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- Welfare and social justice
- Foreign policy and Islamic Ummah
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A Comparative Study of the Concept of "Global Justice" in Imam Khomeini's Political Thought and Neo-Gramscianism

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Abstract

The concept of "Global Justice" is a core concept in Imam Khomeini's thought which substantially contributes to a profound understanding of his ideas. However, understanding other thinkers' points of view in this regard, besides Imam Khomeini, may result in a more comprehensive understanding of this concept. Among all the various international relations schools of thought, the most emphasis on the concept of global justice has been held by Critical thinkers. Most specifically, Neo-Gramscian theoreticians such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Mark Rupert deserve more attention; of them, it is crystal clear that Cox's views are the most important. Cox has come up with many ideas on global justice and challenged the injustice nature of the current international order by proposing power, ideas, and institutions as three critical components contributing to the consolidation of hegemony. The very same challenge is the standard approach in Imam Khomeini's thought and Neo-Gramsci a Theory. Despite fundamental met theoretical differences, there is no conflicting matter in terms of an existing challenge. The present study, considering the importance of addressing this challenge, aimed to review the approximation of Imam Khomeini's political thought and that of Neo-Gramscian theoreticians about the concept of global justice. To do so, discussing Imam Khomeini's and Neo-Gramscian theoreticians' point of view on international relations, general, and global justice, in particular, a comparative method is employed to assess the two ends of ideas. The findings suggest that despite blatant differences in the definition of justice, they both agree on the prevalence of structural injustice in the current international system and, even further, consider global justice a vital prerequisite for the establishment of peace and stability in the world.

Keywords: Imam Khomeini, Neo-Gramscian Theory, Global Justice, Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Mark Rupert.

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Introduction

Justice, along with some other concepts as Independence, Freedom and Republic System, should be considered a focal axis of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These concepts take a special meaning under the Islamic-Revolutionary interpretation of Imam Khomeini. This purpose is undoubtedly far different from what was in the mind of the revolutionaries of France and Russia in the respective 18th and 20th centuries. However, some approximation is apparent. Such approximations are more elaborated when, for example, the concept of justice is addressed in both domestic and global spheres. When justice is discussed as an ideal situation under the spectrum of Rightist and Leftist schools of thought, the need to change it and the way and logic for it are also attended. The very same issue is highlighted explicitly in the view of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). However, when the ideas and opinions of the theoreticians criticizing the current capitalist system are addressed, considerable similarities are found between them and Imam Khomeini. Among these critical theoreticians, such thinkers as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Mark Rupert, and Giovanni Arighi, all considered under Neo-Gramscian Theory, are prominent.

Here, discussing the approximation between the political thought of Imam Khomeini and Neo-Gramscian theoreticians, mainly Cox and Gill, tried to pave the ground for a comprehensive study of Imam Khomeini's ideas as a critic of international relations. Performing such research would contribute to introducing the indigenous Theory of International Relations primarily based on the teachings of the founder of the Islamic Revolution.

The article has three parts. First, Imam Khomeini's views on international relations focusing on the concept of global justice are studied. Then, Neo-Gramscian Theory and its thinkers' views on the concept of global justice are explored. Finally, a comparison between Imam Khomeini and Neo-Gramscian theoreticians is conducted in terms of global justice.

1. The Place of Global Justice in the Thinking of Imam Khomeini

The concept of justice has a special place in Imam Khomeini's viewpoint on international relations discussions, in a way that it seems pretty crude to speak of international relations without justice. In his eyes, justice is a human value, and all human beings call innately for it. For Imam Khomeini, justice is a fundamental pillar of human society's laws. All divine prophets and their endeavors and teachings have implemented justice, equality, and peace in society. Conceptually, the concept of justice has been employed by Imam in different situations for different meanings, including:

- A) Bestowing no privilege upon a particular group or class of the society except for their human values;
- B) The popular uprising against tyrannies and plunders;
- C) Rescuing the oppressed from the oppressor and cutting the hands of the oppressor;
- D) Toppling unrighteous rulers, as well as advancing independence, freedom, and fair distribution of wealth.

For Imam Khomeini, establishing justice, fighting the oppression, and rescuing the oppressed underpin all policy-making of the Islamic system and government. In his eyes, divine prophets' primary duty and objective have been to establish a fair social system via the implementation of religious rules and to regulate social relations based on justice.

To better comprehend the place of global justice in Imam Khomeini's political thought, we should discuss the concept in two axes; first, we should draw the coordinates of the unfair international system, and then the way out of it needs to be addressed. In other words, initially, the quiddity and then the way out of this situation should be discussed.

1.1. The Coordinates of Injustice in the Current International System

Saying, "The United States is worse than the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom is worse than the United States, and the Soviet Union is worse than the two."²

Imam Khomeini has defied the state-centric Westphalian system West-East bipolarity from the very beginning days of his uprising. He classified all bullying regimes under the arrogant powers, while anti-bullying states, the majority of world inhabitants, come together as "The oppressed." Along these lines, proposing "Neither East nor West- but the Islamic Republic" slogan, Imam Khomeini stood against Nationalism structures as colonial identities and called for not only equality but fraternity (Tahaei, 1388: 104).

Imam Khomeini always rebuked intellectual foundations of the West and arrogant powers for their negligence to the fundamental concept of justice. In his eyes, Marxism, Secularism, Liberalism, and Nationalism, as manifestations of intellectual and thinking basics of the bullying camp, either do not believe in justice or, even if they pretend to defend it, as Marxists do, do not thoroughly digest the concept.

According to Imam Khomeini, the colonial powers have uniformly imposed an unfair political-economic system on the world; people can recognize two groups of people through their puppets: the oppressive minority and the oppressed majority (Khomeini, 42-43). He believed that the Islamic Revolution led to

2. Imam Khomeini's Speech Against Capitulation on 25 October 1965

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the victory of Iranian people over an imperial regime and triggered a global anti-oppression movement underpinned by the oppressed nations' awakening and uprising (Mohammadi, 1387: 50).

Imam Khomeini fundamentally opposed the ruling order of the global system as unjust. He not only rejected the mainstream theories of international relations, which propose "MIGHT IS RIGHT" (ibid: 50) but also believed that would not achieve the ultimate peace and security in the world unless the bullying arrogant powers are wiped out (Khomeini (a), 1370: 262).

As mentioned, Imam Khomeini argued that the world is the scene of an increasing alignment of nations in two conflicting blocs, namely the oppressor and the Anti-oppression. These two blocs have their characteristics, classifications, and objectives and have introduced their novel definitions of international relations concepts. While the leading actors of the oppression bloc endeavor to maintain the status quo and unjust Westphalian world order, the other bloc's agents are after breaking the taboo of a several-hundred-year-old system of domination. They also design new plans, objectives, and rules for the international community (Mohammadi, 1387: 51-52).

For Imam Khomeini, global justice is the prerequisite for the establishment of world peace. Since the dominant world powers would never give up their interests for justice, it is inevitable to fight and force them.

1.2. Approaches to Create a Fair World System

Profound evolution in domestic policies has always brought about significant changes in foreign policy, especially regarding Iran, in which changes were sponsored by a rich culture. There is lots of evidence pointing to Imam Khomeini's views on international relations and foreign policy are indigenous and deeply rooted in Iranian history. His approach to international relations and foreign policy is based on two axes: self-awareness of the past and courage to change the policies of the world system (Tahaei, 1388: 90-91).

Relying on these two axes, Imam Khomeini transformed the unfair international system as a primary objective of his Islamic Revolution. Along these lines, jurisprudential and doctrinal foundations of his approach can be enumerated as follows:

- Negation of ascendancy of aliens over Muslims or Nafy-e-Sabil Rule (Non-Dependency Rule);
- Negation of oppression in any form;
- Maintenance of independence of the country and avoiding its reliance on foreign actors (neither East nor West principle);
- Preservation of territorial integrity;
- The principle of relationships based on mutual respect and non-interference;
- The principle of fulfilling the covenant;
- Reinforcing relationships with Muslims and supporting their unity;

- The principle of Export of Revolution;
- Defending the oppressed (Haghgoo and Ketabi, 1398).

Imam Khomeini, since the outbreak of the uprising and especially after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, has repeatedly explained the characteristics of the ideal world system in terms of Islam and Islamic Revolution, at this moment listed:

1.2.1. The oppressed nations can only survive by their awareness and awakening, and, contrary to Marxists, nothing is predetermined. To change should act, and predestination does not rule over history (Khomeini (a), 1370: 259);

1.2.2. The establishment of sustainable world peace does not require balance-of-power and other western solutions, but it is conditional upon defeat and eradication of oppressive powers and advance of global justice;

1.2.3. The oppressed nations are not limited to Muslim communities, but it includes all under oppression people across the globe (ibid, 213);

1.2.4. Contrary to previous systems underpinned by secularism and humanism principles, Imam Khomeini's favorite system relies on return to religious values and rule of Almighty God and seeks happiness injustice.

The fraternity of Muslim nations, which the proximity of Muslim governments will follow, is a core ground for Imam Khomeini to advance its policy of change in world politics and establish a good system. He considers the very same issue as a primary objective and mission of the Islamic Republic system and its efforts on all domains (Tahaei, 1388: 104).

In Imam Khomeini's eyes, maintaining existing international order and conducting fair relations with other actors is subjected to the prevalence of justice in international interactions. Referring to change in the global balance of power after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, he says: "We hope the world balance would not be endangered since we do not incline to the East or the West, and conduct uniform and fair relations with others as far as they respect justice in relations with us." (Khomeini (c), 1370: 199)

According to Imam Khomeini, the anti-oppression bloc comprises masses of people in the developed countries, non-Muslim nations of developing countries, the world of Islam and World of Shias, and Iran at the top of them. In contrast, the pro-oppression bloc consists of Islamic and developing states under western dominance, developed countries that accompany the West, and western powers, with the United States at the top of them (Tahaei, 1388: 104). Imam Khomeini believes that the unity of Muslim states and communities may lead to their alliance against the Superpowers, disruption of current unfair interactions, and establishment of global justice (ibid,

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105). Struggle with oppression and oppressor is not limited to the Islamic world, but non-Muslims can also contribute to the fulfillment of this objective.

As Imam Khomeini assumes, Iran has taken the leadership of the anti-oppression movement to reconstruct international relations based on new foundations, which is both structurally and conceptually different from what is currently known in the literature of global politics and relations (Mohammadi, 1387: 37) It is clear cut that in such a view, justice, not power, prevails.

Imam Khomeini believes that the third world war has already been triggered, far different from its two antecedents in terms of both form and content. According to Imam Khomeini, this war is a cultural, political, economic, and sometimes military one out broken between the two blocs mentioned above. Assured of God's promises, Imam Khomeini daresay that the anti-oppression nations would ultimately overcome.

2. Global Justice in Neo-Gramscian Theory

Before discussing global justice in terms of Neo-Gramscian Theory, it seems necessary to deal briefly with Antonio Gramsci's ideas in this regard. However, he must be considered a sociologist rather than an international relations theoretician (Talei Hoor et al., 1397: 23). Although changing the level of analysis from domestic to international makes understanding Gramsci's ideas difficult (Germaine and Kenny, 1998), he, when developing a significant discussion on hegemony, plays an essential role in comprehending the concept of global justice in Neo-Gramscian Theory, sociologically addresses justice. According to Gramsci, the dominant class reproduces the hegemony through civil society institutions to teach and impose their own favorite moral, political, and cultural values and norms across the society and subordinate classes. Albeit, as mentioned, Gramsci's Theory of hegemony covers the domestic sphere. Still, his followers extended his ideas to the international relations and international political economy sphere and, promoting a global interpretation of hegemony, proposed a theoretical approach known as "Neo-Gramscian Theory." (Talei Hoor et al., 1397: 23)

Undoubtedly, a proper understanding of hegemony both in domestic and international spheres can aptly contribute to explaining the place of injustice in these spheres.

Similar to Gramscianism, Neo-Gramscian Theory is considered among Marxist-affiliated theories classified as a critical theory in terms of metatheory. As mentioned, within this theoretical framework, such thinkers as Robert Cox, the most prominent ones, Stephen Gill, Mark Rupert, and Giovanni Arighi, attempt to employ Gramsci's ideas and mixing them with Marxist teachings. By conducting a critical approach to the current world situation, they

propose a novel analysis of hidden strata of power interactions in the field of international politics (Talei Hoor et al., 1397: 23). In his famous "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relation Theory," Cox takes advantage of Gramsci's ideas to employ a novel approach to deal with injustice and oppression in international scenes under such topics as "Hegemony and World Orders" and "Social Forces, Hegemony and Imperialism" (Cox, 1981: 138-146) which will be at this moment discussed.

The same as the previous section, hereby it is tried to explore global justice in the thought of some of the most prominent figures of Neo-Gramscian Theory as Robert Cox and Stephen Gill under two axes: the quiddity of the current unfair system and the way of changing it.

2.1. The Coordinates of Injustice in the Current International System

International hegemony is one of the focal topics addressed by the Neo-Gramscians. Upon scrutiny of this concept, it is just upon scrutiny that one can understand the coordinates of injustice in the current international system. The idea means that the power of dominant classes is not merely based on coercion but also consent because it enables them to propagate and teach in subordinate classes' tenets and ideas that meet the interests of a specific group. In Cox's eyes, international hegemony is rooted in domestic domination; namely, dominant ruling classes have shaped it. Then, the hegemon gradually expanded and exercised influence on its peripheral countries. The peripheral countries adopted technological-cultural-economic patterns of this hegemon, heedless of its political model (Moshirzadeh (a) 1384: 232).

According to Cox, the birth of such hegemony requires the alignment of three components of thinking, material power and institution (Cox, 1981). So, we can only understand the current injustice in the international system upon comprehension of these component's functions and their interrelations.

Gill argues that the current world order comprises a set of historical structures which have become more liberal and material due to capital restructure and its inclination towards the right pole of the political spectrum. This trend takes in territorial expansion and social deepening of liberal economic definitions of society and its objectives and individualist and possessive patterns of action and politics (Gill, 1385: 235). Gill believes that the domineering bloc is apt for a market-centric and trans-national free economy whose existence depends on a spectrum of state-civil society institutions in the current era. Such a system is both within and out of the state. It is a part of "Local" political structures and a contributor to a "Global" political and civil society. So, according to Gill's portrayal of global power politics structures, there is a trans-national historical bloc whose central system is composed of organizing elements of the G-7

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group and trans-national capitalism. Capitalist policies in the form of neoliberalism have brought about hierarchical and contradictory results that can argue that turning to neoliberalism is a manifestation of government's crisis of authority and credibility and the problem of governance in a group of societies. This crisis points to the very same issue highlighted by Gramsci as "The gap between the masses and the rulers."

The efforts by post-industrial governments to accelerate the globalization process are assessed by Neo-Gramscians a plot by such governments to consolidate the current unfair situation for their benefit. They argue that neoliberal political-economic principles and institutions A disciplinary dimension is exercised both at the macro level and the micro-level and in the form of supervision of newly-born international agencies on national institutions and management on local identities.

According to Gill, disciplinary neoliberalism is institutionalized at the macro level in the form of quasi-legal restructuring of government and international frameworks: "The New Law-Abidance." This discourse of global economic governance is reflected in conditional policies of Bretton woods organizations, quasi-legal regional arrangements such as NAFTA or Maastricht treaty, and regulatory frameworks of some other newly-born trade organizations. It can be defined as a political program to make trans-national liberalism and, if possible, capitalize liberal democracy the unique model of development in the future. Hence, law-abidance closely relates to the emergence of market-oriented civilization (Gill, 1385: 254-55). The new law-abidance has turned into the practical discourse of conduct in a significant part of the world political economy (ibid, 259).

This bloc, nowadays manifested in the form of neoliberalism, resists any attempt of change. While the critical knowledge is after salvation, it has employed all its efforts to wipe out all manifestations of injustice and re-configure justice (Moshirzadeh (a), 1384: 248). Critical Theory is after rescuing humanity from unfair structures of global politics and the global economy under hegemon powers' dominance. It aims to unveil the hidden strata of the supremacy of the affluent North over the poor South (Jacson and Sorenson, 1997: 233-234).

Emphasizing continuous historical evolution and interaction between different areas, Gill argues that the official system of the ruling government, which has been once reinforced and consolidated by previous forms of international economic activities, is now gradually diminishing as the result of the prevailing economic rivalry and convergence, which is far more profound. According to Gill, the structure of world political power is composed of a trans-national

historical bloc of local varieties with G-7 countries' trans-national capital at its core.

In Rupert's eyes, the historical bloc explains and articulates an ideology rooted in a specific socio-political situation and production relations and bestows ideological content and integrity on its social power (Rupert, 1993: 81-82). The successful historical bloc is organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that bestow its composing components a type of strategic orientation and integrity. The creation of a new historical bloc requires a "Conscious and planned struggle" which criticizes the international relations and political economy, namely the system of ruling states and the global division of labor (Moshirzadeh (a), 1384: 247), and paves the ground for the establishment of proper order in the international sphere.

As explained, critical theoreticians, in general, and Neo-Gramscians, in particular, not only deal with injustice in the world and the role of hegemony in it but simultaneously provide approaches to modify the situation. This significant issue would be dealt with in the following.

2.2. Approaches to Create a Fair World System

Getting rid of injustice is the focal point of Neo-Gramscians. Along these lines, the main topics emphasized by these thinkers can be classified in the following axes:

- Developing meta theoretical discussions (epistemology and ontology);
- Challenging the mainstream of international relations;
- An alternative description of international relations;
- Possibility of change in the international relations and system (ibid, 215).

Meta theoretical discussions are a primary consideration of such thinkers as Cox. This emphasis on epistemology and ontology, which many mainstream international relations theoreticians have criticized, has a close connection with the other topic attended by critical theoreticians, namely, change in the international relations, and so is considered an inseparable part of its theoretical schema (Moshirzadeh (b), 1384: 225). Since critical Theory is obsessed with norms in international relations, it inevitably includes a change in its program (Moshirzadeh (a), 1384: 60-61).

Despite mainstream international relations, namely Realism, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, Scientists, and generally what is known as the stream of nationalistic ideologies in the international relations, which is concerned with order and stability, such thinkers as Cox, Gill, Rupert, and Arighi attempt to not only show historicity (changeability) of the status quo but the consequences of its unfair nature. They try to include any factor contributing to change and diversity in their studies. Mark Rupert, as an example, believes that one may enjoy a un-reductionist understanding of the system of

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ruling states and capitalist global economy by employing Gramscian historical ontology. In his eyes, international politics is a second-degree alienation since it deals with the mutual separation of communities that are themselves brought up within alienation-based relations. In other words, the existing social links, inclusive of the compound system of states and international political economy, have been constructed historically and can be politically challenged.

Neo-Gramscians criticize the meta theoretical dimension of the mainstream for its very conservative nature and heedlessness of the possibility of change in social life and international relations. In Neo-Gramscian's critical view, such mainstream axial propositions as "The current world must be considered the fixed framework and structure" are fundamentally criticized. Rejecting such proposals that ignore any change and believe that the future is the same as the past, Neo-Gramscians emphasized possibility, and beyond it a necessity, of change in the current unfair world order. Considering a fundamental role for social forces in the process of change, Robert Cox argues that the mainstream theories have not taken proper heed of these forces and have reduced their capacity to change under the concept of state (Moshirzadeh (b), 1384: 226-228).

A primary objective of critical studies is to weaken the dominant security discourse by revealing the contradictions within the existing order and criticizing ruling security regimes. The other aim of such thinkers is to modify the regulating and composing norms of the international system so that states desist thinking and behaving based on realistic models (Abdullahkhani, 1383: 69-70). Hence, the followers of critical theory favor a system in which justice prevails and the marginalized groups are regarded.

Cox continues that the mainstream theories and thinkers are merely obsessed with maintaining the status quo and so do nothing to modify the current order and establish a fair system, and subsequently divides international relations theories into two groups:

- 1) Critical Theory: this Theory believes that the current international order is unfair and seeks to change the current situation in favor of establishing global justice;

- 2) Problem-Solving Theory: these theories operate within the existing system to solve its problems and have a conservative approach (Moshirzadeh (a), 1384: 220).

In general, Neo-Gramscians favor the following issues in their aspiration for change in the international order:

- Returning to moral norms in international relations;
- Decreasing global inequalities;
- Establishing international justice;
- Respecting diversity, pluralism, and difference.

Cox has the most revolutionary approach to change in the international system. He is after discovering and uniting the

opposition forces within the global structure. To achieve such a goal, he believes one may take advantage of internal contradictions of the current order to challenge it and bring about fairer world order. In his eyes, social movements and anti-hegemonic forces can be the most potent challengers of the ruling political and institutional arrangements. Cox admits that this political project requires the creation of a new historical bloc whose prerequisite is conducting a conscious and planned struggle that would conquer the power centers and enjoy ideological and economic power and convincing argument. Although Cox thinks any mutual hegemony in the current international system is farfetched, it seeks its possibility within the communities, not at the international level. In other words, he believes that making a change in the global system is feasible through new historical blocs at the national level. Considering the current order as historical, not natural, Cox believes that would modify this unfair order if some special conditions are provided. Discussing internal contradictions of the current international order, Cox refers to social movements that can take advantage of such contradictions to further efficient challenges against the order and achieve a fairer world system.

According to Gill, these are anti-hegemonic forces that defy ruling political and institutional arrangements. To advance this challenge, it is necessary to develop the "Anti-Hegemony" in terms of a set of alternative values, concepts, and considerations (Stean and Pettiford, 2011: 117). Anti-hegemonic forces do not have a peculiar nature and may or may not be progressive (Gill, 1993: 143). As mentioned, struggling with the hegemony requires creating a new historical bloc that is not merely a coalition of classes but contains political, economic, and cultural dimensions of a specific social formation (Moshirzadeh, 1384: 247). Albeit, it should be noted that thanks to the artistic view of Gramsci, any discussion concerning change in international relations are mostly tinted with cultural dimensions. For Gramsci, a pervasive change in social reality is achieved via creating a "Mutual Culture," (Rupert, 1993: 79) an issue that Neo-Gramscians undoubtedly emphasize.

Conclusion

As mentioned, the concept of justice is a focal point in Imam Khomeini's political thinking and behavior so that it can be considered the "Keyword" of his political literature. On the other hand, neo-Gramscian theoreticians of international relations have emphasized justice in a way that takes this concept away from the critical theory, in general, and Neo-Gramscian Theory, in particular, there remains nothing of it.

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Despite some differences in the definition of "Justice," Imam Khomeini and Neo-Gramscians have the same opinion on the existence of injustice in the current international order. In common with the monotheistic approach of Imam Khomeini, many critical theoreticians maintain that the establishment of justice is the mere remedy for developing sustainable peace in the world. Along these lines, Cox argues that any effort to achieve sustainable world peace without paving the ground for the establishment of justice and removal of existing injustice would be in vain. Global justice is a prologue for sustainable world peace.

According to these two approaches, structural violence prevails in relations between the units of ruling international system, which is rooted in the oppressive nature of such relations (between dominance and subordination) and embraces colonization, exploitation, and oppression. The best description for the heart of the international system during the last decades has been nothing but structural violence. It has been confirmed for both western and eastern blocs. In other words, during the Cold War era, there existed two kinds of structural violence in the world; vertical violence exercised by Superpowers against each other and a horizontal one imposed by the Superpowers on their subordinates and especially the third world countries. A primary objective of the Islamic Revolution, like Neo-Gramscian Theory, was to put an end to this situation and propose an improved new way of interactions between the international system units. The Islamic Revolution and Neo-Gramscianism have a common critical approach to the unfair and oppressive status quo.

Considering the structural violence in an international system with several blocks of power, all these blocs are composed of three components: the core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states. In this classification, power is distributed top-down, and Superpowers are the ultimate decision-makers. The farther the area (Semi-peripheral or Peripheral) from the core, the less participation in decision-making. The peripheral regions have fundamentally turned into a scene for the core states to settle their accounts with each other. In other words, the peripheral areas are the victims of conflict of interests of core powers, while they don't make a considerable profit from such rivalries. It has just been propagated that the security of political units depends on their joining in one of the blocs of power. In contrast, the very same security dilemma has deceived countries into tolerating such structural violence.

Another dimension of structural violence concerns with North-South relations, primarily economic, which has been lamented by all Neo-Gramscian theoreticians as well as Imam Khomeini. In such a relation, a small number of countries (the North) exploit and oppress so many countries. This trend is still one of the prominent characteristics of the international system. The nature of North-South

relations, characterized by unbalanced trade and economic relationships, is so that it brings about the backwardness of the South and accelerated growth of the North. Accordingly, the Southern states have consistently called for the establishment of economic balance in the form of a new economic order.

After all, the Islamic Revolution led by Imam Khomeini emerged in such a context and aspired to modify the environments suffering from structural violence. In other words, change was the focused objective of the Islamic Revolution, which was sought through the transformation of minds and thoughts. None of the leading trustworthy carriers of the idea of the Islamic Revolution have ever been after modifying and transforming the structural violence through force and occupation. Instead, they have favored the transformation of thoughts (preparing mental conditions) through increased awareness. The majority of Neo-Gramscians, as well, have emphasized on cultural approach for changing the current unfair situation and establishment of just order.

The revolutionary movement of Imam Khomeini considerably trembled the foundations of the international system, especially in regional subsystems. Although the bipolar system could hardly keep its trembling structures for a few decades, it was inevitably doomed to failure. The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to the bipolar system, but the structural violence continued to survive in a different form. Nowadays, the world witnesses two blocs of dominance and subordination. The subordinate nations and groups are trying to defy the authoritarian powers in any possible way and establish justice in the world. It is a very significant issue that Neo-Gramscians have focused on, emphasizing such concepts as social forces (Cox, 1981). The increased number and diversity of groups who reject and criticize the current world order is evidence of this claim.

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Appearance Conditions Based on the New Islamic Civilization Centered on the Martyr Soleimani School

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Abstract

Civilizations have always faced harm and challenges in their movement and promotion; the new Islamic culture is one of these cultures. The efforts of human beings who have reached a proper knowledge in the strict sense of the word and have sacrificed their lives for its excellence caused the protecting the understanding and affirmation of ideas, achievements, and cultural identity in this civilization. Apostate people believe that Islam cannot provide a framework, law, and morality appropriate to today's world; therefore, we need spirituality as an alternative to religion. Hence, with the slogan "I Am Spiritual, but I Am not Religious," they confronted and rejected Islam and its new civilization and finally blew the apocalyptic view in their minds. The Soleimani School, influenced by the teachings of Islam and the discipleship of the Valy-e Faqih, went against such innovation. With proper and codified planning throughout the religious system, he established the view to reviving the new Islamic civilization in its practical form. Based on the new Islamic civilization context in appearance conditions and its problems, the present study aimed to answer the main question 'What are the appearance conditions based on the new Islamic civilization context centred on the school of Martyr Soleimani?' The analytical method was used with a futuristic approach to this practical aim and collected data with the library method. The results indicated that a multifaceted process based on the second phase statement to the modern Islamic civilization aligns with the characteristics and signs of appearance. This multifacetedness has emerged in Soleimani School and is manifested and consistent in the various layers of the second phase statement.

Keywords: School, Appearance, Context, New Islamic Civilization, Martyr Soleimani.

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Introduction

Civilization is a unique and material form of people's life based on culture and thought; manifestation of a set of customs, traditions, behaviour and practices, science, technology and industries that originate from certain cultural principles and foundations (Khorramshad, 2013 AD/1392 SH).

It is the most extensive construction of cultural identity. Although civilizations have continuously evolved, they have always been based on a particular culture. Therefore, the creation of any civilization depends on strategies and policies that can save it from the vortices of competition and identity and management crises in various historical periods and guarantee its possibility of survival and longevity. The Islamic Revolution has tried to promote the new Islamic civilization. The present age is witnessing the establishment of an Islamic government based on the Islamic divine concepts.

On the other hand, it is seeing the decline of the ruling civilization of the West. Many schools in the world were from the prophets and theologians or from Materialistic. According to its power, each of them had a specific scope. Imam Khomeini School has been one of the most influential schools in the present era. Some members of this school have been so prominent and compelling that they emerged a new school following the Imam school. Martyr Haj Qasem Soleimani, with his martyrdom, played an essential role in the history of the world and the Islamic Revolution (Khani and Mohammadi, 2020 AD/1398 SH: 6).

Western believes that culture and values depend on the people who shape it, so societies with different cultures are also considered separate. Culture is like clothes, and you can not cover older man clothes to a young man. With the distinct and relative culture, we cannot expect the two societies to be the same and, based on that, formed a single world law, and as a result, the rule of Imam Zaman (AS) should not be formed. This point for years was institutionalized in scientific societies and encouraged others to this theory. They established a strange hegemony worldwide (Mariji, 2021 AD/1399 SH).

On the other hand, Islamic lands have never been safe from the onslaught of enemies, simultaneously with Muslims authority in the world, they always have been under enemies attack. The present age is one of the critical periods in the history of Islam .The Islam enemies, fearing the expansion of the influence and authority of Muslims in the international arena, have threatened them in any way from any ideology and school. They have sought to dominate the Islamic world and plunder

their resources and wealth (Varaei, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 42-71). Knowing the "Pattern" in Islam, the necessary characteristic for growth is based on two ways:

- 1) Description of the Quran and the Sunnah from the perfect man;
- 2) Knowing an ideal human being is not through expressions, but objectively and ensuring that they are made based on the Islam and the Qur'an teachings and are the objective existence of perfect Islamic human beings (Motahari, 1995 AD/1373 SH: 15-16).

During the absence of Imam (AS), there were and still are martyrs and righteous people who follow the Imams, a clear example of which is Martyr Soleimani, with his presence and even his martyrdom as a star, he illuminates a world. Therefore, the Supreme Leader states in his Friday prayer sermon:

“Do not look at the martyr Haj Qasem Soleimani as a person; look at him as a school and way” (Khamenei Statements. Friday Prayer Sermon of Tehran, 1398 /10/27).

The basis of this research was the practical effect of a new Islamic civilization with manifestation in thought and, finally, the school of Martyr Soleimani by playing the role of an appearance context. The researcher seeks to present the common point of this school with the Vilayat-e Faqih to bring the audience to a common understanding. Therefore, the theoretical research framework has been established focusing on the Soleimani School, the modern Islamic civilization context and the appearance. The present study aimed to analyze the arrival conditions in modern Islamic civilization focusing on the Martyr Soleimani School. The main question is ‘What are the conditions for the appearance of a modern Islamic civilization centred on the school of Martyr Soleimani?’

Obedience to the leader's measures and paying attention to the statement of the second phase, the Islamic nature, value and guardianship of the Soleimani school with the future mapping and providing the ground for appearance show the importance of research.

The necessity of research is:

- Continuation of global and international arrogance threats due to its hegemonic nature;
- Ambiguity in the view of religious communities and the recognition of importance;
- Neglecting to the valuable goals and ideals of the new Islamic civilization.

1. Research Background

Some research about this issue has been done. The article "Analysis of the Mahdavi Teachings Status in the Revival of Modern Islamic Culture and Civilization" is written by Hassan Najafi et al. (2018 AD/1396 SH).

It is about relative intellectual development, scientific progress of moral excellence, optimal measures, economic development, the establishment of justice and providing security ground are some of the characteristics of civilized Islamic society that have been discussed in Mahdavi teachings. Mohammadi Pouya et al. (2021 AD/1399 SH), in the article "Educating the Foundation of the Modern Islamic Civilization with Emphasis on the Supreme Leader Thoughts" deals with the complexity civilization-making process. According to the components of spirituality, scientism, ethics, rationality, justice, unity, progress, continuous struggle and dynamism of culture is needed to provide ground to research education based on the evolutionary documents of the country by influencing the components of the modern Islamic civilization. The article "Waiting Society and the Necessities of Civilization-making from the Perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei" was written by Qanbar Ali Samadi (2021 AD/1399 SH).

He notes that one of the essential issues in Islamic thought is civilization, civilization-making and the waiting society mission. The Supreme Leader considers the most critical task of the waiting nation in the contemporary era is civilization-making inspired by the ideals of Mahdavi civilization. "Grounds for the Fulfilment of a Modern Islamic Civilization in the Islamic Society According to the Supreme Leader" was written by Arefigorvan, (2019 AD/1397 SH).

The author considers the beginning of the Islamic civilization forming simultaneously with the Islam appearance. He states it is growing and flourishing. He further acknowledged that the goal of the Imams of the Islamic Revolution and the nation and revolution was to create modern civilization. Its fulfilment requires a correct and accurate intellectual system. The article "Structural Components of Islamic Civilization (with a futurology approach)" was written by Piroozman et al. in 1398. Using a divine paradigm, the response to the dominance of Western civilization in the Islamic world has expressed the need to move towards building a new Islamic culture. To this aim, scientific explanation and creating a civilized discourse with influential components in the modern Islamic civilization have been critical. Moghimi (2021 AD/1399 SH) in the *Journal of Islamic Management* has an article entitled "Sincerity-oriented Leadership; the Essence of the Shahid Soleimani School." In this article,

the researcher has studied Martyr Soleimani as a central concept in sincerity-oriented leadership. Based on the content analysis and themes chain, the researcher designed and explained a process model based on the ground-making factors of enthusiastic leadership, the characteristics of sincerity-oriented leadership, and the achievements of this type of leadership. In this model, he proposed a set of factors affecting the sincerity of Martyr Soleimani as the ground-making factors that play a central role. In this model, the components of leadership were grouped based on the seriousness in the form of nine overarching themes, the core of which is sincere behaviour, as the most central influential theme interacts with other pieces. In the end, the leadership achievements based on Martyr Soleimani sincerity have been considered in the form of six articles. Regarding the data extracted from the theoretical and practical life of Martyr Soleimani, a scale for measuring the style of sincerity-oriented leadership was designed.

2. Theoretical Framework

The present study theoretical framework is based on the perfection of humanity and ensuring public happiness in Islam and the source of inspiration for the duties and responsibilities of human beings in this religion. One of the valuable examples of the future of Islamic society and creating modern Islamic civilization can be seen in the divine promise regarding the formation of Imam Zaman appearance. The Shia community is waiting for fulfilling the divine promise regarding Imam Zaman appearance. Based on Islamic narrations, the Imam's followers are obliged to provide the conditions for the formation by taking appropriate measures. Considering all the rulings issued in the second phase statement of the Leader, especially in the field of "Revolutionary Manifestations" continued in the Soleimani School and was practical in him, causes the expansion of this vital issue.

3. Research Innovation

This research is a step towards starting a transformation in the appearance ground-making and a future that is indeed an important layer and a crucial dimension of this universe.

4. Civilization Conceptology

Civilization has been defined several times regarding its ambiguity. Toynbee writes that "Civilizations are complex systems with an intertwined overall whose components are related to each other and its

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political, economic and cultural elements are in proportion to each other while paying attention to a whole." (Pahlavan, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 436)

Toffler (1997 AD/1376 SH) writes: "It is a set of material and spiritual achievements that human beings create to flourish and organize their lives. According to him, no other word adequately covers all these various subjects such as technology, family life, religion, culture, politics, business, hierarchy, leadership, values and epistemology." (Toffler, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 29)

In fact, "Civilization is a social phenomenon that is transferable and accept religious, moral, aesthetic, technical-scientific common aspects in a society or related several societies." (Motahari, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 7-121).

5. Islamic Civilization

Since Islam is a set of fundamental beliefs based on monotheism, it shapes values and provides norms for orienting behaviours and symbols. It can create a standard ideological system for individuals to achieve a common cultural identity. The function of this belief system is to give meaning to the facts by regulating the general concepts of existence. Therefore, religious knowledge is the source of ultimate purposes, connects various cultural and social elements, and provides identity and solidarity (Piroozmand et al., 2020 AD/1398 SH: 333).

Hence, "Islamic civilization represents all the political, cultural and economic aspects of society that cover the existential dimensions of the individual and community. It is a religious civilization that all its components are based on Islam." (Jan Ahmadi, 2015 AD/1395 SH: 51-52)

In other words, "Islamic civilization based on the monotheistic view is an ideological civilization with a set of spiritual and material resources of Islamic society that leads man to spiritual and material perfection." (ibid., 52)

According to the leadership, "Islamic civilization is a space where a man can grow spiritually and materially and reach the desired end God Almighty has created him. To have a good and dignified life, dear human beings with power, will, initiative, and the construction of the natural world. Islamic civilization means this, and it is the goal and ideal of the Islamic Republic." (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Chairman and members of the Assembly of Leadership Experts, 1392/06/14)

Regarding the nature of civilization and its objective effects in the form of social systems, the structural study of Islamic civilization-

making can be a set of coherent factors that, by combining and arranging their logical relations with each other, form a network of elements in the civilized system. The process of civilization-making involves a kind of universality.

The process by which active agents, in different time sequences, mutually relate and change the structures of social life to create a world with the rule of properties but interconnected. In fact, regarding the nature of futurology, civilization-making with the view of preparing the ground for the appearance of Imam Zaman (AS), Islamic civilization-making also becomes a process. The formation of the Islamic Revolution in the first level of civilization-making and then the Islamic system, the Islamic State, and the Islamic society leads to the new construction of Islamic civilization. Today, this statement is confirmed by passing through the four stages mentioned in the Islamic culture and creating practical actions.

A clear example is the performance of Martyr Soleimani and the founding of the appearance ground-maker school. According to the Supreme Leader: "An efficient Islamic society means a society on which life-giving Islam, invigorating Islam, mobilizing Islam, Islam without perversion and deviation, Islam without eclecticism, Islam that encourages human beings to be brave, and guides human towards science and knowledge are governed on it. This society brings political dignity and economic prosperity." (Khamenei statements. 1384/05/28)

Therefore, the Islamic Ummah in the world today should be such that it illuminates the path of humanity like a torch, shines on society like a sun, and brings good to them. This Islamic society should be

"يدعونَ الى الخَيْرِ", "لِتَكُونُوا شُهَدَاءَ عَلَى النَّاسِ" and be the leader of humanity in all good deeds. "The Islamic society, which should have a ray of "وَلِلَّهِ الْعِزَّةُ وَلِرَسُولِهِ وَلِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ" is far from the current state of the Islamic world and the Islamic Ummah." (Khamenei statements. Meeting of the agents of the system, 1376/11/09).

Therefore, human society needs a basic model in constructing a new Islamic civilization, that the cultivation of academic human resources is one of its most vital tools.

6. Modern Islamic Civilization

The term "Modern Islamic Civilization" is an initiative of the Supreme Leader, which has been raised many times in recent years and then in scientific circles, and most recently in the second phase statement, emphasizing specific cases for its realization. In using this term, his

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emphasis on the two attributes of being "Islamic" and "Modern" indicates the religious nature of this civilization and its dynamism. In Islamic culture, all the foundations of social life, including attitudes, behaviours, discourses, communications, internal and external interactions, industrial and technological products, and other civic achievements of Muslims, are influenced by religion and culture. The "Modern" aspect of this civilization is the growing and productive feature of Islamic thought in responding to man's present and future needs and the power of its construction.

The meaning of "Modernity" is a kind of civilization-making that, in its foundation and formation, the new and emerging needs of human beings and the evolutionary aspects of social civilization are considered. Islamic civilization is "Modern" because it seeks to change all aspects of individual and social life and manage all human and natural phenomena under the needs and requirements of the conditions and time. Therefore, it is imperative to pay attention to the provisions of human life in the finding meaning of the new Islamic civilization. The first necessity for creating civilization in the age of waiting is a comprehensive view of the realms of human existence and attention to his material and spiritual needs in the areas of life.

7. The Relationship between Civilization and the Soleimani School

Since the idea of modern Islamic civilization is a new project in the political and governing literature of the Islamic Republic and Islamic thought in general, the theoretical foundations mentioned in this article are based on the concept of Islamic civilization and civilization. We can categorize it in a conceptual model of Islamic civilization. One of the most important points emphasized by the Leader in the fulfilment of Islamic civilization is the revolutionary training generation. The way to raise the flag of the new Islamic civilization is to educate a generation with characteristics such as: brave, erudite, religious, innovative, pioneering, self-confident and zealous (Khamenei statements. Meeting with the Scientific Elite, 1395/07/28).

He divides the factors of fulfilling new Islamic civilization into two levels:

- 1) Level, hardware contexts (tools);
- 2) The level of software fields (real).

The hardware level includes material advances such as science, economics, politics, security, the military, inventions, the promotion of international prestige, etc. The group of software that is presented to the

world as the truth of Islamic civilization and what Islamic civilization wants to offer includes the Islamic lifestyle, which itself includes: marriage style, cover style, political behaviour, treatment with friends, enemies, and family, etc.

Examining the personality dimensions of Martyr Soleimani as a civilization-maker agent shows that he, as a successful sample, had outstanding features both at the hardware and software levels that could significantly advance the Islamic fulfilment of modern civilization (Dara et al., 2021 AD/1399 SH).

The national sphere of modern Islamic civilization in Shahid Soleimani is mentioned as a model appropriate to the themes discussed above, which will be discussed in more detail below:

7.1. Characteristics of Martyr Soleimani and Its Adaptation to the Appearance Ground

According to Shahid Soleimani's heartfelt indication to creating appearance ground, his spirits and actions show the appearance characteristics, some of which are his contextual and scholastic impulses in this regard:

- **Human will and faith.** A human can shape the certainty of the future but does not affect its confidence. A human being can form the inevitability of the end of Mahdavi's appearance if his actions are faithful, sincere, trustworthy and mediocre;
- **Sincerity as the highest indicator of his presence in the field of action;**
- **Lack of pretence.** It was one of his apparent points. He is always present in all experiment scenes. With sincerity, sympathy and learning for those who have a high position. He had an active presence in all areas of service and struggle;
- **Observance of divine limits and precaution in it.** In military areas, satan has a fact, and hostility may pressure humans. Still, Martyr Soleimani, like Imam Ali (as) and his Leader Khamenei, took precautions even in the military arena, which many may not have exercised;
- **Courage.** According to the Supreme Leader, "Martyr Soleimani was both brave and prudent;" (Khamenei statements. 2020 AD/01/08/1398 SH /10/18)
- **Modelling among Resistance International Figures.** This feature gave him entrance into the realm of the Islamic world, and it was a step towards achieving the main goal and handing over the flag of Islam and revolution to Imam Mahdi (AS).

7.2. Semiotics of Appearance Centered on the School of Martyr Soleimani

The method of semiotics is proposed and used in the fields of its appearance and future (Riyazi, 2021 AD/1399 SH). This method seeks to observe the signs of appearance and uprising, characters and events that

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are the basis of Imams statements about the conditions before the appearance, on the eve of it, simultaneously or after the appearance, which appears (Khazaei, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 248).

On the other hand, signs are tokens that are aware of something in the future. Some politicians, thinkers, great leaders and commanders of the Right Front have an extraordinary power of understanding in analyzing trends and events and discerning the future, predicting bright and confident futures from weak signs and signals. For example, the founder of the Islamic Republic with signs of Taghut ruling, and their fulfilment with the divine promises that show the help of the rebellious believers in the way of God, ensured the overthrow of the Taghut regime. Regarding the role of definite and uncertain signs of appearance, we cannot ignore the influential events on the future or the drivers and the weak signs of change in drawing future scenarios and images. Definite or uncertain signs of appearance that are considered as the background of appearance, in one way, can be regarded as the drivers of the Mahdavi utopia and, in other respects, weak signs of change towards the realization of the ideal society emergence. Because according to the hadiths, the occurrence of appearance signs indicates it's indeed happening. Therefore, by accurately and logically matching the authenticity news and narrations to the observed signs, the ground for understanding and preparing for achieving the future and facing it is provided (Ghorbani, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 214).

In this process, signs role, especially their accurate knowledge according to the Qur'an and hadiths, is essential for the future orienting and the vision-making of a united society and the actions of those who wait for their duties. Every believer must prepare himself to face the future, build a bright future, and use his strength in this direction. They need to think about their future and tomorrow, identify them, and create them. The signs of revelation, especially those derived from divine promises and the conditions for fulfilling the desired future in the Quran, are promising for the believers. Tomorrows and futures, under the will of God Almighty, are the result of the actions, plans and even intentions of individuals. Accordingly, divine futurism focuses on man thinking about the future by thinking about his actions and behaviour and improving it (Karegar, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 150).

God says: "O you who believe, practice piety, and let each one of you look at what he has sent down for the future." (Al-Hashr: 18) Imam Ali (AS) has explained the meaning of this verse well in a narration: "Today,

man must take care of his future and look to the future from now on." (Nahj al-Balaghah, Sermon 83: 585)

We define the appearance age when the world achieve the appearance conditions of Imam Zaman (AS). According to the Quran and Hadiths, the world has, in the appearance period, three main characteristics:

- Pervasive oppression and sedition that enters every house (Ibn Tawus, d. 664 AH);
- Existence of enemies such as Sufyani and Nawasib, etc., who are active against Shias in Iraq and other parts of the Islamic lands (Yemen, Syria, etc.) (Majlisi, d. 1110 AH);
- Companions and patrons of Imam Zaman who are trying in Islamic lands and scatter the memory and name of Imam Zaman (AS) in the world (Saduq, 2011 AD/1390 SH).

These symptoms are spreading right now and in the form of fire under the ashes. Martyr Soleimani, being established from this religious point of view, entered the arena of struggle and presence on the battlefield against the events that took place in these areas. And put the foundation of the battle against these signs on the agenda by order of his commander, and in this way, kept the red line of martyrdom open. The likes of Martyr Soleimani are and have been obliged to look to the future because by their actions and deeds; they have prepared their way of life to enter the end and prepare the environment for the appearance. In many verses, God, by stating the fate of some tribes, has instructed the believers or the following nations to learn a lesson and pay attention to the fact that the earth is for the genuinely righteous and oppressed believers in God and the Day of Resurrection. In such verses, there are expressions such as " فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولَى الْأَبْصَارِ " about the necessity for the conscious to take advice from the world events. Some commentators have considered the meaning of " فَاعْتَبِرُوا " as a reflection in work (Tabarsi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 2-155).

He became a pattern for the followers of the true path and justice and established a world full of justice and the fight against injustice. These verses recommend lessons and express traditions such as the victory of truth over falsehood, believers over infidels and polytheists, and the elimination of oppressors and tyrants. It indicates a reciprocal and harmonious relationship between religious traditions (Riyazi, 2021 AD/1399 SH).

According to the Qur'anic teachings, the signs of appearance should depict a future in which the community is eager and waiting to implement the goals of the promised Savior. The type of signs should avoid determining the time of appearance and instead enable the

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possibility of observing the characters with the enthusiasm and hope of those waiting to help achieve the goals of justice, security and benevolence in Islamic society and fight against oppression (Assariannejad, 2016 AD/1395 SH).

8. The Most Important Future Event

The appearance of Mahdavi is one of the most critical future that has been the dream of all the prophets and Imams. The future that God has promised in the Qur'an: "We wrote in the Psalms that in the future the righteous and the pure will inherit the earth, and the world will be cleansed forever from the unrighteous people." Martyr Soleimani ensured security and peace for all people by giving objectivity to the verse, ground-making appearance and creating a doctorate of soldiers without borders. Also, the appearance needs a just leader, which is not limited to Shia thought but exists in all religions and different human attitudes somehow. The expectation of such a leader strengthens the faith of the oppressed and gives them hope for ultimate victory. This belief does not make them irresponsible; instead, it gives them strength, confidence and an energetic spirit. In a meeting with foreign guests on 1396/11/18, the Supreme Leader said:

“Imam Zaman (AS) is the symbol of divine justice on the earth; therefore, all humanities are waiting for the Imam appearance. So, Imam Zaman (AS) is not specific to the Shias or Muslims but is an expectation in the hearts of all human beings and nations of the world. There is hope in the heart of humanity that history is moving towards goodness, so they earn strength, and their hearts will be light; it turns out that every just-oriented action is in the direction of law and the natural circulation of this world human history. Martyr Soleimani, following the leadership, actualized this critical issue and incorporated it with Islamic teachings. His martyrdom attracted many followers that became his path following. The most crucial act of Martyr Soleimani in facilitating and ground-making of appearance was the adaptation and focused on the verses and narrations that promised the signs of appearance. He, by following Imams, instructions of the Imam Khomeini reminders and recommendations, avoiding the erroneous methods mentioned in the verses and hadiths, not considering himself independent of any ijthihad principles, and finally, act to false manner followed the Imam and luminous verses of the Quran (Riyazi, 2021 AD/1399 SH).

9. Research Methodology

According to the primary research issue, the purpose and question raised in the introduction, the type of research are practical, and the method is futurology-analytical research with signs of appearance. We used the potential of the qualitative research method. In the first level, we paid attention to the theoretical framework of research, which was prepared through information and written documents in the hidden content of the second phase statement of the revolution. Then the obtained information was explained and formulated. In the meantime, we surveyed future religious studies, age of appearance, and definite and uncertain signs. The present study used the library method to collect and analyze information and then presented the result.

10. Research Findings

According to the signs of the inevitable signs of the appearance brought by the Imams to recognize Imam Zaman, in other words, the processes of remembering his time events and the reasons for establishing his government, Martyr Soleimani realized the formation of this path.

On the other hand, the unique view of leadership in the modern Islamic civilization and its formation, which was an essential lesson for the martyrs and especially Martyr Soleimani, is the lifestyle at the community level. Other fields, including economics, technology, industry, etc., are a means to achieve this aim, peace, security, excellence and tangible progress that underlies the new Islamic civilization.

Basic codes of Research Arising From the Appearance Background in the Modern Islamic Civilization of the Soleimani School

Descriptive code	Explanatory	Selected code
The appearance of Imam Zaman is the function of definite divine will.	Faith to the divine will	Believe in appearance
All appearance narrations are common in expressing definite signs.	Certainty in appearance is indeed	waiters observe for the occurrence of symptoms
Recognizing the correct path in the Mahdavi appearance in the light of the Vilayat guarantees a Mahdavi understanding and diagnosis signs of emergence.	Positive ground-making of the waiters depends on understanding the Vilayat and accepting it	Knowing the signs of the appearance age under the emphasis of the Vilayat
The proper understanding of Mahdism is for those who strive, trust and persevere in the way of God and the establishment of the rule of divine justice, even if they do not experience appearance.	Feelings of failure and hopelessness in passive waiting	The success of the waiting community depends on active waiting

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Maahdavi futurology is a discourse that should not be determined at that time.	Lack of accurate determination of emergence time	Lack of time determination
Islamic civilization means a civilization in which science is accompanied by morality.	Pay attention to spirituality and materialism	Political power is associated with justice
The permanence of the modern Islamic civilization in the appearance era	Historical lasting	It is related to generations and is not a repetitive, partial or slogan work
The modern Islamic civilization is being formed step by step.	Care in every step	Penetrating vision of the path it takes.

Conclusion

It is less common for a school to revive and create a civilization with its worldview. The modern Islamic civilization was introduced to the world as a living civilization after various steps and during the events of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and reached its peak with forming the resistance pillar in the world. After the martyrdom of Soleimani and observing internal and external developments and increasing demand for arrogant departure from the region, we witnessed the creation of a new school to revive the modern Islamic civilization. The school of Martyr Soleimani in the macro view of civilization with the deep philosophical and intellectual support of its monotheism and a robust system of vision and secretary revived a genuine civilization. In this research, the school is a compilation of religious lessons and clear behavioural guidelines following the do's and don'ts of Martyr Soleimani School from the point of view of Imam Khamenei.

On the other hand, civilization-making and creating a modern Islamic civilization is one of the essential strategies of the Islamic society to achieve future goals. The Supreme Leader considers civilization-making a possible thing and the most critical mission of the community. The Islamic Revolution is a clear example of finding objectivity and taking a step in this direction. In this regard, the revolution son, Martyr Soleimani, based on his Leader and acting his commands, regards the presence on the right front as a sign of creating security and establishing the ground for appearance. In Soleimani School, according to the characteristics of this research, some notes are as follow:

- 1) The human will and the divine will are the basis for effective emergence;
- 2) The absence of Imam Zaman has occurred and is ending;

3) For the age of appearance, signs have been expressed that are formed from the heartfelt belief in the divine will, inevitable promise, the acceptance of the presence of Imam on earth, the promise of Imam appearance and the blessing of Imam's word in interpretation of Quran;

4) The certainty of God's command in fulfilling the principle of appearance and the involvement of human will and faith in delaying and hastening the fulfilment of this promise is the main point of difference between these two religious and non-religious approaches;

5) The proper understanding of Mahdism is for those who strive, trust and persevere in the way of God and the establishment of divine justice rule, even if they do not experience appearance. Therefore, a feeling of defeat and despair awaits passive people from whom Martyr Soleimani and the like are exceptions;

6) The positive ground-making of the waiters depends on understanding and accepting the Vilayat;

7) The observation of those waiting for occurring signs is one of the signs of the Soleimani School. This research did not have any defects in the evidence, but it is a problem, shared beliefs that hinder scientific progress in this field and perhaps the Soleimani School. Of course, the existence of deep knowledge included in religious texts by compiling the collected literature can digest the views and schools of the Western productive.

According to the contents and achievements of this research, the world after Martyr Soleimani can be transformed with a modern civilization view and with the resounding support of monotheistic philosophy and creating love elements in the system of creating a single nation, according to martyr and form the world army of appearance.

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Archaeology of the Schools Proximity in the Second Phase Statement Emphasising the Institutional Approach

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Abstract

The proximity of Islamic schools with the emergence of Islamic extremist currents has become a significant concern for Muslim thinkers. It has doubled the need for approximation and intra-religious dialogue. From a historical and institutional view, Iran and Egypt are the institutional pioneers of approximation among Islamic countries. Since the early 1942s, they have developed their activities in various formats based on the view's approximation of the two sects' religious scholars. The two countries' intellectual, political, and cultural atmosphere and a sense of leadership for the Islamic world in Egypt and Iran have been the largest producers of thought in the Islamic field. It was a significant factor in theory-making and pragmatism in this field. The main question is 'How can the prominent meanings in the institutional network of schools proximity in the Islamic world and contemporary Iran be explained from an institutional and policy-making perspective?'. The results indicated that after the developments leading to secularism in Egypt, Iran became the only pillar of approximation among Islamic countries. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, by emphasising the issue of Palestine, Hajj and the formation of a single nation, to guide domestic and transnational audiences by highlighting religious affinities in the geography of Islam and Muslims guide to religious coexistence. The second phase statement of the revolution is the most innovative manifestation of the institutional approximation strategy that Ayatollah Khamenei, emphasising trans-ethnic, trans-religious and transnational themes, has presented his institutionalist reading as a "Comprehensive Approximation" using previous historical experiences.

Keywords: Schools (sects) Proximity, Second Phase Statement, Institutional Approach, Ayatollah Khamenei, Unity, Islamic Revolution.

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Introduction

Concepts such as the proximity of Islamic schools and unity in different fields and times have led to multiple views on the factors underlying approximate and the quality of its continuity within Muslim consensus's beliefs, values, and norms. From a historical perspective, several significant developments in the contemporary period caused the design and re-pursuit of approximation among Islamic countries. The process of the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1921 had put Muslims at the forefront of the struggle against the West and Christianity for a long time and kept them from disputes that would destroy their power. The activities of political elites such as Mohammad Abduh in Egypt, Mohammad Rashid Reza, and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi can be analysed in this regard that even tried to put the Shias of Iran in a theoretical unity with the Ottomans in the idea of Islamic internationalism.

The second important political event was the issue of Palestine, which united Muslims against a common enemy. Finally, Pakistan made the conflict between Muslims and Hindus inevitable regarding British activities. Iran has a diverse ethnic and cultural composition. Consolidation of national identity, deepening national unity and cohesion, convergence and plurality of ethnicities and religions are essential issues of multi-ethnic countries.

However, the desired perfection of any federal government is to have a unified nation in which there are no significant linguistic, religious, ethnic and racial differences, and all belong to and are loyal to an all-encompassing national identity. Few countries naturally have a population without linguistic, spiritual, and ethnic differences among the world's independent countries. One of the crucial indicators of the world's social structure is the multi-ethnic context or an ethnic-religious minority. The Iranian plateau is a geographical-regional and cultural region that has always caused racial and ethnic diversity. Because geographically and historically, Iran has been at the crossroads of civilisation. In the meantime, the diversity of the constituent tribes of Iran is such that it is inevitable to refer to it as a multi-ethnic society.

Linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity and life of different ethnicities, such as Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchi and Turkmens together and within the framework of single political geography, represent the ethnic-cultural mosaic of Iranian identity and civilisation that can be a good opportunity for the country. Iran has historically been composed of different ethnicities and religions, and the peaceful coexistence of Islamic religions in Iran has been an important principle.

Therefore, pursuing the issue of unity and approximation has been one of the most traditional Iranian approaches. Nader Shah Afshar did one of the oldest events related to the approximation to the Najaf Congress formation in 1156 AH to bring the Islamic religions closer and recognise the Jafari Shia religion (Jafarian et al.: 1396 SH/2017 AD: 2).

Nader Shah's goal was to change the opposition political-religious system between Shia and Sunni Ottoman Iran. The Ottoman forces first invaded Iraq in 897 AH /1515 AD with the conquest of Mosul, and this land gained a significant and strategic position on the eastern borders of the empire. The Ottoman government was forced to dominate Iraq to maintain the eastern borders of Anatolia, and the Ottoman sultans, who called themselves the Prophet caliphs, expanded their religious and spiritual prestige.

On the other side of the Iraqi border, the Shia king of Iran was not satisfied with accepting these claims of the Ottoman sultan and tried to repeat Iran's claims to the holy shrines. Safavid kings in Iran considered southern Iraq as their legal and historical heritage and fought for two centuries with the Ottoman government in Iraq for control of that area. Therefore, Nader Shah Afshar entered Najaf in 1156 AH, following his military activities in Mosul. He decided to hold a meeting among religious scholars in the shrine of Imam Ali to conclude on the differences between Shias and Sunnis. He gathered Shia and Sunni scholars from different parts of Iran to Iraq to offer the Jafari Shia religion as the fifth official Islamic religion (ibid).

After the death of the Prophet of Islam, the Muslim Ummah disputed about his successor. These differences were primarily socio-political-economic. With the spread of Islam and moving away from the time of revelation and the demise of the Companions and Successors, it gradually became theological, jurisprudential, narrative and historical differences. The mentioned intellectual differences gradually led to the emergence of three solid theological currents of Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites and Shiism, and five schools of Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i, Maliki and Shiism jurisprudence (Anbarmoo, 1399 SH/2020 AD: 177).

All the caliphs of Baghdad and the Ottoman rulers, except the Fatimid government in Egypt and then the Safavid state in Iran - which marked a productive new life in Islamic culture and civilisation - supported the four Sunni religions in different proportions. The Shia theological-jurisprudential current has always been under marginal political pressure.

With Shiism as an approximation-seeking movement, Sufism should not be overlooked in the Islamic world, especially in the Arab world, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Indian subcontinent. We must consider them the pillar of convergence and proximity of Islamic schools and Muslim communities (Yazdani: 1392 SH/2014 AD: 8). Just as Sheikh al-Arefin Sayyid Safi al-Din Ardabili played an essential role in creating social solidarity in Iran, so did prominent Sufi movements in the Islamic world in the contemporary period (ZarrinKoob, 1362 SH/1983 AD: 96).

The second phase statement (Bahman 1397 SH/2019 AD) is one of the essential policy-making documents issued by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution. It emphasises Islam instead of the Shia religion and the trans-religious and trans-ethnic attitude, transformation in the

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Islamic-Iranian lifestyle regardless of ethnicities and the achievement of modern Islamic civilisation with the participation of all Muslims irrespective of nationality and religion. However, it should be noted that this transcendent attitude is unprecedented in Ayatollah Khamenei's thought and has been emphasised and recommended in various ways in his various statements. The present study aimed to examine the institutional approach of the Islamic Republic by highlighting the second phase statement in institutionalising and pragmatism in this field by evaluating the actions major approximating and unifying organisations. This paper shows the second phase statement at the national level emphasise the possibility of applying to the environment of ethnic groups and religions in the framework of unity, interaction, empowerment and strengthening the internal structure of the Islamic system and strengthening the participation of all ethnicities and faiths in the fulfilment of modern Islamic civilisation. The transnational level emphasises the transcendent thought of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution on fulfilling a united nation and a new Islamic society.

1) Research Literature

Our issue is new, and so far, independent research has not been done about approximation from the perspective of institutionalism in the second phase statement. However, this issue has been discussed in the past and present jurisprudential books scattered and briefly regarding its importance. The following professional researches have examined the approximation from a historical perspective. Books on Islamic proximity by Mohammad Ali Taskhiri (1338 SH/1960 AD) published by Avay-e Vahdat. It selected Persian articles in the 7th International Conference on Islamic Unity by Mohammad Saeed Moez al-Din (1391 SH/2013 AD).

Approximation Leaders, Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, Proceedings of the Congress in Honor of Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout (1383 SH/2005 AD). Background of approximation, history and documents of Dar al-Taqrīb of Islamic schools in Cairo and review of its magazine (Resalah al-Islam) by Mohammad Ali Azarshab and Reza Hamidi (1384 SH/2006 AD), all of which are published by the World Assembly of Approximation.

2) Research Methodology

The present study has a practical and fundamental purpose of investigating the proximity of Islamic schools in the Islamic Republic with an institutional approach by descriptive and analytical methods. The institutional policy, described as an institutional school, pays special attention to society's cultural, social, political, and economic infrastructure as the primary basis of development. The focus of institutionalist analysis emphasises the role of institutions as an independent variable in the formation of trends and concepts of

individual and collective action and political and social phenomena. An institution is an organised system of social relations that includes specific public values and practices and meets the particular needs of society. Douglas North, one of the leading institutionalists and winner of the Nobel Prize, defines the institution as follows: "Institutions are the remained laws in society, and in other words, are the restrictions imposed by the human that form the mutual relations of human beings with each other." (North, 1990: 19)

Institutions are also known as human-created contracts that structure human interactions. They consist of ceremonial laws (Constitution), informal laws (values, customs), and executive characteristics. The difference between an organisation and an entity is often explained as follows: "If the entity determines the game rules, the organisations are their players". An organisation comprises a set of people guided by a specific common goal. Accordingly, the institution has a multifaceted relationship with beliefs, preferences and practices. The relationship between ideas, tastes, institutions and practices is evident in the following model:




Figure 1: Institutional system model

In a general category, institutions can be divided into formal and informal. For example, in the present study, the prohibition of extremism as an ideology of Islamic proximity is one of the informal institutions worthy of the whole system. At the same time, the legal provisions of the Islamic Republic Constitution regarding the rights of ethnic groups and religions are included in the official institution in this area. From an institutionalist point of view, the rules of the game and the space should reduce the parties' uncertainty and be consistent with the parties' preferences, motivations, and beliefs. According to the above mentioned, the main subject of this research is the pathological study of institutionalism in the field of historical and functional approximation.

2.1. Theoretical Foundations of Research

The approximation is derived from proximity, closeness, and cooperation (Dehkhoda: 1377 SH/1999 AD). In this research, we mean approximation in religious affairs.

In a general definition, an approximation is cooperation in promoting and preserving religious commonalities and disability in religious disputes and emphasis on the Quranic principle of equality and friendship of Muslims with each other in the political, social, moral, economic etc., areas, as well as not insulting religious leaders and principles have defined other Islamic religions. The World Assembly for the proximity of

Islamic schools also expresses the closeness of the followers of Islamic faiths to get to know each other and achieve religious brotherhood based on certain principles and Islamic commonalities (Quarterly Proximity Thought, No 3, 1391 SH / 2012 AD, website: www.Taghrib.org/farsi).

The word approximation associates pregnant concepts such as interaction, tolerance, and dialogue as fertile concepts. It should be noted that tolerance, regardless of its accepted principles in non-religious societies, expresses a moral character that is the way of dealing with the desires, beliefs, habits and behaviour of others, which requires the acceptance of different intellectual tendencies, libertarian vision and the rejection of any dictatorship (Aghabakhshi: 1379 SH/2000 AD: 55). Therefore, assuming tolerance and interaction in the proximity and unity, it should be noted that the basis of approximation means the negation and elimination of all differences and the rejection and prohibition of conflicting and reciprocal tendencies, as well as the renunciation of some ideas, do not mean to close each other. Instead, it means creating an atmosphere of communication and dialogue about the principles of Islam and committing to unity around them.

a) Archeology of the Proximity of Islamic Schools

According to the Islam history, the life and tradition of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), analysis of various events and happenings in the early Islam, recognising the Holy Prophet's reaction in multiple situations, the influential role of the Holy Prophet in creating and expanding unity is evident in that era. Muslims, as his followers, following him, believed in his obedience to Islamic unity to form a united nation in all Islamic times.

The issue of the Islamic Ummah is critical in today's world. Because Muslims have various opportunities and threats that the killing of Muslims by Muslims is clearly against the tradition of the Holy Prophet of Islam. One of the cohesion and interconnectedness factors of Islamic religions is paying attention to the approximation of beliefs, which has always been considered a model of unity and solidarity.

According to the World Assembly for the proximity of Islamic schools, approximation means to close Islamic religious followers to get to know each other through fulfilling spiritual empathy and brotherhood based on standard, fixed and fundamental Islamic principles (Quarterly Proximity Thought, No 3, 1391SH/2012AD, website: www.Taghrib.org/farsi).

Accordingly, unity is a logical result and means cooperation between followers of Islamic religions based on standard, fixed and fundamental Islamic principles and taking the same position to achieve the highest goals and interests of the Islamic Ummah and a united place against the enemies of the Ummah while respecting ideological commitments and the practice of each Muslim to his religion.

The approximation in the strategic and strategic sense is considered the most crucial detoxification, empowerment of beliefs, and

comprehensive knowledge-making. The most important goals of the rapprochement of Islamic religions are prevention of the internal collapse of Islam, protection of all Muslims, cutting off the greed of the Islam enemies, satisfaction of the messenger of unity, the formation of the Union of Islamic countries, the stock market of Islamic countries (Tabarraeian, 1384 SH/2006 AD: 215).

b) Institutional Approach to Approximation by Iran and Other Islamic Countries

The historical study offers a variety of experiences about approximation in different periods of the Islamic world. But in the contemporary era in a coherent and general way, Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi was one of the first people to claim the unity of Islam and considered the Islamic unity as the only way out of the unhealthy situation of Muslims against the Western colonial rulers. Therefore, it created an approximation between Islamic religions (Khosroshahi: 1379 SH/2001 AD: 560).

Hence, we should briefly discuss the historical evolution of the unity and proximity of Islamic schools and the approximate movements and currents from the late nineteenth century to the present day. The most important institutions and imprecise associations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Islamic countries in which Iranian scholars played a crucial role in their formation can be listed as follows:

2.1.1. Al al-Bayt Islamic Thought Institute

The Al al-Bayt Islamic Thought Institute was established in 1890 in Jordan under the Royal Assembly for the Study of Islamic Civilization. This institute's most important duties and responsibilities are introducing the religion of Islam and Islamic thought, correcting misconceptions about Islam, institutionalising the culture of dialogue between Islamic faiths, and spreading the culture of moderation (Journal of Peyk-e Taqrib, (Azar, 1381 SH/ 2002 AD. No. 16, <http://www.taghribnews.com>). Sayyid Abdolmajid Khoei, the head of this institute, was invited to hold a conference in Damascus on 1999/2/10 and emphasised pursuing a proximity strategy between Islamic religions. The meeting was owned by several different religious scholars and thinkers, centres and seminaries in the Islamic world and beyond. The main topics discussed in the conference include dialogue literature, control of spiritual crises, the culture of approximation, comparative studies, the importance of Ijtihad, the role of institutions in the process of proximity, criteria of scientific criticism, approximation strategy, the background of differences among Muslims, Muslims division, practical programs to fill the gaps, the idea of Islam without religions and the necessity approximation (ibid).

2.1.2. ICISCO¹

ISISCO is a specialised organisation operating under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). It acts in Islamic countries' education, science, culture, and communication to support and strengthen relations between

1. Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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member countries. The head office of this organisation is located in Rabat, and its director-general is Dr Salem bin Mohammad Al-Malik. This organisation, the scientific, educational and training organisation of the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, is one of the essential Islamic organisations that is almost considered proximity as a strategic goal. The Secretary-General of this organisation, Abdul Aziz Tajiri, has codified the following strategies in expanding the horizon of approximation between Islamic countries:

- Development strategy and developing education in Islamic countries (1988 AD);
- Cultural strategy of the Islamic world (1991 AD);
- Strategy of cultural activities in the West (2000 AD);
- The strategy of exploiting the immigrant elites of Islamic countries in the West (2002 AD) (Tabraian, (1394 SH/2015 AD: 191).

2.1.3. International Assembly of Islamic Jurisprudence

The International Assembly of Islamic Jurisprudence is a scientific, jurisprudential and cultural centre affiliated with the organisation of the Islamic Conference. All Islamic countries that are members of this organisation have representatives in this assembly. This assembly was established in 1983 in the city of Mecca to achieve Islamic unity, complete the ideological foundations of the Islamic Ummah, and examine the problems of Muslim life and genuine Ijtihad arising from Islamic law. To achieve its lofty goals, this forum has compiled an encyclopedia of jurisprudential terms, writing Islamic jurisprudence in simple language, cooperated with scientific and jurisprudential centres of the Islamic world, compiled Islamic jurisprudence in the form of laws, set up centres to study Islamic issues, and published the results of the forum, revived the jurisprudential and principled heritage on its agenda (Journal of Peyk-e Taqrib, (Azar 1381 SH/2002 AD. No. 16, <http://www.taghribnews.com>).

2.1.4. Dar al-Taqrīb Bayn al-Mazahib al-Islamiyyah

Dar al-Taqrīb in 1317 in Cairo was the first approximate experience among Muslims. Mohammad Mustafa al-Maraghi and Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Qomi were among the most important founders of the association, which had political and religious consequences. In the first statement in the first issue of "Resalah al-Islam" magazine, signed by Allameh Sheikh Abdul Majid Salim, the head of the Fatwa Committee in Al-Azhar, the foundations of approximation were discussed.

It was pointed out that there is no difference of opinion among Muslims in the fixed rulings, and Ijtihad is only acceptable in the Ijtihadi commands that are legally acceptable. Turning natural differences into blind or dry prejudice led to bloodshed and dispersal among the Ummah. Allameh Kashif al-Ghita and Allameh Mazandarani, Iranian scholars, emphasised it. This cooperation finally culminated with the famous fatwa of Sheikh Shaltout that it is permissible to refer to all Islamic religions on the 17th of Rabi al-Awal in 1378 (Jafarian: 1394 SH/2015 AD).

2.1.5. The Implications of the Institutional Approach to the Proximity of Islamic Schools in Iran

The approximation and strengthening of Islamic cohesion are critical issues in the Islamic world that have always been considered by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the leaders of the Islamic Ummah. On the other hand, the Islamic Revolution victory was when the puppet governments of the hegemonic system and the unpopular rulers of the Islamic world, regarding the regional and national policies and according to the Supreme Leader, were suffering from divisiveness and lack of unity. Therefore, one of the permanent missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to deepen unity and convergence in the Islamic world and the Islamic Ummah at different levels and dimensions. Hence, this issue has been emphasised by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Ummah, Ayatollah Khamenei, as one of the greatest preachers of Islamic unity and cohesion. He also pays attention to it in his latest guidance in the form of the second phase statement of the Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a system based on the people's opinions and derived from the value-oriented teachings of pure Muhammadan Islam. It has widespread and national acceptance by all members of the Iranian nation of all ethnicities, religions and divine legitimacy in religious democracy, with a serious commitment to national unity and Islamic cohesion and to enjoy various ethnic and spiritual opportunities in different political, economic, cultural and social fields. It has confronted any enmity and discord trying to achieve social, economic and Iranian-Islamic justice in the form of national, trans-ethnic and religious identity. It is known as a positive model of Islamic government with a focus on national unity and Islamic cohesion, and anti-arrogance among other Muslim and even non-Muslim nations.

The sublime thought of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution is derived from the teachings of Islam, the Prophetic rule (PBUH) and the teachings of the Islamic Revolution. It is regarding his deep insight in planning, modelling, discourse-making and defining the civilisation perspective of the Islamic system. By examining the measures and the Islamic Republic's achievements, the below actions are the essential steps towards the fulfilment of proximity:

- 1) Establishment of the Association for the Proximity of Islamic Schools;
- 2) Active participation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference;
- 3) Announcing the Week of Unity (12-17 Rabi al-Awal) determining the seventeenth Rabi al-Awal as the birthday of the Prophet (PBUH) without the most miniature history in the first four centuries, was one of the innovations and facilities of Sheikh Mufid and Sheikh Tusi after the Islamic Revolution by Imam Khomeini that institutionalised in religious and national relations;
- 4) Emphasising the trans-religious discourse of Islam in official policies such as the Islamic-Iranian model, Islamic civilisation etc.;
- 5) Holding numerous unity conferences;

6) Establishment of universities and joint scientific centres.

A) Establishment of the Association for the Proximity of Islamic Schools

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the establishment of an Islamic government by the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran paved the way for the spread of approximation and unity among Muslims. The slogan of unity and special attention of Imam Khomeini to this strategic idea is crystallised in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. It declares that the followers of Islamic religions have complete freedom in adhering to their beliefs and jurisprudence. Mohammad Vaezzadeh Khorasani is a primary figure in the establishment of this forum. He did several actions such as holding the World Congress of Sheikh Tusi since 1350 AH/1931AD with the participation of scholars and leaders of various Islamic sects and some Orientalists (on the occasion of the thousandth anniversary of Sheikh Tusi) and participating in multiple congresses inside and outside the country before and after the Islamic Revolution. In one of these congresses, he proposed the establishment of the World Assembly for the Proximity of Islamic Schools. He was appointed to its secretary-general on Mehr 19, 1369, (1990/10/11) by the ruling of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and he was in charge of this position until 1380 (Soltani: 1382 SH/2004 AD: 14).

Belief in the continuation of these approximate ideas eventually led to the holding of the Fourth Conference on Islamic Unity, which the Islamic Propagation Organization held with the participation of Islamic world thinkers, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution ordered the formation of the World Assembly for the Proximity of Islamic Schools. The primary mission of the Assembly is to raise the level of familiarity and awareness and deepen understanding between followers of Islamic religions and strengthen mutual respect and the disciplines of Islamic brotherhood among Muslims without any distinction in terms of their sectarian, ethnic or national affiliation to achieve a single Islamic nation.¹

B) Proximity in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic

The Constitution has created a definite trend in terms of futuristic value for Iran's ethnic and religious community. In this pattern, the approaches of ethnic tyranny have been completely removed from the country's political ideas. The next step is provided with the ground of participation of different ethnic and religious groups in all stages of political decision-making and subsequent destination-making. Some of the articles related to ethnic equality in the approximation of the country are:

Confronting tyranny, authoritarianism and monopoly (Article 6 of the Constitution), eliminating undue discrimination and creating fair opportunities for all in all material and spiritual fields (Article 9 of the

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Constitution), ensuring the full rights of men and women, creating adequate judicial security for all and equality before the law (Article 14 of the Constitution), development and consolidation of Islamic equality and public cooperation among all people (Article 15 of the Constitution) etc.

Some other legal principles are the basis of legislation and approximation policy-making in Iran, in which different laws and regulations should be developed based on it. Some of these principles are:

- a) Principle 19. The people of Iran, regardless of their ethnicity and tribe, have equal rights, and colour, race, language, and the like will not be a privilege;
- b) Principle 20. All people, men and women alike, are protected by law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social and cultural rights by Islamic principles;
- c) In the 22, 23, 26 and 29 principles emphasised the basic categories of citizenship rights, the rights of parties and communities and the enjoyment of social security;
- d) Principle 22. The dignity, life, property, rights, housing and job of persons are inviolable, except in cases prescribed by law;
- e) Principle 23. The Constitution is one of the most brilliant principles in civil rights. It accepts people's different opinions and prohibits its inspection;
- f) Principle 26. Parties, associations, political and trade unions, Islamic associations or famous religious minorities are free. They do not violate the principles of independence, liberty, national unity, Islamic principles, and the Islamic Republic's foundation. No one may be barred from participating in or forced to participate in any of them.

C) Approximation in the Second Phase Statement of the Revolution

The second phase statement of the Islamic Revolution is one of the most strategic commands of Khamenei on the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. With a comprehensive view, it outlines the roadmap of the Islamic system to achieve a modern Islamic civilisation in introducing and expanding the pillars of the Islamic system authority. The statement is the roadmap of the Islamic system in attaining a new Islamic culture in which all Muslims, regardless of ethnicity, religion and race, in the form of a united Islamic nation, eradicate oppression. From a strategic point of view, the result of forty years of resistance to the Islamic Revolution can be considered on the one hand the dynamism and progress of the revolution and, on the other hand, the destruction of the main enemy and the beginning of the decline of other enemies (Khamenei, 1397 SH/2019 AD).

- Making Empower Muslims

Empowering is essential in political systems with ethnic and religious diversity, such as Iran. Because, while approximating opinions and views, it uses their hidden and overt capacities to reduce ethnic and religious divisions. Making empower enables social groups to be more

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resilient and flexible in the face of problems and threats. Therefore, empowering is a sustainable source to prevent the vulnerability of society and the system and sow the seeds of hope in their hearts in critical situations and be helpful. One of the concepts that the Supreme Leader of the Revolution has always emphasised in his guidelines is the concept of making empower. In increasing intellectual, spiritual, scientific and structural abilities and capabilities, this concept is always one of their most important concerns. He says in this regard:

"The important thing for futurists to keep in mind is that they live in a country that is unique in terms of natural and human capacity, and many of these capacities have been left unused or underused by the negligence of those in charge. High-minded peers and young and revolutionary motivations will be able to activate them and make a leap in the material and spiritual progress of the country in the true sense of the word." (Statements. 1397/11/22)

- **Convergence and Unity**

In the second phase statement, the Supreme Leader directly and implicitly considers unity as one of the necessities of achieving a new Islamic civilisation and has a strategic view on the issue of Islamic unity and cohesion and sees it as a strategy from the inside of religious principles. Hence, Unificationism is a fertile concept. The spirit of the second phase statement caused the creation of other concepts such as interaction, convergence, cohesion and ultimately, the formation of a single nation. Unity refers to the gathering and non-division of Muslims and Islamic sects, including Shia, ethnicities and religions, etc., around the word of God. This issue has been the concern of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) since the time of Islam and is one of the emphatic recommendations of the Holy Quran.

Creating unity, convergence, and its survival in the Islamic system has always been one of the main concerns of Imam Khamenei. In several statements, he emphasises the necessity of unity in Islamic societies. He considers security in the country regarding the agreement (Statements. 1379/01/26). He pursues unity at the national (people unity, currents and forces of the country) and transnational (unity of Muslims against domination).

"I insist on the unity of hearts and moving in a single path and the unity of the country forces, especially the faithful and revolutionary forces." (Statements. At the beginning of the lesson, outside of jurisprudence. 1395/07/05) The holy existence of the Prophet is the central pillar of the loves and interests of the individual Muslim nations. Everyone loves the Prophet; this is the focal point. All Muslims worship and believe in the Qur'an and the Holy Kaaba, how much is common among Muslims. Confrontation with the United States was the factor of national unity." (Statements. Friday prayer sermons. 1376/10/26).

In the transnational arena, he considers the solution of the Islamic system problems as the unity of Muslims against the Islam enemies:

"If we are together, the Islamic countries, the Muslim nations -Sunni and Shia and the different sects of Sunni and Shia- being kind with each other, have no suspicion towards each other, do not insult each other, see at happens in the world. What an honour it will be for Islam! Unity, unity." (Statements. Meeting of the officials of the system. 1393/10/19)

Conclusion

The present study aimed to analyse the proximity institutional network in the Islamic world, policies and legal institutions based in the Islamic Republic regarding their functions and duties. As a broad cultural current, Islamic religions are present and active in all Islamic countries today. Within each of these Islamic religions, different currents are formed and operate. These various religions have been involved and present in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Our country has been based on value and belief approaches (revolutionary-Islamic) trying to create Islamic unity and bring religions closer between Islamic religions and consequently Islamic currents and various movements. In the meantime, is emphasised Islamic unity as cooperation and collaboration of followers of Islamic religions based on certain principles and Islamic commonalities.

Adopting a single procedure to achieve the highest goals and interests of the Islamic Ummah and taking a common position about the enemies of Islam and respect and heartfelt commitment of each Muslim was the fundamental indicator of the ruling system. This pattern is known as the proximity of schools. Religion approximation means the closeness of Islamic religions to know each other to achieve religious brotherhood based on certain principles and Islamic commonalities. The regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran has put the tradition of institutionalisation in the process of approximation on its agenda by establishing national and transnational centres to turn institutionalism into a public discourse between Islamic religions. The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, as a democratic and all-inclusive revolution, is a turning point for the world Muslims. One of the critical plans of the leaders of the Islamic system from the very beginning of the process was to unite the Muslim nations and the Islamic world against tyranny. Accordingly, prominent movements took place after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in the approximation, including the holding of four annual conferences of Islamic unity by the Deputy Minister of International Affairs of the Islamic Propaganda Organization aimed at attracting Islamic scholars and accompanying them with Revolution. As the second phase statement explicitly and implicitly emphasises trans-ethnic, trans-religious and transnational themes and concepts, the comprehensive invitation to participation and demand, repeated emphasis on Islamic civilisation, socialisation and unity play an essential role in creating a common way to strengthen cultural and religious links of the Muslims of the world

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Coordinates of the "Revolutionary System" Theory in the Second Phase Statement Emphasising the Rationality Structure

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Abstract

The second phase is a strategic and intelligent statement based on the model design of the self-construction levels, socialisation and civilisation-making. Emphasising the human-divine epistemology in the transcendent-oriented rationality creates a new chapter in deepening and expanding the Islamic Revolution. The modern phrase "The Great Islamic Revolution" as a meta-theory of a revolutionary system is based on Islamism, independence, popular movement and freedom that caused understanding the theory of the revolutionary design. With a qualitative method and an interpretive approach of inferential analysis, the present study aimed to answer the main question 'What are the coordinates of the rationality structure in the rational system theory?'. Another aim is to explain the conceptualisation of the revolutionary system theory, emphasising rationality. This theory emphasises the relationship between justice, rationality, spirituality and freedom. Spirituality is work spirit; justice is director and valuator things; freedom, human choice and rationality are considered the essential work tools in the Islamic system. Paying attention to the philosophical understanding of the problem, timeology, futurism, moderation, gaining experience, and the relationship between realism and idealism is one of the characteristics of this transcendent-oriented rationality. The result of this rationality will be a logical political analysis and decision, increasing the authority of the political system and proper enemyology. Community building based on faith, science and justice has unique characteristics that believe in it wisely and effectively, leads to self-confidence, progress and authority of Islamic Iran.

Keywords: Trans-Theory, The Great Islamic Revolution, Revolutionary System Theory, Rationality, Problemology.

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Introduction

One of the most important phenomena affecting the growth of Iranian society has been the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which has affected all aspects of political, social, cultural and economic life. Over forty years, the continuation of this development has been accompanied by many ups and downs, capacities and issues. By claiming to return to the forgotten natural truths, the Islamic Revolution has highlighted the function of religion from the perspective of human thought. It offers a modern approach to religion, spirituality, independence, rationality, democracy, humans and the world around us. It involved cultural beliefs in the analysis of the Revolution and, by criticising the common philosophy of revolutions, challenged the central subject of the positivist teachings of modern revolution theories. The Revolution seriously questioned the end of the ideological era in the global village. In this regard, Imam Khomeini believed that the leading cause of Iran's political and social Revolution is based on the internal Revolution and theism (cf. Rahbar and Bighleh, 2019 AD/1398 SH). He has always designed an inspiring model of the relationship between religion and politics to create social changes, political systematisation and its continuation based on this idea over the past few decades, based on direct path and in contrast to the centuries-old dominance of secularism in the reverse process (Barzegar, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 1).

During the four decades since the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, while leading the Islamic Republic of Iran, explained the second phase statement based on realistic and instructive historical considerations. Like the Iranian Islamic model of progress and resistance economy, this statement is a structured set of guidelines of the Supreme Leader which discusses the capacities, successes, harms and problems of the Iranian society (cf. Rahbar, 2020 AD/1399 SH). To explain society's political health, we must pay attention to the balanced distribution of independence, Islamism, republic, freedom, justice, spirituality, relative prosperity, security, comprehensive and lasting peace. Another point is that the key to society's problems is the imbalance between these components (cf. Rahbar and Akbari Aghdam, 2020 AD/1399 SH).

The second phase statement of the Revolution is based on the rapid growth of Iran's population, changes in the socio-political structure of society and developments in the global arena (in the form of globalisation) and the political management of some agents. In this statement, the Leader of the Revolution seeks a political-social problem-solving of Iran and the intelligent prevention of "Growing Conflicts" and the achievement of material and spiritual progress in the form of a revolutionary theory. Therefore, the main question is 'What are the characteristics of the conceptual design of the revolutionary system

theory?'. A qualitative method with a descriptive approach and a library collection method is used to achieve an epistemological statement appropriate to the question-answer.

To explain the second phase statement written several books and articles have. The book "Dimensional Attitude of University Professors to the Second Phase Statement" deals with various political, economic, social and cultural aspects (cf. Rahbar and Akbari Aghdam, 2020 AD/1399 SH). "The Second Phase of the Revolution Addressed to the Iranian Nation" is a book about a Leader lecture about the second phase in the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution victory. The second phase statement is the renewal of the treaty with the Iranian nation and especially the youth, which are a charter for the second stage of self-construction, socialisation and civilisation-making, which will approach the new chapter of the Islamic Republic and prepare for the Imam Zaman province. We can also refer to the collection of articles of the National Conference on Civilizing Components in the Second Phase Statement of the Revolution (1399) and the International Conference on the Second Phase Statement of the Revolution and the Islamic World.

Interpretive paradigm is used among the three main research paradigms, namely positive, interpretive and critical. In the Interpretive paradigm, the main reason for research is to understand and describe the social action of people that has a meaning, and social reality is related to human interpretations in social interactions. Human beings produce sense and constantly give meaning to their environment by interpreting. Therefore, by understanding widespread knowledge, one can receive essential theories. A conceptual framework is used in the interpretive paradigm instead of the term theoretical framework. These interpretive descriptions could provide the basis for proposing purely analogous theorising of the Weberian concept. Also, in the interpretive paradigm, a good explanation is considered acceptable from people's view is objective and correct. Values are also inseparable from people's lives and are only different (Newman, 2000 AD: 181-194).

1. Communication Coordinates of Theory

This theory finds meaning along meta-theory; therefore, we should explain meta-theory.

1.1. Meta-Theory

The meta-theory overlaps with the term "Thomas Cohen" paradigm. He has considered the paradigm a meta-theory, theory, methodology and a combination of all features in a field (Badreh, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 23). Thus paradigm has a broader meaning than meta-theory. At the same time, meta-theory is the core of any paradigm and represents it in many senses. The level of theoretical thinking from philosophical foundations

to research usage is in a range of meta-theory (observer of epistemological and ontological presuppositions), intermediate level theories, and then specific hypotheses and predictions (ibid.). Meta-theory offers a model of science. Unlike the approach, the meta-theory does not talk about the function of the universe but talks about theories' foundation. In the field of meta-theory, examine ontological and epistemological claims of previous ideas and structures about reality (Moeini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 12).

Meta-theory discussions have a somewhat scientific nature if we consider science not in the realm of objectivity but in information about how the world and decryption. More precisely, meta-theory is a meta-science. Meta-science studies the limits of scientific knowledge. Meta-theories act as a challenging blueprint and express coordinated and uncoordinated components with central logic. Thus it provides a set of methodological recommendations that, according to Lakatos, include positive and negative suggestions.

Regarding the differences between meta-theory and fundamental theories, we should not ignore the possibility of change in ideas and meta-theories. Questions arise from meta-theory. 'What is the theory?' 'How is a theory made?'. 'How is the theory used?'. 'What are the goals of theory-building?'. 'How is the validity of theories?'. However, political meta-theory is preferred to political theories; because it gives us information about making theories (Moeini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 13).

1.2. Theory

Theory building needs processes of ontology, anthropology, epistemology and methodology. Also, observing the hierarchy of paradigm, theory, model, the method is essential for theory building. Of course, we should not ignore philosophical and ideological interests (Hassani, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 113). It is also necessary to pay attention to the three principles of coordination, compatibility and synergy in theories; because non-observance of the previous principles will cause the collapse of the view.

The importance of political theory is being linked to a new situation. First, the entrance of issues and new concepts (post-traditional society, public sphere, colloquial language, virtual sphere), then, the new definition of common concepts in politics (human rights, civil society, multiculturalism) changes the face of political theory (Moeini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 8). The third point influencing these developments is increasing the gap between registered and established concepts with socio-political realities. It should be noted that there are two different goals in theory building for theorists: acquisition of knowledge and improving the political situation. The critical point is that social, political and economic developments interact with political theories. Then,

intellectual, philosophical, and scientific products and technological changes change the quality of our political expectations. For example, communication and media developments and the atmosphere of globalisation require specific governance patterns and models; democracy forms change. Classical democracy, early liberal democracy, and modern democracy are fundamentally different. Therefore, the related issues to meta-theory and theory are not merely abstract but are related to the day's facts and political and social phenomena. The idea is a set of discourses that logically are associated with each other and expresses a part of reality (Rafipour, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 9). Of course, the words meaning space are essential, preventing misunderstandings of a talk by logical definition (specific attributes and rules). There are two crucial points in defining the lexicon:

1) The meaning space of the word must be firmly established to everyone under that word understands only one thing and can not possibly change the different meaning and interpretation, which is called the condition of consistency.

2) The definition should be accurate to examine the word quickly (Rafipour, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 143,144).

1.3. The Nature of Social Theory

The theory is made for two reasons: it helps simplify reality to understand and control it. Then, it guides us to test our perceptions correctly. The view is a set of symbols that are logically related to each other and show how we think about world events. It is a product of human imagination, hard work, and sometimes luck (Mannheim, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 30-31). Theories are formed in the light of different paradigms of social sciences; therefore, the framework of their view of reality is other. Each approach represents a specific arrangement of concepts and their relationships; ideas in the social sciences are not intelligible independently of theory. For example, regardless of functionalism theory, the notion of dysfunction is incomprehensible or brings another meaning to mind. The approach provides a perspective for looking at and studying the social world. Therefore, each theory especially looks at the issue in the social world (Sayyid Emami 2008 AD/1387 SH: 162-163). Conceptual design in views is a significant issue.

Contrary to the description that data is categorised and summarised, theories are interconnected with related concepts and create a specific conceptual design (cf. Shomiker, 2011 AD/1390 SH). Political theory is in transition, and in the periods between formal ideas and social reality, we are probably in the broader gap. So, Brian Maggie's claim is worth considering. He wrote about his central thesis:

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“The fact is that the world is changing so fast that we all want to see the previous events as old and outdated. One of the ways is our use of abrogated political terms; vocabularies whose key terms were built in a few generations ago in a society quite different from ours today community” (Osullivan, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 20).

Issues examine such as the individual nature and its relationship to society, the concept of citizenship and its relationship to the conditions of social diversity and politics, the growing importance of global contexts and the necessary revisions in the overall understanding of political theory nature in the new space (Osullivan, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 10).

Elsewhere, Sullivan argues that to understand the complex nature of politics, we must free it from misunderstanding the nature of power that has dominated Western political thought since Rousseau. Of course, the essence of this misunderstanding is a tendency to equate power with domination and exploitation. For example, in liberal theory, the government replaces power. In democratic theory, "Popular Self-government" is returned, in which power has no place, and in socialist theory, strength plays an instrumental role in the management of the state. Power in all three perspectives is equivalent to domination or exploitation. He believes that we should pay attention to the three main elements of discourse in the new political theory: power, authority, and legitimacy (Sullivan, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 21). While taking a holistic view of theory (in a way that is methodologically, logically, metaphysically, and empirically), we must consider the application of theory in understanding theoretical or practical crises in society.

2. Coordinates of Socio-political Knowledge of the Second Phase Statement of the Revolution

The second phase statement establishes a deep and systematic relationship between the past, present and future with a fair and wise view of the past of the Islamic Revolution and a logical and compassionate attitude towards the presence of the Islamic Republic. It is common among futurists that the universe is one, not a mixture of independent and unrelated components. From a futurist perspective, man, like all universes, is a part of the universe. According to futurists, the future world is created from within the present world. So, we can learn a lot about the future regarding the world events over the past few years. They believe that today's decisions form tomorrow's world, and in the second statement, the futurology attitude of the Supreme Leader is quite evident.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has critical appropriate capabilities and capacities such as:

Establishment of religious democracy in the secularism arena, paying attention to the general and specific features of the political system, political modelling, the growing political culture of the people and repeated experience of being able and changing, political independence and national self-confidence, positive mobility in some indicators human development and significant progress in the scientific and defensive fields of the country, paying attention to infrastructure development and services, people's participation in their political and security destiny, the state of national wealth and young population and geopolitical position (cf. Rahbar and Akbari Moghadam, 2020 AD/1399 SH).

Extensive and essential concepts and examples in the second phase statement are as follow:

Great Jihad, the blessing of the Islamic Revolution, optimistic hope, self-esteem, religious values, criticism and correction of past mistakes, positive experiences, revolutionary mercy, revolutionary slogans, Alawite justice, powerful Iran, neglect of the Revolution, more youth than Islamic Revolution, the wise and motivated revolutionary believer.

The new horizon of the Supreme Leader is the discussion of the civilised material and spiritual dimensions of the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Revolution has a transnational identity, and changes, structural and normative developments within the country affect international and inter-regional developments. The Islamic Revolution proposes the issue of freedom, democracy, justice, independence, Islamic governance, and the denial of tyranny. It considers anti-arrogance and the denial of accepting domination, the unity of the Islamic world, the spiritual issuance of the Revolution, and attention to world peace and justice.

Another point is about the progress that manifests itself in the collective consciousness of the activists, especially the youth. The main concern of the Supreme Leader is the progress issue in which spirituality, justice, economy, technology and people's lifestyle are considered. This statement links with the basic model he is interested in, and a group of seminary and university elites have drawn it in its original form.

3. The Great Islamic Revolution as a Trans-theory of the Revolutionary System Theory

The revolutionary system theory is in line with the trans-theory of the Great Islamic Revolution. To understand this theory, we should use the trans-theory of the Great Islamic Revolution. According to the Supreme Leader, the Great Islamic Revolution has the following topics:

The most similar event to the miracles of the prophets, truth and derived from a divine tradition, a tremendous historical innovation, the most remarkable development and change of power during our history, a religious revolution, justice its main slogan and the great goal of the

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Islamic Revolution. This Revolution saved the country from dependence on the main slogans and values such as independence, freedom, democracy, national self-confidence and national self-belief, justice, and above all, the fulfilment and implementation of the religion and sharia command in the country and country dignity (cf. Second Phase Statement of the Islamic Revolution, 2020 AD/1399 SH).

Regarding Ayatollah Khamenei, "All Muslim all over the world, simultaneously with the Revolution victory, coming Imam and raising the flag of Islam and La ilaha illa Allah felt that he had won" (1373 / 08/11). In his view, "The revolution has placed a set of ideal bright stars above our heads, inviting us to move, fly, and leap toward these bright spots. We also tried and saw that we can fly and this flight is possible" (1388/06/14).

According to the revolutionary behaviour of Imam Khomeini and his school -his way, heritage and intellectual system- we can say that the school of Imam is based on spirituality, rationality and justice. Imam Khomeini's preliminary plan was to build a civil-political order based on Islamic rationality.

The Imam School is a complete package, a collection, with dimensions that we should see together. The two main dimensions in the school of our great Imam are spirituality and rationality.

Dimension of spirituality means our Imam did not follow his path simply by relying on material factors and appearances. He was a believer, had paid attention to the spiritual manner, was modest, believed in divine help, and his hope in God was endless. In the rationality dimension, the application of wisdom, prudence, thought, and calculations have been considered in Imam's school. I will say a few words about each. There is a third dimension, which is derived from Islam, like spirituality and rationality. Imam's rationality is also from Islam, spirituality is Islamic and Qur'anic, this dimension is taken from the text of the Qur'an and religion, and that is the dimension of justice. These must be seen together. Relying on one of these dimensions, regardless of the other sizes, leads society astray and deviates. This collection and the complete package is the intellectual and spiritual heritage of the Imam. Imam himself, in his behaviour, observed rationality and spirituality, and with all his being, he was aware of the dimension of justice (cf. Ayatollah Khamenei Media Information Database, 1396).

4. Coordinates of the Revolutionary System Theory in the Supreme Leader Thought

The theory of the revolutionary system uses a chain of concepts related to the revolutionary design, which includes the concepts of rationality,

justice, freedom, spirituality and the collective movement of the Muslim people of Iran.

4.1. Rationality in the Revolutionary System Theory

4.1.1. Elements of the Intellectual Power of the Islamic System

The Islamic Revolution of Iran began with the slogan of Islamic rule and then clearly stated the slogans and policies adopted from the same Islamic basis. The construction of these slogans was based on rational calculations. Ayatollah Khamenei emphasises that these rational calculations of the Islamic Republic depend on the components such as trust in God and the traditions of creation, distrust of the enemy and his knowledge, confidence in people and beliefs, belief in self-belief and that we can. In the following, we will review some elements of the rational power of the Islamic system, which have been specified in the statements of the revolutionary leaders (cf. KHAMENEI.IR. Examples of intellectual events of the Islamic Republic, 1399).

1) Codification of the Constitution and System General Policies

The country's constitution was one of the issues that the Imam noticed at the beginning of the Revolution. The observance of pious Islamic laws was the first stage of the subsequent planning for the country; because the law is the channel of all the country's movements. According to the Supreme Leader, the Imam instructed the nation's experts to draft the constitution, and then, with the Imam's intelligence and rationality, was considered to the people's vote. Of course, the general policies of the system should not be neglected as a rational manifestation.

2) The Slogan of Islamic Unity

From the perspective of Supreme Leader Imam Khomeini, choosing the motto of Islamic unity and paying attention to political rationality created a convergence among all Muslims worldwide. Because the enemy want to create discord, and if the Muslims themselves become sects under the pretext of religious differences, they are somehow in the plan and will of the enemy.

3) Managing the Sacred Defense from the Beginning to the End of the War

Another area of revolutionary rationality was the complete defence against the aggression of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Imam Khomeini, recognising the main enemy from the first moment, declared the correct position so that he introduced the United States and Saddam as the leading cause of the war. Mobilising the people, appropriate tactics in the war and managing the end of the war in terms of Imam's realism were actual examples of the Imam's wise and prudent command in solving the problem of war.

4) Interaction with the World Based on Dignity, Wisdom and Expediency

Communication with the world is one of the Islamic Republic's foreign relations principles. Although it has clear borders with the enemies of

Islam, those who have no hostility have established friendly relations. The leaders of the Islamic Revolution considers this logical interaction three pillars of "Dignity, Wisdom and Expediency." (cf. KHAMENEI.IR. Examples of Intellectual Events of the Islamic Republic, 1399)

5) The Slogan of Self-confidence and Self-reliance Policies

The policy of self-reliance and promoting the slogan "We Can" was Imam's slogan manifested its truth for enemies and in the period of sanctions. Needless to the country, in terms of agriculture, production, industry, etc., the boycott will be ineffective. The Revolution leaders equate the spirit of self-confidence with the nature of humiliation of Iranians in the past. A manifestation of Imam's rationality was the injection of the self-confidence and self-reliance spirit in the nation.

4.1.2. Manifestations and Results of Revolutionary Rationality

Revolutionary rationality regarding the Supreme Leader has various and valuable manifestations and results. Expressions of rationality in the Imam school have some concepts:

Islamic democracy, his stubbornness and inflexibility in dealing with the invading enemy, injecting the spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance in the people, drafting a constitution, fulfilling the slogan "People Own the Country." (KHAMENEI.IR. Examples of Intellectual Events of the Islamic Republic, 1399)

Components such as conservative calculation, stratification, petrification, captivity to illusions and fantasies, compromise (with the enemy) conflict with the sound system theory regarding Ayatollah Khamenei. Also, from the perspective of the Supreme Leader, revolutionary rationality has the following results:

Scientific progress, the power of high and correct analysis, the management of the enemyology (anti-arrogance is based on rationality), the connection between realism and idealism, the combination of principles of wisdom and practicality in foreign policy, insight (piety is the prelude to increasing understanding, perseverance in work, right choice (elections is the manifestation of the nation's rationality, the timeology, learning by example, the contemplation and comprehensive (values), affairs division to the primary and subordinate, the growth (weakness) of the culture of reading, honouring the position of scientists, scholars, elites, teachers, promoting research position, innovation and creativity, experiencing, student spirit, futurism, moderation (avoidance of excess), productivity (in the general sense) and reduction of computational disorder.

4.1.3. Transcendence-oriented Rationality and Political-philosophical Problemology of Ayatollah Khamenei

Paying attention to rational principles is crucial in good governance, politics, and policy-making. Naturally, this attention to our rationality

can lead to many different issues, different axes, and the possible consequences of a decision. Therefore, considering the critical role of the Supreme Leader in the country administration and the general management of the country, we seek his theoretical and practical life with relying on rationality and his strategies and views in this format. Another look at reason in Islamic debates is that the Leader takes his intellectual source from the same issues according to the requirements of time and place. About 267 times in the Qur'an discusses the reason and raises it as a severe issue. In Surah, Yusuf says: "I invite myself and those who follow me to the manner and insight of rationality; this insight is the basis of the invitation and mission of all the prophets". This insight is considered by monotheism and affects human monotheism. The reason that can make the man pay attention to this world and the Hereafter is the reason that is related to revelation. In other words, it is transcendence-oriented rationality that is considered, not the rationality itself. This intellect becomes the basis for accepting obedience and the foundation of socio-political responsibility in the religious, cultural and political spheres.

Imam Hussein (AS) is asked, and he argues that the diversity of fasts and prayers is essential when the intellect is perfect. That is, the action and reward of each person depend on the extent of their rationality. These discussions emphasise the theoretical and the practical aspects of reason. Based on the verses and hadiths, the efficiency of every individual, society and system depends on this kind of rationality. Secondly, the sign of this rationality is acumen and affairs will.

For this reason, when we talk about reason in verses and hadiths, in the local logic, the discussion of power, type and good choice is considered. During its fortieth anniversary, Iran owes the preservation of the values and norms of the Islamic Revolution, which are based on independence, republic, Islam, freedom and justice, to the blood of the martyrs, the presence of the people and the wise and just leadership of the leaders of the Islamic Republic. Here, far from stereotypical discussions and personal issues and views, tried to explain the debate on transcendental-oriented rationality and the problematics of political judgment from the perspective of the Supreme Leader to answer many questions and issues raised in this regard. In transcendental rationality and the problematics of political decision, we first need to introduce the discussion and the concept of rationality in the West and Islam. The second premise is problemology and knowing the problem and the characteristics and the factors that create a problem. Finally, the main argument emerges from these first two assumptions: transcendental-oriented rationality and problemology.

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It is one of the indigenous issues that the Leader produced in transcendental-oriented rationality and political-philosophical problemology. Leader, unlike many intellectuals, has a very appropriate, optimistic view of the Iranian people in the discussion of identification and view of the Iranian people. He reminiscent Iranian people always praised and thanked and knew people as one of the essential engines of the country's growth, development, and overall progress. He states that the Iranian nation has found its way and has moved forward with logic and rationalism by relying on God, power, and trust. The Supreme Leader must argue that the movement of the Iranian nation is not based on a general and emotional passion but on logic and rationalism in general, which considers this rationalism to be accompanied by confidence in divine promises.

For this reason, there are objective debates, such as the events about science and the production of science and the various constructs that take place, all in this format. The next point is that the result of the nation's rationality and confidence in the divine promises is that the leader of the Revolution determines that the country will achieve its desired ideals. He argues that the Islamic Republic is associated with logic and rationality especially. He believes that the Islamic Republic has acted with reasoning from the beginning and refers to the imposed war, in which reason became the basis of the country's work. This logic has been present in adopting resolutions and various affairs since the war. For example, some people wanted to manage the polls differently. Still, with his rationalism and rational logic, the Supreme Leader tried to conduct the polls properly within the framework of the law and away from political excitement. Under his leadership, another objective debate in the Islamic Republic is the peaceful debate over nuclear energy, backed by proper logic and rationality.

‘But where did the rationality school of Leader come from?’ Rationality is opposed to going to extremes, and the experience becomes a sign of rationality. For example, he discusses various issues before the Revolution and the coup d'état of 28 Mordad on multiple problems related to the long-standing hostility of the United States towards Iran. About JCPOA, Supreme Leader said that we should not be bitten twice by the enemy and that the enemy's experience, before and after the Revolution, tells us that we should not trust him. It is a perfectly rational argument that we can recognise in the process of earthly debates. Therefore, leadership rationality and his intellectual source of the rationality is based on transcendental-oriented rationality that, along with issues, verses and hadiths, responsibility, choosing between good and evil, prudence and experience are considered.

Problemology is one of the masterpieces of Ayatollah Khamenei. We have many wise people who create creative spaces but are incapable of understanding things. Therefore, one of the essential topics and issues of the Supreme Leader is problemology. He knows social and political issues very accurately and with a broad perspective. When we talk about the problem, we introduce several features of the social crisis in terms of political sociology (cf. Luzik, 2019 AD/1398 SH).

The first problem is that we show that something is the wrong and general perception. They put a lot of emphasis on this issue and take it very seriously, and they pay a lot of attention to the public perception and the collective movement of the people. One of the apparent differences between them and the intellectual elements is that they consider public perception an essential criterion. The second point is a more complex and more severe issue. Our reliance, trust and belief in the Hereafter and divine help do not cause us to give up difficulties and seriousness; it is his idea.

The problem is generally used where a man can solve it. One of their conceptual and theoretical points is that we never reach a dead end when the issue is raised. In the current situation and at the height of sanctions, Corona, economic dissatisfaction and inefficiency of some brokers, he hopefully proposed a second phase statement with dignity and optimism for the future. The third point is the analysis of his political rationality. The first question is ‘Whether we need to change our foundations, norms and values after forty, fifty or seventy years?’. ‘Does the Islamic Republic need a severe transformation or not?’. Leader of the Revolution refers to an exciting point and says that the enemy constantly wants to change our calculations. Still, they would fail because our system calculation was based on logic, wisdom and rationality. In rationality discussion, the Leader considers the profit and loss and the cost of the benefits. One trusts God and his monotheistic attitude, and the other distrusts the enemy and knows it.

Therefore, the computational system of the Supreme Leader is rooted in two primary principles. One is “لا حَوْلَ وَ لا قُوَّةَ إِلاَّ بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ” and other “أَعُوذُ بِاللَّهِ مِنَ الشَّيْطَانِ الرَّجِيمِ”. Of course, the devil or the enemy exists in different layers and holes. He also says a proper process for rationality is maintaining independence and non-dependence. The Leader regards the logic of arrogance as an opposite element to political rationality. We could develop political rationality wherever we opposed arrogance and knew the enemy well. In discussing the plague of rationality, he believes that if a man sees the present and does not see the future or observes criticism but does not see long-term work, it will be a great plague for human intellect and happiness. In the JCPOA, he issued an appendix of

several articles and had foresight. Many of these events might not have happened in our country if the state had acted seriously on those issues. And now we were not waiting to see who would be elected in the United States, while we could manage this situation based on his political rationality.

When talking about rationality, we must also act and pay attention to anti-rational factors. Ignorance, prejudice, selfishness, lack of reflection and thought are very important plagues of rationality. He points out that if we cover the intellect with ignorance, prejudice, selfishness, and shortcomings in thinking and thought, we will deviate from the path of guidance. His arguments on rationality are so crucial that they become a book on rational-political debates. In his view, divine victory and occult aids will be included in a rational society, preserving national interests and country progress accompanied by rationality.

The spiritual dimension of rationality, i.e., personal and social purity, strengthens the intellect. According to Leader, some people equate rationality with conservatism, while his view of rational calculation is quite different from conservatism. The revolutionary rationality is Leader's idea. Evolutionary rationality is enlightened rationality and the strategic depth of the system that can face various plagues and eliminate them. One of those plagues is appeasement based on fear and apparent interests. His desired rationality is an atmosphere of society educating and creating insight that can inject the spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance in the community. Religion is presented as political, social, and cultural capital in his political rationality. This kind of rationality derived from religion and national identity can significantly support creating a political balance in rationality. One of the critical plagues is the instrumental expediency that causes differences.

These differences are outside the sound system and the internal power of the strengthening system. If we think we can reach the goal no fee, it is inconsistent with rationality. After all, every move and partnership can have some costs and benefits. The rationality of the Leader is based on problematics and political views that support the oppressed, and justice-seeking must be based on spirituality. His discussion of moderation is different from what may be on some people's minds.

The first point of moderation is enemyology; the priority of the revolutionary faithful is in cultural affairs, lack of surrendering to the enemy and emphasising internal capacities and reliable association with the socio-political space. Our country needs rationality to continue its overall growth, development and progress. One of the essential evils of rationality is that cowards have no right to speak of rationality; because the basis of rationality is courage, wisdom, justice and spirituality. Fear of inside, outside, family, faction, and the enemy of inside and out are

significant factors that destroy rationality. The Leader emphasises that when rationality is created in society, and rational calculations are transferred to rational courage based on transcendental rationality, both the officials and the people calmly do essential work and do not pay marginal actions. They look for the basics and principles of efficiency rather than individual issues and misdirected addresses.

The Leader believes that the enemy is always trying to instil rationality in the wrong sense. This nonsense of the enemy is derived from his fear and backwardness. They seek to cause somehow these space constructs and the rational computational system to suffer. However, regarding his view of problematics, the Islamic Republic will move forward in all areas thanks to God. The anti-oppression, justice-seeking and tremendous social struggles must be based on logic. It is the logic of transcendental rationality, which avoids unholy ignorance, orthodox intellectualism, and asceticism. They do not confuse principle and sub-principle.

Explaining the revolutionary in the political thought of the Leader will cover two basic levels (Mousavinia and Jamalzadeh, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 219). The first level is the semantic field of discourse and the extent of its otherness-making, and then is the social function of revolutionary discourse. We should also pay attention to some of Ayatollah Khamenei's statements have a prescriptive aspect and is not events description. In otherness-making, the powerful speech is understood with enemy policies. This front is trying to eradicate and create deviations in revolutionary thinking by severely censoring revolutionary thinking, changing the computing system of Iranian society, using media tools and creating divisions. In social functions, we can also refer to self-confidence, industrial and scientific progress, influence and authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the crystallisation of revolutionary thinking in rules and regulations. Also, his prescriptions for improving the social function of revolutionary thinking are:

Development of Iranian society, use of art and media tools, the approach of religion, concern of the Islamic world in revolutionary thinking, deepening of faith, updating of Islamic and revolutionary thoughts, a continuation of revolutionary studies through elites, the seminary mission in propagating extreme knowledge, exceptional attention to forces Revolutionary.

There is also an important relationship between authority and rationality in the theory of the revolutionary system. The Supreme Leader, in a video conference with the joint graduation ceremony of military universities students, explained the basis of authority in the Islamic Republic:

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"The basis of authority in the Islamic Republic is a basis of "Rationality." We do not pursue management based on feelings, emotions, illusions, and the like. The calculation of national sovereignty is a rational calculation. That is a correct and logical calculation. Some people who use the name of reason and rationality means to be afraid of rationality. When they say be wise, it means being frightened; being passive, running away from the enemy!. No, cowards do not have the right to name rationality." (Lecture. 1399/07/21)

Another important manifestation of political rationality from the perspective of the Supreme Leader is the attention to the political structure of the Islamic Republic. The glorious and proud secret of the permanence of this system is these two words: Republic and Islamic; people and Islam. Republic means people, and Islam means religious democracy. The outstanding work of our great Imam was to create this idea and theory of the Islamic Republic and introduce it into the field of various political views. Then he fulfilled it (Statements. 1400/03/14).

5. Justice in the Revolutionary System Theory Based on the Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei

Justice has a special place in the revolutionary theory, without which the element of rationality and freedom would be ineffective. In this regard, we review the most important statements related to social justice from the perspective of the Supreme Leader:

- The importance of theorising about Islamic justice with severe efforts and conflicting opinions of thinkers and the need to pay attention to the role of religions in understanding justice;
- Dissatisfaction with the deficit of maximum justice in society (despite the excellent work done in the field of justice);
- Justice, the goal of social systematisation of religions and the movement of human beings in the framework of religion;
- The prophets' attention on explaining justice and conflict with the tyrants and oppressors;
- The belief of all divine religions at the end of human history to a just era;
- Paying attention to the relationship between justice and progress;
- Avoid eclecticism in explaining justice;
- The unique view of Islam on justice in Islam is based on truth and divine duty;
- The need to find indicators to measure the fulfilment of social justice.

6. Freedom in the Revolutionary System Theory Based on the Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei

In the revolutionary system theory and rationality and justice, the two categories of freedom and spirituality have a severe place. They are, in a way, the foundation of the theory of the revolutionary system. In the following, a brief reference to freedom will be given:

- Along with the term freedom meaning ascension and nearness to God, spiritual freedom means liberation from internal constraints and fighting against obstacles to freedom (obstacles such as negligence in Jihad, frankness and hypocrisy);
- In the discussion of freedom, we must also pay logical attention to restrictions; for example, Islam and the Islamic framework somehow restrict unlimited freedom. It is the first limitation, do not be afraid of constraints.

Conclusion

Theories are formed in the light of different paradigms of the social sciences, and in this respect, the framework of their view of reality is other. Each theory represents a specific arrangement of concepts and the relationships between them. Ideas in the social sciences are not independent of theory. Another point is that the acquisition of knowledge and improving the political situation result from theorising. Conceptual design in views is also a significant issue. Despite the description that the data is categorised and summarised, ideas are interconnected with related concepts and create a unique conceptual design. In the second phase statement, reviewing the 40-year experience of the Islamic Revolution, Leader refers to the entry of the Revolution into the second stage of self-construction, socialisation and civilization-making. The second phase is related to the "Revolutionary System Theory," "the Efforts and Struggles of the Islamic Iran Youth," and the realisation of "Creating a New Islamic Civilisation and Preparing for the Sunrise of the Great Province." The new and innovative phrase "the Great Islamic Revolution" is a meta-theory of a revolutionary system based on Islam, independence, the collective movement of the people, and freedom. Attention to it provides an understanding of "the Revolutionary System Theory." In the grand theory of the Islamic Revolution, the new factors will introduce the remaining aspects of the Islamic Revolution. In the revolutionary system theory, while paying attention to the basic concepts of justice, spirituality and freedom, political rationality based on transcendental rationality is emphasised. While rejecting the rationality of the secular foundation, Transcendent-oriented rationality has paid serious attention to the interaction of revelation and reason and tries to monitor the material and spiritual progress of human beings. The conceptual design of political rationality resulting from the theory of the revolutionary system on a

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comprehensive and correct problem-solving, appropriate timing in political and social decision-making, the main subordination of issues, foresight and simultaneous calculation of task and result, as well as the use of historical experiences in moderation improperly emphasises. The result of this rationality will be a move towards sustainable development and increasing the political system authority.

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Elite Political Culture and Political Development of Iran in the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress

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Abstract

The Islamic and Iranian model of progress is an indigenous document based on the Iranian-Islamic fundamentals and values of society, which follows the fulfilling the final step of the modern civilisation of Islamic Iran in the future. The basis of this model is a systematic view of the development and provision of mechanisms for active-voluntary participation and competition of social groups in the general sphere of society. Therefore, the attitude of the governing political elite is critical. The present study aimed to answer the question 'How can the political culture of the ruling elites lead to the fulfilling political development in the Iranian-Islamic model of progress?' The hypothesis is that the political culture of the governing group is the source of political action and behaviour in society. Therefore, reforming and improving the attitude of the ruling political elites towards political development within the framework of political and jurisprudential capacities in the religious discourse and the Islamic Revolution provides the ground for fulfilling political development in Iran as a model.

Keywords: Political Culture, Ruling Elites, Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress, Islamic Revolution Discourse.

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Introduction

Development in today's world is very vital. Political progress among the development branches in the modern era has special conditions regarding its role and position in society. Although political development has entered the discussion of growth in the last half-century, especially in the Western world, its elements and components were the ideals and public aspirations of nations and the agenda of democratic governments. Its elements are freedom, legalism, the existence and possibility of the activity of civil institutions, pluralism, stability, competition and political participation (Nazari and Eivazi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 10). However, Western progress models are often instructive and valuable for Western countries. Their use and application for other countries, including Iran, as the only appropriate model of progress and development, is not rational. Most Western models have faced obstacles and limitations regarding being non-indigenous and not paying proper attention to the issues and problems of our society. Hence, experts and ideators have proposed various approaches to modernisation and development.

We assume that the political culture of the governing group will be the source of political action and behaviour in society. Iran has the discourse capacity to achieve progress based on Iranian culture in the 20-year perspective and upstream documents (Iranian-Islamic model of progress or cultural engineering plan). Therefore, it should pay to the governing elites' political culture to accurately describe people's behaviour in a developing way. Iranian culture combines Iranian, Islamic, liberal and socialistic culture (Haghighat, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 301). When we consider the prevailing political culture, we must also consider these dimensions of culture. Compared to popular political culture, the attitude and knowledge type of the elites play an essential role in advancing or weakening the elements of development.

When we talk about the political culture of a society, we regard the political system as recognitions, feelings and evaluating its members in their minds and souls. Every country depends on the role of its elites, especially the political elites. Their thoughts and ideas influence political and social programs and how fulfilling people's demands determinatively (Abedi Ardakani, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 135). The present study aimed to offer techniques, with collecting data, to improve the country's political development process. The main question is 'How can the political culture of the ruling elites lead to the fulfilling political development in the Iranian-Islamic model of progress?'. The authors claim that the political culture of political elites is the source of political action and behaviour in society. Therefore, the quality of attitudes and mental ideas of this type of elites to political development in the framework of governing capacities

in the religious discourse and the Islamic Revolution will create ground for fulfilling the political development of Islamic Iran in the future. To explain the above hypothesis, the present paper is divided into several sections. The first part discussed the discussion background of the works of domestic and foreign writers. Then the conceptual framework of elites and political development is examined. Then, it mentioned the Iranian Islamic model of progress and the position of political action and its elements in this model. In the next part of the article, the function of political elites in political development will be evaluated. Finally, it discussed the pathology and requirements of political action in the Iranian Islamic progress model.

1. Research Background

Iran's political development has undergone significant changes over the past century, including:

- The rise of the constitution in 1906-1911;
- The period of absolute rule and hidden modernisation under Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi;
- The brief period of parliamentary democracy under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh;
- The Islamic Revolution in 1979 with different approaches to fundamentalism, pragmatism, reformism, justice-based fundamentalism and the moderation discourse.

Iranian society and politics had significant changes often imposed from above each period. These changes, along with Iran's geo-economic and geo-strategic position, which has been the motivating factor for the great powers, have affected Iran's political development. Many scientific works on the history of Iran as an ancient country and civilisation are available. Many of them are not dedicated to Iran's political development; instead, they proposed political action in their discussions. The following sources are the most authoritative and most cited works related to the political history of Iran. The Cambridge History Collection of Iran (Avery et al., 1968 AD:91), with the Frye works (1984) and Amanat (2018), provide a very general overview of Persian culture and politics over two and a half years of history. Amir Arjmand (1984) has dealt with this issue in detail. Nikk Keddie has reviewed the complex links between religion and politics in Iran by reviewing modern political developments in Iran. He evaluates the roots of the Islamic Revolution to the complex history of the 19th and 20th centuries in Iran. Finally, Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (1985) states some of the dynamics and contradictions in modern Iranian society through the complex links between religion, tradition, and politics in post-revolutionary Iran. In addition, there are many sources on political developments in the country. The most comprehensive, authoritative and well-known source is the Iranica

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Encyclopedia, which contains entries on all aspects of Iran's political, cultural and social life. A review of domestic and foreign sources on Iran's political development shows that the elite debate has received less attention from these sources. Here, we attempt to analyse the role of political elites in political action in Iran and its application in the Islamic-Iranian model of progress.

2. Conceptual Framework: Elites and Political Development

The concept of political elite was introduced in the early twentieth century by Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto. Mosca called the ruling group the "Political Class," while Pareto called it the "Ruling Class" and distinguished it from the "non-Ruling Elites." Mosca goes into detail:

"The first class, always in smaller numbers, performs all political functions, monopolises power and use its advantages. At the same time, the second class is more extensive and controlled by the first class in a way that is now more or less legal and arbitrary and violent. The first class is essential by providing material means for the livelihood and vitality of political systems." (Mosca, 1939 AD: 50)

The concept of "First Class" is a group that impose power over the masses. This class has such control due to the balance of political forces in society. Thus the balance of political parties determines the nature of its ruling class (Mosca, 1939 AD: 65). Regarding the verdict class concept of Mosca, Pareto proposed the idea of a "Circulation of Elites." Therefore, he implicitly acknowledges the existence of at least one elite or other potential elite in society.

Suppose an elite A controls the society, and another elite is B trying to replace it. Then, C represents the rest of the people, including displaced people, people without energy, low intelligence, etc. These groups only matter if they are led by A or B (Meisel, 1965 AD: 12-13).

According to these considerations, the criterion of being elite of political elites has three areas:

- 1) Having public fame;
- 2) Having a special place in decision-making;
- 3) Having official positions in political and administrative organisations (Khajeh Sarvy, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 191-192).

The political elites here means the ruling elite. That is, famous people and officials in political and administrative institutions who are directly and indirectly involved in the decision-making and policy-making of the country.

1.1. Political Culture

Political culture is the orientation of individuals in society towards politics and, to some extent, patterns of political behaviour. The system

of religious attitudes and beliefs, expressive symbols, social values, mental perception of history and politics, fundamental values, how to represent feelings, knowledge and political reflections that are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups and the framework of feedback and behaviour where the political system is, include in the relatively broad concept of political culture (Bashirieh, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 9). The political culture here refers to political elites' attitudes, values, and perceptions on various issues, including government and development.

1.2. Political Development

To understand the meaning of a term, we must begin with its literal meaning. The Oxford Dictionary defines politics as "the State Science and Art" and political as "Relating to the State or Body of Citizens, the State and its Politics, Especially in Civil and Secular Affairs or to this science." Development is "Coming Out of Secret Capabilities (anything)" or "Gradual Progress through Gradual Stages." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971 AD: 228-707) Accordingly, political development has related to gradual progress through government, government, and political action. Political development is the transformation of the governing structures, systems, and institutions of a society to meet the perceived needs and influence the goals of that society. Organski defines political development as "Increasing the state efficiency in using the human and material resources of the country for national purposes." (Organski, 1965 AD: 7) However, this definition implicitly assumes the existence of a nation-state as a precondition for political development. He defines the first stage of the political development levels as "The policy of primitive unity that participates in nations' birth and childhood." In addition, according to him, the changes must take place before the formal creation of a nation-state, which is, in other words, an integral part of political development. However, such a position is inconsistent with his definition of political development.

Other authors define political development as the ability of political elites to handle demands through political institutions (La Palombara, 1974 AD: 48-49). Or political development refers to certain conditions, such as "The acquisition of conscious political capacity from a defined political system, or patterns of participation and equal distribution of resources." (Coleman, 1965 AD: 15)

Regarding such definitions, political development means greater participation and equality. These terms are Western concepts and are not necessarily the target of selectness who are themselves in the process of change. Political elites may be involved in addressing demands through changing political institutions, or they may be confronted with orders arising from egalitarian and participatory motives. But in all these cases,

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the signs and consequences of political development do not define any concept.

1.3. The Relationship between Elites and Political Development

Political culture and development theories say that political action transfers the values and feelings that hold people together in traditional societies and political structures to developed values and emotions and increases the ability to organise grassroots associations and manage complex systems. The power of leaders and community members, which depends on individuals' cultural and psychological characteristics, is involved. In political systems, there are at least two types of political culture: the political culture of the elite and the political culture of the masses. In political systems, there are at least two types of political culture: the political culture of the nobility and the political culture of the groups. The culture of political elites deals with the privileges, feelings, and patterns of behaviour of those who influence political employment and have a significant impact on system outputs. Mass political culture is shaped regarding the attitudes and tendencies of the people (for example, as a whole) towards politics, which do not significantly affect the system's outputs (Pai et al., 2001 AD). Thus, political culture is the sum of the interactions between the four elements of mass culture, elite culture, the historical and political experience of the nation, and the prevailing political structure. According to Nafisi (2000), the perception of elites and masses of political reality, the behaviour of leaders, the performance of institutions, the beliefs of political leaders and nobility, the modernisation and development of industrial societies, the status of independent groups and the implementation of mass media in shaping and establishing the political culture have a critical role. Various sources have influenced Iranian political culture.

On the one hand, there are historical, geographical, demographic and economic conditions, and on the other, religions and beliefs, family education. Iranian public culture is rooted in Iranian history, continued by an authoritarian political system. Each of these sources has impacted the development and maintaining such a subordinate and limited political culture in Iranian society.

The social situation of Iran plays a vital role in shaping the identity, power structure and political system of Iranians. One of the sources is all the competitive beliefs and different behaviours of Iranians derived from this country's geographical and historical conditions. From this perspective, Iranian society, which has been on the path of history and civilisation, has people with positive and negative aspects of personality. On the one hand, Iranians have an open and flexible view of the new

situation. Therefore, the country is more compatible with other cultures in the face of cultural transformation.

The development of Iranian society regarding the political culture of the Iranian elites in different historical periods has shown the decisive and influential role of political elites in this process. Historically, the development process in Iran started from the Qajar period, especially from the constitutional movement onwards. During the Qajar period, the development process accelerated with the initiative of constitutionalist intellectuals and court reformers. In particular, during this period, Amir Kabir's actions played an essential role in introducing modern manifestations into society. Amir Kabir's reformist efforts remained unfinished following the malice of rivals and those around him, the short-sightedness of the rulers and political leaders of the time, and the assassination of Amir Kabir by his ill-wishers. During the Pahlavi regime, Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah tried to modernise the Iranian society using comprehensive procedures. After the Revolution, government officials sought to develop Iranian culture.

2. Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress

In 1385, Ayatollah Khamenei proposed designing and codifying the Iranian-Islamic progress model. Regarding this necessity, the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress Center was established in 1390, whose task is to formulate the desired horizon of the country in the next five decades. After seven years, communicated in 1397, a document of the Iranian-Islamic model of progress to Iran's institutions and country's agencies becomes the origin of the "Modern Islamic-Iranian Civilization."

This document, which outlines the "Most important principles and ideals of development and the desired horizon of the country in the next five decades," is to be implemented from the beginning of the fifteenth century AH (the year 1400). All policy-makings, documents and visions, even the twenty-year and ten-year visions that will be compiled in the future, should be based on this model. According to the Supreme Leader, the "Historical, geographical, cultural, climatic and political geographical conditions" of Iran influenced the formation of this model. "Iranian thinkers" have prepared this model, but the ends, goals, values, and work methods are derived from Islam teachings (Khamenei, Sayyid Ali, 89/9/10).

The basic assumptions of this idea are that the current models of development can not answer society's needs and aspirations. Second, Islam has the intellectual capacity to support and provide a model of progress. Then, Iran's scientific and strategic capabilities can take a step in designing and developing the Iranian-Islamic model of progress as its primary and even vital necessity (Zoo Elm, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 6). This

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model is an upstream document and a unit for all planning documents, vision and policy-makings of the country. The Iranian-Islamic model of progress seeks to provide a suitable pattern for the development of Iranian society regarding the historical and geographical, cultural and social conditions and relying on Islamic concepts and teachings, national values and strategies. This pattern, like other models, has principles and requirements that are different from other models in terms of structure and purpose. However, there is no denying the similarities between this pattern and other patterns. The intellectual and philosophical system of the Iranian-Islamic model of progress has an exceptional epistemological and ontological basis. These principles analyse the relationship between man, society, individual, and government. The need for political, social, cultural and economic development in this model is influenced by basic concepts such as justice, independence, welfare, national dignity, cooperation, freedom and government. The Islamic content of this model is based on monotheism, resurrection, inseparability of this world and the hereafter. Progress in this model revolves around religion. In other words, achieving progress and development in a specific sense is the same as performing a good life and spiritual pleasures (Ghafouri, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 206).

3. Elements of Political Development in the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress

The Iranian-Islamic model of progress, like other models, has characteristics that are mainly derived from its ontological and anthropological foundations. Although these elements may overlap with the features of other models, the philosophical foundations and, consequently, the reading of development is different from the Islamic model. In the following, we explain the essential features of the political product in the Iranian-Islamic model of progress.

3.1. Political Participation

In the Iranian-Islamic model, political participation is through Iranian-Islamic identity and the link between religion and government. Regarding the religious foundations of Islam and jurisprudential sources such as the Qur'an and the words of the Imams (AS), we can find the fields of participation, council and collective will and cooperation in the political, social and cultural areas. These categories are formulated and used to achieve political development in the Iranian-Islamic model (Kalantari et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 91-92). In addition, there are principles in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic that relate to the issue of participation in the political, social and cultural spheres (principles three, six, twenty, twenty-three, twenty-six and fifty-six). In general, and

according to the religious principles and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the essential foundations of political participation in this model are Islamic vision, legal regulations and laws, elections and political parties.

3.2. Religious Democracy

Religious democracy means the administration and control of society in the political area by the people's representatives, per religious values. This concept has central law, proper orientation, satisfaction, and central value components. In religious democracy, the government's legitimacy is in its religious acceptance, and then the people's happiness is meaningful in the form of law and its scope. In this model, the operation of the government requires the support of the people (Akhavan Kazemi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 137). Religious democracy in the Iranian-Islamic progress model is based on a religious rule system with both divine and human dimensions. This system analyses the relationship between the government and the people by considering Islamic principles (Nabavi, 2002 AD/1391 SH: 506). Accordingly, the Iranian-Islamic model must be based on the conditions and necessities of religious democracy.

3.3. Freedom

From the Islamic perspective, the index of freedom has a fundamental role in forming and continuing Islamic progress. The concept of freedom has its limits in Islam, and freedom has no place in its absolute and unbridled meaning. Islam has rights and laws in which freedom finds its subject and purpose as a political and social system. In Islam, freedom is valuable when it does not conflict with divine rights and limits. With conflict, freedom is invalidated because God has the right to legislative guardianship. Man has the right to freedom and authority within the framework of the rules and limits, and he should not go beyond that. Hence, the right to human freedom is limited and assigned by the divine right. Imam Khomeini says in this regard: "Freedom is within the limits of Islam, is within the limits of law and according to the Sharia, the nation is free, and man was created free by nature and should not follow others. On the other hand, humans should serve the Creator who gave them life and avoid the slavery of other than God. Freedom in the worship of God is worthy of Him".

4. The Position of Political Elites in the Political Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In post-revolutionary Iran, the elites' commitment to Islam and the Islamic Revolution was one of the essential preconditions for development fulfilment. The main goal of political development in Islam is to achieve happiness and nearness to God, earning through materials. From Imam's view, the ultimate goal of political action is creating

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suitable conditions for human ascension and providing an environment of humanisation and closeness to God and the path of God (Khomeini, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 33 and 34). Regarding the differences in the ultimate goal of political development in the Western and Islamic perspectives, the position of elites in society is different. For example, legitimacy is one of the most critical indicators of political development, which has different definitions in the Islamic-Iranian and Western models.

The issue of legitimacy in Islam is the "Religious Justification for Imposing Ruling Power." That is, 'By what religious authority does the ruler have the right to impose power?'. That is, legitimacy means the capacity of the political system to create and maintain the belief in the principle that 'The political institutions in society are valid or not?'. Indeed, the legitimacy meaning in the term political science and the term religious meaning in the sense of religious rule is different. Legitimacy in political science is more in line with equations such as acceptability and legality than legitimacy. In Islam, the inherent source of legitimacy is God alone. Because the Creator of the world, man and the owner of the whole universe is the only independent, influential and governing (wise) the world power and the Lord of the universe and man. In Islam, government and political sovereignty, which control creatures' affairs, are considered matters of lordship. The basis of the government legitimacy in religious thought is different from the legitimacy in secular view, in that secular thought pays more attention to public acceptance. According to Imam Khomeini, Islam has established a government that has not an authoritarian manner in which the individual's desires are imposed on society, nor in the way of a constitutional or republican government established based on human rights and obliged the imposition of group votes of people on the community. Instead, he found a government inspired by divine law in every field. In this government, none of the governors has the right to rely on their vote in an authoritarian manner. Instead, everything related to government, even the people's obedience to rulers, must inevitably follow divine law. Of course, in the Muslim community's practicality, the ruler can decide on matters with all members. Their decision is not a tyranny of votes but expediency. Therefore, his vote and decision, like his work, will be subject to the interests of society (Nazari and Eivazi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 21). Although it does not derive its direct legitimacy from the people, a religious system is obliged to ensure the maximum good and salvation of the people. One of the appropriate mechanisms embedded in the spiritual government is the direct and continuous communication between the government and the people. Such communication should not be merely superficial and formal. Still, contact should receive information from the government

and the people to know the government. General indicators of political development are political participation, religious democracy, equality and freedom. These characteristics are consistent with the Iranian-Islamic identity and local conditions and factors and are based on Sharia and national values. In Islam, political participation is one of the characteristics of an advanced Islamic society, which can be shown in the pattern of Islamic progress in the vision, structure and behaviour. The view of the Islamic school on political freedom is different from other schools of law. Islamic law has rights and rulings prescribed by revelation and explained by the prophets. In this system, to prevent tyranny and self-centeredness, important moral and sensual traits are necessary conditions for the religious leader and government officials, provided for the Prophet and the Imam through infallibility and justice and righteousness for others. The individuality of the elites in the Islamic system has no value in itself. What puts rulers on the path of progress is to move on the divine path and serve the people. Indeed, the political elites in Islamic society are the mediators of leading others to spiritual progress and material prosperity.

5. Lack of Political Development and Pathology of the Political Culture of the Ruling Elites

Regarding Iran's history, the ruling political culture on the political elites of Iran, after the Qajar period, has mainly been nationalistic and contentious. It means that many problems and obstacles to political development are derived from political elites' anti-development personality and culture, not their expertise and knowledge (Shahramnia and Eskandari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 92). In the political culture of Iran's elites, politics is often seen as a hostile occupation, and the continuation of conflict and non-compromise is considered the best way to secure the interests of each side. Simultaneously, in the political culture of the Iranian elites, any dispute that caused negating principles governing politics is considered distasteful. The political elites believe that politics is an arena for the negation of another rather than an arena for cooperation (Bashirieh, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 31).

In examining the process of political development in Iran, we have encountered a kind of lack of institutionalisation of political action. After Constitutional time, modern concepts such as freedom, law, and participation entered the country's political arena. Some issues, such as adopting the constitution and establishing a parliamentary system, stabilised political development. However, political action has faced a steep path regarding institutionalising these concepts and teachings in the elite political culture.

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Iran's political culture throughout history indicates that there is not enough trust between individuals in society and consequently organisations and institutions. In such circumstances, roles in the social and political system are assigned based on kinship and ethnicity. The individual and the citizen are alone with the government and political institutions. It means that intermediary institutions and organisations that protect their rights and interests in the face of power and the power tools do not exist or are not permanent. Individual independence is not valid, and collective conscience limits the circle of individual conscience (Sari al-Qalam, 2016 AD/1397 SH: 115). Various factors affect creating such a culture. Many believe that Iranian political culture in general and elites, in particular, are the product of Iran's transitional conditions. Mahmoud Sari al-Qalam believes that the set of Iranian political attitudes, values, and behaviours is rooted in the tribal culture of Iran. In this regard, he says, the accumulated Iranian political culture is based on distrust, ambiguity in expression, irregularity, automatic behaviours, excessive emotions, harmful individualism, aversion to reality and the method of elimination and destruction in resolving disputes. These are serious and fundamental obstacles to collective rationale competition, especially in politics. Despite the change of political systems and the different class bases in these political systems from Safavid onwards, the accumulated Iranian political culture has maintained its incompatibility with the fixed rules and principles of development. This culture is rooted in the tribes and 'clans culture. The essential features have been kinship, the spirit of war and militancy, and the maintenance and expansion of the tribe through invasion and looting (Sari al-Qalam, 2016 AD/1397 SH: 7-8 and 56-58).

Alireza Gholi also considers the problem of underdevelopment in Iran regarding the continuation of traditional or tribal culture. In this regard, he points out many negative features such as "Criticism," "Rule of Mysterious Forces," "Closed Economy," "Immutability of Social Systems, Mental Texture of Magic Temperament," "Religion Inherent in Tribal Culture," "Lack of Change and Violence and Absolute Power and Hostility" are due to traditional Iranian culture (Reza Gholi, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 72). But in the meantime, Hossein Bashiriyeh believes that the political culture or ideology of contemporary Iranian political elites has been mostly a continuation of the old patrimonialism (patriarchal) political culture (Bashiriyeh, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 30).

Simultaneously with the Islamic Revolution, a new phase of political development and its components such as freedom, participation and legitimacy began. At the beginning of the Revolution, the people became acquainted with the true meaning of popular rule or democracy. Still,

with the outbreak of the imposed war, political development faced various obstacles, and indicators such as people's participation in politics became difficult. After the war, different governments had different approaches to political action. For example, in Hashemi Rafsanjani's government, technocratic managers designed a strategy of economic development at home and expediency abroad under the title of "Construction Agents." Thus, the policies pursued by the political elites of the Hashemi government led to a change in some of the attitudes and values, which were mainly secular and material (Ghorbadzadeh, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 132) and wealth was considered valuable. Thus, the political culture of the political elites was not appropriate with the capacity of the political system to answer the various demands and accept the opposition and tolerance of the opponent. The result was creating a closed atmosphere and reaction at any time (Abedi Ardakani, 153 and 154).

After the reform government, the new middle classes, mainly comprised of intellectual, scientific, and cultural forces and managers, lawyers, and technocrats, emerged within the power bloc (Bashiriyeh, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 103).

In such an atmosphere, efforts were made to change the political culture in political development. Signs of political action are the quantitative and qualitative increase of affiliations and parties, efforts to institutionalise the political system and oversee the implementation of the constitution and the transparency of covert political rivalries (Bashiriyeh, 2003 AD/1382 SH:188).

However, regarding the rule and continuity of the same political culture of the previous period over the political elites and the country's particular political and cultural situation, tensions and political and social conflicts arose in the society. During this period, the political community was increasingly faced with a lack of consensus among reformist and fundamentalist political elites and political conflicts. As a result, under Khatami's government, the slogan of reform became a challenging element and a factor in the unhealthy competition of the valley within the political elite (Keshavarz, 1996 AD/ 1375 SH: 8).

After the reform government, political development came under such concepts as social justice and slogans such as the fight against poverty, corruption, discrimination, inequality and the return to Islam. In such an atmosphere, the new political elites criticised the policies of the constructive and reformist governments and spoke of the "Islamic State" and the establishment of "Justice." In fact, in the conservative government, we witnessed the approach of the political and cultural atmosphere of the country to the era of idealism in the early days of the Revolution (Abedi Ardakani, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 160-161).

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The conservative state is the manifestation of populism. Groups of the lower classes of society were able to gain more or less political power and government and, as a result, formed the political elite of the period. Under these circumstances, the elites were quickly exposed to the mass's influence, and the groups of the people were easily accessible to the nobility (Kourhouser, 1959 AD: 22).

Later in the Rouhani era, the election of the majority of cabinet members from among those with security and military backgrounds indicated that the new government was willing to make politics in Iran security and military. The existence of an intolerant culture in political discourse can not resolve issues and problems, cause tensions, and create political unrest within society. Therefore, in this government, regarding the characteristics of the ruling 'elites political culture, even more than previous governments, there is an obstacle to the creation, growth, sustainability and stabilisation of the components of political development.

6. Requirements for Political Development in the Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress

An overview of the political development process in Iran, especially in post-revolutionary Iran, clearly shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not seen a growing trend in political development over the past few decades. All post-revolutionary governments have pursued their policies in political action. In other words, political progress has not continued a stable process and an efficient and unified model during these years. According to the elected governments' tendencies, political development has been accompanied by ups and downs.

The unknown and ambiguous trend of political development in the country is more than anything else derived from the lack of a political development model. According to the author, presenting a progress model based on domestic and indigenous capacities while improving the country's political development process can prevent the ambiguity of the policies governing development. The presentation and communication of the 20-year vision document of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the horizon of 1404 SH can be assessed based on this approach, which aims to provide a model of indigenous Islamic-Iranian development. However, the realisation of such a model depends on the fulfilment of the following requirements:

- Regarding the value nature of the Islamic Republic, the model proposed in the form of the "Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress", unlike other models of development in the Western world, can not be based on purely material values. Instead, beyond the temporal dimensions and approaches to progress, it includes techniques that provide human status

in the evolutionary path from the perspective of Islam. This model focuses on the "Justice Fulfilment" and "Material and Spiritual Development" of human society, which planners and decision-makers of Islamic-Iranian development should consider. In this view, the political development of communities reflects the development of human resources. Progress aims to strengthen the fundamental values, the balanced growth of material and spiritual needs, and in general, the pursuit of political, economic and cultural development based on religious matters;

- It is required to have a codified and defined national program to preserve the elite people and exploit these national assets considering the influence of the societies elites in the development and progress of the necessary societies;

- The most crucial principle and requirement of development are to reach a consensus at the elite level. Growth is not possible unless there is a method and quality between the elites, the coalition and the harmony. There are two essential groups in society: Powerman, thinkers and expertise. If there is an opinion unity and consensus between these two, the internal core of the community will be rich. Thus, society has demanded responsibility and efficiency from its best (Sari al-Qalam, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 80);

- The intelligent system of the Iranian Islamic model of progress and from the religious mechanisms embedded in the law should give the accountability of the elites to the people priority. To reform the political culture by establishing a connection between the masses and the nobilities. According to Imams Sirah, no one is an exception to this rule, and everyone should be present reasonably;

- In the Iranian-Islamic model of progress, there must be a deep connection between all aspects of development to achieve balanced growth and active political participation among members of society;

- In the context of the Iranian-Islamic model of progress, the law implementation by the elites should be based on correctness and trust.

Conclusion

In Iran, the political culture of political elites and their performance, which arises from this type of political culture, has not created the necessary structures for political development in society. In some cases, if there were a structure that could bring us closer to political progress, we would have tried to destroy it. However, to create development or change or solve a crisis or disease in a political system, we must pay attention to both the hardware and software dimensions. Political culture is the software aspect of political development and the underlying layer

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of a political system. Political progress first occurs in this mental political system or political culture. In other words, political culture is the crystallisation of the political system present in the minds of that society; then, we see its objective realisation in institutions and, ultimately, in the political and social system. Although political culture is always interrelated with the political structure, the two have a lasting effect. But historical experience and scientific theories have taught us that the transformation of the political culture valley is a prelude; otherwise, the emergence of social change and behavioural revolutions is not justified.

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The Theory Based on Divine Verses of the Modern Spiritual Civilisation Emphasising Recreation of the Infrastructures of Fulfilling the Religious Civilisation

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Abstract

By examining the conditions of possibility and refusal, the present study aimed to answer the main question 'Under what conditions, spiritual civilisation in the contemporary world becomes possible?'. In the timeological assessment of the civilisational situation, referring to the loss of the "Positive Aspect of Modern Civilisation" and its continued bio-negative in the absence of alternative models limitations, it examines the "Modern Position of Civilisation" in terms of universal basis and valuable theoretical framework different from current literature in modern and non-modern research civilisation. By creating a distinct consciousness organisation, do not block the path of spirituality in civil and civilised life, without eliminating science and technology, overlap with the universal needs of the world. And also create different formulations of civilisational actions, structures and relations that make the way of facing the world and science and technology meaningful, distinct and religious. Therefore, systemic Ijtihad and "Divine Verses" present the new spiritual civilisation's conceptual and theoretical organisation. This context and critical approach recreate the Islamic Revolution's software infrastructures and civilisation-making organisationware.

Keywords: Divine Verses, Modern Civilization and Science, Theory, Justice, Modern Religious Civilization, Software Organization, Religious Democracy.

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Introduction

Today, the astonishing acceleration of developments and events deprive humanity of profound thinking opportunities. The discussion of civilisation -incredibly spiritual and Islamic- is a blessed opportunity for self-awareness and other awareness of the meaning of life and its quality. It allows us to think of new possibilities by distancing ourselves from these daily routines. And what values and ideas or what intellectual and epistemological organisations have the weight and ability to play a permanent role in life and do not obstacle to spirituality like the paradigm governing life today.

In his book "Critique of Theoretical Reason," Kant's style focuses on the possibility of helpful knowledge amid a diverse epistemological spectrum and, in general, changes the course of epistemology. His style caused us to go beyond the most common questions and discussions about the renewal of Islamic civilisation. First, he questioned the fundamental issue that 'Under what conditions does the possibility of spiritual enlightenment in the contemporary world arises?'. Then, assuming its possibility, at a higher and more critical level, 'What conditions make religious and spiritual civilisation possible?'. Conditions regarding its coordinates possibly preclude the revival and renewal of civilisation through previous patterns. Any serious study of the fulfilling religious and spiritual society requires theory.

Therefore, with systemic Ijtihad and semantic method in "Divine Verses," a conceptual and theoretical organisation of religious and spiritual culture is presented. The software that follows it examine the infrastructures and civilisation-making organizationware. Finally, through this theoretical framework, we will address some gaps, challenges, and fundamental considerations regarding religious civilisation, the most important of which is the hypothetical organisation of "Science and Technology" in religion-based culture. Islamic civilisation requires a theoretical organisation distinct from the literature standard in research, especially modern culture.

The present study begins with a question about the nature of modern science and the status of contemporary civilisation in terms of the possibility of continuing its current trends and practices on a global and long-term scale and then discusses the case of alternative culture. At the same time, it distances itself from extreme optimism about the imminent fulfilment of a replacement civilisation, pointing to some critical challenges.

It believes that religious culture will not emerge only with the creation or development of quantitative and qualitative new sciences and educational centres and universities of the kind and nature of universities ranked first in the world today. It emphasises, however, that the attempt

to perpetuate modern civilisation by emphasising its extension from the ancient West and denial of any possibility of other society, especially the spiritual and religious type involves ignoring essential facts. Part of these facts is related to the state of modern culture and its trends and procedures, which we follow here from the status and dignity of identity, modern science and its evolution.

1. The Civilisational Situationism and the Possibility and Refusal of Spiritual Civilisation

Addressing the developments of modern science and technology is a good turning point for discussing modern civilisation and its current state. Regarding the typology, modern science and technology have an independent and distinct nature, not the evolution of pre-modern science and technology, or "Top of Science" and their "Above." While giving objectivity and characterisation to modern civilisation, this distinctive identity shows its ups and downs and its strengths and weaknesses.

Francis Bacon, one of the founders of modern science, is not a prominent thinker but has proposed a statement about the relationship between man and science that has a philosophical significance in terms of paradigm shift and shows the direction and end of modern science. According to him, the need to change the centre of gravity and science aim from "Truth" to "Material Ability and Power" has been centralised. In his most famous work, he introduced human knowledge and power as one (Bacon, 2000 AD: 33).

Therefore, emerged literature and discourse in the world that concentrated the existential philosophy of science and knowledge on the empowerment of man. Hence, the nature of modern science became a "Posteriori," and technology became ahead of science and had a "Priori" rank. So, from the beginning, in the modern era, those sciences have found a privileged position that gives human beings ability and dominance. Those sciences that do not have such an ability mostly lose their importance compared to modern sciences unless they are linked to the main problem or have theoretical support.

Modern science and technology more or less found distinctive features in purposefulness. "For example, the natural sciences, physics, chemistry, and astronomy consider that understanding the universe purpose and its laws, based on knowledge is valuable." (Weber, 1991 AD: 144)

What is referred to in this text as the "Different" identity of science and technology in modern times -without being considered "Inherent and Unchangeable"- is initially the result of a paradigm shift and a kind of intellectual organisation. But in later developments, it builds a variety of evolved secular-based rationality. In addition to implying a form of

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humanism, ontological materialism, and secular presuppositions of world relations, it changed how we deal with the world and phenomena materially. Regarding the nature of modern science, it is not easy to say that new science and technology can be obtained through the gradual increase of scientific facts. Instead, it is similar to what Cohen calls "Revolutionary Displacement."

Therefore, one scientific pattern or paradigm replaces another paradigm. It draws our attention to the question of 'Why the choice between competing paradigms, such as the state of modern and the spiritual civilisation in this study, constantly raises issues that the standards of conventional science cannot solve?' (Kuhn, 1970 AD:109).

From an epistemological view, after initial optimism about the modern scientific achievements, discourses and critical studies were gradually formed in parallel with the emergence of its growing problems, emphasising the reductionist aspects of contemporary science. So, postmodern and modern philosophers became more critical; because they introduced the basis of modern science and rationality and humanity as the primary source of existing problems.

Thus, if Nietzsche recognised "Cognitive Nihilism" in it, later philosophers, especially Heidegger, considered the situation far more dangerous and higher than cognitive nihilism and evaluated technical thinking as the cause of "Existential Nihilism." At the same time, the current situation has intensified, and human nature and destiny are influenced by newer technologies, not their relationship to God and monotheistic spirituality. The predictable future of man is evaluated regarding such process and a sense of technology. Therefore, modern civilisation and its fluid relations in the secular world need new technologies than reason, religion, and spirituality.

In answer to the first question of 'What conditions make spiritual civilisation possible?', there is the world's question about this science and the civilisation that results from it. As if in the bio-world of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, the possibility of imagining a non-Western, non-secular culture was considered impossible, it was regarding the favourable position of modern science, relying on its international expansion and materialist advances. Perhaps in the Hegelian sense of modernity (Habermas, 1990 AD: 23), at the end of history, imagined the movement towards the ultimate perfection of subjectivity; as Hegel exaggerates, "like the divine similarity, he does not want any god before him." (quoted in Jaeschke, 2004 AD: 10)

This situation, despite crises, continued, but the likes of Husserl saw the root of the problems of modern science not in its spiritual discontinuity but in the "Abstraction of Geometry," which dates back to Galileo (Husserl, 1970 AD: 48-49).

In such perspectives, by emphasising a European intersubjectivity relation, as the concept of history and civilisation was considered a subset of humanity, European culture, from the metaphysical view, had all the perfections of science and civilisation. So, finally, they convinced others to resolve the crisis of science in a secular atmosphere.

Thus, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the West gave almost no civilisation to other people in the modern era. But today, in all theories of civilisation - at least - talk of alternative systems and civilisations is accepted. Whether in the form of attention to the historical areas of non-European civilisation, or acknowledgement of other civilisations in selfish theories such as the clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1996 AD), either reluctantly accepting the failure of modern civilisation and emphasising the "Death's of Western Civilisation" following the decline of moral norms and the collapse of the family (Buchanan, 2010 AD), or the end of "End-of-History" theories (Fukuyama, 1992 AD).

Therefore, the problematic nature of modern civilisation - from its adherents - is more severe and worrying than at any other time in the history of this civilisation. This situation is sometimes expressed in strategic language that "The collapse of all past values, especially in the modern parts of the world, has destroyed our ability to extend the present situation - not the future situation." (Brzezinski, 1995 AD: x)

The problem is not related to diminishing the authority of ideas, assumptions, ideas, and modern science; instead, a new world is emerging in which Western values do not the past dominance. In this regard, Western philosophers and thinkers had shown that this problem and crisis occurred before its importance declined in the eyes of others and the reduction of modern civilisation in modern reason and rationality. Instead, its growing troubles stem from the crisis of contemporary rationality and its representation in an intensifying process. The rationality that Max Weber referred to as instrumental rationality has become "Science as a Profession." (Weber, 1991: 143)

In conclusion, contrary to the Hegelian induction that modern civilisation is the inevitable destiny of world history, we believe that this destiny is not based on the historical status of religion but mainly on an avoidable process (Cf. Sayyid Nejad, 2015AD/1394SH: 7 and 44). Just as a modern civilisation today has largely lost its positive aspect, and unlike in the past, instead of the positive part of contemporary civilisation being strong enough to be considered the ultimate civilisation, now there is talk of no alternative or weakness and limitations of other options.

2. Challenges and Opportunities of Alternative Civilisation

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The challenges of alternative civilisation are relevant from this perspective, which from the "Denial of the Present Civilisation" does not necessarily exist the "Proof of Religious Civilisation." Must consider existing complex challenges and limitations. One of the most significant challenges is we have almost no influential civilisational organisation in the general process, and everything we do is influenced by modern civilisation.

We are faced with global and dominant structures already formed in the existing culture. The dominant systems have predetermined all areas and aspects of human life - Togolese - in a reproductive way; so that they have taken control of almost all influential regions. Therefore, although everyone in the Islamic world agrees on the usury of banks, there is no immediate prospect of eliminating the usurious bank and replacing it efficiently. The Islamic world and Christianity, despite opposition, have not been able to do much.

Many scholars and enthusiasts of spiritual and religious civilisation in the world pursue the desired culture and renew it in a context more or less similar to the ruling society and in its desired reconstruction. Examining the current characteristics of the existing civilisation, it becomes clear that although using their capacities to create a new paradigm is the starting point for reformers.

But regarding the special features - such as the existence of maximum structures and pre-existing in the world - previous civilisation experiences are not very exemplary. In fact, minus their religious and secular nature and the type of organisation of consciousness that supports them, their software and institutional capacity for civilisation need to be reconsidered considering the intellectual paradigm of the modern world and the activation of postmodern trends.

Otherwise, insisting on previous models for establishing a new religious civilisation - as the study basis of an essential part of alternative civilisation claimants - means the "Negative Life of Modern Civilisation in the Absence of Alternatives" and "I Am Your Supreme Lord" will earn new dimensions if we consider the narrations of religious civilisation, which are issues of spiritual culture. Although "Religion has become an inescapable discourse, the question now is not whether religion is important or present in modern societies (which it is, of course), but the fundamental issue, its form." (Lausten & Waever, 2000: 738)

In addition, in discussing alternative civilisation, we should pay attention to the enormous possibilities and capacities of the existing civilisation in the re-creation, the imminent collapse of which seems simplistic. The fact is that the present culture has no cultural alternative, and religious thought has almost no form of product civilisation and has not yet found the civilisational structure. Their repetition will probably

become bland if intellectual states and normative organisations do not find objectivity. When secularism and its institutions have become the dominant cultures and structures globally, exaggerated about the opposition to religious and spiritual civilisation and the obstacles in its way.

In contrast, some facts make the discussion of religious civilisation unprecedented. Part of these facts is religion itself and its civilisation-making capacity from a different point on a global scale. Therefore, we should pay attention to the importance of religious civilisation-making. The origin and the first foundation of Islamic civilisation is the first word of God Almighty with the Holy Prophet; the excellent expression "Recite" establishes the Prophet selection and the foundation of Islamic culture based on the love of science, innovation and reason.

In the first encounter of civilisation, the root of "Peace, Safety and Security" is usually referred to like the word "Islam and Faith." The greatness of Islamic culture is in coexistence (and the tolerant spirit of Islam) with each other as long as the other does not hostility (Abdul Hamid Zaki, 2016 AD: 256).

The Prophet (PBUH) is the last because he has given to another because of this characteristic. Qur'an has made the right of another (even an infidel) obliged as a human being and has guaranteed life peacefully: "لَا يَنْهَاكُمْ اللَّهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يُقَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَلَمْ يُخْرِجُوكُمْ مِّنْ دِيَارِكُمْ أَن تَبَرُّوهُمْ وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ بِالْحِكْمَةِ وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ بِالْحَسَنَةِ وَجَادِلْهُمْ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ". Also emphasizes in his invitation to wisdom: "يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ".

Islam as a transformational school in a very short distance from the selection and Hijrat became a leading and privileged current among the civilisations of that day. In renewing this covenant, today, the Muslim Ummah, along with other religious people, is one of the most remarkable capacities to fulfil spiritual civilisation. In the meantime, the Islamic Revolution has unique characteristics and possibilities inspired by this Islam and its authority, drawing a new and different example of civilisational structures. The religious civilisation is not a sub-choice and virtue. Still, it is a point of agreement and union of all religions and spiritualists and an integral part of the world's religion and religious thought program. Following these developments, in the more or less post-secularist studies and effects of civilisation in the world, the "Religious-Spiritual" gap versus the "Secular-non-Spiritual" has become one of the essential active gaps. According to these aspects, global trends indicate civilisation's new capabilities and position. They include effective movements in the balance and the meaning and concept produced from spiritual culture.

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This revolution blocked the reactionary path related to spiritual civilisation. In addition, as a great illuminator, from the strange angle of the modern world, created a deep familiarity in the world with contemporary society. The Islamic Revolution has a new meaning and theme of Islamic culture and a complete plan of spiritual civilisation. It has created unique capacities that give freshness to the discussion of




Figure 2. National nano emergence scores by time period

Islamic civilisation. Through religious rationality and the organisation of religion-based consciousness, the Islamic Revolution paints a vision of spiritual and intra-religious development in the world. So that the religion of "Masses Opium" and "Dead and non-Constructive Religion of Civilisation" has become "the Religion of Challenge and Change in the System of Domination and Modern Civilization" and "One of the Most Important Living and Constructive Phenomena in the Contemporary World." In this way, some heresies that have historically become religious traditions have been deeply challenged. By building a novel system in the form of religious democracy, the central infrastructure of civilisation and one of the most critical areas for fulfilling spiritual culture - and even on a national scale - has been provided.

Regarding the scientific rank and science production, the Islamic Republic has been in a high and growing position globally for the first forty years. The most focus - along with the other three developed countries - was on the most emerging and advanced fields of science and technology. An international study shows that Iran is ranked fifth among the most developed countries in nanotechnology, emphasising the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the direction and quality of scientific achievements. The study, conducted by researchers at

GeorgiaTech University and a university in China, compares countries and science and technology institutes worldwide based on a new index called "Focusing on Emerging Areas of Technology." It shows that governments, institutions, and even experts have focused on science and technology, the promising and emerging fields of science and technology.

According to this criterion, China is in the first place with a long distance, and the four countries of the United States, South Korea, India, and Iran are in the second to fifth places with a short distance from each other. Interestingly, in this ranking, Iran ranks higher than all European countries and Japan in the nano-research with a cost of millions of dollars. The article's authors have explicitly expressed this as "Surprisingly." (Porter and others, 2019 AD: 25)

What adds to the importance of these facts and intersects the discussion of Islamic civilisation is that religious and spiritual civilisation is essentially a common point of consensus among the diverse cultures of religions and the wide range of spiritualists worldwide. The spiritual civilisation is the objective and fulfilled form of spiritual culture and thought in the world, and spiritual culture depicts the mental structure of this civilisation. In this sense, spiritual civilisation is the point of the spiritual ideas emergence of wills and values and their objective embodiment in the form of institutions and structures of culture. The title "Wisdom" in the culture and literature of Islamic scholars, in its strict sense, implies civilisation.

3. Civilizationology and the Urgent Need for a Theoretical Understanding of the New Religious and Spiritual Civilisation

Apart from solid theoretical arguments, the experience of the Islamic Republic, its ups and downs, confusion at the policy-making, its institutional turmoil, the unfavourable situation of the scientific institution and the uncertainty of its civilisational priorities clearly show the urgent need for a religious theory of modern civilisation. In the absence of this theory and a general evaluation of the over four decades of experience, we can say that the cultural aspect of Islamic culture was vital in the first decade of the Islamic Revolution. In contrast, less attention was paid to its civilisation aspect.

But in recent times, the cultural and moral aspects and civilisational software have been significantly weakened, and society (even the scientific community) is not culturally in the desired position of the preparations of religious civilisation. Instead, the civilisational aspect and hardware, especially in science and technology or the development of universities as an institution of science, has received more attention and gained strength. Although today's universities are significantly more

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consumer than a producer in civilisational aspects, simultaneously, they have had outstanding results. "Religious Theory of Modern Civilization," in addition to the ability to diagnose and pathology, shows that religious civilisation requires a combination of the first period of the Islamic Revolution with the second period. Even the second phase statement per such a theory can be examined and, from a futuristic view, be a basis for evaluating past periods.

Therefore, the issue of "Religious Theory of Civilization" is essential. We pursue it by reflecting on the Qur'an, in addition to theoretical independence and a robust reasoning system that answers the civilisational issues that (Islamic Revolution) needs about religious and spiritual civilisation. Therefore, merely presenting general and abstract propositions about the fulfilment of the new Islamic culture is not enough. The absence of such a religious civilisation theory may increase the volume of existing works on Islamic culture with other studies and extract thousands of current propositions and facts. Therefore, it may produce results related to the goal of religious culture in scientific institutions, without specifying from which path and with what institutions and structure in the world today it is possible or what arrangements and organisations are appropriate for its realisation. This situation is not specific to Iranian studies.

Despite the production of vast literature and forming discourses on Islamic civilisation - from the East to the West of the Islamic world - the place for such theories is empty. A new religious culture is not achieved simply by praising the past or slandering modern society, discussing it, wondering about it, or self-deception. Instead, it is obtained through precise religious theories that correspond to the main issues and the latest cultural realities. This issue about the Islamic Republic of Iran has become an inevitable necessity. In the absence of such a theory, in parallel with the existing structural pressure from the ruling civilisation and its various daily conflicts, its institutional and cultural priorities and requirements are not clarified. Without such a theory, the complicated structural contradiction of two different systems will become more objective.

In addition, in a positive sense, the "Religious Theory of Civilization" clarifies and updates the understanding of the cultural ends. Without a theoretical knowledge of dubious and hierarchical ends, the basis of spiritual and religious civilisation finds extremely unsolvable difficulties regarding the growing ambiguities about how to organise socially or make policies to achieve the benefits of society. It means that without a theoretical understanding of the ends and normative organisation, the level of civilisation policy-making is practically formed with religious and non-religious ambiguities theories and may paradoxically lead to the

violation of purpose and undesirable results. The "Religious Theory of Modern Civilization" provides a general framework and, with realism, validates and influences the presence of the desired discourse of spiritual and religious civilisation. It shows what kind of formulation and technical organisation can shape and guarantee a religious society. 'Which current structures are not or will not be able to study and solve the cultural problems?'. Finally, it constantly justifies and restores the cultural structures in the gap between the "Ideal Status" and the existing situation. By globalising and overcoming the "Outcome View" instead of the "Case View," it guides the best decisions and cultural actions in the accelerating changes and structural pressures.

The theoretical organisation is presented with an emphasis on the world's cultural realities. The weaknesses and structural criticisms in the substituting civilisation lead to regenerative reflection in the civilisation-making software and organizationware infrastructure. Another issue that limits the details of the theoretical organisation of spiritual culture in this article is the existential and ontological connection of religious culture with the most complex and perhaps the most challenging and necessary issues of civilisation in the contemporary world, namely justice. Obviously, in such a situation, without claiming comprehensiveness, a theory of religious culture is presented, based on the verses and principles of religion, which deals with the issues of civilisation.

4. An Introduction to the Theoretical Organization of Religious Civilization Emphasising on the "Organization-Consciousness" and "Basic Concepts" of Religious Civilisation

The religious theory of the modern Islamic civilisation is a set of coherent and interrelated propositions that are redefined by humbly referring to the divine verses. Finally, it defines our task systematically about the modern religious civilisation and the path of its realisation. In the proposed formulation of the contemporary Islamic civilisation theory and the theoretical organisation, there is a reasoning system that the organisation-consciousness, basic concepts and policy-making justify the basic structures and other proposed arrangements.

It shows that the discussion of religious and spiritual civilisation goes beyond a few moral, normative, or executive and structural rules and the reducing strategy of the semantic system. We should emphasise the organisation-consciousness of Islamic civilisation. Religious and Islamic civilisation does not derive from organisation-consciousness, even fanatical religion. Islamic civilisation has close and correlated relations with some elements, spiritual wisdom and rationality.

Therefore, in the spiritual and religious culture, organisation-consciousness and religious rationality are emphasised as the computing

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system and religious understanding and the reading of "Rationality and Justice-based of Islam." As long as the main view of the world and civilisation is not a spiritual organisation consciousness, it will not be possible to produce and recreate religious values, turn them into objective and institutional bases, and pursue them in the form of clear policies. The organisation-consciousness based on religion and spiritual rationality is responsible for confronting religious culture and its explanation and prioritisation.

It changes the world's perspective to the level of new and universal world civilisation. In addition to a clear differentiation between rationality and instrumental rationality, this kind of rationality is fundamentally different from alternative and irrational narratives of religion unprepared to abandon the irrational view or oppressive and hegemonic discrimination. Indeed, by emphasising such rationality -as a prerequisite for world civilisation- the religious civilisation values have found the ability to be followed and modelled on a global scale. In a dynamic and constructive process and flexibility, they create civilisation's action and advance civilisation's work in various dimensions.

5. Dignity and Justice; Existential Dignity in Islamic Civilization and the "Basic Concept" in Theoretical Organization

Referring to the distinctive feature of religious civilisation from non-religious, it is emphasised that fairness and justice are the "Basic Concept" and specific in the theoretical organisation of Islamic culture that clarifies the boundaries of the identity of religious civilisation from others. Without the civilisational manifestation of justice, there would be no religious and spiritual civilisation. Also, religious culture loses its true meaning and concept by eliminating or abandoning justice. In connection with its monotheistic content about guiding and policy-making elements, this concept finally draws a network and a theoretical framework that, as a conceptual system, provides new scientific possibilities for studying civilisation.

So, it can lead to a further evaluation of culture and civilizationology. Because being fair and unjust can distinguish the civilisational formulations in nature to varying degrees. According to divine revelation, the assumption of fulfilling religious civilisation without the attendance of justice, by definition, is impossible in spiritual attribution. Hence, closer formulations such as "Civilisation's Existential Precedence over Justice," such as "Development Precedence over Justice," can be considered descriptions of civilisations.

Their main idea revolves around the central notion that unjust formulations of religion are essential aspects of their culture. Hence, the

perception of being religious requires attention to the meanings and content that give existential dignity to justice in theology and holy civilisation. Therefore, justice for religious thought and its civilisation is not a choice and virtue of sovereignty but shows the existence of spiritual civilisation. Togolese is the deputy justice of religion in civilisation and precedes every prophet and religious mission. The relation and position of justice is the position of pure faith. Man and the Islamic society achieve to existence with fair. According to Togolese, the state and relation of religion and justice is an existential unity and condition in philosophical terms.

The struggle between justice with oppression and arrogance is existential, not a purely moral, jurisprudential or faith conflict. Moreover, by emphasising the difference between justice with similar concepts, especially "Absolute Equality," we can say that the areas of justice in religion are far beyond distributive justice or human relations with other people and societies. Instead, it contains far more precise and possibly more complex relationships, such as man's relationship with himself and God, as the departure from justice - in the soul - leads a person to rebellion and arrogance against others.

This critical issue is impossible except in religion, which, in the fierce conflict between "Carnal Desire" and "Justice," obliges man, in the most extreme situations of hostility, to observe justice even in the face of his enemies eagerly: “ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ لِلَّهِ شُهَدَاءَ بِالْقِسْطِ وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَاٰنُ قَوْمٍ عَلَىٰ أَلَّا تَأْتُوا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ بَلِ الْأَمْرُ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ لَا يَخْفَىٰ عَلَىٰ السَّاعِدِينَ شَيْءٌ وَاللَّهُ الْبَصِيرُ ”. Imam Ali (AS), who was brought up in this monotheistic school, swears that: “By God if they give me seven regions with what is under the heavens so that in the disobedience of God, to get barely peel unjustly from an ant, I will never do so” (Nahj al-Balaghah, 1369: 260).

In general, justice and its religious necessity in the depths of philosophical discussions have typically acquired an aesthetic nature. The place of holy justice has become a moral place, and this is not a new problem. In the earliest works, justice was a complete virtue of the only good for others among all virtues (Aristotle, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 167-168).

The transformation of religious justice into morality and virtue that act to it is strongly recommended and has the Hereafter reward is part of the problems in the holy justice and is rooted in intellectual weakness. Based on this intellectual weakness, a culture of religiosity combined with holiness and a history of thousands of years has been formed in which justice is a branch of righteousness. How many saints who justice is not their trouble. By improving the "Tradition and Principle of Multiplicity" and sanctifying it, many jurists have ruled on the necessity of patience

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over the oppression of oppressive governors and governments and, by consensus, issued a fatwa do not flood against rulers and tyrant governance: "قَدْ أَجْمَعَ الْفُقَهَاءُ عَلَى وُجُوبِ طَاعَةِ السُّلْطَانِ الْمُتَعَلِّبِ." (Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, 1379: 7)

The fact is that justice in religion is more fundamental than humanity has ever imagined in its weak intellectual.

Contrary to popular belief in religiosity and secular culture, justice is not merely to some extent like virtue or a credit proposition and ultimately morality in religion. Justice is fundamentally religious, and the dignity of righteousness is religion's existential and ontological dignity. A fundamental and epistemological matter in religion defines religion's primary and general view in the face of the world and human relations. Instead, the basis of faith and the universe is on justice "وَالْعَدْلُ أَسَاسٌ بِهِ قِيَامُ الْعَالَمِ".

This consistency is in the hands of a just God, whose will never belongs to oppression, even to the smallest detail "بِئِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَزِلُّهُمُ مِنْ قَالِ ذَرَّةً". Hence, in the original religious literature, the severance of human relationships in all internal, individual and social matters, and even in nature from justice, means severing their spiritual and divine connection. A subject with this religious sensitivity and existentialism has introduced justice as the mission of all the prophets. Before that, its existential basis has been human nature, whose general, universal, permanent and immutable aspect is based on just creation.

In a positive sense, justice is "Closer to Piety," and in a negative connotation, abandoning piety is the worst kind of leaving fair. As a result, human beings, intellectual, social, and human affairs, policies, structures, procedures, and institutions' distance from justice caused their reduction of religiosity. Ultimately, when civil orders and regimes, their norms and values, their mechanisms and methods would be just are considered religious. Separating justice from such context and content is unfair. Instead, secularism is regarded as a necessary and definitive premise of social justice in all modern formulations. As materialism defines the limit of its totality, the Quran reflects on the critique of this view: "وَقَالُوا مَا هِيَ إِلَّا حَيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا نَمُوتُ وَنَحْيَا وَمَا يُهْلِكُنَا إِلَّا الدَّهْرُ وَمَا لَهُم بِذَلِكَ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَظُنُّونَ".

Today, justice regarding the secular concepts explain, analyse and theorise. The most important and influential later formulations of justice are the "Social (Secular) Fundamental Institutions or Structures" and the "Subject of Justice Theories" (Rawls, 2001 AD: 55). Even if we define justice as the place of truth in conceptual systems as the supreme virtue in social systems (Rawls, 1971 AD: 3), justice still does not find its

natural, deep and substantial place. The processing of religious civilisation would not be precise without such a theory of justice, even if it were not mixed with secular ideas.

Michael Walzer's pluralistic and critical entry rather than John Rawls's pluralistic definition of "Spheres of Justice" (Walzer, 2008 AD), despite its practical significance and the opening of new horizons -that every aspect of social life demands justice commensurate with itself- regarding their reductionist and secular nature, do not exposed to the religious basis of justice, and the resulting civilisation. Basically, in the prevailing thinking, the limit of the totality of justice is materialism and secularism. In this dominant intellectual tradition, religious civilisation's basis is still not accepted. However, the fate of holy justice and spiritual culture is not based on secular thinking. Justice has the maximum connection and signification with religion; therefore, monotheistic justice is another name of divine faith. However, justice preserves the boundaries of identity, knowledge, religious practices and structures. Regarding the shortcomings of the believers, we can say that the infrastructural problem today, especially the religiosity history, is not in pragmatism but the lack of religious theories of justice.

6. Justice; the Issue of Voluntary Participation of the People, the End of Religious Civilization and a Reality in Need of Culture

Examining and representing the essential aspects of the "Religious Theory of Civilization" is explicitly examined by semantics and from a different angle of civilisationology literature. There are verses and implications in the Quran that we follow, focusing on the verse “لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا ”رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ” without any comprehensive claim in this systemic Ijtihad. According to this verse, the purpose of the divine prophets is not to build temples, monasteries, and abbeys, nor to establish the spirituality of isolation, aversion to society, secularism, Sufism, but to create a general public uprising for justice. This verse clearly shows that fulfilling justice is the goal of Islamic and spiritual civilisation. The prophets wanted this Islamic civilization: “أَخَذَ اللَّهُ عَلَى الْعُلَمَاءِ ”أن لا يُقَارُوا عَلَى كِظَّةِ ظَالِمٍ، وَلا سَعْبِ مَظْلُومٍ” (Nahj al-Balaqah). The verse emphasises the monotheistic justice that is the basis of change and revolution towards the monotheistic culture. The religious culture can not be connected to tyranny and oppression. The general context of the verse considers justice as a universal issue and the mission of all divine prophets and beyond individual problems and social and national structures, which is not limited to personal good deeds or negative compensatory and criminal aspects. It has mainly a positive and founding part. In particular,

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the verse tone is accompanied by the ultimate grace of God towards the people and can be considered as “لقد كرّمنا بني آدم”.

It denies the cultural context of "Nas" in the real world or takes its evil in secular and tyrannical culture seriously. "Nas" in its general attribution - regardless of characteristics such as nationality, border, race, religion, gender, or language implies a plurality that religious civilisation, minus this plurality and diversity, do not take on a comprehensive and all-encompassing form.

“لَيَقُومَنَّ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ” shows that each one of the people is relevant in this divine mission, and according to divine wisdom, there is no one who is excluded from the scope of this call. Finally, it puts the issue of justice on the shoulders of the people. The construction of Islamic civilisation begins as follows: universal and permanent call to justice so that people get used to justice.

“لَيَقُومَنَّ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ”, embraces the concept of responsibility and strengthen human beings will. It harmonises them together for Islamic civilisation. This approach is very different from people and believers who are pessimistic about the people and the masses. Or the view of those who think that Islamic civilisation is a particular concern of a limited group of elites. Interestingly, throughout history, many have theorised this view and accordingly narrated the history of civilisation. The Qur'an shows that these do not provide a correct estimate of the potential readiness of the people to enter into challenges and bear the cost of achieving the rich and irreplaceable benefits of Islamic civilisation. Prophets aim to fulfil justice through the comprehensive and voluntary participation of the people, which begins with explaining the reasons and the promotion of divine standards and norms.

“لَيَقُومَنَّ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ” shows that authoritarian justice or implementing justice by the force of the sword is ultimately unattainable or has no religious utility. The people themselves must demand justice and rise for it. It is a guide to the primary and moral method of religion. Therefore, in verse, an expression such as “بِالْقِسْطِ لِيُقَمَّ النَّاسُ” not used for authoritarian justice and forcing people to justice. Still, philosophically, people discussing fairness and justice are the "Subject" and "Object." In addition to the demand for religious justice, such a process leads to the renewal of faith in a broad social sphere worldwide and caused compassion and kindness between people. The fundamental question is ‘Under what circumstances do people pay attention to justice?’.

‘How is social justice achieved?’. In its modified form, this question has always been the subject of thought throughout history and, more problematically, the subject of the theories of the world today. The most important works in the ruling intellectual tradition of the world, such as

Rawls' justice theory in his book "Justice as fairness," finally evaluate the fundamental role of social institutions. The followers of the same intellectual tradition today believe in its inadequacy. And that "The issue of designing institutions that observe the equal importance of all individuals - without making unacceptable demands on individuals has not yet been resolved." (Nigel, 2020 AD/ 1399 SH: 105)

Nigel deeply is involved in the problem, ultimately seeks to resolve the conflict between "Partisanship and Equality" not at social institutions but the level of the subject's inner workings. In other words, all the essential existing ideas should become a moral norm in society to the institutions will succeed and do their job desirably. The main point is that we should pursue justice from its original position (religion) to become a solid internal norm that consistently transforms and guarantee the more fundamental and far more important aspects of justice to the inherent subject in addition to the materialist dimensions of justice. The method of internalising justice is related to justice itself and does not appear to be unfair or anti-religious.

The Qur'an evokes the strongest and highest sensitivity in people towards righteousness and defines the primary mission of the divine prophets in this monotheistic situation. But the more complicated issue in today's world is that in the dominant culture, based on the separation of the intellect of "Religion and the Prophets" from the narration of "Religion and the Prophets," they want to understand the quotation of "Religion and the Prophets" with modern and similar rationality. In such circumstances, what is not said about religion is more important than what may have become matters such as "Morality" or the slaughterhouse of faith in modern reason (Kant, 1998 AD).

The same ideas are still being repeated in modern evolution, and Hegel's position is the source of inspiration: "Outside society there is no proper reference or concept of humanity that allows us to ask ourselves whether our society is moral or not" (Brown, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 284). Therefore, at the end of these theories align with the intensified injustice and the increasingly problematic nature of justice in the modern period, this fundamental question would be the turning point of justice and civilisation discussion.

‘What concepts are the base of awareness organisation of such theories or in the context of which ideas?’. ‘Do such ideas and the consciousness organisation make justice possible, or are they part of the problem of the lack of justice in the world?’. Especially since thought, in the language of Islamic wisdom, is an existential matter and the existential matter, inside and outside, is the source of the work.

Various conflicts inside and outside of man, except with paying attention to "Human Nature" and "evangelist and warner" and, more

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importantly, "Understanding the Presence of God and Divine Traditions," can not reach justice. It requires a system of education that is just and fair. Therefore, according to the above verse, the education issue of all humanity and the world is in the head of the divine prophets' duties and responsibilities.

It emphasises that God Almighty has sent the holy prophets for education (Al-e Imran/164) and has warned against another teaching. Institutionally and educationally, therefore, the fulfilling of a justice-oriented civilisation requires priority beginnings such as a just and inclusive education system. In other words, uprising for justice in people -in a guaranteed and lasting way- occurs when it becomes an existential and internal norm in society through a longitudinal relationship with justice and justice-oriented values, as well as just paths and methods. In the absence of such a process, and as long as people are not sensitive to oppression and injustice, the administration of justice through dictatorship and from top to bottom always faces social resistance and failure and does not reach the desired outcome.

Therefore, if you want Islamic civilisation, do not look for it in economics, although economics is one of the culture's pillars and essential aspects. Quran repeatedly emphasises the importance of economics and judicial justice. In addition to the inherent extent of economics in the dignity and self-esteem of man, which God Almighty commissions, economics is also essential in terms of capacity-making in the matter of justice. An unjust economy leads to injustice and the instability of justice in other sectors. The problem, but the main path to its fulfilment, occurs specifically in the type of awareness organisation and through science and justice-oriented education system. While reasonable and just, this internalisation must allow people to stand up to the unjust and oppressive challenges. Simultaneously, religious democracy must be a robust structure that, from the lever of power, can stand from uprightness to justice against the aggressor tyranny, which is inherently defended of aggression, extravagance and coercion. The goal is not necessarily to destroy the other party but to stop the attack. Power underpins cultural work, and the principle is that justice should be so inherently internalised that its people can stand up to its challenges.

7. Determining the Path of Religion-based Civilization and re-Creating the Infrastructures of the Organizationware and Civilization-making Software

In addition to showing the purpose of Islamic civilisation, this verse has surprisingly determined the path of religious culture. The situation of this issue is uncertain in many works and civilisation studies. "لَيَقُومَنَّ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ"

shows that justice is the main path to the realisation of civilisation and progress and justice is not separate from progress. So that spiritual progress and civilisation are possible through justice. Hence, religious rationality implies finding ways of justice, just as rationality can tell justice without religion and spirituality.

Thus, "لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ", while centralising justice, practically refers to the structure of civilisation and the type of governing organisation, and defines responsibilities that can only be accomplished through a proportionate and just managing organisation. It seems that the best format today is religious democracy. In fact, with the term "Khalifa Allah" and the default "Human Governance on Their Social Destiny," religious democracy caused its appearance. An exciting experience that creates an active, creative and courageous encouragement in spiritual civilisation. It provides the possibility of using power on the path of culture and justice structurally and institutionally. It allows the decision-making equation based on awareness and thinking in a fair system.

"لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ" represents that justice should be followed up in a popular mechanism. Based on the typology of political systems in the contemporary world, undoubtedly, religious democracy is the most potent mechanism of fulfilling the justice and spiritual and religious civilisation in the modern world. According to the verse, we can say that religious democracy is one of the most innovative and leading branches of religious rationality, which will be the most crucial context of Islamic civilisation and its guarantee until the appearance of Hazrat Mahdi (AS). The extraordinary importance of this issue is when we notice that the most crucial part of each civilisation is related to its political construction. Political construction affects overall civil relations. In addition, the political building has a deep relationship with civilised software organisations, especially science and technology.

The political structure and its kind are essential in civilisation, science and technology, and science's type, quality, and orientation. Science and technology can not be formed independently of political construction and create sustainability for civilisation, especially if we notice the implicit reasons of verse, which involves institutional and knowledge requirements that made quantitative and qualitative thought in existing science and scientific paradigms.

For example, the concept of civilian jurisprudence is based on the same "Primary Goal" of religious commands. Unless spiritual civilisation is defined without eliminating the conceptual distinctions of the monotheistic religion or neglecting the difference between the real and non-real religions or empty from divine jurisprudence and sharia, like the Almighty God calls the believers to the "كَلِمَةً سَوَاءٍ" (Al-e Imran/64), that is

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the common point and consensus of believers group of Christian. Therefore, religious civilisation, perhaps, requires morality and civilian jurisprudence, other than ethics and religious and jurisprudence that are common in the Islamic world. Hence, democracy finds the way for Islamic civilisation and is a leader.

It means that it should persuade the publication path of justice and science. Today, religious democracy is the most critical context of justice, rights, the divine duty of community injustice, and the expansion of science, technology, and responsibility. Therefore, religious democracy will not be limited and unique in political participation. So, reducing religious democracy is merely a political building of domestic reflection and revision. Religious democracy, as an inclusive framework, also narrates the epistemic opponents of a spiritual paradigm for living in the contemporary world. A political structure should not be an unfixed form to adapt just in Iran. In particular, the critical feature introduced in verse about the prophets' mission says that the capacity and scope of Islamic civilisation is global capacity. In this regard, religious culture makes rich the literature on global justice.

We should not describe it by reactionary approaches, as "أكل ميثته" which is derived from by an emergency and a kind of passivity against non-religious civilisation.

Damaging the democratic engine or reducing its power is a kind of deviation in infrastructure that is the most prominent backing of religious civilisation. On the other hand, crossing the spiritual perspective of "Democracy" and changing secular and liberal democracy prevent or destroy the basis of religious culture and religion-based civilisation. Another problem is the level of civilisation policy. It is the most critical level, which connects the current situation to the desired position in society. In addition to the end, each civilisation requires a level of policy-making that can bring the current situation to the desired status and show its fulfilment. In addition to designing the lots, the verse above creates new facilities in policy-making about religious civilisation.

"لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ" refers to the ratio of freedom and justice. It means that supplying justice occurs with space, which is one of the highest human existence in religion. It separates humans from angels and reaches them Khalifa Allah (al-Baqarah/30). So, religious justice-seeking is not permitted to strip freedom. Therefore, justice in the genuine religious culture, with the negation of sophistication, justice, is the most important context for people's liberation, as the "لَا إِكْرَاهَ فِي الدِّينِ" is not acted as long as the monarchy and insisting on the unbelieving be existed.

The technical organisation, the executable mechanism, and civilisation justifying manner must be consistent with religion and consciousness

organisation and religious rationality. Therefore, establishing justice, with sub-religious rationality that is not justice their priority, and possibly by emphasising the divine destiny of oppression, have given a favourable position and inadvertently turned oppression into a dominant culture; or, like some other formulations, eliminates any entry into social justice, and consider oppression as a blessing that learns human beings humble, is not possible. As the Quranic justice, or secular rationality is not possible and does not seem to be desirable in any way. Hence, mechanisms must necessarily have a synchronicity with its religious nature. The emphasis on "يَقُومَ النَّاسُ" questioned the issue of dictatorial and from top to bottom justice.

8. Critical Retrieval of the Realization Processes of the Modern Islamic Civilization

In the meantime, it is necessary to enter the arena of global competition in producing science and technology and play an active role in world science production. Still, it is not enough for the modernisation of religious civilisation. The dignity of science and technology in modern civilisations is an essential dignity of the ontological type. At the same time, the issue in religious models cannot be reduced to the study of current or strategic science and technology.

Undoubtedly, the relationship between science and civilisation is not limited to old and new civilisations. Just as the scientism of civilisation is no place for doubt, civilisation can not emerge without science. Although, the question is 'What knowledge and religious civilisation depend on which intellect and rationality, which, if lacking, loses at least its religious character?'. So, it is necessary to represent and create a kind of religious rationality. It shows a missing link in civilizationology and science and technology, especially religion.

The relationship between the institution of science and justice is so chaotic that it should be re-read and fundamentally reconsidered. Especially by referring to the Qur'anic meaning obtain a new and unique basis of the definition and function of science and civilisation. Religious science and civilisation, in philosophical language, is like the "Truth of the Surplus Essence," which, in a common continuum and synergy, defines its dignity and identity and belonging by distancing itself from the existing formulations "Based on Justice." Therefore, the dignity of religious science and civilisation is the dignity of justice establishing.

From this perspective, the type of confrontation with the society depends on the kind of conceptualisation of science and technology, and the religious and non-religious nature of civilisation requires to bring justice in the margin or text the vital clause of "قَائِمًا." In verse 18 of surah

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Al-e Imran, the Almighty God, by describing and setting the rule, after the creational witness to His uniqueness deal with to "أولو العِلم" and their witness. He immediately describes "أولو العِلم" as "قَائِمًا بِالْقِسْطِ" "أولو العِلم". "بالْقِسْطِ" That is, the desired divine knowledge, the science bound by the resurrection and the establishment of justice and belongs to it. Therefore, the chosen divine wisdom finds its belonging and its proper dignity. "أولو العِلم" means one by one is committed to justice. Hence, science and civilisation become religious only by doing fairness.

On the negative side, science and civilisation, or those who do not establish justice or confront with the justice executors "وَيَقْتُلُونَ الَّذِينَ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْقِسْطِ مِنَ النَّاسِ" the basis of their knowledge is the place of conflict. It is an excellent challenge for civilisations and studies of civilising, and ignoring this issue is one of the faults and precipices of our civilisational studies. Accordingly, the key to the progress of nations and civilisations in achieving a comprehensive approach to justice science is that it is the essential basis and software capacity and can become a substitute for the hegemonic system of modern science and technology and its ideas and civilisational formulation by constantly monitoring the organizationware infrastructure. In the absence of such identification software, science and the scientific elite and their advances are not much different from bolts and nuts. Instead, science and civilisation without spirituality and justice is a challenging experience of secular-based civilisation.

The retrieval of a new basis in the civilisation definition and function does not merely imply a virtuous and benevolent relationship but expresses a causal relationship. The existence or non-existence of religious civilisation and its richness and stability depends on this dignity and limit of identity. It does not prevent the spiritual culture become "Hierarchical" and synergistically and increasingly manifesting different aspects and levels of justice. Hence, about the last Imam says: "يَمَلَأُ اللَّهُ بِهِ" "الأرض قِسْطًا وَعَدْلًا".

The author believes that dealing with science and technology is not much different from the scholars of modern civilisation. With carelessness, what happened in the world of Christianity and Western civilisation would be renewed somehow, among the claimants of religious and spiritual enlightenment. As Max Weber describes in "The Spirit of Capitalism and Protestant Ethics."

If capitalism began with value-oriented actions in Protestant society and the ethics of Protestantism and shifted from capital and capitalism to the ultimate in later generations, eventually moved from "value-oriented rational action" to "goal-oriented rational action," lest a culture is formed from the knowledge of science in which, in the end, "قائما بقسط" is missing.

Especially in the process of constantly evolving, creating a kind of rationality which they probably and gradually, for the pursuer of them, make rationality that they more or less think with it. The rationality that, ontologically and fundamentally, may turn one away from religion and humble them in the face of materialism.

Therefore, it is appropriate to re-read the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran today and the first period of the Islamic Revolution in terms of culture and public morality. In a general result and beyond the specific country, this issue should find its natural place in the software and normative organisation by using the organizationware, constantly retrieving and representing its perception of scientific and civilisational trends and procedures. Regarding the dignity and identity of religious science and civilisation, it is simplistic to assume that everything, especially ethics and religiosity, is consolidated or strengthened by prioritising modern science and technology in approaches and policies. Unless we mean ethics and religion, ethics and spirituality focused on modern science and technology.

Conclusion

In the dominant culture and structures in the world today, it is exaggerated to oppose religious and spiritual civilisation and the obstacles it faces. The present study refers to the facts that have given a new subject to discuss religious and spiritual culture. Simultaneously, it is emphasised that in the absence of a "Religious Theory of Civilization," the pursuit of religious ideals is formed in the realm of "Obscure all-Encompassing" theories. Even assuming the correct recognition of "Normative Ends and Organization," in practice, its level of policy-making is pursued, perhaps paradoxically, in the process of structural contradiction.

The experience is mentioned in the text. Positively, this paper presents generalities of the "Religious Theory of Civilization," which, in addition to determining the task of "the End of Islamic Civilization," defines the context of its emergence and the path of its realisation. Emphasising the dignity of justice, as "Existential, Epistemological and Ontological Dignity in Religion," is referred to as a "Basic Concept" and correlated and specific in the theoretical organisation of Islamic civilisation. In connection with other conceptual, organisational, institutional and structural elements, as a guiding system, it provides new possibilities for studying civilisation. Therefore, it can lead to a further evaluation of civilizationology. In this regard, it is significantly argued that the prestige of science and culture in religious models can not be reduced to the study of modern or supra-strategic sciences and technologies.

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According to such a theoretical organisation, it finally evaluated the re-creation of the software infrastructure and the civilization-making organizationware of the Islamic Revolution. It has been emphasised that religious civilisation -for example- requires a combination of the first period with the second period of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Also, the theory of religion-based culture, from a futuristic point of view, implies a modest perspective, as if history is heading towards the divine end in the last Imam period: "يَمَأُ اللَّهُ بِهِ الْأَرْضَ قِسْطًا وَعَدْلًا."

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Evaluating the Amount of Consensus and Prioritizing the Components of the Soft War Officers Role in Advancing the Goals of the Revolution's Second Phase

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Abstract

The soft war to weaken the intellectual and cultural circles ruling the society and the instability of the socio-political system has a broad scope against Iran, and the role of the soft war officers is essential. Accordingly, with the descriptive-analytical method and qualitative approach, the present study has a development-applied aim to formulate the soft war officers' position in advancing the goals of the revolution's second phase. The study's statistical population includes experts and thinkers in the Islamic Revolution, and the sample size has been done through purposeful sampling (judgmental). Based on interviews with the elites, there are 31 components to the soft warfare officers' role in advancing the goals of the revolution's second phase. The most common consensus is acceptance of the Vilayat and defence of it (2 scores), formulation of budget deficit strategies (1.98 scores), establishing a think tank to formulate an operational plan of the "We Can" discourse in society (1.97 scores), demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption (1.96 scores), demanding from officials regarding justice spread (1.95 scores), formulation of strategies for improving people's livelihoods, increasing the value of the national currency and improving the purchasing power of the people (1.94 scores).

Keywords: Soft War, Soft War Officers, Revolution's Second Phase, Consensus, Priority.

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Introduction

Today, simultaneously with the world becoming smaller and more complex, the increasing growth of mass media such as the Internet and satellite. New equations have replaced the old equations regulating relations between countries. Instead of using force directly, the powers focused on using soft power and changing peacefully by using new methods of interfering in countries' internal affairs. In addition, in this era, the media is used as an essential tool to implement the policies of authoritarian powers, and global competition has emerged in the media battle.

Soft warfare plays an essential role in weakening societies' intellectual and cultural circles to capture the nation's thoughts and ideas (Mah Pishaniyan, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 4).

In other words, in the age of information and communication technology, countries with more tools share and power in using data better achieve their internal and external goals. The United States and the West, by having communication-information facilities, take action to destroy and marginalise their cultural-civilizational rivals in the world (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 151).

Today, soft war is one of the most dangerous, critical, efficient, and least costly battles against Islamic countries' values, culture, and national security (Naeni, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 149). In this regard, global arrogance, led by the United States, have sought to overthrow the regime since the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. After their disappointment with the brutal overthrow, they have changed their approach to soft war (Habibi and Sabouri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 31).

The Islamic Republic faced cultural invasion from the second decade of the Islamic Revolution and after experiencing combat, assassination and boycott of enemies. Gradually, this cultural invasion became a cultural ambush and a soft threat. The main goal of this war was to delegitimise the Islamic system based on the centrality of Velayat-e Faqih in the social space (Bigdelou, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 126).

Soft warfare, targeting culture and ideology, focuses on the intellectual deviation of society and seeks to create intellectual passivity and then passivity. It will weaken the support and cooperation of the people as the most crucial source of the system power and the direct support of the political system based on religious democracy. As a result, the enemies provide a suitable ground for implementing their policies (Bigdelou, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 92).

In soft warfare, using its superior cultural, civilisational, scientific and technical aspects, it tries to influence the enemy's thoughts and change his behaviour. Using modern communication tools (such as satellite, Internet, etc.) and sophisticated psychological and sociological techniques, emphasising the strengths of its soft power elements and the weaknesses of the enemy's soft power elements, disarm it intellectually and changes his political, social and cultural behaviour in his favour. As

a result, it peacefully puts its desired political current or political system in place to secure its maximum interests (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 51).

Also, the phenomenon of soft war in the form of creating economic unrest, shaping dissatisfaction in society, establishing large-scale non-governmental organisations, media war, psychological operations to make the administrative and executive apparatus of the government ineffective, weakening Iran's sovereignty appear through civilisational methods and creating cultural NATO (Maleki and Hatami, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 70).

Therefore, the need for protection against soft war is felt by presenting a comprehensive model and instructions (Hatami et al., 2013 AD/1392 SH: 85). On the other hand, the Supreme Leader has proposed a comprehensive doctrine confronting the enemy's soft war. In such a way, students have been introduced as officers and university professors as commanders of the enemy's soft war front (Labaf, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 104).

In the meantime, they have a particular emphasis on the position of soft war officers. Soft warfare officers play a significant role in countering the enemy's soft warfare by forming jihadist, intellectual, and cultural nuclei throughout the country.

Today, the dimensions of soft warfare have become broader and more complex than before in a way that includes various cultural, social, economic, etc., sizes.

Therefore, recognising the central strategies of soft war is necessary. It consists of accepting the existence of soft war, enemyology, avoiding internal differences and maintaining unity and cohesion, setting up free-thinking seats, increasing insight as a compass against soft war, cultural engineering, boosting self-confidence, self-confidence and strengthening social capital.

We should not neglect the ruling force's training and principles, i.e., commanders, officers, and soft war experts, so that the commanders and officers of soft war are revolutionary and creative managers who, while maintaining readiness to protect and promote religious culture, are always defending culture and scientific jihad. They, with Basiji thinking, are pattern and model-making in society (Soleimani and Maleki, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 85).

Accordingly, the present study aimed to identify the role of soft warfare officers in countering it.

1. Theoretical Foundation

1.1. Multidimensional Conceptual Soft Warfare


The foundation of soft warfare was first proposed scientifically by Joseph Nye. He defines soft power as the ability to shape preferences. He believes hard power is for coercion and soft power is for attraction and persuasion (Soleimani and Ahmadi, 2019 AD/1398 SH). He believes that: "Soft power is the ability to achieve what we want to attract rather

than coercion." According to him, soft power is equivalent to the indirect way of achieving the desired results without tangible threats or rewards (Shamoli et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 150).

According to Nye, soft power is the ability to absorb, which leads to satisfaction. Soft war is a war of ideas. Regarding some experts such as Goldstein and Keohane, ideas are considered one of the guides of actors' strategic behaviour. According to them, ideas in conditions of uncertainty as one of the characteristics of the current strategic environment led actors to strategies carrying out the goals and achieving their interests. Thoughts can draw roadmaps for achieving utility for actors (Jalalpour et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 132). The material of soft war is neither force nor money, but investing in people's mentality and creating attractiveness to create shared values (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 155).

According to Sanders, soft warfare is a kind of cold war that ultimately leads to cultural transformation. From Fazio's point of view, soft warfare is a deliberate attempt to influence governments, groups, and peoples of different countries through propaganda, media, political, and psychological tools and methods to change attitudes, values and behaviours (Rezaei and Tajeri Nasab, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 37).

John Collins, a theorist at the American National War University, defines soft warfare as follows: "The designed use of propaganda and related tools to infiltrate the enemy's intellectual coordinates by methods that improve the national security goals of the executor" (Collins, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 487). Figure 1 shows the forms of soft warfare.



Source: Author's drawing with deformation by Jafarzadeh et al., 1393: 168.

In soft warfare, instead of explicitly and heavily investing in culture, the actor activates side areas such as economics, law, politics, trade, etc., and in this way, slowly enters his norms in the community (Eftekhari, 2012 AD/1391 SH; Khatibi, 1394: 74). Soft power refers to those capabilities of a country that indirectly affect the interests, behaviour, or

existence of other countries by using tools such as culture, ideals, or moral values (Maleki and Hatami, 2013 AD/1392 SH).

According to Supreme Leader, "What is now called the soft war in the world is that the enemy comes to the spiritual strongholds to destroy them. The enemy seeks the beliefs, knowledge, determination, foundations and pillars of a system or country to destroy them and turn their strengths into weaknesses in their propaganda. They try to turn the opportunities of a system into a threat" (Quoted by Soleimani and Maleki, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 65).

The most important statements of the Supreme Leader regarding soft war are: "War is the will and determination, policies and tactics; soft war means creating doubt in the hearts and minds of the people; it is warfare by today's advanced cultural tools and war by influence, lies and gossip. Soft war is the invasion of religious, ideological and cultural boundaries. It is a war to disappoint people from the struggle" (Eyvazi et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 30). In soft warfare, at least in the early stages of the war, there is no physical or brutal conflict. Soft war is a kind of cultural war. The tools of this war are cultural, intellectual, and behavioural and not military. Enemies in soft war seek to conquer the beliefs and values. The main goal of soft war is to capture hearts and brains; in this case, they have turned the opposite front into their front (Sharifi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 26).

It is best reflected in San Tzu's remarks in "The Art of War" book: "You can fight, but the most important thing is that you win a battle without a war." (Purkaveh Dehkordi and Salavatiyan, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 121)

According to Jane Sharp, director of the Albert Einstein Institute, soft warfare is an option used instead of complex, armed warfare to confront governments. In soft warfare, action must bring about social and political change. The most critical issue in the transition from idea to measure is choosing the appropriate mechanism or process to influence the attitudes and behaviours of rulers and people (Seif and Khojasteh, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 8). Soft warfare is a set of actions that seek to change people's cultural identity and behavioural patterns in any political system and seek a kind of domination in various dimensions (Amiri, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 22).

Thus, soft warfare consists of any psychological action and propaganda that, without military conflict and war, leaves the target group inactive and, by weakening its intellectual and cultural circles, seeks to destroy thought and the thinking of the target society and finally, the injection of instability and in the political and social system (Bigdelou, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 82).

In other words, soft war is a set of deliberate cultural, political and social measures and actions of countries that target the views, attitudes, motivations and values of the target audience, including governments, government affects foreign groups, groups and people. It causes a change

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in their individual and social character, behaviour, and actions (Elyasi, 2008 AD/1387 SH). In addition, Figure 2 lists the essential features of soft warfare.




Figure (2): The essential features of soft warfare

Source: Author's drawing with transformation by Ghazizadeh, 1390; Zabetpour and Qorbi, 1391:14.

Soft war has been the strategy of the dominating countries to destroy the beliefs, values and virtues of a nation. Contrary to the Cold War, it goes without the need for mobilisation and the provision of troops and soldiers to achieve its goal. To achieve this, the people of the target country use changing things, values and culture (Shahin, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 46). Soft warfare includes any psychological action and media propaganda that targets the questioned community or group and forces the opponent to passivity or defeat without military conflict and opening fire (Eyvazi et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 26). The main tools of this war are soft power, especially the power of persuasion and accompaniment of public opinion. It mainly tries to use modern communication tools, computer warfare, internet warfare, soft subversion, launching of radio and television networks, networking (Gandomgoon and Ganje, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 2) and psychological knowledge to create doubts in intellectual, ideological and cultural identities. The action scope of this thoughts war is the thoughts, ideas, social and cultural customs, feelings, inclinations, behaviours and intellectual characteristics, beliefs, values, interests and tendencies of the target community that the attacker plans to occupy. Finally, capturing the thoughts, minds and hearts of the target

country people occurs a change in structures (Khalili Dehdezi; Kiyani Ghale Sardi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 1). Soft warfare engineered the message. In other words, by producing and distributing honest news (white letters) that have the most negligible impact on public thoughts, behaviours and beliefs, they prepare a beautiful and deceptive platform for publishing and transmitting black messages. These messages are produced, disseminated and distributed, for a destructive effect. In this tricky process, the enemy makes the most of black literature and black (false) or grey messages (a combination of true and false statements) in the direction of its sinister goals (Ameri, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 43).




Figure (3): Soft War Message Engineering
Source: Ameri, 1395: 45.

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This war is not inside the fronts but the hous hearts and decision-making complexes. Therefore, the primary basis of soft war is based on a cultural and intellectual campaign and the context of culture as the cornerstone of any society or regarding the Supreme Leader, "The Soul of the Body of Society." It is also known as the systematised face of aggression and cultural ambush, which focuses on creating internal disruption and influencing the actors, structures, beliefs, and epistemological systems of Islamic society to weaken and eliminate the steely will of the nation. In this way, it attacks the faith, insight, morality and piety of the people and spreads various dangerous spiritual viruses (Jazayeri, 2011 AD/1390 SH; Sobhanifar, 2020 AD/1400 SH). To achieve this focuses on multiple components of problem-making and inducing despair and hopelessness, sowing the seeds of doubt and misunderstanding, creating doubt in the hearts and minds of people, highlighting internal and external differences, promoting corruption, the humiliation of the achievements of the Iranian system and capabilities, inducing inefficiency and instability in various fields and arenas to attract elites and disappoint them and replace Western culture, standards and values (Jazayeri, 2011 AD/1390 SH). In addition, Figure 4 reflects the goals of soft warfare.




Figure (4): Soft warfare targets
Source: Writers' Drawing, 1400.

Soft war has various economic, social, political and cultural dimensions and is very complex. Because it is the product of the elite mental processing and its measurement and diagnosis, regarding its non-objective and intangible nature, has many complexities (Rezaei and Tajeri Nasab, 2013 AD/1399 SH: 37). Soft warfare is a set of psychological and propaganda actions of the media invading the beliefs, values and beliefs of the people, which seeks a fundamental change in the cultural identity and behavioural patterns accepted by a political system. they seek a kind of domination in the three dimensions of government, economy and culture (Shamoli et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 150). With the advent of new technologies and communication sciences, the source of mass media and various new media, soft warfare has become more complex and widespread and has taken on different dimensions mentioned in the table.

Table 1: Dimensions of soft warfare

Dimension	Concept
Cultural	<p>It is considered the most crucial dimension of soft war, and cultural invasion is regarded as the prelude to quiet war.</p> <p>Because the perpetrators of soft war seek it through the mechanisms and methods of culture on the fundamental values of society (including God-centeredness, Vilayat-oriented, anti-enemy, justice-seeking, self-belief, etc.) and basic attitudes (such as attitudes toward foreigners, attitudes toward the type of government, attitudes toward the kind of social relations) have a devastating effect.</p>
Political	<p>In this dimension, the goal of the perpetrators of soft war is to manipulate the attitude, stance and action of the citizens of society against the government and its political institutions to incite them to protest movements such as marches, demonstrations, strikes and so on. In other words, to lead the citizens of the society to the opposition to gradually change the government's behaviour or even the type of government, and finally, challenge the legitimacy, acceptability and efficiency of the existing political model.</p>
Social	<p>One of the most critical components of the social dimension of soft warfare is the social actions of relationships and interactions, customs and collective behaviours. The goal of the</p>

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	perpetrators of soft war is a profound and destructive effect on the identity of the people of the society, social cohesion, national spirit, social capital, behavioural patterns and national attachment.
Economic al	In this regard, they use economic tools such as sanctions, confiscation of property, severing trade and non-trade relations, and severing monetary transactions by the planners of soft war and their allies to pressure the country.

Source: Lotfiyan Karim et al., 1400

1.2. Soft Warfare Officers

In his orders, the Supreme Leader referred to students as young officers in soft warfare and university professors and researchers as commanders and designers in fighting the enemies' soft war. He explicitly confirmed in the statements dated 1388/06/08:

"If in the social issues, political issues, country issues, things that need open-mindedness, our young student is a young officer, you who are his teacher, you are a higher rank of a young officer. You are a commander who has to look at the big issues." Among these, the critical role of professors is to enlighten them for students and transfer the appropriate perception of the current situation to their students (Shariati, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 2). Also, by training elites and advanced indigenous forces, playing the role of a civil institution and promoting the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, they can produce soft power for the country (Zabetpour and Ghorbi, 2011 AD/1390 SH). Soft warfare officers are young people who have the excitement of the youth and spend more time with mass media, satellite, Internet, computer games and entertainment such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, etc. (Mohammadi Najm, 2009 AD/1388 SH). The duties of soft warfare officers are significant for two reasons:

1) Global conditions in the age of the invasion of communications and information, the formation of a global village and community and economic inequalities and political inequalities;

2) The current situation of Iranian society as an influential political and cultural power in the West Asian region (Khatibi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 70).

Therefore, the role of soft warfare officers in the revolution second phase is vital, and they must act as determined, alert, motivated, hopeful, hard-working, thoughtful, brave and self-sacrificing human beings. From the Supreme Leader's point of view, if the officer would be bold, rational, kind, faithful, hopeful, determined and motivated, he can create a solid and inviolable barrier against the enemy's strategies in soft warfare. The analysis of the content of the Supreme Leader's words indicates that the

officers of the soft war should prevent the realisation of the enemy's goals in several main areas (Table 2).

Table (2): Duties of soft war officers

Component	Explanation
Reduce potential damage	Students' and professors' degrees of awakening and vigilance are directly related to the damage that enemies may inflict. In case of negligence, becoming emotional, acting recklessly and staying asleep, the wear and cost of the enemy's actions will increase.
Protection of scientific progress as an essential pillar of national security	In small and insignificant political cases, the university's atmosphere and the university's scientific work should not be affected, and the closure, convulsions and various disorders in the university should be prevented. In fact, by protecting the dynamism of the country's laboratories, classrooms and research centres, care must be taken to maintain the scientific movement of universities. Because in the long run, the enemy seeks to reduce the country's scientific potential and thus weaken its security.
Keep the university atmosphere calm and rational.	In cultural, political and security wars, the enemy's movements are not visible. Therefore, students and professors should be conscientious not to be the enemy in the puzzle of one hundred or two hundred pieces in their movement, stances, and comments. Because the enemy for perfection seeks to issue his word by academics.
Cultural work at the university	Artistic work at the university is an original and extracurricular work that focuses on acquainting minds with the culture of the revolution and the culture of Islam.
Avoid creating parallel lines.	Creating parallel lines means making a competitor for Basij. Prevention must be strictly avoided as this will cause soft warfare officers to neglect their primary objectives.
Increasing insight	Today, the most crucial task of the enemy is to anxiety in the country's political space through loud propaganda and its modern and highly advanced methods. In a way that with propaganda methods, creating controversy, by sending a lot of untrue words, they try to change and influence the atmosphere of societies. Soft warfare officers must discern the truth themselves, have insight into their surroundings, and make matters clear to the public.
Increasing religious knowledge	Through their familiarity with the Qur'an, the officers of the soft war, with the writings of the Martyr Motahari, and the great scholars of the seminaries in the present age must raise the amount of their knowledge.
Religious education method	The officer of soft war in the Islamic Republic of Iran relies on religiosity, innocence, purity and avoidance of instincts extremes. The structure of the identity and personality of the young Islamic is formed of loyalty, hope, cheerfulness, activism and initiative.
Declaration of the revolutionary position	Student organisations must have a physical, intellectual, and expressive presence in the country's main issues as both the friends and the enemies of the revolution should know the positions of the organisations on the critical issues of the country.
Decisiveness against encroachment, aggression and undermining national independence	Masters as commanders of soft warfare must, by their behaviour, statements, expression of opinion in various fields, method and character, the spirit of decisiveness against encroachment, aggression and undermining national independence in the young educated generation of the country, induce and inject and create. As successful commanders are ahead of the common element on the battlefield and the front lines, so must the master be present in the middle of this deep, vital, and sacred battle - what we call "Soft Warfare," which is a holy defence.

Source: Writers' Studies Based on Content Analysis of the Supreme Leader's Statements, 1400.

2. Research Method

The present study used the descriptive-analytical method with the development-application aim. The research approach is qualitative and uses the elites' opinions. Documentary-library and experimental methods have been used to collect research data. The consensus and priority index model has been used to analyse the data and information collected. There is no solid and explicit law on selecting and the number of specialists. Their number depends on the factors of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the sample, purpose or extent of the problem, quality of decision, the ability of the research team in study, internal and external validity, time gathering available data and resources is the scope of the problem and the

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acceptance of the answer. The number of participants is usually less than 50 people and most often 15 to 20 people, and inhomogeneous groups, it is usually 10 to 15 people. Therefore, the statistical sample size using the available sampling method, from 20 experts with non-random method of purposive sampling, includes university professors, researchers and experts related to the subject. The sample size includes faculty members, doctoral students, experts and research managers related to soft war and the second phase of the revolution. Criteria for selecting the sample size consists of the number of internal scientific-research articles associated with the soft war and the revolution second phase, the number of approved research or scientific projects conducted with the relevant field, the number of books (authored or translated) or review articles related to the appropriate area and resume with related institutions to the second phase of the revolution. To evaluate the internal consistency of the questionnaire questions, using the technique of measuring the reliability of Cronbach's alpha coefficient, which according to the value of this coefficient ($\alpha = 9.0$), the reliability of the questionnaire was confirmed. In the following, explain the method of consensus and priority model.

2.1. How to Calculate the Consensus Index (Agreement)

This indicator confirms the agreement of experts and thinkers on the components and indicators in question. To achieve this consensus was designed the following five options were. Completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, intermediate opinion. After collecting the data at this stage, the consensus index is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Number of replies to option A} \times 2 + \text{Number of responses to option B} \times 1 + \text{Number of responses to option C} \times (-1) + \text{Number of responses to option D} \times (-2) + \text{Number of responses to option E}$$

The total number of answers to options A to E

The proximity of the consensus index to zero indicates the votes dispersal to measure the desired dimension. The distance of the consensus index value from zero indicates the agreement on the subject. In this study, the value of the consensus index is shown on the vector "from +2 to -2" to determine the degree of consensus of experts fully.

2.2. How to Calculate the Priority Index

This index was used to prioritise each of the components and indicators of the model. At this stage, Delphi participating members were consulted to prioritise the elements and hands of the model by selecting one of the options, "High Priority, Medium Priority, Low priority." The priority index is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Number of responses to high priority option} \times 100 + \text{Number of responses to medium priority option} \times 50 + \text{Number of responses to low priority option} \times 25$$

Total number of replies

The proximity of the "Priority Index" to 100 indicates a higher priority of these topics. The tendency of the index score to zero means lower stress of the issues considered by experts.

3. The Role of Soft War Officers in Advancing the Goals of the Revolution Second Phase

The results of the interviews with the elites indicate the most crucial role of soft war officers in advancing the goals of the revolution second phase:

“Establishing a think tank to confront economic issues; establishing a think tank to produce soft power in the Islamic education; demanding from the authorities regarding the rejuvenation of the government; forming a think tank to organize cyberspace; developing soft war indicators; developing strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increase the value of the national currency, improve people's purchasing power; demanding from the authorities regarding justice; holding free-thinking chairs; developing creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities; Vilayat-accepting and defence of Vilayat; trying to recognize national identity and increase self-confidence; demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption; improving the business environment and the banking system; developing strategies to curb rising inflation in the country; establishing a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society; establishing a think tanks in universities with a focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism; developing budget deficit strategies; observing the promises of the officials and demanding from them; developing indicators of public trust; developing indicators of popular lifestyle, unassuming behaviour, avoiding aristocracy for the officials of the system; strengthen faith and unity; the relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution; introducing the characters of the first Tsar of the Islamic Awakening to the younger generation; creating a software movement; increasing the power of foreign media analysis; clarifying and removal of doubts; forming a young student organizations; gaining awareness and insight; promoting hope and optimism for the future in Islamic society; originalizing the study of science on cross-cutting political activities and finally confronting the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy”. Table 3 shows the elite consensus on the soft warfare officers' components in advancing the revolution's second-phase goals.

The results of the interview with the elite about the highest consensus are as follows:

“Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat (2 scores), the development of budget deficit strategies (1.98 scores), the formation of a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society (1.97 scores), demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption (1.96 scores), demanding from officials regarding expanding

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justice (1.95 scores), formulating strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increasing the value of the national currency, improving purchasing power people (1.94 scores), the establishment of a think tank confronting economic issues (1.93 scores), formulation of strategies to curb increasing inflation in the country (1.92 scores), promotion of hope and optimism for the future in the Islamic society (1.89 scores)), face the intrigues and conspiracies of the enemy (1.88 scores), improve the business environment and the banking system (1.86 scores), development of indicators of popular lifestyle, unassuming behaviour, avoidance of aristocracy for the officials of the system (1.85 scores), development of people's trust indicators (1.82 scores), strengthening of faith and unity (1.81 scores), creating a software movement (1.76 scores), formulating creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities (1.75 scores), holding free-thinking chairs (1.74 scores), demanding from the officials regarding the rejuvenation of the government (1.72 scores), monitoring the promises of the officials and demanding from them (1.69 scores), trying to recognize the national identity and increase self-confidence (1.68 scores), the establishment of think tanks in universities with the focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism (1.67 scores), increasing the power of foreign media analysis (1.62 scores), clarification and removal of doubts (1.57 scores), the relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution (1.52 scores), the introduction of the first tsar characters of the Islamic Awakening for the younger generation (1.43 scores), establishment of a think tank to produce soft power in the Islamic education (1.32 scores), development of soft war indicators (1.30 scores), formation of young student organizations (1.28 scores), formation a think tank for organizing cyberspace (1.25 scores), gaining knowledge and insight (1.25 scores) and authenticating the study of science on cross-sectional political activities (1.22 scores)".

Table (3): The amount of elite consensus on the components of the soft warfare officers' role in advancing the goals of the revolution second phase

Row	Component	Consensus
1	Establish a think tank to deal with economic issues	1.93
2	Establishment of a think tank to produce soft power in the field of Islamic education	1.32
3	Demanding from officials regarding government rejuvenation	1.72
4	Forming a think tank to organise cyberspace	1.25
5	Compilation of soft war indicators	1.30
6	Demanding justice from the authorities	1.95
7	Holding free-thinking seats	1.74
8	Develop creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities	1.75
9	Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat	2
10	Trying to recognise national identity and increase self-confidence	1.68
11	Strengthen faith and unity	1.81
12	The relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution	1.52
13	Introducing the characters of the first tsar of the Islamic	1.43
14	Awakening for the younger generation	1.76

15	Create software movement	1.62
16	Increase the power of foreign media analysis	1.57
17	Clarify and dispel doubts	1.28
18	Formation of young student organisations	1.25
19	Gain awareness and insight	1.89
20	Promoting hope and optimism for the future in Islamic society	1.22
21	Originalization of science education on cross-sectional political activities	1.88
22	Faced right with the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy	1.85
23	Compilation of indicators of popular lifestyle, unruly behaviour, avoidance of aristocracy for the officials of the system	1.82
24	Develop indicators of people's trust	1.69
25	Observing the promises of the officials and demanding from them	1.98
26	Develop budget deficit strategies	1.67
27	Formation of think tanks in universities with the focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism	1.97
28	Establishment of a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society	1.92
29	Develop strategies to curb rising inflation in the country Improving the business environment and the banking system	1.86
30	Demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption	1.96
31	Develop strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increase the value of the national currency, improve people's purchasing power	1.94

Source: Authors' Calculations, 1400.

In addition, in Table 4, based on the results of interviews with the elite, the highest priority, respectively, are as follows:

“Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat (100), formulation of strategies to improve the livelihood of the people, increase the value of the national currency, improve the purchasing power of the people (100), demanding from officials for justice (100), facing the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy (100), demanding from the officials regarding the rejuvenation of the government (100), formulating strategies to control the growing inflation in the country (97.48)), promoting hope and optimism for the future in the Islamic society (95.21), developing budget deficit strategies (94.12), demand from officials regarding anti-corruption (92.03), improving the business environment and the banking system (90.45), developing indicators of popular lifestyle, unpretentious behaviour, avoiding aristocracy for the officials of the system (88.10), forming a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society (85.71), establishing of a think tank confronting the economic issues (83.33), trying to recognize national identity and increase self-confidence (81.22), strengthening faith and unity (80/11), forming thinking room for organizing cyberspace (80.05), observing the promises of officials and demanding them (80.05), developing indicators of public trust (80.01), developing creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities (76.19), gaining knowledge and insight (76.19), compiling indicators of soft war (73.81), forming a think tank to produce soft power in the field of Islamic education (73.62), creating a software movement (72.15), clarification and elimination of doubts (71.13), increasing the power of foreign media analysis (71.02), forming think tanks in universities with a focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism (70.76), holding free-thinking seats (70.16), forming young

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student organizations (70.11), originalizing the study of science on cross-sectional political activities (67.86), the relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution (67.86) and introducing the characters of the first tsar of the Islamic Awakening to the younger generation (86.67)".

Table (4): Prioritizing the components of the soft war officers' role in advancing the goals of the revolution second phase

Row	Component	Priority
1	Establishing a think tank to deal with economic issues	83.33
2	Establishing a think tank to produce soft power in the field of Islamic education	73.62
3	Demanding from officials regarding government rejuvenation	100
4	Forming a think tank to organise cyberspace	80.05
5	Compilation of soft war indicators	73.81
6	Demanding justice from the authorities	100
7	Holding free-thinking seats	70.16
8	Developing creative and innovative strategies for the Islamization of universities	76.19
9	Vilayat-accepting and defence of the Vilayat	100
10	Trying to recognise national identity and increase self-confidence	81.22
11	Strengthening faith and unity	80.11
12	The relationship between the third generation and the first and second generations of the revolution	67.86
13	Introducing the characters of the first tsar of the Islamic Awakening for the younger generation	67.86
14	Creating software movement	72.15
15	Increasing the power of foreign media analysis	71.02
16	Clarifying and dispelling doubts	71.13
17	Formation of young student organisations	70.11
18	Gaining awareness and insight	76.19
19	Promoting hope and optimism for the future in Islamic society	95.21
20	Originalizing of science education on cross-sectional political activities	67.86
21	Facing right with the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy	100
22	Compilating of indicators of popular lifestyle, unruly behaviour, avoidance of aristocracy for the officials of the system	88.10
23	Developing indicators of people's trust	80.01
24	Observing the promises of the officials and demanding from them	80.05
25	Developing budget deficit strategies	94.12
26	Formating of think tanks in universities with the focus on anti-arrogance and anti-colonialism	70.76
27	Establishing a think tank to formulate operational strategies of the "We Can" discourse in society	85.71
28	Developing strategies to curb rising inflation in the country	97.48
29	Improving the business environment and the banking system	90.45
30	Demanding from officials regarding anti-corruption	92.03
31	Developing strategies to improve people's livelihoods, increase the value of the national currency, improve people's purchasing power	100

Source: Authors' calculations, 1400.

Conclusion

Soft warfare seeks territorial domination by managing public opinion and dominating the hearts of the elite and the masses. In this process, the enemy is not directly involved in occupying the land or destroying a country's critical facilities and points. Instead, it focuses on immaterial goals, namely, the thoughts and beliefs of the people and the destruction of spiritual strongholds, especially their faith and knowledge, because the occupation of the ideas and dedication of a nation is a prelude to the easy and lasting occupation of their land. Accordingly, soft warfare officers must neutralise the enemy's goals in soft warfare by accelerating the

scientific movement, progress and keeping alive the ideals and values of the revolution.

According to the research results, the highest consensus is related to indicators such as Vilayat-accepting, budget deficit, operationalisation of the "We Can" discourse, demands for anti-corruption and expanding justice, improving people's livelihoods, increasing the value of the national currency, improving the purchasing power of the people, curbing inflation, creating hope, recognising the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy, improving the business environment and the banking system, avoiding the aristocracy of the officials, building trust and strengthening the faith and unity of the people.

Their scores are between 2 to 1.80. The highest priority is given to components including Vilayat-accepting, people's livelihood, the value of the national currency, the purchasing power of the people, expanding justice, recognising the seditions and conspiracies of the enemy, rejuvenating the government, curbing inflation, promoting hope, deficit budget, anti-corruption, business environment and banking system. Their scores are between 100 and 90.

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Evaluating the Relationship between Hezbollah Lebanon's Discourse with the Islamic Revolution of Iran: A Critical Approach

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Abstract

The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 by the leadership of Imam Khomeini, the resulting discourse and its influence on the internal political and social structure, affected the Islamic world, the Middle East, and the Lebanese Shias. The rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon was a manifestation of the Islamic Revolution discourse on the Shia community regarding meaning and identity. With a critical approach, the present study aimed to answer the question 'How close and different has Hezbollah discourse with the Islamic Revolution discourse from view, structural and identity?'. The issue was analyzed using the theory of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse analysis and operationalized by explaining the positions of the movement, its leaders and the function of Hezbollah and comparing it with the political thought and works Imam Khomeini as the Islamic Revolution ideologue. It shows that the Islamic Revolution has been very influential in shaping Hezbollah's Islamic and revolutionary identity. Meanwhile, the sign of Shia political Islam is the central sign of the Islamic Revolution discourse, and the (Islamic) resistance is the primary sign of the Hezbollah speech. The result indicated similarities in most floating characters, namely Shia political Islam, belief in Velayat-e Faqih, justice-seeking, nationalism, independence, issuance of Revolution and revolutionary identity, and resistance (struggle against Israel and anti-Zionism, and anti-arrogance). However, there are some identity distinctions regarding the emphasizing Hezbollah on the Shia, Arab and Lebanese identity and the broad definition of some signs and, consequently, the attribution of some meanings to them, which should be considered from the pathology of future relations between Iran and Hezbollah. This issue regarding common counter-discourses such as Salafi-Takfiri, Liberal Democracy and the Akhavani is essential.

Keywords: Iranian Islamic Revolution Discourse, Lebanese Hezbollah Discourse, Discourse Analysis, Shia Political Islam, Resistance, Identity.

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Introduction

The victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, while affecting the internal political and social structure and system, also affected its environment. Many Western analysts have considered it. They referred to it as the reflection of the Islamic Revolution in the international system. The Islamic Revolution influenced other societies, governments, and non-state actors through its discourse. Therefore, understanding the Islamic Revolution discourse is vital. Because this Revolution, using values, concepts, and signs, tried to create a unique semantic system. So, while defining the revolutionary and Islamic identity for the political strategy derived from the Revolution, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran, it also affects many foreign actors.

Lebanon and the Shia community were prone to issuing the Revolution and accessibility regarding the favourable historical, religious and social contexts. By allocating the values and revolution teachings among the Lebanese Shias, Imam Khomeini and his Iranian revolutionaries provided the ground for the hegemony of elements and signs of this revolution discourse in the Lebanese Shia community. Meanwhile, the Israeli regime's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was an accelerating factor that unleashed the power and potential of the Shias following the Islamic Revolution, and with the leadership and support of Iran, Hezbollah of Lebanon emerged. A movement that was initially formed and gained the power to fight the Israeli occupation. Its victories over the regime and its Western allies in Lebanon, and its effects on other Islamic movements in Palestine, transformed Hezbollah from a mere military and guerrilla movement into a powerful actor and symbol of resistance in Lebanon and then in the Middle East. It was achieved by transferring the Islamic Revolution's discourse elements to Hezbollah and creating an Islamic and revolutionary identity and the continued Iranian support for Hezbollah during the 1980s and 2000s.

The manifestation of Hezbollah's victory was to force the Israeli regime to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 and accept defeat against the movement in the 33-day war in 2006. With the start of the crisis in Syria, Hezbollah, based on its discourse and identity elements, supported the Syrian political system and countered Salafi-Takfiri terrorism in the region. Some factors had an indirect effect on Hezbollah's position in Lebanon and the area:

“The ISIS crisis in Iraq, the Saudi military invasion of Yemen, the rise of Ansar Allah alongside the Islamic resistance movements’ victories in Palestine against the Zionist regime”.

Regarding the role of the Islamic Revolution in shaping the identity and discourse of Hezbollah, it is essential to study how the discourse of the Revolution affects Hezbollah, its discourse and identity, and the degree of convergence and difference between Hezbollah's discourses with the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, the central question is ‘How

close and different has Hezbollah to the discourse of the Islamic Revolution from the discursive view, structural and identity?'

To this aim, the theory of Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis was used. Therefore, while explaining this theory, the amount of convergence and differentiation of Hezbollah's discourse with the Islamic Revolution of Iran is compared. So, by analyzing the discourse, the points of intersection and difference of these two discourses by the leaders' positions and influential members of the two, their central and floating signs are examined.

1. Research Background

Moshirzadeh (2018 AD/1397 SH), in "From the Islamic Revolution Discourse to the Discourse of the Islamic Republic Foreign Policy" explained the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the formation of the Islamic Republic foreign policy from a discourse perspective. He expresses the manifestations of this matter in two general discourses, idealistic and pragmatic. Toriki and Sotoudeh Araei (2019 AD/1398 SH), in "Hezbollah as a Socio-political Movement" explain how Hezbollah transitions from an ideological force to a socio-political movement in Lebanon.

They believe that two elements of ideology and belief are essential. Dabiri Mehr (2013 AD/1392 SH), in his book "Cultural Components of Islamic Resistance Discourse in the Middle East" uses discourse theory to study the cultural components of the discourse of resistance against rival speech. The two main currents opposed to this discourse are Salafi fundamentalism and American-centered liberal imperialism. Akbarzadeh (2016), in the English article "Why Does Iran Need Hezbollah?" considered the influence of the Iranian revolution ideology and a particular version of Shia Islam on the strategic ties between Iran and Hezbollah. Azani (2009), in his book "Hezbollah:

A Narrative of God party" considers the Hezbollah appearance in the 1980s as a result of the Islamic Revolution reflections and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Deeb (1988), in "Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Constituent Ideology, the Social Foundation and Ties with Iran and Syria" analyze the Amal and Hezbollah Shia movements formation in Lebanon, their ideology and social foundations and relations with Iran and Syria in the 1980s.

Regarding Hezbollah, he also pointed to the organizational structure of this movement. He paid attention to the influence of this actor on Imam Khomeini's political thought and his belief in Velayat-e Faqih. According to the Persian and English works, we can say that none of these works from the discourse analysis and with a critical approach to explain the differences and similarities between Hezbollah's discourse and the discourse of the Islamic Revolution. The contrast of the present study with the previous research is that it does not pay to the similarities between the speech, identity and norms of Hezbollah with the Islamic

Revolution discourse and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Instead, it considers this issue from a critical and pathological point of view.

2. Theoretical Framework: Laclau and Mouffe Discourse Analysis

According to Laclau and Mouffe, must include every action and phenomenon to be meaningful and understandable in the discursive system (Haghighat and Hosseinizadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 106-114). According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, discourse is a set of signs, and articulation is a process by which the symbols fuse and create a semantic system (Soltani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 153-155). In this theory, the concepts of signifier and signified have great importance. Signifiers are fundamental ideas, phrases, and symbols with different meanings in different discourses. Signifieds are a definition and an example that a signifier indicates. In other words, the signified is a sign that, when seen, the desired signifier enters the human mind. Among the signifiers, the symbol or concept that is the pillar of other symptoms is called the central signifier. As the central core of discourse, this signifier keeps other signs in their realm of semantic attraction. A floating signifier is also a sign whose meaning is floating and unstable, has several signified and different discourses try to give sense to it and compete with each other to attribute questioned signified (Kasraei and Poozesh Shirazi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 243-244).

Another concept in Laclau and Mouffe's theory is opposition. According to these thinkers, identity has not always been discursive and established. Opposition shapes identity, and each identity is created in reaction and confrontation with the other. Therefore, discourse identification requires conflict with another (or discourses) (Nozari and Karimi, 2012 AD/1391 SH, 62-63).

Identities and discourses are shaken regarding the hostility and dependence on the "Other." "Other" on the one hand, provides the conditions for the possibility and creating identity and, on the other hand, threatens it and exposes it to destruction (Haghighat and Hosseinizadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 106-114).

In Laclau and Mouffe's theory, identity, subject and discourse are formed through the confrontation between inside and outside and the enemy and the other, and otherness and otherness-making (Soltani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 156-162).

Laclau calls the attempt of political projects to consolidate certain discourses the hegemony acts. Hegemonic actions aim to create or stabilize the semantic system with hegemonic formulation (Haghighat and Hosseinizadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 114-106).

Discourse becomes a hegemonic discourse when it can reach relative stability, consolidate its semantic system, gain consensus and persuasion, and be accepted by agents and subjects. Conclusion and meaning become hegemony of a discourse, highlighting the desired signifiers and their

semantic system and marginalizing rival discourses' signifiers and semantic systems (Moghaddami, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 101 and 93-94).

A discourse is hegemonic when relying on its central signifier brings its intended signifieds closer to its discourse signifiers. In other words, it establishes its desired semantic system in the collective social mentality, even temporarily, and attracts public satisfaction. According to Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony is set when a particular signifier approaches its signified, and they agree with the meaning of that sign. Deconstruction occurs, confronting the hegemony, so the signifier is separated from the signified and the hegemony is destroyed. It happens when rival discourse can, with the help of various mechanisms, undermine the semantic system of the dominant discourse and disrupt the semantic structures formed in the collective mentality of the people. It occurs when this discourse loses its hegemony. Therefore, the success of actors and political groups depends on their ability to produce meaning (Soltani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 155-160).

In deconstruction, signifiers are redefined and find a new meaning. It is done by separating the signified from its signifier and assigning another signified. The investigation aims to destroy the stability of a sign's definition and break the hegemony of the opposite discourse (Kasraei and Poozesh Shirazi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 351).

3. A Study of Distance and Proximity Amount (Convergence, Differentiation and Distinction) of Hezbollah Lebanon's Discourse with the Islamic Revolution of Iran

In the Islamic Revolution discourse, the central signifier is Shia political Islam. Floating signifiers are:

“Independence-seeking, justice-seeking, Islamic resistance (opposition and struggle against Zionism and anti-arrogance), revolution issuance (revolutionary identity), nation-oriented and belief in Velayat-e Faqih”.

In Hezbollah's discourse, the resistance signifier is the central signifier. Because Hezbollah resulted from the resistance against Israel, other signifiers above, including the signifier of Shia political Islam, are floating signs. Each of these discourses has been articulated with its central and floating signifiers by their meanings. Despite the many discourse similarities between the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah and the similarities in a signifier and conceptual element, Hezbollah's attitude differs from the revolution discourse. The present study will not explain all the signifiers, points and aspects of the two discourses of the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah. Instead, we want to address and emphasize the familiar and different signifiers and elements of these two discourses that have influenced their identity, distance and closeness to each other.

The similarity and convergence mean how close or similar the components of Hezbollah's speech are to the Islamic Revolution. Although the two discourses of the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah in Lebanon are very close to each other, even Hezbollah's discourse is a

sub-discourse in the general discourse of the Islamic Revolution, in terms of discourse analysis, and they are in contrast in some signifiers. It needs attention to the difference and non-alienation of the two discourses to each other. In other words, in addition to signifiers' commonalities, there are some discourse differences between the two discourses addressed during the discussion.

3.1. Believe in Shia Political Islam

Shia political Islam and Shia politically mean that it believes in religion and Sharia in political and social affairs during the absence, based on Shia faith. Hence, political-Shia Islam seeks the formation of an Islamic government. There are several main characteristics of the revolutionary Shia jurisprudential Islam, represented by Imam Khomeini:

“Absolute jurisprudence of the jurists (meaning the rule of provincial rule based on expediency, which takes precedence over the primary and secondary rules), Revolution and violent methods (such as Jihad) to overthrow the cruel system (internally and externally, i.e. the international strategy), and the rejection of the colonial aspect and ideas of the West (i.e., confronting the political-military and cultural domination of the West)” (Haghighat and Jeddi, 2013 AD/1392 SH).

Acceptance of the religious authority and Islamic law in political and social affairs is one of the common denominators of the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah discourse. More precisely, Hezbollah has taken this component of its identity from the speech of the Revolution and Imam Khomeini.

In official documents published by Hezbollah, we can see the movement's belief in Imam Khomeini's Shia political Islam and this part of the Islamic Revolution's discourse. Hezbollah's official views on the belief in Shia political Islam were in an open letter published by the movement in 1985. In this letter, Hezbollah, which while announcing its existence, identity, strategy and ideological program for the first time, explained its belief in Shia political Islam:

“At the same time, we emphasize our belief in the life-giving religion of Islam as an idea, political system, thought and government. We invite everyone to know Islam and accept its sovereignty and commitment to carry out its orders and rulings at the individual, social and political levels. We demand an Islamic system based on free and direct choice by the people” (Asadollahi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 200).

Shia political Islam was accepted as an ideology by Hezbollah because it contrasts with Sunni political Islam, especially its fundamentalist form, in terms of discourse and denationalization of identity. But this has not distanced Hezbollah from Islamic resistance movements in Palestine. In other words, Hezbollah, in line with the Islamic Revolution discourse and the signifier of Islamic resistance and support for the Palestinian ideal, has accepted and supported Sunni political Islamist movements (such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) even

endorsed them. It is also essential to unity Ummah creation signifier and Islamic unity.

The Islamic Revolution discourse affected Hezbollah's movement (and derived from Shia political Islam), and this Revolution also inspired the culture of Hezbollah slogans. Also, the name of Hezbollah, derived from verse 22 Surah "al-Mujadilah" "أَلَا فَإِنَّ حِزْبَ اللَّهِ هُمُ الْغَالِبُونَ" and verse 56 Surah "al-Maedah," "وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا فَإِنَّ حِزْبَ اللَّهِ هُمُ الْغَالِبُونَ." It is a discourse derived from the political culture of Iran after the Revolution. Therefore, in the discourse of Hezbollah, Muslims and other weak nations of the world are called oppressed, and the United States of America is referred to as global arrogance (Asadollahi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 184-185).

The Islamic Revolution discourse and Shia political Islam has also influenced Hezbollah's political and organizational culture. The committed and revolutionary clergy had a unique role in the political action and the pillars and activities of Hezbollah. Many Lebanese clerics were acquainted with Imam Khomeini's political-religious thought in Najaf before the Islamic Revolution and were drawn to political issues after the victory of the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, inspired by the Revolution it and influenced by Imam Khomeini's views. While establishing Hezbollah, they became the head of this movement (Javan and Khosroshiri, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 120).

Hezbollah's numerous successes at the national and regional levels during the time of the Secretary-General of a cleric named Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah demonstrate the objective and successful adoption of this model and discourse of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Other manifestations of Hezbollah's acceptance of this model is in the presence of clerics in Hezbollah's structure, such as Sheikh Naeem Qasim, Deputy Secretary-General, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, Head of the Political Bureau, Sheikh Mohammad Yazbak, Member of Hezbollah's Central Council and chairman of the movement, Ayatollah Khamenei's jurisprudential (religious) lawyer in Lebanon and in charge of collecting his sharia funds from the imitators, and Sayyid Hashem Safi al-din, the head of Hezbollah's executive council.

3.2. Belief in Velayat-e Faqih and Following It

Since its inception, acceptance of the Velayat-e Faqih and belief in it have been a central element of Hezbollah's discourse. It is evident from the performance of Hezbollah's central nuclei, from allegiance to Imam Khomeini in the 1980s to the movement's open letter in 1985, which is considered its manifesto. In this letter, regarding the identity of Hezbollah and its relationship with the Supreme Leader, is stated:

"We, the children of the Hezbollah ummah in Lebanon, declare our commitment to the orders of the one, wise and just leadership of Valy-e Faqih, who is currently embodied in the person of the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini" (Asadollahi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 199-200).

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The importance of Hezbollah's belief and the full acceptance of the theory of Velayat-e Faqih and the leadership of Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei was the essential link between Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran (and at the more significant level of the Islamic Revolution discourse). Because since the establishment of this movement in 1982 until now, Velayat-e Faqih and its role have been one of the fundamental and inseparable pillars of Hezbollah's intellectual and practical foundations (Javan and Khosroshiri, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 118).

It separates Hezbollah apart from other Islamist groups in the Arab world. This feature has dominated all of Hezbollah's organizational pillars and views. It has been one of the main reasons for the merger of the Lebanese Shia community in 1982 and the creation of Hezbollah (Asadollahi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 174).

Therefore, there is a unique closeness between the Islamic Revolution discourses and Hezbollah in Lebanon from the position of Velayat-e Faqih. This subject is one of the differences between Hezbollah's discourse and Palestinian militant Islamist movements such as Hamas. In other words, by emphasizing this element, Hezbollah creates alienation between itself and the militant Palestinian Sunni movements, especially Hamas, and consolidates its identity accordingly. Prominent members of Hezbollah and Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah have emphasized the belief in Velayat-e Faqih on various occasions and forms.

Sheikh Naeem Qasim, Hezbollah's deputy secretary-general, explains Hezbollah believes in the supreme leader. There is no connection between the top leader's nationality, influence, and authority as a religious leader. Naeem Qasim referred to Imam Khomeini as the "Muslims Leader" who, while managing the Islamic State of Iran, defined the political duties of all Muslims in other countries in various fields. According to him, after Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei has the same powers and position. While emphasizing the acceptance of Hezbollah's directorate and command of the Supreme Leader, Naeem Qasim believes that the Secretary-General of Hezbollah and its other pillars gain their legitimacy from the Velayat-e Faqih (Qasim, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 80-82).

There are some differences and distinctions, apart from the above similarities in the signifier of Velayat-e Faqih, the view and approach of the revolution discourse and the Iranian system from Islam and Velayat-e Faqih with the Hezbollah idea. For example, while Imam Khomeini emphasized Islam rather than Shia Islam or Iranian and Arabic Islam, some statements by Hezbollah leaders differ. We can refer to the speech of Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah in November 2010 AD/Aban 1389 SH, which was published on the Al-Manar website belonging to Hezbollah, emphasizing the duality of the Arab-Persian discourse and stating:

"Maybe it means Iran, but there is no such thing as Persianization or Persian civilization in Iran today. What is in Iran is Islamic civilization. Iran has the religion of Mohammad Arab Hashemi Maki Qurayshi

Tahami Mazri [refers to the Arab lineage and ancestors of the Prophet of Islam]. The founder of the Islamic Republic was Arab, and he is the son of the Prophet Muhammad; peace be upon him and his family. Today, the leader in the Islamic Republic is Imam Sayyid Khamenei Qureishi Hashemi, the son of the Prophet of God and the son of Ali ibn Abi Talib and Fatemeh Zahra, who were Arabs” (Nasrollah, 2010).

Enumeration of characteristics such as Qurayshi, Arabic affiliations for Valy-e Faqih and otherness-making of Islamic civilization versus Persian civilization, Arab versus Persian and Arabic identity versus Persian identity and emphasis on ethnic, linguistic and primarily Arabic elements in the field of religion and the characteristics of Velayat-e Faqih are different and contradictory with the discourse of Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. Imam Khomeini did not emphasize the nationality of Valy-e Faqih in his book Velayat-e-Faqih, and other speeches and positions. According to him, being a scholar and fair is necessary. Simultaneously, he was opposed to any racial and ethnic view of Islam and religion. He believed this view is reactionary and considered the dual perspective of Arabs and non-Arabs ugly; he emphasized the importance of divine holiness among the people. He says: “إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ اتِّقَاكُمْ” it means no difference between Arab and Persian, Arab and non-Arab, Islam is a point of reliance. Racism is a reaction” (Khomeini, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 19).

According to the revolution discourse, Imam Khomeini emphasized the necessity of "Leaving ethnic and ignorant dogmatism in favour of the world colonialists and their dependents." (Khomeini, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 37). Therefore, the emphasis on Arab identity, mild pan-Arabism, and the excessive focus on Shia identity by Hezbollah is not in line with the Islamic Revolution discourse.

3.3. Justice-seeking, Revolution Issuance (Revolutionary Identity) and Establishing a United Islamic Nation

Justice-seeking, one of the fundamental pillars of the Islamic Revolution's discourse, has been determining role in shaping the Islamic identity of Iran and has shaped the identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a justice-seeking state. It is reflected in support of justice-seeking movements and the oppressed of the world (Moshirzadeh, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 22-23).

According to the norms of the Shia religion, the unit of analysis is the Islamic Ummah and not the national government. As one of the norms emphasized by the Shia faith, justice-seeking has obligated the Islamic Republic of Iran to support the Muslims and the oppressed of the world, particularly the Hezbollah movement (Yaghouti, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 22).

Because in the Islamic Revolution discourse, the international system is not composed of national units, but in terms of faith, the world is divided into two realms, Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam, or arrogance and oppression. From this point of view, the existing international system does not have the necessary religious legitimacy. It is the result of

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historical changes in which Western powers have played a significant role; because it contradicts the idea of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr. From this perspective, they should make continuous efforts to create a united Islamic nation in the future and at the world system concerning the spread of Islam (Moshirzadeh, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 21-22).

Accordingly, Iran's support for Hezbollah aligns with the Islamic Revolution discourse. It is consistent with signifiers such as justice-seeking, nation-oriented, confronting arrogance, and supporting the oppressed. The revolution issuance is the signifiers of the Islamic Revolution discourse, which Imam Khomeini has emphasized in his speech. In emphasizing revolutionary identity and exporting the Revolution, he states: "We end the domination, and oppression of the repressor by issuance our revolution, which is the export of true Islam and the expression of the Muhammad commands (PBUH)." (Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 20/345)

He states in another position: "We export our revolution to the whole world, because our revolution is Islamic and until the slogan of

" لا اله الا الله و محمد رسول الله " do not spread all over the world remain the struggle, and as long as there is a struggle against the arrogant everywhere in the world, we are." (Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 12/147-148)

Accordingly, the Imam speaks of the duality of oppression and justice in the revolution discourse, true Islam, pure Muhammadan Islam versus American Islam. He calls the Islamic otherness-making and anti-arrogance of the Revolution, Jihad and martyrdom-seeking in the revolution issuance against inaction, passivity and compromise. Many analysts consider the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon as one of the most significant and most successful manifestations of the strategy of revolution issuance. In the early 1980s, Hezbollah's revolutionary model turned the Lebanese Shia peaceful protest model into a radicalized movement, which eventually led to the growing power of the Shia community in Lebanon (Harzan, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 251).

The impact of this Revolution on the Lebanese Shia has been in the form of creating religious self-awareness, increasing socio-political and military mobilization. It was because the Islamic Revolution discourse of Iran, by its very nature, had a revolutionary and justice-seeking identity. It tried to expand this identity in line with the principle and rule of issuing the Revolution. From another perspective, this discourse sought to attract the Lebanese Shias, who had been in contact with Iran and its Shias for centuries.

Creating the necessary consensus and persuasion led to the acceptance of its semantic system and strengthened its signifiers, including revolutionary identity. Therefore, regarding its radical nature, the Islamic Revolution had different content effects and thought types, behaviour, and action of the Lebanese Shias. The result was creating a revolutionary identity in the formation of Hezbollah's anti-Zionist and anti-arrogance

movement. From this perspective, there is a lot of closeness and similarity between the Islamic Revolution discourse and Hezbollah.

Therefore, the revolutionary identity of Hezbollah is placed under the revolutionary essence of the Islamic Revolution discourse. The Islamic Revolution discourse and its Shiism ideology provided and strengthened the Lebanese Shias. The Shia romantic elements to which the Iranian clergy - and later the Iranian political system - granted them social and political protest ideology (The Essence of Confrontation With Shia oppression and Justice-seeking that Culminated in the Uprising of Imam Hussein (AS) in Karbala) (Alagha, 2011: 19).

Hezbollah promoted the position of the Shias in Lebanon and confronted the oppression that these Shias had endured for years in numerous Israeli military aggressions aligned with justice-seeking. In addition, Hezbollah, in alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, has acted to achieve these justice-seeking ideals at the national and even international levels. Its objective manifestation has been its presence in Syria to counter Salafi-Takfiri terrorism and support resistance movements in the region.

That is, Hezbollah, following the Islamic Revolution discourse, pursues justice-seeking in its broadest sense with a strategic view. They aimed to create justice at the national, regional and international levels by confronting the hegemonic-seeking plans of the United States, Israel and its allies. This issue is in line with the discourse of the Islamic Revolution.

The similarity of the Hezbollah logo with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps logo as a symbol of the revolutionary identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows the influence of the Islamic Revolution discourse. From a discursive point of view, it indicates the closeness of these two discourses and Hezbollah's adherence to the revolution discourse. Of course, this indirectly shows the unique role of the Revolutionary Guards in the creation and empowerment of Hezbollah.

This similarity is significant because, according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Revolutionary Guards should defend the values of the Islamic Revolution at the national and transnational levels. Regarding the similarities between the Ansarullah Yemeni logo as a united movement of Iran, which was created after Hezbollah (in the 1990s) with the symbols of the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to figure 1-1, it shows their discourse elements and signifiers.



Figure 1-1: Similarity between the Logos of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansarullah in Yemen and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

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Regarding the discursive difference, Hezbollah has accepted the independence-seeking discourse of the Islamic Revolution, but objectively, it relies on the support of Iran. Iran support from Hezbollah has been emphasized by its leaders. For example, Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah states in this regard: "We say out loud and clear that we receive material and financial support from the Islamic Republic and we are proud to have this kind of support. The Islamic Republic is also proud to support this resistance [Hezbollah] and the resistance movements." (Nasrollah, 2015).

Based on a strategic view, we cannot criticize Hezbollah. Because of Lebanon's unique social and political conditions, which since the creation of all the Sunni and Maronite tribes have enjoyed foreign support, have imposed the lack of autonomy on the Shia Hezbollah like other tribes. Hezbollah is also a minority in the Arab world regarding its kinetic nature, logistical, military, financial, and ideological affiliations with the Islamic Revolution and the revolution discourse (the most important of which is the acceptance of Shia political Islam and Velayat-e Faqih) is dependent on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its supporters. In other words, Hezbollah is a discourse derived from the Islamic Revolution, but from this perspective, a distinction has been made between the discourses of the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's lack of speech confronting Iran has impacted the positions and policies of Hezbollah and its leaders regarding Israel, the United States, the West, Arab rulers, the crises in Syria and Iraq and Yemen, and other regional issues. It has made Hezbollah a follower of the Islamic Republic in the region. As evidenced by its military presence in Syria and its support for its government as an ally of Iran and Hezbollah. That is, a strategic move to preserve Syria as a bridge between Hezbollah and Iran. As a result, Hezbollah does not have absolute autonomy, but at the same time, it is not dependent on Iran.

Regarding the revolution issuance, despite the cultural nature of the Islamic Revolution had a cultural identity. Still, the action of Hezbollah was based on militaristic actions and mainly indicated the military export of the Revolution and not necessarily its cultural export. These actions have been after increasing their national and regional role (since 2010), their efforts against the Zionist regime, cooperation with the Palestinian resistance movements, military presence in Syria, and cooperation with other Shia non-governmental allies of Iran, show the emphasis on Guerrilla and military identity, the strengthening of allied military networks and the export of the Revolution. Based on strategic view, these measures have been in the interests and national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies. But from a discursive perspective, this does not deny the discursive conflict between Hezbollah and the Revolution, at least from the signifier of the revolution issuance. In other

words, this part of Hezbollah's actions is not in line with Imam Khomeini's view and emphasis on the cultural export of the Revolution.

From another perspective, Iran, through Hezbollah, has sought to export this movement model to various Shia areas such as Iraq and Yemen - and even Sunnis such as Palestine and in recent years Syria - in the Middle East. These actions have had more military networking than a cultural dimension. It is regarded as a challenge for Hezbollah and Iran. Because this type of networking is faster than cultural export, it does not have the necessary stability. The cultural export of the Revolution is time-consuming but was more permanent. Instead, the military export of the Revolution in the short term will not have the necessary stability and durability.

While supporting the establishment of a united nation in its discourse (including in the 1985 statement), Hezbollah makes little difference with the Revolution speech regarding reading and signifying this signifier.

It concerns the emphasis on the Arab identity and the Arab ummah alongside the Islamic identity, which contrasts to the Islamic Revolution discourse, which emphasizes the Islamic identity and not national or Persian. In addition to confronting the Zionist regime, this movement has emphasized Arab unity, nations, and the Arab nation. Some of Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah's positions are analyzed in this regard. For example, his remarks in response to the UAE government's peace agreement with the Israeli regime in 2020:

“I say to the oppressed and affected people of Palestine and to the Arab and Islamic people who are still at the heart of the problem on behalf of the resistance movements that we are angry in our hearts, and we deny this evil in our hearts. ‘Where is the Arab consensus and departure from the Arab agreement?’ ‘Where is this Arab consensus, which has left the United Arab Emirates alone?’ ‘Where is the Arab peace plan?’ ‘Is there still an Arab route or table and a peace plan?’

‘Is there an Arab League or an official Arab organization in the first place?’ We do not want to say that there are still Arabs because they are not Arabs, the Arabs are another people. ‘Is there still an Arab path or table and a peace plan?’ ‘Is there an Arab League or an official Arab organization in the first place?’ Basically, if the masks are removed, the natural face of some Arab rulers will be revealed” (Nasrollah, 2020).

Nasrollah has tried to draw his own and others borders, while emphasizing the identity of resistance and anti-arrogance and anti-Americanism of the Hezbollah movement by otherness-making and emphasizing the Arab-non-Arab duality, i.e. foreign otherness-making, and internal among Arabs, describe the Arab rulers as a traitor to Islam and sanctities, a servant and dependent on the United States. At the same time, he emphasizes the Arab people issues and his Arab and anti-Zionist identity as a defender of Palestine and the Arab and Islamic peoples.

3.4. Islamic Resistance (anti-Arrogance, Struggle against Israel and anti-Zionism)

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In the Islamic Revolution discourse and based on the jurisprudential view and the rule of Nafy-e Sabil, the domination of infidels over Muslims has been vehemently denied. Hence, the Israeli regime is a symbol of the authority of the values and colonial tendencies of the West. Therefore, any compromise and cooperation are rejected with Israel (Yaghouti, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 22). In this regard, Imam Khomeini emphasizes the Qur'anic verse, " لن يجعل الله للكافرين على المسلمين سبيلاً " (Khomeini, 1999 AD/1387 SH: 4/317).

The resistance signifier, as the element of the revolution discourse, is semantically related to other signifiers such as being revolutionary, independence (which is necessary to maintain and promote that resistance) and the continuation of the struggle (to save the worlds oppressed) (Moshirzadeh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 54). This signifier has two elements of anti-arrogance and anti-Israel and struggles against it. Those elements form the resistance identity of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran system.

Imam Khomeini in explaining the resistance position, anti-arrogance, struggle against Israel and Zionism and revisionism, the issuance of the Revolution and the principle of invitation and justice-seeking, as the signifiers of the revolutionary discourse that have formed the Islamic and revolutionary identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah, says:

"We have repeatedly stated this fact in our foreign and international Islamic policy that we seek to expand the influence of Islam in the world and reduce the domination of the cruel. Now, if the American servants call this policy expansionism and the idea of forming a great empire, we are not afraid and welcome it. We seek to dry up the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and communism in the world. With the grace and care of God Almighty, we have decided to destroy the systems based on these three pillars and promote the Islamic system of the Prophet (PBUH) in the arrogant world (Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 21/81).

According to Imam Khomeini's speech, we can analyze the expansion of the resistance area-based align with the revolution discourse, the development of the Islam influence in the world and the Revolution issuance from a cultural rather than a military perspective.

In the Islamic Revolution discourse, the non-recognition of Israel and the non-normalization of relations with the United States are considered defining pillars of identity. The United States and Israel are two "Other" enemies in this discourse. Transnational selves are Palestine and its supporting actors (such as Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ansar Allah, Iran's allied Shia militias in Iraq). They constitute Iran's primary collective selves and are essential for regional and international coalitions (Moshirzadeh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 58).

Hezbollah's intellectual connection to Iran, through its belief in and adherence to Velayat-e Faqih, leads to Hezbollah's ideological stance on

many important regional and international issues (derived from the Islamic Revolution discourse).

The nature of Hezbollah's conflict with Israel has been influential, relationships with other Muslims, and attitudes toward the Western world. Therefore, Hezbollah believes in world division into arrogant and oppressed and considers the United States the great devil. It assumes that American policy in the Middle East is an instrument of Israel and is the leader of state terrorism in the world (Hajjar, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 222-227).

Hezbollah blames the United States for all the Middle East's suffering and considers it the most significant enemy of the Islamic world. Hence, anti-American symbols are so visible in Hezbollah's public ceremonies. This discourse is also seen in Hezbollah media, including Al-Manar TV, followed by broadcasting short films between programs with slogans of struggle-seeking and resistance against the repression of Zionism and the United States (Fakt, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 296-297).

So, in its discourse, Hezbollah, in line with the Revolution, considers the United States, Israel, and the West as its "Other." Therefore, it defines relations with other governmental and non-governmental actors based on distance and closeness to these others.

The manifestation of the conceptual elements of Imam Khomeini's political Islam in Hezbollah's behaviour and identity is in accepting the Islamic Revolution's discourse in foreign interactions and trying to revive political Islam and fight the United States, as well as Israel as the main restraining force of political Islam in the region.

The struggle against Israel, as the leading cause of the intellectual war between Western liberalism and political Islam, is an attempt to preserve and perpetuate the kind of political Islam that this regime seeks to destroy. Hence, Hezbollah's conflict with Israel has a positive dimension alongside a negative one; from a positive point of view, it is a basic necessity to strengthen the identity and achieve the goals of Hezbollah (Dehghani Firouzabadi and Vahabpour, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 223-225).

Align with the Revolution discourse, Hezbollah has emphasized the rejection of the unjust Western system that rules the world - and established in Lebanon - and has called for the deconstruction of this order. To explain Hezbollah's destructive attitude towards the international system, Hezbollah's open letter in 1985 is crucial, which states the movement's view of international organizations:

“We fight to eradicate denial and believe that the root of all rejection in the world is America. So, any conspiracy to force us to take marginal action compared to confronting the United States will not work. We emphasize that these organizations have lost their effectiveness regarding the dominance of global arrogance over the adoption or rejection of resolutions” (Asadollahi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 194-214).

Imam Khomeini considers the issue of Zionism danger for Islam and Muslims beyond national and regional borders and (with an ummah-

centred view) speaks of the vital importance of the conflict with Israel. He knows this struggle not only as a Palestinian or Arab issue but as an Islamic issue that all Muslims are responsible for and emphasizes the necessity to confront Israel as a threat to the Muslim ummah, even with the sacrifice of life. Thus, the practical concept of Imam Khomeini's positions for Muslims - including Hezbollah - is that all ways are closed to Israel, and the only solution is to resist using all means, methods and facilities. In this way, must confront any action to justify the existence of Israel and its legitimacy. Finally, it should be destroyed by adopting (strategy) of ground-making resistance (Center of Bahith lil-Dirasat, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 208-209).

Hence, this discourse is opposed to the speech of compromise with Israel. According to the discourse distinction, Hezbollah, contrary to Iran's broad view of the issue and the axis of authority, the axis of resistance means most Arab actors aligned with Iran in the Fertile Crescent and much fewer issues of non-Arab Shias and beyond the Arab Middle East. At the same time, consider the issues of Muslims and Shias, who are aligned with the axis of resistance and support them against Israel if necessary.

In 2017, for example, Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah responded to Israeli threats against Hezbollah. He warned Israel that in any future Israeli regime war with Lebanon, Syria or Gaza, "Tens of thousands and possibly hundreds of thousands of Jihadist auxiliary forces from Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but from all over the Arab and Islamic world" will enter the struggle (Radio Farda, 2017). So, Hezbollah is divisive and demarcating itself between Muslims and Shias. In other words, Shias and Muslims are considered supporters of Hezbollah and its allies, insiders and others. Of course, these remarks also indirectly emphasize the Arabic identity of Hezbollah.

4. Analysis

By examining the signifiers and elements of Hezbollah's discourse and comparing it with the Islamic Revolution, as shown in Table 1, we can see the convergence and difference or distance and proximity of Hezbollah's identity and discourse with the Islamic Revolution.

Table 1. The convergence, difference, distance and proximity of Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Islamic Revolution of Iran discourse regarding the discursive, identity and structure

Convergence/difference	Islamic Revolution/Islamic Republic of Iran	Convergence (proximity)/ Hezbollah	Difference (distance)/ Hezbollah
The nature, type of discourse and scope of coverage/mission	Cultural/Government, Global Discourse National and global	Cultural	The nature of the movement and guerilla and paramilitary group Guerrilla-national-regional discourse
Ideology	Political Shia Islam	Political Shia Islam	
Issuance of Revolution (type of publication and expansion)	Cultural	cultural	Cultural and military / with the support of Iran
The extent of independence	With political-military independence (independence to the West and the East) and autonomy		- Relying on and dependent on Iran's political-military and financial support - Lack of political, military and ideological autonomy from Iran
anti-Arrogance	anti-Arrogance (with emphasis on some Western countries such as the United States, Britain, France, Germany) Using all instruments (political, military, economic, cultural, media) to confront the United States		Emphasizing on America as a manifestation of arrogance - Using military, cultural and political tools to confront arrogance and the United States
Justice-seeking	A Fair approach at the national, regional and international levels	- Lack of legitimacy of the unjust order governing the global system - Supporting Islamic resistance movements	Efforts to establish justice at the national and regional levels
Resistance and resistance pillar	- Fighting against Israel and anti-Zionism, anti-arrogance and confrontation with the West - Detailed definition of the resistance pillar (Arab Middle East, Afghanistan and even outside the region such as Venezuela) -Emphasizing extended and multidimensional resistance	Fighting against Israel and anti-Zionism, anti-arrogance and confrontation with the West	- Narrow definition of the resistance pillar (geographical area of the Fertile crescent) - More emphasis on military resistance
Identity	Islamic, Revolutionary	Islamic, Revolutionary	Islamic-Shia, Arabic, Lebanese
Vilayat-e Faqih	Fair and scholar Valy-e Faqih	Accepting Velayat-e Faqih, its leadership and believing in it in the arena of action and opinion	Emphasizing being a Quraysh and an Arab Valy-e Faqih
Islamic Ummah	Paying attention to all Muslims problems regardless of religion and language		Special attention to the Shias problems and Muslims alike (insiders) and Arabs
Opposite discourses (Anti-discourse)	Liberal Democracy, Salafi-Takfiri and Ekhvani	Liberal Democracy, Salafi-Takfiri and Ekhvani	

(Source: Authors)

Conclusion

The Islamic Revolution discourse has sub-discourses inside and outside Iran as a macro discourse. Hezbollah in Lebanon is the superficial level manifestation. Regarding the identity and the Islamic Revolution effects on the Hezbollah identity, this Revolution has influenced forming Islamic and revolutionary identity of Hezbollah. Evaluating the distance and closeness of these two discourses shows similarities between Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolution in many aspects of identity and semantics, and of course, in some signifiers and signifieds.

Hezbollah has adopted signifiers and concepts such as political Islam, Velayat-e Faqih, ummah-oriented, justice-seeking, nationalism, anti-arrogance, fighting Israel and Zionism, and revolutionary identity from the Islamic Revolution discourse. It also has attributed some of its signifieds to it. In other words, although there is much convergence between these discourses, there are some discourse and identity differences. For example, while there are similarities between the two discourses regarding nationalism, there is a signified difference between them.

Although Hezbollah believes in nationalism, it has not to discourse independence regarding its movement nature, special political, social, and religious conditions in Lebanon and the region, and its reliance on Iranian support and ideological affiliation with the Islamic Revolution. It does not have complete military security, political and economic autonomy and independence from Iran. According to the sign of resistance, which has become a discourse on a larger scale, in the speech of the Revolution, resistance is broad and includes various dimensions. Still, considering Hezbollah, it has more military and political dimensions.

Regarding the resistance manifestations, the Islamic Revolution has a macro view. Hezbollah emphasizes the resistance against Zionism and the United States and its allies in the Arab region. From a justice-seeking perspective, the Revolution discourse has a broader idea (at the national, regional, and international levels), and Hezbollah has a more general view in Lebanon and the region. Regarding the Ummah-oriented component, the attitude of the revolutionary discourse emphasizes the Islamic Ummah, Hezbollah the Islamic-Arab and the Islamic-Shia Ummah. Also, it emphasizes the Arab, Lebanese identity and Arab unity. Regarding regional issues, Hezbollah's discourse view of the necessity of being a movement and being Lebanese and Arab has a narrower view of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a system derived from it. Of course, referring to the differences between the two discourses does not mean distancing Hezbollah from the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Because, as explained in this study, Hezbollah undoubtedly has the closest discourse to the Islamic Revolution from a discursive point of view. It also has a similar strategic position with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, the comparison of

Hezbollah's discourse with the Islamic Revolution aimed to pathology this discourse and strengthened the doctrinal, ideological and strategic ties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah as members of the resistance. It prevents any abuse by the enemies of the revolutionary discourse. Liberal Democracy, Salafi-Takfiri, and even the Ekhvani are considered discourses against the Islamic Revolution discourse and Hezbollah, which seeks to dominate and hegemony their desired signifiers in the semantic system.

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Investigating the Processes of Revolutionary Rationality Formation in the Speech System of the Islamic Revolution

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Abstract

The present study aimed to analyse the process that caused revolutionary rationality. Revolutionary rationality supported extreme action in the years 1356-57. Shia political thought through the centuries has developed fertile and deep rationality in various fields of knowledge such as philosophy, history, mysticism and jurisprudence. "Philosophical Rationality" means that religion is interpreted with philosophy and given a philosophical form. "Jurisprudential Rationality" is the proven reason that establishes the goodness of religious rules and command. "Historical Rationality" identifies the principles and regulations behind the events of history, and "Mystical Rationality" is the expression of mystical meanings through rational style. Revolutionary rationality is rooted in the above principles. This rationality interacted with revelation and supported it, and had a relationship with other ideas, including the thought system in the old and new West, and emerged during the Islamic Revolution. Revolutionary rationality was manifested in the words of the revolutionary leaders in explaining the objective situation of society and politics, as well as in drawing the future of the revolution. The theoretical and methodological basis of this research is discourse analysis and its result, explaining the achievements of this rationality in overcoming the political order of Taghut and the birth of the Shia political order.

Keywords: Shiism, Rationality, Islamic Revolution, History, Philosophy, Mysticism, Jurisprudence.

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Introduction

One of the most critical issues in political studies is revolutions, which act as dangerous events that destroy the pre-existing political order and replace it with a new political order with extensive social consequences. In recent years, narratives have been produced by critics of the Islamic Revolution, mainly liberal forces, and have attracted colonial mentality through media production:

"The revolution was the result of the prevalence emotions derived from public dissatisfaction with the Shah's performance during his ruling, while this performance that it was fixable by some reforms, and there was no need for a revolution."

This pseudo-narrative is based on the dual concept of Romanticism Rationality. It considers the Islamic Revolution as an irrational and unnecessary phenomenon and the result of the ruling body's rigidity in accepting political and social reforms, regardless of the illegitimate structure of the Pahlavi establishment and its structural and inherent dependence on relations of domination.

If the Shah had acted to the Constitution and accepted the standards of liberal democracy such as freedom of election, press and parties, the revolution would not have taken place. This analysis misunderstands a political structure based on authoritarian power and lacks fundamental legitimacy, and ignores the "Rational" basis of the revolution, reducing it to a pragmatism based on emotion.

At the same time, this claim can be proved that the Islamic Revolution is based on the great rationality derived from Shia political thought, which was developed over the centuries and generally from the beginning of Islam and emerged during the revolution. The present study aimed to answer these questions; 'What are the rational aspects of the Islamic Revolution?'. 'What sources does this rationality come from?'. 'How was the determination of Shia rationality in the words of the leaders?' 'What was the purpose and intention of the Islamic Revolution leaders in using rational propositions in their speeches and writings?'

To give the shortest answer to these questions, consider both the historical lineage and the ideological and philosophical originality of the Islamic Revolution and the flexible policy of its leaders towards modern world ideas. The primary hypothesis is that Shia political thought is based on the interaction of reason and revelation. This interaction and connection have been manifested in Islamic sciences such as jurisprudence, history, philosophy and mysticism. Regarding the great emphasis of religious texts on the importance of "Intellect" and "Thinking," early Islamic thinkers began a rational dialogue with the East and West civilisations and reflected their achievements in their world. This intellectual capital flourished for centuries until, in the 1350s, when the illegitimate and inefficient nature of the Pahlavi regime paved the way for a general uprising, it was determined by the leaders of the Islamic Revolution in the form of arguments against that regime; and

emerged in establishing a new political system called the "Islamic Republic."

This idea was based on the synchronicity of "Intellect" and "Revelation" never denied the dialogue with the rationality of Western civilisation and others, either at the time of its birth in the early Islamic centuries or at the time of its resurgence during the Islamic Revolution and did not use its sufficient funds. The first part of the article, entitled "Historical Genealogy of Revolutionary Rationality," referred to the historical process of rationalism in different areas of Shia political thought. It means proving the historical presence of "Rationality" in Shia belief and practice. In the second part, we discuss the definition of this "Rationality" in the period of the Islamic Revolution. Its various aspects are explained by referring to the speeches and writings of the leaders of the Revolution. Before these two sections, the method, theory and concepts used in the text are described.

1. Method and Theory

The paper explains a historical subject that from historical events, nothing remains but writings and documents. Exploring these documents, texts, and sources requires appropriate methodological tools to examine these texts accurately. "Discourse Analysis" is the best method, regarding its attention to the context and providing proper tools and techniques of reading and analysis. In this research, two different methods-discourse theory branches are more effective. The first is the method-theory, which pays attention to the genealogical and historical aspects of a text and examines the themes and discourse strategies that have been formed through historical ideas and events.

The historical-discourse approach seeks to integrate into a historical-political inquiry the extensive knowledge available about historical sources and the context of the social and political arenas in which discourse events are embedded to analyse the historical dimension of discourse actions (Wodak, 2005: 45).

This approach examines more extensive socio-political and historical contexts in which discourse practices are incorporated and related. It also has two practical implications for this research: "Intertextuality" and "re-Contextualism." "Intertextuality" are texts related to other readers, in the past and present. Such connections are established in different ways, explicit reference to a significant subject or actor, sources reference to similar events, refers or concerns, the transmission of critical arguments from one text to another, etc. The second way analyses the different types of rational arguments in a text and evaluates the style of the logical content of a text. Rationality is divided into theoretical and instrumental parts. Rationality is a tool that legitimises things by referring to their purpose, application, and effects.

Theoretical rationality legitimises things by referring to a natural order but is more direct and evident than moral naturalisation. In the case of

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theoretical rationalisation, the basis for legitimation is not that 'Is the action morally justified or not?', 'Is it purposeful or effective or not?'. Instead, it is based on that what the situation is. The combination of the above mentioned two theoretical approaches caused both to summarise the historical evolution of rationality in political thought and examine the emergence of this rationality in the lectures of the revolutionary leaders during the Islamic Revolution.

2. Primary Research Concepts

"Rationality" and "Revolutionary Situation" are two central concepts of the article that need to be explained and refined, which is more necessary about "Rationality."

2.1. Rationality

It refers to the perceptual system that exists equally among all human beings, which is the tool of knowing the world. A definition based on what Islamic philosophers and thinkers have mentioned is considered. Mulla Sadra in "Description of Osul-e Kafi" defines the distinguishing feature of man from the animal, knowledge of the prominent and certainties, the power that is obtained through practical experience, good understanding and quick access to the existing material, a complete single who is not material (Aboutalebi quoted by Javadi Amoli, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 123).

Allameh Tabatabai's definition is "Rationality is the power which man distinguishes between good and evil and right and wrong. In this sense, wisdom does two things. One is the perception of truths, and the other is the distinction between good and evil and right and wrong." (Yazdani Moghadam, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 181)

2.2. Revolutionary Situation

In 1356, simultaneously with a series of domestic, international economic, political, and social developments that made it possible to express opposition to the status quo, the deposited crisis manifested in the most objective form. A revolutionary position or situation was formed. The revolutionary situation refers to conditions and problems due to the conflict between the Pahlavi government and its opponents during 1356 and 1357.

3. Main Discussion

This section consists of two sections. The first part, entitled "The Genealogy of Revolutionary Rationality," explains rationality's historical roots and contexts in different Shia knowledge and thought fields. The second part evaluates the determination of revolutionary rationality in the extreme situation of 1356-57.

3.1. Genealogy of Revolutionary Rationality

The use of "Reason" as a force for knowing the world was emphasised in the Holy Qur'an. However, the use of rational methods to understand phenomena, affairs, justification and interpretation of the religion, after

Muslims informed of Western philosophy, entered Islamic thought and was used in various fields such as Islamic philosophy, history, jurisprudence and mysticism. We aimed to explain rationality and its function in these areas.

3.1.1. Philosophical Rationality

The Islamic philosophy is the religion interpreted with philosophy and has been philosophical, a philosophy that emerged in the Islamic period. Its owners were officially or indeed Muslims (Davari, 1980 AD/1359 SH: 289). According to the philosophical levels of Muslim philosophers, the first step is proving the incompatibility of reason and revelation. Then, regarded sense, along with revelation, as one of the ways of cognition; because the world of nature and the world above has a practical aspect and has been created based on rational principles, man uses this intellect to know this world. Instead, regarding the mere existence of intelligence, we cannot understand the whole place and unity; in addition, our mind has no way to understand some issues at all (Ghaffari, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 124).

Therefore, the intellect is the revelation and can discover its command (Aboutalebi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 76). The intellect has no access to and awareness of all human beings' spiritual and material dimensions. If left to their own devices, men pursue sensual desire and seek their interests. Therefore, the presence of the Prophet in this world is necessary, and after him, we need an intelligent leader. Since the survival of the species in its entirety requires a system and the system needs planning, we invariably need a leader to maintain and establish the status rules by the Prophet. In the time of absence, we need a leader due to the necessity of communication with the active intellect (the essence of Holy God) and the inability of the human mind to access the details of worldly and otherworldly matters and its need for revelation. He implements the traditions of the first ruler and, in cases of ambiguous affairs, deduces the rulings; therefore, he needs the science of jurisprudence (Aboutalebi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 138).

Mulla Sadra believes in this, "Regarding the necessity of connecting the first ruler with the active intellect, which is the source of divine grace, and the attribution of the head of the Sunnah to jurisprudence, the right of sovereignty is created for them by God." (Javadi Amoli, 2003 AD/1381 SH: 130). The determination of philosophical rationality in the Islamic Revolution highlighted the concept of "Velayat." In practice, the Imam united thought and practical reason with "Velayat" to remove the veil from the realm of intellect. As Allama Javadi Amoli describes it in the historical letter description of the Imam to Gorbachev: "The practical intellect of the Imam was united with the Velayat; as his theoretical intellect was united with jurisprudence, and because he was on the high horizon of freedom, the veil between thought and action was removed." (Javadi Amoli, *ibid*: 70)

3.1.2. Jurisprudential Rationality

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"Jurisprudential Rationality" is the intellect that confirms and proves the goodness of religious rules and regulations. It is used to know the entity of rules of religion and to demonstrate the necessity of their existence for the well-being of human beings and to ensure their happiness. The process of rationalism in jurisprudence was mainly formed from the third century, AH and with the emergence of Akhbarians (Ismaili, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 27). From the time of Mulla Sadra Shirazi (1050 SH), philosophy entered the science of Osul. It flourished with Mohaghegh Thani and Mohaghegh Khansari. The peak of mixing Osul with philosophy and logic can be seen in the "Kifayah al-Osul" of Mohaghegh Khansari (Amirzadeh, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 36).

Jurisprudential propositions are based on the fundamental doctrinal teachings of religion; it is the general argument expressed using the rational method to confirm jurisprudence rules. If they are aligned with those propositions, considering the rationality of believing in those fundamental propositions, we can also accept the rationality of getting these propositions (Noei, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 810).

One of the essential products of rationalism in the science of jurisprudence is the theory of expediency. This theory, which has a historical character in the jurisprudential knowledge of Muslims, was established by Sheikh Mufid in Imamiyyah jurisprudence. Shahid Avval, by examining it in jurisprudential rules, made it organised and generalised. The writer of the "Javahir" shows the relationship between Velayat-e Faqih and expediency.

Imam Khomeini proposed a comprehensive plan and turned it into a theoretical basis for political action by expanding it. In Imam's worldview, the most critical field in expediency theory was political jurisprudence. He viewed political processes and practices from jurisprudence, based the new political order on its propositions and rules, and revived commands such as justice, consultation, La Zarar and expediency. Restoring the law of practicality is the culmination of rationality, jurisprudence, and rationalism based on jurisprudential propositions. In this regard, his approach was based on a complete source of theories that have been produced and compiled for this concept in the history of Islamic jurisprudence.

One of the early scholars, Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali, defined it as "Gaining Profit or Repelling Harm." The ruler aims to protect religion, life, intellect, generation and property, and whatever about the protection of these five principles is expediency (Salmani, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 56).

According to Allameh Tabatabai: "Expediency is an action that has a good aim that is arranged on the aspects of that action." He said: "The issue is about Islam and the Muslims; the interests of Islam and Muslims. We cannot be negligent." (Khomeini, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 290) It means that the political structure of the monarchy did not serve the interests of Islam and had to be destroyed.

3.1.3. Historical Rationality

"Historical Rationality" refers to reason recognising the principles and rules of historical events. This rationality is the product of the researcher's transcendence from the transparent surface of history to its hidden and deep layers. What became the basis of revolutionary political action as a rational approach to history can be traced to Sadra's wisdom. Mulla Sadra believes that man inherently benefits from a continuous movement and enjoys a constant individual and social life despite stability. Therefore, human life history is ongoing and extensive in multiple and numerous periods. The evolution of his personality instability and constant change will be fully understood.

Accordingly, the social developments of nations should be reviewed and pondered in the past social traditions and their historical evolution (Omidi, 2017 AD/1395 SH: 139). Allameh Tabatabai believes that the whole world is moving in this regard. This movement is fundamental and leads to transforming all existing moving truths. This existential transformation aims for primary motion (Yazdani Moghadam, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 143).

The theory of the essential motion of transcendent wisdom and Allameh Tabatabai's discussion on the concept of nature became the basis of Shahid Motahari's view of history philosophy regarding Islam. Motahari's genius helped him confront the Marxists' materialist historical philosophy with a positive religious interpretation of human historical destiny based on human innate talents and nature. In this interpretation, although the inevitable destiny of human beings was liberation from oppression and achieving happiness, it also required the mobility and dynamism of human beings themselves. Allameh believed history is not a collection of random and unrelated events but an evolutionary path.

He analysed the theory of nature and the concepts of "Movement" and "Continuity of Movement" by his teacher, Allameh Tabatabai, in the context of the philosophy of analysis history with a Shia recitation. He believed that human movement in history is based on evolution, not a few human beings, but all humans have these talents to move towards perfection. There are two categories of knowledge that human beings need to move towards the model. The first is natural knowledge and then religious knowledge, per nature. According to the Holy Qur'an, through the guidance of God, the general flow of history is to overcome the right over the wrong. Because man, due to his inner guidance and the power of will and choice, can overcome the false current (Motahari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 293).

The ultimate happiness will come to man with the advent of the Promised Mahdi (AS) and bring humans to the final transcendence and will pave the way for the origin of the "Perfect Man." This scientific and intellectual approach to history became the cornerstone of Imam Khomeini's revolutionary action. "Since the beginning of human civilisation, weapons have been in the hands of the unrighteous, and it

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was all human problems. Until these disarmed gunmen are disarmed, human work will not end. The prophets came to disarm these incompetent unarmed gunmen." (Khomeini, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 19)

3.1.4. Mystical Rationality

Mystical rationality is considered equivalent to Mulla Sadra's intuitive knowledge, which expresses esoteric meanings through rational style. The entrance of reason to mysticism dates back to the perfection of the mystical thoughts period in the third century AH. According to Allama Javadi Amoli, Abu Hamid Torkeh, for the first time, bypassing through the conventional peripatetic intellect, presented a new field of mind which is called "Enlightened Intellect" or, in the words of Ayatollah Javad Amoli, "Pure Mystical Intellect." (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 28)

After the emergence of Sadra's transcendent wisdom, philosophy could enter mysticism and use the intuitive knowledge of mystics to strengthen its epistemological foundations and raise the peripatetic intellect to the intellect of Sadra's philosophy (Ahmadi Saadi, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 36). The ease of entering mysticism is regarding the emphasis of the Holy Quran on the importance of reason in cognition. On this basis, in magical thinking, since the discovery of the non-innocent, unlike the discovery of the innocent, may be erroneous and slippery, it must be examined by criteria. One of these measures is intellect. Based on this approach, the concept of "Imam" was introduced as a guide of followers in transcendent wisdom, which was used in the Islamic Revolution for the salvation of this world and the transcendence of human biomaterial.

As Leily Eshghi says, Shia mysticism, which seeks the knowledge of God, needs an "Imam" as a leader to lead a group to its destination. Amid the Islamic Revolution, this group was not the followers of a monastery or individual beings who chose seclusion to discover truth and manner. Still, this group is a "Nation" that also can become an "Ummah." At that time in the history of Iran, the election of Ayatollah Khomeini as the "Imam" made him a link between the known and objective dimension of truth (knowledge of this world) and the possibility of achieving that nation to the ultimate truth.

The Imam led an "Ummah" to seek liberation from ignorance and guidance. Imam's goal was nothing but to achieve divine knowledge. He was to determine the Shia mysticism that had been practical in the objective world and change this world's temporal relations. He sought the truth and, in this way, led a great objective being called the nation, which had historical temporal and spatial aspects, to heaven. At the same time, the "Imam" had the theological capital of the pure Imams and was also a politician who sought to dress up the influence of the "Satan" (the West, the king) and the hostile relations (dependence, plunder, tyranny) of the soul of a nation. He wanted to bring together the prosperity of this

world (freedom, justice, independence) and eternal bliss and exaltation (living faithfully and divinely for salvation).

3.2. Determining Revolutionary Rationality

The rationality is hidden in Shia thought, which was formed over the centuries and was available to the Shias in four types of mystical, philosophical, jurisprudential, and historical rationality, which became verbal propositions at the time of the revolution. Proposals were declared by the primary opponents of the Pahlavi regime. The wise men who were previously scientific and social capital used that capital in politics during the revolution.

They used philosophical, mystical, jurisprudential and historical principles to challenge the existing objective and material order. That rich epistemological capital became the basis for producing deconstructive theological propositions against the current political system. Strong rational recommendations that explain the causes and factors of a political regime's illegitimacy in terms of functional weaknesses were themselves produced on a solid foundation of religious and divine beliefs.

Imam Khomeini was the leading actor in the revolutionary situation that practically emerged as the opposition leader. Along with him, we can mention Martyr Beheshti and Motahhari, who were Imam's students, played the role of the commentator of his ideas to the public. The results and effects of the application of rationality in the context of the discourse system of these leaders can be explained as follows. First, their reliance on rationalisation made it possible for them to present a realistic style of political analysis. In this sense, they represented political relations, events and phenomena, persons/ political/ social situations as they were, and established an accurate account of the current situation for society.

Then, they may have expressed a value-oriented and critical approach to these relationships and conditions at the next level. Still, their valuation has also been formed on an objective basis. Then, by considering "Rationality" in political analysis, they showed their seriousness and coherence in their political goals. By focusing precisely and rationally on events, they turned them into practical and causal chains through this analysis.

They gave a comprehensive and coherent picture of the current situation and the future ahead. Now we explain the inefficiency and corruption of the Shah's regime and the necessity of revolt against the Pahlavi regime and the establishment of Islamic rule. Rationalisation of speech has two kinds: theoretical and practical. First, the methods of theoretical rationalisation, which include definition, explanation and prediction, are survived, and then, practical rationality that is examined the goals, results and ends of the revolution that these people have expressed.

The theoretical and instrumental rationality used in the revolutionary leaders' speeches, texts, and statements derived from the four

abovementioned types forms the main branches of evolutionary rationality.

3.2.1. Theoretical Rationality

The revolution leaders, mainly through the strategy of "Definition," provided a rational explanation of what had happened in the past. This past included historical narratives from early Islam and the contemporary period.

In stating this history, the leaders' purpose was to represent a horizon in which the war of right and wrong was portrayed. This image answers questions such as 'Who deserves to rule?' and 'What kind of government is needed for prosperity?'

"Since the beginning of human civilisation, weapons have been in the hands of the unrighteous, and it is all human problems. These disarmed gunmen should be disarmed to human work will end. The prophets also came to disarm these incompetent gunmen, and they could not; they were bullies. In every age, the worthy people who wanted to take this weapon from the incompetent and take it into their own hands did not succeed, and this weapon was in the hands of the incompetent and the ignorant. It is all problems of humans." (Khomeini statements. 1356/10/19)

Martyr Beheshti, by "Defining" a part of early Islam history, by identifying the types of unrighteous and righteous guardianship, considers the governance of the righteous as the basis of religious rule.

"In the Islam history, four types of Velayat can be defined. The first type is unique and very similar to the Prophet and has all its aspects except receiving revelation. In this guardian, the pure will gather around him, the sinners will turn away, and the people will enjoy the best conditions to remain pure and have a happy life.

The second type is related to the personal Velayat, who, although he does not have the enchanting and magnetic attraction of attracting pure elites, has some Islamic social discipline of Islam similar to the period of Abu Bakr and Umar. The third type is related to the type of Velayat; although it was not corrupt, it provided the ground for the unclean and corrupts. In the end, the one who has come to war with Islam openly and completely, not only there is a ground for the growth of corruption in society, but it is also the centre of power, corruption-seeking and promoters of corruption." (Beheshti, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 11-25)

These two texts transfer the historical concepts of "Velayat" and "Righteous Sovereignty" from early Islam to the present period. The narrators of these texts, by resorting to "Recontextualism," transferred these concepts from their previous context in early Islam to the present and introduced them into the discourse of the Islamic Revolution. These concepts were marginalised during the rule of the Pahlavi regime. Still, by recontextualising these concepts, these leaders provided a new political ground for the growth and re-development of marginalised Islamic political thought. Then, using these concepts in the current socio-political context, they created a coherent narrative based on history,

stating that "According to the early history of Islam, the prophetic tradition and the words of the Imams, political power should be in the hands of the righteous, not corrupt corrupters."

In this narrative, a historical mission was formed to fight against illegitimate Taghut, and a border was drawn between the righteous and the unrighteous. The righteous were the leaders of the revolution and the people of Iran, and the unrighteous included members of the Pahlavi regime. This alignment led to the creation of a political-historical identity for the revolutionaries. The revolution leaders' second type of production of rational speech propositions was based on "Explanation." In this way, the current state of Iranian society was analysed. "We remember the crimes of fifty years of Pahlavi's illegitimate rule and the bloodshed of these 50 years.

Reza Khan was armed from the beginning by the incompetent British criminals who had guns in their hands, and they brought this unscrupulous and unarmed man with weapons and ruled over the people. 'What crimes during the time that the bad man was at work happened?'" (Khomeini statements. 1356/10/19)

The essential functions of "Explanation" are explaining the physical and symbolic violence of the regime, explaining the regime's dependence on the West, showing the diversity of the regime's opponents and expanding the struggle from the political to the social field. In a revolutionary situation, the orators explained the consequences of the Shah's presence at the top of the pyramid of Iranian political power to explain the regime's corruption.

They blamed the king for killing innocent people during the years of his rule, especially during the revolution. Using the causal system they formed in their speech, they introduced the cause of a series of disorders as a definite and natural consequence of the Shah's presence at the top of the pyramid of power.

The third type of rationalism is "Prediction." 'What were the plans of the revolutionary leaders for the future after Pahlavi?' and 'How did they portray future events and developments?'. It seems that the "Reform" of affairs in all fields is based on the divine teachings and the creation of an "Islamic Society" were their predictions for the future of Iran after the revolution.

"In the Islamic terminology, "Reform" is the opposite of "Corruption," whether it is gradual and superficial and so-called transverse or fundamental and essential. The general aims of Islam in the statement of Ali (AS) are as follows: Return to true Islam. Islamic traditions are each a sign of the path to prosperity. The great reform of cities. The third goal is saving the oppressed. Our goal is getting rid of the oppressed from the oppressors." (Motahhari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 30)

"Prediction" caused to draw a clear vision and horizon for the future and promise social reform if the Islamic Revolution wins.

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"We have reasonable ways to resolve the crisis by establishing a national-Islamic government and replacing extravagant traitors with God-fearing patriotic nationals and first, cutting off the hands of the looters of the treasury, headed by the Shah. It was second, cutting off the hands of ministers, lawyers and important managers of departments from abuses and betrayals. Third, eliminating many branches of departments that are trouble for the people and spending the treasury. Fourth, the correct use of agricultural force." (Khomeini, 1984 AD /1363 SH: 17)

Also, "Islam," as a whole that corrects the current situation and establishes a transcendent future, became the reference point of these predictions. Islam was introduced as a semantic reference to answer all questions. It created the capacity to make sense of oppositional actions, form coalitions, and, ultimately, depict the utopia.

3.2.2. Instrumental Rationality

Rationality was a valuable tool for answering three basic questions about the Islamic Revolution. 'What is the purpose of the revolution?' 'What should be achieved?' 'What is the effect of the revolution?' 'What is the result of the revolution?'. Some parts of Beheshti's speech answers these questions.

"The government of Islam, the government of the Islamic Republic, should provide capital for every Muslim, Iranian, non-Muslim, and every person who has the citizenship of the Islamic Republic from the public treasury, oil revenues, other incomes, taxes so that no one has to sell his work for a small wage paid to him by others. In our view, the people's councils must be the real administrators and overseers of the revolution. Instead of inspections from above, we should create a monitoring and guidance system from the mass. We will not have political independence until we find economic independence. We invite all committed intellectuals, with all kinds of tastes and thoughts, to come and sit together and share their demands, to have a free discussion." (Beheshti, 2010 AD/ 1389 SH: 252)

His reliance on "Theoretical Rationalization" allows him to present a realistic style of political analysis. In this sense, he sees and represents political relations, events and phenomena, persons, political and social situations as they are. Of course, he may have a value-oriented and critical approach to these relationships and conditions in the next level, but that value is also formed on a factual basis. "The Shah's regime has used some Western press at great expense. To divert the minds of the West from the main issues, one of the most important of which is the departure of the Shah and his oppressive relatives and the shortening of the hands of foreigners, he has resorted to hollow propaganda." (Khomeini, 1983 AD/ 1362 SH: 17)

Second, incorporating "Rationality" into the political analysis will lead to seriousness and coherence in political targeting. In other words, the narrator and producer of the text show that the field of politics and its events has a pivotal and fundamental position for him. Therefore,

carefully and rationally focusing on events tries to turn them into practical and disabled chains, achieving a comprehensive and coherent analysis of the current situation and the future ahead. Finally, applying the method of "Rationalism" leads to careful attention to the tools and means available for battle in the political arena. Regarding these material and spiritual possibilities and tools, a political leader determines his micro, macro, medium and long-term goals and takes political action.

He also continues the subsequent efforts at the level of political theory and practice by measuring the results of his actions and those of the other party.

At the semantic level, the question arises 'Whether by examining these texts it can be claimed that they represent a semantic system or discourse?'. The answer is yes. We seem to be facing a political discourse with different components and concepts than the discourses of our time. This difference can be explained in several cases. According to the mentioned above, words, phrases and sentences of their texts reflect, based on the speakers of the revolutionary discourse, history is a scene of political conflict between righteous and non-righteous. The historical mission of the Muslim is to be on the moral front rather than using the weapon of power to save the world from corruption.

The distinction between one's front and another front and defining the position of the human actor means the creation of a new political identity. It is a genuine historical identity that takes an aggressive stance and defends itself against corrupt and dysfunctional imposed structures. As much as it is free against the set structure and has the power of action and freedom of movement to the point of rebellion to destroy, this identity is obligated to its divine mission.


It must stand against oppression through his presence in the historical political arena and because of his holy duty, and ultimately achieve happiness and goodness. According to these leaders, the Shia identity is the same action within the framework of a moral, political and faith order that relies on the fear of God and obedience to the guardian to achieve salvation and prosperity.

If these texts and discourses are considered as a complete example of phenomena-making discourse in terms of the comprehensiveness of the semantic and reasoning system as well as the time situation in them; their most important conceptual aspects can be summarised as follows:

- Emphasis on the illegitimacy of the basis for establishing a government. Here, the text emphasises the discourse of usurpation, a jurisprudential discourse and refers to political rule's illegitimacy without the jurists' religious authority. According to the lecturer, this basis has been provided by a foreign power;
- Emphasis on the illegitimacy of the continuation of ruling the current governing body. The dependent and independent construction of the regime and oppression and acts of cruel and illegal actions are the reason for the illegitimacy of the continuation of this rule;

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- Explaining the legitimacy of revolutionary action against the current ruling body. The uprising against the current government is inevitable regarding the religious duty to establish a righteous government and regain political power from the unrighteous.



Conclusion

The rationality of Shia political thought was manifested in four areas of philosophy, jurisprudence, mysticism and history. It answered equally with different approaches to ‘Who and why is worthy of government?’. These answers were determined in four historical, jurisprudential, philosophical and mystical narratives during the Islamic Revolution. According to historical rationality, the answer was that human history is a continuous history, and man is moving towards perfection during this history. While the world is a scene of confrontation and conflict between righteous and non-righteous, the government of the righteous must be formed through a revolution against corruption to facilitate this evolutionary movement. Jurisprudential rationality is based on this principle since, during the absence of the Imam, the need to establish order in society does not disappear; the ruler of the Islamic community, aware of the jurisprudence commands, should govern and through the Islamic Revolution provide "Velayat-e Faqih" ground. Philosophical rationality confirms the role of "Just Leader" and "Vali" in the transcendence of Islamic society, and mystical rationality emphasises the importance of leading a "Perfect Man" in the guise of "Imam." Amid the Islamic Revolution, the collection of these constructions was combined with modern society's social and political conditions, which required

independence, freedom, and legitimate government, to produce a theoretical and cognitive apparatus called "Revolutionary Rationality."

Despite its traditional base and critique of modernity becoming its "other," revolutionary rationality has never been and is not anti-modern. Instead, it uses modern tools such as bureaucracy, the military, and the university to achieve its ultimate goal of nurturing the perfect human being. However, this application is necessary, not absolute and unequivocal acceptance. This acceptance of modern tools is not accepting the intellectual principles of modernity and the prominent position and "Text" of the political field from that tradition.

Thus, this rationality is composed of an Islamic worldview and the tools of dying to meet the necessities of life in the new world. This rationality was not formed in the "Moment" and time of one or two years leading up to the revolution, but it is gradual, and a process and has fourteen-hundred-year in Shia history. Finally, the most critical sign of the preference of "Logic" and "Reason" over "Emotion" and "Excitement" in the Islamic Revolution. Revolutionary rationality seeks to explain "Conditions" and "Existing Conditions." Conditions that the governing body has made unacceptable and again tries to predict the "Future" by using "Rationality."

A "Ruined" future if the status quo continues, and "Bright" if you try to change the status quo. The present study aimed to recognise the complex and stellar rationality that formed the basis of the leaders' actions of the Islamic Revolution in publicly calling for an uprising against the Pahlavi regime. This article does not claim to explain what happened comprehensively but can introduce more profound research in this area.

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Outgroup Inflicted Economic Failure Solidifying the Position of the Leader Regardless of Gender: An Experimental Study

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Abstract

Economic punishments and sanctions have been used against the Islamic Revolution of Iran and some other countries. But their efficacy is usually in dispute among politicians and economists. Current research reports a randomized experiment that seeks to identify the cause of the failure of broad political punishments and sanctions. Most sanctions and political punishments are ultimately employed as a psychological-economic device. They are meant to adversely affect the opinion of the people of a country, thereby putting pressure on the government to change course. We propose and empirically test the hypothesis that a reduction of welfare has a different effect when it is attributed to an out-group versus an in-group agent. We find that when economic failure is believed to have been brought about by an outsider, it solidifies the position of the leader. There is, moreover, no statistically significant difference in the reactions across sexes. The study draws on insights from the sociology of group identity to answer an old political economy question.

Keywords: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, Political Sanctions, Gender, Political Economy, Psychological-Economic

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Introduction

The Islamic Revolution of Iran has faced several sanctions and political punishment courses over the past four decades.¹ After about forty years, some of the most influential scholars of the field respect the legitimacy² of this new governance, considering the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran among the world's original constitutional transitions defining the rise of global constitutionalism. (Ackerman, 2019, 1-53, 166, 295, 324-360, 395; see also: Maftouni, 2019, 4-5).²

The course of the past forty-two years gives rise to the question: 'do political punishments and sanctions work?' 'Have political

1. A brief list of The UN Security Council sanctions on Iran follows (let alone the US sanctions)

a. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 – passed on 31 July 2006. Demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and threatened sanctions.

b. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 – passed on 23 December 2006 in response to the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006). Made mandatory for Iran to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and cooperate with the IAEA, imposed sanctions banning the supply of nuclear-related materials and technology, and froze the assets of key individuals and companies related to the program.

c. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 – passed on 24 March 2007. Imposed an arms embargo and expanded the freeze on Iranian assets.

d. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 – passed on 3 March 2008. Extended the asset freezes and called upon states to monitor the activities of Iranian banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and to monitor the movement of individuals involved with the program through their territory.

e. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835 – Passed in 2008.

f. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 – passed on 9 June 2010. Banned Iran from participating in any activities related to ballistic missiles, tightened the arms embargo, travel bans on individuals involved with the program, froze the funds and assets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and recommended that states inspect Iranian cargo, prohibit the servicing of Iranian vessels involved in prohibited activities, prevent the provision of financial services used for sensitive nuclear activities, closely watch Iranian individuals and entities when dealing with them, prohibit the opening of Iranian banks on their territory and prevent Iranian banks from entering into a relationship with their banks if it might contribute to the nuclear program, and prevent financial institutions operating in their territory from opening offices and accounts in Iran.

g. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984 – passed on 9 June 2011. This resolution extended the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the Iran Sanctions Committee for one year.

h. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2049 – passed on 7 June 2012. Renewed the mandate of the Iran Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts for 13 months.

i. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – passed on 20 July 2015. Sets out a schedule for suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions, with provisions to reimpose UN sanctions in case of non-performance by Iran, in accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

2. Major Muslim philosophers like Abu Nasr Farabi regard revelation as the main source of political legitimacy though. (Farabi, 1991, 44; 1968, 133-134; 2004, 55; 2003, 116-121; 1987, 259; 1997, 195; also see: Maftouni and Baharluyi, 2011, 57-74)

2. Yale's Professor Bruce Ackerman works on a variety of issues around constitutionalism in the United States. (Ackerman, 1991, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2014)

sanctions exerted crucial influences in Iranian communities?' This question has baffled researchers for decades. Generally, it is accepted that sanctions and political punishments have a history of failure. Support for economic coercion in the literature has vacillated over time; however, the highest success rate attributed to the policy is just 35% (Hufbauer et al. 2007; see also: Alt et al. 1996; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Kapstein 2020).

Moreover, even these relatively low rates of success have been the subject of controversy (Pape 1997). Although many studies have tackled the question of economic coercion, the diagnosis of the failure of sanctions and political punishments has attracted relatively little attention. Most studies steer clear of why political sentences fail and are instead limited to the questions of whether and to what extent. We assume the generally accepted negative answer to whether political punishments work and investigate the cause. As mentioned, the highest success rate assigned to the economic sanctions is only 35% (Hufbauer et al., 2007).

This paper reports the results of a randomized experiment that seeks to identify the cause of the failure of political punishments. We propose and empirically test the following hypothesis. A reduction of welfare has a significantly different effect when it is attributed to an out-group versus an in-group agent. While in the latter case, it tends to decrease support for the leadership of one's group, in the former, it is likely to increase support for the administration.³ We use

3. Administered by OFAC, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, The US sanctions against Islamic Republic of Iran include the family and relatives of the Supreme Leader as well as a variety of economic, trade, scientific and military sanctions against Iran. It is clear from the selected list of these sanctions:

a. Carter sanctions: imposed against Iran in November 1979 after the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, after the US permitted the exiled Shah of Iran to enter the US for medical treatment. Executive Order 12170 froze about US\$8.1 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. It also imposed a trade embargo.

b. Reagan sanctions: an arms embargo in 1984 on both Iran and Iraq, ceasing all US assistance during the Iraq-Iran War (1981-1988). And an embargo on Iranian goods and services was imposed in 1987.

c. Clinton sanctions was some of the toughest sanctions against Iran in March 1995, during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, prohibiting US trade in Iran's oil industry. Clinton also issued Executive Order 12959 in May 1995 to prohibit all US trade with Iran. Trade with the United States totally stopped while it had been growing after the Iraq-Iran War.

d. Bush sanctions: In February 2004, the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the presidency of George W. Bush ruled against editing or publishing scientific manuscripts from Iran, and stated that U.S. scientists collaborating with Iranians could be prosecuted. In June 2005, Bush issued Executive Order 13382 freezing the assets of individuals connected with Iran's nuclear program. In June 2007, the U.S. state of Florida enacted a boycott on companies trading with Iran, while New Jersey's state legislature was considering similar action. In September 2006, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Bank Saderat Iran, barring it from dealing with U.S. financial institutions, even indirectly. As of November 2007, Iranian banks: Sepah, Saderat, Melli, Kargoshaee, and Arian were prohibited from transferring money to or from United States banks. In 2008 the US Treasury ordered Citigroup Inc. to freeze over

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the terms out-group and in-group in a sense used in sociology and social psychology (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971a; Tajfel et al. 1971b; Tajfel 1974).

Put simply, when economic failure is believed to have been brought about by an outsider, it solidifies the position of the leader. We find that political punishments defeat the purpose. When a group leader's ability to distribute money is blocked by a member of that same group, the tendency to oust the leader rises by 0.25. However, when the leader's ability to distribute the same amount of money is blocked by the leader of another group, the tendency to oust the leader declines by 0.38. While in the control group, economic failure tends to decrease support for the leadership, it solidifies the leader's position in the treatment group. This finding questions much of the practice and part of the theory of political punishments.

Most political punishments are ultimately employed as a psychological device. They are meant to adversely affect the people's opinion of a country and make them less supportive of their government. Even authoritarian leaders cannot rule merely by relying on force (Wang 2015, 5). By decreasing support and putting popular pressure on the governments, the coercer hopes to compel the target to change course. It means that whatever economic effect they may have needs to be translated into a psychological impact to bring about the desired political outcome. Thus, most political punishments could be considered an independent economic variable aimed at a psychological dependent variable. An exception is political punishments aimed at military impairment, which are not concerned with popular opinion (McCormack & Pascoe 2017; Monteiro & Debs 2020).

The anatomy of a typical sanction could, therefore, be dissected into three intended causal links. First, political punishments adversely affect the economy. Second, the diminished welfare adversely affects people's opinion of their leaders. And third, popular discontent compels leaders to change course. In short, this is a movement from political punishments to the economy, from economy to psychology, and from psychology to politics.

\$2 billion held for Iran in Citigroup accounts, while the total assets frozen in Britain under the EU and UN sanctions against Iran were nearly \$1.64 billion.

e.Obama sanctions: on July 1, 2010, Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), which the United States Senate and House of Representatives have passed on June 24, 2010. On 31 July 2013, the United States House of Representatives voted 400 to 20 in favor of new sanctions. Effective first July 2013, imposed additional financial sanctions against Iran. According to an administration official, under the new Executive Order significant transactions in the rial will expose anyone to sanctions, and predicted it should cause banks and exchanges to dump their rial holdings.

The first link, i.e., the effect of political punishments on a country's economy, is well researched and more or less known. Economic theory and empirical studies verify that political disciplines usually assume the volume of trade and hence welfare (Lindsay 1986; Kaempfer 2007; Konstantin & Aleksei 2019).

The connection between popular opinion and leaders' rise and fall has also been considerable scrutiny. The missing link in the literature is the leap of faith from economy to psychology.

The closest that some studies get to this is vague references to a possible "Rally Round the Flag" effect, which is sometimes mentioned as a side note rather than part of the primary mechanism through which political punishments are supposed to have the intended impact. Moreover, the amorphous idea of a rally round the flag effect has, to the best of our knowledge, never been formulated as an empirically verifiable hypothesis, much less to be put to the test.

It is essential to clarify a rally around the flag to know what it is not. There are a few other reasons to suspect that political punishments may not have the intended effect.⁴ Some argue that rulers can isolate themselves from the adverse effects, shifting the suffering to ordinary people (Hufbauer 2007, 29).

Others contend that even if economic pressure is successfully transferred to governments, modern states are too resilient to be overthrown by financial stress (Pape 1997; see Olson 2000).

These arguments effectively say that political punishments may not be sufficient to compel a government to change behavior.

We are not concerned with these cases. Regardless of whether it generates enough pressure to change the government's behavior, widespread opposition is considered by most researchers and policymakers to be an intended outcome of many political punishments. It is the causal link that we examine. This study investigates the question of whether political disciplines succeed at least in the sense of getting a population to oppose its government.

4. Economic decline in Iran is another issue that must differentiate from the current research. Personally, I believe in philosophical roots of economic decline. I mean the introduction of a dichotomy in the taxonomy of philosophical areas of specialization in Iran has resulted in the relegation of what would elsewhere be considered the majority of philosophical disciplines. Most philosophical fields have, accordingly, not begun to gain a foothold in domestic academia. Crucially, one such area is economic philosophy, which due to its vital role in the daily livelihood of the average person is abnormally popular among the populace in industrialized countries. The uniquely pervasive influence of this philosophical discipline is, in turn, a consequence of its make-or-break impact on economic development in a country. Indeed, no country has had a successful economic overhaul without a philosophical one beforehand. Having arisen as the empirical implications of various theories of economic philosophy, schools of economics themselves have all been founded by philosophers. Thus, what we have been trying to do in Iran to no avail, as in many other stagnant models of development, is to upend the edifice of civilization, erecting the superstructure of economics before forging its philosophical bedrock.

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This study contributes to the literature on political punishments by investigating the causal link between political sentences and decline in government support. The finding that a reduction in welfare caused by an out-group agent is unlikely to reduce support for leadership casts doubt on the policy and theory of political punishments. Although many studies have pointed to the failure of political penalties, the cause is not identified. We seek to hypothesize a cause and empirically test it.

The study also contributes to opinion formation and persuasion (e.g., Monroe et al. 2000; Transue 2007; Akerlof & Kranton 2010, Kinder & Kam 2010, Bolsen et al. 2014).

While this is among the most extensively researched subjects, little work has been done on whether in-group and out-group sources of economic change have a different effect on opinion formation. Our findings contribute to this body of work by bridging the gap between studies of economic coercion and the literature on identity.

The findings also speak to the literature in behavioral economics that empirically studies the assumptions of neo-classical economics. We show that preference satisfaction is not merely a function of shifts in the budget constraint. Who is believed to be the source of that shift plays a significant role in determining whether people support the status quo.

The results, moreover, relate to the literature in evolutionary sociology. The question of whether traits like loyalty and resistance to out-group pressure differ across sexes remains unsettled.⁵ The most recent and large-scale study on the subject finds that sex differences in loyalty and authority are slight in size and highly variable across cultural contexts (Atari et al. 2020). Our laboratory results confirm this observational study. We find no statistically significant difference in the reactions across genders.⁶

5. The issue continues in other fields of humanities. Stan (2015) points out “Regarding gender, even if this variable is often perceived as a main predictor of differential outcomes in social psychology literature, it is not yet clear how these differences impact customer loyalty and the relationship between consumer loyalty and its antecedents. The findings of this study demonstrate that women are more loyal to store than men. In addition to this, it can be noted that gender does not moderate any of the relationships between loyalty and its antecedents” (See also Rogowski 1987; Rogowski and MacRae 2003).

6. I am working on other relevant issues in terms of gender, probably proving that prejudice against women is not an inherent feature of Islam and is rather a function of the descriptive beliefs that prevail in some Islamic societies regarding women’s capabilities. So far, my research reports what is probably the first scientific study of the effect of music on a precise extreme mood. Using a randomized experiment, I measure how a music affects sexism. More specifically, the experiment measures the extent to which a piece of music that we have created weakens the belief among some Muslims that women are not as suitable as men for positions of chairmanship. We find that the music reduces sexism by 22.48 percent, compared to a control treatment that presents the same argument and story verbally. Another experiment in which we remain in touch with subjects and survey them after longer periods of time can measure how the effect develops across time.

The paper continues as follows. Section I briefly reviews what the literature on economic coercion has so far found. Section II explains the design of the experiment and presents the results. Section III critiques the limitations of the study and offers a conclusion.

1. Economic Coercion: The State of Current Academic Findings

Research on economic coercion began with pessimism. In the 1960s and 70s, it was generally agreed that political punishments are ineffective (Galtung 1967; Doxey 1971; Knorr 1975; Losman 1979). The next decade of scholarship was critical of this assessment. Critics argued that the failure of a few significant cases, e.g., Cuba or Ethiopia, had affected scholars' opinion of all political punishments (Rogers 1996, p. 72; Daoudi 1983; Carter 1988; Martin 1992, p. 250; Kirschner 1995, p. 166).

Yet even these studies did not claim that political punishments were successful in most cases.

Given the continued use of political punishments in the face of failure, some sought to propose alternative motives. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) argue that political punishments are meant to appease domestic interest groups. Others suggested that political punishments play a signaling role, communicating resolve (Dorussen and Mo 2001; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007).

With the advent of the Information Age, some started to use large data sets to decipher the riddle of political punishments. Hufbauer et al. (2007) conducted a significant study of post-war political punishments, which ascribed a 35% success rate to the policy. Some argue that they have exaggerated the role of political punishments in eliciting countries' demands that imposed them (Pape 1997). Marinov (2005) used one of these large-N datasets to question the methodology of all prior studies.

Finally, another strand of the literature has used formal models to analyze political punishments and their effectiveness. It is a heterogeneous set of studies that are only united by their game-theoretic method. While some take up the efficacy of political punishments per se, others concern a specific group of political punishments (Drezner 1999). Political punishments aimed at military impairment are examples of these studies (McCormack & Pascoe 2017; Monteiro & Debs 2020; Bapat & Kwon 2014).

For all their merits, none of these works have examined the psychological effect of economic coercion on the people it is meant to motivate to oppose their government.

2. The Current Experiment

One hundred eighty-nine subjects took part in the study. Seventy-seven of them were male, and 112 were female. Some aspects of the experiment were revealed to be issues, and some were not. The

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subjects were told that the investigation was a multiple-shot game with an unknown number of rounds. Subjects were divided into two groups. This division did not have anything to do with the division into the treatment and control groups.

Subjects were, furthermore, told that in each round, every participant could be given 500,000 IRR (~ \$2) by the randomized leader of the group. The money was more than 1% of the estimated per capita income of the average Iranian per year.

No tasks needed to be performed to receive the money. However, the subjects were informed that could block the leader's attempt to distribute the funds to them. The leader of each of the two groups has the option to prevent the other from spreading resources. A randomly selected member of one's group also has this option. That is, she can block the distribution of money to their group. If the blocking option is exercised, participants will receive nothing. Subjects were indeed divided into two groups, but which group each person fell into was inconsequential. One might as well conduct the same experiment without the division. However, since participants were told they were divided into two groups as part of the prompt, the division was done merely to maintain honesty and minimize deception.

Did not reveal part of the structure of the experiment to subjects. Although the number of rounds was not known, in reality, there were only two rounds. And only the first round was relevant to the study. The second round was there to reward subjects for their participation. Moreover, the two groups' leaders and the group member who could block their own leaders' attempts were dummies. The decisions were already made. At the end of the first round, all subjects were told that the leader's attempt was blocked. And at the end of the second round, they were all given the money. Note that none of this is inconsistent with the information provided to subjects. The information available to participants was incomplete but not incorrect.

The single-shot nature of the game was kept secret to avoid game-theoretic unraveling. In the real world, individuals' reaction to political punishments is in part shaped by their expectations of future actions of their leaders and their enemies (Drezner 1999). To simulate such expectations, it was essential to conceal the number of rounds.

Subjects in both the active and control treatments were given two prompts. The first prompt was given before the treatment was administered. That is, the same prompt was given to both. This pretreatment prompt was meant to measure subjects' baseline tendency to oppose the leadership when facing the risk of welfare loss. It recorded their tendency to oust the leader when her failure to deliver resources was known, but before, it was attributed to either

in-group or out-group sources. Afterward the treatment prompt was administered. The active and control treatments revealed the source of the leader's failure as the pressure of an out-group and an in-group agent, respectively.

The active treatment was the following prompt. The leader of the other group has decided to block the distribution of resources to you. If you change the leader, it is more likely that she agrees with the distribution. 'Would you vote to maintain the leader or change her?'

The control treatment was the following prompt. One of your group members has decided to block the distribution of resources to you. If you change the leader, it is more likely that she agrees with the distribution. 'Would you vote to maintain the leader or change her?'

The use of gender-specific English pronouns may admittedly trigger specific reactions, positive or negative, in some people. It should be noted, however, that prompts were in Persian, and Persian is a gender-neutral language.

Votes were recorded as a binary variable indicating whether each subject chose to change the leadership before the source of failure was revealed and afterward.

3. Results

Responses to the pretreatment prompt suggest that the position of the leader was insecure, to begin with, due to her failure to deliver the promised money. In the control and treatment groups, 0.57 and 0.65 of the subjects opposed the leader, respectively.

	Control	Treatment
Opposition Pre-Treatment	0.57 (0.095)	0.65 (0.095)
Opposition Post-Treatment	0.82 (0.073)	0.27 (0.088)
Change in Opposition	0.25 (0.110)	- 0.38 (0.124)
Average Treatment Effect	- 0.63 (0.032)	

There is, however, a statistically significant difference between subjects' reactions to the active and control treatments. While in the control group, it tends to decrease support for the leadership of one's group, it solidifies the leader's position in the treatment group. Opposition in the control group rose by 0.25, whereas in the treatment group, it fell by 0.38. Thus, the average treatment effect is - 0.63. More importantly, the exact economic change has a more negligible effect on a leader's popularity but the result is also flipped.

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Results confirm that the same economic pressure has different psychological effects depending on whether it is administered by a member of one's group or the leader of an out-group. Reduced welfare caused by an in-group agent is likely to create opposition to the group's leadership. By contrast, the reduced interest of equal size caused by an out-group agent does not produce significant opposition. Indeed, it reinforces support for the leader.

Below is the breakdown of results by sex.

	Control		Treatment	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Opposition Pre-Treatment	0.60 (0.163)	0.55 (0.120)	0.83 (0.112)	0.50 (0.138)
Opposition Post-Treatment	0.8 (0.133)	0.83 (0.090)	0.16 (0.112)	0.35 (0.132)
Change in Opposition	0.20 (0.200)	0.27 (0.135)	- 0.66 (0.142)	- 0.14 (0.177)

There is no statistically significant difference across sexes. The performance of both male and female subjects more or less mirrors the results for the whole sample. The only sizable difference is that the treatment effect is more significant in males. Females appear to be slightly more likely to oppose the leader regardless of the source of the threat to their welfare.

	Male	Female
Average Treatment Effect	- 0.86 (0.075)	- 0.42 (0.057)
Change in Opposition in All Treatment & Ctrl Aggregated	- 0.272 (0.149)	0.093 (0.113)

The only finding that is significantly different across sexes is that there is a higher tendency amongst females to oppose the leader if we lump the control and treatment groups together. It is the only statistic that has different signs for the two. The revelation that the source of the threat to their welfare is an out-group member appears to be less effective in garnering support for the leader among females.

4. Analysis

A common concern in all experimental studies is the extent of generalizability. Strictly speaking, the experiment confirms that individuals in the laboratory exhibit the hypothesized effect. But ‘do citizens in countries under political punishments react similarly?’ We argue that people in the real world are more likely to respond this way than laboratory subjects.

First, group identity is usually stronger in nations than in a temporary lab team.

Research shows that identities affect people's opinions even if they are newly formed and are whimsical (Tajfel 1970). Our findings confirm these results. But the depth and history of identity play a role in its effect. If such a shallow and newly formed lab identity creates a "Rally Around the Flag" effect, then it will be safe to conclude that nationality is more likely to have such an effect.

In addition to the effects of nationality, a leader's popularity is often an essential factor. National leaders usually use propaganda and the education system to inculcate a sense of loyalty in citizens. No such means were employed in the experiment. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the observed effect would be more substantial in the real world.

A significant limitation is the consequences of changing the leader. In the experiment, there are no real consequences except for the possibility of economic gain. There are no negative consequences involved, for example, the disintegration of the country or perhaps a takeover of the country by the enemy or other opposition groups. In the real world, these factors make the situation much more complicated.

Another limitation that it is hard to see how an experiment can overcome is choosing the leader. In this study, subjects were told that leaders were selected at random. Randomization is meant to rule out any correlation between observed and unobserved variables, including the treatment and potential outcomes. Yet, in such an experiment, randomization might be considered a treatment in its own right. Instead of ruling out any mechanism of succession, randomized leadership could itself be considered a succession mechanism. A randomized leader probably enjoys a different measure of popularity than one who is democratically elected or who has assumed power in a coup. It might be safely assumed that specific methods of the assumption of control can make a leader more or less popular than a randomized one.

In the language of causal identification theory, the assumption of consistency is thrown into question. However, “despite the sophistication of causal identification theory, estimators based on simple covariate adjustment remain the most common strategy for evaluating the ACE from data” (Nabi 2021).

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A series of experiments in which different modes of succession are tested can be helpful to avoid this problem. A large sample can be divided into subsamples in each of which the leader can be chosen using a different method. Even in such an experiment, however, it is hard to see how a coup, for example, can be simulated. One way to get as close as possible to a natural experiment would be to sample subjects from populations that have recently undergone the modes of succession in question. For instance, Egypt can be considered a suitable candidate for testing people's reaction to political punishments imposed on a leader who has assumed power in a coup.

In sum, however, given the conformity of the results with the theoretical expectations garnered from the sociology and political science pieces of literature on identity, it is safe to conclude that the experiment verifies the hypothesis that a reduction of welfare has a different effect when it is attributed to an out-group versus an in-group agent. When economic failure is believed to have been brought about by an outsider, it solidifies the position of the leader. This finding questions much of the practice and part of the theory of political punishments.

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