

*In the Name of God*

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## **About Journal**

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# Examining the Role of Faqih in the System Building According to Imam Khomeini; from Supervision to Velayat Regarding the Qur'an Teachings and Etrat

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## Abstract

The views and thoughts of Imam Khomeini indicated that his political thought is undoubtedly inspired by Shia faith and Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), i.e., the school of the Qur'an and Etrat. However, we should not ignore the impact of socio-political conditions and developments in society on their formation because using the teachings of the Qur'an and Etrat as well as Ijtihad, Shia jurisprudence can be flexible following various events and conditions of the community. The present study aimed to explain the reasons for the change and evolution of Imam Khomeini's views over time by comparing his views on the political system and the role of fuqahā (Islamic jurists) in the system building. To this aim, two important works of Imam have been studied, namely "Kashf al-Asrar," written in the early 1320s SH and "Velayat-e Faqih" introduced in the late 1340s SH. Based on the theoretical framework of Spragens' crisis, the hypothesis of the study says that although Imam Khomeini has faced a similar crisis in each period, in his view, the severity of the crisis and, most importantly, the causes of the crisis are completely different and have led to different solutions. Consequently, Imam Khomeini considers the inefficiency of the rulers as the cause of the situation in Kashf al-Asrar, and the key is the supervision of fuqahā. But in Velayat-e-Faqih, the cause of the problem is recognized as the political system's inefficiency. The answer is to overthrow the existing system and establish an Islamic government based on Velayat-e Faqih (Governance of the Jurist). It proves that the conditions and developments of the society have played a significant role in the formation of Imam's political thought.

**Keywords:** Spragens, Imam Khomeini, Crisis, Kashf al-Asrar, Velayat-e Faqih, Quran, Etrat.

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### Introduction

The role of crisis, developments and various conditions in the formation of political theories can be ignored, but special attention should be paid to their construction for a better understanding. It is especially true for pragmatic thinkers and those concerned about solving their society's natural rather than abstract problems. Hossein Bashirieh mentions this issue in his book "History of twentieth-Century Political Thought." He believes that there is a difference between political philosophy and political thought; political thought is more pragmatic and has abandoned the abstract interests of political philosophy, including the discussion of reasons, necessity, and the foundations of the formation of the government. Bashirieh believes that political thought is shaped by reality and what exists, but political philosophy is presented in an abstract world and far from fact (Bashirieh, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 17).

It is necessary to mention that great thinkers have always addressed abstract and philosophical issues to formulate their theory before proposing solutions. But it should not be overlooked that thought is not formed in a vacuum, and every thinker must have faced a question before addressing a subject. It is a general rule, and some theories have been proposed regardless of temporal and spatial conditions (Spragens, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 39). Therefore, studying a text alone is not enough to know a political thought because every idea is rooted in particular issues that the interpreter must understand and the reader. In other words, he must know what question the author has sought to answer. As Glenn Tinder says: "A scholar who is familiar with the answers but does not know the questions, knows almost nothing of political thought" (Tinder, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 4).

Imam Khomeini is also one of the prominent thinkers in the world. According to the above, he can be both a political philosopher who intends to answer general and abstract questions and a political thinker derived from the Qur'an and Etrat who uses them to solve specific problems of society. At every opportunity, he informs the people with his warnings about three issues: Pure Islam (Mohammadi, not Yazid or other Taghuts), Velayat-e-Faqih (Governance of the Jurist), and the connection between religion and politics (Mohammadi Eshtehardi, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 14), part of which refers to verse 256 of Al-Baqarah (فمن يكفر بالطاغوت ويؤمن بالله) and the other amount is based on narrations such as the Tawqī (letters) of Imam Mahdi (AS) (فأما الحوادث الواقعة فارجعوا الى رواه احاديثنا) (al-Hur al-Amili, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 101, 18). Since it is beyond the scope of this article to deal with Imam's philosophical discussions, only his political views are mentioned in the two books of "Kashf al-Asrar," and "Velayat-e Faqih" are discussed.

In these two important works, Imam Khomeini has discussed the

political system and the role of fuqahā in system building. In *Kashf al-Asrar*, he did not express any opposition to the principle of the imperial system and only took a stand against individuals and the Shah. According to Imam's view in this book, fuqahā have never opposed the basis of the monarchy, and if they have sometimes expressed opposition, it has been opposition to the sultan (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 186). At that point, Imam considers the supervision of fuqahā to be sufficient and does not want a faqih to rule in any way.

Imam's view on the role of fuqahā in government in *Velayat-e-Faqih* differs from his view in *Kashf al-Asrar*. In the late 1340s, in the face of problems and to solve them, he proposed overthrowing the monarchy and establishing an Islamic government under the leadership of a fully qualified faqih (Khomeini, n.d.: 182).

From the above, it can be understood that Imam Khomeini (AS) presents a reformist view in *Kashf al-Asrar* and a radical and utterly subversive view in *Velayat-e Faqih*. Hence, in the early 1320s, he considered the role of fuqahā to be limited to supervising the rulers, but in the late 1340s, he believed that fuqahā should be in power, having the same authority as the Prophet (PBUH). This study looks for the causes of this change. 'Why and how did Imam Khomeini change from a reformist theorist to a radical theorist?'

The present article hypothesises that Imam sought to respond to the crisis of his time and always sought to remove the obstacles and problems of society. As the socio-political situation in Iran has changed over time, his solution has also changed. In *Kashf al-Asrar*, and per the conditions of that time, the answer is considered to be the supervision of fuqahā and the reform of the rulers. Still, in *Velayat-e Faqih*, he thinks of overthrowing the system and ruling a faqih.

The theoretical framework used in this research is Thomas Spragens' Crisis Theory which consists of four stages. According to the framework, every political thinker starts theorizing about the events, happenings and socio-political crises that occur continuously in his own time and place. As stated by Spragens, most theorists wrote their works when they felt their society was in trouble. Once the crisis has been appropriately identified, the theorist must find the root of the problem. The next stage is the image of a political order that did not exist in his time. Finally, the theorist presents his practical suggestions (Spragens, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 39-40).

Therefore, each political theory is formed in four stages: Observing crisis and disorder, diagnosing the problem and cause of the situation, imaginative reconstruction of the polis, and prescribing a solution. The hypothesis is tested in this theoretical framework and the form of these stages.

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One of the researches conducted in this field is an article entitled "Study of the Evolution of Imam Khomeini's Political Thoughts before and after the Islamic Revolution and the Impact of Time and Place on It." Although the article emphasizes the evolution of Imam's thought from 1320 to 1348, it superficially and transiently considers this change as merely due to Imam's difference in the position about the anti-authoritarian movement in Iran in the two mentioned periods (Mansournejad, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 8). Another article entitled "The Reason for Abd al-Razzaq Mesri and Imam Khomeini's Different Views on the Relationship between Religion and Politics" has been written, emphasising the impact of Shia discourse and concepts such as Velayat on the formation of Velayat-e Faqih theory (Mozaffari, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 129). Therefore, the emphasis on the impact of the current crisis on the construction of Imam Khomeini's political theory distinguishes this study from previous studies.

The present article consists of three parts. In the first part, Imam Khomeini's views in *Kashf al-Asrar* and the socio-political conditions prevailing in Iran in the 1320s are examined. The second part deals with the theory of Velayat-e Faqih and the requirements of its formation in the 1340s. Finally, the third section is devoted to summarizing the content and testing the hypothesis.

### 1. *Kashf al-Asrar*

Imam Khomeini wrote *Kashf al-Asrar* in 1323 SH in response to "Secrets of a Thousand Years" written by Hakamizadeh. The beliefs of Shia Muslims and especially Muslims the positions of clerics in society were severely criticized. Imam has dealt with several issues in this book to answer the doubts raised by Hakamizadeh. However, the main discussion is the issues related to government and politics and the role of fuqahā in the government. Still, before addressing them, we should examine the socio-political conditions and developments of that time.

The political situation in Iran in the early years of the 1320s seemed very favourable compared to the rule of Reza Shah. Mohammad Reza is a young and inexperienced king who has just ascended the throne and has little power. People who were fed up with Reza Shah's dictatorship now seemed satisfied with the status quo. An essential feature of this period in the contemporary history of Iran is the relative freedom that emerged in society after about two decades of Reza Shah's dictatorship. Numerous parties and hundreds of newspapers and weeklies were created and published in the country. The people witnessed relatively free elections, and the parliament almost returned to its legal status (Zibakalam, 2004 AD/1383



SH: 1). With the fall of Reza Shah, it was as if the black night of tyranny was over, and sparks of hope appeared over time. Political prisoners were freed; political, religious and other meetings could now be held openly; newspapers and books could be published without political censorship; people could speak freely in their homes, unafraid of being reported by a servant or relative; women could wear the chadur and go to the public bath (Katouzian, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 186). The emergence of different parties, groups, guilds and the creation of conditions for the expression of different opinions showed the improvement of the situation, and it should be noted how hopeful the people who had experienced Reza Shahi's tyranny and its suffocating atmosphere were in this situation. In the words of Abrahamian: "The reign of silence was superseded by the clamour of flamboyant deputies, lively journalists, outspoken party leaders, and discontented demonstrators." (Abrahamian, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 153)

Imam Khomeini wrote *Kashf al-Asrar* in this regard. Throughout the book, Imam considers Reza Shah's rule as a dictatorship, calling him a murderer, thief and looter of the country. He also refers to how members of parliament came to power and fraud in the elections of that time (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 180). The main problem that plagued the society at that time was the tyranny of Reza Shah towards the people. In the imperial system that ruled Iran, everything was under the supervision and command of the Shah, and no one was able to oppose his orders. During the reign of Reza Shah, he had absolute power, and the Shah determined even the composition of the parliament. As stated by Abrahamian, the parliament was reduced to a rubber stamp. Reza Shah appointed the prime minister and all his ministers, and they all, as usual, received a vote of confidence from the parliament and remained in office as long as the Shah trusted them. Reza Shah closed down independent newspapers and destroyed the political parties (Abrahamian, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 126). Although the government was a constitutional monarchy and the people were involved in its administration, in reality, everything revolved around one person's absolute will and served him. Hence, the Majlis became a redundant rubber-stamp; ministers degenerated into the Shah's houseboys, and their departments became- in the first instance- instruments for the promotion of the Shah's public wishes and private property (Katouzian, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 169).

Imam also understood this situation well and repeatedly attacked Reza Shah's government in *Kashf al-Asrar*. In his view, all the laws and orders related to that time were invalid: "The orders issued by Reza Khan's dictatorial government have no value, and even the papers of the laws that were passed in the parliament during his time should be burned and erased

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and the lawyers in those days do not have the right to practice law today." (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 214)

It indicates that Imam, at the time of writing *Kashf al-Asrar*, considered Reza Khan as a clear example of the verse "يريدون ان يتحاكموا الى الطاغوت وقد امروا ان يكفروا به" (al-Nisa: 60) that should be avoided, but he hopes that the situation will improve. The writings of the book show that Imam objected to Reza Shah's dictatorship and called his government a tyrant because Reza Shah did not do his job: "If the government is conscientious and acts based on the reason of the Islamic state, and the government employees are conscientious, not thieves or smugglers, and behave according to the official law of the country which is the law of Islam, that government is not oppressive nor have the government employees supported oppression and tyranny" (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 239). But in an Islamic government, the structure of the rule of kings is not acceptable because Islam never endorses their practice.

Considering that the socio-political situation of the society had improved by rejecting Reza Shah and not changing the ruling political system, Imam recognized the inefficiency of the rulers as the cause of tyranny, oppression and corruption. Imam believes that not to repeat these problems and prevent the rulers from deviating, *fuqahā* should supervise them. Therefore, he says: "We do not say that a faqih should govern the government, but we say that the government should be governed by the law of God, which is the good of the country and the people, and this will not happen without the supervision of a cleric." (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 222) According to Imam's view on *Kashf al-Asrar*, a good government is a government in which the divine laws are observed, even in the form of a kingdom. This view is called the ordered theory of Velayat in Islamic society. Perhaps it can be said that the atmosphere of writing the book, the demagogue of the author of 'Secrets of a Thousand Years', and the exceptional situation of the country in the years of writing the book has made Imam formulate this theory (Jamshidi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 510). Therefore, he says: "If a monarchy or a government is formed... they (*fuqahā*) have never opposed this semi-system and did not want to destroy the foundation of the government" (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 186). This method of Imam is the same as the lives way of the Imams who sometimes did not rise against the governments and caliphs of their time to protect the interests of the Islamic society. Imam considers time and place as two determining elements that cause an issue that had a ruling in the past seem to find a new command in the future (Jamshidi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 138). In response to what is meant by 'Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist', Imam said somewhere

in the book that Velayat-e-Faqih does not imply that a faqih is simultaneously a king, minister, or military minister person and a sweeper. Still, that fuqahā should oversee the election of the sultan as well as the legislature. This supervision is also for the divine laws to be implemented in the society and not violated (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 185).

So far, determined the crisis, the cause of the problem, and its solution from Imam Khomeini's point of view in *Kashf al-Asrar* based on Spragens' crisis's theoretical framework. But Spragens envisions another stage in forming a political theory called the "Imaginative Reconstruction of the Polis." He believes that the pressures, crises, disorders, and disruptions of the old system make the theorists think of rebuilding a new political system in their minds (Spragens, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 120).

Studying the works of Imam Khomeini, it becomes clear that he considers an ideal society that is under the rule of God, "ان الحكم الا لله" (al-An'am: 57). Therefore, he says: "No one has the right to rule except God, and no one has the right to legislate. Reason dictates that God should form a government for the people and enact the laws. Such Law is the Sacred Law of Islam" (Khomeini, 1944 AD/1323 SH: 184). Accordingly, God does this through His chosen servants, who are the prophets. But according to the Shia religion, after the death of the Prophet (PBUH), the infallible Imams (AS) will be responsible for running the society. Shia Muslims believe that God should determine the Imamate and leadership of the community, and the caliphs and sultans do not deserve it. Imam Khomeini has dealt with this issue in detail in *Kashf al-Asrar* and provides evidence to prove it, including verse 67 of Surah Ma'idah: "يا ايها الرسول بلغ ما انزل اليك من ربك وان لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته والله يعصمك من الناس ان الله لا يهدي القوم الكافرين". He considers the circumstances of the revelation of this verse related to the announcement of the Imamate of Ali (AS) in Ghadir Khum by the Prophet (PBUH) (ibid., 112-130). Accordingly, the Prophet acts by the command of God and introduces Ali (AS) as his successor. Therefore, after the Prophet (PBUH), Imam Ali (AS) manages society. After him, the Imamate will be entrusted to the children of that nobleman by the God command, and this dynasty will continue until the twelfth Imam. Twelver Shi'a Muslims believe that Imam Mahdi (AS) has disappeared, and they are awaiting his return. Imam Khomeini also strongly confirms this point, stressing that the ideal government is Imam Mahdi (AS) that fills the earth with justice. He considers all governments during the absence to be flawed: "None of the governments that will be formed until the appearance in the world will do their job" (ibid., 225). It indicates that the most desirable society from Imam Khomeini's point of view is that the prophets and saints of God govern. The issues

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related to supervision or guardianship of the faqih are raised in a situation where the groundwork is not laid for the infallibles rule.

Based on the theoretical framework of Spragens' crisis, Imam Khomeini's view in *Kashf al-Asrar* in the early 1320s is as follows:

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Observing crisis and disorder                    | Tyranny, oppression and corruption                       |
| Diagnosis of the problem and cause of the crisis | Inefficiency of rulers                                   |
| Imaginative reconstruction of the polis          | Society under the leadership of the infallible Imam (AS) |
| Prescribing a solution to the problem            | Fuqahā supervision over the government                   |

## 2. Velayat-e Faqih

When Imam Khomeini was in exile because of his opposition to the policies of Mohammad Reza Shah, he proposed a theory known as Velayat-e-Faqih. The idea and its formation in terms of the theoretical framework of the crisis are examined. As Spragens says, to understand a political theory, one must first recognize the problem faced by the thinker in question. Therefore, in the case of Imam Khomeini, understanding how his political thought relates to the external realities of society is of great importance. Thus, the developments and socio-political conditions of the period after the 28 Mordad coup d'état, especially the 1340s SH, must be examined to properly understand the conditions for the formation of the theory Velayat-e Faqih.

A significant problem that has plagued almost all Third World countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the issue of colonization and the presence of foreign forces in those countries. Although Iran was never fully colonized, it was always under the influence of powerful and colonial governments, which we see during the second Pahlavi regime and after the coup. The effect of countries such as the United States and Britain, which had diminished during the 1320s and resulted from the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran's economy and politics, increased again. An example of this was the 1333 oil contract, which left the production and supply of Iranian oil to a consortium of British, American, French and Dutch companies for 25 years (Katouzian, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 247). In addition to oil contracts, another critical factor that influenced the political-economic influence of foreigners in the country's affairs was receiving loans and financial aid from them. According to Abrahamian, between 1332 and 1336, they acquired a total of \$145 million in emergency economic aid from the United States to ward off government bankruptcy (Abrahamian, 2010: 382).

Imam Khomeini was not unaware of this issue and always warned the people in his messages and speeches about the destructive role of the colonialists: "The arrogant are not limited to kings, presidents, oppressive governments. The arrogant have a general meaning; one example is foreigners who consider all nations weak and aggress" (Hajizadeh and Darini, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 3). He writes about the colonialists' plans to strike at Islam and the clergy in the book "The Greatest Jihad: Combat with the Self" and warns that their main goal is the destruction of Islam: "The colonialists want to destroy all aspects of Islam, and you must stand up against them." (Khomeini, 1972 AD/1351 SH: 56)

Muhammad Reza Shah's devotion to foreigners was constantly increasing, leading to Imam Khomeini's arrival on the scene in the 1340s. One example of Imam's struggle against the presence and interference of foreigners in the country's affairs was his opposition to the passage of the Capitulation Law in Mehr 1343, according to which all American advisers and employees in Iran enjoyed judicial immunity. Imam Khomeini described this disgraceful law as follows: "If an American servant or an American cook assassinates your Marja in the bazaar or knock the stuffing out of him, Iranian police are not allowed to stop him, Iranian courts do not deserve to judge him... the case must be referred to the U.S and be decided there by American lords." (The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 1992 AD/1371 SH: Vol. 1, 170)

Another major problem that severely affected society was the growing tyranny of the government towards the people. In the previous pages, it was mentioned that after the overthrow of Reza Shah and the coming to power of the new shah, the suffocating atmosphere of the society improved, and we witnessed the participation of the people in the form of parties, unions and guilds. But these conditions did not last long, and the challenging situation returned to society with more intensity.

The events in Iran after the coup d'etat of 1332 were the exact opposite of what happened in 1320. Political activists were arrested and tried illegally in military courts. In 1336, the Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) was formed to suppress the opposition and consolidate the power of the Shah. The path of Iran's political history since the 28 Mordad coup d'état is based on the destruction of institutions of legal participation and disabling the pillars of the famous political system such as the Parliament and the Executive and turning them into tools of personal power. Another period begins in the continuation of the previous tradition, which continues until 1357. The decrees of the Shah communicated all critical decisions, the parliament and other organizations had a dummy role (Azghandi, 2003

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AD/1382 SH: 232). The tyranny and monopoly of the Shah, especially in the 1340s and 1350s, reached their peak due to the huge oil revenues and the lack of need to collect taxes from the people. According to the formula of "non-Taxation Versus non-Representation," the Shah, as the country's first-person, made all decisions, did not feel any obligation to the people and carried out his political and economic actions regardless of social will and consent. Thus, everyone should be obedient and submissive to the Shah (Azghandi, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 43-44).

This suffocating atmosphere severely suppressed dissenting voices, and no one could stand against His Majesty's demands. Farzin Vahdat, in his book "Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity" describes the tough situation of Iran in the era of Mohammad Reza Shah. He writes: "After the bloody suppression of the Khordad 1342 religious uprising, in which Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers played a central role, the Shah's secret police, the SAVAK, expanded their control over almost all aspects of public life, banning independent political parties; political literature, art, the discourse was subject to widespread censorship" (Vahdat, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 198).

Another critical problem that has plagued Iranian society is its widespread economic corruption, which has made the ruling class richer and ordinary people poorer. This corruption started from the government system of the Shah and eventually reached the lower classes. The exact amount of the Shah's wealth is unknown, as it was distributed in many countries around the world, in banks, insurance companies, construction companies, private enterprises, restaurants and hotels. According to Azghandi, there are incomplete statistics that Mohammad Reza Shah and his wife had a capital of about \$35 billion and held between 30 to 40% of the shares of private banks in Iran (Azghandi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 241).

As the wealth of the Shah and his entourage increased, the ordinary people became poorer day by day and lived with great hardship. In this regard, Imam Khomeini says: "The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence" (Khomeini, n.d.: 37). An important questioned issue is taking care of the deprived people of the society, who have always been deprived of their rights due to not being connected to the ruling class.

Therefore, it can be said that tyranny, oppression and corruption in all fields had reached their peak in the 1340s. The Pahlavi regime had made Iran one of the most dependent countries on the West, especially the United

States. Culturally, the prevalence of slavery, corruption and debauchery, and from a religious point of view, lack of religious affiliation along with the distortion of spiritual truths and the removal of religious values from society as a result of foreign cultural invasion, had spread throughout Iran (Jamshidi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 14).

Once the crisis has been identified, we must examine the cause of the crisis from Imam's point of view. At this point, he presents the imperial system as a secular system that called for the separation of religion from politics and the exclusion of fuqahā from political and social affairs as the main cause of the crisis and problems of society. Accordingly, the government always tried to separate politics from religion so that religious scholars would not interfere in the government's policies and the Shah could do whatever he wanted arbitrarily. Azghandi describes this situation as follows: "In fact, from 1340 onwards, Mohammad Reza Shah sought to realize the theory of the separation of religion from politics and not Islam minus the clergy. He promoted a religion that was parallel to his policies or at least indifferent to the social and cultural policies of the Shah." (Azghandi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 107) The Pahlavi government took steps to achieve this goal, including propaganda against religion. For example, they declared that Islam is not a comprehensive religion providing for every aspect of human life and has no laws or ordinances pertaining to society. It has no particular form of government. Islam concerns itself only with rules of ritual purity after menstruation and parturition. It may have a few ethical principles, but it certainly has nothing to say about human life in general and the ordering of society (Khomeini, n.d.: 7). Imam believes that propaganda against Islam by the government has unfortunately been effective and has left the rules and laws of Islam unknown. He considers influencing the clergy as one of the important tools of anti-religious propaganda and calls them preachers of the government system who present an incomplete form of Islam in seminaries to stop Muslims implementing the rules of Islam (ibid., 7). Imam Khomeini also mentioned this issue in his political-divine testament: "In the hands of oppressive rulers and wicked preachers, who were more decadent than the Taghut rulers, the Holy Qur'an was abused as an instrument of oppression, cruelty and corruption and was distorted to justify acts of tyranny by the enemies of God. Unfortunately, in the hands of conniving enemies and ignorant friends, the Holy Qur'an, this divine book that is empowered to decide man's destiny, has found no place anywhere except in graveyards and at the gatherings for the dead." (Khomeini, 1989: 5)

In short, Imam Khomeini considers the cause of the crisis at this point to be the inefficiency of the ruling political system, which must keep its

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primary enemy - Islam and its guardians - away from the political arena to survive. It is pretty evident that to solve a crisis, so we must eliminate its cause. Imam Khomeini believes the cause of the concern in the 1340s was the ruling political system, i.e., the monarchy, which had to be destroyed. As Imam said in the late 40s: "Monarchy and hereditary succession represents the same sinister and evil system of government that prompted Imam Hussein (AS), the Doyen of the Martyrs, to rise in revolt and seek martyrdom to prevent its establishment... Islam does not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession;" (Khomeini, n.d.: 11) because in Islam, according to verse 120 of Surah Tawbah, unquestioning obedience to the leader and commander is necessary (Masoudpour, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 1, 338) and if the ruler is a tyrant, obedience to him is forbidden (al-Nisa: 60).

Imam Khomeini was trained in the school of the Qur'an and the Ahl al-Bayt (AS). Therefore, the different positions of Imam Khomeini can be related to the various roles of Imam Hassan and Imam Hussein (AS) against the Umayyad rule or Imam Hussein's different approaches in confronting Mu'awiyah and Yazid. Mu'awiyah sometimes pretended to be religious while Yazid was trying to overthrow Islam. The behaviour of Aba Abdullah (AS) had not changed in principles, but according to the circumstances, it was changed. The same is true of Imam Khomeini. When the young king pretended to pay attention to the demands and rights of the Muslim people of the country, Imam Khomeini only emphasized the need for the supervision of scholars and fuqahā on the performance of the rulers. And when, around the 1940s, the Shah made every effort to eliminate his main rival, i.e., the religion of Islam, Imam Khomeini spoke of overthrow. Moreover, it can be said that at first, Imam Khomeini did not have enough supporters and companions to be able to confront the tyranny of his time openly.

Before examining Imam Khomeini's approach in the book of Velayat-e Faqih, we should say that the ideal society from his point of view in this book is a society under the rule of God and under the leadership of the Imam (AS), which was mentioned in the review section of *Kashf al-Asrar*. There is no need to repeat it.

After identifying the crisis and its cause, a solution must be provided to treat the community. To this end, Imam Khomeini inevitably distances himself from his ideal society, which is the rule of the infallible saints of God. Still, as for what should be done in the time of occultation, he says: "Now that we are in the time of the Occultation of the Imam (AS), it is still necessary that the ordinances of Islam relating to government be preserved and maintained, and that anarchy be prevented. Therefore, the establishment of government is still a necessity. Reason also dictates that we establish a



government to be able to ward off aggression and to defend the honor of the Muslims in case of attack” (Khomeini, n.d.: 53). It is clear from these statements that Imam Khomeini considers the establishment of a religious government as the solution to the crisis of society. However, it should be noted that throughout the history of Islam, many governments have been formed under the name of Islamic government, including the system based on the caliphate and the kingdoms that claimed are Islamic. Imam refers to the Islamic government as a particular type of government first established in Iran, a system based on Velayat-e Faqih. He has repeatedly pointed out that Islam has a comprehensive relationship with politics, and the two cannot be separated: “I swear by God that Islam is politics in its entirety, but it has been misrepresented. Political science originates from Islam” (The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 1992 AD/1372 S: 1, 105). Therefore, Muslims must form an Islamic government, must enforce a government in which sovereignty belongs to God and divine laws (Dastani Biraki, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 299). Instead, it is managed under the supervision of a fully qualified faqih.

Regarding the conditions of a faqih who should be the ruler of the Islamic society, he raises two prerequisites: Knowledge of law and justice. Because the Islamic government is the rule of law, the ruler must be aware of the divine laws, and on the other hand, he must have religious and moral perfection and not be tainted with sins, which is justice. Imam Khomeini considers such a person suitable for leading the Islamic society during the absence of the infallible Imam (AS): “If a worthy individual possessing these two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will maintain the same authority as the Noblest Messenger (PBUH) in the administration of society. It will be the duty of all people to obey him” (Khomeini, n.d.: 55). According to the issues raised, Imam Khomeini considers a fully qualified faqih as the successors of the Prophet (PBUH), and the Imam (AS) believe that should establish an Islamic government to save society and get rid of the current crises under the leadership of the Valiye Faqih (Supreme Leader).

Imam Khomeini's view in Velayat-e Faqih and the theoretical framework of Spragens’ crisis is as follows:

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Observing crisis and disorder                    | Oppression and corruption   |
| Diagnosis of the problem and cause of the crisis | Inefficiency of the political system                                  |
| Imaginative reconstruction of the polis          | Society under the leadership of the infallible Imam (AS)              |
| Prescribing a solution to the problem            | Establishment of an Islamic government in the form of Velayat-e-Faqih |

### 3. Differences in Identifying the Causes and Various Solutions

In the previous sections, an attempt was made to reconcile Imam Khomeini's view, at two different points in time, about the government and the role of fuqahā in the system building with the theoretical framework of Spragens' crisis. As mentioned before, in *Kashf al-Asrar*, Imam considered curing society as reforming the system through the supervision of fuqahā over the executors and legislators. Still, in *Velayat-e-Faqih*, the solution to the problems is overthrowing the imperial system and establishing an Islamic government under the leadership of a fully qualified faqih. By putting the above together, we can easily understand the reasons for the evolution of his political theory.

In both periods, the 1320s and 1340s, which are the subject of the present study, Imam is facing an almost similar crisis, namely tyranny, oppression and corruption. However, according to him, the cause of the problem is different in each period. It has already been explained that the socio-political situation in Iran in the early 1320s, with the departure of Reza Shah, suddenly changed and significantly reduced Rezakhan's tyranny. The point is that the monarchy had not changed but had changed with the king's replacement. Therefore, Imam Khomeini recognizes the cause of the crisis as the inefficiency of Reza Shah himself and his henchmen. Hence, the solution he offers, namely monitoring the rulings, is appropriate to this cause.

That is why identifying the causes of a crisis is essential for understanding the problem and treating it. The critical point that Spragens points out at this stage, which he considers one of the most sensitive issues in political theory, is that the identification of different causes for problems and crises is the source of the separation of the schools of political theory. What is essential at this stage is that the theorist cannot make appropriate suggestions for the treatment of the problem without clarifying the natural causes (Spragens, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 80).

According to the above mentioned, Imam in the 1320s, under the influence of relatively free conditions after the Reza Shah dictatorship, hoped to improve the situation; the effect of these conditions can be seen in identifying the causes of the crisis in providing treatment by him. Imam's relative satisfaction with that situation can be seen in his statement in a proclamation issued in the early 1340s: "My generation remembers that in 1941 the Iranian people were happy that the invading foreigners threw out the shah. I do not want the present shah to meet the same fate as the old shah. It is why I beseech the shah (Mohammad Reza) respect the religious authorities, don't help Israel, and learn from your father's mistakes." (Abrahamian,

2010: 389) But as mentioned before, the Iranian society and government's situation went against the people's expectations, and the crisis in the 1340s was visible. In these circumstances, Imam correctly recognized the cause of the problem in the context of time and, as a result, distanced himself from his position in *Kashf al-Asrar*. At this time, he recognized the cause of the crisis, the inefficiency of individuals, and the entire monarchy.

Consequently, he called for the overthrow of the existing system. Therefore, the solution is not only the supervision of *fuqahā* over rulers but also the direct rule of a fully qualified *faqih* over the society. Before this period, Imam sought to reform the monarchy, but seeing the widespread anti-Islamic dimensions of the Pahlavi regime, he called for the abolition of the system and the establishment of a new government. In a period in the history of Iran, namely in the 1340s when the crisis had become widespread, and almost everyone was aware of it, Imam proposed the theory of *Velayat-e-Faqih*. It is worth mentioning that the 1340s was the period of the culmination of the sabotage of the Pahlavi regime, and these problems and crises provoked the society and coherently started the struggles. Iranian society in this period has witnessed the emergence of many theories by different groups and individuals. The emergence of groups such as the Freedom Movement centred on Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleghani, *Fadaiyan-e-Islam* and the *Mojahedin Khalq*, both of which had Marxist leanings. Above all, the direct entry of Imam Khomeini into the struggle against the regime all occurred in the 1340s.

Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hosseinizadeh, in his book "Political Islam as a Discourse" clearly refers to how the crises of the 1340s provoked the minds of various thinkers and groups. He believes that since the beginning of the 1340s, the Pahlavi regime has shown its repressive, secular, and pro-Western features and each of them stimulated and strengthened anti discourses. Authoritarianism and Westernization supported freedom and localism, and finally, anti-religious policies led to the reconstruction of religious principles and speech and led it to become more and more politicized (Hosseinizadeh, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 183). Hussein Bashirieh also emphasizes that the politicization of Islam in the twentieth century was a reaction to the spread of secularism. He believes that although Islam was presented as a political movement in response to the threats and pressures of modernism in the contemporary era, it showed more of its political image (Bashirieh, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 404).

Therefore, the relatively improved situation of the 1320s and the highly critical situation of the 1340s had a significant impact on the formation of Imam's political theory about government and the role of *fuqahā* in the system

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building. The following sentence from Imam Khomeini, delivered by him in a speech in 1357, clearly shows the impact of the crisis and circumstances on the formation of his political theory: "If only they had compromised somewhat with the people; if only they had heeded the people's demands; if only they had performed their duties; if only they had shown sympathy towards Islam and the laws of Islam then the people would not have opposed them so." (Khomeini, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 2, 26)

It is understood from these discussions that Imam Khomeini's primary concern is the dominance of Islamic affairs over society, and in his view, what is essential and constant is the content of the government. Its form may change according to circumstances, as long as the rules of Islam are respected and enforced. The sanctities of Muslims are not insulted. Evidence shows that Imam did not want to gain political power for himself and other clerics in any way. He inevitably entered politics when he saw the society was exposed to complete corruption and destruction.

#### Conclusion

Discussing and thinking about Imam Khomeini's political thought is very important as a renowned thinker and to get acquainted with his views as the leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The founder of a new political system in the world; especially since the idea of Imam is taken from the Qur'an and Etrat. Therefore, this study, analyzed his political views from different angles. The article's primary purpose was to examine the evolution of Imam's views on the role of fuqahā and their position in government, presented in the two books of "Kashf al-Asrar" and "Velayat-e Faqih," which we achieved using the theoretical framework of Spranges' crisis. For that purpose, he studied his thoughts and opinions in the two books and the socio-political conditions of Iran in the two decades of 1320 and 1340 and its religious documents in detail.

The critical issue is that Imam considers the role of fuqahā in Kashf al-Asrar to supervise the rulers and implement the rules of Islam merely. Still, in Velayat-e-Faqih, he wants fuqahā to rule over the society. In response to why Imam's view on the role of fuqahā in the government has changed, the authors believe that since Imam always sought to answer and solve the problems and issues of society, he presented his solution according to the conditions and developments. The inclusion of the socio-political developments in his theory about the Pahlavi government over the years is quite evident, as the verses of the Qur'an sometimes command peace and in some cases, war, and the same kind of stance is obvious in the lives of the Imams and the uprising of Aba Abdullah (AS). In the 1320s and in the

particular circumstances of that decade, Imam Khomeini was satisfied with the supervision of fuqahā over the government. Still, he took a different stance when he saw the severity of corruption and degeneration in later years. He moved from the supervision of fuqahā over the government to establishing an Islamic government led by a fully qualified faqih as the only way to get rid of problems.

It should be noted that the main foundation of Imam's view, namely the creation of a society based on the implementation of the rules of Islam, has not changed at all, and what has changed over time is the way to achieve this society. He always believed that Islamic scholars should intervene in political and social affairs and be the guardians and executors of the rules of Islam. Only the form of this intervention has been different in different periods and conditions. Both the views, Supervision and Velayat-e-Faqih, point to the fact that the content of the government must be Islamic.

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# Methodology of Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Politics of Enmity with the Oppressor and Support for the Oppressed)

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## Abstract

An analytical look at the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows that its strategies and procedures in the world system and the surrounding environment are methodical. The present study aimed to methodize the policy of enmity with the oppressor and support for the oppressed. The importance of this issue is that most of the mentioned strategy has not been studied in the form of theoretical and transtheoretical studies due to the label of being unscientific (Western attitude). Therefore, the concern is 'how the methods of recognizing the policy of hostility to the oppressor and support for the oppressed in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be analyzed?' The authors use the inductive method and analytical approach to introduce the innovative thesis that the four sources of religion, history, jurisprudence and futurism of Mahdavi, the policy of hostility to the oppressor and support for the oppressed. The structure of religion, through the methods of "Tawalla and Tabarra," principle of "no Way," and "Jihad," the border between the oppressed and the oppressor in foreign policy.

Due to its spiritual and material results, the source of history puts the methods of "Believing in the Culture of Ashura," "the Spirit of Self-Sacrifice," "Denying Hegemony" and "Maintaining Independence" on supporting the oppressed and hostility to the oppressor on the foreign policy agenda. The structure of jurisprudence defends the oppressed and is hostile to the oppressor in foreign policy formulation through "Dynamic Ijtihad" and "Independent Clergy." Finally, the structure of Mahdavi futurism is a guide to desirable perspectives in foreign policy with methods such as "Culture of Waiting," "Justice" and "Islamic Unity."

**Keywords:** Foreign Policy, Methodology, Support for the Oppressed and Enmity with the Oppressor.

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## **Introduction**

With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the formation of the Islamic Republic, the "Hostility to the Oppressor and Support for the Oppressed" policy has methodically found a firm place in Iran's foreign policy. However, in the study of Iranian foreign policy, the methodology<sup>1</sup> of such strategies and procedures has been less discussed. The present shortcoming is rooted in two issues: First, scholars of political and international studies, based on the mainstream of political science (politics), do not consider the ontological foundations of non-Western knowledge to be scientific due to power-knowledge considerations. Second, most thinkers who have tried to streamline Iran's foreign policy strategies have broadly used Western models unfamiliar with indigenous knowledge.

For this reason, the methodological analysis of the policy of "Hostility to the Oppressor and Support for the Oppressed" is derived from the sources and structures of Iranian foreign policy; it is essential. From a scientific point of view, the connection of the methodological issues of the policy of enmity with the oppressor and the support of the oppressed with its epistemological and ontological research reveals this policy's theoretical (scientific) coherence. Consequently, awareness of the theoretical aspects of this policy and internalizing its acceptance in the agents and policy-makers of Iran's foreign policy will lead to the realization of spiritual and material goals and interests.

Therefore, the primary purpose of this study is to answer the fundamental question of how the methodological foundations of the policy of hostility to the oppressor and support for the oppressed 'can be theoretically analyzed in Iran's foreign policy?' The authors believe that the four pillars of religion, history, jurisprudence and Mahdavi futurism enlighten the policy of enmity with the oppressor and support for the oppressed. The description of this hypothesis using a deductive method and analytical approach is on the agenda of this research. Mentioning this essential point in this research when we say foreign policy means the science or knowledge of foreign policy. Therefore, the methodology of the policy of supporting the oppressed and enmity with the oppressor is primarily theoretical in the present study and, secondly, the practical (political) dimension.

## **1. Background and Research Methods**

### **1.1. Background**

In the background of the present study, we are faced with two types of

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1 . Here, methodology is the means by which we think of appropriate ways to realize the ability to acquire knowledge about what exists.

research: The first category is research whose authors consider the policies and strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be derived from the ideological and thought sources of Muslim thinkers. For example, in a study, Imani has explored Imam Khomeini's foreign policy approach based on the Quranic rule of Tawalla and Tabarra. According to him, the jurisprudential teachings of Islam are the primary basis for the formation of Imam Khomeini's foreign policy thought (Imani, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 122-151). Zarei et al. Believe that the principle of denying domination as the basis for ensuring society's independence and preventing economic dominance has formed the foreign and macro policy structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Zarei et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 182-167). Sarvestani believes that anti-Americanism is not in itself original in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Instead, it is the result of an anti-arrogant approach. Anti-arrogance was also not a tasteful and self-made approach; it is rooted in the depths of Islamic teachings (Sarvestani, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 384-339). The second category is research whose authors do not consider research on foreign strategies and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be scientific. Because they are one of the mainstream theories of international relations (mainly realism). In his foreign policy articles, Naqibzadeh describes the foreign policy resulting from the Islamic Revolution with attributes such as "Aggressive" and "Lack of Theoretical Framework" and considers the result as "Isolationism" and "Passive Neutrality" (Naqibzadeh, 2009 AD/1389 SH: 33-55). Sajjadpour believes that he takes a holistic view of Iran's foreign policy methodology. In his opinion, [most] of the research conducted in this field is not "Scientific", but is based on "Praise" and "Condemnation", which results in the adoption of "Selective" and "Reductionist" methods (Sajjadpour, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 27-42). Sari al-Qalam believes that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is confronted with this theoretical paradox: if it mixes with the world, its identity and legitimacy will be damaged, and if it does not mix, it will be deprived of many economic, political and other possibilities (Sari al-Qalam, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 38). With the first research category approach and the rejection of the second category, this paper believes that a scientific and systematic study of the Islamic Republic of Iran (supporting the oppressed and hostility to the oppressor) is possible. These policies are original and discourse-based (based on indigenous beliefs, history, and ideas).

### **1.2. Method**

The primary method of the present study; deductive, and its approach is analytical. Type of research; it is qualitative and theoretical. Method of data collection; it is a library and documentation and data collection tools; it will be filing. The method of data analysis is also qualitative (analytical

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and logical). By examining the four constructs of religion, history, religion (jurisprudence), and the future in the Shia theoretical system, the authors hypothesize that these four pillars illustrate the policy of hostility to the oppressor and support for the oppressed. Therefore, the methodology of this policy also results in its scientific methods. In other words, in the technique of hostility to the oppressor and protection of the oppressed, for example, it is possible to study both independence and border integrity (realism approach) and in the academic community, to explore the doctrinal aspects of foreign policy (indigenous system) acceptable and legitimate is considered.<sup>1</sup>

### 2. Methodological Structures of Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Understanding the foreign policy methods of the Islamic Republic of Iran requires special temporal and spatial requirements of the Islamic Revolution for politics and political science. In many ways, the Islamic Revolution's intellectual infrastructure and ideological resources challenge methodological issues in Western social studies. In other words, the specific ontology of the Islamic Revolution has its own unique cognitive and methodological cognition for political science and foreign policy. The authors of this study believe that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been influenced by the four structures of religion, history, religion (jurisprudence), and the future. As we will see, the combination of these structures, firstly, distinguishes the methodology of Iran's foreign policy from the methods of understanding the foreign policy of other states (humanist paradigms) and, secondly, formulates the behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards international order and the environment.

#### 2.1. Religion

According to some, science has grown in thinking and material value systems and is not commensurate with religious thought and value systems (Eshkevari, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 7). However, due to the comprehensive approach of religion to various categories of human biology, religious science is one of the approaches to confront the West (Khosropanah, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 9) and modern Western humanities. Proponents of religious theory in international relations and foreign policy believe that macro theories of international relations are an analysis of many dimensions and angles of

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1. of course, the results of the policy methods of supporting the oppressed and enmity with the oppressor in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as the power of unity and coalition building of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region, etc., are not the main purpose of this article.

transcendental and transcendental issues (war and peace) and new concerns (environmental problems, the prevalence of infectious diseases, nature The future and the situation of the victims in it, etc.) have survived. This issue has led to the formation of worldviews that challenge the basis of cognition in international relations (Islami et al., 2016 AD/ 1395 SH: 211). To the extent that Eftekhari depicts ethical methods in political science as opposed to Western methods: Immoral method: In force-based and practical approaches, ethics will prevail in the realm of practical and theoretical politics that evaluates "Achievement of Interests" as the owner knows practices and theories. Ethical method: In this method, the essence of ethics and moral principles and its observance has originality, and both goals and political tools and means must be approved in the field of ethics and, naturally, religion (Eftekhari, 2015 AD/ 1394 SH: 45). Thus, unlike the new methods proposed in foreign policy, such as the quantum method, which can not provide a criterion for order and disorder (for example, the role of structure and agent in war and peace (Pan, 2020: 14), the religious theory is possible that knows the knowledge of right from wrong.

## 2.2. History

Voltaire wrote in the eighteenth century: "We must calculate, measure, measure, observe, this is the nature of philosophy, and the rest is fiction" (Jamshidi, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 32). The dominance of this method (observation and experimentation) over social sciences caused that topics such as ethics, mental perceptions, ideas, norms and [history] have no place in the scientific studies of international relations (Mir Muhammadi, 2007: 676). This approach led Mearsheimer and Walt to acknowledge that hypothesis testing and empirical research have shown inefficient international relations (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013: 427). It has also recently criticized the anti-historical instrument, emphasizing the importance of history as a method for the prosperity of international relations and foreign policy, using network theory and interpersonal trust. Considering the mechanism of "Agency" [the role of the individual] in history, he highlights the act of the part of "Clemer Von Der Goltz" in the union of Turkey and Germany (Sazak, 2020: 64).

According to Islamic thinkers such as Imam Khomeini, such a view of science (anti-historical) is condemned. From his point of view, the man himself is the subject of unique knowledge, and it is human knowledge, which is the knowledge of divine prophets and messengers. The Messenger of God (PBUH) program is the program of human education. Therefore, first of all, human beings must be known and discovered to cultivate their infinite talents: if it is a subject for any science (Jamshidi, 2004 AD/1383

SH: 32). Therefore, history and its perpetrators have a significant impact on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in two ways. First, the biopolitical and social way of historical agents, especially the figures of Islamic history, is more critical than their dominance over their political power and achievements. Second, historical agents' biopolitical and social process is modelled if moral or somewhat religious.

### **2.3. Fiqh**

International relations and foreign policy thinkers have been criticized for lacking a "Fundamental Problem-solving" theory in the last decade. This theory has a natural solution to global crises (cf. Brown, 2013: 483-497). In the pathology of this dilemma, they believe that international relations, to cover their theoretical weakness, should move away from "Differentiating" (unique) analyzes such as realism and approach the heart of society (Sylvester, 2013: 609). In the face of these harms, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran benefits from jurisprudence. The jurisprudence of International Relations is a jurisprudential knowledge which, relying on the principles of jurisprudence and using its methodological model (Ijtihad), explains the Shari'a rules governing international relations, sets the rules and requirements governing the relations between International politics and the State. On the other hand, it should also change due to social changes (Shirkhani and Ebrahimi Varkiani, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 125-126). Therefore, scholars of jurisprudential issues consider the most critical efficiency of jurisprudence in international relations as "Extracting the Rules that Islamic Law Has to Regulate Relations" (Dehghani Firoozabadi and Ghanbari Mazidi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 15).

### **2.4. Futurism (Mahdism)**

Futurism as a method in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is tied to the sacred concept of "Mahdism." In foreign policy based on the doctrine of Mahdism, contrary to the conventional Western and exploratory approach, [the government] does not cause to knowing the future. Instead, it seeks future change based on goals and norms based on society's accepted values and paradigms. In this way, what is original is not predicting the future. Instead, creating an image of a desirable end in the light of principles and values (Elahi Nejad and Sharifi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 4-5).

Qashqavi (then Deputy Foreign Minister) considers the doctrine of Mahdism as the basis of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and believes that Iran's foreign policy is based on defending the rights of all Muslim nations and not committing to hegemons and denying any hegemony, maintaining lasting peace in the world. Pay attention to the environment and strive for justice. Mahdavi society is a society of peace, but when there

is resistance against this thinking, the use of the sword is inevitable (cf. <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1393/03/22/398766>). Therefore, the doctrine of Mahdism in foreign policy does not have only idealistic dimensions (denial of hegemony, rejection of paternal domination, defence of Muslim rights, prosperity of human society, the rule of law and justice, etc.) (Jabbari, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 87). The current Islamic resistance and its achievements in shaping the material and spiritual interests of the nations of the Islamic world is one of the characteristics of the doctrine of Mahdism in practical terms.

### **3. Research Findings**

In the methodology of Iran's foreign policy, the four constructs of religion, history, religion and futurism introduce methods that study and research reveal their scientific aspects.

#### **3.1. Religious Methodology of the Policy of Enmity with the Oppressor and Protection of the Oppressed**

In the foreign policy of the Islamic State, the role of the school of Islam, the principles and teachings derived from it and the views of Islamic jurists and thinkers in this regard are decisive. Just as cultural and ideological characteristics may influence the foreign policy of any country, the Islamic Republic also seeks to realize academic and monotheistic values in the framework of (Zarei, Zinivand and Mohammadi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 171) its methods in foreign policy.

##### **3.1.1. Tawalla and Tabarra**

Tawalla in Islamic culture is: accepting the government, guardianship and friendship of God and the Prophet and Tabarra, avoiding the person and the current that has no divine direction and is considered the enemy of God (Wafa et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 12-13). In the words of Martyr Motahari, Shia history has been accompanied by the name of a series of admirers, lunatics and veterans of the unknown (Motahari, 1989 AD/1368 SH: 35). In foreign policy, Tawalla and Tabarra have an absolute position in the sphere of Islamic political thought. In confronting the system of domination and accompanying the dominated, decision-makers use this as a model for their foreign relations.

##### **3.1.2. The Rule of Enmity with the Dominator**

Islamic thinkers and jurists have established the jurisprudential rule as the rule of hostility with the hegemon to preserve the dignity and greatness of Muslims, citing the verses of the Holy Quran and the narrations of the infallible. According to one of the verses of the Qur'an, the way of any domination of the infidels over the believers is closed (Zarei et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 169-170). Regarding the Qur'an, under the enmity principle

with the Muslims domination, we are warned about the danger of non-Muslims influence. In this regard, the constant criterion in the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims and infidels is to close the ways of persuasion and prevent their possible domination (Wafa et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 53-55). For this reason, in the Holy Quran, after the issue of Jihad in the foreign policy of the Islamic State, no other political issue such as the denial of non-Muslim guardianship over Muslims has been considered and emphasized (Zarei et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 171).

### **3.1.3. Jihad**

Islam has used war as a last resort to destroy idolatry and spread monotheism, no country-opening and domination of weak nations (Rokni Yazdi, 2010 AD/1398 SH: 1). The concept of war is broader than Jihad because it includes all conflicts, and Jihad is a kind of it (Faghfor Maghribi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 30). Jihad in a general division is divided into two types of primary and defensive Jihad. In the "Defensive Jihad" of the Islamic State and every Muslim against foreign aggression against Islam, they enter the war and campaign. In the "Primary Jihad," the Muslims first attack another country without charge (Haj Ismaili and Habibollahi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 36-37). One of the most important goals of Jihad in Islam is to repel sedition, eliminate aggression and support the oppressed and downtrodden (Haj Ismaili and Habibaollahi, 2012 AD/ 1391 SH: 45-59). The principle of Jihad in Shia political culture has always made Muslims aware of the need for military readiness to prevent the tyranny of the oppressors and not to accept the oppression of the oppressors.

## **3.2. Historical Methodology of the Policy of Enmity with the Oppressor and Protection of the Oppressed**

Inspired by the Ashura paradigm, history teaches the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the use of the spirit of self-sacrifice and martyrdom leads to the denial of domination.

### **3.2.1. Belief in the Culture and Movement of Ashura**

The events of Ashura in which Imam Hussein (AS) and his companions are martyred in an oppressed way that provokes human emotions and feelings has a unique and symbolic place in Shia political culture. This movement's effects are negligence's impermissibility in protecting and guarding religious values under the pretext of lack of power (Honari Latifpour, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 89). The uprising of Imam Hussein (AS) aimed to return the Islamic society to its correct line when it had diverted the oppression and tyranny of Muslims. Examples of Ashura include the need for sacrifice to preserve religion and the vulnerability of the enemy front with all its apparent capabilities (Khamenei. Speeches in Friday Prayer Sermons,



1374/3/19). This manifestation has always been present in the lives of Shia, and Muslims in the fight against the oppressors have considered the Ashura as an allegory of such a movement and have relied on it.

The "Ashura" paradigm is not a single concept. Somewhat, many other ideas are tied to what comes to mind. Concepts such as "Martyrdom," "Commanding the Good and Forbidding the Evil," "Jihad" and "Tawalla and Tabarra" are all aspects of the content of the Ashura epic and shape the Iranian interpretation of political events inside and outside their society. For example, the concept of "Jihad" is fully manifested in the life of Imam Hussein (AS), in a way that Shia call him "Sayyed al-Shuhada." Iran's eight-year imposed war with the Ba'athist regime in Iraq (Naqibzadeh, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 266) and the defence of the shrine of Hazrat Zainab; peace be upon him, are examples of the influence of Ashura culture and martyrdom in foreign policy. Ashura culture is generally considered a symbol of the struggle against oppression and the defence of rights for Shias.

### **3.2.2. Historical Belief in the Spirit of Self-Sacrifice and Martyrdom**

The centre of gravity of Shia religion and thought is self-sacrifice and martyrdom in the fight against oppression (Islamic Revolutionary Documentation Center, 2010). Shias have a particular belief in the concept of martyrdom and martyrdom. With a brief look at the history of Shiism, we find that all Shia Imams (AS) have been poisoned and killed by their enemies. However, this prominent value of Shia political culture is linked initially to the name of the third Shia Imam, Imam Hussein (AS), and the Ashura event and the Shias consider the title of "Sayyed al-Shuhada" to be specific to him (Aboutalebi, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 13). In Shia political thought, Jihad and martyrdom are considered strategic and influential principles and goals in the defence scene and international interactions of the Islamic world. It is the most critical factor in rescuing the oppressed nations from colonialism and the exploitation of oppressive governments. (Documents of the Islamic Revolution, 2010 AD/1389 SH). For example, the martyr General Soleimani regarding the importance of martyrdom in the school of Imam Hussein (AS), says:

"I offer my condolences to all of you, dear brothers and sisters, this month of blood and martyrdom, this month of honour and greatness. May God grant success to all of us to be the followers of Imam Hussein - the incredible freedom that taught the lesson of freedom and dignity, chivalry and self-sacrifice to all the martyrs and all the free people of the world. All the world's free people from Imam Hussein's martyrdom to the end of the globe are students of Imam Hussein's school and study in the presence of Imam Hussein. One of the speakers of this statement is Mohammad Ali

Jinnah - the Supreme Leader of Pakistan - about Imam Hussein. We are Imam Hussein's Shias, we are used to the name of Imam Hussein inside our houses and in the skirts of our mothers and under their tears, but we did not think that this great man belongs only to the Shia world. These are the words of great personalities; they are eminent people, philosophers, great university professors, and eminent personalities. I thought it was better not to say a word about myself. Let me remind them of their words, the words of a human being who looks at Imam Hussein from one Shia point of view and another and introduces Imam Hussein to his society. This great leader of Pakistan has a beautiful sentence: "There is no example of courage in the world better than what Imam Hussein showed in terms of sacrifice and audacity. In my opinion, Muslims should follow this martyr who sacrificed himself in the land of Iraq "(<https://www.yjc.news/fa/news/6256317>).

### **3.2.3. Historical Negation of Domination**

The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on Islamic and historical teachings and beliefs, should avoid relations based on hegemony and domination in its foreign policy (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 130). Article 152 of the Constitution states: "The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the denial of any hegemony and domination, preservation of all-round independence and territorial integrity of the country, defence of the rights of all Muslims and non-alignment against dominating powers and peaceful reciprocal relations with non-combatant states. " 'What is perceived in Imam Khomeini's thought about foreign policy is the classification of countries into the following three groups based on the jurisprudential rule of Tawalla and Tabarra?' Of course, the relationship with them is defined in this interpretation: brotherly relationship with Islamic countries, Respectful relationship with non-hostile infidels and hostile relationship with hostile countries (Imani, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 129). Accordingly, Iran's foreign policy has been based on this policy over the past forty years. There are many examples of the denial of tyranny and oppression in the history of Iranian foreign policy, such as hostility to world-dominating powers, rejection of the Zionist hegemonic regime and the defence of the legitimate rights of Palestinians, opposition to Western hegemony and resistance to US aggression and pointed out the powerful countries of the world.

### **3.2.4. Maintain Independence, and Prevent Foreign Domination of the Country**

The historical background of Western countries in Iran has led to a defeatist mentality in the Iranian people towards establishing relations with foreigners (Britain and the United States). Article 9 of the Constitution recognizes that in the Islamic Republic of Iran, freedom, independence, unity, and territorial integrity are inseparable. Their preservation is the duty of the government

and the people. No individual, group or authority has the right to inflict the slightest damage to Iran's independence, political, cultural, economic and military and territorial integrity in the name of using freedom (Nouri and Malakouti, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 16). The issue of banning tobacco and rejecting the law of capitulation, and emphasizing the resistance economy (by Mirza Shirazi, Imam Khomeini and Imam Khamenei, respectively) and neither eastern nor western principle of the Islamic Republic in foreign policy arise from such a rule (Zarei et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 168 ).

Imam Khomeini, referring to this verse and rule, says that Muslims should not trust and rely on foreigners in all aspects of their political life: "The international cannibals will gain political, military, cultural and economic independence "(Khomeini, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 24). Imam Khomeini emphasized the importance of economic independence from different dimensions of independence (Khomeini, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 433). Autonomy and the preservation of independence are also pursued today. For example, in the context of the resistance policy economy, the Supreme Leader was a theorist.

### **3.3. The Jurisprudential Methodology of the Enmity Policy with the Oppressor and Protection of the Oppressed**

The authors believe that dynamic ijthihad and independent clerics are part of Iran's foreign policy methods, especially about hostility to the oppressor and support for the oppressed.

#### **3.3.1. Dynamic Ijthihad and Independence of Shia Clergy from Government and Centers of Power**

The Muslim person aligns his behaviour and actions with Islamic laws during his personal and social life. Still, the developments of human life raise new questions for which there are no clear answers in religious sources (Karami and Pourmand, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 20-21). Therefore, it was necessary for the Islamic community, especially the experts in the field of religion, to solve it and determine the duty of the Muslims. These efforts led to the formation of the science of "Jurisprudence" which is the knowledge of inferring religious rules (Anabestani, 2009 AD/1381 SH: 8).

Some believe that the acceptance of Shiism in Iran can be considered the practical result of Shia beliefs in the field of justice and leadership of the righteous element and the struggle of Shia clergy based on the principle of ijthihad against authoritarian monarchies (including Pahlavi) (Akhavan Mofrad, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 163). The clergy in Shiism is financially supported by the people and their religious taxes and make a living (Akhavan Mofrad, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 188-190). Also, unlike the Sunnis, who consider coercion and domination as one of the ways to establish a government, this issue is wholly rejected in Shiism (Feirahi, 2009 AD/1388

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SH: 37). Shia scholars' financial and intellectual independence from the government causes them to have an independent view of the government in foreign policy and place the principle on Shia *ijtihad* and jurisprudence and not the opinion will of the government.

The anti-colonial position of the Shia clergy from the early Qajar period led to their leadership through different classes of people. Shia scholars Fatwas in support of the people against foreign forces, including the fatwa of Jihad in the second Iran-Russia war and the fatwa of Haji Mirza Masih to save Muslim women, which led to the assassination of Gribaydov and the Russian delegation, to revoke the Reuters privilege and the tobacco uprising, indicates the anti-colonial aspect of the clergy that had a great impact on the growth of national consciousness (cf .Ayvazi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 11-15).

### **3.3.2. The Role of the Clergy in Inviting People to Fight Oppression and Support the Oppressed**

With the advent of the Safavid rule in Iran and Shia scholars' severe and prominent role in political and social issues, the influence of religious scholars among the people intensified. Therefore, many social affairs were carried out under their supervision and guardianship as the general deputy of Imam Zaman (AS) (Aboutalebi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 56-59). In the Pahlavi period, despite the suffocation, such movements took place in abundance. As an example, we can mention the role of Ayatollah Kashani in the process of nationalization of Iran's oil industry (Kargar Jahromi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 65). Following the coup d'etat of 1332 and the development of military and political relations between Iran and the United States, the United States demanded the political and judicial immunity of its citizens in Iran in the form of capitulation. Imam Khomeini called the signing of such a document by the parliament as the signing of the record of slavery of the Iranian nation and gave vital speeches against the transfer of this privilege, which eventually led to his deportation and cancellation of capitulation (Kajbaf, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 111-108). The leading role of the clergy in the struggle against colonialism and the people invitation to fight against oppression and non-acceptance of non-Muslim domination is derived from the religious aspect. It is based on the rule of denial of sovereignty, which has manifested itself in the constitution and practical policy of the Islamic Republic. In this regard, Imam Khamenei's remarks on the Palestinian issue are noteworthy:

"If the Muslims were fighting Israel - a real and serious struggle - it would not have been possible for Israel to stay. The United States, bigger and stronger than Israel, has not resisted the struggle of honest and determined nations. One example is ourselves, and another example is other countries

that we're able to overthrow American or French colonial rule. We believe that a sincere and genuine struggle against the usurping Zionists will undoubtedly lead to establishing a Palestinian state of right. We hope you and we will witness that day. Send my greetings to the dear brothers who work with you: "Say that we are with you, behind you and with you, like the time of Imam Khomeini (may God bless him and grant him peace), and there will be little doubt in our support of the Palestinian cause" (Khamenei. Speeches in a Group Meeting of Palestinian Muslims, 1368/4/24).

### **3.4. Mahdavi Methodology of the Policy of Enmity with the Oppressor and Protection of the Oppressed**

The victory of the Islamic Revolution and the formation of the Islamic Republic changed Iran's foreign policy. These changes are basically derived from the religious components of the Shia religion, which were clearly reflected in the constitution and the implementation of Iran's foreign policy. Naturally, Islamic (Mahdavi) futurism has its methodology about the approach of hostility to oppression and protection of the oppressed.

#### **3.4.1. The Culture of Waiting**

Waiting in Shia political culture "is a spiritual quality that creates a state of readiness of people for what they expect, and against it, are despair and hopelessness. The higher the expectation and the brighter and brighter the flame, the more active and dynamic he will be and as a result, he will be more prepared "(Mousavi Isfahani, 2014 AD/ 1393 SH: 235). Innocent was placed. Regarding the unfavourable conditions of the time and according to the divine interest, that Imam will remain behind the curtain according to the welfare of God until the conditions are provided (Honari Latifpour, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 75-74). The authentic culture of expectation is based on three essential elements: a) dissatisfaction with the current situation, b) hoping for a better future, c) moving and trying to transition from the current situation and being in a more desirable situation (Mohammadi, 2004 AD/ 1383 SH: 115). Waiting in Shia political literature is a critical component that warns the state against stagnation and encourages it to strive for the desired status quo in the international system. Some have misinterpreted this concept and interpreted it as meaning laxity and refraining from any attempt to improve the situation, while the idea of waiting has obvious manifestations of oppression and lack of silence in the face of pressure; because there is hope in creating a favourable situation and we should try to make such a situation.

#### **3.4.2. Anti-Oppressive Practices**

Anti-Oppressive Practice has been one of the most significant and influential elements in Shia political literature throughout history, which has called on Shias to confront arrogance and xenophobia at various times. This arrogance

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has sometimes been the cause of Shias' anti-Oppressive Practice to the ruling body (Aboutalebi, 2005 AD/ 1384 SH: 13). Because in the past, rulers and kings easily granted various privileges to foreigners and colonial countries for personal gain. From the point of view of Islamic political culture, arrogance is a kind of domination and hegemony and colonization and cultural, political and economic exploitation by a limited minority of oppressors and profiteers over a large number of deprived masses. One of the essential elements of the Islamic Revolution and Iran's foreign policy is the struggle against the arrogant (Sarvestani, 2015 AD/ 1394 SH: 361).

### 3.4.3. Justice

Justice in the political and social sense is opposed to the concept of oppression. Therefore, justice is: respecting the rights of individuals and granting rights to every rightful person. The importance of the principle of justice in Islam is that Muslims in general and Shias, in particular, must fulfil the condition of justice to hold political and social responsibilities such as Friday prayers, judging, and governing (Honari Latifpour, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 72). In foreign policy, Mahdavi teachings are based on the observance of justice among individuals and human societies, and the agents of the Islamic State do not act neutrally in the face of injustice. Instead, it fights and resists the founders of such injustices to promote justice and respect the rights of human beings. As in the long history of Iran, in different periods, we have witnessed the emergence of movements in the fight against injustice, such as the tobacco embargo.

In addition to not accepting the domination of the dominating powers, the Islamic Republic is obliged to fight against arrogance and injustice, and not accepting the dominating powers and not merely committing to them alone is not enough, because the transnational nature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, while adopting a negative stance on oppression, should have a positive and pragmatic stance on combating the manifestations of oppression. The religious state, especially the Islamic government, is a just system (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2009 AD/ 1388 SH: 170-171). Also, according to Article 154 of the Constitution, "the Islamic Republic of Iran considers human well-being as the ideal of human society as a whole, and recognizes independence, freedom, and the rule of law and justice as the right of all peoples of the world." In the framework of justice, the approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran in foreign policy is a revisionist approach to international order (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2009 AD/ 1388 SH: 180).

### 3.4.4. Unity of the Islamic World and Support for the Oppressed

Anti-Oppressive Practices and the continuation of justice, which is one of the central teachings of Islamic futurism, make it necessary to defend Muslims'

rights and establish a foreign policy based on the unity of the Islamic world. Accordingly, to protect Muslims, the Islamic Republic has made the unity of the Islamic world one of the main foundations of its foreign policy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in parallel with the struggle against arrogance and colonialism, considers itself obliged to support the oppressed of the world and liberation movements. Article 154 of the Constitution states that "the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the rightful struggle of the oppressed against the arrogant everywhere in the world" (cf. Nikzad, 2004 AD/ 1383 SH: 24-42).

Justice in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran requires that Iran realise the rights of Muslims and the oppressed of the world in the form of human and Islamic interests, the top priority of its policy. Because supporting the persecuted and oppressed nations of the world and supporting the public rights of Muslims is one of the positive aspects of seeking justice in international relations and foreign policy (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2009 AD/ 1388 SH: 175-176). It is helpful to pay attention to Imam Khamenei's statements in this regard.

"... If Islamic values are to be presented as definite values in the world and attract the hearts of human beings, and based on that there will be a change in the lives of Muslims - If we want this - this is not possible without the unity of Muslims, it's not possible. It will not be achieved by branching out, making enemies, or starting sectarian wars. We do not tell the sects of the Islamic world to give up the beliefs of your sect and accept the beliefs of another sect; no, but we tell all Muslims that what is common among Muslims is more and more fundamental than what is disputed among them. Our enemies rely on differences. We must rely on common positions and not allow the enemy to make excuses and find a point of pressure on the body of the Islamic Ummah by dividing us. Fortunately, we in Iran have solved these issues. In the Islamic world, many of our brothers in different parts of the Islamic world have either solved these issues or are close to solving them. But the enemy is not a manipulator. From time immemorial, from colonialism to Islamic countries - that is, from 150 years or nearly 200 years ago - to the present day, they have worked on the issue of differences between Muslim sects. We have to be very careful. "Shias and Sunnis must commit themselves to support and striving to bring Islamic sects closer together and to preserve and protect brotherly love and interaction with one another" (Khamenei. Speeches in a Group Meeting of Clerics Across the Country, 1368/4/4)

## **Conclusion**

Analyzing the material presented during the article, it became clear that

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the policy of "Enmity with the Oppressor and Support for the Oppressed" is in the various pieces of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the political, economic, cultural, etc. Iran's interactions with the world abroad have been one of the most critical foreign policy strategies and have the support and original theoretical sources in the religion of Islam, history, Shia jurisprudence, and Islamic futurism. However, with the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic system in Iran, this policy became the basis of the work of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus from a scientific and methodological point of view. The officials were obliged to observe commit to implementing it.

Therefore, the question is 'How can Iran's foreign policy theoretically analyse the methodological foundations of the policy of enmity with the oppressor and the protection of the oppressed?' In answer to this question, the authors emphasize the role of the four constituents of religion (history, jurisprudence and Islamic futurism (Mahdavi)) in methodizing the policy of enmity with the oppressor and supporting the oppressed.

The structure of religion, through the methods of "Tawalla and Tabarra", "the Rule of Denying the Hegemony" and "Jihad" defines the border between the oppressed and the oppressor and how to treat each in foreign policy. In foreign policy, Tawalla and Tabarra have an absolute position in the sphere of Islamic political thought. In confronting the system of domination and accompanying the dominated, decision-makers use this as a model for their foreign relations. In the rule of negation, denying hegemony is a constant criterion in the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims and infidels, closing the ways of influence and preventing their possible domination. In connection with the principle of Jihad, Muslims have constantly been reminded of the need for military readiness to avoid the tyranny of the oppressors and not to accept the oppression of the oppressors. Thus, unlike the new methods introduced in foreign policy, such as the quantum method, which can not provide a criterion for order and disorder (for example, the role of structure and agent in war and peace, religious theory recognizes the possibility of recognizing right from wrong.

Due to its spiritual and material results, the structure of history puts the methods of "Believing in the Culture of Ashura," "the Spirit of Self-sacrifice," "Denying Domination and Domination" and "Maintaining Independence" supporting the oppressed and enmity with the oppressor on the foreign policy agenda. The Ashura culture and the spirit of martyrdom are generally considered a struggle symbol against oppression and the defence of the Shias right. The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on Islamic and historical teachings and beliefs, should avoid its foreign policy relations and relations



based on hegemony and domination. Also, the principle of maintaining independence and non-dependence has had a special place in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic throughout its forty-year history. Therefore, history and its perpetrators have a significant impact on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in two ways. First, the political and social style of historical agents, especially the figures of Islamic history, is more critical than their dominance over their political power and achievements. Second, historical agents' political and social style is modeled if it is moral or somewhat religious.

The structure of jurisprudence defends the oppressed and enmity with the oppressor in foreign policy formulation through the methods of "Dynamic Ijtihad" and "Independent Clergy." Shia scholars' financial and intellectual independence from the government causes them to have an independent view of the government in foreign policy and base their principles on Shia ijthihad and jurisprudence, not on the opinion, will and will of the government. Therefore, the fact that Shia scholars throughout history have always stood against shameful agreements and sometimes ruled on Jihad or fatwas out of sanctity is due to its structural-functional independence from the government. Scholars of jurisprudential issues consider the most critical effectiveness of the jurisprudence of international relations as "Extracting the Rules Established by Islamic Law to Regulate the Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy of the Islamic Country with Other Countries and Governments."

Finally, the structure of Mahdavi futurism, with methods such as "Culture of Waiting," "Justice," "anti-Oppression" and "Islamic Unity" is a guide to the desired perspectives in foreign policy. Waiting in Shia political literature is a critical component that warns the state against stagnation and encourages it to strive for the desired status quo in the international system. In the context of justice, which are the central teachings of Mahdavi culture, the approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran in foreign policy is a revisionist approach to international order (domination). The continuation of justice, which is one of the central teachings of Islamic futurism, makes it necessary to defend Muslims' rights and establish a foreign policy based on the unity of the Islamic world.

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## Social or Political Revolution? The Pattern of Revolutionary Developments in Iran and Georgia

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### Abstract

In 1979 and 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Georgia underwent revolutionary transformations. However, there are significant differences between the two revolutions, including ideology, the scope and extent of revolutionary developments, the nature of social forces and movements, the heart of the former and post-political regimes, and their new foreign policy direction. The country has been very influential in both domestic and foreign arenas. With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to investigate why the Iranian revolution in 1979 became social, whilst the Georgian revolution in 2003 was confined to the political realm. It appears that Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, in response to the Pahlavi period's quasi-modernism and inspired by cultural and identity components, resulted in the formation of a discourse known as self-return. It recognized that such a possibility could not be realized without changing political, social, economic, and cultural factors. But the colour revolution in Georgia, under the influence of components of historical memory resulting from the suppression of nationalist and independence-seeking tendencies, saw a change in the ruling political structure as sufficient to achieve this goal. The present study has used documentary (library) and the analytical-comparative method., this comparative study, to examine the above question and hypothesis, first takes a brief look at the background of the formation of the two revolutions and then examines their possible differences and similarities.

**Keywords:** Social Revolution, Political Revolution, Iran, Georgia, Pseudo-Modernism, Independence.

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## **Introduction**

In the typology of revolutions, we mention two types of political and social revolutions. The commonality of both is changed, but the amount of these changes is different. The most crucial element influencing the extent of change is the role and importance of the ideology.

Ideology in social revolutions has three functions: criticizing the status quo, drawing the desired situation, determining how to achieve the desired position, and providing appropriate tools.

The Georgian revolution and other colour revolutions, included in the general category of political revolutions, are based on nationalism. Nationalism cannot be regarded as an ideology, like socialism, liberalism, or Islamism. The Georgian revolution took place when communist elites were still ruling the Soviet Union despite the collapse of the Soviet Union because of its exclusive situation for adversaries' power who were seeking to extend their ideological boundaries to the place of Soviet heritage.

But the social revolution, particularly the Islamic revolution of Iran, which had a strong orientation of independence and exodus from the domination of others, was understood in the form of a grand ideology that we have witnessed since the 1940s, and it gradually developed becomes a discourse. It could marginalize rival ideologies and become a hegemonic discourse in the political and social life of Iran. Of course, the message of political Islam was not confined to independence but meant in other contexts such as justice and freedom.

Given such differences between the two revolutions, it seemed that the experience of the two revolutions with their specific elements and features would help us understand these two. For this reason, this article seeks to examine why the 1979 Iranian revolution became social, whereas, in Georgia, the revolution was confined to the political sphere. In other words, the causes and factors that led to the two types of revolutions in the two countries are the most important concert of the present article.

To answer the above question, we first deal with the conceptual framework of the distinction between the two categories of revolutions. Then discusses the formation of the discourse of political Islam in Iran through the pseudo-modernist policy of the Pahlavi regime and then will draw to the Georgian revolution and the factors that affect it.

## **1. Research Method**

The research method in this article is the comparative method. Today, this method is widely used to study societies, systems, phenomena and political policy developments. The importance of this method is especially evident



when the researcher compares the events of another country with its own. For this reason, some political scientists have considered that the scientific nature of the study of a political phenomenon is depends on its comparison method (Harsij, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 8). According to Sartori, comparing systems, policies and societies, and political developments means identifying similarities and differences in the comparative approach. In other words, there is no point in comparing cases that are similar in all respects or different in all respects. Because in the first place, the study of two things is the same, the study of one is equal to the study of the other, and in the second place, the study of conflicting and contradictory cases that are incomparable. Therefore, similar issues include only similar examples and differences in some respects (Sartori, 1991: 246). In Iran and Georgia, we witnessed a similar event called revolution, but of two different types. Social revolution in Iran and political revolution in Georgia. Recognizing the similarities and differences between these two revolutions and mainly the reasons for the differences is the most critical issue facing this research, which is done using a comparative method.

## **2. Conceptual and Theoretical Research Framework: Ideology and Revolution**

The twentieth century was full of ideologies in many ways. Doctrines such as Marxism, Nationalism, Liberalism, Fascism, and Anarchism, although rooted in the nineteenth century, such as liberalism, Marxism, and Fascism, were able to create their own political and economic systems in the twentieth century (Ghaderi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 1-5). Ideology can more or less be seen as a correlated set of ideas that provide the basis for political action. Therefore, all ideologies describe the existing order, usually in the form of a worldview, a model of a promising future and an image of good society; and they determine how a change can be brought about (Hood, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12).

For Brinton, revolution and revolutionary transformation do not occur without spreading new ideas and ideologies (Brinton, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 45). Ideologies have played a significant role in the establishment and sustainability of the revolution. Reductive views have usually overlooked the part of ideology, while ideology is not merely a factor that adds to the cause of revolution but is an inherent characteristic of revolution. Ideology gives a state a distinct revolution from the usual struggle for power or class difference (Moaddel, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 280-300).

The establishment, maintenance, and supremacy of a particular ideology must be understood within the context of the specific historical context of

that ideology. An ideology causes people to act and is a hierarchy of values that drives revolutionary activists. The effectiveness of an ideology depends on how much it is internalized (Moaddel, 2003 AD/1383 SH: 280-300). The term cultural framework is used to express the ideas, values, myths, stories, and symbols behind society's subjective context, reflecting the dependence of ideology on cultural contexts. In the meantime, an ideology is built with a clever and selective, unlike cultural framework, and it is the values, arguments, and judgments most strongly associated with it. The most efficient ideologies are based on dominant and fundamental cultural frameworks and are updated to fit older images based on new circumstances. For example, the belief in the millennia of celebrations in Chinese Buddhist sections reinforced some of the revolutionary ideas of Chinese communism. Thus, any cultural framework can provide revolutionary or counter-revolutionary ideological foundations (Goldstone, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 401-404).

There may be several competing ideologies in a revolutionary situation, each offering a different picture of the future. It seems that the coordination of doctrine with the cultural context can have an impact on its success. The other purpose of ideology is to give a new interpretation of history for the movement's advantage and glorify the movement's past (Bashirieh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 82). In Johnson's view, different groups are unable to unite, and after the revolutions, an ideology is influential in building a new system and its legitimacy (Johnson, 1984 AD/1363 SH: 88-93).

Political Islam and nationalism shaped the Iranian and Georgian revolutions. The difference between the two led to two types of revolutions in these countries, the social revolution in Iran and the political revolution in Georgia. The rate of change in the Iranian revolution was very fundamental compared to the Georgian revolution, and it is not irrelevant to the differences between political Islam and nationalism.

Contrary to political Islam, there seems to be serious doubt about considering nationalism as an ideology. Nationalism is seen more as a political doctrine or a political goal than a political ideology.

The central point of nationalism as a political goal is that nation is the states only natural and a constituent unit. At the same time, other ideologies such as liberalism and socialism are a complex set of interrelated ideas and values. Second, nationalism, more than a theoretical, profound concept, is a psychological reflection of one nation's hatred or loyalty to other countries and is, therefore, a temporary and fleeting phenomenon. Nationalism also makes sense in its association with different ideologies, including socialism (National Socialism), liberalism (liberal nationalism), and political Islam.

In this way, nationalism has been able to give other ideologies more impetus and power (Haywood, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 276).

Although there are some fundamental differences regarding the relationship between religion and ideology, political Islam can be regarded as an ideology based on a common understanding. At the heart of political Islam is an Islamic government or creating a state based on Islamic principles. The basic premise is that Islam implies a comprehensive theory of government and politics and is superior to other political ideologies because it relies on Islamic sources and revelation. Those who believe in this ideology believe that Islam, as a universal ideology, encompasses the human world and the other world and has clear rules and commands for all fields of life. It contrasts all modern and traditional discourses that do not integrate religion and politics (Hosseinizadeh, 2010 AD/1389: 195- 237).

Nationalism and political Islam have evolved in response to contextual ideology, whose simplicity or complexity can influence the simplicity or complexity of competing doctrine. According to Moaddel, the nature of ideology's power underlies its context and position it in the socio-political space of the political or social orientation of the new doctrine. Because the new ideology production requires an ideology critique of the context and a review of its institutional foundations (Moaddel, M. 1992 AD/1371 SH: 15), the relationship between the two ideologies can be characterized by the social and political revolutions. According to Huntington's theory, the social revolution is a rapid, fundamental, violent domestic change in a society's dominant values and myths in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and governmental activity and policies (Huntington, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 264).

Such a definition implies significant and structural changes in society. Skocpol, who first described the meaning of social and political revolution in the book of *State and Social Revolutions*, believes that social revolutions begin with a class-based revolt from the bellow, which is very rapid and causes radical changes in class and social structure. While political revolutions change the form of government, they do not change the social system and are not necessarily caused by class conflicts. For Skocpol, social revolutions simultaneously lead to fundamental changes in political and social structure. These changes occur through intense political and social battles in which class forces play a crucial role (Skocpol, 1979: 21-32). Emphasizing the role of structures in shaping revolution, Ms Skatchpole believes that different groups with different motivations participate in multiple and complex struggles in historical revolutions. These conflicts occur in the existing economic, social, and international conditions and are

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not controlled by a particular class or group. Nor are all the consequences of the revolution naturally predictable with any other group. (ibid) Thus, the main characteristic of Ms Skocpol's definition is the attention to structure versus the agent and the role of revolution formation based on social systems. Although the indicators of social revolutions vary in definitions, theorists still agree on a few key points below;

The social structure of society is changing;

Social revolutions are necessarily violent;

Social revolutions are pervasive and are interfered with by the majority of the people.

Social revolutions lead to changes in the cultural, political, and economic structure of a society.

Opposite to the social concept of revolution, which encompasses maximum changes, is the concept of political revolution, which involves minimal changes. From this point of view, the political idea of revolution means the transformation of political and governmental institutions. The political revolution changes the nature of government power and its personnel. Stan A. Taylor views the political revolution as an attempt to change the structures and institutions of politics and change the personnel of regimes and government policies (Shafi'ifar, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 37). An essential component of Taylor's definition is the restructuring of government and political institutions, which involves minimal changes to realise the phenomenon of revolution.

Anthony Giddens also argues that the seizure of the state power through violent means by the leadership of the mass movement where the ruling power subsequently initiates a broad process of social reform leads to a political revolution. Thus, in political circles, the most significant change is taking place in the political regime.

In the above definition, violence is also one of the common aspects of social and political revolutions. At the same time, some current theorists speak of the diminishing effect of violence on new political revolutions. John Foran argues that widespread civil disobedience or even electoral methods (Tudoroiu, 2007: 317). Such revolutions, which are considered a type of political revolution by the change in the political system, are known as colour revolutions. Colour revolutions, velvet, or muddy revolutions refer to the set of developments that have taken place in the republics of the former Soviet Union that have led to a change in the political system in power. Such developments in post-communist countries have led to the abandonment of pro-Soviet regimes and the rise of Western-oriented governments. The main features that lead to the distinction between social

revolutions and colour revolutions are:

In colour revolutions, violence is generally less severe than in social revolutions.

The intensity and scope of mass intervention are less in the colour revolutions, and the revolutionaries are merely content with political change. They do not want change in the social and cultural structures of society.

In these revolutions, the leaders' ideology is merely democracy, and communist thought is firmly rejected.

In the colour revolutions, the role of the mass media and the student and the middle class is high.

Colour revolutions necessarily occur in countries where state and government are weak (Mitchell, 2012: 10).

The most critical time for colour revolutions is the time near an election. During this period, with the support of domestic and foreign media and peaceful gatherings of the opposition, the opposition protests the government's performance in the election. It determines the election results in its favour before the official announcement. The spreading of the protests has led to the government's move to hold re-election, which eventually seizes control of the opposition without resorting to conflict and violence. Such a process was repeated in the revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

### **3. The Iranian Revolution, Pseudo-modernism and Political Islam**

The developments of modernity are not confined to Western geography. The triple intellectual, scientific, and industrial revolutions completely transformed the face of post-medieval Europe. There have been relations between Iran and the West since the Safavid era. Still, the west of the Safavid era - the 16th century - was not yet aggressive and reliant on the nineteenth century's industrial revolution, and the extent of the Iranian-Western trade was not sufficiently influential for Iran. This relationship continued until the nineteenth century, when its form and content changed dramatically. On the one hand, there was the industrialized West, or, as Hobbess Baum said, the West "After the Industrial Revolution" the West was well-equipped, advanced, armed, and, on the other hand, a helpless, backward, ignorant, and weak Qajar era (Zibaklam, 2000 AD/1379 SH (a): 204).

The unequal confrontation between Iran and various representatives of the European civilization, including England, started to raise serious questions in the minds of the Iranians; a new crisis seems to have arisen, and the first and foremost question for the Iranians was 'what to do in such circumstances?' (Spragens, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 28-37). This question can

be seriously addressed in Abbas Mirza's question from Joubert. In this question, he asks Joubert, "O foreigner, tell me what to do" (Jaubert, 1968 AD/1347 SH: 127- 133). Although this question illustrated the Iranians' efforts to get out of this critical situation, it did delay understanding the nature of developments in the West. But understanding the nature of products in the West has historically been lagged. In other words, in a logical process, the heart of this transformation had to be recognized first and then decided what to do. However, the question of what to do creates a wave of action, including reform to revolution.

### **3.1. From Reform to Revolution**

The nineteenth century was full of events for Iranians. Military defeats by Russia in 1813 and 1828 and Britain in 1857, the inability to maintain internal order and stability, the widespread interference of foreigners in the country's affairs, and the unprecedented concessions exhibited some of the most important developments of this period. Nearly three centuries before the formation of the Qajar government, the Safavid era, as Foran described, was emerging as a significant power outside the world system but gradually became a peripheral and then dependent state (Foran, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 75-89). Responses to the growing weakness of the Qajar government can be summarized as reform, uprising or rebellion, and ultimately revolution. Accuracy in these developments reveals a general pattern of prioritizing governmental actions and their failure to transmit these changes to society. The government initiated a reform process by elites such as Abbas Mirza, the crown prince of Fath Ali Shah, Ghaem Maghams, Amir Kabir, and Mirzah Hussein Khan Sipahsalar and Nasser al-Din Shah. Government elites put numerous reforms first on the agenda to regulate financial, military, political, and foreign policy issues. These reforms did not succeed because of the resistance of the oligarchic body of power and only had little effect on the short-term (Nabatian, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 63).

The failure of the reforms brought about another kind of change that, this time, began from the community level. The most significant developments were the various uprisings around the country, especially the big cities, the tobacco protest, and, ultimately, the constitutional revolution. If the tobacco movement remained limited to a public demand to abolish the tobacco concession, the constitutional revolution would pursue larger goals, reform the ruling political structure, and legalize it. The constitutional revolution failed to consolidate its goals and achievements (Rahbari, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 75-96). The cause of the failure can be seen from the perspective of internal problems, particularly the internal sabotage of the former faithful, the ideological divergence between the influential constitutional streams

and the problems and economic crises on one side and the role of external factors on the other side. Unfortunately, the constitutional revolution coincided with the historical reconciliation of the two great powers of Russia and Britain over their interests in Iran, and other international events, including World War I, prevented the blossoming of the constitutional seedlings (Zibaklam, 2000 AD/1379 SH(b): 210).

### **3.2. Pahlavi Government and the Imperial Modernity**

The Failure of the constitutional revolution creates two fundamental transformations between constitutionalist forces; first, the resignation of the religious spectrum from the constitution that sought to justify its religiosity, and second, moving the intellectual stream to a different alternative - to support the rule of law and the dictatorship of the peacemaker (Cf. Afshar, 1923 AD/1302 SH: 139-140). Of course, it would not have been possible for a state to get into power without regard to global change and the influence of the politics and relations of the great powers in Iran. In other words, the lack of alternatives and external support are the two major factors in forming a new order in Iran (Tajik, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 85). If the reforms failed in the Qajar era and were unable to bring about the development process, and the constitutional revolution was unable to establish a new order, the Pahlavi government, as a modern absolutist state, had the tools and facilities to make such a change and took the path to renovation and modernization (Vincent, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 35; Afzali, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 34- 47).

Scholars who have studied the early Iranian conception of modernity agree that this phenomenon has different concepts (Haeri, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 15; Vahdat, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12-15; Mirsepasi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 320-328)

It seems that there are inevitably multiple interpretations of this phenomenon for some reason; the dual nature of the phenomenon in its original geography (Haeri, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 15-30). Modernity has had two main dimensions from the beginning to the present: the critical intellect that manifests itself in the increasing autonomy and freedom of the subject. The other is an instrument shaped by rational and scientific-technological domination of the world (Jahanbegloo, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 47). Depending on which dimension to consider, it can differentiate the notion of modernity (Vahdat, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 12). The second point is the existence of different paths and forms of modernity that seem to have been ignored by the Iranians in the early days; for example, Iranian intellectuals were close to the French reading of the highly secular relationship between religion and state (Mirsepasi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 323- 350). The third

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point is the characteristics of the Iranian world or, in other words, the Iranian understanding and translation of this phenomenon. In Ajudani's words, the new concepts that flowed from Western culture to our culture were essentially concepts that had developed in the context of another history and culture. These concepts had no precedent in our culture; there was also a problem with the meaning of Iranian human history and subjectivity. So, the human mind was well thought out in the Iranian language and history, was unfamiliar with those concepts. The Iranian man with such sense and language and history, when he got acquainted with new ideas, because he did not have the linguistic and historical experience of those concepts (which were two sides of a coin), interpreted and reconstructed them with his understanding, his historical conception, and through his linguistic experience (Ajudani, 2003 AD/1383 SH: 7-8).

Therefore, it can be said countries must embark on the process of modernization, whether or not it conforms to their spiritual and metaphysical traditions and heritage. In other words, the question is how the Pahlavi government looked at modernity and how the effects and consequences of this attitude changed the political and social formulation in Iran and led to the formation of a discourse of resistance. However, the dominant approach during the Pahlavi era was to adopt a linear pattern of modernity, regardless of the origin of modernity and its incorrect and inappropriate application in different geography. A kind of superficial conception that emphasized the full realization of modernity, expressed by Sayyed Hossein Taghizadeh, one of the intellectuals of the constitutional era who said that We must be westernized from head to toe (Taghizadeh, 1961 AD/13 40 SH: 417-429). Thus, the Iranian modernity in the shadow of imperial despotism (Atabaki, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 20-35) became apparent to the West and Westernization, resulting in the formation of a caricature of modernity and the creation of heterogeneous combinations of what can be mentioned as pseudo-modernism.

One Iranian scholar defines pseudo-modernism as the unintentional and uncritical application of theories, methods, techniques, and ideas derived from the experience of advanced countries or a superficial understanding of European modernism by intellectuals and political leaders. In his view, the simple performance was both of his society and history and Western ideas and their conformity, rooted in the left and right groups (social democrats and liberals) and among state and non-state groups. It was not, in his view, European ideas and techniques that disrupted the social fabric of Iran in this way. Still, first, the ignorance and criticism of these methods in their primary European context and, second, the imitation rather than using those ideas and



techniques were practical (Katouzian, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 151).

### **3.3. Pseudo-modernism and Its Effects**

The path of modernization in Iran in the Pahlavi era changed Iranian society's foundations and had various impacts on different fields, which affected the formation of social movements, including the Islamic Revolution. As a modern government, the Pahlavi regime laid the foundation stone for the first development in Iran. The way they were laid out in the political and social formulation and their alteration had significant effects.

#### **1) Political**

In Iran, pseudo-modernism in the political sphere has shown itself in returning to tyranny and a rapid increase in the state's power and weakening of political freedoms. Tyranny and state dictatorship are meant to be lawless governments, and they act beyond society, and as one may refer to Reza Shah, a one-person regime. Mehdigholi Khan Hedayat points out in his memoirs that Reza Khan said that every country has power and that ours is a single person (Hedayat, 1965 AD/1344 SH: 386). The development of the authority and exercise of state sovereignty has resulted from the rise and administrative concentration and military institutions and the creation of an extensive and centralized network of bureaucracy.

The loss of budding civic institutions such as parties and the press and the establishment of legal and judicial powers resulted from the consolidation and concentration of power. The Independent Representatives of the parliament were removed, and the parliament was first filled with the desired representatives of the Shah and the court. Traditional centres of power in Iran, including the tribal ones, are oppressive, and sedentary policies transform their livelihoods and economies.

The parliament was not closed during the reign of Reza Shah, as opposed to the power of Mohammad Ali Shah, but it lost its proper function. Abrahamian wrote: from the sixth to the thirteenth parliamentary periods, the king himself determined the results of the election and the composition of the parliament. Therefore, the parliament was not a valuable and influential institution but an impersonal entity that covers the naked body of the curfew (Abrahamian, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 172).

#### **2) Economics**

Economic and social development has been a top priority for developing countries. No matter how rational and economical it is to prioritize the economy, economic development has tangible effects. Pseudo-modernism in the economic field has shown itself to be overly military. More than a quarter of the state budget was spent on rebuilding the military. While the Ministry of War alone accounted for more than 40 per cent of the total budget, other high-priority areas were the Post and Telegraph and Telephone,

Education, and Justice. Katouzian says that after 1931, industry and agriculture had been abandoned (Katouzian, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 158). The military was modernized for the first time, but despite spending a great deal of money and widespread propaganda on the occupation of Iran, it collapsed in World War II. The Iranian economy became a dependent and petroleum economy, neglected by traditional production and dependence on oil revenues, and the process of the reliance of the Iranian economy on major economies intensified. Foran refers to this period as the period of dependency. In his view, this was mainly due to three mechanisms: British control over Iranian oil, unequal trade with the Soviet Union and Germany, and trade fluctuations due to the marginal supply of raw materials (Foran, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 373). Lack of prioritization of infrastructure investment, for example, railway, costly plans, slow growth in imports, renewal of Darcy's unfair oil contract, were all wrong paths in the Iranian economy and had an impact on its future.

### **3) Legal and Judicial**

Ali Akbar Davar reformed the legal and judicial system of Reza Shah. He played a crucial role in administrative reform, the reorganization of justice, and establishing the local registry. However, the modernization of Iran's legal and judicial system and cultural context did not receive much attention, leading to legal opposition such as Mossadegh's (Katouzian, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 150-190). The legal and judicial system was not, of course, an obstacle to abuse. Still, with the formation of the Documentation Register, the power-holders became great owners, Reza Khan himself was a clear example in this regard. Ali Akbar Davar, a high-ranking law graduate from the University of Geneva and close to the Reza Shah regime's advisory circle, presented the first volume of the civil law and judicial reform bill, which included a hierarchy of courts. The first part of this law was the precise and complete translation of French civil law. The final version of the Criminal Code, adopted in 1940, also followed the model of the 1930s Mussolini era in Italy (Shaygan, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 9-11). Most law professors and advisers to the Ministry of Justice were European professors. Eight French and two Italian professors taught for 16 years at Law School at the University of Tehran.

### **4) Cultural and Social Area**

Iranian pseudo-modernists strongly favoured the tendency to create social cohesion between Iranians and Westerners. Therefore, Iranians had to change their appearance, dress, and clothing to distance themselves from their traditional clothing, look like Westerners, and throw away their ancient garments to renew their ideas. With these changes, Iranians were not

considered "Others" in the West and underdeveloped countries. Changing caps and hats, unveiling, releasing Iranian women from tents, kerchief, arresting and imprisoning and even executing opponents of unveiling (Asadi Governor of Khorasan) for those who did not make these changes were a cost the Iranians had to pay to look like another people. In this regard, Iranian traditions and customs, especially Islamic culture and religion, were seen as symbols of backwardness and opposed development. If the medieval and part of traditional and Christian values were opposed to development and modernity, the same stereotype would be applied to Iran and Islam. Uniformity in ethnic and dress and ethnic humiliation to create a nation-state, returning too much attention to the era of ancient Iran, the revival of pre-Islamic Iran's glory, and the emergence of some form of old nationalism and opposition to religious rituals and ceremonies were all aimed at westernizing the Iranian society. Being similar to others included even other elements of identity, such as race and language (Adibzadeh, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 21). In other words, by establishing a similarity between the Iranian "Us" and the Western "Them," Iranian civilization is part of an old family that includes Western civilization. Iranians are part of the American and European race in another part of the globe and come together in one family (Pahlavi, 1976 AD/1355 SH: 8-9). Edward Shales says that the first generation of political leaders in most underdeveloped countries was more or fewer Westerners (Shils, 1963: 18- 55). As can be seen from the process of Iranians' dealing with modernity, the stage of imitation and similitude begins after the period of amazement and silence.

The simple and caricature implementation of modernity in Iran did not lead to the modernization of Iran but also brought about significant changes in social, economic, and political formulation. The emergence of opposition and resistance was another phase of Iranian confrontation with modernity, known as the stage of the crisis, wandering, and returning to the original Islamic discourse (ibid.). The roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran must be seen as a reaction to pseudo-modernism, particularly its cultural effects. The closest meaning to pseudo-modernism is the discourse of resemblance to the West or Westernization or Pahlavism. The emergence of the antithesis of the Western similarity is more common in countries with strong religious and metaphysical traditions. In the 1940s, the indigenous identity resurgence and the returning discourse to selfhood exhibited the antithesis first traces of the likeness to the West. The third generation of Iranian intellectuals should be regarded as a generation that refuses to be astonished and imitated, seeking an indigenous alternative to modernity. To this tremendous intellectual capacity must be added the growing transformation of non-intellectual and

religious currents that discredited the discourse of resemblance to the West by turning to cultural activities first in the 1920s and then to political movements in the 1940s, offering another alternative that not only avoided the problems of pseudo-modernism but also had credibility.

As the common denominator of this alternative, political Islam, despite various readings, created the last great revolution of the twentieth century (HosseiniZadeh, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 151; Boroujerdi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 39-72).

#### **4. Georgia and the Nation-State Building Process**

The Republic of Georgia has experienced several difficulties since its independence in the nation-state building process. The national identity crisis and ethnic minorities have created a weak government that has allowed the penetration of great powers and the creation of a colour revolution due to its geopolitical position. Most theorists have analyzed domestic and international causes or combinational factors influencing the revolution in analyzing the Rose Revolution in Georgia. This article also explains the revolution's impacts on both domestic and international factors.

##### **4.1. Internal factors**

One of the central policies of the Soviet Union to create a homogenization of nations was the policy of Russianization and the unity of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic state formed by dominant ethnic groups. Soviet policy was based on creating republics centred on a particular ethnic group and incorporating other ethnic groups within the republics, which always kept the fire of ethnic independence in the minority (Basiri et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 13). The intense nationalism of the Georgian people in protest against the Sovietization and nationalization policies of the Soviet Union began in 1956. It increased after the new Soviet constitution, which weakened the Georgian language.

The Georgian language was the core of Georgian national identity, and Georgian leaders, especially in the post-war period, were more autonomous than Moscow's (Mitchell, 2012: 20). Such protests were intensified after the Glasnost policy and the increase in freedom of expression in 1988. Anti-Soviet sentiment and ethnic conflict were heightened in 1989, following Abkhazia's attempts to secede from Georgia and Soviet support. It resulted in the abolition of Article 6 of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution, based on which Georgian law prevailed over all Soviet laws. After the parliamentary elections, the Free Georgia Union and the pro-independence parties won two per cent of the vote. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was thus elected as a prominent politician and leader of

the Free Georgia Union in the parliament. Although the election was conducted by a significant majority of the population and was free and fair, Gamsakhurdia was, in many ways, an undemocratic leader. He did not tolerate the opposition and often called political opponents a traitor. Effective institutions such as courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies did not evolve this year (Mitchell, 2013: 22). The Soviet policy of dominating an ethnic group over the minorities also led to continued discrimination in the post-independence years by rejecting other ethnic minorities in the process of administering affairs, leading to divergent actions between ethnic groups and their conflict with the central government (Basiri et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 14). In this regard, the Gamsakhurdia government, without regard to ethnic heterogeneity and the background of ethnic conflicts between Georgians and other minorities, adopted the Georgian nationalist approach in the extreme, with the slogan "Georgia for Georgians." Such a policy renewed ethnic wounds and created divisions and separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, leading to civil war by government intervention. Eventually, Georgia lost control of Ossetia with Russia's intervention and failed in this conflict (Amir Ahmadian and Asgari, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 25). Gamsakhurdia's extremist policies led to a military coup and his ouster and then his assassination. Georgia's inability to provide services, maintain infrastructure, and enforce the law has led to the destruction of infrastructure and the economic downturn in Georgia. Gamsakhurdia's extremist policies led to a military coup, his ouster, and then his assassination. Having complex relations with Russia, Georgia's largest trading partner, quickly destroyed tourist markets and foreign products (Mitchell, 2013: 22). Following Gamsakhurdia's dismissal, former Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze was elected as the chairman of Georgia's Supreme Council. After relative political stability and national reconciliation in 1995, he won the presidency with 75% of the vote. As Shevardnadze got into power, diplomatic relations with the West resumed along with economic restructuring. Georgia's international recognition accelerated as Shevardnadze was internationally recognised and used his robust global network and personal relationships. He was able to improve the infrastructure of the community to some extent during this period. Although Georgia was significantly freer than many former Soviet states, in these years, democracy did not prevail. There were no free elections; the rule of law or bureaucracy and corruption was rampant. In addition, while stronger than Gamsakhurdia's presidency, the government was still fragile (*ibid.*). He came up with the claim of restoring territorial integrity and improving relations with the West but proved unable to solve the

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fundamental issues of territorial control and government functioning. During this period, the Georgian parliament failed to pass an essential law on national and linguistic matters.

Overall, although the government's biased attitude towards national minorities changed over this period, the Shevardnadze government did not develop any coherent policy for the federal integration process. During this period, however, efforts were made to create a comprehensive national identity and safeguard the rights of all ethnic groups. A citizenship law passed in March 1993 guaranteed unconditional citizenship to all residents of Georgia. Georgian lawmakers also adopted UN conventions such as the Convention against All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Council of Europe's Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A parliamentary committee on human rights and a national special investigator were also set up to protect the rights of minorities (Bashiri et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 24). But all this was not enough against the will of the separatist regions for autonomy. The Shevardnadze government attempted to suppress and seize control of separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazian armies but failed. In other words, the Georgian government has never been able to show its superiority overall political and ethnic groups. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and Adjara for more than a decade) were entirely outside the circle of central government sovereignty. In South Ossetia and Abkhazia, self-proclaimed governments claimed independence and rejected the central government's authority (Zargar, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 51-52).

The structure of Shevardnadze's government was, in fact, the legacy of the communist Soviet Union and semi-authoritarian. Even though such a system was established in Georgia when the Soviet Union collapsed and called for independence, it remained authoritarian in the lowest levels of government.

The same was true for government elites who had a management background during the Soviet era. In other words, although trying to enforce the law and hold a health election, the government elites did not change their authoritarian policy. Thus, with the independence of Georgia, only the appearance of the state changed, but the ruling political culture remained unchanged. Such a process led to the preservation of apparent democratic aspects. Still, the circulation of the elites was not free, and the participation of the people, especially the ethnic minorities, who were angered by the central government, was weak. It led to the escalation of corruption and political inefficiency during the years of Shevardnadze's government.

Schneaker believes that the main reason for the increase in inefficiency

in Georgia was the weakness of the public administration, the lack of a well-regulated program, and the failure to enact and implement laws between parliament and the executive branch. The parliament also had little leverage to enforce laws, and in addition to ineffective law enforcement, there were not enough staff (Shaban, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 150). Enforcement of regulations in Georgia after independence has always been a mystery. The lawlessness and widespread administrative corruption have brought the government into a crisis of legitimacy, which has hampered the regime's political stability.

Shevardnadze did not want to change the Soviet model of individual rule with political corruption. His decision prompted the Security Council to intervene and cheat widely in the 2000 election and declared 79.8 per cent of the vote favouring Shevardnadze (Sardarnia, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 56). 2000-2003 were not good years for the president. Shevardnadze failed to provide any meaningful economic development for Georgia, unemployment continued, foreign investment did not grow, and tourism and trade with neighbouring countries did not return to their former routine. His government was also unable to exert Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It failed to return internally-displaced persons to the region, who were numbered about 250,000 in the late 1990s. He made no serious effort to reduce corruption so that growing crime damaged the economy and undermined the education system. It frightened foreign investment and made it very difficult for Georgians to live in general (Mitchell, 2013: 32).

In general, Georgia was sixth among the countries in the world in 2003 in terms of corruption in state institutions. According to reports in the local press, 10% of the Georgian rich held 80% of the country's income and wealth, reflecting a sharp class divide (Porfard and Tofiqian, 2015 AD/1395 SH: 132). In the years before the Rose Revolution, the central government's influence was only a few miles outside of Tbilisi. Even in the capital, ordinary citizens often lived without electricity or water. Georgia's per capita national income was lower than Swaziland, and more than half lived below the poverty line (King, 2004: 16). Sardinia divides the Georgian economy from 1991 to 2003 into three periods: 1. 1991 to 1994, when the government ignores the economy. During these years, the rate of recession and inflation was very high, and the value of the national currency declined rapidly. 2. The years of relative reform from 1994 to 1998, when the government sought to control unrestrained inflation and prevent uncontrolled debt to the central bank. During these years, the parliament approved the national budget, and the Russian rouble went out of the Georgian currency cycle. 3. Years of economic crisis and corruption from 1998 to 2003.

During these years, the value of money declined due to the economic crisis, and the government lost control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in economic and political terms. The smuggling of cheap Russian goods increased (Sardarnia, 2011AD/1390 SH: 53-54).

Overall, the government's apparent weakness in building national identity and integration during Shevardnadze's second term, the economic crisis, the inability to rebuild infrastructure. Most importantly, the severe lack of will to fight corruption is among the most critical internal factors that have fuelled public discontent and civil society's efforts to effect change.

#### **4.2. International Factors**

The post-Soviet collapse of the Caucasus region has always been a source of conflict. Being in the transit belt of goods and oil and gas to Europe and crossing the northern and southern neighbours has made the region susceptible to influence and intervention. Georgia's geographical location in the Caucasus region and the 800-km-long border with Russia to the north, in the form of the Greater Caucasus Mountains and on the route to connect the South Caucasus to the Black Sea and having strategic ports with the possibility of exporting oil and gas and transit of goods, are from the most geopolitical features of this country that lead to the sensitivity of this region and its profound impact on Russia. It has led to the creation of various Russian military bases in different parts of the Caucasus. It has finally become one of the main points of conflict between the two countries.

Despite its claims to integrate with the soviet republics, Russia, to support the sovereignty of these countries against the West, seeks to strengthen its dominance (Pilerood, Zarmehri, 2015 AD/1395 SH: 45).

After the Soviet collapse and Georgia's declaration of independence, Russia refused to evacuate its military bases in Georgia by presenting vital strategic interests and the military support of Russians stationed in Tbilisi; Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first president was ousted during a bloody coup. Russia thus sought to maintain its supremacy despite Georgia's independence. Russia views the republics of the South Caucasus and Georgia as its strategic depth. It sees any impact that foreign intervention might have on the region as a threat to its national security (Ebrahimi and Mohammadi, 2011: 5). Thus, the most important strategic goals of Russia in Georgia are:

- 1) Tying Georgia's security with Russia;
- 2) Control over their traditional sphere of influence;
- 3) Controlling and sharing energy transmission lines;
- 4) Countering the influence of foreign powers, including the United States;
- 5) Preventing Tbilisi's Link to NATO (Yazdani et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 269).



On the other hand, the political goals and economic benefits of Georgia's geopolitical position determined the United States to influence and dominate Asian and Caucasian states after the Soviet collapse and the annexation of Eastern European countries by NATO to play the role of absolute hegemony. In "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives," Brzezinski writes that since superpower Political Interaction, Eurasia has been the centre of world power. This region has dominated the rest of the world. Because Eurasia is the largest region globally, it is geopolitically the most central and the power that dominates Eurasia can control other advanced, dynamic economies. Brzezinski outlines the geopolitical features and values of Eurasia for America and seeks ways to control America in this region as an essential factor in the survival of the American hegemonic power (Asgari, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 86). The American presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus at the turn of the twenty-first century, according to Brzezinski, can be described as follows:

- 1) Strengthening the economic and military power of these countries in pursuit of their complete independence;
- 2) Exploiting their underground resources and reserves, in particular, oil and gas energy and location utilization;
- 3) If these countries can achieve complete political-economic independence in a united body and become strong, they will not return to Russia (Amir Ahmadian and Asgari, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 88-89).

In this regard, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States pursued Russia's policy of containment as a strategic priority to weaken its geopolitical, geopolitical, and even geo-economic position in addition to restraining the demands and capabilities of the Moscow First World. The US-Russia game in the Caucasus region has been orbiting the Cold War pattern of the zero-sum game. Russia has always wanted to continue expanding its influence in the area. Its leaders have considered the South Caucasus "Part of the Near Abroad" and a sphere of their security interests (Hazi Nia, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 162-163). On the other hand, the social crisis caused by ethnic heterogeneity (about 70% of Georgians and 30% of different ethnicities) and ethnic conflicts and separatist tendencies of non-Georgians led to a constant fear of Georgians being threatened by Russian threats and interventions. So, the ethnic subconscious tends society towards America's superior power. Such a historical background made the Georgian government more inclined to the US, despite Russia's tendencies. The United States has also used the issue to support newly independent governments and made Georgia the largest recipient of US funding in the 1990s. Such

assistance, however, did not prevent a widespread economic crisis in Georgia. Although the government tended toward the United States during the Shevardnadze era, the United States did not support it at the height of the problem.

### **5. Conclusion**

A comparison of the two above revolutions shows that the Islamic Revolution in Iran with the idea of political Islam as an ideology was able to provide a platform for political mobilization and pave the way for sweeping change in Iran. The emergence of political Islam as an ideology and discourse was in response to the pseudo-modernist actions of the Pahlavi government. As a superficial reading of modernity, Pseudo-modernism sought to create a kind of discourse similar to that of the West and sought to provide an alternative to Iran's backwardness that formed an essential part of the political agenda. Because of the resistance of identity and cultural elements, Pseudo-modernism created another option that was defined not along this path but by returning to identity and cultural roots. For this reason, as a central concept, Islam was able to provide the necessary background for the social revolution in Iran in the wake of the failure of other alternatives and the lack of interest in them.

In the Georgian revolution, however, the place of the element of ideology was empty. The increasing problems of state-nation-building as a legacy of the former Soviet Union in many Central Asian and Caucasian republics intertwined with foreign intervention led to the formation of the Georgian revolution with ethnic nationalist tendencies. Of course, the influence of economic factors and variables can also be seen as a facilitating and accelerating variable in the Georgian revolution. For people who have been accustomed to the communist state economy for many years, the West and models based on free economics have become more attractive. The communist-era elites seemed to have become a significant obstacle to economic reform in this country. It is precisely why a kind of transition from this elite to economic change was also seen in the revolutionaries' demands.

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# Dimensions and Educational Features of "The Specific Righteous State Builders" Based on Ayatollah Khamenei's Viewpoint with an Emphasis on Imam Khomeini's Transcendent Education

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## Abstract

The present study focuses on realising the desired Islamic state to achieve "the Islamic Goals and Modern Islamic Civilization" based on the geometry and intelligent system of Ayatollah Khamenei. His innovative system includes five stages: 1) The realisation of the principle of "the Islamic Revolution," 2) The completion of "the Islamic System," 3) The culmination of "the Desired Islamic State," 4) The emergence of "the Islamic Country," and finally, 5) The formation of "a Modern Islamic Civilization." It is because an Islamic state makes an Islamic country that seeks to achieve the total goals of the Islamic Revolution, as Ayatollah Khamenei acknowledges. Forming a condition appropriate to the Islamic Revolution requires individuals and elements with solid beliefs who have the necessary qualities and characteristics and play a prominent role in realising the desired Islamic state. Ayatollah Khamenei's interpretation is "the Specifics" or "the Specific Righteous State Builders." In this research, they are the specific righteous state builders. In his thought, tasks must be realised and achieved logically by identifying the specific righteous state builders. In the research model of Imam Khomeini's transcendent education, human grows through the strengthening of reason among the existential powers and in terms of epistemology, through the strengthening of morality and jurisprudence. Thus, he can reach perfection and receive comprehensive Islamic education, as desired by Imam Khomeini. In the research hypothesis, the formation of the specific righteous state builders has been considered the solution to the shape of a desired Islamic state based on the Leader of the Revolution's view and following Imam Khomeini's transcendent education. To this aim, the present study has explored the characteristics of the specific righteous state builders based on the opinion of the wise Leader of the Revolution by examining the basis of Imam Khomeini's transcendent education. The result indicated that: "As Imam Khomeini stated, perfect humans have appropriate training in different existential layers of intellect, heart and appearance". Accordingly, the "Educational Dimensions" of Ayatollah Khamenei's "Specific Righteous State Builders" can be categorised into three dimensions of "Religious Education," "Ethical Education," and "Behavioral Education."

**Keywords:** Transcendent Education, Perfect Human Being, Specific Righteous State Builders, State Builder Nation, Desired Islamic State.

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### **Introduction and Problem Statement**

Every Revolution achieves its goals in its growing process through different stages, and the Islamic Revolution is no exception to this rule. By examining and contemplating the collection of letters, we can find leaflets, statements, and speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei, his knowledge's geometry and intelligence system. This geometry and approach are also crystallised in a discussion entitled the process of achieving Islamic goals and achieving a modern Islamic civilisation, which includes his school of thought about the Islamic Revolution. In this regard, some tasks should be actualised and performed logically (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21). Therefore, as one of the Islamic Revolution's requirements, the Islamic State has had several ups and downs in the path of its realisation (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21). Although a complete Islamic state will be formed when there is a perfect human being, we must formulate a set of state agents conforming to the Islamic Revolution goals (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1384/06/08).

In the Islamic Revolution and realisation of its ideals, until the achievement of a comprehensive model of the Revolution and finally the formation of the modern Islamic civilisation, the revolutionary nation won the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Then the system maker nations created the Islamic system<sup>1</sup> after the victory of the Revolution. In the third stage, considering that the desired Islamic state has not been formed yet (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21), the state builder nation came together. It created the desired Islamic state (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21).

That is why the formation of a desired Islamic state requires educated, self-made, and competent people (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21) without whom no success is conceivable. They play a prominent role in realising a desired Islamic state because training the politicians and officials must follow the rules and conditions of the Islamic state from the perspective of the Supreme Leader (Jahanbin and Moeinipour, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 37). It is what he calls "the Specifics" and "the Specific Righteous State Builders" (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21). In this research, they are "the Specific Righteous State Builders."

These state builders have not yet been identified and come together. It

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1. The Islamic system means implementing the total Islamic form (Khamenei Message. Conference of Tens of Thousands of People "Serving the Basij" in Azadi Stadium, 1379/07/12).

is the missing link between their characteristics and functions. In the next stage, the researchers' task is to explain their structural position and recognise the Islamic Revolution to form a state according to its goals.

Undoubtedly, realising these goals in the people's lives to form a state at the level of the Islamic Revolution requires individuals<sup>1</sup> who believe in themselves and have the necessary qualities and characteristics. They have to adapt their social orientations and behaviour and their relationship with people to Islamic standards to achieve those goals. Then they have to consider those orientations and move quickly towards them (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Families of the Martyrs of Tir 7<sup>th</sup> and a Group of the Families of the Martyrs of Tehran Province, 1394/04/06). Hence, forming a desired Islamic state requires educated, self-made, and competent people. In the second stage of the Islamic Revolution, according to Ayatollah Khomeini and Khamenei, and based on the experiences gained from the first stage, the functions of the affective factors on the structures formed need to be changed basically since it can be predicted that things will be organised and great successes will be bestowed on the nation and the country if the righteous can act.

In the research model of Imam Khomeini's transcendent education, human grows through the strengthening of reason among the existential powers and in terms of epistemology, through the strengthening of morality and jurisprudence. Thus, he can reach perfection and receive comprehensive Islamic education, as desired by Imam Khomeini.

As Imam Khomeini stated, perfect humans have appropriate training in different existential layers of intellect, heart and appearance. Accordingly, the "Educational Dimensions" of Ayatollah Khamenei's "Specific Righteous State Builders" can be categorised into three dimensions of "Religious Education," "Ethical Education," and "Behavioral Education."

Therefore, the primary purpose is to determine the characteristics and features of the specific righteous state builders from the viewpoint of the Leader of the Revolution. Based on Imam Khomeini's transcendent education. Accordingly, the main focus of this research is to examine the principles of the specific righteous state builders in line with the political thought of the Supreme Leader and according to the principles of Imam Khomeini in the discussion of educating perfect human beings.

Ayatollah Khamenei has mentioned all the goals and requirements of the Islamic Revolution after forty years in the strategic document of the second step of the Islamic Revolution. Thus, implementing this document

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<sup>1</sup>. Individuals include both male and female elements and agents (Khamenei Message. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21).

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to realise and form a state at the level of the Islamic Revolution requires a new discourse. This research can take a small step toward this discourse. Although in this study, we do not claim to explain and design a contemporary lesson in forming a state at the level of the Islamic Revolution. We can help create this discourse by explaining its links (i.e., the specific righteous state builders).

In this study, only the specific righteous state builders are explained from the perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei, while the strategies to achieve these goals from his view are not mentioned.

### **1. Research Methodology**

This research on the analysis of the characteristics of the specific righteous state builders in the view of the Supreme Leader with an emphasis on the theoretical foundations of Imam Khomeini (PBUH) is descriptive-qualitative. The present study collected data using documents and sources through the library research method. Then, it was interpreted and historically analysed using the most common historical research method, namely content analysis.

### **2. Research Background**

To the subject of this research, the characteristics of the state builders have been discussed sparsely. In articles such as "Analysis of the features of the modern Islamic civilisation in the thought of the Supreme Leader" (Akbari and Rezaei, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 85-108), and "Theoretical and objective requirements of the extension of the theory of Velayat-e Faqih in the evolutionary process of the Islamic Revolution with an emphasis on the second step of the revolution" (Taqizadeh and Meshkani Sabzevari, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 35-58), there are materials mainly related to the characteristics of the modern Islamic civilisation and the aspects of building a desired Islamic state from the perspective of the Supreme Leader.

However, based on the reviews, it can be said that the closest research in terms of content conducted in this field is an article entitled "The Research Model of the Formation of the Islamic State with an Emphasis on the Nation Builders" (Khodadi and Moniri, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 156-183). In this study, the specific righteous state builders have been investigated in line with the thinking of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution and based on Imam Khomeini's transcendent education and Thomas Springs Crisis Approach. Since so far, no article, dissertation, or book has been conducted on the characteristics and coordinates of the specific righteous state builders in Ayatollah Khamenei's intelligent system, emphasising the transcendent education of Imam Khomeini, the present study is an innovation.

### 3. Conceptual Framework of Research

#### 3.1. The Intellectual Systems of the Islamic Revolution in the Works of Ayatollah Khamenei

One of the conceptual frameworks of this research is that Ayatollah Khamenei has a system of thoughts and macro engineering. By examining and contemplating the collection of letters, leaflets, and statements of Ayatollah Khamenei, one can find his geometry and epistemological intellectual system. His philosophical system expresses a particular intellectual-cultural discourse and current that continues the intellectual discourse of past scholars, such as Sheikh Mufid, Sheikh Tusi, Khajeh Nasir, Sahib Jawahir, Sayyid Abdul Hussein Lari, etc. It is also the continuation of Imam Khomeini's discourse, deals with contemporary issues with an Ijtihad approach and is distinct from the modern currents and speeches, including the traditional winds regardless of the concerns of the stylish man, the westernised and easternised intellectual currents, the eclectic religious, intellectual currents, the anti-modernist and traditionalist currents, and the modern anti-rational news currents (Khosropanah, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 12-13).

Accordingly, this geometry and system are also crystallised in a discussion entitled "The Process of Achieving Islamic Goals," including the basis of his school of thoughts about the Islamic Revolution. In this regard, he believes that the Islamic system has principles and pursues ideals, and there are duties for the rulers and officials of the Islamic system. He outlines and explains five foundations as the basic principles of Islamic thought, including:

- 1) All Islamic ideas are based on monotheism;
- 2) Humans and their unique place in the creation system is based on respect;
- 3) Human life continues after death;
- 4) Human has infinite talents because God is infinite. Therefore, human has been created for an infinite journey;
- 5) The world is moving towards the rule of right and the domination of right over wrong. Although there have been ups and downs, the general trend is always towards the domination of right over wrong.

By outlining the five main foundations of revolutionary thought, he also sets out five tasks for the rulers and officials of the Islamic system that can be achieved logically. He believes that if these tasks are performed correctly, achieving Islamic goals will be achieved. The stages of the process of attaining Islamic goals are:

- 1) The realisation of the principle of "Islamic Revolution" was conducted in 1979;

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- 2) The realisation of the "Islamic System" was achieved in 1980 with the drafting and approval of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
- 3) The realisation of the desired Islamic state has not been achieved yet;
- 4) The emergence of the "Islamic country" after establishing the Islamic state;
- 5) And finally, the formation of the modern Islamic civilisation.

The critical point emphasised is that now the focus should be on realising the desired Islamic state because an Islamic state can make an Islamic country. Another issue is that, among these five stages, a higher setting can be achieved only when the lower one is executed. Therefore, if all the steps are completed, the epiphany of the Age Imam will be accelerated (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1379/09/12).

#### **3.2. The Specific Righteous State Builders, Required for the Formation of the Desired Islamic State**

In the Islamic Revolution and the realisation of its ideals, to achieving a comprehensive model of the Revolution and finally the formation of the modern Islamic civilisation, the revolutionary nation won the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Then the state builder nations created the Islamic system<sup>1</sup> after the victory of the Revolution. In the third stage, according to Ayatollah Khamenei, the desired Islamic state has not been formed yet (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21), the state builder nation came together. It created the desired Islamic state (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21).

These state builders have not yet been identified and come together and are the missing link between their characteristics and functions. In the next stage, the researchers' task is to explain their structural position and recognise the Islamic Revolution to form a state according to its goals. This nation, which should include the desired Islamic state, is named in this study as the specific righteous state builders (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Commanders of the 27<sup>th</sup> Division of Muhammad (PBUH), 1375/03/20). They are people with particular characteristics; they are self-made, virtuous, pious, brave, and trained with Islamic ethics and honesty. They are agents of the state who have obtained the necessary and sufficient criteria to a certain extent. They orient their individual and social behaviour and social relations to the Islamic norms, and they are always loyal to it (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the President and Members of the Cabinet, 1384/06/08). This group of revolutionary forces has an epistemological and jurisprudential

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<sup>1</sup>. The Islamic system means implementing the total Islamic form (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21).

transformation in line with the educational model of Imam Khomeini in some stages. Then they take the necessary measures regarding the possibility and necessity of realising the Islamic state.<sup>1</sup>

### **3.3. Permanent Change in Governance, an Essential Feature of the Islamic Revolution**

One of the points that should be clarified in explaining the specific righteous state builders in Ayatollah Khamenei's intelligent system is whether the ruling in the Islamic Revolution of Iran is stable or evolving and if it is becoming, 'is it transient or permanent?' Examining his views, we come to the point that he considers the permanent change in governance as an essential feature of the Islamic Revolution (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Students, 1397/03/07).

Therefore, the Islamic Revolution of Iran has a "Horizon and Direction" and proving this from the perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei helps to analyse a detailed understanding of the process of the Islamic Revolution. Explaining the permanent change in governance shows that if the Islamic Revolution is in this direction, and if the specific righteous state builders have characteristics per the opinion of the Supreme Leader and the theory of Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution gets close to the third stage of the Islamic Revolution process. Along the path to the realisation of the specific righteous state builders, the characteristics of these people are ranked and obtained gradually with effort (Khamenei. Statements in the Meeting with Government Agents, 1380/09/21). Therefore, to the extent that these characteristics are more realised in these people, we can say that the realisation of the desired Islamic state is more possible.

## **4. Transcendent Education Influenced by Transcendent Wisdom**

### **4.1. Transcendent Wisdom**

Imam Khomeini is a neo-Sadr philosopher in the house of transcendent wisdom and influenced by Sadr al-Mute'allehin Shirazi, so Imam Khomeini's anthropology is also based on transcendent wisdom. Emphasising the movement of the voluntary and involuntary essence of the human, he divides humans into eight types<sup>2</sup>. Imam's view on politics and analysis of

<sup>1</sup>. In another study, it is possible to explain the necessary measures for the specific righteous state builders to achieve the desired Islamic state. In short, it can be said that this organized and spontaneous group has a mission in four major dimensions of the Islamic state, i.e., first, in the two soft dimensions of "Character" and "Method" and then in the two hard dimensions of "Systems" and "Institutions."

2. 1) Rational-oriented human, 2) Lust-oriented human, 3) Violent-oriented human, 4) Evil-oriented human, 5) Lust-oriented and violence-oriented human, 6) Lust-oriented and evil-oriented human, 7) Violence-oriented and evil-oriented human, 8) Violence-oriented, lust-oriented and evil-oriented human (Lakzaee, N.; Lakzaee, R., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 154).

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national, regional and global issues is also based on this anthropological view. Hence, transcendent wisdom intellectually and culturally supports the Islamic Revolution of Iran and is affected by it and can be considered a framework to analyse the Islamic Revolution of Iran (for more explanation, see Lakzaee and Lakzaee, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 154). Furthermore, studying the Islamic Revolution using the elements of transcendent wisdom is a new approach in the analytical analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran (Lakzaee and Fathollahi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 125).

### **4.2. Transcendental Education**

In this study, transcendental education is opposed to metanarrative education. In metanarrative education, the factors of human survival in the material world are emphasised, and human eternal and otherworldly survival is neglected. While in transcendent education, in addition to the threats to humans' physical and worldly survival, the threats to their eternal and spiritual survival are also considered. Thus, the factors of human's material and otherworldly survival, in terms of being a farm for the Hereafter, are considered (Lakzaee, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 25). In this research, an anthropological model is presented based on Imam Khomeini's point of view based on transcendent wisdom. Based on this anthropological model, the specific righteous state builders' educational dimensions are organised on the Supreme Leader's view.

Therefore, Imam Khomeini, as one of the scholars of transcendent wisdom, based on narration in the book of "Forty Hadiths,"<sup>1</sup> presents research on the means of logical thinking about the issues of human education in various dimensions. He claims that if the dimensions of humans, which are in line with the origins of the universe, are adequately answered based on the three parts of religion, he is trained as an Islamic man. It can impact the realisation of anything ideal in the present discussion of the desired Islamic state.

### **4.3. Three Dimensions of the Universe**

Imam Khomeini believes that the universe has three dimensions, positions or origins.

- 1) The material world and the position of martyrdom which constitutes the behaviour basin;
- 2) The world of purgatory and the middle world and the position of dream which constitutes the tendency basin;
- 3) The other world and the position of spirituality constitute the cognition basin.

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1. A brief look at the description of the soldiers of reason and ignorance shows that in explaining and analyzing the meanings of the hadiths, Imam also paid attention to Mulla Sadra's views and opinions (Lakzaee, N; Lakzaee, R., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 154).



### 5. The Need to Train the Layers of Human Existence

As Imam Khomeini noted, humans have three origins and positions, and in each of these positions, they must learn special training and perform a specific action. Similarly, scientists are responsible for each of the three authorities (Imam Khomeini, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 386). Therefore, human has three layers intellect (cognition), heart (tendency) and appearance (behaviour). Among these layers, the intellectual dimension requires perfection, the ethical dimension needs to be nurtured, and the appearance dimension requires action (Imam Khomeini, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 387). Therefore, based on the image of human perfection, education is necessary for all three sizes to adjust the human being and make him divine.

Imam Khomeini believes that religion has considered the necessary training for the three dimensions of human beings in the form of the three sciences of beliefs, ethics and jurisprudence. A review of Imam Khomeini's statement in the twenty-fourth hadith of the noble book "Forty Hadiths" shows that his view of religion is entirely comprehensive and under the structural layers of human existence and human needs. Hence, he pays attention to philosophy and mysticism related to human beings' intellectual and spiritual dimensions. He also pays attention to ethics and education, which are associated with the middle measurement of human existence, jurisprudence, and Sharia's appearances (Moeinipour and Lakzaee, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 55). Therefore, given that Imam Khomeini considers human beings to have three layers of existence, education can be presented in three dimensions from his point of view:

- Religious education which is the container for the formation of human beliefs;
- Moral education, related to the existential layer of the heart, which is the container for the realisation of virtues and vices;
- According to the Shari'a, behavioural training is a container for the manifestation of human behaviour and affects the Muslim human's behaviour through the demand for action.

### 6. The Most Central Elements of "the Specific Righteous State Builders"

Since Imam Khomeini considers human beings with three existential dimensions, the educational dimensions of the ideal human being of the Islamic society and the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic system is also available in three sizes from the perspective of the Supreme Leader (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Heads and Principals of Education, 1399/06/11). He states: "The revelation of the Holy Prophet of Islam was an

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invitation of the people to rational education and moral education and legal education. These are the things that a comfortable and evolving human life needs" (Khamenei Message. Speech of Mab'ath Eid, 1388/04/29).

Accordingly, and considering such a systemic and systematic theology, politics finds a prominent place in the realisation of religion (Jahanbin and Moeinipour, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 33).

The Supreme Leader's system of thought shows that, in achieving the desired Islamic state, at least three things must be conducted. These are spiritual (moral) transformation, epistemological (doctrinal) transformation and finally, jurisprudential adaptation to the forms and criteria of Sharia (jurisprudential). According to Ayatollah Khamenei, state builder nations are complete, competent individuals with all human existential layers. In the following, the developments expected from the specific righteous state builders are investigated in these three fields.

#### **6.1. Creating a Spiritual Transformation in the Specific Righteous State Builders (Moral Education)**

Based on the intellectual system of the Supreme Leader and in line with the epistemological, ontological and anthropological foundations of Imam Khomeini in the path of spiritual (moral) transformation, the state builder nation should create a spiritual and moral change. Because from the perspective of Imam Khomeini, according to Islamic teachings, only God is effective in the world of existence, and man should bring himself closer to God as much as possible morally (Imam Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379b SH: 17). Therefore, it is necessary to achieve the highest existential conscience of monotheism internally and consciously and move toward the absolute origin in the context of the goals of the Islamic Revolution and have revolutionary motivation and insight to struggle and confront the enemy. He believes that the first and most crucial issue is the spiritual transformation of human beings since we are affected by long non-Islamic upbringing (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Foreign Visitors, 1370/11/14). Therefore, by examining his intellectual geometry, he considers spirituality as inner love and attraction and innate knowledge that constantly leads man to that desirable end, closeness to God. He defines spirituality as that inner attraction and love towards similarity to God, natural in human beings. Man is imbued with divine love and divine knowledge (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Supreme Assembly of IRGC Commanders, 1386/06/08).

The Supreme Leader believes that the specific righteous state builders should elaborate and fertilise this spirituality within himself to give it depth and sublimity. It means for the stage of Islamic state building, the state builder nation needs transcendent spirituality: "We had good spirituality

in the Revolution. However, it is not enough for the state-building phase. It was good for the revolution stage, but not enough for the state-building stage". In his intellectual geometry, the authentic spirituality in the Ahl al-Bayt school is spirituality without isolation, without separation from life, spirituality with politics and mysticism, with social activity, supplication and crying for God Almighty and spirituality with jihad. In fact, from his point of view, Islam does not have spirituality without looking at social issues and the destiny of human beings (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Supreme Assembly of IRGC Commanders, 1386/06/08).

According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the indicators and areas of realising spirituality in the Islamic system for the state-building nation are divided into two parts. These are the Islamic state agents' spirituality towards themselves and the Islamic state agents' spirituality towards the people.

**6.2. The Spirituality of the Agents of the Islamic State towards Themselves**  
He emphasises spirituality with rationality (Khamenei Statements. Speech of Friday Prayer Sermons in Tehran, 1390/11/14). He considers justice combined with spirituality as the true justice (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Members of the Cabinet, 1388/06/16). Therefore, they believe the basis of justice is spirituality and rationality (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the President and Members of the Cabinet, 1387/06/02).

Therefore, from his point of view, they are just agents who have both spirituality and rationality. Thus, progress will not be achieved (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the President and Members of the Cabinet, 1387/06/02) because ethics and spirituality are the main dimensions of actual progress (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Pilgrims and Neighbors of Hazrat Ali ibn Musa al-Reza, 1388/01/01).

However, from his point of view, worship of God is considered in its broad and complete meaning. Therefore, in practice, there are two duties: obedience to the Almighty God and the worship of the Lord of the universe, and disobeying the "Andad Allah," i.e., anything that wants to rule man over the rule of God (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Agents, 1379/09/12).

**6.3. The Spirituality of the Agents of the Islamic State towards the People**  
His advice can be classified into three types of ethics that sometimes overlap.

- A) A set of recommendations concern an agent's status and dignity about himself as an individual morality, such as permanent continuity with God (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Commanders of the Air Force and the Air Defense of the Army, 1399/11/19);
- B) The other category refers to the recommendations and guidelines expressed to society and the people, e.g., gaining the people's consent

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(as a part of social ethics). He considers the people's satisfaction in the popularity of the officials (Khamenei Statements. Speech of National Conference of the Judiciary, 1399/04/07);

C) The last category is about interacting with other colleagues and subordinates and doing work (as part of administrative ethics).

In general, it can be said that the purpose of observing these requirements and moral abstinence is to serve the people to obtain divine pleasure (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Members of the Assembly of Experts, 1381/12/13) so that the agents should always put people at the centre of affairs. It will lead to achievements such as people's trust in the officials' (Khamenei Statements. TV Speech of Qorban Eid, 1399/05/10), maximum participation of the people (Khamenei Statements. TV Speech on Eid Quorban, 1399/05/10), as well as honour and pride of the Islamic community (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with a Group of Iraqi Mourners, 1398/06 28).

Therefore, according to his system of thought, to achieve the goals and ideals of the Islamic system, spirituality and spiritual issues of human beings should be the main elements of the model of the Islamic Republic. It must be a unique and desired human system called the "Islamic Nation." Hence, according to the Islamic Revolution future, completing the foundations of the system and spreading it in the emotional and intellectual background of the nations should be a priority.

In this regard, he states that the issue of the Islamic Republic is an extraordinary phenomenon gradually developing and taking root in an essential part of the world. It is a system in which spirituality is one of the main pillars (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Elite Students and Representatives of Various Student Organisations, 1385/07/25).

#### **6.4. Creating an Epistemological Transformation in "the Specific Righteous State Builders"**

The necessity of creating an epistemological transformation of the specific righteous state builders can be explained by considering the following points. Given that the real prophets have led all human beings to the knowledge of God (Imam Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 17), Ayatollah Khamenei believes that:

First, we must complete the Islamic system regarding its epistemological foundations (Khamenei. Statements in the Meeting with Elite Students and Representatives of Various Student Organisations, 1385/07/25).

Second, we must complete the construction of the system based on those epistemological foundations, i.e., the Islamic design, the Islamic State, and the Islamic country are arranged in the same way (Khamenei Statements.

Meeting with Elite Students and Representatives of Various Student Organisations, 1385/07/25).

Third, when the Islamic system is formed on an epistemological basis, it must naturally spread to the emotional and intellectual background of the nations (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Elite Students and Representatives of Various Student Organisations, 1385/07/25).

The purpose of creating an epistemological or insightful transformation is to obtain a chronological knowledge of the current conditions of the social life of religion. It should be noted that gaining contemporary knowledge is not meant here because modern knowledge includes the last one hundred and two hundred years. However, we need to learn about a more extended period, i.e., the age of absence. In fact, in the insightful stage of epistemological transformation, the state builder nation must be able to organise the knowledge of the period of absence according to the situation and conditions of the age of lack. Epistemological evolution describes the basic, strategic and applied macro understanding of the school of the Islamic Revolution and the achievement of the macro idea for managing the Islamic programs.

Further explanation is that the state builder nation needs to effectively understand the Islamic issues to solve the world issues of this century (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Foreign Visitors, 1370/11/14). Undoubtedly, the state builder nation must have an epistemological transformation, believe in the connection between the principles of Islamic belief and the public movement towards the goals of the Islamic Revolution, and comprehend the efficiency and effectiveness of Islam to solve the problems of humanity in the contemporary century. The critical point is the epistemological transformation in the state builder nation depends on gaining the correct knowledge since gaining the proper knowledge in all matters is as necessary as gaining the lowdown on the battlefield (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the Members of the Supreme Leader Office and the Guard Corps of Ayatollah Khamenei, 1388/05/05). However, the source of epistemological transformation in the specific righteous state builders is the correct knowledge and training of believers, scholars and thinkers (Khamenei Statements. in the Meeting with Foreign Visitors, 1370/11/14).

### **7. Creating Epistemological Transformation through Self-belief**

To realise the Islamic ideals in the Iranian Revolution, he believes that the design and formal engineering of the Islamic system must be based on the law. He must train managers to manage the country affairs. One of the key points in training the managers is to create an epistemological transformation to achieve self-belief at various levels; the Supreme Leader of the Revolution emphasises this issue significantly.

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From the Supreme Leader's point of view, self-belief means creating knowledge, belief, faith and heartfelt belief in different levels in the specific righteous state builders (state builder nations) to achieve the desired Islamic state as a prelude to the modern Islamic society and civilisation. Hence, we extract the levels and types of self-belief from his intellectual geometry in the following. Transformation in beliefs occurs on three levels:

- 1) **Belief in God:** In his view, any nation that relies on God, believes in itself, believes in its personality, accepts its power, and understands that it can defend itself, gains pride and dignity throughout the world. Therefore, he recommends that humans strengthen their relationship with God (Khamenei Statements. Speech of the 24<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Imam Khomeini's Departure, 1392/03/14);
- 2) **Belief in people:** In his view, if officials, like Imam Khomeini, feel deep love and trust in the people and believe in the people's courage, faith, loyalty and presence, the people will genuinely and reasonably reward them with absolute confidence (Khamenei Statements. in the Speech of the 24<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Imam Khomeini's Departure, 1392/03/14);
- 3) **Belief in yourself:** In this regard, he believes that the way to victory in this challenge and confrontation is only to stand with faith and self-belief because you have to think in the way you step in (Khamenei Statements. Speech of the 24<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Imam Khomeini's Departure, 1392/03/14 SH).

Other types of self-belief from the perspective of the Leader of the Revolution include:

- 1) **Political self-belief:** At the beginning of the victory, the Islamic Revolution, observing the leadership of Imam Khomeini, was able to inject political self-belief into the nation and thus show that the basis of all manifestations and aspects of self-confidence is its human and moral dimension. Therefore, Ayatollah Khamenei, since the onset of the third stage of the Revolution, emphasised the principle of self-belief and moved toward forming the desired Islamic state, following Imam Khomeini (Khamenei Statements. Speech of Friday Prayer Sermons in Tehran, 1389/11/15);
- 2) **Military self-belief:** He believes that if the armed forces have faith in God and rely on Him for Jihad and doing their duties, they can achieve military self-belief. Otherwise, it is impossible to compete with the great world powers by relying solely on military equipment and facilities because they are years ahead of us regarding equipment and human resources (Khamenei Statements. Speech of Imam Ali

Military Academy, 1390/08/19);

- 3) Social self-belief: Ayatollah Khamenei believes that people and mostly, the officials must abandon saying we cannot, and there is no way to succeed (Khamenei Statements. Nowruz Meeting of the Senior Commanders of the Armed Forces with the Commander-in-chief, 1396/01/20);
- 4) Economic self-belief: One of the critical words of the Supreme Leader during his years in the leadership position was to strengthen the spirit of economic self-belief. He considers the presence of faithful, self-confident, and God-dependent elements at high priority to solve the financial problems and realise economic self-belief. Hence, he believes that officials in both parliament and state should not let these beliefs weaken in the economic section (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Government Officials, 1393/04/16);
- 5) Scientific self-belief: He believes that the revival of the spirit of pride and self-confidence in the nation will cause the prosperity of the brilliant, talented people and the achievement of all these scientific and political honours (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Female Doctors and Surgeons, 1372/09/08);
- 6) Cultural self-belief: He believes that the lack of cultural self-confidence in Taghut led the people to corruption, slavery, self-destruction, and disbelief. As a result, self-defeat against foreigners was strengthened, and economic and cultural independence had no meaning in the country (Khamenei Statements. Speech of the 8<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Imam Khomeini's Departure, 1376/03/14). Therefore, in the Islamic state, cultural self-confidence is achieved by leading people to anti-corruption and helps empower self-belief.

### **8. Behavioral Training; Full Jurisprudential Compliance with the Forms and Criteria of Sharia**

The third characteristic of the specific righteous state builders, based on the principles of Imam Khomeini, which also exist in the thought system of the Supreme Leader, is the jurisprudential conformity with the forms and criteria of Sharia. In explaining the characteristics of a perfect human being, Imam Khomeini believes that he has an outward appearance and an inward one. The external appearance is a jurisprudential issue that people (the specific righteous state builders) should properly benefit from (Imam Khomeini, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 83). Therefore, in this regard, Ayatollah Khamenei believes that the realisation of the state should be based on religious laws or forms and criteria of Sharia (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with Basij Students, 1384/03/05).

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As he mentions, the meaning of the slogan of the Islamic state is that we want our behaviour, our treatment with people, and our therapy with ourselves, and our treatment with the international systems to be close to Islamic standards and norms. This slogan is very valuable. Insha'Allah, we can adhere to this slogan and try more earnestly to take this big step towards achieving those goals because achieving those goals requires strong men (Khamenei Statements. Meeting with the President and Members of the Cabinet, 1384/06/08).

Full compliance with religious and jurisprudential rules is necessary both in the function of the specific righteous state builders and in the structure and format in which they perform their duties based on religion. In a state, arrangements and methods are like a system where agents should interact and act with each other. Suppose we imagine a situation where agents have Islamic characteristics, but the processes and structures are based on temporal patterns. In that case, these are practically the material requirements, relationships and patterns imposed on the ideals and aspirations of the Islamic state and limit the state to their imposed frameworks. In this case, in practice, the institutions and structures of the system will face an internal and permanent conflict between the Islamic state and secular models.

According to the "Jurisprudence-based" Shia political system, in the era of absence, all the stages of the evolutionary process of the Islamic Revolution must be based on Shiite jurisprudence. Thus, the set of state buildings will not be an exception to this rule. The jurisprudential standards must first be explained and applied for state-building (For more explanation, see Taqizadeh and Meshkani Sabzevari, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 35-58).

In explaining the long and challenging process of achieving the Islamic goals and the state builder nation, the Supreme Leader refers to full compliance with the religious and jurisprudential rules. Both are in the function of the specific righteous state builders and the structure and format in which they perform their duties based on religion. He points out that this is why they believe in issuing jurisprudential rules commensurate with state-building in both fields. The Supreme Leader emphasises that in the Islamic society, we need people with knowledge of religion to meet the new needs of the contemporary era (Khamenei Statements. in the Speech of the Leader of the Revolution at the Beginning of the Jurisprudence Course, 1374/06/14).

### **Conclusion**

In line with achieving Islamic goals and a new Islamic civilisation based



on the geometry and intelligent system of Ayatollah Khamenei, which has five stages, the lack of a desired Islamic state is the reason for not achieving the total goals of the Islamic Revolution.

The formation of a state at the level of the Islamic Revolution requires self-confident elements that play a significant role in realising the desired Islamic state. In the present study, these people are referred to as the specific righteous state builders. From Ayatollah Khamenei's point of view, tasks must be performed logically to identify the particular righteous state builders.

Based on the view of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution and following the transcendent education of Imam Khomeini, the research hypothesis emphasises that the formation of the specific righteous state builders is necessary for the construction of a desired Islamic state. The review of the functions of the influential factors in the structures created by the Islamic Revolution shows that the specific righteous state builders have a significant role in pursuing and realising the country's main challenges. Their presence is necessary for the governance processes.

Hence, the following findings are in line with the research hypothesis:

The educational dimensions of the specific righteous state builders are commensurate with the dimensions of the existence of a perfect and comprehensive human being. Considering that human beings have three layers of reality in their intellect, heart and appearance, the educational dimensions of the specific righteous state builders can also be classified into three dimensions: religious education, moral education and behavioural education.

Based on Imam Khomeini's anthropological foundations, which indicates the model of educating the perfect man, the specific righteous state builders grow epistemologically, morally and jurisprudentially through the strengthening of reason. In this case, it can achieve the desired Islamic state that Ayatollah Khamenei intends. Comprehensive Islamic education has three parts:

1) Creating a spiritual transformation in the specific righteous state builders (moral education):

Ayatollah Khamenei emphasises that it is necessary to achieve the highest existential conscience of monotheism internally and consciously and move toward the absolute origin in the context of the goals of the Islamic Revolution and have revolutionary motivation and insight to struggle to confront the enemy. As he believes, the first and most crucial issue is the spiritual transformation of human beings. Ayatollah Khamenei divides the indicators and areas of realisation of spirituality in the Islamic system for the state-building nation into two parts: a) the spirituality of the

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agents of the Islamic state towards themselves and b) the spirituality of the agents of the Islamic state towards the people.

2) Creating an epistemological transformation in the specific righteous state builders:

The importance of creating an epistemological transformation in the specific righteous state builders can be explained through Ayatollah Khamenei's emphasis on completing the Islamic system through its epistemological foundations.

To realise the Islamic ideals in the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei believes that the design and formal engineering of the Islamic system must be based on the law, and the managers must be trained to manage the country's affairs. One of the key points in training the managers is to create an epistemological transformation to achieve self-belief at various levels; the Supreme Leader of the Revolution emphasises this issue significantly.

3) Behavioral training; full jurisprudential compliance with the forms and criteria of Sharia:

The third characteristic of the specific righteous state builders, based on the principles of Imam Khomeini, which also exist in the thought system of the Supreme Leader, is the jurisprudential conformity with the forms and criteria of Sharia.

He maintains that the meaning of the slogan of the Islamic state is that we want our behaviour, our treatment with people, and our therapy with ourselves, and our treatment with the international systems to be close to Islamic standards and norms. Full compliance with religious and jurisprudential rules is necessary both in the function of the specific righteous state builders and in the structure and format in which they perform their duties based on religion.

Therefore, today, in the second stage of the Islamic Revolution, according to Ayatollah Khomeini and Khamenei, and based on the experiences gained from the first stage, the functions of the affective factors on the structures formed need to be changed basically.

Finally, we suggest that future research focus on expanding the role and presence of the specific righteous state builders in the governing environment and directing social planning so that such people can act in different social sectors of the Islamic state.

In this study, only the characteristics of the specific righteous state builders have been explained from the perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei. Thus, another study requires introducing the approaches and strategies to achieve these goals.

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## **On Islamic Movements** **(Case Study: Hezbollah in Lebanon)**

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### **Abstract**

One of the crucial issues in the Islamic Revolution of Iran is its impact on Islamic countries and movements. One of the countries that the Islamic Revolution has dramatically influenced is Lebanon. The Lebanese Hezbollah movement is one of the most successful Islamic movements. Today, Hezbollah in Lebanon plays a decisive role in the fate of that country, but also regional and global equations. The present study aimed to study the effects and thoughts of the cultural ideas of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the teachings of Imam Khomeini on the Lebanese Hezbollah movement. The article's central question is, 'what is the cultural impact of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the teachings of Imam Khomeini on Hezbollah in Lebanon?' The research hypothesis is that with the victory and expansion of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Muslims, especially Lebanese Shias and the Hezbollah movement, were more influenced by the Islamic Revolution of Iran than other groups. The results indicated that with the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Islamic movements, based on the teachings of Imam Khomeini, took steps towards identity and independence. Political Islam came to the text from the margins. Iranian Islamic ideas inspired Islamic movements. The result is that among the Lebanese Shias, the Hezbollah movement was more influenced by the Islamic Revolution of Iran than any other group. They see Iran as a supporter and model of the rescue struggle. Ideology and belief have played an essential role in the emergence and continuation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. This element has transformed Hezbollah from an ideological movement to political and social action. This article deals with the cultural dissemination of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Hezbollah in Lebanon based on the theory of broadcasting and using a descriptive-analytical research method.

**Keywords;** Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah, Broadcasting Theory, Export of Revolution, Reflection.

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## Introduction

The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 occurred when the bipolar rivalry between the West and the east had divided the world's ideology into two separate identities, liberalism and communism. Nevertheless, the Iranian revolution chose a third way to shape Islam's semantic system. Islam was a new identity at that time. Islam overthrew a Western-backed dictatorship in Iran. Hence, Islamism was introduced as a practical political, cultural, and economic orientation. Accordingly, this revolution's values and concepts are articulated in a different semantic system. It forms a novel idea in its time. This revolution has always been influential in various regional and global developments. This study aimed to study the cultural beliefs of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Imam Khomeini's teachings regarding identity and semantic impact on the Lebanese Hezbollah movement. The main question of the present paper is 'what cultural impact has the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the teachings of Imam Khomeini on Hezbollah in Lebanon?' The report is based on the assumption that with the victory and spread of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Muslims, especially Lebanese Shias, became more hopeful than before. Following the teachings of Imam Khomeini, they took a step towards identity and independence. Lebanon's Hezbollah sees Iran more than any other Islamic group as a supporter and model of the rescue struggle. Therefore, this article tries to show the cultural reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Imam Khomeini's teachings on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Study how Lebanon's Hezbollah was formed and how this political group transformed from an ideological force into a socio-political movement. The present research has been done using the descriptive-analytical method. The library method has been used to collect information.

## 1. Research Background

Valuable texts have been written in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There are also essential texts in exporting the Islamic Revolution. Some of the studied works have only considered the political structure of the post-Cold War international system and its effects on Iran's foreign policy. These writers have contributed to other influential domestic components in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Dalirpour, 1997 AD/1376 SH); (Sotoudeh Arani, 2001AD/1380 SH); (Mohammadi, 2005 AD/1384 SH); (Pourahmadi, 2007 AD/1386 SH). Others have focused solely on government performance, foreign policy, and the weakness of Iran's diplomatic apparatus. They have criticized it (Tajik, 2004 AD/1382 SH). Others have examined the fundamental contradictions in the constitution of

the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the ideological obligations of this system, compared to other nations of the world, in the foreign policy and the weakness of the country's diplomatic apparatus in forming alliances with regional governments and major world powers. The common denominator of the texts studied in this field is that none of the mentioned research has completely covered the subject of this article. The present paper has the necessary innovation because it reflects the cultural ideas of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the teachings of Imam Khomeini in the form of dissemination theory and as cultural dissemination.

## 2. Theoretical Framework: Broadcast Theory

The broadcast theory is one of the most popular theories on how ideas, thoughts, and ideas are disseminated, spread, and developed. This theory was invented in 1953 by the Swedish geographer Hagstrand for agricultural exploitation and diseases such as tuberculosis and cholera. It has spread to cultural fields, political science and geography, international relations, and revolutionary studies. Revolution theorists believe that the issue of exporting the revolution is one of the inherent and fundamental issues of processes because any course will affect other countries, especially its neighbouring countries. According to the diffusion theory, each revolution will have regional and International follows. The Iranian Revolution as a model provided the causes of Islamic awakening movements in the Middle East (Jamalzadeh, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 61).

The theory of diffusion was invented in 1953 by the Swedish geographer Hagerstrand (Hagerstrand, 1968:152). Acceptance is accepted. Strand enumerates six main factors in broadcast theory: 1. The domain or environment in which broadcast appears; 2. Playing time, which may be continuous or intermittent; 3. The subject of distribution; 4. Origin of distribution and its head; 5. Broadcast destination; 6. The path of phenomena (Haggett, 1972: 350). According to Strand, the degree of playback may vary from place to place. Broadcasting accelerates through the early stages to the middle and gradually. Especially in the new era, cultural elements and innovations spread rapidly between jet aircraft and satellite images between countries and continents (Jordan and Raventry, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 316).

### 2.1. Types of Broadcasts

Strand has identified three types of playback:

**Displacement:** Displacement dispersal occurs when individuals or groups with a specific idea physically move from place to place. In this way, innovations spread in the new land. Religions spread through the

dispatch of religious missionaries.

**Hierarchical distribution:** Phenomena and innovations are spread hierarchically in this type of distribution. Ideas extend from a critical person to another or from a significant urban centre to another urban centre. This type of broadcast is also known as "Drop Release." That process flows from critical and essential centres to smaller ones (Haggett, 1972: 305). The highest propagation speed is hierarchical because the phenomenon is quickly transferred to the absolute rule (Hosseini and Barzegar, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 39). In this type of broadcast, the most prominent individuals and organizations are the audiences. It is then transferred to other groups.

**Infectious or contagious part:** In this type of distribution, the general spread of ideas occurs without considering the hierarchy. This process is strongly influenced by distance. The distribution process follows factors such as the main characteristics of phenomena, their quality, the centre of wonders, the population ready to accept and its distance, and the resistance or acceptance of the phenomenon (Morrill and Manninen, 1975: 296). Of course, the broadcast phenomenon is not just one of the above, but maybe a combination of them.

## 2.2. Principles of Broadcast Theory

In general, the principles and components of broadcast theory can be classified as follows:

1) Primary domain and environment: The first factor is the domain and environment in which diffusion occurs. This environment has natural or environmental, human or social characteristics;

2) Broadcast time: A phenomenon spreads to other regions over time. Time can be days and years as separate periods;

3) Subject or phenomenon of broadcasting: Problems and events that spread from one area to another can be technical and scientific innovations, new agricultural and production findings, and social phenomena such as behaviour, dialect, fashion, diseases, or cultural activities. It can be political like revolutions;

4) Origin of broadcast: The origin has particular characteristics and conditions for creating and forming the phenomenon. It spreads to other areas due to widespread acceptance;

5) Broadcast destination: Areas and places where the subject and phenomenon of broadcasting have spread over time and among these areas people;

6) The path of the phenomenon: The subject of the broadcast flows in specific directions. These routes bring the broadcasting phenomenon to its



destination (Hosseini and Barzegar, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 175). In the present study, the spread of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Lebanon is investigated using this theory.

From the perspective of the present article, the dissemination and reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran occur in the form of displacement, hierarchy, and contagion. The broadcast of the Islamic Revolution of Iran cannot be limited to one of the above. Because the Iranian Revolution had a general and universal message. According to religious teachings, it is not limited to borders. This theory cannot clearly show many of the influential capabilities of the Iranian Revolution, including in the soft power in Iran. But it can be used to study the effects of the revolution in many areas. However, this theory cannot fully show the effectiveness of the Iranian Revolution. But for various reasons, including the religious and cultural affinity between the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is a suitable tool for analyzing and explaining the spread and export of the Islamic Revolution.

Differing views have been expressed on how and why Islamic movements formed in West Asia. Dekmajian considers the crisis-stricken Arab society and Farahmand leadership as two fundamental factors (Dekmajian, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 31). According to Buzan, the security and racial structure of the Middle East is the most critical factor in the growth and formation of these political currents (Buzan, 2002: 643). Migdal proposes the theory of a "Weak State-Strong Nation" (Migdal, 2016: 105). These theories emphasize a specific part of Islamic society's causes and social movements. Most of them neglect to pay attention to Islamic ideology and the ideological system in creating these groups. The motivation of Muslims to participate in Islamist groups and take collective action should be sought within the ideological system of Islam and the historical tradition of Muslims (Ahmadi, 1999 AD/1377 SH: 70). In addition, globalization and the collapse of Islamic societies are the most important reasons for the formation of these groups in the Islamic world (Ahmadi, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 50).

### **3. Lebanese Shias**

Lebanon covers an area of 13,452 square kilometres. It is bounded on the north and east by Syria, on the south by occupied Palestine, and the West by the Mediterranean Sea (Toloui, 1994 AD/1372 SH: 748). The official languages are Arabic, French, and English. 40 to 50 per cent of Lebanon's population are Christians, and 55 to 60 per cent are Muslims. In Lebanon, 17 religious denominations are recognized. There are 11 Christian sects, 5

Islamic sects including Shias, Sunnis, Druze, Alawites, and Ismailis, and one Jewish sect (Alizadeh, 1990 AD/1368 SH: 11). The current Lebanese population is 6093,509, according to 2018 statistics (Rotbe.com). Its political and demographic structure is very heterogeneous. Lebanese society lacks solidarity and a unified national identity. Government positions, public services, the army, and the judiciary, are divided according to sectarian and religious affiliations (Pargo, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 12). The president is elected from the Maronites, the prime minister from the Sunnis, and the parliament speaker among the Shias. According to the Lebanese constitution, s. Jabal Amel Shia scholars claim that the Lebanese Shia community is older than other Islamic communities except for the Hijaz. The establishment of this society is attributed to Abuzar Ghaffari (Assaf, 1996: 105). The history of activity and scientific life in Jabal Amel dates back to the establishment of the School of Charities by the first martyr.

Shias were excluded from the political scene in Lebanon, especially in the 19th century. Except for the Shias, all Islamic and Christian sects were associated with foreign countries. They enjoyed their support. Until the late 1960s, Imam Musa Sadr emigrated from Iran to Lebanon. Provides a solid network to support the peasants in southern Lebanon under "Movement of the Deprived." (Pargo, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 25)

He gave Lebanese Muslims, especially the country's Shias, great confidence. If today they have resisted the great powers, especially Israel, they owe much to the divine teachings of this superman of history. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, inspired by the Iranian Revolution, a particular movement and dynamism arose among all Lebanese Muslims, especially the Shias of this country. Today, the Lebanese Shias play a decisive role in the fate of that country, but also the global equations.

#### 4. Hezbollah Movement

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the occupation of Beirut, a large number of believers in the Amal movement and abroad founded a new anti-Zionist movement called Hezbollah (Kadivar, 2000: 116). Its main and primary goal was to fight against the occupiers, based on Islamic principles according to the order of Imam Khomeini (Gaub, 2013: 6). This group quickly opened a place in the people's hearts by creating nuclei of resistance and carrying out large-scale operations against the Zionists (Pargo, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 125). This party consisted of the critical Shia figures opposed to Amal (Maksad and Lord, 2018:5). He worked closely with Iran. In such a way, it was considered the political-military arm of Iran in Lebanon (Pargo, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 47). Hezbollah believes in the

principle of Velayat-e Faqih. It feels obliged to obey the Islamic leader (Asadollahi, 2001 AD/1379 SH: 58). It believes that this leadership is in the present age in the Islamic Republic, and every Muslim is legally obliged to obey the orders of the guardian of Muslims. Hezbollah did not have good relations with Amal in the late 1980s. There were even clashes between them. Until the mediation of Iran from mid-1988 onwards, reduced these differences. Finally, in early 1989, with the participation of the Lebanese national-religious Forces at the Tehran Conference, the two groups put aside their differences (Fрати, 2003 AD/1381 SH: 48).

Essential factors in the formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon are deprivation and lack of social justice in the Muslim community and the inefficiency of the existing government structure; civil wars, the collapse of the social-democratic system, and the disregard for the Shias' political, cultural, and social rights; increasing the Zionist regime's aggression in the southern regions to weaken the position of Muslims; the impact of the teachings of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on Lebanon, especially the Shias (Talash, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 56).

## **5. Theory of Broadcasting and Influence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Teachings of Imam Khomeini on Hezbollah in Lebanon**

Every revolution, naturally, after victory, seeks to spread and promote the achieved ideals and affect the environment. This principle is the coercive result of the phenomenon of the process throughout the history of the world (Ramezani, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 55). It is considered part of the extraterrestrial mission of all revolutions (Mohammadi, 2007 AD/1385 SH: 60). The Islamic Revolution of Iran has also affected other societies. These influences are more visible in the case of neighbours, Islamic countries, and Shia currents. The most significant and influential impact and reflection of the Islamic Revolution have been in Lebanon.

### **5.1. The Beginning of the Broadcast of the Islamic Revolution and the Teachings of Imam Khomeini**

The Islamic Revolution of Iran introduced a new cultural and political model. Without dependence on the world's superpowers, without modern and advanced weapons, empty hands, and faith and belief in the eternal divine power, can defeat a robust regime. Of course, having a Godly leader is a necessity. Before the Islamic Revolution, well-known ideologies all had a material colour and smell, in the meantime, resorting to religious belief and faith as a revolutionary ideology was considered an improbable and unexpected event (Alia Nasab and Kheiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 102). Iranian Revolution in 1979 can be considered a significant turning point

for contemporary Islamic movements. Because with the victory of the Islamic Revolution led by Imam Khomeini in Iran, Islamic movements and the Islamic Awakening entered a new phase. The general and global nature of the Islamic Revolution caused this historical development not to be limited to the geographical borders of Islamic Iran. Have an impact, especially in the Islamic world.

The Islamic Revolution has influenced Islamic movements from various dimensions. It seems to have had the most significant impact on academic and cultural fields. The Islamic Revolution of Iran introduced new cultural values in the political struggle of Islamic movements. One of these values is the tendency to Jihad. After the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Islamic movements have accepted Jihad, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice as fundamental principles. In other words, principles such as Jihad, martyrdom, and sacrifice, which were the symbol of the Shia revolutionary movements and the slogan of the Islamic Revolution, were accepted as the basic principles of the struggle (Asadollahi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 172).

The role and influence of Imam Khomeini on Islamic movements can be studied from both theoretical and practical dimensions. Theoretically, Imam Khomeini's political-religious ideas had a profound and comprehensive impact on Islamic movements. A positive approach to the rational management of religious teachings in various areas of collective human life hopes for a bright and prosperous future. Most importantly, confidence in Muslim societies' religious and Islamic identity is among Imam Khomeini's most apparent effects in the theoretical part. The deep and comprehensive connection that the Imam established between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and religious movements around the world, on the one hand, made the religious movement of the Iranian people a point of reliance and source of support for these movements. On the other hand, the firm foundation of the ideology of the revolution, the Islamic movements also had dynamic ideological foundations and ideology (Sajjadi, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 374).

Therefore, Imam's impact on the theoretical dimension and Islamic movements, in addition to providing a logical and appropriate response to the challenge of Islamic movements with the West, the most robust sense of religious identity and strong belief in the effectiveness of spiritual teachings and ideology. He also left Islam as a memory. The profound effects of the great thoughts of the religious leader of the Islamic Movement of Iran on the Islamic Movement were not limited to the theoretical and intellectual dimensions. On the practical side, it has also influenced the movement of Islamic movements. Most Islamic movements and Muslim countries in

their anti-colonial struggles have benefited from the experiences and objective achievements of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which shows aspects of the beneficial influence of these movements from Imam Khomeini.

### **5.2. Broadcasting Destination: Hezbollah Movement in Lebanon**

The Lebanese Hezbollah movement was founded in 1982, about three years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. This movement is now the most famous and influential Islamist group in the Islamic world that has achieved this with its activities and actions. Therefore, we should study and know this movement's history, background, goals, principles, and programs. On 6 June 1982, as Lebanon was burning during a civil war, the Israeli army invaded Lebanese territory and quickly and without significant resistance occupied more than half of Lebanese territory. Three days after the rape began, it reached the gates of Beirut and laid siege to the city. The Israeli military aggression lasted about a month and a half, during which only some Islamist groups in southern Lebanon and some other areas resisted. With Iran's efforts, disparate Islamist groups came together, and after negotiations, a nine-member committee consisting of Lebanese Shia clerics was formed. After negotiations, the group presented its final plan, known as "Document 9," to Imam Khomeini, and he approved the project. The nine-member committee elected a five-member council to chair the new organization at the end of the nine-member committee. This new council was named the "Lebanese Council," and its first meeting was held in the winter of 1982. The Lebanese council adopted the method of collective leadership and the principle of a majority of votes in decisions. This council was initially responsible for the formation of the following tasks:

Organizing military and security organizations; managing political organizations; expansion of military operations against the Israeli army; dealing with all enemies: Israel, the West, the Lebanese political system and the Arab gathering, etc.; preventing the conclusion of any peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel; spreading Islamic ideas through cultural and propaganda activities. In 1983, after holding a conference of liberation movements in Tehran and the agreements reached, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces entered Lebanon. They trained the military and ideological forces of the resistance forces in Lebanon in the Bekaa Plain and the Baalbek region. The arrival of the IRGC in Lebanon led to a cultural revolution because the members of the IRGC transferred Imam Khomeini's thoughts and Islamic culture to Lebanon and attracted everyone with their behaviour. Despite having a specific understanding of how to deal with Lebanese society and events, the disparate Islamist groups gathered in Baalbek had no choice but to merge due to exceptional circumstances.

None of these small groups could lead a popular uprising and counter the occupation.

On the other hand, these disparate Islamist groups shared two views: Belief in Velayat-e Faqih and following Imam Khomeini and confrontation with Israel. The young people who gathered in Baalbek also agreed that the parties and organizations in the Lebanese supply could not achieve their political theories and goals. Taking advantage of the experiences and successes of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, they should think about creating a new organization to realize their Islamic theories and goals (Asadollahi, 2001 AD/1379 SH: 69).

Thus, Hezbollah's core and its organizational structure are from the Islamists. According to all Lebanese analysts, the Israeli military invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the cause of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement (Fazlullah, 1994: 56). In other words, Hezbollah emerged in response to the Israeli occupation. The occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the educated Lebanese clerics of Najaf, who were influenced by the thoughts of Imam Khomeini, played a significant role in the formation and emergence of Hezbollah. In general, it can be said that the occupation of Lebanon by Israel, the continuation of the civil war, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the lack of central government and instability, led to the completion of the process of politicization of Lebanon. The politicization of Lebanon provided the environment for the emergence and growth of revolutionary discourses in the address of resistance. It was in such evil that the Hezbollah movement was born. The goals of the Hezbollah movement are:

A) Efforts to establish Islamic ideology and link Lebanon to the body of the Islamic world;

B) The liberation of Holy Quds from the clutches of the Zionist regime;

C) Continuation of resistance against the occupations of the Zionist regime.

We should say broadcast topics are different from each other in terms of the degree of compatibility, connectivity, and ease of access (Shokouei, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 302). The subject of the message of the Islamic Revolution of Iran to the Lebanese Hezbollah movement was quite compromising. The seed of this party, inspired by Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1982, was formed following the occupation of the suburbs of Beirut by Israel (Taheri, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 206). Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah, the party leader, said: "We are part of the Islamic Revolution, and we announced this ten years ago" (Mohammadi, 2006 AD/1384 SH: 236).

### 5.3. Playtime

The spread of a phenomenon from one centre among the people who are ready to accept that phenomenon takes place over time (Shokouei, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 122). From the very first days of its victory, the Islamic Revolution of Iran sought to spread its message to other societies. This effort has always been continuous. The Islamic Revolution of Iran has a global nature. This effort has always continued (Asgari: 2008 AD/1386 SH: 113). Nikki Keddie concludes in her observations in several Muslim countries: "As a general principle, it can be said that the Iranian revolution during its period and for several months after the victory is widely considered inspiring in the Islamic world, especially in third world countries, but over time, except for a few. The Shia country and some radical Islamists, especially students, have a positive view of the revolution." (Keddie, 1995: 118) Since the Islamic Revolution of Iran with the Shias of Lebanon was friendly from the beginning of the revolution's victory. Therefore, influencing and promoting the Islamic Revolution has continued continuously in Lebanon.

### 5.4. The Subject of Broadcasting the Message of the Islamic Revolution

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeini brought about a profound change in the Middle East. The triumph of the Islamic Revolution of Iran under the supervision of Imam on 11 February 1979 created a profound difference in the area. From the first days of the victory, the Israeli embassy in Iran was closed and established the Palestinian embassy. Imam Khomeini Muslim students occupy the US embassy and expose its espionage plans. Iran opened its doors to various organizations, parties, countries, and forces in the world to cooperate within the framework of the policy of the new Islamic government and held several conferences on Islamic unity, the issue of Palestine. Clergy and Islamic groups in Lebanon found this Islamic state as a source of hope and support. Hezbollah also found it possible to achieve its ideals and goals through its support and approval of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The deployment of IRGC forces after the invasion of occupied Israel to train Lebanese youth interested in fighting Israel, assistance to Lebanon to support the Lebanese resistance, and participation in meeting existing social needs are examples of this support. The relationship between Hezbollah and Iran grew rapidly and confidently. Some of the most important reasons are as follows: Hezbollah and Iran's faith in the theory of Velayat-e-Faqih; the election of the Islamic Republic, which is following the Islamic principles believed by Hezbollah; political cohesion and coordination resulting from Iran's achievements in opposing domination

(Divasalar, 2007 AD/1385 SH: 75). Hezbollah's influence on the teachings of the Islamic Revolution is, in fact, one of the factors influencing the party's tendency to use the model of resistance and the use of coercive methods against Israel. After the Israeli military aggression in June 1982 and the annulment of all peaceful plans in dealing with Israel or cooperating with the United States, the principle approved by the Islamic Revolution, namely resistance and resistance against the oppressor, gained great acceptance and credibility. As a result, the groundwork was laid for the merger of small Shia Islamist communities and establishing a single organization called Hezbollah in Lebanon. This new Islamist organization showed the most outstanding readiness to accept the teachings and values of the Islamic Revolution. In general, the topics of spreading the message of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Hezbollah in Lebanon are:

#### **5.4.1. Political Islam**

Hezbollah was an objective manifestation of Imam Khomeini's political ideas. It was not just a military force in Lebanon. Instead, he was considered the representative of Shia political Islam in this region." (Taheri, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 245) Sayyid Abbas Mousavi says: "The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran restored self-confidence to Muslims. He made them aware of the level of power and ability in Islam and the Islamic ideas of the movement. The Islamic Revolution inspired the Islamic resistance in Lebanon." (Amrayi, 2004: 238)

Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah says in this regard: "Islam for us is the religion, the mosque, the school and the government and its institutions. Religion can establish a revolution and establish a government." (Garmabdashti, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 53)

#### **5.4.2. The Idea of Religious Rule**

The main feature of Hezbollah compared to Shia Islamist groups in the Arab world is the full acceptance of the theory of Velayat-e Faqih. Martyr Sayyid Abbas Mousavi, one of the founders of Hezbollah, says about his influence and his party from Imam Khomeini: "Imam Khomeini became the meaning of life in us. He was our friend and companion in all our travels and exiles. The tent under whose shade we took refuge and thus felt calm." (Mir Ali, 2014 AD/1392 SH: 231)

Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah, the party leader, says: "Opposition to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih leads to expulsion and expulsion from the party." (Gharib, 2005 AD/1383 SH: 113) He considers the ability of Hezbollah as a result of following Velayat-e Faqih and says: "We are completely obedient to the leadership and position of Velayat-e Faqih." (HabibZamani, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 160)

#### **5.4.3. The Culture of Jihad, Resistance, Self-sacrifice, and Martyrdom**



Sheikh Ragheb Harb said in this regard: "We used to live in fear and anxiety of the enemy's attack, but in the light of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, now it is the enemy who is terrified of Islam and us." (Taheri, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 242)

#### **5.4.4. The Centrality of the Religious Clergy and the Location of Mosques as the Center of Struggles**

Thanks to Imam Khomeini, Lebanese Hezbollah placed the clergy at the centre of revolutionary work and struggles and mosques at the centre of the battle. In this way, they maintained their Islamic and extreme originality. The clergy plays an essential role in the various pillars of Hezbollah in Lebanon. From the beginning of Hezbollah's establishment, most Hezbollah council members have always been clerics. Hezbollah's spokesman, secretary-general, and deputy secretary-general have always been elected clerics. Most of these Lebanese Shia clerics, who had studied at the seminary in Najaf, were influenced by Iranian clerics and scholars and had close relations. In this way, they established the two essential foundations of Hezbollah's ideology and organizational structure in Lebanon. After the formation of the first Hezbollah leadership council in 1982, the members of this council came to Iran and met with Imam Khomeini. Thus, it established a formal and organizational relationship based on Velayat-e Faqih between Hezbollah and Iran.

#### **5.5. Background and Opportunity of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on Hezbollah in Lebanon**

##### **5.5.1. Velayat-e Faqih under the Leadership of Imam Khomeini**

The main feature of Hezbollah compared to Islamist groups in the Arab world is the full acceptance of the theory of Velayat-e Faqih and the leadership of Imam Khomeini. This feature dominates all organizational elements and Hezbollah views. It is one of the two main reasons for the merger of small Islamist communities in Lebanon (in 1982) and the formation of Hezbollah (Mousavi, 2012 AD/1390 SH: 174). Regarding Hezbollah following the leadership of Imam Khomeini, Sayyid Hassan Nasrollah says: "In our opinion, Imam Khomeini is a religious authority, Imam and leader in every sense of the word." Like any great religious leader in any religion globally, this is not the case; but the Imam is more than that for us. He is the symbol of the revolution against the tyrants, the arrogant, and the authoritarian regimes ..., thus, Imam Khomeini is more than a religious symbol for us. This spiritual relationship existed between the Imam and us, even before the Israeli military invasion in 1982. Thus, Imam Khomeini became the sole source of legal rule in Hezbollah in Lebanon.

##### **5.5.2. Political, Cultural, and Religious Literature**

Hezbollah's political literature shows the party's influence over the Islamic

Revolution in Iran. The terms and expressions used in the statements of Hezbollah or its figures in the 1980s are derived from the expressions popularized by the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Also, Hezbollah's propaganda methods and tools are similar to the propaganda tools in Iranian society. The culture of Hezbollah slogans is borrowed from the dictionary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The choice of the title "Hezbollah," at the same time, is taken from verses 22 and 56 of Surah Ma'idah. It also originated from the political culture of Iran after the revolution. In Hezbollah's discourse, issues such as the oppressed, global arrogance, usurping Israel, Islamic unity, and the liberation of Quds were borrowed from the culture of the Islamic Revolution and the words of Imam Khomeini. The Islamic Revolution of Iran has strongly influenced Hezbollah in adopting propaganda methods and tools.

### **5.5.3. Using Iranian Islamic Symbols and Slogans**

Hezbollah's use of Shia religious symbols to convey revolutionary and radical messages manifests the party's influence over the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The use of characters such as the issue of Ashura and the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Hezbollah conveys Jihad, martyrdom, perseverance, and enduring hardships and sufferings more powerful. Hezbollah's symbolism and use of symbols of the Shia religion caused people to join the party, to stop division and civil war (Asadollahi, 2001 AD/1379 SH: 71). Thus, a villager or a poor Shia youth living in the southern suburbs of Beirut became a revolutionary Muslim through Hezbollah (Divasalar, 2007 AD/1385 SH: 85).

Demonstrations, celebrations for Islamic holidays, Qods Day, mourning ceremonies for the Ahl al-Bayt, and political literature and slogans of political groups, including Hezbollah in the 1980s, also show their influence on the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The choice of Hezbollah's name for this movement is one such example. He also used the term oppressed, global arrogance. He launched the first Hezbollah radio station called "Voice of the Oppressed," inspired and influenced by the Islamic Revolution of Iran (Taheri, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 95).

### **5.5.4. Iran-Lebanon Long-standing Relations and Cultural and Trade Exchanges between the Two**

Before the Islamic Revolution, many Iranians and revolutionaries were in Lebanon. In its open environment, they engaged in socio-political activities. The most important people are Imam Musa Sadr, Mostafa Chamran, Mohammad Montazeri, Sayyid Ahmad Khomeini, Sadegh Tabatabai, Jalaluddin Farsi, etc. The presence of these people and their activities among Lebanese Shias and more Iranian cultures introduced the thoughts

and ideas of the Iranian Revolution. There were also cultural similarities between Iranians and Lebanese Shias, which led to the desire of Iranians to be present in Lebanon and the acceptance of Iranian personalities among Lebanese Shias (Garmabdashti, 2015 AD/1393 SH: 57).

#### **5.5.5. The Seminary of Najaf and Qom and the Person of Imam Khomeini and Imam Musa Sadr**

Most Lebanese Shia clerics who were educated in the seminary of Najaf were influenced by Iranian scholars and had close relations with them. Most of them were students of Sayyid Mohammad Baqir Sadr and were familiar with Imam Khomeini's political views (Ahmadi, 1999 AD/1377 SH: 70). In the late 1970s, Iraqi authorities expelled non-Iraqi students from Iraq for fear that the Iraqi Shias would be affected by the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The young Lebanese students returned to their country and took the teachings of political and revolutionary Islam with them to Lebanon (Shirazi and Rezaei Jafar, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 202). Most of the clerics who returned from Iraq were young people influenced by the views of Imam Khomeini, who, through the establishment of religious schools in Lebanon, passed on the teachings of political and revolutionary Islam to the new Lebanese generation.

#### **5.5.6. Islamic Revolution Guards Corps**

After holding a conference of liberation movements in Tehran in 1982 with the presence of Lebanese scholars such as Sayyid Mohammad Hussein Fazlullah, Sheikh Ragheb Harb, and Sheikh Sobhi Tufaili and requesting their immediate assistance from Iran, the first group of IRGC forces under the command of Ahmad Motavasaliyan arrived in Damascus. The IRGC entered Lebanon as military advisers and training and ideological trainers. In 1982, the IRGC sent about 1000 Revolutionary Guards to train Hezbollah militants in the Bekaa Valley in Baalbek (Esposito, 2003: 193). Thus, strengthening the military and ideological strength of Hezbollah forces provided their significant military arenas and the liberation of Lebanon (Pollak, 2016: 1). Nabih Berri attributes Hezbollah's victory in Lebanon's 33-day war with Israel to three factors. First was the training of the Revolutionary Guards in the first days of the formation of Hezbollah (Taheri, 2010 AD/1388 SH: 235).

#### **5.5.7. Constructive Jihad**

Through its civil and jihadist services in Lebanon, the constructive Jihad of the Islamic Republic of Iran became the basis for the influence of the Lebanese people, the Muslims of this country, including the Hezbollah movement. The constructive Jihad played a significant role in attracting the Lebanese people, especially the Lebanese Hezbollah, to the revolution and its ideals (Mirbageri, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 86).

### Conclusion

The present study evaluates the cultural reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Imam Khomeini's teachings on Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was cultural and religious, and its stance against the great powers and the support of the deprived and liberation movements were met with independence. The Islamic Revolution of Iran sought to expand and export its ideals to other societies, especially Islamic societies. Since the Islamic Revolution of Iran was a Cultural Revolution, and its cultural aspect is superior to other elements, the Islamic Revolution can affect different communities, especially Islamic countries, in cultural factors, especially with an emphasis on soft power.

Numerous theories have been put forward about the formation and survival of political and social movements in the Islamic world. These theories do not have the necessary comprehensiveness. These theories ignore the essential elements of the formation of Islamic movements, namely "Belief" and "Ideology." The approach of this article is to emphasize the aspects of belief and ideology. Islamic movements result from the interactive role of ideology, politics, and society of their time. It is political and social development.

Regarding its capacities, broadcast theory can show the extent of the impact and spread of the Islamic Revolution in other societies. The cultural ideas of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the teachings of Imam Khomeini as the centre and source of broadcasting and Hezbollah in Lebanon as the broadcasting destination have made Lebanon a reception environment for broadcasting. In terms of broadcast time, we see the continuation of the impact of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on Lebanon, especially Hezbollah. The Islamic Revolution of Iran has influenced Islamic movements from various dimensions. It has had the most significant impact in the academic and cultural fields. The Islamic Revolution of Iran introduced new cultural values in the political struggles of Islamic movements, the most important of which are: accepting principles such as Jihad, martyrdom, and sacrifice as the basic principles of effort; the popularity of the struggle and the expansion of the popular base; imitating the slogans of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and writing slogans in the style of Iranian revolutionary fighters; they are organizing Islamic movements from mosques and holy places; holding demonstrations in the type of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The present article indicates that the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the teachings of Imam Khomeini have been able to influence Hezbollah in Lebanon. Teach Hezbollah in Lebanon the concept of values

such as identity, independence, struggle against arrogance, and sympathy for the oppressed. The effects of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on Hezbollah in Lebanon include the active involvement of Lebanese Shias in political and organizational activities, highlighting the role of ulema, strengthening scientific fields, and trying to repel oppression and aggression. Hezbollah is a successful movement in the Islamic world. By standing on its internal and regional positions, this movement has a high understanding of the political and social developments of its time. This movement has opened its way to influence social and political activities in Lebanon and the region. Essential factors in the formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon are:

deprivation and lack of social justice in the Muslim community and the inefficiency of the existing government structure; civil wars and the collapse of the social-democratic system and the disregard for Shias' political, cultural, and social rights; increasing Zionist aggression in the southern regions to weaken the position of Muslims; regional developments; the impact of the teachings of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on Lebanon, especially the Shias.

At present, to model the cultural discourse of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, it is necessary to try to prevent the emergence of religious, ethnic, and tribal differences. Proper use of all capacities resulting from globalization and new information technologies is essential to properly educate the Islamic world's cultural elites.

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## The Media Function of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Iran (Research Type: Radio)

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### Abstract

The revolution of Iran in 1356 (1978) caused the falling of the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, one of the significant conflict periods in the political history of twentieth-century Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Movement is one of the most important and influential events of the contemporary period, which started a new process by challenging the existing order. The functionalist approach describes revolutions as socio-political pathology and seeks their causes in "Imbalance" and "Asynchrony." Functionalist theories assume that society is similar to a hypothetical system; therefore, we can analyse this constructed system. The revolutionary movement and its management in the community are affected by different institutions. The present study aimed to investigate the role of radio in this field. Today, the media has created a new kind of power with an intangible face with its speed and complexity. As a hot media, radio has a special place in establishing direct and comprehensive communication with the general public; therefore, we should evaluate its functions and dysfunctions. The present study aimed to answer the question of 'What role radio has played in the process and spread of the Islamic Revolution?' The results indicated that the radio has two functions and misfunctions. The role of operations is to create the capacity to perceive injustice in society, transmitting the values related to violence management, flourishing critical rationality, and educating the right-oriented and aggression. The role of misfunction is promoting a personal and ethnic fanatical framework, promoting violence as a habit, institutionalising violence in the attitudes and behaviour of individuals in society, and transmitting anti-values related to violence as a tool for the development and cohesion of revolutionary movements.

**Keywords:** Functional Model, Media Function, Radio, Movement.

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## **Introduction**

Iran's revolution in 1977 that caused the falling of the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic is one of the significant periods of conflict in the political history of twentieth-century Iran. Modern theories of revolution have two main categories: psychological and functionalist sociology. Psychological theories mainly limit to how to create protests. They assume that as soon as dissatisfaction and protests arise, they automatically transform into collective action, violence, and revolution. Psychological theories seek the premise of revolution in human beings' "Psychological Turmoil." Therefore, the functionalist approach describes revolutions as socio-political pathology and seeks their causes in "Imbalance" and "Synchrony." Functionalist theories hypothesise that society is like a hypothetical system. Therefore, it is possible to analyse this constructed system (Bashiriyeh, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 18). Different institutions can affect the revolutionary movement and its management in society. The present study aimed to examine the role of radio media in this field. The mass media in any organisation as a power figure is an influential institution that plays an essential and effective role in society. By representing social issues, the media make them appear as the same realities in society (Farhangi et al., 2007 AD/1386 SH: 55). Maden and his colleagues have considered the media's role in developing the individuals' identities (Maden et al., 2014: 117). In this regard, radio has a special place as a hot media due to establishing direct communication with the audience, focusing on one of the audience's senses and covering a large number of general audiences. The present study aimed to analyse the critical theories of media function and its impact on the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Iran with a focus on radio. The main question is 'What role did the radio media play in the process and expansion of the Islamic Revolution of Iran?'

## **1. Theoretical Literature**

The functionalist paradigm aimed to explain the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity, the fulfilment of need and actuality. This paradigm creates the sociology of order-making in its complete, mature form. It emphasises the importance of recognising order, balance, and stability in society and how they continue (Borrell and Morgan, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 44). Many of the fundamental concepts of structural functionalism are derived from Spencer's work. According to him, society is an automated system that can be understood by examining its various elements or organs and their internal connection. On the other

hand, in evaluating the social functions, one must pay attention that a particular structure satisfies the need for a broader system (Ritzer, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 122). Fulfilling these needs, which is the philosophy of any strategy, is called system function (Scott, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 123). In the theory of mass media functions, the basic idea is that the media exists to meet the specific needs of society. Jean Caseno believes that understanding the effects of the mass media is possible when considering their tasks. Therefore, a thorough and conscientious evaluation of mass media function requires determining the demands and expectations of the various social classes. But Lasswell has examined the functions of these devices with an overview. He has defined three main tasks for these devices: protecting the environment by controlling the news, correlating society components in response to environmental needs, and transferring social heritage from generation to generation (Khalesi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 283). In conclusion, the mass media meet the needs of society that are their functions. The present study aimed to identify them by focusing on the radio to explain the impact of radio on the Islamic Revolution movement through their explanation.

## **2. Media and Its Functions**

### **2.1. Media and Its Supervising Role**

As one of the powerful components of civil society and influencing public opinion, the media has significant political and non-political roles. Supervising is one of the most important of them. Harold Lasswell and Charles Wright have done the most classical studies in this field rather than the contemporary research done by Castells; they emphasised the supervising role of media as one of its primary functions. They believed in the severe role and function of the media in society. According to them, the press supervises the environment, creates social solidarity in responding to the environment, transmits cultural heritage and entertainment, and fills leisure time. Sharam also mentioned guarding the media by expressing the roles of teacher and guide. The press can exert several significant influences on the political power of society through their oversight:

First, the change and transformation of citizenship applications include increasing, modifying or decreasing them. Then, changes in government functions include reforming government performance and the image of the people. Finally, change in the ideological cohesion of a society comprises strengthening and weakening values (Sadati, 2010 AD/1389 AD: 193-194).

### **2.2. Mass Media and the Social Construction of Reality**

The mass media play a prominent role in shaping and processing the social

construction of reality. Through the meanings prevalent in everyday life, the mass media significantly impact the construction of social reality and strongly influence social activities. They affect all individual and social spheres and play a decisive and influential role in charting society members' beliefs, situations, and attitudes and are an essential source for the promotion of political values. These media only reflect some models of reality; therefore, they try to create a mentality for us.

According to the social construction of reality theory, facts are continuously produced and reproduced through social interactions; today, the media construction of reality is crucial according to which particulars are continually produced and reproduced (Farhangi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 57-58).

### **2.3. Media and Agenda Setting**

McCombs and Shaw conducted the first field study on agenda-setting. The mass media focuses on specific issues. They make public images of political figures. They constantly present topics that the masses should think, know and feel about (Surin and Tankard, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 328). Immediately, Funkhouser published research after publishing McCombs and Shaw's work about agenda-setting. According to the Funkhouser model, media coverage had little relationship with the facts. In addition to the actual flow of events, Funkhouser has proposed a list of mechanisms that influence media attention to an issue. One of these mechanisms, called media adaptation to a flow of events, is that when similar patterns of affairs continue, they will appear as "Different" themes (Surin and Tankard, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 351).

### **2.4. Media and Knowledge Gap**

With increasing the flow of mass media information into the social system, the sections of the population with a higher socioeconomic status acquire this information faster than sections with a lower base. So, the gap in knowledge between these sectors increases instead of decreasing. Philip Tichenor et al. proposed this hypothesis in 1970; it is called the "Knowledge Gap" (Surin and Tankard, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 363). The relative gap in knowledge between the affluent and the less affluent would increase. Tichenor et al. have presented five main reasons for this hypothesis, including the communication abilities of those with high socioeconomic status are different from those with low socioeconomic status. Individuals' levels of education are diverse, and education prepares the individual for basic information processing tasks such as reading, comprehension, and recall (Train, 2013: 832).

### **2.5. General Aggression Model**

The general aggression model is a behavioural-psychological theory that examines the relationship between media violence and aggression (Kronberger

et al., 2005 AD: 726). According to this model, personality variables (such as hostility) and situational variables (such as the experience of violence and excitement in the media) influence a person's internal states, including cognitive, emotional and arousal variables, which affect a person's violent behaviour. In this model, the mental effect, the emotional impact and arousal are plotted, and finally, the choice of a violent behavioural response is made (Anderson et al., 2004: 202).

### **3. The Radio Media Function on the Islamic Revolution of Iran Movement**

The establishment of radio in Iran is related to the wireless telegraph that entered Iran in 1305. In 1311, wireless institutions were developed. After the radio was established, after providing the preparations, the radio was inaugurated by his crown prince at 10:00 AM on Ordibehesht 4, 1319, simultaneously with the anniversary of Reza Shah's coronation. In 1336, the name of Radio Tehran was changed to Radio Iran, and later, along with Radio Iran, a second transmitter called Radio Tehran was employed, of which, in the beginning, only music was broadcast (Hosseini Harandi, 2018 AD/1397 SH). The radio changed its programs after Shahrivar 1320 regarding the change of the king and the atmosphere of freedom created. Religious programs that had no place in the minds and thoughts of the founders of the radio were included in the radio programs five months after the fall of Reza Shah. Therefore, another issue that had a special place in the policy-making of radio programs after Shahrivar 1320 is religious discourse. At this time, the first severe and crucial criticism of radio, which is available in writing today, was made by Sayyid Mojtaba Nawab Safavi, the leader of the Fadaiyan-e-Islam group. In *The Handbook of Facts*, Nawab not only criticises radio programs in presenting his purpose and plans but also has plans and solutions for them. He was aware of the influence of radio on the thoughts and culture of society and believed that it should be reformed at once according to the standards of Islam. Therefore, he considered radio necessary and valuable for establishing the questioned Islamic government. Hence, Nawab Safavi demanded the spread of the same traditional teachings through the new. According to him, the radio belonged to the nation, and he called it the "Radio of the Muslim Nation." Nawab Safavi's radio was obliged to play Azan to the believers on time and teach the Qur'an and the general teachings and moral teachings of the Al-e Muhammad (PBUH) in simple and straightforward language, not only for Muslim Iranians but to all Muslims in the world and even all the world (Mokhtari Esfahani, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 97). Therefore, assigning

religious sermons to competent people was one of the points emphasised in the review commission. Apart from Hossein Ali Rashed, the famous ministerial spokesman in the history of radio, people such as Morteza Motahhari, Sayyid Mostafa Khorasani, Abdul Hussein ibn al-Din, Sayyid Hossein Sadr Shirazi, Hekmat Al-e Agha and Sayyid Mohsen Behbahani engaged in religious preaching and propaganda on the radio. The regime's propaganda policy for broadcasting religious programs was a cautious one. It was always careful that the programs did not provoke the people's religious feelings or be objected to by spiritual assemblies. The radio began its indirect oversight role and function by broadcasting religious agenda until the movement's formation. Simultaneously with the movement spread, government employees gradually joined the revolution and its slogans. They strongly condemned the method of the military government and their allies on radio and television for not reflecting the real demonstrations and historical march of the Iranian nation during the days of Tasua and Ashura. Radio and television, as an essential database in the society, by giving awareness at different levels, caused the reduction of the knowledge gap between people in various strata and led the nation towards a procedural unity. Apart from the performance of the domestic media, the role of the foreign media was also crucial in the midst of the revolution. During the revolution, the Persian section of BBC Radio became a space for reflecting on the news of the regime's opponents and the Imam's statements. This happened coincided with when the purchase of shortwave radio did not require a license. People's use of radio to hear the news that they were present at the centre was expanding day by day. The army officers in Manzariye Qom did not listen to the report of Radio Iran because they believed that Radio Iran was lying, and they listened to all the information on BBC Radio. Radio Iraq also created a program called "Clergy Movement", which supported the method of Imam Khomeini (Mokhtari Isfahani, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 22-97). Using the functional model of national media in managing the anger of individuals in a society designed by Mahmoudi and his colleagues in 1396 and based on the principle of generalizability and replacement with radio media, the present study aimed to investigate the role of radio on the Islamic Revolution movement. In this model, based on the grounded theory method, the main and sub-categories are introduced; before explaining the results of the functional model and using them in the present study, we will explain the six components of the paradigm. These paradigms include causal conditions, phenomena-oriented contexts, mediating conditions, strategies, and consequences.

A) **Casual conditions.** Categories (states) affect the primary type (Bazargan,



2014 AD/1393 SH: 10). Subjects, natural and social, necessarily have causal forces and capabilities (causal conditions) that, in combination with external contextual conditions and conditional factors (mediating conditions), can cause events.

- B) **Core category.** An incident or event that the series of interactions focuses on controlling and managing (Hojabriyan et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 222). The phenomenon answers the question, ‘What is happening here?’
- C) **Context.** The context indicates a series of unique characteristics that distinguish a phenomenon; in other words, the conditions of a particular context are effective in strategies.
- D) **Intervening conditions.** These conditions facilitate or limit action/interaction strategies in a particular context.
- E) **Action/interaction strategies.** The strategies were created to control, manage and deal with the phenomenon under specific experimental conditions.
- F) **Consequences.** All actions and reactions in response to or managing and controlling a phenomenon have consequences (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 131-133). After explaining the six components of a paradigm, we can use the results of the designed functional model for radio media.

**Table 1- Main and sub-categories of a functional model**

| Row | Main Category                        | sub-Category                                |
|-----|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1   | Phenomena-oriented                   | Violent media                               |
| 2   | Causal conditions of violence        | Blind violence                              |
|     |                                      | Oversimplification of violence              |
| 3   | Violence management strategy         | The flourishing of critical rationality     |
|     |                                      | Right-oriented aggression training          |
|     |                                      | Overcoming violence skills                  |
| 4   | Intermediate conditions for violence | Recall factors                              |
| 5   | Underlying conditions for violence   | Limitations faced by individuals in society |
| 6   | Consequences                         | Equilibrium                                 |

The present study aimed to determine the role of radio in the form,

function, and unfunctional of the Islamic revolutionary movement. This aim tried to identify the relationship of other categories - conditions, contexts, strategies, consequences - with the phenomena-oriented violent media, particularly this relationship with radio as an effective medium. In the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the management of violence by individuals in society via radio requires the study of three categories causal, contextual, and conditional (mediating) conditions. Its functions and unfunctions are displayed explicitly in these three sections. According to Table 1, the causal conditions for aggression in society are fanatical or blind violence and oversimplification of violence, which has become a habit in societies. According to Smelser, social movements are a kind of social action that arise due to normative inflammation and, according to Thorne, arise in the clash of historical class identities. As a stimulus to class identity, radio during the revolution caused and promoted cultural conflict or inflammation (Zahid, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 68). Thus, some radio unfunctions promote personal and ethnic fanatical frameworks and encourage violence as a habit. Therefore, this media should create mediating conditions for managing violence in society and identify the factors calling for violence, including personality, social, environmental, interpersonal and intrapersonal skills. The media is confronted with messages that show the utilitarianism of individuals, extremist perfectionism, power-seeking, etc., or vice versa, with news that contains the content of responsibility-accepting, unity, empathy, justice, etc. It will lead to modelling and imitation of people and, as a result, the internalisation of these negative or positive behaviours in the audience. In other words, values or anti-values are a subset of ideology, which is characterised by: "A statement of the goals, objectives and missions of a movement, for a set of criticisms and condemnations an existing structure that the movement is attacking and is trying to change it." (Zahid, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 74)

Thus, in Islamic ideology, beliefs and values are propagated by radio. This communicational instrument has its effects, and sometimes, regarding its nature, it either accelerates or slows down the influence. With this trend, the leaders mobilise forces to manage the violence of individuals in society.

It can be named the "Function of transmitting values related to the management of violence" or the "Function of transmitting counter-values related to violence." On the other hand, the management of violence in society depends on the readiness of the field and the existence of environmental capabilities. Denial of violence in Islam and considered dangerous is rooted in the high dignity of human beings, which can create rooted love and affection and respect in the way we look at human beings. According

to Shahid Motahari, the freedom of human beings should not be limited by factors such as the natural environment or the social environment to the fulfilment of humanity. Based on the results, economic, social, and information constraints are a factor against the management of violence in society. As the movement takes place in the social, economic and data fields etc., these fields provide opportunities for the movement and create limitations; in other words, these fields also enable to build and limit. Each constraint plays its part in shaping the people's personality in society and providing their behaviour and ultimately the direction of the movement. Radio has played an essential role in the Islamic Revolution based on the facilities and limitations facing members of society and its strengthening and highlighting. Therefore, one of the radio unfunctions is creating and strengthening restrictions on the management of violence, or in other words, to provide the basis for this. The radio's role in informing about the class gap between individuals in society and the existing restrictions for them caused the perception in the public that distributive justice has not been observed in the community, and the community has two classes with economic and social bases, high and low. Such a perception, even if false, will lead to creating and increasing the violence against so-called upper-class people. Thus, one of the functions of radio media in line with the revolutionary movement is creating a perception of injustice in society and promoting violence as a tool to overcome this perception. In addition to causal, external (context) and mediating conditions, the two topics of strategy and outcome are also related to the central phenomenon of this research, the motivating medium that will not be free of violence. According to Table 1, the last role of radio is its strategy to manage individuals' violence in society and shape the movement in a controlled way. These strategies are flourishing of critical rationality, training of right-oriented aggression and skills training to overcome violence.

The strategy of right-oriented aggression is based on intimacy, thematic balance, reinterpretation of anger, and versatility. Also, the skills learning strategy for overcoming violence is based on interpersonal belonging and effective communication. Finally, flourishing critical rationality will create components such as tact and promote consultation and discourse in individuals. By creating a connection between the five mentioned components (phenomena-oriented, causal conditions, mediating conditions, contextual conditions and strategy), the final result of managing the violence of individuals and the event of the revolutionary movement will be achieved. The final result of the introduced pattern is creating equilibrium. The radio was used to form the action and get to its absolute path, known as the Thermidor.

### **Conclusion**

- One of the unfunctions of radio in the early stages of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement is promoting blind violence or the instrumentalisation of violence. By using stereotyped frameworks based on personal, racial and ethnic prejudices in its programs, the radio will promote blind violence in society, which can be called the unfunction of nurturing the unique and ethnic fanatical frameworks. Broadcasting of events during the revolution on the pulpits of mosques caused the audience to perceive radio programs on the eve of the process that had violent and exciting content as an empirical fact. In addition, the broadcasting of such programs, which is displayed as a tool, can lead to the formation of promoting violence as a habit dysfunction.

- Among the mass media, radio can have beneficial or destructive short-term and long-term effects on its audience regarding its comprehensive coverage and constant communication. The public perception of violence is the radio broadcasts violent verbal and emotional messages. So, if we do not say that radio can institutionalise violence in people, it can at least increase the intensity of anger against people in society. In other words, radio has played an essential role in institutionalising violence in the attitude and behaviour of individuals in the community in the revolutionary movement.

- Among the categories that can be effective as mediating conditions in the management of community violence are recall factors. The recall factors include personality, social, and environmental components that influence violence. Therefore, radio has a vital role in shaping the thoughts of everyone through imitating the audience and transmitting values.

It is spreading messages that show the utilitarianism of individuals, extreme perfectionism, power-seeking, and vice versa, spreading messages with the content of responsibility, unity, empathy, and justice-seeking. It will lead to modelling and imitation of people and, as a result, the internalisation of these negative or positive behaviours in the audience. It is called the function of transmitting values related to violence management or the unfunction of sharing anti-values about violence. In the revolutionary movement, both the value spectrum and the anti-value distortion of radio can be observed and examined.

- The human factor is not separate from the environment, so another factor that plays a vital role in anger management is the context. Under the circumstances regarding the differences in the social class of individuals in society with conditions such as economic differences, power-seeking

and information inequality, radio in the revolutionary movement by depicting the class gap between individuals led to the perception that distributive justice is not observed in the society and the society has two classes with high and low socio-economic base. Such a perception, even if false, caused the creation and increase of violence against so-called upper-class people. This issue is named the function of creating a perception of injustice in society and promoting violence as a tool to overcome these perceptions.

- The individuals' strategy of managing violence in society refers to the design created to control, manage, and deal with the central phenomenon of violent media and manage the violence of individuals in the community. By providing a wide range of views to individuals, the radio will create components such as tact and promote consultation and discourse in individuals, referred to as the flourishing of critical rationality. Radio media has the potential to promote values based on right-oriented, realism and comprehensiveness, and skills based on compassion, empathy, optimism, courtesy, and respect as the essential criteria for controlling violence, which can be referred to as the function of sovereign aggression education. This subject is named the right-oriented aggression training and overcoming skills training on violence. Although this type of radio function in the Islamic Revolution movement may not exist in its initial stage, going through its initial stages and reaching its final stage, called the Thermidor period, is better visible. During the period when political bans were lifted, mass rallies gradually disappeared.

- If Radio identifies its unfunctions to provide mediating conditions and context for the management of community violence and applies the appropriate strategy according to the needs, we can hope that a set of identifying unfunctions and using functions to control the phenomena-oriented has led to the ultimate consequence of rationality and balance.

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# The U.S. Tremendous Strategy to Counter the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Biden Government: From de-Geopolitical Policy to de-Legitimacy

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## Abstract

Iran and the United States have experienced hostile and tense relations since the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in 1358. During this time, the White House has not given up on any attempt to change the government in Tehran. The main question is ‘What is the tremendous strategy of the United States to counter the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Biden era?’ The central hypothesis is the U.S. has two new strategies confronting Iran: de-geopolitics abroad and de-legitimacy inside. The present study aimed to analyze these two strategies. The results indicated that according to the teachings of Smart War, the U.S. has two goals for these actions; first, a sinusoidal and erosional process aimed at deprivation and discrediting of the Iranian political system in internal and external levels (de-legitimacy and surrender). The depletion of Iran's strategic and geopolitical capacity in the region to remove power tools from it (weakening to surrender or change the regime).

**Keywords:** Geopolitics, Smart Power, de-Legitimacy, USA, Iran, Middle East.

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## Introduction

Iran and the United States have experienced hostile and tense relations over the past forty-two years. Iran believes the United States has the following characteristics: unilateralism, sovereignty on the world, ignoring the rights of other countries, disregard for international morals and rights, interference in Middle East affairs, welcoming war and violence instead of dialogue and tolerance and is a prominent symbol of arrogance, colonialism and exploitation in the world. In contrast, the White House introduces Iran as a source of insecurity in the Middle East, an obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace, and a supporter of resistance groups worldwide. Washington has also consistently accused Tehran of human rights abuses, attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, and incitement to terrorism over the past four decades. The U.S. could never prove this claim.

In contrast, Iran has a list of bitter memories in its mind and is constantly reviewing it. This list starts from the coup d'état of 28 Mordad, the capitulation before the revolution and until the proof of U.S. espionage in Iran (occupation of the U.S. embassy), support and encouragement of Saddam to invade Iran, sanctions, threats, attempts to change the regime. In the last case, the assassination of a senior commander of the Quds Force of Iran martyred Sardar Soleimani after the Islamic Revolution. It is noteworthy that the wall of distrust between the two countries is intense. The U.S. frustration with the resurgence of relations and the failure of projects such as infiltration, the color revolution, foreign threats, sanctions and pressure caused Washington to resort to new tools and policies to contain Iran in the Middle East. The U.S. National Security Strategy, published in March 2021, mentions China 14 times, Russia 5 times, Iran 4 times and North Korea 3 times. It shows that confronting Iran is still on the agenda and a priority for the United States, and Iran is more important than North Korea. This document states “Regional actors such as Iran and North Korea while threatening U.S. allies and partners and challenging regional stability, seek capabilities and technologies that can change the game” (The White House, 2021: 8). Accordingly, the central question is ‘What is the grand strategy of the United States to deal with Iran, especially during the presidency of Joe Biden?’ The research hypothesis points to de-geopolitics and de-legitimacy as two wings for the U.S. strategy against Iran, likely to intensify in the coming years. A descriptive-analytical method is used, and data is collected with the library method.

## 1. Research Background

Research on U.S. strategies in dealing with Iran has always been a fascinating

topic for researchers; it has been addressed many times over the past forty years. Some of the most important of these works are as follows:

Darvishi, Setalani and Hemmati (2016 AD/1395 SH: 43), using the method of research future, believe U.S. policy in dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the next decade is confrontationalism with limited cooperation, especially in regional issues. Barzanuni and Farhadi use the scenario writing method to consider the favorable scenario of the United States as the beginning of a new round of negotiations (Barzanuni and Farhadi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 91). The possible scenario is to increase sanctions and maximum pressure. Mottaqi compares the type of threats posed by the United States against Iran during the Bush and Obama eras and mentions an aggressive approach to the former and a flexible approach to the latter (Mottaqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 7-13). Rafatnejad et al. categorise U.S. military attack scenarios against Iran into conventional global attacks and limited nuclear and missile facilities attacks (Rafatnejad et al. 2014 AD/1393 SH: 133). Rafie et al. consider new scenarios of U.S. soft power against Iran, including media psychological warfare, economic sanctions, human rights, cyber warfare, Iranophobia, and pressure on regional allies (Rafie et al. 2014 AD/1393 SH: 167). Moshirzadeh and Jafari, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 47) believe that Iran will be under constant pressure from the United States regarding its challenge to world order. Two points are the cause of difference of this research from others: First, the focus is on the de-geopolitics, de-legitimacy, which have been ignored or deservedly addressed in other works. Then, Joe Biden's presidency and U.S. strategy during that period are this paper innovation.

## **2. Theoretical Framework: Smart Power**

Suzanne Nossel added the concept of "Smart Power" to political ideas in international relations in 2004. In an article published in the April 2004 Foreign Affairs issue, he challenged and proposed the adequacy of Joseph Nye's term "Soft Power" confronting the severe threats to American interests (Nassel, 2004: 1). Nye called soft power "the Ability to Shape the Priorities, and Others Preferences through Attraction and Persuasion without the use of Coercion." (Nay, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 43) His proposal of soft power was different from influence because influence can include hard power (threat) or reward. In contrast, soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people through reasoning.

Nassel believes that must align America's military, economic, cultural, and ideological capabilities in one direction to guarantee the U.S. continuity of superiority. Shortly afterwards, the Center for American Progress coined

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the term "Integrated Power," and in contrast formed the phrase " Stupid Power," meaning the misuse or irrational use of hard and soft power (Bagheri Dolatabadi and Beigi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 16). Ernest J. Wilson in a critique of U.S. foreign policy in 2008, wrote: "The use of smart power has become a national security necessity. The need to trace its roots to the long-term international structural changes and short-term failures of the current government." He considered smart power a combination of hard and soft power that effectively and efficiently pursues the actor's goals (Wilson, 2008: 110).

The plot of these wide-ranging debates led Joseph Nye to re-explain the concept of smart power. He writes: "It is a concept I proposed in 2003 to curb the misunderstandings that have arisen over the fact that soft power alone can make an effective foreign policy." Power is the power of influence on others behavior to get what you want. There are three ways to achieve this goal: Coercion, payment, and attractiveness. Hard power is the use of force and cost. If one government can set the agenda of other governments or shape their priorities, this can lead to a saving of carrot-and-stick policy; but can rarely substitute the two. Therefore, we need smart strategies that combine soft and hard power tools (Nye, 2009: 160).

These scientific debates soon found their place in U.S. practical policy, and Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State in the Obama administration, said: "The United States alone cannot solve the current problems, and the world cannot do that without the participation of the United States. The best way to advance America's interests in reducing global threats and seizing international opportunities is to design and implement global solutions. We must use smart power, a range of diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural tools. Use the appropriate tools or a combination of tools depending on the situation with the smart power of intelligence; diplomacy will be at the forefront of our foreign policy" (Clinton, 2009: 1). Thus, U.S. foreign policy shifted away from a mere public diplomacy approach and emphasized soft power and desire for smart power. Since then, the treatment towards Iran changed U.S. foreign policy, and we have seen a new round of crippling sanctions and military threats. Although this policy has shifted more toward "Hard Power" under the Trump administration, smart power has been revived with the return of Democrats to the White House. The concept of hard power, equivalent to economic and military power, is mainly unambiguous. In the following, we explain soft power that is closely linked to soft warfare.

The term soft warfare is a new term for an old concept. Soft warfare is any soft, psychological action and media propaganda aimed at the target


community and defeat without conflict or using force or coercion. Psychological war, white war, media war, psychological operations, soft overthrow, soft revolution, velvet revolution, color revolution, etc., are forms of soft war (Charami et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 89).

Soft war dates back to the birth of human history, like hard war, but its shape has also changed with the development of science, technology, and communication in this field. The modern form of soft warfare dates back to the 1970s. The establishment of a "Current Danger Committee" at the height of the Cold War to counter the Soviets is a clear example of this type of war. During Gorbachev's reforms (Prostorika and Glasnost), the committee ruled out a hard war (military-economic) against the Soviet Union and a soft war to overthrow the Soviet Union with three strategies: Control doctrine, media battle and civil obedience (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 152). The critical question regarding the historical experience is 'What perception does the United States now have of its position in the world, and is it seeking to re-use the same strategies against Iran?' Based on the geopolitical concept, this question illuminates the ideological and operational lines of the country's foreign policy as one of the main actors in international politics. The United States has a geopolitical conception of a unipolar world, according to David Calou, a senior professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, and it is ingrained in the minds of U.S. officials (Sajjadpour, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 1). In America's geopolitical view of the world, overcoming enemies is one of the most critical challenges to achieving a unipolar world. Iran is one of the countries that has been consistently introduced as an enemy by U.S. national security leaders (United States Department of Defense, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 2; the White House. 2021: 8).

A part of the strategy against Iran to neutralize its power, considering the popular basis of the Iranian revolution and its influence in the region and the world based on soft power indicators, is based on psychological warfare. Countries like Iran, which are in a delayed atmosphere in link to modern instrumental power, have a comprehensive need to provide software indicators of national power. The use of these software indicators in confronting the sinister forces during the imposed war was seen by Iran, and after the war, Iran sought to expand it. Software indicators of national power confronting threats are national will, national spirit, type of political system and government structure. Each of these indicators affects the style and process of threats. Therefore, the goal is the context of power-building and security-building by these indicators for the Islamic Republic. According to this strategy, crisis-making and de-legitimacy of the political


system and security components of the system will be on the agenda (Nawabakhsh and Sajjadi, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 9).

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



### 3. The Dual Dimensions of the U.S. Smart War against Iran

Joe Biden's approach to confronting Iran is based on smart warfare. In the hard dimension, try to limit Iran's military and defensive capabilities, from missile programs to conventional military power, through the imposition of economic sanctions, political pressure, etc., to force Iran like JCPOA, to stop developing its military plans (Wright, 2021: 32). On the other hand, emphasize de-geopolitics to deprive Iran of its geopolitical advantages. Regarding the limitation of writing, the present study explains the recent aspect of the hard dimension of American politics. Also, among the various policies in the soft power dimension, the main focus will be on de-legitimacy.



#### 3.1. Hard Power: De-Geopolitics Policy

The concept of "de-Geopolitics" is derived from the term "Geopolitics." While in geopolitics, all attention and policies are focused on using geography to increase the power of a country; but de-geopolitics takes a different path and vice versa. The de-geopolitics policy is a set of acts that destroy the country role and geographical importance, which is directly related to the global power of that country in various ways. These include aligning neighboring countries against it, launching a war, and unsecured its borders (Qalibaf and Pooyandeh, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 104). This policy aimed to disable and ineffective the influential power factor in the

geographical dimension. Redirecting the transit of goods, oil pipelines, reducing the role of straits and waterways in regional and international shipping by bypassing channels and moving pipes behind the straits are clear examples of geopolitical de-geopolitics.

This concept and geopolitical isolation have differences. Geopolitical isolation, known as perceptual isolation or a sense of siege, arises based on the extent of the neighbors' feelings of being threatened. As a result, the threatened country tries to change the shadow of this geopolitical isolation in its favor by creating a positive balance of power with the help of foreign powers (Karimipour et al., 2017 AD/1396 SH: 215). In other words, geopolitical isolation is "Political Isolation." It means the political, economic, social, communication and cultural relations of the political unit with its environment reduced (Mottaqi and Qarabeigi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 140).

Iran's geopolitical and strategic position has particular importance to the United States. According to the U.S. strategic rationality, Iran's geopolitical characteristics have security importance to the United States. Many American strategists believe that the political structure of Iran is one of the most complex and ambiguous political systems in the Middle East today. They emphasize that U.S. goals towards Iran should have similar characteristics (Yuldasheva, 2017: 45). The Americans regard the expansion of Iran's strategic and ideological capabilities as a threat to their national interests and security, so they use more aggressive literature and measures confronting the Islamic Republic. Based on this perception, the U.S. view of Iran, the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic and its political leaders is entirely pessimistic (Ross, 2021: 1). U.S. rulers know any attempt by the Islamic Republic to identify-seeking and gain balance of power in the region as a threat. This perception is the foundation of many U.S. security policies and approaches in dealing with Iran. In other words, the Americans believe any identify-seeking of Iran is an attempt to change the balance of regional power and challenge internationally (Mottaqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 14).

The Americans' unfavorable perception of Iran's political structure changes their approach to Iran's geopolitical position in the Middle East. With the American military invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's cultural, political, and geopolitical situation became more critical. Therefore, Iran's geopolitical position in the Middle East reflects unique indicators about its foreign policy (Barzegar, 2009: 55). The geopolitical characteristics of Iran are in the political literature of many Americans, including Graham Fuller. According to Fuller, in addition to the unique Iranian cultural features, this country has special geopolitical features that

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increase its position in the region. Based on such an approach, the possibility of interaction with Iran in the tense atmosphere of international politics will be necessary and inevitable (Fuller, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 278).

The political developments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf over the past four decades have expanded in a process that has enhanced the possibility of Iran's geopolitical role. It means that no security formation will occur in the region unless there is a basis for Iran's participation and cooperation. Iran's role in the developments in Southwest Asia shows that any regional cooperation in Iran will create more stability and interaction for regional security and U.S. strategic goals (Mottaqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 16).

The Middle East has always been dangerous and threatening for American presidents. Joe Biden's approach to Iran's Middle East policy, like Bush, Obama, and Trump, is aggressive (The Guardian, 2021: 1). Many U.S. strategists believe that Iran's Middle East approach is risky for U.S. security interests. Biden's policy, like his predecessors, is to limit Iran's behavior patterns in the Middle East. Many American strategists still condemn Iran's Middle East policy. First, they believe that Iran supports radical and extremist groups in the Middle East. Another is trying to overthrow U.S. allies in the Middle East. Third, it opposes creating peace between the Arabs and Israel and implementing the Middle East peace agreement. The mentioned above show that Biden's Middle East view has not changed much from previous U.S. presidents. Like Trump and Obama, Biden enumerates many Iranian policies contrary to U.S. goals and interests. Hence, Biden, like other American strategists and rulers, attributes many of his security problems to Iran's Middle East policy (Biden, 2020: 121).

The dominant aspect of Biden's policy in dealing with Iran has dual nature. On the one hand, the Americans seek to persuade and encourage Iran to participate in U.S. security goals. On the other, seek an opportunity to counter Iran's policy of power. The Americans are reluctant to enhance Iran's strategic capability, so as stated in their 2021 National Security Strategy document, they will continue to restrain Iran and counter its actions. "We will adjust our military presence in the Middle East as needed to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect vital U.S. interests." (The White House, 2021: 15)

The policy of containment and deterrence against Iran is not aimed at overthrowing and changing its regime. However, it happy U.S. officials, but know that achieving this will cost the country dearly. Therefore, they prefer to accomplish this goal in other ways (Biden, 2020: 121). In other words, the containment policy has a limited cost to the United States and,



on the other hand, reduces Iran's economic and strategic power in the long run. Such a process is considered an indirect confrontation. The ultimate goal of this model, in the long run, is to create the ground for the erosion of Iran's strategic power and put Iran under economic and geopolitical siege. In line with this goal, it tried to prevent the passage of oil and gas pipelines through Iran to Europe or the Persian Gulf.

The passage of oil and gas pipelines from east to west (Nabaco), north to south (Tapi) and west to east (Emirates-Oman pipeline) were all done in this direction (Goodarzi, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 12). They wanted to overthrow the energy transfer of Iran to the Mediterranean Sea by overthrowing the government of Bashar al-Assad (Darg and Bagheri Dolatabadi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 60-61).

Some actions were done to de-geopolitics from Iran during the Trump era. These are destroying the image of the Iranian regime in the region nations (Iranophobia), preventing political, economic and cultural cooperation between the countries of the region and Iran and reducing the importance and position of Iranian oil in world markets (DiChristopher, 2019: 45). Washington tried to thwart a military alliance in the Persian Gulf against Iran by the "Hormoz Peace Initiative" ineffectiveness to regional countries. The intensification of military confrontations between the two countries in the Persian Gulf directly resulted from such a strategy.

The U.S. policy fundamental basis in the region has been to deprive Iran of its energy markets and its routes to the West and East. Undoubtedly, if the United States can implement Iran's policy of isolation, it will be able to make huge profits by developing the region's oil and gas fields. Doing so will diversify the energy supply of the United States and other industrialized nations and even strengthen their energy security.

### **3.2. Soft Power: De-Legitimacy Policy**

From the Charter compiler at the beginning and its approval, continuing legitimacy had importance. Chapter 18 envisions U.N. reform says reform is a way to increase the quality of exercising authority or solutions to challenges. Apart from the minimal amendments of the Charter from the adoption beginning, "Reforms in the United Nations" was considered shortly after establishing the Organization. It has been on the agenda of the Secretaries General in various ways this day. Text and hypertext analysis of these programs indicates an effort to improve performance and increase or maintain legitimacy. This legitimacy examines in three areas:

#### **3.2.1. International Legitimacy**

1) Legitimacy and efficiency focus on the output and results of international organisations activities in achieving economic welfare, human rights

standards and arms control;

2) The legitimacy of processes caused decision-making and gaining authority. It is inspired by adequate and fair access to the rules implementation, transparency, equal participation opportunities and the like;

3) The structure legitimacy and organization identity determine the ability to gain public trust, good work performance, capacity to identify issues and threats, and ability to attract resources and expertise.

In the United Nations, the first category of legitimacy focuses on the objectives enshrined in the Charter. The second category focuses on the decision-making system in the pillars (including primary, subsidiary and agencies) and issues such as the Security Council or the distribution of positions between men and women, or geographies. The identical legitimacy and structure related to the established norms and beliefs, trust in executive mechanisms and their efficiency and agility, correct understanding of global realities and the quality of cooperation in issues such as the collective security system are considered.

### 3.2.2. Internal Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a form of social control that causes an actor to believe in obeying a rule or institution. This belief creates an inner motivation in the actor to follow the rules and regulations. Without explicitly enforcing the laws or offering material incentives, it establishes social order (Griffiths, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 910). Legitimacy has four essential components: Legality, morality, efficiency, social acceptability. Believing that the illegal system, immoral and inefficient, will cause dissatisfaction and social acceptability. Theorists have always emphasized that one must engage in a credit struggle before a military confrontation to confront political units. It indicates an organized effort obscures the actors' credibility, desirability, and position (Mottaqi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 39). According to Clausewitz, the essential issue of the authority of political units in the soft war is in the form of legitimacy-making (Torabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 54).

Since Barack Obama, the United States has tried to de-legitimacy the Iranian political system by adopting public diplomacy (Mottaqi, 2010 AD/1289 SH: 22). Public diplomacy is one of the soft power tactics in political and strategic behavior. Over the years, public diplomacy has become part of the realities of international politics and foreign policy. Units that use public diplomacy can pursue their goals indirectly, step-by-step, covertly, and insensitively. The media is the primary tool of public diplomacy because it can convey political literature, films, music and emotional concepts (Mottaqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 11).

Both political spectrums within the United States have put this kind of

confrontation with the Islamic Republic on their agenda. The historical evidence shows that Democrats are more inclined to take advantage of social components in soft warfare. They always pursue security based on social and discourse indicators and signs and semantic-conceptual formats (Gates, 2009: 14).

The soft war must create conditions for the society and the political elites of a country to have a differentiated perception of their political structure. Under these circumstances, they lose their inner motivation and desire to fight and resist. "Wolf," in this regard says: "If some of the country's leaders are considered noisy groups of ignorant, deceitful, and deceitful people, or use literature that shows signs of inferiority and disinterest in the country and the political structure, in that circumstances, there is no ground for the production of national power. Such symptoms create manifestations of structural distrust, apathy, and a lack of self-confidence in society. Political hope disappears, and the future faces ambiguity for citizens" (Basiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 85). As Seth G. Jones, project manager for transnational threats at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), explains: "The best attack on Iran and its political system may not be just the use of systemic, financial or diplomatic tools - but soft power" (Jones, 2019: 28). So, he offers a range of options to the U.S. government finds in other strategic reports within the United States. These options include:

**A) Facilitate Growing Contacts between Iranians and Americans**

According to the strategy proposed by Barbara Slavin, director of the "Iran Future Initiative" project at the Atlantic Council think tank, the U.S. government should follow the same path as the Soviet Union, which led to its collapse without war. He writes: "It was American engagement policy that resulted in a successful push for Soviet influence. In this policy, while negotiating with their leaders, promoted peaceful internal changes through the ties of the two countries' peoples and other means of power" (Slavin, 2020: 63).

According to this strategy, as soon as reduction of the current obstacles in Iran, the U.S. government should seriously fund programs to facilitate contacts, especially educational exchanges and other exchanges between Iranians and Americans. The United States, in necessity, should change its current schedule so that Iranians can participate in it, even in the absence of diplomatic relations. According to the advocates' reasons view, if the Iranian government forbids its citizens from participating in these programs, Iranians will blame the government for preventing such participation. One of the first steps taken by Joe Biden in the United States

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was to remove the restrictions that Trump had imposed on Iranians to travel to this country (Biden, 2021: 35). It caused some Iranian media to consider it a sign of Biden's goodwill to return to JCPOA and spoke of the need for Iran to take a nuclear countermeasure.

### **B) Increase Efforts to Engage in Public Diplomacy, Especially with Ethnic Minority Groups**

According to the recommendation of the "Transnational Threat Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies," (Jones, 2019: 28) the U.S. government should make a concerted effort to convey American views through Iranian-targeted channels and media. It includes the BBC World Service and other satellite channels. The United States and other government partners, news agencies, and even the private sector need to increase their coverage of the political and economic challenges of the Iranian political system. To cover the protests more and even to help the protesters (Henry, 2014: 124). The authors of this project, who hope to repeat the same political demonstrations in Dey 1396 and Aban 1398, write in this regard: "Iran's internal rifts are the point of vulnerability of the system. Between 2017 and 2019, there were thousands of protests across Iran, rising over the anger of government's economic policies, opposition to the political system, and concerns about corruption, environmental degradation, and the oppression of women. These protests have included trade unions, truck drivers, teachers, students and others, although they have not yet united in a single protest movement" (Jones, 2019: 42). They advise the U.S. government to take advantage of these protests and intensify them; Washington should increase its funding for public diplomacy and other intelligence efforts (Jones, 2019: 70).

The same recommendation has been made to the U.S. government by another project. Jonathan Ruhe, the senior analyst at the Foreign Policy Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), writes:

"The United States needs to pursue a policy of changing the regime. We do not mean regime change in the same way as the U.S. ground invasion of Iraq in 2003, but continuous and comprehensive pressure beyond economic sanctions to escalate Iran's internal tensions so that the regime eventually collapses from within" (Ruhe, 2020: 95).

In 1399, we observed examples of this tactic in the discussion of activating protest capacities among the Baluch people of Iran. The Western media and their internal support arms tried to pretend that the Islamic Republic of Iran is indifferent to the livelihood of its citizens, especially the border tribes, by proposing "Fuel Extraction" and equating it with "Kulbari." They tried to use the tactic of "Killing" many times and provoke

the people's feelings and emotions in the region and throughout Iran. Following the above line thought of Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh, a member of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, in an article entitled "The Next Revolution in Iran" point out the reasons for the need for regime change in Tehran for U.S. officials and state: "Serious support for regime change does not mean supporting a military attack on Iran but is the United States using whatever means at its disposal including covert aid to the regime's opponents. The United States cannot overthrow the Islamic Republic, but it can help create the conditions for its overthrow" (Edelman and Takeyh, 2020: 12).

#### **4. Strategies to Confronting Iran**

Confronting the strategy of de-geopolitics and de-legitimacy requires two approaches in the Islamic Republic of Iran system. The first is to turn to coalition-making abroad, and the other is tolerance and management inside. We examine these two solutions in this section.

##### **4.1. Coalition-making: Geopolitics Necessity**

According to the theories of international relations, the main reason for forming alliances between states is the fight against a common external threat. Stephen Walt, one of the leading theorists of the alliance theory, believes that states unite for two reasons. Balance power to eliminate a source of threat in the security environment and eliminate a significant external threat (Walt, 1987: 26). He considers these external threats depending on four variables: geographical proximity, distribution of facilities, offensive ability, and understanding of the aggression intent. All threats will not lead to unity in the international arena, but those that seriously overshadow the interests of governments are effective in forming agreement (Moshirzadeh and Ebrahimi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 98-101).

According to the realist approach, the best way to escape the threats of de-geopolitics is to turn to alliance strategy and away from geopolitical isolation. In this view, the main goal of increasing Iran's presence in political-security issues in the region is to expand Iran's security circles, connect Iran's security to regional security, increase chaffer power and, finally, eliminate security threats in the immediate environment of Iran's security (Alipour, Bakhtiarpour and Darkhor, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 88).

Over the years, the main challenge has been the extent of presence in the region and how to balance using geopolitical and ideological elements in foreign policy orientation, which depended on reducing or increasing the capacity of external threat. With increasing alien threat (direct U.S. presence in the region), the ideological element and security approach has

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increased with more presence in the area (Barzegar, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 123).

Therefore, in foreign policy, Iran's most significant political and geopolitical preoccupation should be in the geopolitical field of the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is regarding the irreplaceable importance of this area and Iran's geopolitical interests in this region, especially its intersection and geographical proximity to it. The creation of any crisis in this area and the governing political atmosphere will affect the country's national security and territorial integrity. Regarding the conditions of these areas and confronting problems and geopolitical challenges, and geopolitical obstruction that has arisen to influence Iran in this subsystem and other subsystems in the Middle East, Iran, to expand its geopolitical aims in the Middle East must seek a tactical ally in another subsystem of the Middle East (Alipour, Bakhtiarpour and Darkhor, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 100).

De-legitimacy is the U.S. strategy to empty the container of capacity that occurs more in the surrounding areas where there are crises of more significant influence and distribution. Despite numerous claims to leave the region, American forces on both sides of Iran's borders are a kind of security breach for Tehran. The physical presence on both sides of the edge helps Iran's enemies transfer their infiltrating elements into Iran or control border movements more easily. The Americans still believe that instigation of ethnic groups inside Iran is possible and available. The U.S. has tried to do this in several areas, including southeastern Iran, Baluchistan, the northernmost tip of the Persian Gulf between the Arabs of Khuzestan, and in the west and northwest of Iran (Kurds and Azeris). Iran's response to these threats has several dimensions (Mottaqi, Qarabeigi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 150).

**1) Maintaining a Robust and Deterrent Security Capability to Counter These Movements**

Iran should double its effort in controlling its borders, and any aggression in the East or West must immediately be responded. This response begins with seizing a ship encroaching on Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf and the Arvand River and continues until the UAV enters eastern Iran from inside Afghanistan. In this regard, attention to the southwestern regions will be more critical than the eastern. Because these areas are both more vulnerable and have the largest oil reserves in Iran and petrochemical facilities, and are the lifeblood of Iran's economic life. In this regard, intelligence and security monitoring of sabotage groups and their foreign communications and control of intellectual-political currents in the region will be necessary.

## 2) Tolerance and Management

Increasing tolerance capacities and avoiding emotional actions are part of the need to control soft threats. The tension and conflict capacity of the nature of the marginal and border environments is high regarding economic deprivation. Religious and ethnic divisions in these parts of Iran is increasing factor of sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Therefore, dealing with unrest in these areas should be based on persuasion, orbit and management strategies rather than physical and force-based strategies. Rapid and harsh responses will only activate the hidden energies in the lower strata of society. This management must be done before crises occur by guiding public opinion. The role of local and national media in ideas management should be well considered. Proper reflection of the progress and achievements of the system in these areas and giving hope to the youth for the future and the presence of managers among the people can increase the coefficient of social solidarity in these geographical areas and increase social cohesion (Mottaqi, Qarabeigi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 165).

## Conclusion

Change in the world system with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the expansion of collective and individual competition between governments at the global and regional levels, and the expansion of convergence and divergence in the governments' behavior has changed the realm and analytical dimensions of geopolitical interactions. In this new space, our country is also in one of the most sensitive geopolitical situations in the world.

Our country is in the most sensitive geopolitical situation globally; active geopolitical regions with extensive and numerous functions surround it, making it the center of attraction for regional and global diplomacy. This situation affects the peripheral areas and the problems of Iran. Iran's position in the world and regional system and its interaction with world power poles and geopolitical regions always creates new problems that provide a perfect ground for studying dynamic and evolving political and scientific factors influencing Iran's global and regional developments. Instead, it emphasizes geographical realities to explain foreign policy.

In answer to the main question, we should say, according to the logic of geographical requirements and necessities, the first geographical necessity is to maintain internal cohesion for most countries. For Iran, keeping borders secure and then securing the country internally has great importance. Without secure borders, Iran would be vulnerable to foreign powers constantly trying to manipulate their internal dynamics. Iran must first define the container and then control its contents. The alliance strategy

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helps to minimize any threat to the country's territorial integrity. (Container Protection) the second step is defense measures in border protection. These measures include natural barriers (Zagros and Alborz mountains, border rivers) and unnatural (gravel, border equipment, checkpoints, etc.).

In answering the sub-question, they should consider controlling the container content and managing religious and ethnic divergent components. Once during the Qajar period, Iran lost parts of its territory by the influence of foreign elements in the government apparatus and external pressure. At the beginning of the second Pahlavi government, efforts done to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran. History will always repeat itself. Therefore, neglecting the container content can make the political system vulnerable. The U.S. use a de-legitimacy strategy to container empty the capacity. More than anywhere else in the surrounding areas will occur, where more significant influence and distribution crises may manifest. Despite numerous claims to leave the region, American forces on both sides of Iran's borders is a security breach for Tehran. The physical presence on both sides of the edge helps Iran's enemies transfer their infiltrating elements into Iran or control border movements more easily.

The Americans still believe that manipulation of ethnic groups inside Iran is possible and available. The United States has repeated this strategy in several areas, including southeastern Iran, Baluchistan, the northernmost tip of the Persian Gulf between the Arabs of Khuzestan, and in the west and northwest of Iran (Kurds and Azeris). Iran's response to these threats has several dimensions (Mottqhi and Qarabeigi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 150).

The Islamic Revolution made Iran, one of the U.S. global geopolitical system components in the Middle East, the country's most potent geopolitical enemy. The ideas and concepts derived from the revolution are the most influential factor in Iran's geopolitical development and the basis of Iran's geopolitical interactions and actions with the regional and global geopolitical structure. In other words, Iran's geopolitics depends on the principles of the Islamic Revolution, which has led to the expansion of Iran's geopolitical space and subsequently increased the country's national power. Therefore, part of the U.S. counter-strategy against Iran is based on neutralizing this capacity and de-geopolitics Tehran. Although measuring the effectiveness of the above two strategies, especially de-legitimacy, requires independent research in de-geopolitics, U.S. policies seem to have succeeded in the region.

Further cooperation of these countries with the United States can drastically reduce Iran's national power factor. A recent example of this cooperation is in the policies of the Azerbaijani government in restricting Iran's access to Armenia and its markets after the recapture of the Nagorno-



Karabakh region. For about two decades, Iran used its geopolitical advantage as a political-economic lever against Azerbaijan. The country pursued a political friendship with Iran to access Nakhichevan and Turkish markets and vice versa. But now, Iran lost this opportunity and must witness the loss of its land access to Georgia and Armenia.

Undoubtedly, preserving our national and security interests in the region and the world depends on the country's trans-wing mid-mind, trans-theoretical, trans-historical and transgenerational intellectual and instrumental elites (elites of power and wealth) ward off this danger. While the United States seeks to de-geopolitics Iran. Tehran must focus on coalition-making and unity. The weight and role of the foreign policy apparatus in this regard will be very significant. Iranian diplomacy must increase its diplomatic tools as a shock absorber. Energy diplomacy can strengthen ties with neighbors and use geopolitical capacities for power-making. Media diplomacy can manage public opinion in the region and the world. Public diplomacy can influence elites and influential groups within Europe and the United States and use them as leverage to put pressure on their leaders. With economic diplomacy, Iran's economy can be involved in the nested and complex layers of the global economy to neutralize the sanctions tactic.

All of the above actions simultaneously with the immunity of the political system must be done. The four aspects of legitimacy, morality, efficiency, acceptability and social satisfaction as the foundations of the system's legitimacy-making must be strengthened. Adherence to the law by managers and citizens respect rights as the primary owners of power and system, should be the headline of all decision-making and actions. Emphasis on the "The law Itself" and the need to "Avoid Exceptionalism" guarantee the social health of the system for a long time and prevent any deviations and violations. The Islamic Republic is not military-based but instead based on the relationship between religion and politics; therefore, ethics must be current. The acceptability of any political system also depends on its efficiency. Failure in this dimension can discourage people from linking the two concepts of religion and politics in the future. These quadrilaterals must be strengthened more than anywhere else in Iran's quadrilateral border strips. Because the centrifugal capacities are more significant in these areas, and the social gaps are more profound. Ignoring these areas will cause the enemy to draw their attention to it. Tolerance, management, and strengthening legitimacy will be the game's core to neutralize U.S. threats in these areas.

In this regard, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite relatively significant changes in recent years, still faces several significant

challenges:

1) Dominance of the atmosphere of bilateral and reciprocal hostility between Iran and the United States and its impact on the increase of foreign threats, including the possibility of combining it with more stable sources of conflict between Iran and its neighbors, which transforms Iran's geopolitical functions from security to threats and insecurity;

2) Dominance of doubtful atmosphere in Iran's relations with trans-regional powers (under the influence of the first relationship);

3) The complete existence of Israel by Iran, the lack of effective participation in the Middle East peace measures, and the domination of the maximum atmosphere of confrontation and conflict with an illegitimate and non-neighboring regime;

4) Doubts in relations with Turkey and the growing trend of ambiguity and destructive competition in bilateral relations;

5) Lack of mutual trust in Iran-Afghanistan relations under the control and shadow of the United States;

6) Deep differences between Iran and Pakistan in regional relations;

7) The existence of potential contexts for the unresolved issues of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq and the dominance of an atmosphere of mistrust and doubt in bilateral relations due to the significant U.S. presence in Iraq;

8) The growing trend of distrust and distance between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan;

9) Continuation of significant differences between Iran and the United Arab Emirates;

10) The survival of some border disputes and their unresolved issues, especially in the Persian Gulf basin, has increased political costs.

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## Evaluating the Incongruity of Prohibiting the Use of Mass Destruction Weapons in Emergencies

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### Abstract

One of Islam's jurisprudential and moral issues is the competence or inadequacy of using weapons of mass destruction, predominantly nuclear weapons in war or defense. The present study aimed to analyze this issue and incongruity of do not use weapons of mass destruction with necessities such as the need to maintain the Islamic system or urgency such as preventing harm when there is a suspicion of death and severe embarrassment for Muslims. The results indicated that the use of weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and unconventional, has a jurisprudential and moral prohibition under normal circumstances. There are various reasons for this prohibition: the interdiction of using poison, the ban on killing women, children, the elderly, the prohibition of using inhumane tactics, the aggression rule, the observance of animals and the environment, and the rule of sin. The use of unconventional and prohibited weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, according to the term of international law, even in cases of necessity, has jurisprudential prohibition and moral incompetence. Evidence of use permit is distorted and inadmissible.

**Keywords:** Weapon, Mass Destruction, Jurisprudence, Atomic Bomb, Emergency.

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### **Introduction**

War or defense is an issue that human beings face in their lives, so we should explain the ideological, moral, jurisprudential, and legal issues of war and Jihad according to Islam, and every science is responsible for examining some of these problems.

On the other hand, updating various tactics, techniques, tools, and methods of warfare and defense have caused the issues mentioned above always to need a new study and evaluation.

According to the above two introductions, one of the topics under consideration is the use of weapons of mass destruction, predominantly nuclear and atomic weapons, in war or defense from the Islamic perspective. Although the moral and jurisprudential ruling on this issue may appear under normal circumstances, the challenging point is the ruling on the use of nuclear weapons in cases of urgency and necessity that must be evaluated.

The argument hypothesizes that using unconventional weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and atomic bombs, is not permissible in ordinary and necessary circumstances. Supreme Leader says: “We do not believe in nuclear weapons, and we do not intend to build it. According to our religious beliefs, using such tools of mass murder is strictly forbidden. It is a waste of time and generation that the Qur'an forbids. We do not pursue this” (Statements in the meeting of Jamaran destroyer construction workers - 2010-02-19 = 1388-11-30).

The view or hypothesis that agrees with the use of these weapons when necessary is rejected.

The necessity and importance of examining the benefits of this issue become clear concerning the following points:

1) Given the actions of Western governments in the face of the peaceful nuclear energy program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is essential to examine the essence of the problem and the urgency and necessity that sometimes cause issues and objections, and its solution has numerous benefits.

2) The false propaganda of the Islam enemies to show the stern face of Islam, especially the doctrine of jihad and related issues, reinforces the necessity and importance of this research.

3) The ideas and practices of extremist Wahhabism and affiliated or similar groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, and the like, highlight the importance of this research.

Regarding the article's background, some works have been published on the principle of non-use of weapons of mass destruction in jurisprudence

and law. However, no jurisprudential, legal, or moral research has been published about the conflict between this issue and emergencies, such as the principle of the need to preserve the Islamic system.

## **1. Vocabulary Research**

### **1.1. Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The term weapons of mass destruction were first used on December 28, 1937, by the Archbishop of the Church of Canterbury to describe the devastation caused by the bombing of Guernica, Spain. The term is considered synonymous with unconventional weapons (Saed, 2008, 43). Some believe that Rafael Lumken first used the term weapon of mass destruction in 1944 to denote Nazi atrocities in Europe (Ardabili, 1989, 39). The first international document to explicitly use mass destruction was the indictment of October 18, 1945, against German war criminals at the Nuremberg Trials (ibid).

A weapon of mass destruction is a weapon that can kill many people and cause significant damage to manufactured structures or the environment. Weapons of mass destruction are divided into conventional and unconventional parts. Traditional weapons of mass destruction are like defensive missiles that can hit and control specific targets and not harm civilians. However, unconventional weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, microbial, atomic weapons, and cluster bombs, are classified as weapons. In other words, unconventional weapons of mass destruction are generally classified into three categories: nuclear, chemical, and biological.

In the difference between conventional and unconventional weapons of mass destruction, we can say:

“Unconventional weapons of mass destruction have great destructive power and lead to the destruction of both classes without separating the military from the civilian (Fazel Lankarani, 2013, 10). Using unconventional weapons destroy many human beings without separation and uncontrolled, and caused a lot of damage to the environment (Alidoust, 2013, 9). Unconventional weapons of mass destruction are weapons that, when used for military or military purposes, also harm civilians or cause damage to the environment, and this damage is irreversible” (Abdi and Hashemi, 2018, 720). But conventional weapons of mass destruction, such as non-nuclear and atomic defense missiles with no such properties, have been controlled.

Weapons of mass destruction are any means and tools that cause significant damage to non-invaders, civilians, human infrastructure, and the environment. Whether this tool or weapon is primitive, such as pouring poison in the old form into the water of a village or city, or it is very advanced,

such as nuclear and nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup>

It should be noted that there is a difference between the production, maintenance, and use of weapons of mass destruction. The present study aimed to discuss the usage of these weapons. But from the result of the discussion, we can determine the order of production and maintenance. Therefore, if the use of unconventional weapons of mass destruction is prohibited, it will also ban their production and maintenance.

### 1.2. Necessity and Urgency

Necessity means need (Wasiti,1993, 7/124) and is the infinitive of urgency. Urgency means appealing to the solution: المضطر الذي أحوجه مرض قد (Toreihi, 1995, 3/373). أو فقر أو نازلة من نوازل الأيام إلى التضرع إلى الله تعالى (Ibn Manzur, 1993, 4/483). اضطرَّ إلى الشيء أي ألجئ لسان. In other words, man finds himself in a predicament that is forced to do something against his inner desire to get rid of it. According to Toreihi, urgency means need; need due to necessity such as poverty and other troubles that lead to supplication to God (Toreihi, 1995, 3/373).

## 2. Use of Weapons and Prohibitions

### 2. 1. Using the Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Normal Situation

The first question is ‘whether the use of weapons of mass destruction that caused the killing of several civilians or thousands and millions of civilians under normal circumstances is right or wrong according to Islamic jurisprudence, or is it permissible or forbidden?’

There are various reasons for the inappropriateness and prohibition of using these types of weapons, including:

#### 2.1.1. Prohibition of Pouring Poison in the Lands of the Pagans

Imam Sadiq (AS) says: “The Prophet forbade pouring poison in the lands of the polytheists” (Koleini, 1986, 5/28; Tusi, 1986, 6/143).

In Islamic books, pouring poison into the lands of the pagans is forbidden. Some scholars have stated that this is not permissible (Tusi, 1979, 293; Helli, 1987, 1/283).

According to these narrations, Islamic scholars have stated that

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1. Ayatollah Khamenei stated: “In our opinion, in addition to nuclear weapons, other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and microbial weapons, are also considered a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation, which is itself a victim of the use of chemical weapons, feels the danger of producing and accumulating such weapons more than other nations, and is ready to put all its resources in the way of confronting it. We consider the use of these weapons haram, and the effort to protect human beings from this great calamity is the duty of all (Message to the First International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation - 1/28/2010).

shedding poison will cause the death of women, children, and civilians. Since this is not permissible, it will not be acceptable to pour poison (Tusi, 1979, 313; Ameli, Zayn al-Din (Shahid Thani), 1992, 3/25).

We conclude that any weapon of mass destruction that causes the death of civilians in war is not recommended and is forbidden by Islam. There is no difference between primitive and ancient tools and chemical, microbial, atomic, and similar bombs, and using these tools is against the ethics and jurisprudence of war in Islam.

Of course, Sheikh Tusi, Ibn Idris, Mohaqeq, Allameh, Shahid Aval, Mohaqeq Thani, and many other jurists believe shedding poison provided non-urgency circumstances that the sanctity of mass destruction weapons in an emergency is not used from the above narration. In this narration, the owner of Al-Jawahir has set aside the basic rules and has not constrained the generalization of the hadith with pieces of evidence of urgency. Because he believes that can not restrict the application of the narration because pouring of poison was in an emergency (Najafi, 1983 21/67). Therefore, it is impossible to separate pouring poison and urgency to rule generalization.

But it is not acceptable the lack of emergency rule over the narration application due to the prevalence of pouring poison in emergencies. Because the implementation of the regulations can not be assigned simply because of dominance, the applications, in this case, are subject to restriction. Therefore, the sanctity of inducing poison must be proven by another reason.

### **2.1.2. Prohibition of Killing Women, Children and the Elderly<sup>1</sup>**

According to some narrations, a woman and a child should not kill someone who is not military or aggressive. In war and defense, it is also used not to use weapons that kill women, children, and the elderly who are not in the military. For example, Imam Sadiq (AS) says: “The Prophet forbade killing women and children on the battlefield unless they also fought, and if they also fought, do not deal with them as much as possible and do not be afraid of disorder” (Koleini, 1986, 5/29).

Prophet (PBUH) says: “Fight the polytheists and do not do anything with the elderly and their children” (Tusi, 1986 , 6/142).

Riyah ibn Rabia narrates that “I was with the Prophet during one of the battles, he saw the body of a woman and forbade the killing of women and children” (Al-Hindi, 1988 , 4/391).

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1. The reason for not using the term (prohibition of attacking civilians) is that these narrations forbid attacking women and children, etc. Even in some cases, for example, if women take military action, they are still forbidden to attack them (see: Horre Ameli, 1988, 15/64).

Imam Ali (AS) said before the battle of Siffin: "If they fail and flee, by God's leave, do not kill the one who turned his back, and do not harm the one who does not have the defend power, and do not kill the wounded. Do not provoke women by harassing them, even if they discredit you or insult your rulers" (Nahj al-Balaghah: Letter 14).

The Prophet had recommendations when sending the armed forces to the battle of Muthah, including not to attack men who were in worship places and monasteries and had a neutral position in the war, and not to attack women, children, and the elderly (Majlisi, 1983, 21/60).

### 2.1.3. Prohibition of Inhumane Tactics

In Islam, inhumane actions are forbidden, such as closing the water even if in war with the enemy. For example:

In the battle of Khaybar, when the armies of Islam besieged the Jewish fortress, a Jew told the Prophet to save my life, property, and family so that I could guide you to the conquest of this fort. The Prophet said: "You are safe". "What is your advice?" The Jew said: "Command them to dig this place until they reach the water of the castle, then you can prevent the water and force the people of the castle to surrender". The Prophet said: "I will not do such a thing until God shows us a way to conquer; of course, you are safe" (Majlisi, 1983, 21/30).

Also, in the battle of Siffin, Mu'awiyah's companions the Euphrates River and closed the water to the Imam's companions. The Imam ordered his troops to attack and take the water out of their possession. Then the Imam's companions said: "Now it is our turn to close the water on the enemy corps, but the Imam said: Take as much water as you need and then release the water" (Emadzadeh, 1982, 281).

According to these narrations, any inhuman act contrary to the human values principles and mass destruction weapons is not approved.

### 2.1.4. The Aggression Rule

In verse 190 of Surah Al-Baqarah, the Holy Qur'an devotes war and killing on the military personnel of the enemy and warns the warriors of Islam against the aggression and killing of people who have no role in the war: "وَ قَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ وَ لَا تَعْتَدُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ"

The Sunni and Shia commentators state that: "You should fight only the infidels who are at war with you" (Tayyib, 1999, 2/351). Never attack civilians (Makarem Shirazi, 1995, 2/19) whose killing is an example of "Aggression."

### 2.1.5. Observance of Animals and the Environment

Preservation of the environment is one of the examples of military rules and ethics and war in Islam. One of these teachings is to prevent damage

to trees, fields, and the like. In Islamic traditions, it is forbidden to damage trees, especially fruit trees, meadows, and lots, to cut them down and burn them (Cf. Majlisi, 1983, 19/179).

Islamic scholars, following the narrations, have condemned this practice, except in urgency when there is no choice to damage the trees and natural resources. It permitted as much as necessary (Tusi, 1979, 299; Helli, 1987, 1/283; Najafi, 1983, 21/67; Ibn Hamza, 1987, 201).

Whenever the Holy Prophet sent Muslims to war, he advised them: “Do not cut down a tree except in emergencies” (Koleini, 1986, 5/27; Tusi, 1986, 6/138).

Elsewhere, the Prophet said: “Do not burn the palm tree and do not drown it in water and do not cut down the fruit tree and do not burn the cultivated land” (Horre Ameli, 1988, 15/59).

Indeed, only trees and fields do not have, so by eliminating characteristics of such narrations, this ruling can be applied to all-natural sources and landscapes, and damaging, destroying, and burning them can be considered immoral, except in cases of emergency.

Other teachings include the prohibition of the demolition of buildings such as schools, hospitals, and settlements. Islamic scholars have also emphasized this issue in their books and have not considered it harmful to damage people's buildings except in emergencies. Some scholars have even regarded military installations as subject to this ruling, and they permissible to avoid destroying them except in an emergency (Tusi, 1967, 2/11)

Sheikh Tusi believes that the permission to destroy houses and castles is conditional on the prevailing suspicion in the necessity of military action; otherwise, it is better to leave it (Tusi, 1967, 2/11).

The Prophet also instructed the military: “Do not destroy the buildings” (Majlisi, 1983, 21/61).

Another teaching is the prohibition of harming animals that do not interfere in the war and are not in the enemy's service or have not been trained for the enemy's benefit, which Islam forbids except in an emergency.

In some narrations, the Holy Prophet forbade animals' mutilation, even crazy dogs (Nahj al-Balaghah / Letter 47; Alam al-Huda, 166). These narrations are absolute and include the battlefield and the time when animals are alive.

Also, narrations forbid damaging trees and fields (Cf. Majlisi, 1983, 19/179).

In other words, considering the condemnation of damaging trees and fields, it would be wrong to harm animals not involved in the war (Vahedjavan, 2011, 102).

Accordingly, the Islamic jurisprudential and moral system that does not allow these affairs will certainly not allow the use of mass destruction weapons, including the destruction of innocent human beings, animals, trees, and so on.

#### 2.1.6. The Rule of Sin

In the case of nuclear and atomic weapons, more than the above documents, there is the rule of sin. According to this rule, if the corruption in an act is more significant than its benefit, it would be sanctioned and prohibited, and nuclear weapons are an example of sin. These weapons have far more significant disadvantages than benefits, and we can claim that nuclear weapons have no practical use. The verse “إِثْمُهُمَا أَكْبَرُ مِنْ نَفْعِهِمَا” (Al-Baqarah/219) is about "Wine and Gamble," but as a rule, it is applicable in any case where the greater sin is approved. Regarding atomic and nuclear weapons, all scholars agree on their corruption and greater evil. Accordingly, the use of tools that cause the death of civilians is inappropriate and contrary to the jurisprudence, law, and ethics of war and defense in Islam.

### 3. Conflict of the Prohibition of Using the Mass Destruction Weapons with Necessities

Using the weapons of mass destruction becomes even more challenging with the question, ‘what is the duty if this ban conflicts with emergencies?’ For example, suppose:

A) the enemy to win has made innocent people of himself or some of the Muslims hostages and captives a human shield for itself. So that without destroying that human shield with weapons of mass destruction, there is no possibility of victory, and the Muslims will be defeated and destroyed.

B) Sometimes the enemy uses these weapons of mass destruction against the Muslims, and the Muslims will be defeated and destroyed if they do not use them.

C) If the Islamic system depends on using these weapons, it will destroy its principle due to the enemy's invasion.

We face two issues :on the one hand, there is an emphasis on banning the use of mass destruction weapons. On the other hand, emphasizing the dignity, victory, and permanence of Islam and Muslims, maintaining the Islamic system, the obligation of Jihad (defense) of the lives, property, honor, and religion of Muslims, and the need to prevent the defeat and destruction of the Islamic community.<sup>1</sup> Regarding the emphasis on

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1. This is especially clear with the theory of Velayat-e-Faqih, which was completed by Imam Khomeini.



preserving the Islamic system and defending the lives, property, honor, and religion of Muslims, we should say: "Preserving the Islamic system is a fundamental obligation" (Khomeini, 1994, 2/619).

According to the valid and abundant rational and narrative arguments, Imam Khomeini says in this regard: "The preservation of Islam is a divine duty above all other obligations, and there is no obligation in Islam is higher than preserving Islam itself. Therefore, it is upon all of us, you, the nation, and the clerics to protect this Islamic Republic from significant duties" (Khomeini, 1981-10-26, 2001, 15/329).

According to verses and hadiths, other Islamic scholars have emphasized Jihad and the defense of the boundaries of Islam and the protection of the lives, property, honor, and religion of Muslims from any aggression (Qomi, 1997, 57; Tusi, 1979, 289; Helli, 9/5; Ameli, 1996, 2/29).

'Which is preferable between using weapons of mass destruction or the destruction of the Islamic system or Muslims?' and 'which one to choose?' 'Which issue is more important?' according to Islam, 'should the use of weapons of mass destruction be stopped, or should the destruction of the Islamic system and the lives, property, honor, and religion of Muslims be prevented?'

In contrast to this basis, the need to preserve the Islamic system and the lives, property, honor, and religion of Muslims; there is secularism and the separation of religion from politics. Assuming the validity or acceptance of secularism, in the conflict or antagonism of these two issues can be said: "The destruction of the Islamic system is a priority, not the use of weapons of mass destruction. According to this basis, the Islamic system and the religious government have no originality or credibility to maintain it. However, protecting the lives, property, and honor of Muslims is also contradictory and disturbing to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction".

### **3.1. Preservation of the Islamic System and the Lives and Dignity of Muslims Based on Jurisprudential Rules**

The rule of "La Zarar" according to the prophetic hadith "La Zarar va La Zihar fi Al-Islam," acknowledges the removal of the necessary action and non-acceptance of harm in Islam, and two rational rules refer to the preservation of Islam. When the two activities intersect, one of its sub-principles and the rule of urgency maintain society's system and prioritizes the most important, more corrupt repulse.

According to the necessity of maintaining the Islamic system based on "La Zarar," harm to another and acceptance of damage is forbidden; the enemy can not harm the Muslim. The rule of preserving the system of

society, life, property, honor, and borders of Muslims first shows that the principle of the Islamic system and the life and reputation of Muslims is more important, and this issue is more worthy of preservation. Therefore, using weapons of mass destruction is legal in an emergency.

In other words, using weapons of mass destruction is wrong if the state of war or defense is normal, not the state of necessity.

The main reason for this is the "Priority of More Important on Important" rule, which is intellectually and narratively acceptable. There is no choice but to sacrifice the critical order and act on the more substantial order in such cases. The "Priority of More Important on Important" rule is a rational rule that all wise people understand and adhere to, and Islamic law confirms it (Makarem Shirazi, 2001, 505; Javadi Amoli, 2015, 245).

One of the effects of preserving the Islamic system is issuing the religious ruler's secondary rulings and governmental rulings. Sometimes the Supreme Leader, due to the critical expediency of maintaining the system, or preventing the destruction of the origin of the system and the border of Islam, stops implementing some of the first Shari'a rules and orders the execution of secondary Shari'a rules.<sup>1</sup> For Example:

A) spy on the people's private affairs to identify the enemies of the Islamic system who are secretly working against Islam and the people's public interests is permissible, while spying on the people's internal affairs - which is not related to the government is prohibited.

B) The verdict issuance on the elimination of Islam opponents who cause corruption and disorder in the Muslim system and spy for the benefit of the enemies is permitted. However, the first principle implies not killing others.<sup>2</sup>

One of the jurisprudential rules is "Tatarros," which means that the permission to kill civilians and Muslims that the enemy has used as a shield against the army of Islam.

Imam Khomeini says: "According to the Islamic Jihad ruling about the believers and warning against killing the believer is that if the infidels put a group of believers, Muslims, jurists, and scientists as their shield, kill them because all are considered martyrs and go to paradise. The infidels will also go to hell. This action is to preserve the borders of Islam and the system. Keeping the boundaries of Islam is a duty that is no higher than it" (Khomeini, 2001, 16/465).

Other Imamiyyah jurists have specified the permission to kill civilians

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1. To study how this issue and its arguments, refer to the relevant books, including the book *Velayat-e-Faqih*, written by Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, 2015, 242.  
2. The arguments for these issues have been presented in the relevant books, and we have mentioned them as an example.

and even Muslims in cases of necessity (Tusi, 1979, 293; Helli, 1987, 1/283; Najafi, 1983, 21/68).

According to Sheikh Tusi: "Muslims in the difficult situation, can strike the enemy with catapults, fire and other things that lead to their conquest, even if there is a group of Muslims among the enemy (for example, they have shielded them). When Muslims killed among them or destroyed their property, neither Muslims nor anyone else is obliged to pay compensation like blood money" (Tusi, 1979, 293).

### **3.2. Conditions for Using Weapons of Mass Destruction in an Emergency**

Assuming the competence and permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction in an emergency, 'is it permissible to use any weapons of mass destruction in case of urgency and at the discretion of the Sharia ruler, i.e., the Valy-e Faqih?'

'Is it permissible to use only some weapons of mass destruction?'

'Is the use of ordinary surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-ground, and ordinary bombs and missiles dropped by planes on cities the same as chemical, nuclear, and atomic bombs and missiles?''<sup>1</sup>

The more challenging problem is the using chemical, nuclear and atomic missiles and bombs have far worse effects and, for a long time, seriously endangers the lives of humans and other living organisms. Such weapons, by definition, will destroy all existing movement in the region for decades to come.

The primary point in this challenge is the natural difference between chemical, nuclear, and atomic weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons of mass destruction (such as missiles and ordinary bombs).

In the "Tatarros" rule, a human shield against a military target may or absolutely would be killed; it is permissible as a matter of urgency and in compliance with the law "in urgent cases should be content oneself with necessary" .But in nuclear and atomic weapons, there are no conditions fulfillment of urgency and necessity, and it is impossible. Still, many killed people who were not shields and destroy the next generation and mortals. Human casualties and environmental damage, and the harmful effects of using such a weapon remove the purpose of legitimacy .According to the "Tatarros" and the like, rationally, a few innocent victims have been

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1. The difference between the two is that only the latter, according to international definitions, are prohibited means of mass murder. It shows the precision of the religion of Islam, which considers even the use of ordinary weapons of mass destruction, which are not forbidden by custom, inappropriate in normal circumstances and allows only in cases of urgency and necessity.

forgiven in the face of a greater goal in some circumstances.

In other words, the nature of nuclear and atomic weapons of mass destruction is evil, and there is no permissible use of it. Hence, its use has no intellectual and narrative authorization.

To protect the Islamic system and the lives, property, honor, and religion of Muslims, or if the enemy uses these chemicals, nuclear and atomic weapons (i.e., in times of emergency), ‘can Muslims be allowed to use them?’

‘Can these devices not be used because the device must have some intellectual or customary licenses?’

In the first case (absolute permission), the Valy-e Faqih can also order the use of nuclear weapons and atomic bombs in matters of vital necessity and practicality. In the second case (conditional permission, not absolute), the Valy-e Faqih can only permit those who have rational or customary licenses in case of need. The use of non-nuclear and non-atomic bombs is expected to be ordered by the Valy-e Faqih. But non-atomic missiles and bombs that they are using in war are not under custom or international law, according to Valy-e Faqih, are forbidden.

A third view is after the enemy attack with nuclear weapons, the Valy-e Faqih can order retaliation.

Another viewpoint is if the Supreme Leader can use weapons if we believe in the absolute Velayat-e Faqih, but it is not acceptable according to the particular Velayat. Great people like Imam Khomeini, who were based on the absolute Velayat-e Faqih, did not believe to this extent the authority of the jurist and even excluded the elementary Jihad (Cf. Mousavi Khomeini, 2000, 1/482). When the Supreme Leader cannot order a primary Jihad, he cannot authorize using the prohibited weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and atomic weapons.

Using weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear and atomic weapons), which are indecent in custom or has an international ban, causes the international community to distrust religion and Muslims and endangers the reputation of religion and Islam. This issue could be another reason or evidence for the inadequacy of using nuclear weapons of mass destruction, even in cases of urgency.

Considering the previous contents and assuming the acceptance of the discussion and challenges assumptions, the following points are significant:

First, the challenge is the importance of necessity and practicality, not the ordinary situation. The premise inflicts a significant defeat on Muslims, destroys the Islamic system, or uses these weapons against Muslims. If there is no retaliation, it will ruin Islam or Muslims or the borders of Islamic society.

Then, using these weapons and recognizing necessities and interests is Valy-e Faqih's duty or representative in such matters, not every Muslim; obviously, accurate diagnosis is complicated and requires particular criteria.

Due to these two issues, using nuclear and atomic weapons will also be allowed.

Because the issue of necessity and urgency depends on different conditions and assumptions, and in each case, it has its requirements.<sup>1</sup>

The essential and more essential rule applies here as well.

This rule is derived from religious texts:

“فَمَنْ اعْتَدَى عَلَيْكُمْ فَاعْتَدُوا عَلَيْهِ بِمِثْلِ مَا اعْتَدَى عَلَيْكُمْ وَ اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ” (Al-Baqarah/194)

“وَ إِنْ عَاقَبْتُمْ فَعَاقِبُوا بِمِثْلِ مَا عُوقِبْتُمْ بِهِ” (Al-Nahl/126)

Both verses present the issue of retaliation. Therefore, if the enemy uses a nuclear weapon, the Muslims can also use it.

If the Islam enemies are sure that even if they use nuclear weapons against Muslims, they will not do so, they will courage to attack Muslims with such weapons in necessity. Conversely, if the enemy assumes that Muslims will retaliate if they use nuclear weapons; and even this will significantly reduce the likelihood of enemy use.

Quran says: “وَ أَعِدُوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَ مِنْ رِيبِطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَ “ (Al-Anfal/60): “And to fight the enemy [prepare against them to the utmost, such as armed forces and strong horses and provisions for fighting, to frighten the enemy of Allah as well as your enemy and others besides them, whom you do not know them, but Allah knows them; and whatever you spend in Allah's way will be repaid to you, and you shall not be dealt with, unjustly”.

Because despite the hostility and vigorous opposition of the Islam enemies who did not give up anything, this issue is one of the most important factors preventing the enemies' invasion and the survival of Islam and the lives and property of Muslims.

But Valy-e Faqih can authorize using any weapon, even nuclear or atomic, in case of recognition of necessity or important expediency.

However, in which the authority of Valy-e Faqih is not so much even based on absolute Velayat, according to the issue assumption, this problem is eliminated.

Islamic scholars believe that in defending the borders of Muslims, life, honor, and religion, the permission of the Imam or his deputy is not a condition (Khomeini, 2000, 1/485). And presumably, it is a matter of defense, not elementary Jihad and the like.

1. Depending on the circumstances, sometimes it is necessary to kill only one person and sometimes to kill thousands.

Defensive Jihad in Islam means that Muslims are obliged to confront and defend any individual or group that has invaded their lives, honor, property, border, and everything that belongs to them (Ameli, 1990 :2/377).

It is even permissible for Muslims to fight behind a cruel leader to save the unity of Islam and the Islamic society from the aggressors. Provided that in this Jihad, they do not intend to help the oppressive ruler, but intend to liberate the Islamic land (Helli, 1997, 1/109; Shakuri, 1998, 370).

The discussion and assumption will eliminate the international community's distrust of religion and Muslims and the faith and Islam discrediting.

### **3.3. Altered Evidence for Using the Unconventional Weapons of Mass Destruction**

What was argued and concluded is distorted.<sup>1</sup> The primary necessity claimed in the above argument is the destruction of Islam, the Islamic system, and Muslims' lives, property, and honor.

The question is, 'does this presuppose the disappearance of all Islam, Muslims or Shia, or only the disappearance of a part of Islamic lands territory, some Muslims and a government system?'

If the intention is the first case, it will never fulfill this assumption externally. In other words, this assumption is usually impossible.

The whole of Islam and all Muslims will never perish; because:

First, God Almighty has promised the preservation of the Qur'an (Al-Hijr / 9) and the permanence of the religion of Islam and has even predicted its pervasiveness (Al-Tawbah / 33 and Al-Saf / 9).

Secondly, according to the Shia, there is always an alive Imam after the Prophet (PBUH) and will preserve the religion, even if he is absent.<sup>2</sup>

Thirdly, intellectually and empirically, the enemy can't destroy all the religions of Islam or Muslims, or Shia, even with nuclear weapons and atomic bombs.

Therefore, the destruction of the whole of Islam or the life, property, and honor of all Muslims is a hypothesis that cannot be realized externally. So, we cannot consider it as a matter of necessity. Necessity has degrees, and the need is not enough to prescribe a nuclear weapon.

But in the second case, we have no reason to say using unconventional weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, is allowed; because

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1. The point of discussion in this section is the special use of unconventional weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, when necessary. In other words, the same term that is known in international law as a weapon of mass destruction and has a customary and legal prohibition.

2. The reasons for this have been explained in Shia theological books such as Kashf al-Murad by Allama Helli.

we can maintain this necessity with other things. Those are creating a robust defensive shield that prevents the collapse and destruction of the Islamic system or the lives, property, and honor of Muslims, or preventing a nuclear attack or thwarting atomic attacks.

‘What is our duty if we can not create such an obstacle or shield or use other conventional issues to defend?’ We respond that we are not allowed to use prohibited and unconventional devices such as nuclear weapons, even in this case. The reason is that a religious license is required to use devices that cause widespread loss of life to innocent or civilian people, animals, the environment, etc., and we do not have such a license. It is forbidden to kill innocent humans, animals, and civilians. We have no valid reason to get out of this ban. In Islamic events, too, the Imams did not do so. The best explanation for this is the event of Karbala. Imam Hussein was embodied Islam, and the absolute right knew that he and his companions would be martyred and his family would be captured; he did not take any unusual activity during the war. He did not even start a war to finish the job in his favor. When the companions of Imam Hussein faced the forces of Horr bin Yazid Riahi, Horr said: “You have no right to return, and I am on duty to be with you”. Zuhair Ibn Qayn suggested to the Imam that fighting this small group now is easier to fight this group with auxiliary force. Imam said: “I do not want to start a war” (Majlisi, 1983, 44/380).

The Prophet and Imams' tradition is the opposite. The Prophet never used unconventional acts of war even when the Muslims were defeated and suffered casualties. Imam Ali never used uncommon actions in the battles of his rule and even forbade them (Majlisi, 1983, 21/30).

The more essential and essential rule is here, but the discussion introduction has a problem. The most important is not to use weapons of mass destruction, and it necessary is to preserve the appearance of the Islamic system in a country or to preserve the life and property of some Muslims. Therefore more critical has precedence significant even though some Muslims are martyred.

But the argument to the two verses of the Holy Qur'an and other religious texts that seemingly say retaliate is limited to the ordinary, not the unusual and the like of nuclear weapons. Imams' behavior in the wars, who interpreted the meaning of retaliation and did not allow the use of inhumane tactics and unconventional methods (such as closing the water) even when used by the enemy. This group of texts or appearances aims to retaliate against the aggressor and the military enemy, not the innocent and non-aggressors.

The issue of possible deterrence to preserving the rule of maintaining

social order, using such weapons in case of the enemy's initial use is potential requires a valid intellectual and narrative license that does not currently exist. And as we have seen, we have various reasons for banning the use of mass destruction weapons. Secondly, it creates new tensions between Muslims and the enemies, and the fire of war and the resulting casualties may even become more widespread. Finally, with the disappearance of necessity, the international community's distrust towards religion and Muslims and the disgrace of religion and Islam remain in force.

According to potential sense and arguments context, the production and maintenance of unconventional weapons of mass destruction and their use are prohibited, improper, and not permissible.

### **Conclusion**

Under normal circumstances, using both conventional and unconventional mass destruction weapons has jurisprudential and moral prohibition. There are various reasons for this ban: the ban of using poison, the prohibition of killing women, children, the elderly, the prohibition of using inhumane tactics, the aggression rule, the observance of animals and the environment, and the rule of sin.

Also, the production, maintenance, and use of unconventional and prohibited weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons (as defined by the term of international law), even in cases of necessity, is not permitted and has jurisprudential and moral incompetence. Evidence that confirms their use is distorted and inadmissible.

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## Transition Preparations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a Civilization Outlook

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### Abstract

The Islamic Revolution and Republic, which originated from the nature-oriented thought of Imam Khomeini, led to their cohesion by dominating all government structures and apparatuses. However, by the neglect of this natural-based event deeply, some devices could not adapt to it and create a new foundation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of them. In the diplomacy in the oral history project of the Twelfth Government, it was acknowledged in some dimensions by those in charge of foreign policy. This writing aims to theorise to align foreign policy and its responsible institution with the Islamic Revolution in the second step of the Islamic Revolution. With the descriptive and analytical methods, studies conducted in the framework of the thinking of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, the results indicated that any structural reflections in this regard should originate from the idea based on dignity and nature-oriented foreign policy and be the basis for reviewing the Foreign Ministry. In this regard, to call on all thinkers and scholars to reflect on this issue, the present writer has presented proposals for organisational and structural changes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the wise-civilizational foreign policy of the Islamic Revolution, in the second step of the Islamic Revolution.

**Keywords:** Natural-based Politics, the Islamic Revolution Second Phase, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Organizational and Structural Rethinking.

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## Introduction

The Islamic Revolution of Iran, according to thinkers, was a move against the process of global secularisation. Understanding this issue is the basis of organisational reform of the Islamic Republic institutions. The problem of the Foreign Ministry is not the personal identities of the minister or deputy but the ruling ideology and the incapable structure of this ministry in understanding global issues and developments. Global developments do not mean quantitative and meaningless changes in the secular sense of "Development" and "Underdevelopment." It does not represent the formal interpretation and official microphysical reports of world power of the world projects movement. Instead, the purpose is to move the world's lower layers and the universe nations towards "Perfection."

Therefore, the Islamic Revolution expect that the institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existentially, are not by the microphysics of the domination system power, which should be in line with the gradual movements of the world and the existential field of the revolution. It leads to creating a pattern in the structure level of the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

A structure that inspires and affirms the "Organization of Universal Creation" is not compatible with the "Nature" and "Nature of the Universe Survival Conflict" but must be consistent with human nature.

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran preamble, the Islamic government is not classic and individual or group domination, but the conclusion of the political ideal of a like-minded nation that swings itself toward the final goal (movement towards God Almighty) in intellectual and ideological transformation. In this text, there is the confrontation of two negative and positive views on the definition of government in Islamic thought. In the first sect, the government don't create the possibility of one group of people's dominance over another; therefore, the denial of domination is the first step of government in Islamic thought. The second one, government, simultaneously, requires a desire, especially a political desire, that leads a like-minded nation towards the leader's ultimate goal.

According to the second sect of the Constitution preamble, the positive definition of government is achieving the goal practically of the intellectual change.

Therefore, establish a logical implication between these two aspects. Islamic government comes from people who deny domination. These people must experience an intellectual transformation to walk on the path to God.

The same movement towards God determines the components of such a transformation. The result of God way is: " أَنْ الْأَرْضَ يَرُثُهَا عِبَادِي الصَّالِحُونَ " (al-Anbiya'/105). This result is available just with the obedience of God's

command. God command is: " يا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِالْقِسْطِ " (al-Nisa'/135). The word upholder (قَوَّامِينَ) is in any situation; therefore, the scope of the justice upholding is not only limited to a specific group but extends to the country, government and all internal and external areas. Based on the second principle of the Constitution, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a system based on the belief in "God's Justice in Creation and Legislation." The content of the Islamic Republic of Iran is faith and is a kind of struggle to establish an instalment.

Belief in supporting the oppressed of the world everywhere implies the belief of Muslims in the shared nature of human beings. Their character in the whole world is the same but can grow or decline according to the types of education. Therefore, nature can be considered a set of traits and characteristics instilled in human nature since the beginning of creation. No human being is different from any other of any race, ethnicity, religion and manner, whether urban or rural, savage or civilised, etc. (Mousavi Khomeini, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 180). The emphasis on the oppressed in Article 154 of the Constitution refers to the Muslims' belief in the shared nature of human beings.

Considering the nature of humans and regarding it as the organiser of foreign policy is limited to the Islamic Revolution of Iran and is influenced by the thoughts of the Islamic Revolution leaders.

Foreign policy is a set of political actions related to a country's communication network with the outside world, and diplomacy is one of the essential tools of this communication system.

Foreign policy discourse is a semantic system in which all matters related to foreign affairs are covered semantically. In this regard, the article's central question is 'How to theorise to align foreign policy and its response system with the Islamic Revolution in the second phase of the Islamic Revolution?'. The hypothesis is that nature-based thought is based on human dignity and nature-oriented foreign policy that should be the basis for reviewing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs structure to formulate a civilisational foreign policy appropriate to the Islamic Revolution in its second phase. An organised foreign policy based on nature is consistent with the characteristics of human existence. In such a policy, observing the existential principles of humans and considering his divine dimension is the central pillar that is not limited to the affairs of this world. It pursues the true transcendence and immortality of man. Using a comparative method and a descriptive and analytical approach, the present study first highlights naturalist politics as a theoretical framework for the Islamic Republic of all institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Then, recognising the current Ministry of Foreign Affairs problem turns to natural-oriented foreign policy. Finally, it offers solutions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' formation at the Islamic Revolution's second phase level with its organisational and structural rethinking.

### **1. Theoretical Framework: Natural-oriented Policy Based on Human Dignity**

Politics in the western and eastern classical periods observe its universality and maximum. Both the Eastern thinkers who considered the order of the universe to depend on the excellent management of affairs –politics-, including Farabi (Farabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 65) and the Western thinkers (such as Plato and Aristotle) who considered politics as the prevalent of good deeds in society (Aristotle, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 14).

This thought dominated the minds for a long time, close to the modern period, and confronted with the modernist minimalist view of man and politics. Areas such as ethics, politics, religion, philosophy, etc., which were previously by politics, were expelled from the political realm. Politics was defined as providing a ground to absorb man's most significant material benefit. Islam opposes limiting politics to a specific area of worldly life with a maximalist view, fundamentally different from classical Western thinkers. Because politics in Islamic thought is derived from religion, we can say that religion articulates politics and politics aimed to approach religion. "Siyasat" is derived from the root of (S-A-S), (Yasus) and means government, presidency, punishment, upbringing, administration, expediency, planning, justice, maintenance and protection. In European languages, the word "Politics" is derived from the term (Polis), which the Greeks used to refer to the state/city. State/city in Greek thought means the place of being human and man. Aristotle writes in his treatise "Politics": "Man, according to policies, is a creature created to live in a polis." (Aristotle, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 13)

Thus, the Greeks could not identify man without political and urban appearance. Therefore, Aristotle called those who lived outside the city "Inferior to Man" or "Beyond Man." Politics thus refers to action in all its forms and definitions, and because the act requires power, politics is usually confused with force. In "Society and Government," McGuire defines politics as exercising power and centralised organisation (McGuire, 1965 AD/1344 SH: 29). According to Harold Lasswell, politics teaches us who wins, what wins, when wins, where wins, and how (Sprigens, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 10). Maurice Duverger considers "Power" the central core of politics (Duverger, 1970 AD/1349 SH: 8). The teachings based on "al-



Haq Li-man Ghalaba," as the Sunni political thought, believe in the equality of "Politics" with "Power." (Taheri, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 10)

In addition to power, politics has long been considered the science of studying the "Government." (cf. Anderson et al., 1997 AD/1352 SH: 30; Jakalski, 1967 AD/1347 SH; McGuire, 1965 AD/1344 SH: 29)

Recently, politics has been defined as the decision-making process. Raymond Aron defines politics as "Decision-making about Heterogeneous Events in Society." (Duverger, 1970 AD/1349 SH: 8). Expanding bureaucracy and raising questions such as 'Where political institutions should go?' made politics increasingly tied to the "Management" of society's current affairs and lose its normative aspect, which was derived from politics in its classical period. In addition to these three interpretations of politics (politics/power, politics/government and politics/decision-making), there is another interpretation. Politics as ability reduces human dignity to the object of passion. Politics as a state considers man as one of the replaceable gears of the state machine and refers to the state as its executive mechanism. Politics as management, too, by criticising the bureaucratisation of society, makes a man a critic of inanimate bureaucracies. Therefore, the common point of all three of these explanatory knowledge words is the disregard for human dignity and its reduction. Another view, contrary to it, is respecting the existential dignity of humans. Human pride and existential dignity have not been valued like Islamic thought for a long time in none of the human epistemological systems. Islamic politics has been based on such a basis. Farabi, the founder of Islamic philosophy (Davari Ardakani, ۱۹۸۳ AD/1362 SH), with believed in the relationship between politics and ontology, ethics and guidance, writes:

"The way to create virtue in human beings is that virtuous deeds and acts are always common in cities and among nations; it is impossible except a government can promote these moral practices, rules and acts in the cities and among the people. The result of this service is called politics." (Farabi, ۲۰۱۰ AD/1389 SH: 107) It seems that the basis of Islamic politics is respect for human beings.

The connection between ethics and foreign policy in the minds of Western thinkers, influenced by their anthropology, caused that man to be considered an isolated person who seeks his maximum interests. In the discourse of idealism in foreign policy, man will seek to establish peace by experiencing that his interests will be increased during peacetime. Therefore, his peace-seeking is influenced by the nature of human profit-seeking, which in this discourse is implicitly emphasised. On the other hand, Realist discourse explicitly knows a man with a profiteer and fickle

nature. Hence, by mapping man's inherent characteristics to the state, he also considers the international arena an anarchic arena where only the ruling order is the will of the most vital government units. But the good nature of man is explicitly emphasised in naturalistic thought, and the concept of nature links various aspects of politics, including foreign policy.

## **2. Improper Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

In revolutions, regarding the transformation of myths and values and replacing old cultures and myths with new cultures and symbols, only some ministries and service facilities, etc., there are non-political institutions that do not necessarily disintegrate. However, the bureaucratic system in the services (Like the Foreign Ministry standard services in consular affairs, bilateral or multilateral relations, and those related to international service organisations) as a service ministry did not disintegrate. Instead, they became stronger by adding official behaviours and became myths themselves. Modern official myths have taken root in the State Department instead of revolutionary tales! The Foreign Ministry cannot be demoted to the Ministry of Water, Electricity and Gas, or Services and Welfare. The trustees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the dual idea of field and diplomacy, while the project of oral history of the Twelfth Government, showed their distance, i.e., foreign policy (in the sense of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and its intellectual and logistical apparatus with the Islamic Revolution. With returning to the advisory-combat front of the Iranians and reminding scenes such as the fall of "Khantooman" and the death of commander Badraddin and Hamedani, etc., we find that in those critical moments, the "Bureaucratic policy" of the Foreign Ministry had receded. The heavy burden of politics and battle had been placed on both the resistance commanders and the cross-border fighters. When we remember the unhealthy situation of Iran in the event of the massacre of "Mena" and the humiliation of the Iranians in the days following the killings and monitor the status of the ministry in the face of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and OPEC, or when we raised our expectations about the American criminal regime and the medieval regime of the Great Taghut to such an extent that the spokesmen of the hegemonic system were even upset by the dry condolence of the Secretary of State in the martyrdom of commander Badraddin and expressed their displeasure with the Secretary of State. Or when we meditate on the effects of punching John Kerry on the negotiating table (as narrated by Araghchi) and the automatic firing on the chest of a senior Iranian diplomat, or when we look at the situation in Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain, we realise that the Foreign

Ministry was not in a good position. Especially since we have witnessed many times that the spokespersons of this ministry, hours after the spokespersons of the Resistance Front and the patriotic commanders of Sharia-oriented, have declared their position against the world domination system. There are many examples of this. Such evaluations indicate the unfavourable position of the Foreign Ministry, which requires practical analysis and action. The problem is that the structure of the Foreign Ministry has no apparent relation with the world's general developments. During the past years, we can find the incompatibility of this ministry with the revolutionary approach of the system and the nature-oriented thought of the Imam, especially in some developments in the region and the world that have become an inter-subjective concern among Iranians. 'Where we should look for a problem?' 'Are these problems turning to shortcomings in the Constitution?' 'Are there any problems with intervening institutions formulating and pursuing foreign policy?' 'Does the customary administration of this ministry and the revolutionary missions and its related constitution have two types of ontology and methodology and values?' The Constitution seems to have created tremendous potential for the Foreign Ministry to align with the Islamic Revolution so that there is no shortage, at least from a legal view. The critical question is 'Why this idea and capacity has not been properly crystallised in the form of "Policy-making," "Policy," and structure?' Analysis of this issue requires knowledge of the ontological and epistemological spirit and the value system governing international policies and global structures in the context and text of the Islamic Revolution to achieve a native design through planning. To this aim, we should answer 'How does the bureaucratic structure of the Foreign Ministry relate to the "General Movement of the World?'" 'What is the opposing country's position?' The Relationship between Global Structures and the Natural Process of world trends from Westphalia to Fukuyama is contrary to human nature and dignity. The "Thought" and "Structure" of this international system, based on social Darwinism, have divided power and governing the world has continued with the logic of victorious and defeated states. The United Nations, the Security Council and the veto right have been born in this situation. Dividing the world into influence realms, based on the bio-world formulations of NATO, Warsaw, etc., was based on such an approach, and the logic of the Cold War was based on this principle. The theories of the existing "Bigger Brothers," the new world order and subsequently, the clash of civilisations and the end of history, in all their forms, classical, modern and ethereal, have guided the nature of own-based modern diplomacy and have an oppressive nature.

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In other words, it is a structuralist process of globalisation, which is a model of the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of the great powers and a model based on the idea of domination. At the same time, the nations and the lower layers of the world are moving towards their ultimate perfection and natural end. Although the prevailing view of the current Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic is still influenced by the hegemonic propaganda paradigm of globalisation and Americanization, it behaves in the same political context. Because this ministry is not satisfactory in terms of macro-principles and policies, nor words of performance and structure, with the nature-based principles of the Islamic Revolution, and is facing a 40-year delay in the path of the Islamic Revolution and the formation of educational-revolutionary diplomacy. Despite its changes, it couldn't completely move from the Orientalism structure to the civilisational Foreign Ministry. Globalisation project processes caused many tragedies. It reached deadlocks where the killing of millions of people during the First and Second World Wars is an example of those sufferings. The structure and content of the Security Council and the veto right are incompatible with human nature and the general movement and the underworld and the esoteric will of nations. Therefore, fortunately, the process of globalisation (actually, globalisation or Americanization) is now facing "Reverse Globalization" reactions. Hence, dozens of social movements in the West and the United States, Europe, and Russia tend to represent the decentralised identities of power macrophysics in Central America and Central Europe. 'How can these environmental movements, social uprisings on Wall Street, family restoration movements, etc., be identified?' The general movement of the world (in the sense of process), the cosmopolitanism of man, and his perfectionist spirit are not guided by the domination of hierarchical construction and the impatient and cowardly nature of secular man and the man of American-European traditions and man bound by the political security and economic alliances of these powers. Instead, it is by the nature and dignity of the moving man. Because man is now more inclined to move towards the natural covenants between himself and the "Head of the Creation Organization" and the actual owner and not the tyrant of God and the "Universal Leviathan." As more complete than his employment theory, existing valuable and virtuous "Evolutionary Facts" in Allameh Tabatabaei represent such a situation from the existential realm of the universe and man. This perfectionist desire and willingness for perfectionism in the power and rational politics that flares up in existence and man in "Real Politics" cannot be abstract or illusory and abstract to the political reality.

The Foreign Ministry must understand these issues beyond a consular and financial system and give them a global reach. It is a requirement of the institution that emerged from the Islamic Revolution.

The structure of the Foreign Ministry looks 40 years older than the trilogy of the "Islamic Revolution," the "World General Movement," and the "World Domination System." While the Islamic Revolution was a "Historical Philosophy" backed approach to the world and humans, according to Lanser, the so-called inevitable trends have changed with the endeavour of the Revolution's leadership. As this movement was considered a "Spirit in a Soulless World." In another explanation, he said that this revolution's relations, developments, and political affairs were in a time other than these times; it was written in the kingdom (of heaven) and consequently fulfilled in the real world. Another constructivist explanation in the analysis and understanding of revolutions against this revolution is that if processes had emerged so far, now after observing the nature and manner of the Iranian people's revolution, it should be said that the only revolution that was "Gradually Made" and it did not come into being, it is the Islamic Revolution of Iran. A revolution that, in its geography, thought, culture and religion were affected.

These issues represent the real identity of the Islamic Revolution. As a result, the view of the most important ministry of the Islamic Revolution, from the communication with the outside world, must be far beyond the orientalist view. Notably, the current monopoly of bureaucrats in this ministry should be broken, and everyone can speak and write about the relationship between structure and thought in this ministry. The discussion of the "Liberation of the Foreign Ministry" from the domination of big and small idols of design and quasi-thought should become common in the elite society. Because for more than forty years now, the way of the people in foreign policy has been blocked, and the bureaucrats have monopolised the work. Despite some recent structural changes or changes during the thirteenth administration, the ministry still needs more significant changes. The vacuum of revolutionary-institutionalist thought is felt after the fortieth anniversary of this world revolution. The organisation of the Foreign Ministry must be structured with the "Essence of the Revolution," the "Act of the Revolution," and the "Statement of the Second Phase of the Revolution" in mind.

### **3. Naturalist Foreign Policy**

The country's foreign policy is influenced by that country's domestic policy and is emphasised by both the popular idealist and realist approaches. But this

fact, in none of them, is perhaps highlighted as much as the desired foreign policy in the thought of the Islamic Revolution. In the two dominant approaches to foreign policy, there is an outward view, and generally, the domestic policy of countries is determined by the power relations in the world arena. Therefore, it is possible that the norms and values of a particular country will be defeated in the face of world power relations and will leave the field of politics in favour of reception. While Ayatollah Khamenei profoundly believes that the attitude of the country's foreign policy should come from a more fundamental area, and this field is "Human Nature."

In his political thought, he introduced the debate between "Inherent Dignity" and "Acquired Dignity" and raised the issue of nature in their politics through this debate. In foreign policy, he believes that an organic connection should be established between the existential state and inside and outside lands. Foreign policy issues, whether general or partial issues, can be resolved through discussion, intervention, argument and dialogue. But if we do not strengthen ourselves or foundations of holiness in our hearts and souls, and, consequently, in our actions, with our different beliefs or policy, we will not be able to fulfil it properly. Sometimes this inner deviation changes our view of things, faith, and belief (Statements. Khamenei, 2004 AD/1383 SH). Hence, in their theoretical reflections and practical preparations, all actions in the country's foreign policy should be balanced with the measure of "Nature" and engineered according to its implications. Inconsistency of event or decision in the foreign policy with instinctual human implications destroyed that event and decision. Ayatollah Khamenei has also briefly defined wisdom as "Acting Wisely and Prudently." (Statements. Khamenei, 1991 AD/ 1370 SH) We can say that wisdom-based foreign policy means nature-based foreign policy. According to Ayatollah Khamenei's political thought, being wise in all decision-making is one of the obligations in this foreign policy. As he stated in the second step statement, national dignity, foreign relations, and demarcation with the enemy are considered as branches of the principle of dignity, wisdom and expediency in international relations. (Khamenei, 2018 AD/ 1397 SH: 46). Concretising the discussion of "Wisdom" in the macro arena means if we once presented an event or decision on human nature, and that nature prohibited the event and the determination; finally, that event and resolution, in all political arenas, including foreign policy, will be prohibition-accepting. The idealists implicitly accept the system of world domination, and the realists do not recognise a way out of it, on the contrary. In that case, the wise foreign policy recognises domination and oppression in contradiction with man's innate wisdom and inherent dignity. It

does not accept it in any way. Man's innate wisdom requires him to resist domination, even if he pays a high price. It seems that this political-civilizational idea is, on the one hand, a mediator of dialogue and, on the other hand, a denier of tyranny and cruel-accepting. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, today, the Islamic world should give a "New Spirit" in the body of the current soulless world, such as the Prophet (PBUH), and the religion of Islam transformed the world. He called this revitalisation of the world "the Modern Islamic Civilization." The attempt to overthrow a modern civilisation also oversees the "Nature," the aforementioned natural covenants and the appropriateness of the becoming principle. Suppose, in the opinion of Ayatollah Khamenei, foreign policy should be wise and practical and, of course, pursue the dignity of his country and nation from a revolutionary position (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 47). In that case, this also means observing the requirements of Islamic civilisation. Wisdom is a vehicle for educating the people of the country and teaching them how to face the world; according to civilisation, one must be a teacher of communication, perseverance and resistance; in this case, such a foreign policy can be called a wise-civilizational foreign policy. Incitement to war, terrorism, killing, genocide and exploitation, which have overshadowed the global space today, regarding the policies of the world domination system and its target, the United States, caused the spread of insecurity and the spread of war and other fears. According to its implications, the model of Islamic-wisdom foreign policy, in which the denial of oppression and cruel-accepting is the most important, must confront such a situation. This confrontation, of course, should not be based on a purely negative aspect but should create a positive plan. Regarding the world's prevailing situation and oppression, any attempt to confront this situation, despite the many beneficiaries and defenders, has many consequences, including inciting hatred and enmity. These enmities and animosities have contained the country's hidden and obvious areas. Hence, the keyword "Enemy" is frequently repeated in Ayatollah Khamenei's statements. The Islamic Revolution, concerning its nature, cannot ignore the norms that created the Revolution because of the necessity of wisdom, natural covenant, and excellence and becoming. While the international situation, the country and the foreign policy apparatus are called upon to ignore these norms. Supporting the world's oppressed and helping them have been the plans of the Islamic Revolution. Today, it appeared in the compassion for the Palestinian, Yemen and Bahrain people, etc., the effort to free them from the cruel, while the system of domination does not act such. According to wisdom-civilizational foreign policy, the country's basic principles should

not be abandoned regarding the implications of "Wisdom," and we should not be "Committed" to the enemy. Because allegiance to the enemy is the gateway to all the damage done to a country. Then, according to the necessities of civilisation, we should make Iran a model not only for the Islamic world and Muslim nations but for humanity (Statements. Khamenei, 2016 AD 1395 SH). Today's world is a world of negation of the "Other" and the separation of the world into irreconcilable poles. This system of polarisation ultimately preserves and legitimises the interests of the United States and other hegemons. The area of development-underdevelopment is one of the areas in which the theory of wisdom-civilizational policy can be tested. Following modernisation, the world was divided into developed and undeveloped poles. Consequently, the world is divided into the three-dimensional: the "First World," "Second World", and "Third World." 'Can anyone refute the assumption that the reason for the mentioned divisions is a non-wisdom view and a theoretical dissolution in the world domination system that studies and monitors countries in the duality of center and environs?' Wisdom-civilizational foreign policy theory cannot be compatible with such a classification. Because this attitude denies the "Human Dignity," both inherent and acquired dignity, which was previously stated as an essential part of Islamic man and even rational man.

#### **4. Development of a Naturalistic Foreign Policy with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Level of the Islamic Revolution Second Phase**

From the beginning and according to the teachings of its founder, the Islamic Revolution of Iran just wanted to return to the nature of human beings. Because this nature contains common human heritage and comprises the emergence of intersubjective concepts in human beings. According to Imam Khomeini, nature is unveiled in its essence and truth. While having a great position, man is an example of being God almighty; his nature will necessarily be good and seeks perfection. Among the rules of nature, seeking perfection is in the first place. The six laws of nature are: "Acceptance of the existence origin and absolute perfection; acceptance of monotheism, accepting God attributes, respecting God, acceptance of prophecy and the book of guidance, acceptance of resurrection (Tabatabaei, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 165-170). All of the above rulings contain the characteristics and implications of realistic and nature-oriented diplomacy. The human soul, who instinctively seeks the highest perfection, is afflicted with oppression wherever he is in the world.

(The first command); is considered a violation of the law of God, and



according to verse 279 of Surah al-Baqarah has condemned all kinds of cruel: "لَا تَطْلُبُونَ وَلَا تُظَلَّمُونَ" (Second command); divinity is one of God's characteristics. Any non-aligned event is incompatible with this attribute. (Third command); any disobedience to the divine system, based on justice and fairness, is considered God's ingratitude. (Fourth command); organises his affairs according to the Book of God and the teachings of his Prophet. (Fifth command); believes that all his deeds and actions will be judged in the heavenly court, and he will always be in the presence of God. Because according to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli: "Man is facing God due to inherent poverty; and according to such a perspective in transcendent wisdom, which is directly related to human nature, explains power and politics as immigrants and travellers. Inevitably, man's need for comprehensive and eternal knowledge and laws in providing his material and spiritual needs, which arise from the trinity of creation, the general movement of the world, and the modern nature of man, becomes essential." (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 74; Javadi Amoli, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 104)

All human beings in all parts of the world are endowed with such a nature. However, at present, the veils of integrated politics and language have confronted nature with obstacles in objective areas. (Sixth command); these obstacles are due to individual, ethnic and sensual affiliations. Humans' instinct of a desire and tendency does not require being equally active in all human beings and circumstances, and its objective effects are visible. Contexts influence the emergence of natural consequences. Therefore, different living conditions are effective in their strength, weakness, increase and decrease (Rabbani Golpayegani, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 146).

Hence, the soul requires training and should be guided by its activity to its sources. Allameh Tabatabaei in *al-Mizan* explains the relationship between nature and education using the concepts of formative guidance and legislative guidance. Guidance has two types: innate or constructive guidance and legislative and verbal guidance. God created man equipped with inspiration to recognise the belief in truth and righteous deeds. However, God Almighty sends prophets and messengers, reveals books and establishes laws to guide him in word and language (Verbal, linguistic and legislative guidance) (Tabatabaei, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 20/196-197). Accordingly, the Islamic Revolution created an Islamic government that considered education its mission, as Imam Khomeini declared the Islamic government a government based on Islamic law. The divine laws oblige Muslims to defend the oppressed of the world, and the Islamic Republic,

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as a revolution founded on these laws, is no exception to this general rule. Foreign policy, like other areas of human activity, without notice of the humanity's basic principles, or in other words, human beings are not observed in it, cannot provide the basis for human development, which is one of the main concerns of the founder of the Islamic Revolution. But the State Department's current organisational chart is so structured that Togolese implicitly endorses the global graded system, which is the basis of domination and the prevention of the crystallisation of the "Killing minds." In this organisational chart, the revolution, whose mission was to stand up to arrogance, should not oppose the division of the world into three poles: the First World (Europe and the United States), the Second World (Asia, Oceania, and the Commonwealth) and the Third World (Arab countries and African); and even include it in the organisational chart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the world is in crisis regarding such systems, but according to the existential implications, it can be said that the world movement will not always be like this. Eventually, all forms of domination and oppression will be eliminated, and civilizational-wisdom foreign policy seeks to unite with this recent trend. This problem is proposed that such a statement in the direction of the world's perfectionist movement, though realistic, is abstract and is not accurate. In response to this problem, it must be said that the previous proposition is supported by the constraints that govern the process of world projects. What is more, the project processes of the world (in the sense of globalisation) are faced with severe problems, contradictions and deadlocks. In other words, 'Why is the process of globalisation (globalisation or Americanization) now facing "Reverse Globalization" reactions?' Hence, we can name dozens of social movements in the West and the United States, Europe, and Russia that represent the centrifugal identities of power, Central America and Central Europe. The paradoxical question but positive is, 'By what explanation should environmentalist movements, social uprisings and Wall Street, family revival movements, etc., be identified?' It won't be complete if our foreign policy does not sympathise with such dignified, anti-domination and centrifugal movements. Therefore, in line with the sympathy of foreign policy with the crystallisation of the death of minds ordered by Amir al-Mu'menin Ali (AS) and the elimination of arrogance in international affairs and the domination system, a similar model can be proposed for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Revolution second phase, -in addition to proposals such as "Renaming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, creating an economic

deputy with four administrations in the fields of technology, energy, trade and commerce and international economic organisations, coordinating and directing mega projects Internationally and globally, the restructuring of the Foreign Relations Coordination Council with a focus on the export of technical and engineering services and trade goods, the establishment of the Office of International Technical Cooperation, the rule of Jihadi, brave, serviceable, tireless, young and revolutionary management in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." (Secretariat of the Strategic Council of the Teachers' Basij Organization, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 39).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic currently has five deputies: Legal and International Deputy, Economic Diplomacy Deputy, Political Deputy, Consular, Parliamentary and Iranians Expatriate Deputy, Administrative and Financial Deputy, and two Centers of Public Diplomacy and Political and International Studies. Apart from what is ordinary and necessary for any such institution in any part of the world, it should also pay attention to the following missions in its structure, whether in terms of establishment or integration:

| <b>Row</b> | <b>Subjects</b>   | <b>missions</b>   |
|------------|---|---|
| <b>1</b>   | <b>Religions, Cultures and Civilizations</b><br>(In interaction with the Organization of Islamic Culture and Communication) | Laying the groundwork for religious dialogue and relations between civilisations, strategic world studies, coordination of ethnicities, cultures and habitats, and coordination of followers of world religions   |
| <b>2</b>   | <b>Innateness (nature), Justice and World Peace</b>   | Creating the basis for global coordination against monopolies such as vetoes, the codification of innate human rights, the spread of justice, morality and world peace, the identification of natural capacities and the formulation and dissemination of ingrained policies on the world stage |

| <b>Table 1: Missions of the Revolutionary Foreign Affairs Ministry</b> |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| <b>Row</b>   | <b>Subjects</b>                                | <b>missions</b>   |
| <b>3</b>   | <b>Islamic causes and liberation movements</b> | International coordination of Hajj, Arbaeen and liberation of Holy Aqsa, studies and support of liberation movements and analyses of the awakening of Muslim nations and Islamic causes   |
| <b>4</b>   | <b>Passive defense</b>                         | Sensitivity to ultramodern diplomatic infiltration, protection of national interests in global relations and international organisations, coordination of counter-terrorism and postmodern warfare, anti-sanctions diplomacy with the formation of the Assembly of Western-sanctioned countries and their unification   |
| <b>5</b>   | <b>Public diplomacy and global invitation</b>  | By laying the groundwork for the dissemination of guiding-instructional diplomacy based on the legacy of the invitational letter of Imam Khomeini to Gorbachev, organizing public resources and using the capacity of NGOs and non-governmental facilities to advance foreign policy, combating Western and Eastern fundamentalism and sectarian and religious extremism, and the coordination of global demands for the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction |

| <b>Row</b> | <b>Subjects</b>  | <b>missions</b>   |
|------------|--|---|
| <b>6</b>   | <b>Administrative, financial, legal and consular areas</b> | Supporting citizens and socio-human capital and the dignity of Iranians abroad  |
| <b>7</b>   | <b>Economic diplomacy</b>                                  | Contributing to the resistance economy, advancing human development and economic exchanges with the countries of the world -especially Iran's neighbours-, identifying the economic advantages of Iran and the world, assisting Iranian investments abroad and attracting foreign capital |

In the above-proposed model, the subjects of "Religions, Cultures and Civilizations," "Nature, Justice and World Peace," and "Public Diplomacy and Global Invitation" are highlighted in observing the brotherhood aspect. That Islamic foreign policy should have them, and the Organization of Islamic Culture and Communication capacities should also be considered. Although this organisation is not in the country's current political structure within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff deputies, its existential philosophy, which observes its place in the invitational diplomacy, cannot be ignored. The above subjects have been formulated according to the wise part of foreign policy. Ayatollah Khamenei acknowledges: "The health of the human upbringing environment means that human beings treat their God, their inner self, their fellow human beings, and the nature around them in peace and health. Peace in this general sense is one of the greatest human needs for growth, excellence and salvation." (Statements. Khamenei, 2000 AD/ 1379 SH)

World peace depends on man's harmony with nature and with his fellow human beings, and such peace is a prerequisite for human excellence. Here the fulfilment of "Peace" is tied to the "Nature" and perfection of humans.

According to this model and style, foreign policy should be organised to be a guardian of peace and a "Naturalist." Harmony with nature, kindness and striving for existential excellence are among the wisdom implications of Islamic thought. Therefore, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which want to be a model for Islamic civilisation in other parts of the

world, must consider an organisational mechanism to move forward in these directions. In the same model, the three subjects of "Islamic Movements and Liberation Movements," "Passive Defense," and "Economic and Human Development" have been defined and predicted to observe the civilised aspect of the theory of wisdom-civilizational foreign policy. Paying attention to practical wisdom in writing and producing foreign policy is an international decision, so it is essential to know that the Islamic Revolution is a beacon of hope in the hearts of the oppressed of the world. In this regard, while paying attention to the domestic and identity-based national interests, it must support the movements that have risen for human freedom and dignity and confront the Arrogance front. Since the actuality of the Islamic Revolution in conjunction with the creation organisation, the nature and necessity of formal resistance are becoming oriented. It's ideal is appropriate to wisdom, and wisdom, inherently and acquired, guarantees human dignity and human beings; it cannot be careless to macro and civilised organisations.

### **Conclusion**

"Wisdom Themes," "Instructional Diplomacy," and "Educational Policy" are necessary for the structural transformation of the Foreign Ministry in the leaders' thoughts on the Islamic Revolution. In his historical letter to Gorbachev, Imam Khomeini states: "Mr Gorbachev: We must come to the truth. The main problem of your country is not the property, economy and freedom, rather is the lack of real belief in God, the same problem that has led or will lead the West to vulgarity and impasse. Your main problem is the long and futile struggle with God and the origin of existence and creation." (Musavi Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 21/221)

If we look at the date of this letter again, a point is noteworthy. During this period, the country was in a highly complex situation during the global events. The devastation caused by the imposed war eliminated many civil and productive infrastructures of the country. With all these descriptions and at such a moment, the revolution's leader considers himself responsible for the fate of the people beyond the borders of Iran and guides them to the divine path. This subject is derived from the Imam's belief in the God-seeking nature of all human beings. In this letter, the foundations of such an idea are explicitly stated: "Man in his nature wants every perfection absolutely, and you know very well that man wants to be the absolute power of the world and has no desire for any imperfect power." (Musavi Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 21/221)

Also, this letter is referred to thinkers such as Farabi, Ibn Sina and

Suhrawardi. The existence of such names in a diplomatic note seems very strange. But the Imam implicitly advises Gorbachev not to see man as a simple being whose needs are summed up in the material world. Instead, man is a composite being in the transcendent thought and in the words of the Imam, which is composed of material, spiritual, physical and spiritual dimensions. Therefore, every lifestyle must consider all these dimensions. In foreign policy, traditionally, the concept of power and its mechanisms have importance, and this belief is evident in the dominant discourses in this field; attention is not paid to the spiritual dimensions of man. Accordingly, one of the most fundamental components that naturalist thought introduces in the foreign policy area is to require it to consider all human measurements -and not just his material calculating, which seeks the greatest interests of himself and his government- a foreign policy that does not respect the man and his inherent dignity, in addition to paying attention to his worldly needs, does not at the same time consider his transcendence, has no place in real thought. Only if foreign policy takes a step in the path of innateness will it lead to human excellence. Speaking of innate is very vague in a foreign policy that thinks only of material interests and has organised all its infrastructures and structures to achieve these interests. It may be considered an ill-considered word in the field of international relations. Still, by contemplating the foundations of the thought of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, it can be seen that this is a definite way to free humanity from the present predicament in which overt and covert wars and economic turmoil have prevailed over all parts of the world, the path of human innate, human dignity and true excellence. The necessity of economic assistance does not mean generating income and trade but ground-making for the domestic economy. The spirit of this system should be religious and cultural, not tend or be reduced to a merchant economy and the pursuit of purely material interests. The economic deputy must move around religion, and culture, humanising and moralising the economy and human-centred and virtuous-oriented development, not commercialism, in regional and global relations, because the current world economy is not related to and is destroying the morality and spiritual heritage of humanity. The meaning of the title of human development in the proposed economic deputy is to pay attention to this important matter. If the Islamic Republic, in the form of a nation-state system, inevitably has customary limitations, the Islamic Revolution, with its trans-racial and trans-sectarian explanations and spiritual interpretation of man and the world, created and brought the great potential for the Islamic Republic. Bush's "New World Order" theories, Huntington's "War of Civilizations," and Fukuyama's "Historical

End" theories sought to distribute and dominate liberal values and communist explanations outside the territorial state and the nation-state system. This fact is quite obvious by looking at the structure of the US State Department. The structure of the regime's foreign ministry is, first, based on "Secular Ontology" and "Faustian Man," then "Global," third, "Ideological," and finally, loyal to "Capitalism" and "Liberal Values." The US regime has a single semantic chain and network from classical domination to globalisation. If the secular bureaucrats have the opportunity, they will try to take the Islamic Republic of Iran out of its nature and identity.

The emphasis of this writing is on the constant reference to the thought of the Islamic Revolution, the capacities of the constitution and the state of the world on the verge of a historical turning point, for the people of national and revolutionary thought and the faithful, revolutionary, knowledgeable and skilful youth to present a structure and model mixed with revolutionary rationality and spirituality, under the indigenous model of progress, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran in the second step of the revolution. An example of the suggestions in the direction of "Jihad of Clarification" was presented in this article, and the expectation from the thirteenth administration is sensitivity, attention, listening, measuring and operationalising these types of matters.

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# Analysis and Examination of the Monotheistic Society Characteristics in the Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei

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## Abstract

Monotheistic society reflects the economic and political dimensions derived from the cultural-epistemological measurements from monotheism's social and objective interpretation. It was a response to the lack of research on the social characteristics of Islamic monotheism, which was emphasized and analyzed by often contemporary Muslim thinkers and reformers in the context of the military and intellectual domination and invasion of foreign colonialism and the deviation and decline of Islamic societies. Ayatollah Khamenei (1318 SH) is one of these thinkers who addressed this concept with his approach before the Islamic Revolution. The present study aimed to pay this concept in his thought. The present study is divided into three sections. Its methods are library, documentary, explanatory, and analytical. In the first part, the epistemological and theoretical characteristics, in the second, the economic dimensions and in the third part, the political attributes of the monotheistic society in his thought are discussed. The first part analyzed concepts such as the high importance of monotheism in Islamic thought, monotheistic worldview and ontology, and Islamic monotheistic ideology. The second part proposed a society without monotheistic class differences, economic justice, and poverty and inequality in a monotheistic community and techniques to achieve this goal. The third part explained the role of monotheism in human freedom, denying non-divine governments and proving Islamic rule, the role and position of the ruler and the people in the monotheistic political system and foreign policy in a monotheistic society in Ayatollah Khamenei's thought.

**Keywords:** Monotheism, Monotheistic Society, Monotheistic Culture, Monotheistic Economy, Monotheistic Politics, Ayatollah Khamenei.

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### Introduction

From the beginning of its emergence in human life, Islam has made changes in the minds, beliefs and souls and subsequently the deeds, interests and heads of habits and patterns governing the behaviour and individual and social actions of its intended and desired societies. This religion went beyond the realm of mere mental relations and also regarded the realm of social relations. Therefore, as soon as expressing Islamic concepts and principles, it followed its objective and practical extension in society. "Monotheism" is the most fundamental principle of Islam (Karimi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 19-20). Monotheism has different definitions from the theological view and jurists, theologians, philosophers and mystics of other Islamic sects and religions. It is divided into intrinsic monotheism, attribute monotheism, verbal monotheism, devotional (Muhammadi Reyshahri, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 5, 419), divine, holy, and governance monotheism. Of course, the present study does not aim to address these concepts. Instead, it expresses an objective, "Social" and more recent and contemporary subjects that seek to revive and rebuild itself based on the time requirements, during a purposeful and deliberate return to the religious texts and papers of the early Islam, free from the interventions of various currents and tendencies throughout history. This concept is "Monotheistic Society" and the different characteristics and aspects in the heart of its arteries. The idea of a monotheistic society (in its modern form) is infiltrated by the "Social Interpretation" of Islamic sources. Tendencies that followed the domination and foreign domination of Islamic countries or alien colonization on the one hand and the decline, deviation, corruption and stagnation and internal deprivation of Islamic societies, on the other hand, emerged among the "Reformers" and predominantly Muslim thinkers. It brought various practical changes in society (cf. Bouzari Nejad, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 347-352).

This concept was introduced many times in the contemporary era, especially in the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution of Iran by theorists and thinkers related to different sects (but with different meanings and examples). It was the basis for many theoretical and practical disputes between political and intellectual groups. From about a decade after the Islamic Revolution, i.e., after the end of the imposed war (Iraq's eight-year war against Iran) and the beginning of the so-called construction period in the fifth and sixth governments of the Islamic Republic, the concept of Monotheistic society has been marginalized in the discourse of most governments.

Contemporary Muslim thinkers who have argued this issue with different and sometimes contradictory approaches are Motahari (in the Monotheism

and the Monotheistic Worldview), Beheshti (in the Truth and Falsehood according to the Qur'an), Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Sadr (in al-Madrassa al-Quraniyyah and the Traditions of History in the Qur'an), Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati. In addition to the fundamentalist scholars mentioned above, some eclectic and deviant movements tried to use these concepts, like the Monafiqin and Forqan. But their views were based on Marxist and socialist opinions rather than on Islamic principles. Consequently, the ideas of Muslim thinkers about monotheism, social monotheism and monotheistic society conflicted with their thoughts and ideas.

Ayatollah Khamenei is a thinker who, with his approach and interpretation in the years before the revolution and after it and even now, in written and unwritten works and lectures, spoke abundantly about this concept and its various aspects. Of course, with all their emphatic and influential statements and clarifications in this field, studies and researches to explain the multiple dimensions of this concept by researchers are few and even absent. Undoubtedly, scholars' lack of analysis of this concept, despite the passage of four decades since the Islamic Revolution and their great emphasis on it, highlights the need to address various aspects of this "Issue," especially in his thought. It is the "Issue" that the present study aimed to do. 'What is meant by a monotheistic society in general?' According to the definition of "Monotheism" by Ayatollah Khamenei (which will be determined in future sections) and some sociologists such as Bruce Cohen and Joel M. Charon (Cohen, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 348 -349; Charon, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 72-73) can be briefly stated that: "Monotheistic society in this study means a social organization that has "Ideas," "Theoretical Foundations," "Epistemological" and "Cultural" aspects, and consequently "Symbolic Interactions," "Laws," "Economic" and "Political" and "Social" relations governing its people based on the concept of pure Islamic monotheism organized and expanded and implemented. Therefore, the monotheistic society has cultural-epistemological features and dimensions and consequently economic and political features. In this article, these dimensions and features are investigated in the thought of Ayatollah Khamenei. It is necessary to pay attention that the cultural-epistemological dimensions of the monotheistic society are of particular importance in Ayatollah Khamenei's opinion. These are the cultural-epistemological dimensions that should be reflected in economic and political relations."

### 1. Research Questions

Every scientific research has primary and secondary questions that must be answered during the study. As specified in the title and explained in the

introduction, the central question of this research is:

- How are the various characteristics and dimensions of a monotheistic society defined and analyzed in Ayatollah Khamenei's thought?

Sub-questions arising from the central question of the article also include:

1) How are the characteristics and cultural-epistemological dimensions of a monotheistic society (monotheism and monotheistic culture, monotheistic worldview and ontology, monotheistic ideology) explained and analyzed in Ayatollah Khamenei's thought?

2) How are the economic characteristics and dimensions of a monotheistic society defined and analyzed in his mind?

3) How are the characteristics and political dimensions of a monotheistic society analyzed in his thought?

## **2. Research Method**

This research has used explanatory, descriptive and analytical methods, and the data collection technique is library and documentary. First, all the data of Ayatollah Khamenei's written (books) and non-written (statements, speeches, etc.) documents are extracted based on the research questions. Then, the data are divided into three sections: Characteristics and cultural-epistemological dimensions: Worldview and ideology; features and economic dimensions: resolving class differences, creating fair and justice, etc.; elements and political dimensions: Human freedom, the denial of non-divine governments, etc., are analyzed and explained, and will answer the questions of the article.

## **3. Cultural-epistemological Characteristics and Dimensions**

Sociologists have offered various and sometimes contradictory definitions of the concept of culture. If we want to emphasize a general, comprehensive, often accepted definition of this concept and show its homogeneity and overlap with epistemological matters (values, norms, beliefs, worldviews, ideologies, etc.), we should refer to an important point. In other words, a particular culture in its intangible aspects includes ideas, values, norms, thoughts and imagines that are important and desirable for the members of society. They give meaning to their social world interactions and embody the rules of their social behaviour, and intangible aspects also include individual and social actions and deeds (Giddens, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 35). In this sense, cultural-epistemological characteristics represent monotheistic culture and thought and worldview, monotheistic values, ideology, and

norms. The quality of a monotheistic society's economic and political dimensions depends on its dimensions and cultural-epistemological characteristics in Ayatollah Khamenei's thought.

### 3.1. The High Importance of Monotheism in Islamic Thought

In Ayatollah Khamenei's view, "Monotheism" and monotheistic culture have a high rank and importance in Islamic thought. The significance that none of Islam's principles, beliefs, teachings, and practices reach. Because all of them derived from monotheism and turn to it, and monotheism is current in all Islamic pillars: "Monotheism is part of the worldview of Islam and the constructive life-giving ideology of Islam. In addition, monotheism manifests itself in each of the sub-rules of Islam. Wherever you see a ruling and law and order in the name of religion in which monotheism falters, there is anti-monotheism in it, and there is no monotheism in it, know that this is not from Islam" (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 143).

Therefore, in his view, monotheism and monotheistic culture have a far-reaching influence and inclusion and include various theoretical and practical areas of the worldly and religious life of the Muslim individual and the religious community. Hence, the concept of monotheism is "the First and Last Word of Islam" (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 3) and the primary root and cornerstone of all the foundations of religion (ibid., 19). Therefore, he also criticizes the approach that views monotheism as a purely subjective, ideological, philosophical and abstract theory and writes about its objective and practical dimensions: "Monotheism, contrary to popular belief, which is merely a philosophical and subjective theory, is an underlying theory of man and the world, as well as a social, economic, and political doctrine. Among religious and non-religious words, few words can be found that is so full of revolutionary and constructive concepts and refer to various aspects of human social life" (ibid., 5).

Elsewhere, he explicitly states that the purpose and goal of the "Belief in Monotheism" is to create a "Monotheistic Society" and says that: "Belief in monotheism means creating a "Monotheistic Society." A society formed and governed based on "Monotheism;" the belief in monotheism is this; otherwise, there would be no enmity with the prophets" (Khamenei statements. Meeting of students of seminaries in Tehran province, 1396/06/06).

On the other hand, monotheism has a literal and an idiomatic meaning based on his vision. The literal meaning, which most Muslims and monotheists accept, is "Unification." In other words, monotheism is from root of "Unity," meaning "Being One." But its literal meaning, which is

apparent and derived from the same literal sense, is: turning the various and numerous gods into one God, uniting the polytheists and turn a "non-Monotheistic Society" into a "Monotheistic Society." The means of monotheism has very importance in his attitude and includes commitment and enormous weight (Khamenei, 2018 AD / 1397 SH: 226-227).

### **3.2. Monotheistic Worldview and Ontology**

Worldview and ontology are the most critical aspects of culture and cultural-epistemological values in a society. In Khamenei works and writings, there are divisions and branches derived from the concept of monotheism. The most important divisions are "Islamic Monotheistic Worldview" and "Islamic Monotheistic Ideology." He believes that to know any school of belief, thought, philosophy and culture, including material and spiritual schools, one must pay attention to its "Basic Principles." These doctrinal principles begin with "Worldview" and ontology and then end with "Ideology" and "Minor sub-Rules." (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 737)

In his view, in the general culture of a monotheistic society, a monotheistic worldview has several fundamental features. These are 1) The unity and integrity of the whole world and the kinship of all its components and elements; 2) The purposefulness of creation and the calculation and discipline of the calculated world and the existence of meaning and spirit in the individual of its components; 3) The obedience of all the objects and elements of the universe to God (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 5-7). By accepting and surrendering to Him, God, all gods and material powers are rejected and violated. Gods and deities who are not merely worldly idols but can be made of wood and stone etc., that is, inanimate and alive.

In Ayatollah Khamenei's monotheistic Islamic culture and worldview, obedience to other than God, as well as non-divine and anti-divine powers, is considered "Polytheism." (cf. Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 180 and 186-185; Khamenei. Statements in the fourth meeting of strategic ideas on the subject of freedom, 2012/08/23) He emphasized the two dimensions of "Monopoly Divinity," i.e., the absolute monopoly of the legislation and "Canonisation" to God, who has the genesis of the universe, and "Monopoly Lordship," i.e., the total trust of ruling over the Almighty God. He does not allow obedience except to those God Himself has determined to be the executors of divine commands and decrees (Khamenei, 2018 AD/ 1397 SH: 173-174).

This view of the cultural-epistemological dimensions of monotheism and consequently the monotheistic worldview leads to a concept called "Governing Monotheism." In case of its practical extension in social objects, it establishes the theoretical foundations and obstacles of "Islamic



Government." As Ayatollah Khamenei, in many cases, introduces the basis and backbone of the Islamic system and government "Monotheism" and "Obedience to God." (Khamenei statements. Meeting of Experts Assembly members, 1388/12/06; Khamenei statements. Meeting of Zanzan students, 1382/07/22) He believes that: "Monotheism is the main pillar of the vision and view based on which we want to launch this government, system and movement." (Khamenei statements. Meeting of regime agents, 1379/09/12) We will discuss in more detail in future sections.

### **3.3. Islamic Monotheistic Ideology**

In Ayatollah Khamenei's view, Monotheistic ideology is those practical instructions and commands that a monotheist Muslim who believes in a deep and correct monotheistic worldview must believe in and commit and fulfil it in the objective realm of the society for "de-Polytheism" from all spheres of existence. So, monotheistic ideology is a part of the monotheistic culture and the manifestation of norms and rules governing the behaviours of the monotheist individual and society. According to Ayatollah Khamenei's thoughts, the monotheistic faith and worldview without ideology, norm and practice in human organs, human orientation, choices and political, social and economic equations around man do not affect his existential, social, or social, worldly and otherworldly destiny. This man is not a true believer (cf. Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 49-50, 176 and 226).

Based on this view, the incomplete and incorrect understanding of monotheism and monotheistic culture and the lack of connection between monotheistic worldview and monotheistic ideology and practice caused the fulfilment of the social destiny of disorder in Islamic societies. As a result, it has led them to slavery, colonialism-accepting, weakness, humiliation, slavery and servitude to ungodly powers. Some mistakenly attribute such a self-inflicted fate to Islam and monotheism. Regarding the above mentioned with more accuracy, it is not valid. Instead, man and consequently the monotheist Muslim community who believes in and is committed to the correct and comprehensive Islamic monotheistic worldview is a human being and a society that does not accept any of the aforementioned restrictions and does not bow down except in front of the oneness of God.

### **4. Economic Characteristics and Dimensions**

Expressing the cultural-epistemological dimensions of monotheism in the concept of monotheistic worldview and ideology to explain this concept's social, economic, and political dimensions was proposed as the "Monotheistic

Society." The cultural-epistemological foundations of monotheism are the foundation of a monotheistic society and system. In the following, we will discuss the economic and political relations field prevailing in the heart and context of a monotheistic community.

#### 4.1. A Monotheistic Society, A Society without Class Differences

Regarding the role of monotheistic culture or, in other words, theoretical and epistemological monotheism in building economic monotheism in a monotheistic society, Ayatollah Khamenei believes that: "When the spirit of monotheistic culture and worldview enters the body of a society, it must change this social body and form in all economic dimensions. In other words, theoretical mental, cultural, and epistemological monotheism leads to objective and economic class monotheism<sup>1</sup>. If we believe culturally-epistemologically and ontologically that God is unique, we must also be economically different from those who believe in two or three gods. This difference, willingly or unwillingly, penetrates our economic relations, consciously or unconsciously, and destroys class differences" (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 191; Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 216-217). He defines class differences as follows:

"What is the class difference? It means that the people who live in this society are not the same. Some are doomed to suffer deprivation and serve other groups, and they should not complain about this deprivation and suffering. Some people should also have, benefit, have the pleasure and enjoyment of life, be able to enjoy all the benefits and have no problem" (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 210).

He points to the fundamental and actual role of monotheism and monotheistic culture and worldview (as defined in the preceding sections) in the negation of class differences in society. He believes that in a monotheistic community that believes in a monotheistic culture and worldview, "Class Differences" and "Discrimination" are meaningless, up and down are meaningless. In this society, "You are all of Adam and Adam is of dust"<sup>2</sup> is established; aristocracy and non-aristocracy have no meaning. People's enjoyments are not very different; they are all on the same level and have the same rights and benefits; some are not slaves to others

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1. It should be noted that the concept and meaning that he introduces from the classes is including economic classes. That is, it includes all economic, political, social, etc., classes, but in this section, according to the discussion, we rely more on economic dimensions and enumerate economic classes.

2. Referring to the noble hadith of the Holy Prophet (PBUH): "يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّ رَبَّكُمْ وَاحِدٌ وَإِنَّ أَبَاءَكُمْ وَاحِدٌ كُلُّكُمْ لِأَدَمَ وَ أَدَمٌ مِنْ تُرَابٍ" (Nahj al-Fasaha: 675): O people, your Lord is one and your Father is one, you are all of Adam and Adam is of dust.

(Khamenei statements. Community of pilgrims and neighbours of the holy shrine of Razavi, 1387/01/01). This society should not rule different gods and goddesses, and there should be no economic exploitation. Emperors, kings, tyrants, and great capitalists should not dominate the people, rule over them, milk them, and suck their blood. Divide the masses into sects and classes by creating veils and profound and significant class differences (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 164-165, 214 and 282-283).

On the other hand, Ayatollah Khamenei called the monotheistic society a "Classless Society" and said in this regard: "A monotheistic society is a classless society in which groups of people are not separated based on the rights and benefits. All human beings live under the same legal roof. Everyone lives and moves in the same direction, with the same facilities and privileges. It is a society that puts monotheism in front of our minds and imaginations according to the social classification [and consequently economic]" (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 210).

In his view, in a monotheistic society the people "Classes" and "Strata" have the same levels regarding the "Legal," "Licit" and "Judicial" enjoyments. In such a way that "Opportunities" and "Possibilities" are distributed "Equally" among all sections of society. Therefore, the word monotheistic society within itself also follows the negation of the class system. So, there is no need to take advantage of a "Monotheistic Classless Society" Marxist and non-Islamic; because the concept of class in the sense that Marxists have is also incorrect in the eyes of Islam. In other words, according to Islam, a monotheistic society is one in which there is no legal distinction between two classes and groups, and everyone enjoys equal opportunities and powers (Khamenei, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 72-75).

#### **4.2. Fair, Economic Justice and the Elimination of Poverty and Inequality in a Monotheistic Society**

Ayatollah Khamenei believes that monotheism and a monotheistic society and the elimination of class differences are meaningless without justice and the establishment of the fair (Khamenei statements. Meeting with Basijis, 1378/09/03). He knows the implementation of "Justice" and "Economic Justice" as the duties of the prophets, governments and monotheistic societies. Referring to verse 25 of Surah al-Hadid<sup>1</sup>, he believes that the prophets' primary mission after forming a monotheistic society is to establish justice and a fair environment in the community (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 308-309). He proposes strategies for creating justice and a monotheistic

١. لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا الْحَدِيدَ فِيهِ بَأْسٌ شَدِيدٌ وَمَنَافِعُ لِلنَّاسِ وَيَعْلَمَ اللَّهُ مَن يَنْصُرُهُ وَرُسُلَهُ بِالْغَيْبِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ.

economy and eliminating class differences in a monotheistic society. These strategies emanate from the heart of monotheistic culture and its components, namely, Islamic monotheistic worldview and ideology. The most important of these solutions are:

#### 4.2.1. Denial of Monopoly and Amass of Wealth

By forbidding and denying the "Monopoly" and "Amass" of wealth in a monotheistic society, he paves the way for presenting Quranic solutions to avoid the problem of poverty and inequality in the body of human society. Referring to the hadith of Imam Ali (AS): " ما رأيت نعمة موفورة إلا وإلى جانبها حق " <sup>1</sup> مضيع he believes that the accumulation and gathering and monopoly of wealth by a specific group of the people, willingly or unwillingly caused to create a class system and increase the weakness and increase deprivation (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 335). In this regard, referring to a part of verses 34 and 35 of Surah al-Tawbah<sup>2</sup>, he refers to the concept of (Kanz) "Treasure," which means amass and consolidation and accumulation of wealth and avoiding spending it in the way of God and the public: "Kanz is absolute collected money that not use for the general public. The symmetry of this meaning is the " وَلَا يَنْفِقُونَهَا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ " in verse, which shows if the literal meaning of the treasury was [just] accumulating money and burying it, the clause " وَلَا يَنْفِقُونَهَا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ " was not useful. It understands that what the Qur'an condemns is lack of almsgiving" (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 227-228).

As a result, in the economic system of the Islamic government and the monotheistic society, measures must be considered to prevent the amass and accumulation of wealth.

#### 4.2.2. Limitation and Control of the Economic Property System

According to Ayatollah Khamenei's view, the ownership of property and assets in Islam, like capitalist systems, is not unlimited and absolute but has limits, conditions and restrictions. Regarding a part of verse 33 of Surah al-Noor,<sup>3</sup> he denies unconditional ownership in the monotheistic worldview and considers property as "God's property." He believes that such money should be spent on eradicating the poverty of the poor and needy (as specified in the Qur'an). He about the "Borrowed" and "Fiduciary" ownership of property and assets in the monotheistic worldview and

1. I did not see any accumulation of wealth or blessings unless I saw the lost right next to it.

٢. وَالَّذِينَ يَكْنِزُونَ الذَّهَبَ وَالْفِضَّةَ وَلَا يَنْفِقُونَهَا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ فَبَشِّرْهُمْ بِعَذَابٍ أَلِيمٍ، يَوْمَ يُحْمَىٰ عَلَيْهَا فِي نَارِ جَهَنَّمَ فَتُكْوَىٰ بِهَا جِبَاهُهُمْ وَجُنُوبُهُمْ وَظُهُورُهُمْ هَذَا مَا كَنَزْتُمْ لِأَنفُسِكُمْ فَذُوقُوا مَا كُنْتُمْ تَكْنِزُونَ.

٣. وَأَتَوْهُمْ مِنْ مَالِ اللَّهِ الَّذِي آتَاكُمْ.

consequently the economic relations branching out from it within the monotheistic society, says: "God is one and not two. It means that all you have of wealth, you and all other human beings, is for God; you are nothing more than "Trustees." Who is ready to monotheist now? " جَعَلَهُ " المال مأل الله، جَعَلَهُ "ودائع عند الناس" God has entrusted wealth to human beings. This [attitude] is a requirement of monotheism" (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 164).

To prove the absolute ownership of God and to deny the absolute and unconditional privilege of man, he concludes that: "The absolute and genuine ownership of all the blessings, reserves, and beings of the world belongs to God. No one owns anything directly and independently. Everything is a "Trust" in human hands" (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 16).

In Ayatollah Khamenei's view, in the economic relations of a monotheistic society, the right of ownership over property and wealth is conditional on fulfilling the obligation and the divine mission, that is, the duties and responsibilities that God has determined. Among them is the creation of fairness and justice and the elimination of poverty, inequality and economy with monotheistic coordinates in society; otherwise, man has no property (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 231-237).

#### 4.2.3. Extensive Attention to "Anfal" and "Infaq"

Other issues, relations and strategies that Ayatollah Khamenei refers to establish justice in a monotheistic society are "Anfal" and "Infaq." In his view, Anfal is a wealth that is "Public" and belongs to the "General Muslims." Wealth such as a specific part of revenues and spoils of war, mines, forests, plains and vast pastures, etc., belong to the whole nation. According to him, the purpose of creating all humanity, based on a monotheistic worldview, is absolute servitude and perfection; and public wealth is a unique tool for this perfection. In a monotheistic society, these riches must be available to all people (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 AD: 234-235). Its divider and distributor is the Prophet (PBUH), Imams (AS) and the righteous ruler (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 47-48).

Referring to verse 134 of Surah Al-Imran<sup>1</sup> and verse 3 of Surah al-Baqarah<sup>2</sup>, he considers man and society pious, believing, Muslim and united when they pay Infaq. In his view, Infaq does not mean the usual spending of money; even mere material and spiritual help to needy people and beggars cannot be called Infaq. Instead, Infaq means filling the gaps and basic needs in a monotheistic society to overthrow the foundations of class divisions and poverty and public inequality. Infaq in this approach is

١. الَّذِينَ يُنْفِقُونَ فِي السَّرَّاءِ وَالضَّرَّاءِ: Those who donate in abundance and poverty

٢. الَّذِينَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِالْغَيْبِ وَيُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنْفِقُونَ.

not limited to the financial and material dimension but includes all measurements. But in the material economic dimension, it means that the monotheist man, based on the Qur'anic and monotheistic approach, must pay attention to the primary economic vacuum and need of the society at present, and based on it, to fill these gaps and real needs pay Infaq (ibid., 39-40 and 58).

#### **4.2.4. Alms and Zakat**

Another of his strategies for establishing fairness and economic justice in a monotheistic society is to adhere to Quranic principles such as Alms and Zakat. He believes that according to the Qur'an, "Financial Charity" is called Alms, and it is divided into obligatory and recommended alms. In his view, obligatory Alms is never summed up in Zakat. Instead, based on the narrations, it includes any property and money that individuals are obliged to pay according to the laws of the Islamic monotheistic society. It must be handed over to the treasury, the Imam or leader of the Islamic community to be distributed in the proposed uses of Quranic verses. The leader and guardian of the Islamic society have full authority over the quality of its division (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 385-386). Another solution, according to him, is Zakat. He considers Zakat as one of the pillars of faith. He believes that no government, social structure and monotheistic society can survive without financial resources, much of which is Zakat (ibid., 487-490). According to Ayatollah Khamenei, Zakat is the absolute Infaq that a Muslim has from his property (Khamenei. Statements in the holy shrine of Razavi, 1394/01/01). Zakat has become obligatory on the nine commodities (i.e., wheat, barley, dates, raisins, gold, silver, camels, cattle, and sheep). It includes all the Infaqs mentioned in the Qur'an and Islam (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 382). According to him, Zakat has two individual and social dimensions. The individual dimension grants "We Love," and it's social and systematic direct is the general and structural effort to eliminate poverty and inequality. Hence, he described Zakat as "the Financial Regulator of Society" and the "Eradicator of Poverty" (Khamenei. message to the first annual prayer meeting in Holy Mashhad, 1370/07/16). Based on Shia hadiths, he knows this act as a factor in achieving high economic income, the balance between classes of society, creating fairness and justice, eliminating economic poverty and finally, the emergence of monotheistic coordinates in the economic dimensions of a monotheistic society (Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 392-393).

### **5. Political Dimensions and Characteristics**

In this section, we pay to the political dimensions and characteristics of the

monotheistic society. We show that in Ayatollah Khamenei's view, the cultural-epistemological dimensions of monotheism (as mentioned before) have the objective effects and manifestations in the political sphere of a monotheistic society.

### 5.1. Monotheism, Human Freedom and the Denial of non-God Worship

In contrast to the false Western freedom, which is rooted in the desires, the low human inclinations based on the paganistic material worldview, Ayatollah Khamenei introduces the root and origin of "Freedom" in Islamic culture the "Monotheistic Worldview." (Khamenei statements. Sermons of Friday prayers in Tehran, 1365/10/19) He says: "Based on the monotheistic worldview, the "First Principle" and fundamental of the "Monotheistic Resolution" in the context of a society's political relations is the decisive and victorious denial of "Servitude" and "Obedience" of non-God. The denial guarantees man's political and social freedoms to an infinite degree - albeit limited to the limits of God and not to His servants. In this view, Prophet quotation: "قولوا لا اله الا الله تفلحوا" (al-A'raf: 65) or "O people, worship Allah, for you have no deity except Him" above all, it emphasizes the denial of the worship of non-God. In other words, in this call, "Divinity" and godliness other than God are denied (Khamenei statements. Meeting of the regime's agents, 02/07/1382; Khamenei. Statements in the meeting of the agents in Hajj, 1388/08/04). In this monotheistic view, all gods are rejected except the great God:

"The denial of deities and idols [also] means the rejection of all those who strive to oppress the people and, by imposing or fooling themselves, ride on the shoulders of human beings and saturate their rebellious instincts and inclinations" (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 30-31).

Therefore, in the view of Ayatollah Khamenei, criminals, non-divine political powers, oppressors of history throughout human history have always been imposed on people under various letters and titles. They oppressed the people for their material interests, tyranny and oppression, enslaved them and tore them apart from their true human freedom. Based on the monotheistic worldview, they have no little place in the context of the monotheistic society and its political relations and are doomed to decay and destruction because:

"The creation of a "Monotheistic society" means "the Exclusive Rule of God" and "Exclusive Obedience to God." Monotheism means the equality of human beings before the Lord of the universe. If a person, a society and a system are based on monotheism, there is no oppression in that system and society" (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 319-320).

## 5.2. The Role of Monotheism in Denying non-Divine Societies and Political Systems and Proving Islamic Rule

Monotheism and monotheistic society in Ayatollah Khamenei's view do not deny the authoritarian and oppressive domination of "Individuals." Instead, it emphasizes the rejection of "Systems" and non-divine political systems and governments. At this point, he explains the "Governing Monotheism" in a monotheistic society and believes that one of the "Worship" meanings based on the Qur'anic culture and the Imams hadiths is "Obedience." Therefore, in a monotheistic society, "Obedience" to powers, laws, political systems, governments, rulers, inclinations, and instincts etc., with any title and name that have a non-God source are a clear example of "Worship" other than God and "Polytheism." (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 178 and 193-196 and 207-208; Khamenei, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 148-149)

After denying political systems and non-Islamic governments in the monotheistic worldview of Islam, Ayatollah Khamenei proves the Islamic government. Using the epistemological foundations of the monotheistic worldview, which we have already discussed in detail, he believes that the main foundation for the theory-making and proving the Islamic government and state is institutionalized in the concept of monotheism and its main slogan and description "لا اله الا الله."

"لا اله الا الله" is not merely a pure belief and mind-matter. It is the source of "Effect" and "Action." The same Islamic state that emerged in Medina is the result of "لا اله الا الله." That is, "Government" is just for God Almighty and God's messengers. [Hence] the Muslim Ummah must return to monotheism" (Khamenei statements. Meeting of officials and ambassadors of Islamic countries, 1397/01/25).

On the other hand, they believe that God has the highest "Expediency" in governing, legislating, ruling and guiding the universe with all its components. Therefore, all matters are related solely and exclusively to the God Almighty. It is only God who is able to design and implement the way of life and the program of communications, interactions and actions of human beings, and that is why:

"Any interference [arbitrarily] by others in determining the path and practical policy of human beings is an encroachment on the realm of divinity and a claim to divinity and causes polytheism" (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 13).

He, about reasons for the rational and Qur'anic proof of divine sovereignty and rule, based on al-Mulk: 1 and Yunus: 32, emphasizes the necessity of giving power of "Legislation" to God. In other words, he believes that in a "Monotheistic Society," to free themselves from the shackles of human



sovereignty and ungodly governments, which as ungodly masters rule political, intellectual, cultural and economic destiny have taken human beings and societies under their tyrannical will and made them slaves to their interests and purposes, "Legislative Rule "is for God that "Formative Rule "carries it (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 184-185).

### 5.3. The Role and Position of the Ruler and the People in the Political System of a Monotheistic Society

As a result, a monotheistic society is a free and non-authoritarian society in which no one has the right to rule except God and those he has determined. According to the thought of Ayatollah Khamenei, the political government formed in a monotheistic society is the ruling of the divine "Law" and not the "Individuals." If individuals are to be considered for government, they have to carry out divine commands and laws in the context of human society. Referring to Al-Baqarah: 213,<sup>1</sup> he concludes that what the Prophet use to judge the people is not the personal opinion and will of the individual who is the "Book." The book in this verse also means divine commands and laws. Therefore, any tyranny of opinion and hypocrisy is rejected in this way and manner. Everyone can comment, criticize and offer solutions in governmental and political affairs as long as it does not contradict the divine laws. Ayatollah Khamenei, referring to the letter 53 of Nahj al-Balaghah, points out that in the political system of a monotheistic society, people without power and wealth and ordinary people in the society should be able to get their legal rights without the fear and anxiety from those in power and wealth, the Islamic government must support them in this (cf. Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 254 and 333-336).

The Islamic community members can order to goodness and prevent evil to each other and those in charge of affairs, thereby creating an atmosphere of political freedom, social responsibility and spreading the ground of criticism, demand, and vulnerability to create justice.

### 5.4. The Principle of Order to Goodness and Prevent Evil: a Symbol and Reflection of Freedom and Socio-Political Responsibility in a Monotheistic Society

Ayatollah Khamenei, based on al-Tawbah: 71,<sup>2</sup> knows the faith sign and one of the aspects of "Freedom" and "Socio-political Responsibility" in the worldview and the monotheistic Islamic society in the principle of "Order to Goodness and Prevent Evil." The code guarantees the "Survival" and

١ . كَانَ النَّاسُ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً قَبَعَتَ اللَّهُ النَّبِيِّينَ مِبَشِّرِينَ وَمُنذِرِينَ وَأَنْزَلَ مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ لِيَحْكُمَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ فِيمَا اخْتَلَفُوا فِيهِ .  
 ٢ . وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَيُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ الزَّكَاةَ وَيَطِيعُونَ  
 اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ أُولَئِكَ سَيَرْحَمُهُمُ اللَّهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ .

permanence of the "Islamic Principles" and the "Revolutionary Spirit" and has a fundamental and apparent conflict with corruption, oppression and injustice. He does not limit this liberating social and political responsibility to ordinary members of society. He believes that this duty is an "Objective Obligation" that all community members, including ordinary people and officials, and members of the caravan and the caravan leader must perform towards each other (cf. Khamenei, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 471-474). He considers the order to goodness and prevent evil, and consequently the freedom of criticism and opinion if it does not collide with deceit, seduction and misguidance, as the factor of survival and preservation of the "Revolutionary State" in society. This state creates the pillars and conditions that guarantee the maintenance of monotheistic thought and belief. He also considers this duty not as anti-security but as a factor in achieving social security (ibid., 478).

Based on the narrations, simultaneously removing social duty from the monotheistic society, corruption, deviation, oppression, tyranny, and injustice remain; all previous sufferings derived from the abandonment of this "Objective Obligation." (ibid., 483)

#### **5. 5. The Quality of Foreign Political Relations in the Political System of a Monotheistic Society**

Ayatollah Khamenei refers explicitly to "Monotheism" and "Unity" about the political relations of the Islamic political system in a monotheistic society. A monotheism causes the development of the central part of the unity between the various Islamic sects and creates conflicts and struggles with the oppressive political powers (Khamenei message. Hajj Congress, 1379/12/12). In this view, the political system of a monotheistic society in the relations with Islamic societies and Ummah should try to move towards the unity of Islamic communities and countries and prevent any differences and divisions in this area (Khamenei. Statement at the closing ceremony of the 18<sup>th</sup> competition of recitation, evidence and interpretation of the Holy Quran, 1380/07/26; ibid., Statement at the meeting of System Agents, 1382/02/29).

On the other hand, the relations of the monotheistic society with "non-Islamic" and "anti-Islamic" states and countries are discussed. He believes in taking decisions to prevent the fulfilment of their province over the Islamic world and subsequent dependence and the destruction of independence. In his view, the very formation of a monotheistic society (in a sense mentioned) creates enemies whose interests, governments, and sovereignty conflict with this society. Because such a society seeks the rule of God and the divine laws, and its enemies seek the command of their lusts and desires. Therefore, he has rejected the view that he believes in living peacefully

and sincerely with everyone. He believes that historical experiences and numerous Qur'anic verses confirm that such a view is impossible in the real world and the realm of practice. The concept of monotheism in its heart, "Total Peace" (i.e., we should peace with all), denies: "The monotheism of total peace, the monotheism that agrees with "Rivals" of God the monotheism that is only an accepted hypothesis in mind, is nothing more than an imitation of the prophets monotheism" (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 20). Thus, the conflict with the dominating and oppressive powers of the international community is the result of such a monotheistic attitude in international relations (Khamenei statements. Meeting of regime officials in the resurrection of the Holy Prophet, 1387/05/09). In his view, unlike the people who believe, there is no attempt to apparent enemy-creating. Instead, speaking of monotheism and a monotheistic society (with its extensive meaning) will create enmity and hostility towards the great tyrants<sup>1</sup> and international hegemony and their dependent and indigenous tyrants (Khamenei statements. Meeting of regime officials and ambassadors of Islamic countries, 1398/01/14). Therefore, monotheism is the cause of this hostility and struggle and the outline of this struggle's generalities, principles, and main lines. Hence, a monotheistic society cannot accept the force and oppression and not stand against the oppressor (Khamenei statements. Meeting of officials and ambassadors of Islamic countries, 1397/01/25).

Of course, he states that this lack of communication with anti-Islamic countries and a regulated and controlled relationship with non-Islamic countries does not mean political, economic, commercial, etc., isolation. Instead, it means the absence of "Vilayat" and "Connection" and the essential connection with them. Otherwise, normal relations with non-Islamic countries have no difference in superiority, power, stability and vigilance in the Islamic society, and its political system has no obstacle (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 429-430).

## Conclusion

The present study aimed to explain and analyze the cultural-epistemological,

1. He considers the Great Taghut the regime of the United States of America and explicitly says in this regard:

"Quran says: *فمن يكفر بالطاغوت و يؤمن بالله فقد استمسك بالعروة الوثقى* (al-Baqarah: 256). This means scratching to *Habl allah* for us. What is it? By believing in God and disbelieving in Taghut. Today, the greatest tyrant in the world is the regime of the United States of America (Khamenei. Statements during the meeting of the participants in the conference of the Islamic Unity Conference, 1385/05/30).

economic and political characteristics of the monotheistic society in the thought of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. A goal has been tried to address to a large extent in the article. What can be deduced from his set of arguments and conclusions, and consequently the decision, is that Islamic monotheism in its deep, pure and straightforward sense is not a mere theological, jurisprudential and philosophical thought. Instead, it was the most fundamental principle of Islam that should have manifested in all cultural-epistemological, economic and political areas of society. By institutionalizing the monotheistic worldview and ideology in the culture and public mind and the implementation of instalments and justice in economic and social relations and the fulfilment of true human freedoms and the rule of God and His Shari'a in political dimensions, its objective reflections in the form of a concept called "Monotheistic Society" has manifested. This way offers the world an ideal example of an Islamic community. Despite the great importance of this concept in the development of social relations of Islamic society, unfortunately, little research is found. One of the primary purposes of this article was to fill the relative gap in this area. Of course, an article's technical and structural limitations can explain. However, what has been claimed and desired by this article is a concise, analytical, specialized, and practical address to the essential features of this society in Ayatollah Khamenei's thought. In the end, we can suggest for future research the explanation of the monotheistic society concept and its various aspects in the minds of other prominent contemporary Muslim thinkers such as Imam Khomeini, Motahhari, Beheshti, Sadr, etc., and consequently new theories in this field according to the requirements of the time and the modern context.

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