder, and the Smell of rubber.



**Figure 5-** The Effect of War Reminiscent Signs Based on Inhabitants' Opinions


After the signs, the city functions were chosen second by the people(193 out of 400). The most critical townscapes that evoke war memories are prioritized: Khorramshahr Grand Mosque, Saif and Safa Bazaars, war hospital, Mosques (Railway and Sheikh Solaiman), schools (including Rasaei School), Jannatabad, and Shahid Chamran Dej.




**Figure 6 -** The Effect of City Functions Based on Dwellers' Opinions

The name criterion was chosen(159 out of 400 inhabitants). Responders believed that the names include Bloody City, Operation Bait al-Moghaddas (resulting in the city's victory), Martyr Aviny, Martyr Sayad Shirazi, and Martyr Shamshiri.





**Figure 7** - The Effect of Memory-making Names Based on Dwellers' Opinions  
Based on a questionnaire survey, collective ceremonies and beliefs are in the fourth and fifth priority.



**Figure 8** shows all the townscapes surveyed in this city to importance of impact.

### Conclusion

The city's physical environment is a source of signs, mental images, and memories. According to their mentality, each individual receives their perception of the environment and feels a sense of belonging to it. Wherever events occur, memories are formed. But a city cannot recount its past and circumstances, and thus external factors are needed to promote and create those memories. External factors are required to embrace and deliver memory to others constantly. Based on the criteria obtained and the data taken from newspapers and personal memoirs on the war, memory-making townscapes of

## Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View

Khorramshahr were expressed as the potential of this city. Those townscapes will cause changes and create mental images for future generations (Table 2).

A questionnaire was designed and responded to by 400 dwellers - who were not born at war based on the data. The questionnaire analysis shows that "Signs" and "Functions" are the most influential criteria in the dwellers' ideas. Two more effective vital samples for the signs and Symbols of War criteria are the walls with battle scars and the beheaded palm trees. "Functions in War Era" have the second priority, such as the function of Khorramshahr Grand mosque as a symbol for the city's resistance.



**Picture(set) 4** – Some of Khorramshahr Townscapes Before the War



**Figure 9** - Zoning of Khorramshahr Using War Events

According to the studied opinions of Khorramshahr dwellers, the following suggestions are put forward:

- The physical environment of the streets and passages – especially those with battle scars- can express a part of war history in pictures and text;
- More attention should be made to the evolution of urban construction to keep war townscapes. For example, preserving and displaying the beheaded palm trees is recommended as symbols of the brave martyrs' slaughtering. It is also suggested to plant trees in the name of martyrs;

- Reconstruction of Khorramshahr grand mosque as the symbol of resistance is also essential. It needs exhibitions about the Mosque, the war era, and showing its changes from the beginning of the war to the Khorramshahr liberation;
- Improving the environment of Safa Bazaar, the economic point of Khorramshahr, in which exploded many bombs. Those areas can be revived and used as cultural and tourism attractions in the city;
- The beautiful shore of the Karun River and the Arvand River can be improved physically to suit recreational tourism activities related to the war, such as using the boats previously used in the war;
- Holding ceremonies and conferences on essential days and reminding operation codes and the operations' areas. Also, it can display the principles of the procedures in an exhibition environment. Rahian-e Noor ceremony used to take place in Khorramshahr as well as the cities around. The number of its participants and the duration of this ceremony should be increased.

A survey was undertaken of the opinions of the dwellers of this city. According to the results, the effective axis in this city is the route connecting the entrance bridge to the town to the grand Mosque. Currently, Yadavaran Park and the museum of war are located there. In the figure below, this connection axis and essential areas are planned from the people's point of view.

Moreover, the city view needs a platform and a region to depict the power and sacrifice of this city in its entrance. The connection route should also employ tourism and recreational functions attractions along with visual war elements to revive the unique townscapes. Connecting this route to the main bazaar can bring back the past vitality to this city. Here, a selected way has been proposed to be a memorial route for war events (Figure10).



**Figure 10** - The selected Route from the Entrance Bridge to Khorramshahr Grand Mosque to Revive and Strengthen Townscapes.

**Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in  
Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View**

232

Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution | Volume 3 | No.9 | Summer 2021 | PP. 213-235

**References**

- Alexandrovskiy, A; et al. (2015). "The Early History of Moscow: Dates from Red Square." *Proceedings of the 16<sup>th</sup> International Conference*. (W.G. Mook and J. V. Plicht). Vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 583-589.
- Arandjelovica, B; Bogunovich, D. (2014). "City Profile: Berlin." *Cities*. Vol. 37, issue (April, 2014), pp.1-26.
- Ayyash, D. (2013). "The Brandenburg Gates: Unity, Division, and Reinvented Tradition in Post-wall Berlin." *Master Thesis*. City Planning. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Bell, S. (2015 AD/1394 SH). *Model Perspective, Perception and Process*. (B, Aminzadeh. Trans). First Edition. Tehran: University of Tehran Press.
- Boyer, C. (1994). *The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Correia, S. (2013). "Death and Politics: The Unknown Warrior at the Center of the Political Memory of the First World War in Portugal." *E-journal of Portuguese History*. Vol. 11, no. 2, pp.6-29.
- Cullen, G. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Selected Urban Landscape*. (M, Tabibian. Trans). Third Edition. Tehran: University of Tehran Press.
- Davidaston, M. (2004). *A Planners Dictionary*. Washington: American Planning Association published.
- Dennen, J. (1981). "On War: Concepts, Definitions, Research Data - A Literature Review and Bibliography." *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies 1980*. Westport: Greenwood Press. pp. 128-89.
- Eraydin, Z. (2014). "The Global Image of the City: Impacts of Place Branding on the Image of Ankara." *Ph.D. Thesis*. City and Regional Planning. Middle East Technical University.
- Farzan, S. (2020 AD/1399 SH). "Design and Change of the Use of Ahmadzadeh Square Buildings in Khorramshahr in the form of Cultural-commercial Complex, with the Aim of Facilitating the Reconstruction of Urban Life." *Master Thesis*. Architecture. Iran University of Science and Technology.

- Felasari, S. (2013). "Enhancing Virtual City with Collective Memory to Support Urban Design Learning." Ph.D. Thesis. Architecture the University of Sheffield.
- Habibi, A. (2001 AD/1380 SH). *Khorramshahr in War*. First Edition. Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research.
- Habibi, M. (2008 AD/1387 SH). "Let's Clear the Imaginary Forms of the City." *Journal of Architecture and Construction*. Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 115-117.
- Haseman, D; et al. (2005). "Implementation of a Group Decision Support System Utilizing Collective Memory." *Information & Management*. Vol. 4, no. 42, pp. 591–605.
- IRGC War Studies and Research Center. (1993 AD/1372 SH). *From Khooninshahr to Khorramshahr (Report on the Passage of the Occupation Phase)*. IRGC Publications–operations' Office, Tehran.
- Jaber, K. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *The Last Night in Khorramshahr, Memoirs of Iraqi Colonel Kamel Jaber*. (F, Sabzpoosh. Trans). Second Edition. Tehran: Sure, Mehr Publications.
- Jackson, H. (2017). "The USSR in World War II." Classroom Country Profiles. University of Washington, [https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/02/2018//USSR\\_WWII.pdf](https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/02/2018//USSR_WWII.pdf)
- Jazini, M. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Bibliography of Khorramshahr*. First Edition. Tehran: Shahed Publications.
- Kennedy, G. (2017). *Pan-european Displaced Archives in the Russian Federation*. First Edition. London: Routledge.
- Markozani, E. (2019). "Reclaiming the Memory: A Memorial Scape Along Neretva River, Mostar." *Master Thesis*. Architecture and the Built Environment. Delft University of Technology.
- McGilvray, E. (2019). *Poland and the Second World War, 1938–1948*. (n.p.). Pen & Sword Books Ltd.
- Mir Moghtadaei, M. (2009 AD/1388 SH). "Criteria for Measuring the Possibility of Formation, Recording, and Transfer of Collective Memories in the City (Case Study: Tehran)." *Journal of Fine*

**Townscapes of War Capital; Prioritizing Memorable Townscapes in  
Khorramshahr from the Dwellers' Point of View**

*Arts*. Vol. 10, no. 37, pp. 5-16.

- Montgomery, J. (2011). *Moscow, Russia, ULI*. First Edition. London: Urban Land Institute.
- Nassar, J. (2014 AD/1393 SH). *Evaluative Mental Image of the City*. (M, Asadi Mahalchali. Trans). First Edition. Tehran: Armanshahr Publications.
- Niemczyk, M. (1998). "City Profile Warsaw (Warszawa)." *Cities*. Vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 301–311.
- Parvin, H. (2013 AD/1392 SH). "Landscape of War, designing a part of Khorramshahr with the Approach of Reviving the Memories and Values of the Imposed War." *Master Thesis*. Landscape, University of Tehran.
- Righi, C. (2014). "Lebanese Youth: Memory and Identity." *Ph.D. Thesis*. Department of Social Psychology, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
- Sepehri, M. (2012 AD/1391 SH). *The Book of Nouredin the Son of Iran (Memoirs of Sayyed Nouredin Arefi)*. Forty-second Edition. Tehran: Surah Mehr Publications.
- Spearn, A. (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Townscape Language*. (H, Bahreini; B, Aminzadeh. Trans). Second Edition. Tehran: University of Tehran Press.
- Tolle, A. (2010). "Urban Identity Policies in Berlin: From Critical Reconstruction to Reconstructing the Wall." *Cities*. Vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 348-357.
- Vajihi, A. (2013 AD/1392 SH). "Historical and Legal Background of Khorramshahr Wars Throughout History." *The First Conference of Academics and the Holy Defense, Shahr-e Rey*.
- Warsaw Tourist Office. (2019). *WARSAW, Warsaw Meetings Guide. Tourism in Warsaw Report*. Warsaw Tourist Office.
- Winter, C. (2009). "Tourism, Social Memory, and the Great War." *Annals of Tourism Research*. Vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 607–626.
- Wozniak, M; et al. (2007). "Continuity of Y chromosome haplotypes in the population of Southern Poland before and after the Second World War." *Forensic Science International: Genetics*. Vol. 1,

no.2, pp. 134–140.

Zhou, W. (2016). "Construction of Traditional Cultural Tour Landscape Field Based on City Memory-taking Nanjing Fuzimiao (Confucius Temple) Qinhuai Scenic Area as an Example." Vol. 24. *International Seminar on Social Science and Humanistic Education (SSHE 2015)*. <https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20162401005>.

