In the Name of God

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A Comparative Study of the Social Function of Religion from the Latin American Revolutionary Church and the Social Theology of the Imam Khomeini Movement

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Abstract

Imam Khomeini's reformative movement in the twentieth century with the support of the Iranian awakening is considered the most significant religious revolution of its time. In the face of this spiritual revolution, formed a theological movement in the Latin American region. The struggle against public oppression in Latin American society, social and economic injustice, the exploitation and colonisation of nations by international imperialism were the essential aim of the Latin American Revolutionary Church for its movement. But it failed to implement the goals of its action in establishing social justice and eradicating poverty and oppression in society. The present study primary question is 'What are the commonalities and differences between the Latin American Revolutionary Church and the social theology of the Imam Khomeini movement in the social function of religion?' The hypothesis is the most critical goal of Imam Khomeini's movement is to bring man to true happiness, and the only strategy to achieve it is creating justice in a monotheistic society. Despite aligning with its ultimate goals and operational plans, the Latin American Revolutionary Priests Movement has failed to produce the grounds for a human awakening in the Latin American region due to its disbelief in the expansion of justice in the context of monotheistic society and its school subscription with Marxism and Nationalist parties. Belief in the two components of religious democracy and Vilayat-e Faqih formed a vital strategy called the Islamic Republic for Iranian people that the followers of the Revolutionary Church can fill their vacancy through this strategy. The present study, with a descriptive-analytical method and based on library resources, has been done.

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Introduction

In the twentieth century, with the beginning of forgetting the role of religion in the social arena, a significant change took place in two geographical areas and theological thought, which revived the semi-hidden role of religion in human life. Given the history of the twentieth century in the two geographical areas of Islam and Catholic Christianity, social uprisings and movements were the most critical challenges of governments in dealing with their societies. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Vatican formed the Second Vatican Council. It tried entirely to prevent the passivity and isolation of Christianity among its followers. They knew the reason for Church's teachings isolation among the followers, the Church's passive attitude to the social anomalies of human societies. Thus, the council's final article of association adopted an amended regulation that committed the Catholic Church to do any action to create justice, peace, and human rights (Ferrari, 1969: 10-13).

On the other hand, Imam Khomeini's theological revolution in the mid-twentieth century was closely related to the theological process of Latin American Christian priests. The main similarities between the two movements are restoring social functions in religion and opening a healing prescription to solve human social problems. But the Latin American revolutionary clergy movement has failed and isolated and has been unable to liberate the oppressed nations of the imperialist-dominated continent from cruelty and injustice. The present study aimed to analyse the symmetry and alignment of these two theological movements carefully and find gaps in the intellectual system of Latin American revolutionary priests. And by using Imam Khomeini's thought system to show a successful model of the Islamic Revolution of Iran for the rebellious young priests of Latin America. We are now witnessing the profound interest of the thinkers of the Latin American revolutionary priests in acquainting themselves with the ideological foundations of Imam Khomeini as the leader of the most significant religious movement in modern times. However, the region's poisonous atmosphere of Islamophobia and Iran phobia prevents some Christian thinkers from approaching these principles. This paper can open new horizons in the academic space. The research issue is about the Imam Khomeini movement and its regulations based on social theology. So far, the application of these two issues has not been discussed and researched independently.

1. Conceptology
1.1. Social Function

The function is the Latin root and means task and operation. This concept

in sociology refers to a result that can be expressed and expected theoretically or can be deduced and observed empirically in human societies (Tavassoli, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 216). The social function can be theoretically or empirically and practically appropriate or inappropriate or positive or negative, each of which can be a factor in the society's survival or disruption. Whenever a function answers the basic needs of communities following the social system, it is considered a desirable and appropriate function. And whenever it interferes with the durability and survival of the components or the whole social system, it is called a harmful and inappropriate function (Boudon, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 112). The most important social functions of religion from the perspective of Western religious sociologists are: Creating social solidarity, giving meaning to life, legitimising the ruling system, stimulating a sense of community and social unity and regulating individual behaviour for the good of all, stability and survival of society, creating values and organising plans and organising the seemingly arbitrary nature of the world (Skidmore, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 142). According to the theological views of the Latin American Revolutionary Church and the social theology of Imam Khomeini, we will examine the three social functions of religion comparatively. These functions cause success or disruption in their followers' religious community in the permanence and survival of social movements in their region. These social functions of religion are social and economic justice, reform of human social life, legitimisation of the order in human societies.

1.2. Social Theology

One of Islam's social theology branches explains the doctrinal teachings and theological principles about social issues. Its propositions have direct or indirect consequences on the social dimensions of humans and affect the type of social behaviour and the institutions of society. Therefore, any discussion of the social aspects of prophecy, Imamate, religion, politics, government, faith and its role in community health, etc., put in the scope of social theology (Amin, 2004 AD/1425 AH: 5).

2. Latin American Revolutionary Church

In the second half of the twentieth century, the Vatican formed the Second Vatican Council and tried to prevent the passivity and isolation of Christianity among its followers. According to the council statement, attention to the social functions of religion was necessary to break out of the Catholic Church isolation. The announcement sparked the formation of the Latin American Revolutionary Church in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1967 and spread to other Latin American churches within a year. The turning point

in this theological movement was the Council of Churches in Medellín-Colombia in 1968, which caused the formation of liberating theology in the Catholic Church in Latin America. Most of these theological thought followers are found in the Jesuit Church, including Camilo Torres in Colombia and Pope Francis (the current Pope).

2.1. Revolutionary Church in Latin America - Historical Background - Theological Principles

The emergence of the Latin American Revolutionary Church is rooted in the historical presence of Christianity in that geographical area. In the 11th century, with the Umayyads fall in Andalusia and the Granada conquest and the defeat of the Muslims, formed a unified Catholic government. By exerting his influence in the Vatican, the King of Spain made al-Khandour VI the second pope of Spanish origin (Mojtahedzadeh, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 103). On the other hand, Christopher Columbus, with the help of the Franciscan clergy, could approve his conquest plan to the Catholic King of Spain (Dussel, 2009: 26). Franciscan priests were the first Christian missionaries to arrive in Latin America (Labrado, 1987: 146). The Spanish conquerors in all the conquered lands, by force of bayonet, placed the cross next to the Spanish flag and justified all their conquests by expanding the holy rule of the Pope (Washburn, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 25). The cruel of the region natives caused the Christian bishops to form the first council of Latin American bishops in 1583 AD in Lima, the capital of Peru, with the presence of all the bishops of the Latin American region to confront the oppression of the Spanish conquerors (Mojtahedzadeh, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 188). The formation of this council by Jesuit priests was a turning point in the shape of the Latin American Revolutionary Church. From the beginning, Jesuit missionaries promoted the teachings of the Catholic religion with a revolutionary approach. They put the social policies of faith at the forefront of their work to combat oppression, corruption, poverty and discrimination alleviation based on human dignity (Vilar, 1977: 65). Simultaneously with the failures of the central governments in Latin America, which was affected by the great French Revolution in Europe and the weakening of the Catholic monarchs in Spain (Rooy, 1997: 76), the leaders of the Catholic Church, who saw the isolation of Christianity and Church doctrine in the successive failures in the Latin American region, have no choice but to consult the council to pull the Church out of the abyss of the individual declaration into social doctrine. Therefore, in a historical action, they invited all the leaders of the Catholic Church to attend the second meeting of his church leaders, the Second Vatican Council (Ferrari, 1969: 10-13). The most important influences of the Second

Vatican Council in the Latin American region were the formation of the Latin American Conference and Episcopal Council and the first step in the shape of the Revolutionary Church. In August 1967, eighteen Latin American bishops, led by the Archbishop of Brazil, Helder Camara, convened the first Latin American Council of Priests in Rio (Gheerbrant, 1974: 36). They issued a statement expressing the deplorable state of poverty and social injustice of Third World citizens due to the performance of global imperialism and the world capitalist system in colonising and exploiting nations under the support of ruling governments and the silence of theological institutions systems (ibid.). In September 1967, 270 Argentine priests wrote a letter to the Archbishop of Brazil declaring that the Rio Declaration could establish the Latin American Revolutionary Priests movement for the Third World (Concatti, 1969: 140). The letter was signed by 400 Argentine priests and another 500 Latin American priests at the first meeting of the Third World Revolutionary Priests Movement (MSTR) in May 1968 as an annex to the Rio Declaration (Martín, 1992: 102-115).

Accordingly, regional conferences were held repeatedly in the Latin American region. The most important of these were the two Colombian Medina Conferences and the Puebla Conference, which marked a turning point in shaping the Latin American Revolutionary Church (Concatti, 1969: 76). Such a process led to revolutionary thinking among Latin American priests, a theological thought that considered socio-political liberation its main goal (Granz and Elson, 2007 AD/ 1386 SH: 414).

Due to the prevailing conditions in the region and their claiming spirit and anti-oppression, the followers of the Revolutionary Church have based their revolutionary movement on three important theological principles. They have found all social activities on these three principles.

2.1.1. Contextual Theology

The first theological principle regarding the theologians of the Revolutionary Church is should deeply relate theology to specific social and cultural conditions. Based on the concept of "Sociology," this theology discusses the subject and all its components are associated with the social and cultural environment of specific regions (Gutiérrez, 2004: 75). In their view, theology can be dynamic when social environment cognition production components are limited, whether this cognition is related to the ruling class or the opposite class, a critical class against the ruling class. Hence, awareness can change the related theological components (Gutiérrez, 2006: 140).

In defense of the principle of contextual theology, the theologians of the Revolutionary Church say: "Ecclesiastical theology in Latin America has the right to adopt schools such as Marxism for its theological systems

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and make the necessary changes to adapt them to their environmental context" (Bonino, 1975: 76).

As a result, the theologians of the Latin American Revolutionary Church consider the uniqueness of the context and conditions of their region in comparison with other Christian theological systems is new and innovative (Granz and Elson, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 323-320). Therefore, contextual theology is one of the main issues in the conflict between Latin American theologians and the Vatican Church (Boff, 2013: 86).

2.1.2. The Principle of Liberation and Salvation

According to the theology of the Revolutionary Church, salvation is one of the essential principles and foundations of the church movement for free from oppression. In their view, salvation is the joint function of God and human beings throughout history that drives human relations ultimately to socialised. One of the most critical concerns of this standard practice is that human beings become like "Brothers and Sisters." To eliminate the unjust social system that oppresses and exploits and alienates people; and act to stop oppression using all social tools (Granz and Elson, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 332). According to them, the concept of salvation must be interpreted in terms of political ideas (ibid., 372). True liberation and freedom are regarding the release from the cruel and domination of the colonialists and their ruling collaborators. Freedom is the struggle to create a society based on social justice (Gutiérrez, 2006: 247).

Pope Francis says in his papal statement: "This is the salvation which the Lord hath proclaimed unto us by the Church, unto all men. Through redemption, God has created a way to unite with every human being at all times. But the important thing is that God has decided to call human beings to salvation as a nation, not as a solitary creature. God has considered us in a complex system with personal relations in a social society" (Papa, 2014: 112).

Gustavo Gutierrez believes salvation and redemption are Christianity's fundamental issues and considers Christian theology to reconstruct the teachings of salvation and freedom. He argues that, in the past, the Church has wrongly emphasised the quantity of salvation. It tried to ensure the entrance of many people to heaven, so deliver them. But today, especially in Latin America, salvation must be interpreted qualitatively. That is, it must be seen as a theological commitment to social change because this approach is the only way to confront God truly (Gutiérrez, 1970: 39).

Theologians of the Latin American Revolutionary Church, in contrast to the Vatican, who see emancipation as the inner and individual freedom of human beings, consider freedom as the true freedom of human beings

and personal salvation at the expense of social libration (Gutierrez, 2004: 73).

2.1.3. Preference of the Poor and Love of Neighbors

God's choice in favour of the poor and love of neighbours is one of the essential principles of Catholic theology.

Attention to the poor in the principles and foundations of the revolutionary church theology was a new development in interpreting the scriptures. The monopoly of interpreting the scriptures, especially on poverty, was removed from the elites. The poor, afflicted racial minorities, women, and other dispossessed people could correct the elites' reading of the interpretation and distortion of texts favouring authoritarian regimes and against the oppressed (Concatti, 1969: 35). In the Revolutionary Church theology, attention to the poor and the oppressed is derived from the source of Christian theology in understanding the truth of Christianity and practising it. The Church is obliged to support the needy in human society. Because, God has unequivocally endowed the poor, all Christian principles and missions must begin with healing the pain and suffering of the poor and deprived (Núñez Bustillos, 2019: 124-137).

In his papal proclamation, Pope Francis considers the attention to the poor as the most crucial social element of Christian evangelism. He emphasises that attention to the poor is not just paying attention to the word poverty and personal view of the poor, but also its social inclusion (Francisco, 2014: 120).

3. Principles and Foundations of Social Theology of Imam Khomeini Movement

The leadership of Imam Khomeini's divine uprising was when the tyranny of Muslims had severed the threads between religion and society. As one of the Islamic scholars, he considered the relationship between religion and community very close. He believed that all monotheistic religions have a mission to educate human beings in all its dimensions and bring them to happiness; it would not be achieved except in the context of society (Mousavi Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 18, 274).

3.1. Fundamentals of Theology (Monotheism) of Imam Khomeini

According to Imam Khomeini's social theology, the Islamic Movement of the Iranian people was formed based on monotheism. Its content is current in all aspects of life because the only deity of man and the whole world is God Almighty. Therefore, in this society, personalism, utilitarianism and hedonism are condemned, and all individual and social acts of human beings are defined based on monotheism (ibid., 6, 81).

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3.2. Monotheism in Rulership Is the Essential Principle of Imam Khomeini's Theological Movement

According to Imam Khomeini, like other Shia theologians, monotheism has different levels, including monotheism, in essence, attributes and actions. The main monotheism level in Imam Khomeini's social theology, which is the pillar of his movement, is monotheism in rulership and legislation (Mousavi Khomeini, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 1, 253).

He believes that establishing a government and political system is one of the essential human needs according to the reason and nature argument. People obey the one who owns everything and controls everything. He is the Almighty God, the owner of all beings and the creator of the heavens and the earth. So, all ruling and changing, he has done it on his property. Now, if God leads a person and considers his rule to be obeyed by the prophets, then man will also need to follow him (ibid., 2008 AD/1387 SH: 181-182).

3.3. Vilayat Is the Most Crucial Pillar of Monotheism in the Foundations of Imam Khomeini's Movement Social Theology

Imam Khomeini considers the rule of the prophets and Imams is derived from monotheism and believes that their guardianship is a formative guardianship of a great and spiritual authority whose perception is beyond human capacity and beyond the intellect, mysticism and intuition, which is specific to the Prophet and the Imams. Without reasoning and self-cultivation, human beings will not achieve this degree (ibid., 2013 AD/1392 SH: 42). Legislative guardianship means that Imams are God's substitutes in legislation and his reasoning over human beings. That is, God argues against his servants because of their existence, manners, behaviour and speech in all aspects of life. Imams should have justice in all government areas (ibid., 2009 AD/1388 SH: 2, 476). Accordingly, in the foundations of Imam Khomeini's social theology, the Caliph of God in the monotheistic society has missions that are referred.

3.4. The Missions of God's Successor in a Monotheistic Society

In Imam Khomeini's theological principles, the position of the divine caliphate is the most critical in a monotheistic society that guarantees the survival of that society and human well-being (ibid., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 197-199). Therefore, he considers the mission of a perfect human being as a substitute for God over people in society as a severe duty and states two essential tasks for such a position in a monotheistic society.

3.4.1. The Spread of Monotheism in Human Society

Imam Khomeini believes that the perfect man, according to the divine wisdom, has scientific and objective knowledge of the intrinsic affairs and manifestations of the names and deeds of God. He is the absolute mortal

and eternal and has no boasting and superiority, but he is considered a good name and a great name. Such a perfect man can invite people to the straight path of theology and godliness because his way is explicit and is originally dedicated to the Prophet and consequently belongs to the prophets and Imams (ibid., 2015 AD/1394 SH: 293).

3.4.2. Humanisation Based on Monotheism

In the foundations of Imam Khomeini's social theology, one of the crucial missions of the perfect man is humanisation based on monotheism. He states that an ideal human being fully preserves and records the bounties of the upper world and bestows blessings on people. Therefore, Prophet is perfectly human, and it is the meaning of the Last Prophet. Consequently, it can take all beings from complete existence to the last minor manifestations (Ardabili, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 2, 354). On the other hand, a monotheist human being must be a follower of a perfect man to achieve the goal, which is happiness in the light of a monotheistic society (Mousavi Khomeini, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 531).

3.5. A Monotheistic Society from Imam Khomeini's Point of View

According to Imam Khomeini, a society can guarantee human well-being whose foundations are based on monotheistic principles, which is the desire of all prophets, human intellect and nature (Mousavi Khomeini, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 236). All the prophets and Imams tried to make humanity blissful by being in a social system. Therefore, they had to create a just social system by implementing laws and rulings to fulfil the goal of their resurrection, which is to bring men to perfection and happiness (ibid., 2013 AD/1392 SH: 70). In his view, only monotheistic principles can formulate the complete program of human happiness and perfection (ibid., 2015 AD/1394 SH: 138). Therefore, such a society must have two axes: the rule of divine law and justice.

3.5.1. Characteristics of a Monotheistic Society According to Imam Khomeini

1) The Rule of Divine Law

Based on the monotheistic worldview, Imam Khomeini introduces the belief in God's formative and legislative rulership and the rule of divine laws as the first feature of a monotheistic society (Mousavi Khomeini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 368). He knows one of the essential features of the divine laws ruling as the comprehensiveness and uniqueness of these laws that consider everyone equal to the practice of divine laws (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 9, 425). He thinks the rule of religious laws in society is a means of achieving justice in the community and the basis of education and guidance of human beings (ibid., 2013 AD 1392 SH: 62).

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2) Establishing Justice and Fairness

According to Imam Khomeini, justice and fairness, along with monotheism, is one of the main principles of Islam and a pillar of monotheistic society (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 267). He considers justice as one of the most virtuous divine names and attributes, the manifestation of which in the truths of human existence is one of the most apparent manifestations of God Almighty (ibid., 2005 AD/1384 SH: 112).

According to him, man as an individual is a subject of justice; therefore, society, which is the place of human upbringing, also becomes the subject of justice to teaching human society in the right path of perfection (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 5, 388). Accordingly, the fulfillment of justice in society is the essential duty of the divine prophets, so they tried to fulfill social justice in the community and inner justice for the individual (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 11, 386). Therefore, establishing social justice and preventing cruelty has been the divine prophets' most important goal and duty (ibid., 3, 113).

4. The Common Ground between the Two Theological Views on the Ultimate Goal and Social Functions of Religion

Although the distinction between the theological foundations of both views has caused the intermediate goals and strategies to achieve the ultimate goal to be compromised, both opinions on the ultimate goal and social function of religion have similar views.

4.1. Human Happiness and Perfection, the Ultimate Goal of Both Theological Perspectives

The final goal is the most critical typical joint of the Revolutionary Church and the social theology of Imam Khomeini's movement. In the foundations of Imam Khomeini's social theology, man's achievement of absolute perfection and the position of God's caliph is that this goal is per human nature and inner desire (ibid., 2003 AD/1382 SH: 297) and the creation of a monotheistic society is not the ultimate goal of religion. Instead, it is the central goal and the basic strategy to achieve the ultimate goal (ibid., 2004 AD/1383 SH: 7). Also, in the foundations of the social theology of the Revolutionary Church and based on the principle of salvation and freedom, the final goal is human happiness and perfection. They consider human happiness and model as one of the fundamental pillars of Christianity. From beginning to end, Juan Luis Segundo believes that Christianity is based on the true satisfaction of man, hope, looking to the future and moving towards it that caused the spiritual revolution of the believers and transforming society today (Segundo, 1970: 128). Jorge Mario Bergoglio (Pope Francis) believes that all the efforts of Jesus, the Son of God, were

to achieve the glory and perfection of the Father. Therefore, we must unite with Jesus, pursue Jesus goal (Francisco, 2014: 256-271). According to Gustav Gutierrez, the purpose of Christ's mission is not merely personal salvation but the fulfillment of the hope of human well-being in the light of social justice and the education and the realisation of peace and tranquillity for all humanity (Gutierrez, 1989: 78-82).

4.2. The Fulfilment of Social Justice, the Common Point of the Two Theological Views in the Social Function of Religion

According to the statements and documents of the ecclesiastical councils, social justice has been the chief concern of the Revolutionary Clergy. They considered the belief in establishing social justice in society as the most critical factor in achieving human dignity. The priests of the Revolutionary Church declared that Christ is the only saving force that can respond to the cries of the poor that have ascended to heaven, stand against cruelty and injustice, and be the inspiration of social justice (Dussel, 2009: 276). According to them, there are four main foundations for social justice. First, the class conflict in the world must be eliminated (Concatti, 1969: 110-108). Second, action to establish social justice is not an individual activity but requires the unification of all members of society. The first, step is to confront the misconceptions of the ruling capitalists. With the support of nature, all people must unite and challenge the false utopia of the capitalist system that pursues the class conflict (Francisco, 2014: 142-171). Third, priests, missionaries, workers, lawyers, teachers, and all people must renounce indifference to injustice in society. They should understand the pain of the poor and weak people and take responsibility for poverty removal in the community following the benevolent Samaritan[1] (Gutiérrez, 2004: 185). Finally, it isn't easy to establish social justice in society without relying on the people. Trust in the elites of society cannot develop the foundations of social justice because they do not want to be popular. However, they work for the people but have nothing to do with them (Francisco, 2014: 201-204).

In the social discourse of Imam Khomeini, justice is the principal value and virtue of human societies of all ages (Mousavi Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 16, 224).

Imam Khomeini considers social justice as the direct human path that leads man to true happiness. He believes that if we connect servitude directly to the position of nearness to God, which is absolute perfection, the direct line is social justice in an objective allegory. It covers man's path

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[1]. It is a moral story from the Gospel of Luke in which Christ explains the meaning of the word "Neighbor" or "Mankind" in the form of this parable.

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to absolute perfection from the defect point of servitude to the dignity ideal of lordship (ibid., 2003 AD/1382 SH: 147). Imam Khomeini considers the beginning of justice individually as the first step in establishing social justice in society. He says after the internalisation of justice in the community, justice in society will establish. Then, it can be implemented and pursued in the whole society and finally in all communities and among all nations (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 9, 72).

Imam Khomeini considers the establishment of social justice as the basis of Islam and Islamic society (ibid., 9, 42). According to him, the reform of human society is conditional on forming a just government (ibid., 15, 162). Suppose a government form based on Islam, social justice in all its dimensions will be fulfilled in society without other systems' corruption (ibid., 5, 72). Imam Khomeini believes that with forming a government, the reform of human society and social justice are fulfilled. Still, Islam's view of the formation of a government is instrumental. The fulfillment of the Islamic government is a tool for establishing social justice in society. It is impossible without the refinement and self-improvement of the governmental elements - the people and the rulers. Therefore, he says correcting behaviour, and self-discipline is necessary for everyone in any rank and position (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 8, 284).

4.2.1. Convergence of Two Views on Economic Justice

Economic justice and the elimination of poverty and class conflict in society have been some of the most critical concerns of the theologians of the Revolutionary Church from the beginning of its formation (Gutiérrez, 2003: 181).

The essential factors in establishing the Revolutionary Church movement in the Latin American region are the people poverty, a significant class conflict in society, the exploitation of Latinos by foreign colonisers despite the apparent independence of Latin countries, and the silence of church leaders and Vatican representatives in the region (Villanueav, 1995: 93).

The theologians of the Revolutionary Church initially focused the motivation of their reform movement on the Church (Esteban, 2007: 142). Their most crucial criticism of the Vatican Presidents was that they had forgotten the teachings of Christianity and the biblical commandments on social justice and the protection of the poor and oppressed. They willingly or unwillingly collaborate with the plunderers of the rights of the oppressed indigenous people. Their silence in front of them caused the weakening of deprived people (Francisco, 2014: 57).

Theologians of the Revolutionary Church in their doctrinal charter, based on the two critical theological principles of "Salvation and Liberation"

and "Preference of the Poor over the Rich," state the establishment of economic justice, poverty alleviation, and elimination of class conflict in society are the garments of the Christian mission (Gutiérrez, 1975: 91). They believe that God chose his son Jesus to be the absolute deliverer of all human beings from worldly vices such as poverty and fornication at all times (Boff, 1978: 128).

The clergy of the Revolutionary Church attributes the disbelief and distrust of the people to the Church in Latin America are the result of the Christian clergy's disregard for poverty, discrimination, and reluctance to help the implement social and economic justice (Violencia, 1978: 182). They say that the Bible expects us, Christian Pastors, not to disregard social and economic justice. In this case, we may preach the lesson of God's ignorance in prayer ceremonies. It is undoubtedly the reason why people do not trust your Church (ibid., 21).

They believe, a gospel that leads us to disregard compromise with imperialism and colonialism and exploitation or to accept injustice and discrimination; that gospel is in pure opposition to the gospel of Christ (Gheerbrant, 1974: 159). The only thing we should be afraid of is the betrayal of the Bible, which is a betrayal of social justice and our conscience (ibid., 168).

In the foundations of Imam Khomeini's social theology, justice in the economy, distribution of welfare and wealth are the primary examples of social justice in society. The most fundamental function of the concept of social justice in his theological thinking is the equitable development of the economy and livelihood in the community. He considers two social classes, "Oppressor" and "Oppressed" due to unjust economic systems in society. He always finds it his duty to defend the oppressed class (Mousavi Khomeini, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 44). Imam Khomeini believes that the only way to achieve a just and prosperous economy is to implement the economic laws of Islam. The system of fair economy in Islam is based on the implementation of two important financial principles, namely the sanctity of usury and the acceptance of property rights of individuals, the performance of which can play a crucial role in solving problems and inequalities of society (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 5, 451).

Imam Khomeini considers one of the most critical factors in creating class conflict in society as individual freedom in the unlimited accumulation of wealth and does not accept the soul of accumulating wealth, both legitimate and illegitimate (ibid., 10, 349). The elimination of class conflict is not an obstacle to the free economic activities of individuals. Because Islam, unlike the socialist schools, respects the private property of individuals and

allows them to engage in economic activities freely. Provided that they pay the financial rights of the Islamic system and the production of their wealth does not lead to the accumulation of personal wealth and amassing wealth (ibid., 36, 8).

Imam Khomeini's view differs from the theologians of the Church. Imam Khomeini considers reducing the social class conflict, minimising poverty and maximising social welfare as the goal of economic justice. While class society has no place in the Revolutionary Church theologians' attitude, their ultimate goal is to eliminate the class conflict. It is the socialist school thought in their foundations. This thinking ultimately leads to the individuals' deprivation of their private property rights. This method practically does not eliminate the class conflict and leaves the dependent governments free to plunder public rights (ibid., 36, 8).

4.3. Differences between Two Theological Perspectives on Operational Principles and Strategies

The difference between the two theological views is how society creates a platform for the emergence of social and economic justice. According to Imam Khomeini, a monotheistic community is the only suitable ground for spreading justice (ibid., 2015 AD/1394 SH: 138). But Revolutionary Church theologians deny the rulership role of monotheism in creating a justice-oriented society and think creating such a society is impossible in this world (Horacio, 2010: 67). This subject is the difference between the theological foundations of the Latin American Revolutionary Church and the social theology of the Imam Khomeini movement.

4.3.1. The First Difference between the Two Theological Views in Monotheistic Principles

Imam Khomeini considers monotheism in government and legislative lordship as the pillars of the monotheistic society (Alah Bedashti, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 188). Based on these monotheistic principles, he considers the right of government and legislation exclusively to God. He believes that the ruling of the Prophet and his successors from the Imams and after the Vilayat-e Foqaha has been established based on this rule (Mousavi Khomeini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 184-185).

On the other hand, theologians of the Latin American Revolutionary Church, in contrast to Imam Khomeini's theological principles of monotheism in government and legislation, believe that establishing divine and religious rule in this world is not possible (Gutiérrez, 2014: 92). They think that we may prepare the prologues of government, but in this world, we cannot reach the ideal government of God because, according to Jesus, the perfect government is possible in another world (Horacio, 2010: 67).

Although, they consider God owner and sovereign of all things, they believe that Christ gave the good news of his father's kingdom in heaven and did not seek kingship and rule on earth (Bresci, 1994: 106-108).

Theologians of the Revolutionary Church believe that although the gospel of Christ has a universal purpose, the ultimate goal of Christ is to establish a divine government in heaven (Gutiérrez, 2014: 180); therefore, in Christian teachings, there is no plan to form a government in the world. Of course, from their belief, it is possible to create social justice, poverty eradication and fair distribution of welfare in society in the light of a just government. It is possible through school participation with revolutionary movements such as Marxism and Communism (McGrath, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 1, 233) or government involvement with national parties (Bresci, 1994: 105).

4.3.2. The Second Difference between the Two Theological Perspectives on Intermediate Strategies and Goals

One of the specific points in the views of the Revolutionary Church theologians and the social theology of Imam Khomeini's movement is the application of operational strategies to achieve the true happiness of man, which is the ultimate goal. According to the social theology of both views, changing the social situation favouring the oppressed and implementing social justice in a society is possible with a just government. Still, the method of government formation is the same strategic difference between these two theological views. A critical point in the cause of this difference is the distinction based on monotheism in government and legislation, which has led the Revolutionary Church to convergence or divergence from the revolutionary schools and national parties. In adopting practical methods to change the social structure by the Revolutionary Church, deconstructive schools such as Marxism and Communism in Latin America had the most effect in adopting these practical methods. Hence, the Revolutionary Church put forward three operational strategies in creating a justice-oriented society. All three plans failed to help them build a just society because of the school's affiliation with revolutionary movements such as Marxism, Communism, and Nationalist parties:

1) Social Revolution and Guerrilla Operations: The First Strategy of the Revolutionary Church in Common with Marxism to Create a Just Society

Guerrilla and armed operations were the first methods some young Revolutionary Church priests used to reform their communities. This method strongly criticised the leaders of the Catholic Church in the Vatican (Gheerbrant, 1974: 121-142) and other priests of the Revolutionary Church.

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They called the followers of this method the Guerrilla Church (Torres, 1968: 134). Young clerics believed that armed action was a theological practice derived from the scriptures. They introduce this method as a strategic action based on poor preference and love for neighbours (González, 1967: 137-148). Also referring to the other words of Jesus, they introduce using a sword in establishing peace and justice in society as his mission (Matthew, 10, 34). Another element that plays a central role in the ideology of guerrilla operations is the revolutionary teachings of Marxism (Orlando, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 89). They believed that Marxists were fighting for the new society and that we Christians should fight alongside them (Torres, 1968: 120). To advance the goals of this uprising, we must have a common front with the Marxists, but it is not possible for us to unite with the Communist Party, although it is familiar to the enemy before us (González, 1967: 187-202).

2) Liberating Theology: The Second Strategy of the Revolutionary Church in Partnership with Marxism to Create a Just Society

In the view of the theologians of liberating theology, Jesus action was an attack on the foundation of cruelty and injustice, but he never used his sword or armed uprising. Jesus is a liberating being, not a militant guerrilla who seeks to establish the kingdom of God on earth through struggle. Jesus Christ showed us through his words and deeds how to actively spread justice for deprived freedom (Gutierrez, 2014: 147). The leaders of this revolutionary method consider Marxism as an assistant to the "Christian Praxis." They have used Marxist social analysis to understand the specific circumstances of Latin America and its prevailing poverty and to find solutions to its problems. According to them, understanding the current nature of Latin American Society and ways to improve the plight of the poor is possible by using the social teachings of Marxism; because this school offers programs through which create a just society (McGrath, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 1, 233). According to them, the capitalist system is inherently evil, and the system of socialism, although very different from the kingdom of God, is an ideal system (Gutierrez, 1977: 86). According to Gutierrez, the abolition of the present government and the establishment of a new socialist system is the best way to act on the command of Jesus (Granz and Elson, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 313-337).

3. Alliance with Popular and Social Parties: The Third Strategy of the Revolutionary Church to Build a Just Society

They are another branch of revolutionary priests who, with an independence-seeking view, drew their theological line to achieve social justice outside the Marxist and communist teachings. To accomplish this goal, they believed

that they should unite with Nationalist and anti-imperialist governments. Because, according to Jesus teachings, the ideal government is not achieved in this time and this world (Horacio, 2010: 67). Accordingly, they believed that the Church must find its allies to, with their help, form a religious government and establish social justice in society (Bresci, 1994: 36). At that time, Peronism was the only socio-political current in which revolutionary priests based their religious movement on its principles. The Revolutionary Priests' Movement, whose movement goals were affiliated with the Peron Socialist Party, experienced five decades of history with this party. Whenever this party was in power, they were also at the top, and otherwise, they would be isolated (Horacio, 2008: 127).

4.4. Islamic Government and Vilayat-e Faqih Are the Essential Strategies for Creating a Just Society

Imam Khomeini's view on the forming of government as a central goal and the operational strategy in achieving the final destination is in contrast to the opinion of the theologians of the Latin American Revolutionary Church. He did not accept using guerrilla and armed operations to advance the goals of the uprising and to establish a monotheistic society and social justice in the community. He always introduced his movement basis on enlightening and informing the people and mobilising the strata (Mousavi Khomeini, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 189). Relying on his monotheistic principles, he rejects revolutionary schools such as Marxism in the people's religious movement process. He also advises those who have chosen Marxist methods to fill their revolutionary gaps to reconsider their approach. According to him, the result of Marxism and Communism is turning away from God and religion from society, which inflicts great harm to people (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 21, 66). He also does not accept establishing the movement and the government in alliance with the Nationalists; because, they go towards enemies humiliating and compromising in times of hardships and difficulties. To free themselves from daily political pressures, they turned their backs on all the national and patriotic claimed covenants and obligations (ibid., 24, 243).

4.4.1. The Islamic Republic: The most Crucial Strategy of Imam Khomeini in Creating a Monotheistic Society

Religious government is the essential strategy of Imam Khomeini in creating a monotheistic society and achieving individual to genuine happiness (ibid., 2005 AD/1384 SH: 1). In his view, the role of the people and rulers in creating a religious government is critical. Therefore, the two components of religious democracy and Vilayat-e Faqih are the essential components of forming a religious government in Imam Khomeini's view. In his view, the

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people's role in such a government is not legitimising the ruler because government legitimacy is exclusively religious. The comprehensive jurist's ruler has the Vilayat position before the people elected, along with the Imams and the Prophet (ibid., 2009 AD/1388 SH: 2, 459).

In his view, the role of people in determining their destiny is the role of legal legitimacy and acceptability (ibid., 1999 AD/1378 SH: 6, 13). Accordingly, Imam Khomeini calls the religious government based on the two pillars of Vilayat-e Faqih and religious democracy, the Islamic Republic, and invites everyone to establish such a government. He emphasises that our path is establishing the Islamic Republic, not a word, more minor, not a word, more (ibid., 5, 182).

Conclusion

The goals of the Latin American Revolutionary Priests movement were: to fight public oppression in Latin American society, social and economic injustice, exploitation and colonisation of nations by international imperialism. On the other hand, Imam Khomeini's reform movement in the twentieth century, in support of the widespread awakening, is considered a religious revolution in its time. His significant goal is to create a ground for the rule of truth in favour of the oppressed, establish a monotheistic society, achieve human beings to true happiness. The only achieving strategy is to create fairness and justice and expand social justice by the Islamic Republic. The essential principle in the social discourse of Imam Khomeini's movement is "Monotheism in Rule," whose crystallisation is the rule of the Valy-e Faqih at the head of the religious government as the first pillar to achieve religious authority. Creating an internal revolution in the individual of society is the second pillar of establishing a religious government. Revolutionary thinking appears in their souls and responds positively to the invitation of the revolution leaders and gives it legitimacy and legal acceptance.

In contrast, the Latin American Revolutionary Church, despite its closeness to the purpose and social functions of religion and the social discourse of the Imam Khomeini movement, has not been able to save its oppressed nations from the domination of poverty and injustice. The main reason is the difference in the principles of monotheism in government and differences in operational strategy in common with schools such as Marxism and Nationalist and Socialist parties. Therefore, by examining the symmetry and alignment of these two theological movements and studying the gaps in the intellectual system of Revolutionary Priests, the present study can effectively help them use the principles of social theology of the Imam

Khomeini movement:

By creating a new opportunity for the Revolutionary Church on academic environment away from the political sensitivities of Latin America through Islamophobia and Iran phobia; by precisely manifesting the intellectual roots of the theology of revolutionary Christians in the scene of social theology of Imam Khomeini movement; drew the attention of their elites to the outstanding achievements of the religious revolution of the Iranian people. Those can be a suitable alternative to the teachings of Marxism and Communism on the scene of the spiritual revolution in Latin America and be a promising clear path forward for the revolutionary movement of the Latin American Church.

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A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution
(Case Study: Max Weber's Theory of Charisma)

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Abstract

The present study, for scientific use, aimed to combine and integrate the presented analyzes of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which is based on Weber's charisma theory with different approaches and in the form of individual and scattered studies in the form of books, articles, interviews, dissertations and thesis. To this aim, with the qualitative method and meta-analyzed technique, and the scientific method of the volume of research, time, place, the format of works, research methods have been used, and the findings of Weber's analyzes of the Islamic Revolution, similar species have been identified. The statistical population is 56 of the existing works of 37 domestic and foreign authors and analysts. The findings indicated that a group of works acknowledge the power of Weber's theory in analyzing the Islamic Revolution. Another group is trying to empower Weber's thesis in analyzing the Islamic Revolution using adaptation and correction. The third type of works indicates a critical approach confronting the arrival of Weberian analysis and the inconsistency and inability of this theory to analyze the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Thus, meta-analysis shows different and even conflicting types of analysis of Weber's charismatic leadership theory and its usage in studying the Iranian revolution in the contemporary century.

Keywords: Islamic Revolution Analyze, Meta-Analyze, People, Leadership, Charismatic, Max Weber.

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Introduction

Simultaneously with the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a group imagine that the theory of Weber Charisma can analyze the Islamic Revolution or be the basis of analysis, or at least by restoring this theory can analyze the Iranian Revolution. So, they used Weber's approach to study the Iranian Revolution. In contrast, another group in criticism and analysis based on Weber's theory of Iran's Islamic Revolution has researched various books, articles, etc. The main questions are 'What are the types of analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran based on Weber's theory of charisma?' 'What volume of information can be analyzed?' To obtain the answer by examining the descriptional information of analysis before meta-analysis based on the available information and effects has done, and because in researches with meta-analysis method, there is no need for background. The present study needs to collect research findings from various single and scattered studies to combine and integrate its results for scientific and practical use. The results indicated that analyses of the Islamic Revolution of Iran related to each other in the form of scattered results that exist in different research formats and according to the results and strategies could guide us to answer the research question in different dimensions. Using Weber's charismatic leadership theory, we can say what types of analyses of the revolution have been presented and the differences and commonalities of the studies based on Weber's view of the Islamic Revolution. Also, the volume of research, time of study or analysis, location, the format of works, authors and user research methods, and the results of similar analyses and types will be expressed as research findings in the form of a fulfilment model.

1. Conceptual Framework

The most crucial source about Weber charisma theory is "Society and Economics." Weber's writings are based on the methods of individual actors, and his main emphasis is on the mental meanings that active human beings attribute to their actions and examines the reciprocal orientations of these actions in the context of socio-historical contexts. Weber believes that all objective reality is incomprehensible because of its infinite diversity in his scientific thought. Therefore, using scientific reduction, he expressed the "Ideal Type" or "Pure Type" that can reach the truth by consistency or inconsistency with objective reality. In his view, the ideal type is a mental structure that is not seen empirically and objectively; but it can be deduced inductively from social history. Also, to create ideal types, the researcher must first penetrate the historical reality and then make the perfect type. The

application of the concept of charisma in sociology refers to the attributes of those who claim or believe that leadership has abilities derived from unusual-divine, magical, demonic, or exceptional individuality- legitimacy. This term found its way to the social sciences through the writings of Max Weber, who borrowed it from others (Gould and Kolbe, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 629).

Weber generally considers four actions for human beings in different societies. Goal-oriented rational action, value-oriented reasonable action, emotional action or passivity and traditional action based on quadruple activities. Simultaneously, it names the types of authority and identifies the types of legitimate authorities accordingly. Based on the differences between these legitimizing systems, he distinguishes three types of authority: Traditional, charismatic, and legal. In his definition, he considers formal authority as the result of the precedence of tradition, and tradition, habit, and custom legitimize this type of authority. In this authority, the sacred social order is considered immortal and inviolable. The dominant person or group is usually chosen and governed based on the inheritance of the eldership, the patronymic, the blood, and the race.

According to Weber, all governments before modern governments were traditional. The second type of authority is Weber's charismatic authority. In charismatic authority, society's emotional action towards the leader manifests in obedience to him. The charismatic leader may appear in almost any sphere of social life, such as religious prophets, political leaders, or military heroes. Whenever a person calls others to follow him, charisma is involved; in acceptance and obedience. This authority requires the rejection of past, traditional values and rebellion against the old and established system and often acts as a revolutionary force in response to a crisis. The basis of the groups' enthusiastic obedience to the leader is to be ordered to spread the new ideology and the good news of the future, be loyal to the leader and believe that his statements interpret the spirit and ideals of the movement. Weber thinks that divine or supernatural powers inspire the legitimising this kind of authority. The leader's benevolent authority is based on the attraction of leaders who demand the subordination of society because of their extraordinary moral or heroic or religious virtue. Charismatic authority is based on great obedience because of his awesome holiness and respect. The third type of authority is legal or rational authority. Perhaps the rule of law, not individuals, is the manifestation of legal authority (Weber, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 114). Comparing these three types of authority, Weber considers traditional authority as personal power, charisma power as dynamic but irrational, and the power of law as rational, impersonal, and active.

2. Research Method

One of the essential elements in choosing the type and method of research is the nature of the research subject. We only analyze the Islamic Revolution based on Weber's charismatic view regarding the heart of the matter. The research method is meta-analysis, which identifies and collects works in various scientific formats, including (books, articles, interviews, dissertations and thesis) and records the works, setting the sheets and coding. The analyzes, considering the difference in the approach of scientific templates in the subject of research, were classified and presented under three different types (adaptive, therapeutic and critical). Then, reviewed the necessary information and, more than the semantics and expression of the conceptual framework presented descriptive findings or research findings for meta-analysis in the form of a fulfilment model. (Figure 1: Meta-analyze, analyzes Iran's Islamic Revolution based on Weber's charismatic leadership theory). The statistical population of the study is 56 works in different formats from 37 authors and analysts, including books (25), articles (20), master's theses and doctoral dissertations (9) and specialized interviews related to the subject (3). Some authors have presented their works and analyses in several different formats. Understanding their views has used most of the works related to the subject.

3. Research Findings (Descriptive/Analytical Findings)

3.1. Description of the Findings (Three Types of Weberian Analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran)

Analysts present the analysis of the Islamic Revolution based on Weber theory with three types of adaptive, therapeutic and critical (Qavi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: pp7-22). We describe the types of Weberian analysis of the Islamic Revolution.

3.1.1. Adaptive Type

According to this approach, Weber's theory can analyze the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In his theory, the questioned components, including revolution conditions, presence, obedience, and charismatic leader, objectified in the Islamic Revolution victory. He explains the revolution process from the transition period to the period of stabilization in the four decades based on the components of this theory. He mentions Imam Khomeini as a leader with charismatic characteristics and the masses of people based on Weber's concepts and literature in this theory. In this analysis, with a futuristic view, the revolution next movement is also analyzed by Weber, which refers to the direction of Iranian society towards civil society. But until the fourth decade of the revolution, we are still in the period of normalization after the

democratization of society will pave the path to the rational-legal authority of the Weberian model with the secularization of religion. The primary indicator of this category is the analysis of all components, including conditions, structures and personalities in the Islamic Revolution based on Weber's model and Iranian society, which are a clear example of this view following Weber's theory (Qavi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 289-327).

3.1.2. Therapeutic Type

This theory can analyze the Iranian revolution. To empower or localization this theory should make changes and adjustments in the role-accepting and role-making and the precedence and lag of Weber's desired elements. It is due to the personality adaptation of Imam Khomeini as the charisma leader and the people as followers. Accordingly, the time of the charismatic revolution changes according to the reality of the Iranian revolution. In the process of formation and movement of the revolution, proposed changes and restorations that will enable and empower this theory to analyze and adapt the Islamic Revolution as a charismatic revolution and the leadership of Imam Khomeini as a charismatic leader (Qavi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 289-327).

3.1.3. Critical Type

The main feature is that the causes, conditions of the revolution and Weber's examples, including the presence, obedience of the people, and the role-making of the charismatic leader and the basis of legitimacy in the Islamic Revolution, have not crystallized per this theory. Therefore, based on Weber's charismatic theory, the analysis of the Islamic Revolution can be criticized and lead to a reductionist and superficial view of the Islamic Revolution. An essential point that analysts have overlooked is in using any theory in the analysis of social change, post-entry ideas must undergo various stages, including the position of understanding, the application of critique, and finally, the presentation of an alternative to the transferred approach (Barzegar, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 50).

3.2. Findings Analysis

Based on 56 works, a meta-analysis of the works of thirty-seven authors in the three mentioned genres were examined and presented in the form of a fulfilment model in the following three tables. The results of eighteen authors and analysts in an adaptive form indicate the belief in the power of Weber's model in analyzing the Islamic Revolution in Table 1. The works of six authors in the therapeutic type by proposing different corrective-therapeutic methods indicate the ability of analysis in case of adaptation of Weber model, which is stated in Table 2. In contrast to these two types, the works of thirteen authors examined indicate a critical approach in the face of Weber's view and its application in the analysis of the Iranian revolution and the inconsistency and inability of this theory to analyze the Islamic Revolution. Meta-analysis

of works is given in Table 3. Regarding the importance, impact and scope of some authors' works, the arrangement of the tables has been provided, regardless of the precedence and latency of writing data the pieces.

Table 1: A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Based on Weber's Charismatic Leadership Theory (Comparative Type)

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
Hussein Bashiriyah (2002 AD/ 1381 SH)	Descriptive/ Analytical	**Conclusion**: The revolution is divided into three stages: Charismatic, traditional oligarchy and legalism, and the Iranian revolution is a charismatic movement, and Imam Khomeini is the leader of charisma. **Findings**: The direction of the revolution since 1376, with the new rotation and arrangement that emerged in the active political forces, increasingly led to the rule of law, legalism, democracy and the legitimacy crisis intensification. - Development and transformation, and the move towards make-background civil and democratic socialization, result from the middle-class approach.
Saeed Hajjarian (pseudonym Jahangir Salehpour) (1993 AD/1372 SH)	Critical	Conclusion: Religion may be ideologized, and in many cases, it is inevitable to be ideologized. Findings: Apart from religion assessor, it owes categories such as charisma in the social scene.
Saeed Hajjarian (1995 AD/1374 SH)	Descriptive/ Analytical	**Conclusion:** Imam's charisma destroyed the Pahlavi dynasty and transformed many traditions, including our jurisprudential tradition. The transformation of the Shia jurisprudential system needed a revolutionary force. **Findings:** It was the charisma of the Imam who imposed change on our jurisprudential system.

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
Saeed Hajjarian (2000 AD/1379 SH)	Analytical-documentary	**Conclusion:** Imams, before the revolution, gained all forms of traditional legitimacy and, simultaneously with the revolution, earned a charismatic and benevolent legitimacy and after the revolution gained legal legitimacy. **Findings:** Through Islam, Imam Khomeini's charismatic leadership succeeded in destroying the imperial regime; he is called the jurist of the transition period.
Saeed Hajjarian (2001 AD/1380 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** A relationship should be established between leadership claims and the social conditions of formation of revolutionary consciousness among the people, often in the centre of society and history, occurs before the incarnation and emergence of leadership, and the rejection and acceptance of the claims of charisma depend on the emergence of this historhose who accept them. It is true that the social consciousness. **Findings:** Charisma is a quality that, first of all, people make it, and the leader himself has a small share in cultivating it, revealing the social nature of unique attraction.
Saeed Hajjarian(2008 AD/1387 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** The Islamic Revolution of Iran is a joint between classical revolutions and soft revolutions (common in classical revolutions and soft revolutions). **Findings:** Classical revolutions usually have charismatic leaders and ideological goals.
Saeed Hajjarian (2009	Documentary – Critical	**Conclusion:** Maxober's theories have no application in Iran today, and I generalized them to the conditions of

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
AD/1388 SH)		our country with negligence and a critical look at these views. Findings: Without reviewing and criticizing Maxober's works, it endangers national security and shakes the pillars of economic development.
Abbas Abdi (2006 AD/1385 SH)	Adaptive	**Conclusion:** The comparison of Imam Khomeini with another politician also showed his charismatic face. The charismatic nature is so strong that it creates a fluid and decentralized organization with the power of attraction to a charisma that happens to fight against this type of organization, and organizing is more difficult for the ruling government. **Findings:** The Islamic Revolution has this characteristic, i.e., the supremacy of the charismatic aspect of the leadership over the organization. It was the formation of revolution.
Abbas Abdi (2008 AD/1387 SH)	descriptive	**Conclusion**: One of the Imam characteristics was not to get involved in disputes and gather all forces to fight the Shah. His refusal to enter into the divisive social unity for the greater unity of all forces is one of his salient features. **Findings:** The critical point in the following charisma is that this sovereignty is for particular conditions, not casual and even worldly, and does not necessarily conform to the known rules of behaviour. So, charisma tries to avoid getting involved in current affairs because it ignores it, normalizes charisma and empties it of function.
Alireza Alavi Tabar (2008	analytical	**Conclusion:** Imam Khomeini was considered a charismatic personality. There was a strong demand that the

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
AD/1387 SH)		constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides a suitable place for this charismatic figure. This demand was supported both among the elites and by the masses. Until the presence of the Farahmand leader, the charismatic aspect of the constitution will prevail over the other two parts. **Findings:** The Islamic Republic of Iran system will be charismatic in practice. In such circumstances, the legitimacy of the system and how it participates in it and its formal discourse will be affected by the victory of majesty over it.
Hadi Khaniki (2008 AD/1387 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion**: The personality of Imam Khomeini, like all historical leaders, has faced a wave of joyful praise. In the area referred to as Imam Khomeini's leadership, charisma manifests the same phenomenon that marked a critical juncture in the Iranians' quest for freedom, independence, and progress in a particular discourse framework. This kind of majesty leadership has had a special meaning and direction in Imam Khomeini's discourse. **Findings:** According to Weber, Imam's wise leadership has two obvious aspects that have created special meanings in his emergence, role creation and departure. The first is that Imam Khomeini's distinguished epistemological and moral merits were such that he never, even at the height of the people's unique attachments and obedience, was caught in a moment of self-control and selfishness and did not see himself before God and the people. The second

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
		is to think and strive for systematization, institutionalization and regularity in the highest understanding circuits.
Abbas Zare (1999 AD/1378 SH)	Analytical – Explanatory	**Conclusion**: The period of the movement emergence and charismatic leadership is a transitional situation. Iranian political system, by reproducing the traditions before the movement and by institutionalizing the rules arising from the behavioural pattern of the charismatic leader (in the institution of Velayat-e Faqih) from the new age it finds that the statements confirm the appropriateness of charismatic domination in the character of Imam Khomeini and his followers. **Findings:** The "Succession Process" begins in the history of the Islamic Revolution from 1368 to 1375 and explains how the particular period of the charismatic movement returned to normal. The Islamic Revolution of Iran is crystallized in Imam Khomeini's thought, action, and behaviour and his followers, who had a charismatic field.
Abbas Zare (2002 AD/ 1381 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** Examining the principles of legitimacy during the leadership of Imam Khomeini and evaluating it with Weber's charismatic theory shows that the method of charisma in Iranian politics and government is between 1978 and 1989 and the process of charisma normalization in the post-revolutionary period. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini's leadership and authority can be explained by Max Weber's analysis of the emergence of the charismatic movement and the

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
		formation of majesty sovereignty and power.
Taqi Azad Armaki (2008 AD/138)	analytical	**Conclusion:** The first result of Imam's charismatic domination was opposition to two-sided domination and opposition. The conflict of domination before the Islamic Revolution led to the intensification of action and decision. All the followers expected their leader and the followers to move fast and get rid of the conflict situation. **Findings:** While intensifying the action process, these expectations provided a wide-ranging and timely connection between the Supreme Leader (Imam Khomeini) and his followers.
Amir Azimi Dolatabadi (2010 AD/1389 SH)		**Conclusion:** The Iranian revolution, regarding the exceptional and extraordinary characteristics of its leader and his sense of mission, due to the sincere obedience of a large group of people and attributing unique attributes to him, as well as the orientations of this revolution, all in slogans, speeches, marches, meetings and announced goals can be imagined and analyzed as a charismatic movement. **Findings:** The theory of charisma as a conceptual tool for analyzing the revolution is essential in two ways. 1. This analysis draws our attention to new points in the emergence, evolution, and development from the beginning of its formation to the death of its leader. 2. The revolution also, as an example, helps us to complete and refine this theory.

A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution
(Case Study: Max Weber's Theory of Charisma)

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
Abd al-Ali Bazargan (2003 AD/1382 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** The charismatic personality of Imam Khomeini in this period (revolution) and his firm belief in the sovereignty and political guardianship of Shia clergies and the continuous emphasis on reviving mourning and maintaining traditional jurisprudence and intellectual organizations of seminaries increased the political and belief power of the conventional right-wing with the support of the imitating masses and the clergy, who had been involved in political struggles during the revolution, became heavier and heavier. **Findings:** One of the general characteristics of the Second Revolution (Imam's death and the beginning of divergences) is the lack of charismatic leadership.
Saeed Amirarajmand (1988 AD/1367 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** Imam Khomeini's benevolent leadership was undoubtedly an essential factor in the political aspect and the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Imam Khomeini's courage and insistence on challenging the Shah was a sign of the extraordinary personal qualities that could bring charisma to the fore. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini, as an individual, brought a revolutionary change in tradition. His charismatic authority made this revolutionary transformation of the Shia tradition possible.
Majid Fooladian (2014 AD/1393 SH)	Explanatory-analytical	**Conclusion:** In how to use Weber's charisma in the Islamic Revolution, the issue of charisma is addressed in two dimensions. First, the theoretical

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
		dimension and determining the theoretical approach. Then, the experimental aspect and the study of structural and social factors affecting the formation of a charismatic national leader in the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Therefore, theoretically, it does not study charisma in its general sense but the political charisma at the national level and the conditions and causes of the emergence of this type of charisma. **Findings:** In the Islamic Revolution, we have witnessed the emergence of Imam Khomeini's charismatic leadership.
Majid Muhammadi (2008 AD/1387 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** Majesty leader is born and formed within particular traditions and norms, but he can be the author and manipulate the previous criteria and change their board. He (if the government continues) and the dynasty that follows him quickly become traditional leaders. **Findings:** Authority in Iranian society has been traditional and sometimes charismatic (Imam Khomeini). But its direction is to return to tradition.
Farrokh Moshiri (2005 AD/1384 SH)	Descriptive-analytical	**Conclusion:** The application of charisma theory and precisely the concept of charisma political leadership has been tested in the Iranian revolution. **Findings:** Charisma could have played a role in Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran, but its role has been limited in this case. Many Iranians may have been attracted to Ayatollah Khomeini's charisma.

A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution
(Case Study: Max Weber's Theory of Charisma)

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
Yervand Abrahamian (2011)	analytical	**Conclusion:** Ayatollah Khomeini is not an ordinary Ayatollah but a charismatic Imam who created the revolution and led the Ummah to the monotheistic system they have been waiting for four years. **Findings**: Khomeini's charismatic personality was one of the temporary factors that made the clergy strong in Iran.
Yervand Abrahamian (2016 AD/1395SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** Imam Khomeini as a charismatic leader in the Iranian revolution is among the leaders such as Lenin, Mao and Castro. The charismatic personality of the Imam is one of the reasons for the victory of the Islamic Revolution. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini's charismatic leadership phenomenon can be explained by an ideological factor.
John. D. Stampel (1999 AD/1378 SH)	Descriptive-analytical	**Conclusion**: Imam Khomeini was a charismatic leader. He knows himself the spokesman of God and the executor of the justice-oriented rulings of Islam, so the people unquestioningly obey his commands. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini's charisma among the masses of the Iranian people originates from Islamic beliefs.
Nikki R. Keddie (1999 AD/1378 SH)	Descriptive-analytical	**Conclusion:** The success of Imam Khomeini's absolutist reading of Islam was not because most people preferred it to the more liberal or progressive understandings of other Islamic, spiritual and secular thinkers. Instead, it was because, along with theoretical absolutism, practical his charisma and leadership qualities. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini is a

Analyst / Writer	Research Method	Concluding/Findings
		charismatic leader whose positions and actions are not easy to analyze. This working leader's recent revival of Iran is based on and resembles the ancient tradition in Islam.
Brian Turner (2000 AD/1379 SH) (a)	Critical-analytical	**Conclusion:** Leadership in Islam is charismatic with the characteristics of charismatic followers. The action of actors is a kind of value-oriented rational action, not a goal-oriented which possesses rational-legal capacity. **Findings:** The legitimacy of charismatic leaders in Islam is based on the legality of charisma, which cannot rationalize.
Brian Turner (2000 AD/1379 SH) (b)	analytical	**Conclusion:** In the twentieth century, Islam has raised several essential charismatic leaders, the most prominent Ayatollah Khomeini. **Findings:** Islam cannot present the necessary values and ideas to develop rational capitalism. However, in the twentieth century, Islamic culture has successfully hosted economic growth in the oil-rich Middle East and developing societies of Southeast Asia and led the Third World in political reform and revolution.
Michael Kimmel (1996 AD/1385 SH)	Analytical	**Conclusion:** Imam Khomeini is a leader with charisma, and the source of Imam's dominance is the link between him and his followers. However, "Charismatic" is inherently one of the reasons for the legitimacy of religion. **Findings:** The form of religious awareness is the background of Imam Khomeini's charismatic domination.

Table 2: A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Based on Weber's Charismatic Leadership Theory (Therapeutic Type)

Analyst / author	Research method	Concluding/findings
Hossein Hosseini (1998 AD/1377 SH)	Comparative-analytical	**Conclusion:** The influence of the Imam's leadership on the masses of the people is the result of his assimilation with some cultural myths and the embodiment of their values in his personality, message and behaviour. As a result of this assimilation, people transmit the values and emotions towards those myths to the contemporary leader and believe in a series of extraordinary qualities in him. **Findings:** The charismatic movement in Iran in 1356 and 13957, without resorting to this culture and its patterns, could not create positive and negative motivating and inspiring images of contemporary leaders on the scene (charisma and anti-charisma).
Muhammad Hussein Panahi (2006 AD/1385 SH)	Descriptive-analytical	**Conclusion:** Max Weber rightly emphasized the importance of majesty leadership for charismatic movements. The charismatic characteristics of Imam Khomeini and his extraordinary prominence compared to other leaders of the Islamic Revolution in the slogans of the revolution are also quite noticeable. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini and his close followers showed this feature in the first decade of the revolution due to their extraordinary charismatic prominence and the usual belongings and occupations of this free world.
Ali Muhammad	Comparative-analytical	**Conclusion:** Max Weber's theory of charismatic leadership restores and

Analyst / author	Research method	Concluding/findings
Hazeri (1998 AD/1377 SH)		adapts to the Islamic Revolution and the subject of Imam Khomeini's leadership by reconstructing the historical process of leadership theory and the temporal shift of legal and charismatic authority. Charisma is shifted from the leader's personality to the charismatic system, and its decline depends on the charismatic person. **Findings**: Rehabilitation of this theory for analysis and adaptation of the Islamic Revolution as a charismatic revolution and leadership of Imam Khomeini as a charismatic leader with some modifications that caused reconstruction of the process in the consolidating elements of the theory is possible.
Muhammad Abedi Ardakani (1998 AD/1377 SH)	Comparative-analytical	**Conclusion:** Imam, on the one hand, was a charismatic leader, on the other, a traditional leader, and on the third, a rational leader. In the path of his transcendence, Imam Khomeini showed the existence of a multi-layered charisma in his personality and appeared as a charisma of position and rank based on the religious or secular authority of the clergy. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini was a charismatic figure, and he was the most emotional and creative charismatic leader in recent times.
Behzad Doran (1996 AD/1375 SH)	Comparative-analytical	**Conclusion**: The theory of revolution reconstructed from Imam Khomeini with adaptation can be compared with the analytical model presented by Max Weber. **Findings:** It means that the material

Analyst / author	Research method	Concluding/findings
		mediator and the fulfilment of the divine will in the awakening and awareness of Islam's people be considered accurate.
Reza Dejakam (2002 AD/1381 1381 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** The theory of revolution from Imam can be considered as adjustable modifications of the charismatic leadership model presented by Max Weber. **Findings:** The emergence of charisma is the presentation of a new definition of the world, the gathering of followers, and the solidarity of the leadership and the group organization of psychological, moral, religious, political pressures to challenge the established power of the revolution.
Shojae Zand (2004 AD/1383 SH)	Descriptive-analytical	**Conclusion:** The Basiji leadership (Imam Khomeini) in Iran, considering the religious origin and individual capabilities and the readiness and grounds for acceptance, soon found a charismatic nature. **Findings:** The dynamic character of the population mobilized in revolutionary movements always puts double pressure on charismatic leadership-followers relations.
Shojae Zand (2016 AD/1395 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** Religious leaders are charismatic leaders. Being charisma is more about people perceiving that leader than about the leader's personality traits. We claim that Weber's theory is true in explaining the leadership of Imam Khomeini. The existence of inflamed revolutionary conditions and the influence of the religious background caused the peak of charisma in Imam

Analyst / author	Research method	Concluding/findings
		Khomeini. But Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership refutes two other aspects of Weber's theory. **Findings:** True leadership is the same as charismatic leadership, critiquing two components of Weber's charismatic leadership theory.

Table 3: A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Based on Weber's Charismatic Leadership Theory (Critical Species)

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
Jahanbakhsh Izadi (1992 AD/1371 SH)	Analytical-comparative	**Conclusion:** In three cases, there is a fundamental difference between the leadership of the Islamic Revolution and the charismatic leaders in Weber's sense. 1. The invitation of the masses to the standards of the religious school by the Imam in return for the invitation of Weber's charismatic leaders to adventure, selfishness and self-invitation. 2. Duty-oriented and sense of task by Imam in the face of expediency-seeking and pragmatism of Weberian charismatic leaders. 3. The absence of charisma succession problems in Iran (regarding the persistence of religious beliefs) and its institutionalized departure from charisma to the legal-rational system in the face of the issues that arise for charisma leaders in this regard. **Findings:** Weberian charisma does not conform to the leadership of the revolution and according to the values of the Shia and the religious beliefs of the followers and the goals of the leadership in creating the revolution,

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
		as well as the existence of some charismatic leadership characteristics, which are not found in the Imam.
Manuchehr Muhammadi (2000 AD/1379 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** The relationship between the Imam and the people was based on logic and rationalism rather than the domination and charismatic power of the Imam. As a result, despite all the characteristics of a charismatic leader in the Imam and the great interest of the masses, the relationship between the leadership and the people in the revolution was not based on charismatic authority. **Findings:** Although the Imam has the most apparent charismatic characteristics, such as the fascination of the people, for different reasons, this fascination of the leader should be considered among the people and the belief that originates from religion.
Hamid Parsa Nia (2000 AD/1379 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion**: According to Weber's charismatic view, analysing the problems and the Islamic Revolution of Iran and especially the Imam movement, the revolution was exposed to two damages. First, it reduces the Imam's activity and the cultural and social dimensions of the process to Weber's theory. Second, it will lead Iranian analysts to other ideas proposed by Western theorists about mass society and its plagues, civil society, and the like to explain and solve the problems of Western civilization. **Findings**: The analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and especially the movement of the Imam, according to

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
		Weber's view, causes damage and deviation from the goals and ideals of the Islamic Revolution. This damage occurs in Iran in various forms and is practiced.
Davood Mahdavi Zadegan (2005 AD/1384 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion:** For various reasons, Imam Khomeini, knowing his inherent abilities and the degree of influence in the hearts of the Iranian people, has never tried to base their rule on charismatic sovereignty. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini's leadership is not based on Weberian charismatic sovereignty
Hossein Kachooyan (2012 AD/1391 SH)	Explanatory -analytical	**Conclusion:** This (charismatic) personal characteristic of revolutionary movement leadership in Iran is sometimes spoken of in the form of ambiguity concerning the concept of Weber Charisma, despite the central role of leadership cannot be explained. **Findings:** For the first time in Shia history, people had used the most sacred and, at the same time, the highest descriptive title for him (Imam Khomeini), who before it just used for a few of the most exceptional people in the history of humanity or godly and innocent. People called him Imam, not just a charismatic leader with a Weberian look.
Bahram Akhavan Kazemi(2006 AD/1385 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** The model and theory of charismatic leadership does not apply to the administration of Imam Khomeini, but is a kind of delusion and accusation against it. While the use of such terms is the inability to analyze and explain the role of the Imam's leadership in

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
		the Islamic Revolution is fundamentally incorrect and illusory. **Findings:** The profound influence of Imam Khomeini as the leader of the Islamic Revolution was because he was an example of a perfect man and not just a charismatic leader.
Bahram Akhavan Kazemi(2007 AD/1386 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** The claim that the charisma leadership model corresponds to the leadership model of Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution and compares with them is fundamentally false, unscientific and imaginary, but can be criticized. **Findings:** Many negative traits of charismatic leaders such as self-centeredness, domineering, authoritarianism, uncriticism, lawlessness and considering himself extra-legal were not the personality of Imam Khomeini. Contrary to the charismatic leaders and the above theory, the Imam believed in the divine source of legitimacy and was not charismatic and was strongly opposed to discipleship, follower-making, and a massive and passive attitude towards the people.
Hassan Abedi Jafari (1999 AD/1378 SH)	Analytical	**Conclusion:** The generalization of Weber's charismatic leadership theory to Imam Khomeini's leadership model can be criticized. Imam Khomeini creates a system based on a law-abiding structure, which at the same time has extreme communication attractions between the masses and the leader, and the level of communication between the people and him is constantly increasing.

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
		Findings: Regarding Imam Khomeini's differences with Weber's charismatic characteristics, we should not necessarily generalize the theory of charismatic leadership to the structure and supervision of the Islamic system.
Akbar Ashrafi (2008 AD/1387 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** We never have to resort to Weberian's charismatic model to analyze Khomeini's political leadership. Because this model lacks the power to analyze all dimensions of leadership. The source of legitimacy of Imam's leadership is Weber's model of leadership and cannot explain the origin of the legitimacy of Imam's leadership. **Findings:** Imam Khomeini's leadership originated and was legitimized from extra-personal sources, such as religious teachings and Shia authority. The incompatibility of Weber's leadership model with Imam Khomeini's administration is because this model lacks the power of analysis.
Sadeq Karami (2010 AD/1389 SH)	Descriptive-analytical	**Conclusion:** Examining the principles and characteristics of Imam Khomeini's leadership and charismatic leadership and comparing these two types of leadership and mentioning their similarities and differences, the results show that Imam Khomeini's leadership and Weber's charismatic leadership are essentially related to each other. They are completely different. **Findings:** The similarities between these two leadership models are outward regarding the differences predominate on these similarities.
Behjat	Analytical-	**Conclusion:** The Islamic nature of

A Meta-analyzis, Analyzes of the Islamic Revolution
(Case Study: Max Weber's Theory of Charisma)

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
Yazdkhasti / Mahdi Ezzati (2014 AD/1393 SH)	critical	the revolution indicates the inability to analyze the Islamic Revolution of Iran based on Weber's theory. **Findings:** According to a critical view of the Iranian revolution analysis and expressing the characteristics of Imam Khomeini's leadership with Weber, we conclude that Imam Khomeini's leadership cannot be analyzed based on Weber's theory of charisma.
Nayyere Qavi (2015 AD/1394 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** The theoretical harms of Weberian analysis of the revolution lead to a shift from the principles and deviation from the goals and ideals. The actual liabilities of the "Social Arena," which includes twelve harms, are a minimalist view of the revolution and, consequently, of the universal ideals of Islam. **Findings:** The pathology of the Islamic Revolution based on the primary index centred on the thoughts of Imam Khomeini indicates the detrimental consequences for the Islamic Revolution in analysis based on Weberian charismatic theory.
Nayyere Qavi (2018 AD/1397 SH)	analytical	**Conclusion**: In the comparative version of Islamic Revolution analysis, Imam Khomeini's leadership model is based on Weber's charisma theory. In a therapeutic study, this adaptation is possible by forging and modifying some elements. In a critical type, the transformation of the leadership and role of the people in the Islamic Revolution to Weber's charismatic theory has tragic consequences. **Findings:** In the analytical works of

Analyst / author	Research method	Conclusion/findings
		the Islamic Revolution based on Weber's charismatic theory, analysts presented three types of adaptation, therapeutic and critical analyze.
Mojtaba Attarzadeh (1999 AD/1378 SH)	Analytical-critical	**Conclusion:** An inattentive and sometimes hostile groups try to highlight charismatic characteristics in the leadership of the Islamic Revolution to justify the greatness of the revolution seemingly. The attribution of superhuman qualities to leadership indicates Weber's emotional obedience to the emotions, not the rationality of his followers. In this way, a movement based on political understanding and awareness is degraded to an irrational motive. **Findings:** How the leadership continues in the Islamic Republic also challenges the idea of Weber's charismatic leadership in the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Conclusion

This study examined domestic and foreign analysts' works (57 works in different formats, from 38 authors and analysts) on Weberian analysis of the Islamic Revolution. These works study and analyze the Islamic Revolution and the leadership of Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution with Weber's charismatic leadership theory with different approaches. It is essential to pay attention to a few points:

First, despite attempts to analyze and apply the example (Islamic Revolution and its leadership) to the model (Weber's charismatic leadership theory), regarding the differences between the principles, causes, goals and objectives of the Iranian revolution and Weber's charismatic leadership theory, even if the similarities in appearance and primitiveness make the possibility of perfect adaptation unlikely.

To use this theory for analysis, the components of these theories must first

be localized to analyze based on a scientific basis. In the present age, revolutions and the nature of the Islamic Revolution is a complex social phenomenon. Therefore, is not easy to analyze the legitimacy, leadership and role of the people formally regardless of the principles, goals and other elements of the revolution. This analysis is not sufficient for the future of the revolution.

At the beginning of the revolution, some analysts believed that Weber's charismatic leadership theory was compatible with Imam Khomeini's, but later withdrew their claims. With the meta-analysis method, the present study, collecting scattered and individual research in scientific formats (books, articles, interviews, dissertations and thesis) has tried to combine and integrate the analyzes as much as possible to identify and categorize analytical types for scientific-research usage.

Analyzing the existing works in the form of fulfilment-model shows different and even conflicting types of analysis and other approaches that show how Weber's charismatic leadership theory can be used to analyse the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the contemporary century based on different perspectives. This study examined Weberian analysis of the Islamic Revolution with other approaches. In conclusion, expressed three general views. According to a group of internal and external personalities, Max's charismatic leadership theory can analyze and landscape the Islamic Revolution. The other group, which often tries to enhance Weber's theory to apply it in the analysis of the Islamic Revolution, through the method of correction, wounding and modification, agrees with the first group on the power of this theory.

Otherwise, they state that corrective-restorative methods can analyze the theory. In contrast to these two perspectives of analysis, the view of a group of analysts and writers that suggests a critical approach to the application of charismatic Weber's leadership theory to the analysis of the Islamic Revolution is as follows:

This theory cannot necessarily analyze the Islamic Revolution of Iran by preserving the Islamic principles and values, but it will also lead to some harm.

The result of reviewing a large amount of analyzable information to integrate science into existing analyses in the format above while maintaining scientific fidelity and ethics is expressed in three perspectives and a fulfilment-model in three tables for researchers.

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Islamic Revolution Challenges: US-Iran Relations and Human Rights

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Abstract

US-Iran relations were unique and strategic. After the Islamic revolution and the suspension of diplomatic ties, these relations were replaced by a sustainable enmity and hate even after four decades. This matter is unique in the history of diplomatic relations. Based on the direct negotiations between Iran and the United States regarding nuclear issues in the 11th government, the necessity of the analysis of the factors contributing to the continuous conflicts between two countries has attracted the attention of the researchers and scientists in the field of international relations. The main question is 'Why have the two countries failed to establish rational, logical and free from slogan relations even four decades after the Islamic Revolution?' This question is addressed from various viewpoints, including nuclear deals, terrorism, the Middle East peace process and human rights. The present study aimed to investigate the role of the human rights issue and its effect on the US-Iran relations in a descriptive-analytical manner, hypothesizing that this issue has no noticeable weight and importance in the continuous conflict between two countries. To this aim, human rights situations in the Pahlavi era are considered and compared with similar problems in the Islamic Republic. Then their contribution to the US-Iran relations is analyzed. A historical-analytical method is used to explain the pieces of evidence and findings.

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Introduction

In the Pahlavi II period, US-Iran relations were unique and special, which doesn't need further explanation in this work. Hence, only a brief review of these relations is provided before concentrating on the main topic.

After the end of WWII and with less influence of Russia and the UK than the growing influence of the US, relations between the two countries entered a new era. Strategic ties of two countries in the 70s resulted in the assignment of the Persian Gulf control to the Shah. For even better performance, Nixon promised to sell Iran All advanced and complex weapons except the nuclear ones. In this way, the "Twin Pillar Policy" of the United States was formed in the region based on Iran and Saudi Arabia as military and political pillars, respectively. Hence, the US government hoped that it could maintain both stability and security of the region and the interests of the West. Furthermore, having Iran as a close friend and ally in OPEC could facilitate the oil policies of the United States, ensuring the oil export to the western countries and creating a solid barrier against expansionist policies of the USSR (Sick, 2018: 237-253).

In this period, Iran was considered a base for air and land attacks against USSR and spying from this country. Iran's Geographic position and control over the Hormuz strait and its oil and other resources prompted the US government to consider it a country with deterministic importance for US national security (Gasiorowski, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 164-166). Nixon's doctrine satisfied Shah's military ambitions so that during 1970-75, he spent about 6.9bn dollars on military equipment and weapons. The presence of more than 40 thousand American military advisors in 1977 represents the depth of the military and security relations of the two countries. US-Iran relations went beyond military-security considerations as economic relations were also of pivotal importance. In addition to the numerous loans provided by the US government for financial plans of Shah, grants such as 1.5mn dollars for the construction of Tehran international hotel, 30.7mn dollars for Shahryar's power plant generators, 29.2mn dollars for telecommunications, among others, were given to the Iranian government (Mousavyfar, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 19).

The unique role of Iran in protecting the regional interests of the United States and its neighborhood with the competing superpower, i.e. USSR, prompted the US to support Shah's regime. This support stimulated the Islamic revolution wave, which ultimately, on March 13, 1979, led to the US losing Iran strategically. Along with the events occurring in the initial stages of the revolution, the old and strategic ally of the United States ultimately turned against it. It became its most ardent enemy in the region.

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The Islamic revolution of Iran challenged US regional interests.

Threats against the US's vital interests in the Middle East and fears of the revolution leaking to the other regional allies of the US, such as Saudi Arabia, prompted the US to assume a confrontational policy against the Islamic republic, which is still going on (Pompeo, 2020: 5).

Researchers have attempted to hypothesis and provide various viewpoints in seeing the reasons for the conflicts between two countries after four decades. Recently, a book titled "US-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue" has been published in which authors of the various chapters who are all experts of the international relations, alluding to the regretful history of the Iran-US's relations, investigated the reasons as to why the two countries reached to the current point in their concerns and provided a list of possible causes as follows: "The coup against Mosaddegh's government, supporting Pahlavi II, US embassy hostage-taking situation, manipulating the oil price, supporting Saddam Hussain during Iran-Iraq war, demonstrations against great Satan, intimidation, human rights violation, prison and execution, conflicts in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and frequent sanctions and threats." Moreover, as the name of the book suggests, they believe that the misunderstandings are resolvable and common interests are more important than conflicts and controversies – which are in their opinion based on a misunderstanding (cf: Maleki and Tirman, 2014: chapters 2-6).

Several Persian and English books and articles have been written about the challenges in Iran-US relations and the reasons for continuing this situation. Some of them are as follow:

1) A Reflection on US Foreign Policy on Human Rights (with a Look at US Policy toward Iran). Sayyid Davood Aghaei and Reza Bayati (2010 AD/1389 SH);

2) The Role of Human Rights as a Soft Power in US Middle East Policy. Mahdi Rouhani (2020 AD/1399 SH);

3) Legal Study of American and Iranian Human Rights Challenges. Mohammad Sotoudeh and Hamid Abia (2012 AD/1391 SH);

4) Worlds Apart: A Documentary History of US-Iran Relations, 1978-2018. Malcolm Byrne and Kian Byrne (2021);

5) Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and US Policy. Kenneth Katzman (2018);

6) US-Iran Relations. Avery Elizabeth Hurt (2017);

7) The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and US Policy. Robin B. Wright (2010);

8) The Middle East and the United States. Edited by David W. Lesch, Mark L. Haas(2018);

9) Iran Politics, Human Rights and US Policy: Congressional by Kenneth Katzman (2016);

10) Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and US Policy. Congressional Service (2018);

11) Iran and US. Saeid Hosein Mousavian (2015 AD/1394 SH);

12) Iran, US and Human Rights. Sohrab Salahi (2017 AD/1396 SH);

13) America and Human Rights. Fatemeh Mohammadi (2017 AD/1396 SH).

Scrutinizing the related literature, including the sources above, it was observed that none of the reviewed sources have addressed the why, how, extent of the influence, and the weight of the human rights component in creating the current situation in Iran-US relations. Nor did they use the control group and investigate this issue in a single country (Iran) in two different historical periods. Hence, this article aims to touch upon the existing gap in this area with the goal of putting forward suggestions to tackle the problems.

However, in an overall look at the reasons and factors contributing to the continuous conflict between two countries and the controversies in the US-Iran relations after the Islamic revolution, we can classify these factors into four groups:

1) Terrorism;

2) Nuclear technology and mass destruction weapons;

3) Middle East peace process;

4) Human rights.

Confrontation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the above contexts with the US is an issue that has overshadowed the relations between the two countries after the revolution. However, in Clinton's administration, the above matters became the axis of Middle East policies taken by the US government against the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is said that even the aim of taking a dual containment policy by the US was to change the Islamic republic approaches in the contexts mentioned above (cf: Sick, 1994: 19-20).

US foreign policymakers regarding the Islamic republic say: "There is a critical issue which has determined the policy of the United States about Iran since the revolution uncompromising opposition of Iran with the middle east peace process, specifically explicit and implicit support of Iran for groups committing terroristic attacks and violence, attempts to obtain mass destruction weapons and long-range rockets, incomplete respect to human rights particularly in treating religious minorities." (https://www.brookings.edu/research/america-and-iran-from-containment-to-coexistence)

Four disputes are taken as the variables contributing to the continuous conflict between Iran and the US. Each of these poses a hypothesis about the reason for constant hostility between two countries. However, since the

purpose of the present paper is to investigate the role of human rights in US-Iran relations, it is clear that it will not consider other variables in this research.

Issues discussed in the following sections are as follows:

1) Islamic republic and human rights;
2) Membership of Iran in international mechanisms of human rights;
3) The reaction of international institutes to the human rights conditions in Iran;
4) Human rights in Pahlavi II period.

1. The Islamic Republic and Human Rights

The human rights issue is of specific importance in the foreign policies of countries and the public opinions about the nations. Attitudes toward human rights from a universality and/or cultural relativity point of view have no contribution to the importance of the issue in countries' foreign policies. Today, the gap between proponents of universality and cultural relativity is diminishing, and a moderate approach to human rights is being highlighted. Human rights are being addressed from a universality point of view, and this issue has become an interdisciplinary topic going beyond the main issues of the national and international relationships. It has overshadowed all of the national and international issues. Today, no government hesitates to show itself as the defender of human rights and promoter of its values. But what makes the difference are the benchmark and the criteria of human rights, which appeared in the discussions about universality and cultural relativity. In the author's opinion, this difference is being diminished, and convergence is being achieved in universal human rights. However, this convergence is mainly about theoretical and academic issues. Human rights in intergovernmental relations are of political theme and used in the governments' foreign policy.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the countries that has been accused of extensively violating human rights and has witnessed the issuance of numerous resolutions of human rights by international human rights watchers.

The Author of "Islamic Republic Strategy about Human Rights in UN" claims that initially, the Islamic republic had a negative attitude toward western human rights and its conventions. He says: "In this period, the approach of the Iranian human rights policy pursues only the human rights which are mentioned in Quran, and doesn't recognize human rights conventions and international rules addressed in the international charter of human rights." (Sharifian, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 347)

With this approach, in the third committee of the general assembly, the former Iranian representative at the UN defines the stance of the Islamic republic about human rights as follows: "UN is a non-religious organization and universal declaration of human rights is a secular tool. The characteristics of the civil and political rights conventions are based on their ambiguous and incorrect perception of religious concepts. For this reason, secular organizations are not deserved to address spiritual issues. They force Muslims to respect the demands of such organizations. "(Zakerian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 61-2)

Remarks of the head of the Iranian board of representatives in the Vienna human rights conference confirm the implicit refusal of the western achievements in the human rights context. By rejecting the universality of human rights claimed by the West and its ethnocentricity, he says: "Iran asks for serious talks about the principles of the human rights since the main problem of the western countries is their misunderstanding about the humans and human rights. For this reason, westerners failed to provide an acceptable and universal pattern west intends to play as the judge, prosecutor and jury in the human rights context. At the same time, it attempts to take responsibility for the law-making and define the rule." (ibid., 62)

However, the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually changed its attitude about the human rights mechanisms and for the first time in 1998 and at the beginning of the 43rd general assembly of the United Nations, it declared that this country is ready for collaboration with the special reporter of the commission on human rights (https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/43).

The presidency of Khatami accelerated the positive attitude of the Islamic Republic about human rights. The idea of "Dialogue among Civilizations" and the issue of civil society and novel interpretations of sharia, prophecy, and Mahdism led to an approach based on collective wisdom. This approach tried to adapt the principles of western human rights with that of sharia. By hosting a human rights' workshop in Tehran during February and March in 1998, in which many like-minded countries participated, Iran moved towards the acceptance of the universality of human rights' themes and the mutual relationship among cultures with respect for the differences (cf: Amin, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 182-4).

Of course, this matter did not mean that Iranian officials remained silent about the West's selective treatment of human rights' issues, constantly expressing their concerns about politicizing the human rights concepts. Kharrazi, the foreign minister of the Khatami administration, said:

"To avoid dual standards and to take into account the cultural, moral and religious principles and the legal system of the countries, the critical

importance of the human rights in the modern world necessitates that necessary measures are taken to expand these rights and deepen our understanding of them. The instrumental use of human rights and relying upon it for political ends cannot be compatible with the collective wisdom in the modern world." (Zakerian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 64-5)

2. Membership of the Islamic Republic of Iran in International Mechanisms of Human Rights

A brief review of Iran's membership in international conventions of human rights and the way of membership and conflicts between national regulations and international conventions is this section's topic.

Currently, according to the United Nations, there are 25 international human rights conventions, some of which are as follows:
1) International treaty of civil and political rights (1966);
2) International treaty of socioeconomic and cultural rights (1966);
3) Convention of racial discrimination elimination (1965);
4) Convention of banning mass destruction and its punishment (1948);
5) Convention of eliminating discrimination against women (1979);
6) Convention of children rights (1989).

From these 25 conventions, Iran signed two patterns of the abolition of slavery and prohibition of selling people during the Pahlavi regime. Moreover, it approved ten more ways, seven dates back to the Pahlavi regime and three after the Islamic revolution. Two of these conventions are accepted conditionally; one is refugees' convention (9551), and the other is the convention of children rights (Sharifian, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 343-48). Some of the essential routines, such as the prohibition of discrimination against women and torture, face severe discussions regarding the membership of the Islamic republic. During the Khatami administration, the Islamic republic prepared membership in the convention of prohibition of discrimination against women with protections, but it didn't succeed. There is not expected to be a way for membership in these conventions in the upcoming governments.

As stated earlier, only two conventions are approved conditionally, and others are entirely approved with no conditions. Therefore, concerning the contractual commitment, the Islamic republic is committed to implementing the contents regardless of them being supported by this government and or the previous one. Anyway, the Islamic republic is the legal representative of the Iranian government and is committed to the commitments of the previous regime. It must adapt its rules to them and report its actions and progress in human rights to international organizations such as the human

rights committee, a socioeconomic and cultural rights committee, and a commission on the human rights that has become the human rights council. The problem is that there are conflicts between some of the regulations of the international system of human rights and that of the Islamic republic, which is the main factor leading to the condemnation of Iran in general assembly and commission on human rights (cf: Sharifian, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 812-22).

On the one hand, the Islamic republic government and the regime are established by the vote of Iran. The government is based on Islamic rules in which all of the rules must be following the Islamic ones. On the other hand, the Iranian government is bound to respect all of the international commitments of previous regimes, which are approved with no exceptions and conditions, while some of the articles of the constitution and common laws are in conflict and contradiction with that of the international charter of human rights (ibid., 812-22).

3. The Reaction of International Institutions to the Human Rights Conditions in the Islamic Republic

A brief review of the reports, statements and resolutions issued against the Islamic republic since the beginning of the Islamic revolution suggests that most of them are similar and make continuous claims about violation of human rights in various contexts. It means that freedom of speech, freedom of thought, newspapers, sexual discrimination, minorities' rights, execution, stoning, whipping, non-compliance with the international standards in jurisdictions, extensive prejudices against women, concerns about Salman Rushdie, violation of democracy, violence against citizens, harassment of Baha'is, and torture among others.

Various reports of international institutions such as the UN Commission on human rights, a high commissioner on human rights, amnesty international and UN Council of Human Rights during 1982-2014 shows that the aforementioned claims about the violation of human rights are frequently repeated, and even the worsening of these situations in Ahmadinejad administration is emphasized. These reports have further added new cases such as forced deportation of Afghan refugees, and testing of HIV medications on patients without their consent, among others.

In the US secretary of state reports about the world's human rights situations, a part is permanently assigned to Iran and cases similar to those implied in resolutions and statements are emphasized (e.g. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran).

4. Assassination and Violation of Human Rights

In the case of the assassination of regime opponents, there are always claims against the Islamic republic from western countries, particularly the United States and human rights international institutions, which are always denied by the officials of the Islamic republic demanding proof and documents regarding the claims. The most important claims about assassinations perpetrated by the Islamic republic are briefly mentioned:

1) During 1979-96, about 70 anti-regime leaders and activists were killed by Islamic republic agents and /or representatives, dependent on extremist groups and organizations;

2) Killed 27 opponents of the Iranian regime in 23 terrorist attacks, which intensified during 1991-6. Thirteen innocent people were also killed and/or injured during these attacks. 70% of these attacks occurred in Germany, France and Turkey;

3) The Murder of Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, Iranian democrat party secretary-general on July 13, 1989;

4) The assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar, former prime minister of Iran and the leader of one of the main opposition groups of Iran, on August 6, 1991 (cf: Parsi, 2007: 80). The investigations led to the arrest of three Iranians, which included one diplomat related to the Iranian ministry of intelligence. In trials, they stated that various Iranian administrations and centres such as the ministry of intelligence, commercial companies and Iran Air committed this crime;

5) The assassination of Muhammad Hossein Naghdi, head of the national council of oppositions in Italy (an organization is supporting Iranian regime opponents), March 16, 1993.

5. Issue of Salman Rushdie and Other Terrorist Attacks Against the West

After the publication of "Satanic Verses" by Salman Rushdie in 1988, the issuance of Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa about his apostasy on March 16, 1989, stimulated a wave of global oppositions by governments and human rights NGOs against this fatwa which was noted as a violating act of human rights supporting and spreading terrorism. Many attempted to take this fatwa back due to their limited knowledge about the issuance of fatwa in Shia.

Some of the terrorist attacks against western countries and Israel were attributed to the Iranian forces and/or their proponents such as Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas:

1) A suicide attack on US embassy in Beirut, April 8, 1983, with a 62 death toll and more than 120 injuries;

2) A suicide attack against a navy base in Beirut, October 23, 1983, with a 241 death toll and 40 injuries (cf: Parsi, 2007: 111-112);

3) A suicide attack on the French army base in Beirut, October 23, 1983, with a 58 death toll and 15 injuries (ibid.);

4) The explosion of the US military base in al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia leading to a 19 death toll and 372 injuries. After five years, the Bush administration published an indictment against Hezbollah (Saudi branch) as the agent, and Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, Kuwait and Bahrain as the supporters and claimed the discovery of a relationship between Iran and Hezbollah groups (Saudi branch) during 1994-5 (cf: Brennan, 2008: 171; Sick, 2003: 83- 88).

These referred cases are some of the claims made by international human rights organizations about the violation of human rights in the Islamic republic. They represent their attitudes toward the level of compliance with human rights in the Islamic republic.

In the last year of his presidency, in response to the US secretary of state's criticisms about human right's situations in Iran, Khatami rejected these claims and accused the US of violating human rights all around the world. He stated that:

Among all states, the US should not be allowed to speak of human rights, and it should be held accountable for its crimes in Abu Ghraib and or massacres it perpetrated in the name of democracy in the world and also for the sufferings of Palestinians as a result of their support of Israel actions. In his first year of presidency, Ahmadinejad proposed that observers were sent to the western countries to assess the human rights' situations in these countries and return. Western countries sent representatives to Iran to evaluate and compare the conditions of prisons, women and children in Iran and the West and then, for the results to be judged by the public opinions of the world. By these propositions, he rejected the charges against the Islamic republic and claimed the circumstances were better in Iran than in the West. Finally, in 2006, the Iranian supreme leader called the US the most hated country. He said: "We saw the US democracy in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib…. 'How does a government which has such prisons dare to talk about human rights?'."

The present study's aim is neither to confirm the validity of the claims about the human rights violation by the Islamic republic nor to defend the function of the Iranian authorities. This study intends to investigate whether human rights conditions in the Pahlavi era were better than in today's Iran.

Another goal is to examine how the human rights issue contributed to the US-Iran relations. This topic will be discussed in the following section.

6. Human Rights in Pahlavi Era

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became the Shah of Iran when the allies in WWII entered Iran. The Iranian people experienced the happiness of Reza Shah being dethroned as a dictator while being devastated due to the country's occupation by the foreigners. However, the presence of foreign forces didn't hinder the political excitement of people suppressed by Reza Shah. Foroughi's policy in the transition period was to help the young Shah reach a compromise with the suppressed people (cf: Behnoud, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 305-25). For many years, the unstable basis of the young Shah governance and the nationalization of the oil industry didn't allow for dictatorship.

However, the transition from the democratic government of Mosaddegh with the help of the United States and then the discovery of an extensive intelligence network of Russians in the Iranian army formed by the Tudeh party could take hundreds of officers to the highest levels of the commandership prompted Shah to establish a strong intelligence organization. To this end, he relied upon his American friends.

In 1957, the CIA proposed an intelligence organization to Shah named SAVAK. SAVAK officials were initially trained in the US. However, Israel became another center for training SAVAK forces (cf: Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 95).

Initially, SAVAK acted in the same manner as western intelligence organizations. Therefore, following Kennedy's reforms and unity plan for progress in America, the "White Revolution of Shah and Nation" was introduced in Iran. After a turmoil leading to the bloody suppression of people, SAVAK ceased being only an intelligence organization and turned into a secret police organization for confronting political opponents of Shah.

SAVAK was suspicious of any political activity. Hence, arrests, torture to get confessions, and long-term prison sentences became standard intimidation methods in SAVAK (cf: Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 95).

In this period, particularly in the 60s and 70s, the government ruled utilizing terror and intimidation. The known opposition groups and famous politicians, intellectuals, and prosperous families were safe from SAVAK. Some were mysteriously kidnapped. Torture was a common occurrence in prisons. Some of the prisoners were killed under torture. They cannot deny the kidnapping and imprisonment of the opponents with no legal permission and their torture in SAVAK prisons (cf: Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 96).

Zunis says: "SAVAK activities initially covered only the political context. However, at the end of the 70s, no context of Iranians' life was not free from the intervention of SAVAK." (cf: Zonis, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 222)

The issue of SAVAK and the dictatorship in Iran was even the reason of shame for some of the agents of the Pahlavi regime so that Parviz Raji, the ambassador of Iran in London, says: "Every time Iran is mentioned, words such as torture, SAVAK, corruption and dictatorship follow…. I feel embarrassed by these situations." (Nejati, 1992 AD/1372 SH: 2, 285)

Remembering the slogans of Carter about human rights and relating the sales of weapons to the compliance with human rights as well as actions of Shah for providing open political space, Antony Parsons, the former ambassador of UK in Iran, says: "I do not doubt that opportunistically, Shah took steps for taking democratic measures so that he can be away from Carter pressure; if elected." (Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 320)

Here, the policies taken by the US towards Pahlavi II are not to be discussed. However, in the author's opinion, there is no substantial difference between the foreign policy of democrats and republicans of the United States as the primary basis of both parties is naturally national interests. What is different is the policies used for realization of these interests. Later, we will talk about the difference in the policies.

Regarding Iran and the intentions of the Kennedy administration, Bill states that in addition to opening doors for economic and social reforms, the main goal was to maintain the political structure of Iran (cf: Bill, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 1, 245). Kennedy and his advisors believed that the best way to confront communism was to combine reforms with suppression so that if the reforms failed, soldiers, that is, the anti-riot force, could be used. Shah, who was confident about the US support, didn't hesitate to call upon commandos and army Special Forces to suppress the Tehran University protests in January 1962 and Tehran and Qom riots in June 1963 (cf: Bill, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 1, 246-7).

Katouzian emphasizes this issue and says: "Kennedy insisted on political, social and economic reforms in Iran. However, suppression would become acceptable." (cf: Katouzian, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 382)

In this way, in June 1963, military forces opened fire on protesters in Tehran, Qom and Varamin. The prime minister of Iran, Alam, who ordered the shooting later, said: "I had no other way." (cf: Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 293) After a short time, in the final statement given on Shah's trip to the United States, Kennedy ensured that US political and military supports would continue (cf: Houshang Mahdavi, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 1, 599).

What was important for Nixon was maintaining an alliance with the Shah and ensuring Iran's political stability. Therefore, he overlooked the crimes committed by SAVAK both in and out of Iran. This policy became the main principle of Nixon's doctrine, which was also emphasized and recommended (cf: Gonzalez, 2007: 113). Although the way SAVAK treated political opponents was well-known globally and, during 1971-76, Shah's regime was accused of torturing and violation of human rights, admired Shah's method of governance at the same time by Nixon and Ford and he was praised for his firmness in the government. Hence, it must have appeared to the Shah that they approved SAVAK actions (cf: Shawcross, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 20-21).

Ledeen believed that after the 28 Mordad coup (except for 1959-60), never addressed human rights between countries, particularly during Nixon and Ford administrations, who thought that pressure on Shah for national reforms damaged US strategy (cf: Ledeen and Louis, 1984 AD/1363 SH: 44).

The administration of Carter revealed his commitment to promises to Sullivan. It must be mentioned that US interests always influenced the issue of human rights.

The facts mentioned above imply that the anti-human right nature of the Shah regime was clear and free from ambiguity for both democrats and republicans of the United States, and SAVAK crimes were known to American officials. Sullivan states that:

"Despite global reflection of violence and torture utilized by SAVAK and serious protests that made this organization very unpopular, Carter made the difficult decision to maintain relations with this organization despite his promises to promote human rights in the world." (cf: Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 96-7)

The continuous support for SAVAK and ignoring its crimes and violations of human rights occurred when amnesty international secretary-general believed that the human rights background of no country in the 1970s was worse than Iran (cf: Zonis, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 458-9; Shawcross, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 124). Furthermore, in its 1974-5 report, amnesty international secretary-general criticized the torturing of prisoners by SAVAK and estimated the number of prisoners to be almost 25-100,000, asking for the attention of the world and taking measures in this regard (Nejati, 1992 AD/1372 SH: 55).

Carter, who has got into power in America, declaring that human rights issues would be the core of his foreign policy (Zibakalam, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 167), did not follow his electoral slogans; instead, what happened was

focusing on the US national interests in The Middle East and the world, paying little regard to human rights concerns.

Referring to the king's concerns about the new US policy, Vance (Carter's secretary of state) says: "The king's concern about the new US policy in Iran was not right resulting from our misunderstanding and lack of knowledge about Iran. Our national interests required to protect the king and allow him to play a constructive role in the politics of the region" (Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1373 SH: 467) and hence, Carter accepted the king's invitation to spend the New Year's Eve (1978) in Iran. The king, excited by this trip, took the opportunity to show his opponents and critics in Iran and the world that the great American human rights hero had recognized his regime to be worthy of support and innocent of the accusations made against it." (ibid., 126)

The exaggerated remarks of the American human rights hero at Tehran's dinner party about Iran's security and stability and the Iranian nation's regard for the king even surprised the board members, including Salinger, who said: "I was amazed by all of Carter's exaggerations. The day that Carter proclaimed human rights policy, I believed that this policy would conflict with our national interests. I knew that this policy would fall victim to our national interests at the time of a conflict. Carter's speeches at this banquet were a conflict between human rights policy and the need of the United States to maintain a powerful ally in the Middle East, i.e. Iran." (Nejati, 1992 AD/1372 SH: 2, 59)

As we noted in the previous section, in the United States and the West, no one doubted the anti-human rights nature of Iran's government and the use of torture by the king's regime. With the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party, the Shah called on the Iranian people to join this party to reach the gate of the great civilization. Those who chose not to join the party were known to either go to jail or leave the country (cf: Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1373 SH: 281).

The Western press ridiculed the Iranian regime's human rights and democracy and, at the same time, criticized the words of the king for the crimes and savageries of SAVAK. Interestingly, the king himself stated that we will not allow prisoners to torture from now on (with the declaration of political open space in 1977). Hoveyda did not deny the existence of suffering in Iran, announcing that the way and method of torture were taught to SAVAK by the United States and Britain (cf: Bill, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 1, 300). As a US ambassador in Iran, Sullivan acknowledged the issue of torture in SAVAK and protested the collaboration of SAVAK with the CIA. Parsons, the British Ambassador, in his memoirs "the Pride and

the Fall," explicitly states: "Arbitrary detentions, imprisonment of individuals without trial, torture and mass executions and persecution of students and dissident workers were considered an ordinary affair." (Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1373 SH: 264)

Furthermore, The Iranian people witnessed that the Carter government, in the events leading to the Islamic Revolution (from January 19, 1979, to February 13, 1978), declared unconditional support for the king's regime and repeatedly demanded the king to show decisiveness and a firm opposition against the revolutionary people of Iran. Let's look at some of these stances and remarks from the language of US foreign policy directors during the last year of the reign of the king.

In a part of his memoir, Carter said, "I, like all previous presidents, considered the king of Iran as one of America's most reliable allies. I commended his decision to continue selling oil to Israel despite the Arab boycott." The authoritarian and arbitrary policies of the king in the government caused the dissatisfaction of the intellectuals and other sections of the society. They created an opposition that fought to establish democracy in Iranian society. SAVAK acted with extreme violence and brutality against the opposition, and I knew that at least 25,000 political prisoners were dying in the prisons of the Shah's regime (ibid., 447). He says that: "Although Iran was in a critical situation, Sullivan, the other advisers and I believed that the Shah was still the best guarantor of maintaining stability in Iran." He also mentions that: "The Shah is worried about his future. He is hesitant to form a temporary military government, resign and withdraw from power. We have advised him to remain as the head of government, ensuring him of our support." (ibid., 451 referring to Carter's memo of November 2, 1978) Carter says: "I sent a message to him, and I emphasized that we would support any decision he made to deal with the crisis, even the formation of a military government." (ibid., 451) He also states that: "There was no doubt that we should support Shah without any conditions ... and continue to back Shah's regime to protect our interests and to help him succeed in his desperate struggle to keep his throne." (ibid., 452)

In his notes on November 10, 1978 (three months before Shah's absolute fall from power Carter writes, "The king was in a very shaky situation. I asked Cyrus Vance to emphasize to the ministry staff to have complete conformity with my position: the king must know that we are with him." (ibid., 253)

Carter's emphasis on the ministry staff conformity to his policies was because Sullivan was trying to force US officials to communicate with the

Shah's opponents, especially Ayatollah Khomeini, in the last few months of the Shah's regime. As Carter points out in his memoirs: "Sullivan also insisted that we must communicate with Ayatollah Khomeini, but Bakhtiar would interpret such an action as complete abandonment. Sullivan went completely off at this stage, and on January 10 (one month before the fall of the Shah), in a telegram to Vance, condemned our actions outrageously and unacceptably (unconditional support of the Shah) and called it as a big and perhaps irreparable mistake." (ibid., 457)

In general, American policy toward the Iranian revolution and the Shah's opponents was based on a strict and firm policy mentioned in the statements of the first rank government officials of the United States without any concealment. With the tragic event of September 17, 1979, in Jaleh Square, thousands of people were shot to death by the royal guards' machine guns (cf: ibid., 345). Per the suggestion of Vance and Brzezinski (Carter national security advisor), Carter left Camp David's crucial meeting. He assured him of his support and friendship in a telephone conversation with the king. He expressed his sympathy and US support for his actions to restore order (ibid., 479 quoted by Vance p. 520 and echoed by Brzezinski). Sullivan worried about the Shah's move to form a military government, sending a telegram to the ministry asking for the United States' opinion. He says: "He was surprised to receive a quick and clear answer." The answer was:

According to the US government, the survival of the Shah is essential, and the United States will support any decision that he (the Shah) will take to consolidate his power and position (ibid., 158).

In a book titled "Power and Principle," Brzezinski rejects the fact that the United States explicitly refused to call for a firm and strict policy against the opposition, saying: "Carter and I repeatedly contacted the Shah directly and encouraged him to adopt a more solid method against his opponents. If the Shah wanted or had the necessary determination to act firmly against his opponents, these same recommendations and encouragements were enough for him. Of course, due to the Shah's doubts, we should have pushed him more to handle what he was not willing to do and to force him into action." (ibid., 514)

It's a pity for Brzezinski to have failed to exercise more power, even though Carter's government sent his four-star general Huyser to assist him in the last months of the political life of the Pahlavi regime. Brzezinski tried his best to prevent the Shah's fall even at the expense of commanding General Huyser to kill Iranian people (cf: Huyser, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 236) and to launch a military coup in the event of Bakhtiar's defeat (cf: Huyser,

1986 AD/1365 SH: introduction by General Haig: 13, 52-95, ...). General Huyser states in his memoir that: "Even after his return to the United States and the victory of the revolutionaries, the US Department of Defense called him on February 11, 1979. Duncan's deputy secretary of defense asked (Huyser) if he knew about the situation in Tehran and asked Huyser if he would return to Tehran to lead the coup." (Huyser, 1986: 303)

Sullivan, as the most informed person in the United States, who had free rein over the White House's policies, also affirmed the above claim, stating that's: "Huyser was asked to prepare Iranian armed forces to counteract and suppress the opposition if necessary." (Sullivan and Parsons, 1993 AD/1373 SH: 217)

At the end of his memoirs, Brzezinski asks several questions, including the possibility of a military coup by the Iranian or American army without the Shah consent. He replies, "I do not doubt that if the Shah acted with strong will in the early stages of the crisis, using the powerful and disciplined army that he possessed, he could well have mastered the situation. Militants in Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt and Brazil, and elsewhere, have taken over power in more or less similar conditions and have proved their ability and capability in the government." (ibid., 567-9)

He also points out that General Huyser had reported on several occasions that the preparations for the coup were complete. When he asked 'whether they should decide instead of the king (for the coup to proceed) in such circumstances?' his response was: "I have come to believe that due to the importance and magnitude of our interests, we should do that." (ibid., 569-570)

Conclusion

This study reveals that the most important factor shaping the behaviour of the United States around the world, including the critical region of the Middle East, is The US's national interests and foreign policy priorities at each particular time. It is, under no circumstances, separable from Israel's security and interests. It was precisely this behaviour that led to America's disregard for the widespread violation of human rights in Iran, the dismissal of SAVAK's horrible crimes during the Pahlavi era, and withholding any pressure on the regime. Today, what highlights the behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran is exerting pressure on the opponents, political prisoners and the general public. Because the Pahlavi regime's survival was in the interest of the United States in the Middle East, the issue of human rights in the relations between the two countries

did not go beyond the speech and, in practice, American human rights defenders resorted to killing people. The Shah's opponents to save the Pahlavi regime even consider enacting a military coup. Even after the fall of the Shah, they blamed themselves for not implementing iron fist policies more decisively. The survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran conflicts with the interests of the United States in the Middle East -especially the security of Israel- and therefore pressuring this regime is in their interest and consistent with their Middle East policy.

Consequently, White House officials will best use this appropriate weapon (human rights) against Iran's government. Finally, human rights are one of the main controversies in the relations between the two countries. Still, it can certainly not be the main reason for the dark ties between the two. The main factor for the current situation is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has targeted the Middle East interests of the United States.

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Recognising the Concept of Political Excellence in Ayatollah Khamenei's Thought

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Abstract

Development and progress as a complex concept based on a process have various dimensions and levels usually studied in economic, political, social, and cultural development. Political development is one of the essential dimensions and indicators critical in theories and approaches to development in schools of thought and political sociology studies. While defining and clarifying the concept of "Political Excellence" and recognising the differences between it and the idea of "Political Development" and introducing the indicators of this exploratory concept, the present article examines them in terms of content from Ayatollah Khamenei's perspective. The main question is about the place of political excellence idea and progress in Ayatollah Khamenei's political thought. In response, it should be said that in his view, political excellence will be achieved by considering local conditions and domestic equipment, which is a new viewpoint and an acceptable model to replace with the concept of Western political development. Explaining the concept of political excellence, while considering the Western models of development unsuccessful, emphasising the indigenous Iranian-Islamic model of progress, he expressed seven signs and indicators for the desired model of political excellence and improvement, some of which, such as struggle, the spirit of risk-taking and discipline, the foundations of Islamic epistemology and attention to the two dimensions of human [body and soul], are the prelude to excellence and progress, and others, such as ensuring the independence of the country, producing the science and realising the social justice, is the result of excellence and improvement. In explaining the manifestations of political excellence and progress, he also expresses characteristics of the people such as awareness and insight, participation and presence in scenes and elections, and public monitoring and unity.

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Introduction

According to the notion that development exists in popular literature, development and progress have been one of the most controversial concepts in contemporary history; being developed means being Westernized. From this perspective, a developing or underdeveloped country can see its future in the developed country of today. Thus, development means westernisation in all its dimensions. This kind of development is not what Islam thinks of. It is noteworthy and worth mentioning that in the plan of the Islamic-Iranian model of progress, one of the issues emphasised is the difference between the concept of excellence and progress with Western development, which is also considered in this study. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, innovation, excellence, and progress are history's traditions, and human life has no meaning without them. Therefore, if development and progress are appropriately understood, they will no longer be misused or opposed. He says, "We should recognise development and progress, and see the progress model for our country, our society. There have always been two misconceptions about progress and evolution leading to progress. One wrong tendency is the betrayals committed in the name of progress and evolution, ... and on the other hand, there have been and are those who oppose any innovation and change. There have been these two opposing tendencies". According to him, political excellence and progress can be achieved based on a monotheistic worldview, revelation-oriented rationality, and components such as political participation, political independence, and the competence of agents. According to him, in the religion of Islam, not only is there no opposition to the transcendence and forward political and social movement of man, which raises him in the hierarchy of existence to the best of beings, but the fundamental mission of all Prophets and infallible Imams was nothing other than this matter. He believes in paying attention to the movement of society by explicitly distancing it from the two ends of the spectrum of extremism and heresy: "Prophets have come to build the world in a new way, to eradicate disorder, to bring about a resurrection in the ignorant environment of the time. Build a society based on monotheism, social justice, respect for human beings, freedom and legal equality between all groups and individuals, the denial of exploitation, tyranny and hoarding; giving field to human talents, encouraging thinking and learning, and in short, a society that is the cradle of human upbringing and excellence from all sides and with all its main dimensions which puts him on the path of his historical evolution from a significant turning point. This is the duty to which the prophets of God have been inspired to rise" (Khamenei, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 15-16). This arousal for the uprising is the

constant character of a transcendent society and the main distinguishing feature between the transcendent community and the developed society. The present article tries to recognise political excellence and progress from Ayatollah Khamenei's point of view through an analytical-descriptive method and documentary and library resources.

1. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The religion of Islam emphasises reason and science, followed by criticism and innovation, Ijtihad and Tafaqquh [Knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence], deep thinking and having scientific ethics and spirit, scientific conscience, critical thinking, relying on reasons, arguments, evidence and documents; submission only in the face of truth, as well as dialogue, tolerance, accepting conflict of opinions, peace, tranquillity, harmony and a good debate[1]. In Islam and Islamic culture, unlike Catholic Christianity and like modernity, there is a deep emphasis on human dignity and status, individual freedom and rights, intellect, science, the world, matter and nature, livelihood and wealth, work, production and trade, while the difference is that in Islam, all these cases have been considered and emphasised in a spiritual, religious and heavenly context and with a divine direction. The moral and spiritual context arising from the teachings, training, guidelines and worship functions of Islam can prevent the extremist and destructive orientations of those items, which are market-oriented, capitalist and secular extremist society and economy, have harmed man, nature, the world, human life, as well as world peace, security, and justice, and has caused meaninglessness, self-alienation, destruction of the environment, the commodification of everything, death of emotions and love of one another (Muwathaqi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 104- 105). Where God Almighty addresses the Prophet in the Holy Quran; says: "I am, but a man like yourselves, (but) the inspiration has come to me, that your Allah is one Allah: whoever expects to meet his Lord, let him work righteousness, and, in the worship of his Lord, admit no one as a partner"[2], has made faith and decent action the only condition for human transcendence and them reaching the position of nearness to Himself [God]. It is clear to everyone that the meaning of decent action is human social action, behaviour in society, and relation with others. We find the best definition in Mulla Sadra's works if we want to precisely follow the concept of transcendence and political excellence in Islamic thought. In Sadra's view, motion means the gradual departure of the object from power to action. Power and actuality are the existential

1. Quran 16:125.
2. Quran 18:110.

levels of the thing, so movement means coming out of imperfection to perfection and coming out of weakness is intense and involves evolution (Mulla Sadra, 1999: 84). In this view, which is the summary of Islamic thought about the excellence and progress of man and society, both the course of the human self and his social movement is a permanent and uninterrupted matter that constantly takes him from the lowest to the highest ranks. In this sense, Islam is not an individualistic religion like what is interpreted today about Christianity. Still, it is social and political. Without this combination, it is impossible to reach the position of 'the Khalifatullah' [God's representative on earth], which is the ultimate point of human excellence. Contrary to what some have tried to consider Mulla Sadra's Four Journeys as a person-centred mystical movement, contrary to the name of these four journeys, a journey from the creation to the truth; a journey from the truth to the truth is the truth; a journey from the truth to the creation with the truth; a journey from the creation to the creation in the creation with the truth. In Sadra's school, the origin, process, and destination are the creation of God, that is, the community of human beings. The view of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution on human progress and excellence is derived from Islamic thought. It is influenced by the same theory of Sadra, who believes: "The world, in the sense of the opportunities of human life, in the sense of the scattered blessings in the world, in the sense of the beauties and sweets, the bitterness and the calamities; is the means of human growth and evolution. From the point of view of religion, these are also tools for man to continue his path to excellence and development and the emergence of God's talents. The [material] world, in this sense, is inseparable from religion" (Khamenei, 2005 AD/1384 SH: Khamenei. ir).

This theory's primary and inspiring mediator during the Islamic Revolution and for Ayatollah Khamenei is this school's great commentator and agent, Imam Khomeini. Because when Imam, who had previously introduced Mulla Sadra as the greatest philosopher of theology and wrote works on the interpretation of Sadra's philosophy and mysticism, was asked that except for the Prophet and Imam Ali. Did they influence you and your personality the most? He mentions Mulla Sadra in philosophy (Khomeini, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 5/271). Therefore, the concept of excellence and progress has a special place in Islamic principles and teachings, and here we refer to some of its most essential principles in Islam:

A) Rationality; reason and its use in human decisions, behaviours and actions are fundamental from the Islamic point of view. The intellect emphasised in Islam is beyond the instrumental mind, whose particular

task is to measure and calculate economic, livelihood and daily affairs. This rationality in Islam is the fundamental rationality and, more precisely, "Wisdom," which is higher than the level of experience and experimental sciences. Instrumental intellect is along with wisdom and genuine reason. In Islamic literature, logic has been introduced as the inner argument of man;

B) Scientism and knowledge-centeredness, the promotion of science and knowledge to the extent referred to as light and enlightenment, indicates the fundamental importance of science. Considering it as a public obligation for the whole life span and wherever possible shows the remarkable value of science in Islam. The biography of the Prophet of Islam and the Impeccable Imams is full of the principle of scientism and the importance of its expansion and promotion in human social excellence. The flourishing of Islamic civilisation has been realised in a part of history in the light of the essence and advancement of science and knowledge;

C) Stability and perseverance in work; the principle of doing work with firmness and steadfastness is one of the basic principles and essential indicators of political excellence in Islam to the extent that the price and value of every human being depend on the work that he does well and worthily (Torabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 66-67);

D) Discipline, and in principle, development is possible with the order and stages of work. Therefore, society is highly dependent on demand in all walks of life to observe the chronological and practical order of decisions and actions in excellence and growth. Discipline has been a prominent feature of organisations based on economic merit and development optimising human material resources. The Holy Qur'an has repeatedly spoken of the discipline that governs the system of existence[3] and has introduced obedience and discipline as the primary condition of society's progress and excellence[4]. Also, while explaining the order in the life of the prophets, He has put order and beauty in a close connection[5] and has also referred to order as timing;

E) Dignity and pride of the Islamic society. Dignity means strength and invincibility. Important indicators of the dignity of the Islamic community are the level of faith and Taqwa [righteousness] of the majority of society, the level of unity and solidarity in the spirit of cooperation between them, the excellence of modern knowledge and technology in terms of quantity and quality, the percentage of independence in various dimensions, self-sufficiency with monetary authority and readiness to face military aggression

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[3]. Quran 7:54.

[4]. Quran 18:72-73.

[5]. Quran 52:20.

and cultural invasion (Torabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 67);

F) Legalism. For material calculations, planning and policy-making in excellence and progress to be feasible and effective by the people and the government, legal stability and the rule of law must be taken seriously. Calculations for the future will be codifiable when the future situation can be partially predicted with legal support. The Holy Quran has repeatedly spoken about the legality of society and its developments;

G) Interaction between government and society. In Islamic literature and teachings, the government institution has a fundamental duty to provide the grounds for the growth and excellence of culture in economic, social, cultural and political dimensions. On the other hand, the people and the public sector, about the principle of shared responsibility, must interact with the government, hold the government accountable, and interact logically within laws and regulations. The gap between the government, the public sector and the institute and institutions upset the balance in growth and excellence of society (Torabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 67-68);

H) Freedom. While believing that man was created accessible, Islam considers space the cause of changes, progress, revolutions and civilisations and introduces released as the cause of society's advancement towards construction and growth (Alikhani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 206). While emphasising freedom of belief, the Holy Quran considers liberty and freedom of choice as duty conditions. It has introduced release from all kinds of captivity in the philosophy of 'Bi'thah' as the fundamental principle of transcendence of man and society;[6]

I) Poverty alleviation of society. Achieving the transcendent goals that God Almighty has in mind for the creation of humanity will be better possible when man does not feel deficient in terms of physical and material needs. In the Holy Quran, God Almighty introduces poverty as the cause of the tendency of human beings to ugliness and deviation from the right path.[7]

In different places of the Holy Quran, poverty alleviation has been emphasised in Islamic politics and culture;

J) Social justice. Perhaps nothing has been emphasised and recommended as much as justice in Islam. While explaining and highlighting justice in the culture of religions, the Holy Quran emphasises adherence to justice in judgment[8] and speaks of the rights of the minority and the establishment of justice as the governing principle of the politics and manners of the prophets. In many Surahs of the Holy Quran, social justice is emphasised.

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[6]. Quran 7:157.

[7]. Quran 2:268.

[8]. Quran 4:58 and 5:45.

The Holy Quran introduces justice and fairness as the purpose of the prophets.[9] It can be argued that justice is the fundamental concept and pillar of political excellence in Islamic society.

1.1. Political System

The concept of a political system is a new approach to understanding the political phenomenon and includes political institutions and all kinds of political activities in society. The political system is part of the general system and implies the internal dependencies of the various components of this system. The political system and political theory concepts have been developed in recent years. According to the social sciences, the "System" concept is first used in anthropology. In politics, Easton and Almond have a prominent role in developing the "System" theory (Alem, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 149). According to Easton, the political system is a system of action and reaction in any society by which binding or authoritative distributions are created (ibid., 1994 AD/1373 SH: 150). Three primary and general arguments are distinguished in this definition—distribution of values by policy tools, distribution of authority, and the great importance of authority distribution. The same composite components distinguish the political system from other systems. Easton's understanding of the political system is cohesive and pervasive. The political system is a social subsystem, even though he considers the party and group subsystem in the political system as "Part of the Political System" (ibid., 1994 AD/1373 SH: 150-151). Almond accepts Easton's definition but opposes the use of the word authoritarian. Political systems have several features, including:

A) The political system has a software and program aspect and is more similar to a comprehensive theory that pays attention to the organisation of various affairs of society; therefore, it is general and indefinite;

B) It is not limited to time and place. That is, it is not specific to a particular time and may fulfil at different times; as well, can use in other areas and communities;

C) The political system, whose approach is to establish political order and organisation, is thematically in line with the general concept of politics. In other words, political and communication affairs are considered a subset of social affairs; but it regulates and manages the affairs of society, including communication, economic and cultural experiences. Establishing a logical and inclusive relationship between these three areas is the nature of macro and political management, which is presented in the form of a political system;

D) In this definition, the critical issue of "Growth" has been considered

9. Quran 57:35.

the goal of social change. Of course, growth, perfection, and prosperity are defined in a particular way in each political system's doctrinal and educational perspective. Sometimes growth and excellence are characterised by high human values and greater enjoyment of religion and material possibilities (Nosrati, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 40-41).

1.2. Excellence and Progress

The words "Excellence" and "Progress" are normative-grammatical concepts. We must distinguish this word from other descriptive terms, such as change and development. The concept of excellence and progress has long been overshadowed by the concepts of development that have been honoured in industrialised and developing countries. At the same time, the concept of excellence and progress is proposed to clarify the active, potential and creative role of socio-cultural values in the concepts of growth and development. In the progress definition, human beings' material and spiritual needs in achieving development are considered together. Excellence and progress mean a development that, in addition to increasing economic production, accumulation of capital, environmental considerations and natural resources between generations, changes the social, political and institutional structure. It also emphasises the category of human dignity. Therefore, excellence and progress are tied to deep and achievable human values. Thus, excellence and progress are valuable and will be embedded in each society's culture, beliefs, and ideology. In other words, the excellence and development of countries, including development, are based on the values and cultures of their society. Progress includes material economic development and cultural excellence (spiritual and moral) (Sadra, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 85).

1.3. Political Excellence and Political Progress

Excellence and progress are desirable development models formulated according to cultural and historical conditions and based on the belief of heritage and religious faith. It is Iranian because it is produced in Iran and is Islamic because it is based on Islam's theoretical and philosophical foundations. Therefore, excellence and progress are the movement forward and towards perfection, which in addition to the material dimensions, includes spiritual dimensions. This progress will be fulfilled if this balanced and proportionate movement moves forward. Political excellence and progress are how society and social institutions strive to embody Islamic values in the community to achieve perfection. More objectively, political excellence and progress are the behaviour of an individual or an organ or the whole society, using the best tools and a complete plan to achieve the goal of the political system as soon as possible (Mesbah Yazdi,

2009 AD/1388 SH: 181-182). Political excellence and progress are the leadership and management of the relations of individuals and organisations, the governmental affairs and the foreign relations of a country. This concept in our country, in addition to material and economic welfare, combined with cultural and spiritual growth and the rule of Islamic values, in a word, ensures the worldly and otherworldly happiness of citizens that is achieved through the practice of Islamic commands and regulations (Mesbah Yazdi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 183). The main framework for discussing political excellence and progress quantitatively and qualitatively is based on the greater participation of people in political affairs and their better understanding of political issues (ibid.).

2. Excellence and Progress from the Perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei

According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the country and the revolution in the current situation need a concept of progress, a meaning derived from the Islamic divine teachings and based on Islamic jurisprudence and wisdom. According to him, the country's intellectual and cultural elites should propose a new concept, that is, beyond the standard pictures of "Development" and "Progress" mentioned by modernists, which are related to the historical-cultural ground of the modern West. Hence, they have considered using "Progress," which means individual and social excellence, instead of the joint word development. In this sense, excellence and progress are targeted programs for the growth of all levels of a particular country, so any development finds meaning focused on a cultural context. As a result, there is no program and pattern of generalisable development, and it is not practical for other countries and cultures (Haqqani, 2010 AD/1389 SH). Each country's historical, geographical, political, cultural, temporal, and spatial conditions should consider excellence and progress. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the West divided the world into developed, developing and underdeveloped countries through a propaganda tactic. Maybe imagine that a developed country has advanced technology and knowledge and is undeveloped and growing in the same way; at the same time, it is not valid; the set title and the other two titles have a value load and a valuation aspect. A developed country means a western country with its characteristics, culture, customs, behaviour and political orientations. A developing means a country becoming westernised, and undeveloped also means a not Westernized country. Therefore, while emphasising learning the positive points of Western development, they do not accept development in the sense of westernisation because it is anti-value in Western culture. In his view, "When we say progress, development should not be associated with

the common Western concept." The intended progress may have common aspects with what is understood today as the concept of development in the world. Still, the word progress has meaning in our linguistic system, which should not be mistaken with development in today's Western verbal system. What we are looking for is not necessarily Western development. to become Western. There are positive points in the set of behaviours, actions, shapes and figures of the western developed countries that we will learn if we have to learn them; but in our opinion, there is also a set of anti-values things in it. Therefore, we do not accept the collection of westernisation or the so-called progressive westernisation; the progress we want is something else (Khamenei, 2009 AD/1388 SH: Khamenei. ir). The noteworthy point to consider in the above-mentioned is the leadership's attempt to seek a new concept in the development debate and recommend and emphasise conceptualisation in this area.

It is undeniable that every development is for humans and returns to them. Therefore, commonalities can be found between all development patterns. Still, suppose the product in its specific and contextual meaning refers to certain land and nation to achieve it. In that case, we should re-examine and recognise the characteristics of culture and context that each particular development pattern suggests (Haqqani, 2010 AD/1389 SH). While emphasising the necessity of using all the country's capacities in formulating a strategic model for the excellence and development of the Islamic-Iranian society, the Supreme Leader believes that a single model for excellence and progress in communities cannot be found. There is no single model for improvement [excellence] that we can see, go to, and create all the components of that model ourselves and implement in our country. Progress in our country - with our historical, geographical, and territorial conditions, our nation's situation, customs, culture and heritage - has its unique pattern. We have to search and find that pattern. That pattern will lead us to progress; other versions are not helpful; neither the American version of progress nor the European, none of these can be a desirable model for the development of our country. We have to look for our native model. Our art will be to be able to find a native model of progress tailored to our circumstances. Epistemological foundations affect the type of progress that is desirable or sublime. Every society and nation has epistemological, philosophical and moral foundations, which are the solid foundations and tell us what kind of progress is desirable and undesirable. According to our epistemological foundations, we can determine whether this progress is legitimate or illegitimate, desirable or undesirable, fair or unfair. Therefore, epistemological and moral foundations and principled and philosophical

thoughts are decisive in defining progress in a country. If we count the points of difference between progress with Islamic logic and Western development, we should not neglect the commonalities. There is also a common ground that these have been fully present in the development of the Western developed countries. The spirit of risk-taking, initiative, action and discipline are essential. In any society, without these, there will be no progress. These are also necessary (Khamenei, 2008 AD/1387 SH: Khamenei. ir). If we want to compile an Islamic model for the country's development, we must pay attention to its aspects. It does not mean merely material progress; the goal is material and spiritual progress. It is also found in Islamic sources. On the one hand, Islam emphasises work and effort and, on the other hand, defines requirements for the Islamic society and its citizens. In Islam, even economic work, if done with a specific intention and motivation, is accompanied by a spiritual and a special reward in the hereafter. Therefore, in the Iranian Islamic model of progress, both the country's and individuals' material and spiritual growth must be considered. However, the native conditions of Iran itself are also necessary (Haqqani, 2010 AD/1389 SH). Explaining the concept of excellence and political progress, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasises the role of teachers as the founders of excellence and political and cultural progress, introducing it as the concept of creating conditions in which human beings can think and understand the truth correctly. In such circumstances, misleading conspiracies and efforts will not work in that society; of course, this issue cannot be fixed by controversy and fuss and newspapers, but political [political excellence] and cultural development are founded only by the teacher (Khamenei, 1999 AD/1378 SH: Khamenei. ir). His intended model of excellence and progress is wholly rooted in Islamic ontology, epistemology and anthropology, and the first pillar is attention to the origin and then the resurrection. We took the model from Islam, and our people chose the Islamic system out of familiarity with Islam. Our people had read Islamic books and were familiar with the narrations and the Qur'an; therefore, they had some information about values, so they followed them. In the previous regime, these values were unknown. The revolution was to achieve those values (Khamenei, 2000 AD/1379 SH: Khamenei. ir).

3. Excellence and Progress, Model and Pattern of Indigenous Development

Today, with the inefficiency of Western or Eastern development models for other countries, development based on each society's cultural and geographical characteristics has received serious attention from developing countries. Ayatollah Khamenei distinguishes between using the others'

experiences and following educational and inductive models and believes that the development model in the Islamic Republic of Iran, according to the Iranian people's cultural and historical conditions, is wholly indigenous and specific to the Iranian nation. The model of development in the Islamic Republic, regarding the cultural, historical, heritage and beliefs of these people, is an entirely indigenous model specific to the Iranian nation and should not be imitated anywhere; not from the World Bank, not the International Monetary Fund, not some left or right country; it has particular necessity everywhere. The difference between using others' experiences or following educational and inductive models is often abrogated. We should use experiences and knowledge. But the pattern, method and model must be chosen indigenously and internally (Khamenei, 2004 AD/1383 SH: Khamenei. ir). In his view, progress does not have an absolute meaning, a single pattern and model. Instead, different conditions affect the progress models creation. Accordingly, a progress model may be desirable for one country and exactly undesirable the same for another. He believes that progress in the Islamic Republic of Iran has its pattern with its historical, geographical, customs and culture. Therefore, we must look for our native model appropriate to our circumstances (Khamenei, 2008 AD/1387 SH: Khamenei. ir), the same political and social excellence model. Referring to the failure of Western models of progress and the fact that those models were formed with their conditions and principles, he believes that we must find improvement in the sense of political excellence with the Islamic-Iranian model. Western models are shaped by their circumstances, mental foundations, and principles, but they were unsuccessful. The Western model of progress is a failure model. Progress and development could enrich a few groups and a handful of families. But has enslaved, humiliated, and colonised other nations, created war and earned the government. It has spread corrupt morality within those countries, far from spirituality, prostitution, corruption, family destruction, etc. Therefore, it is not successful. We must find progress with the Islamic-Iranian model. 'Why do we say Islamic?' 'Why do we say Iranian?' we say Islamic because it is based on Islam's theoretical and philosophical foundations and the anthropological foundations of Islam. We say Iranian because it emerged from Iranian thought and initiative (Khamenei, 2007 AD/1386 SH: Khamenei. ir).

4. The Islamic Revolution and the Formation of a Religious Government as a Model of Political Excellence and Progress

In Ayatollah Khamenei's theory, discussing the excellence and progress model does not mean the decision to start progress in Iran. Instead, in his

view, the Iranian nation began its progress many years ago with the beginning of the Islamic movement. The formation of the Islamic system in Iran was the most significant and astonishing transformation, excellence and progress in Iran. Because a coup d'état and a hereditary and degenerate government became a real people's government. A new political system was formed based on Islamic teachings of the Shia type and Velayat-e Faqih. The Islamic political system in which the Supreme Leader, the executive and the legislature and the judiciary branches, the affiliated institutions and organs, and beyond all these, the people are its principles. Therefore, to approximate the mind and make the research objective, the discussion will be presented according to the structure of the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was established based on the Velayat-e Faqih.

In his view, Iranian society began to move toward political excellence from the beginning of the revolution. According to him, progress in our country started with the revolution and the revolutionary movement. Under the pressure of dormant talents, a stagnant static society was transformed by a revolutionary movement without allowing any action in the deep sea of our national skills. Today, the formation of the Islamic Republic was a significant change, surprising and great progress. The nation could transform a hereditary government of a corrupt coup d'etat into a people's government, which is no higher than this, and it was a tremendous change and progress. With a theoretical discussion and a clear and disciplined definition of progress, we intend to create a shared belief first among the elite and then among all people. They should know what we are looking for and where we want to reach and that the various parts of the system know what they must do (Khamenei, 2007 AD/1386 SH). He believes the Islamic Revolution said a new word: the Islamic government. It did not follow the example of the East and the West. Of course, not accepting the model does not mean not using the positive points of Western or Eastern models. It also does not mean being complete and flawless, but over time it needs to complete and eliminate weaknesses (Khamenei, 1999 AD/1378 SH: Khamenei. ir). Revolution is a fundamental change based on values and a step forward. What happened in our country was the Islamic Revolution. The significant difference in the political, economic and cultural pillars of the society and a move on and action towards the progress of this country and this nation. Of course, in the revolutionary system, we did not use the East and the West model because we could not get a pattern of those whose systems we considered wrong and against the interests of humanity (Khamenei, 2000 AD/1379 SH: Khamenei. ir).

5. Indicators of Political Excellence and Progress According to the Ayatollah Khamenei

According to Ayatollah Khamenei, a development is desirable and will be a model of the nation's excellence, which would be based on Islamic epistemological, moral and philosophical principles. It considers humans being two-dimensional, so build man's world and hereafter. It guarantees the country's independence, leads to producing science and knowledge, and fulfilling social justice. It should use some positive features of Western models, including the spirit of risk-taking and discipline. According to him, political excellence and economic progress are a prelude and means to reaching Islamic society to social justice, which is the goal of the model of the transcendent society (Khamenei, 1993 AD/1372 SH: Khamenei. ir). Regarding the political excellence and progress model, we first explain the theoretical foundations of political excellence and progress and then discuss the characteristics and components of political excellence. Features and political elements of the model of Islamic-Iranian progress are formed under the theoretical foundations derived from pure Islam and lead the political system to progress with lofty goals under the school of monotheism.

5.1. Epistemological Foundations

Ayatollah Khamenei believes that we must consider society's bio-social and cultural conditions and its epistemological, philosophical, and moral foundations to achieve the desired progress and a transcendent community. These criteria and epistemological and ethical foundations affect the orientations and macro direction of improvement and excellence in the country and the political system. One who clumsily and irrationally chanted one day and shouted that we should go from head to toe and become European did not notice that Europe has a history, culture and epistemological foundations on which the progress of Europe is based that epistemological foundations. Maybe we don't accept some of those principles and misunderstand them. We have our own epistemological and moral foundations. According to our epistemological principles, we can determine which progress is legitimate or illegitimate, desirable or undesirable, just or unjust (Khamenei, 2009 AD/1388 SH: Khamenei. ir).

5.2. Humans Being Two-dimensional

Ayatollah Khamenei expresses some progress characteristics based on the Islamic view and says it is based on the type of metaphysical view of man. Islam considers man a two-dimensional being who has both material and spiritual dimensions. He believes in "Islam as a two-dimensional being; with the world and the hereafter. It is the basis of all that needs to be considered

about progress; it is the main indicator. Our country and the Islamic society are advanced when they not only build the world of the people but should build their hereafter. Therefore, the balance between the world and the hereafter and looking at them is obligatory. It is a major progress indicator." (Khamenei, 2009 AD/1388 SH: Khamenei. ir) Humans being two-dimensional has a close relationship with political excellence and political progress; the belief in human beings as one-dimensional or two-dimensional plays a decisive role in the development of individuals and human societies. If one considers human existence only in the material and worldly dimension, as in the Western world, naturally consider human progress only in material and temporal prosperity development. Instead, when a school and intelligent system, in addition to the material dimension, consider the spiritual dimension as a genuine and eternal dimension of human beings; so, human progress and its indicators find a spiritual approach and pay attention to spiritual matters and needs put among the main concerns (Khaliliyan, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 73). Hence, in the discourse of Islamic transcendence and progress, in addition to the material and descending dimension of man, we must also focus on his transcendent and actual dimension. Because cultivating this human dimension fulfils the valid distinctions of man and flourishes his existential capacities. According to Ayatollah Khamenei's intelligent system, attention to being two-dimensions - material and spiritual dimensions - individual and social existence of man is the most crucial difference between the theory of political excellence and Western political development emphasises only the one-dimensional development of man.

5.3. Political Independence

According to Ayatollah Khamenei, "Independence" is vital for achieving excellence and progress goals. "Independence" is essential in systems' political excellence and development. He always emphasises the need to guarantee independence, maintain decision-making power in the country's development model as an indicator, and not neglect and achieve apparent progress and compulsion to follow the West. Therefore, he believes that "Any progress model should guarantee the country's independence. It is considered an indicator. Any model designed for development that makes the country dependent degrades and pursues powerful, politically, militarily, and economically powerful countries are rejected." (Khamenei, 2009AD/1388SH: Khamenei. ir)

In his questioned model of political excellence, progress is accepted, which considers man as the only servant of God and his dependent He has no eyes or greed for foreign countries, especially Western societies. In explaining

the relationship between independence and political progress, and its relationship with the model of political excellence, we should pay attention to the fact that various historical, geographical, natural, human, temporal and spatial conditions affect the progress and excellence of a society.

It should be said that excellence and progress are not only profoundly linked to political independence, but the necessary condition for its emergence is political independence. Crossing a certain level of political autonomy provides the ground for progress and achievement of a transcendent society. Conversely, at different levels of development, the intensity of the growth of political independence varies. The lower level of countries' development shows less experience of their people gaining political independence. The low inexperience in political independence causes weaker support for progress and development (Taghizadeh Ansari, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 101).

5.4. Social Justice

Progress in the Islamic sense includes the transcendence concept, containing spiritual progress, and justice means giving every group or individual the right in society. Therefore, one of the rights is providing the necessary grounds and facilities to achieve the same spiritual progress in society. Just development is formed and becomes one of its examples (Shabannia, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 20). Ayatollah Khamenei believes in the relationship between justice and political excellence and society's progress: "In the social sphere, development must be tied to the people; people must be the centre of development. Justice is the main indicator. Planning and policy-making that ignores justice and fair distribution of wealth in society cannot provide our questioned vision and is not our desired plan." (Khamenei, 2003 AD/1382/05/15 SH: khamenei.ir)

Thus, he believes that political development without justice does not open the way for us but closes all the paths of man to reach transcendence and takes him away from the divine straight path, which is the only way to save human beings today.

5.5. Struggle

Transcendence and progress are not effortless and have many difficulties. Every turbulent current requires the strong will of a nation to reach the peaks of growth and excellence. Having the spirit of struggle and observing moral and religious principles is one of the requirements of this tortuous path. Ayatollah Khamenei believes that "If you want to progress, you have to fight; seeking convenience, isolation, incuriosity, looking at world events, and not entering the world's great arenas, will not bring progress to any country or nation. You have to go to the middle of the field, which is not necessarily a military battlefield. Political and moral battles are more important

today than military warfare. Today, many countries, governments and societies that are considered advanced in the world, if moral and political accounting, they will be humiliated." (Khamenei, 2009 AD/1388/02/27 SH: khamenei.ir)

5.6. Islamic Ruling

According to the Islam political school, Ayatollah Khamenei believes that the characteristics of the Islamic ruler and Velayat-e Faqih are religious and spiritual norms. It is the opposite in the capitalist countries, which in their developmental theories, these characteristics depend on the powerful and wealthy faction. According to him, the index of the Islamic ruler is science, purity and wisdom. Science brings awareness; piety brings courage; insight ensures the country's interests and the nation. These are the main criteria regarding the Islamic political school (Khamenei, 2004 AD/1383/03/14 SH: Khamenei. ir). Thus, in his view, the Islamic government leader should have at least three main characteristics; jurisprudence, justice and righteousness, and management ability (having correct political and social insight). Accordingly, in the absence era of Imam Zaman, no one or group has the right to rule except a just jurist who, according to his jurisprudence, justice and management and with others' consultation and help, based on the requirements of the time, organise the elements of the Islamic government system firmly and dynamically.

5.7. Structural Separation

Western development theories have based their discussion of the governmental function on absolute structural separation so that no unifying factor can reconcile them. However, Ayatollah Khamenei has emphasised the independence of all forces, the separation of powers, the word unity, and the faith brotherhood. He believes that the constitution determines the duties of each party. The executive branch manages the country and all the organisational affairs of the country and spends the large budget of the country. The legislature is responsible for legislating and overseeing the performance of government officials. The judiciary must prosecute law violators and fulfil their rights; so that no one can oppress or violate others. The leader's most important task is to determine macro policies try; that is, those things that determine the direction of the country and all laws, regulations, and practices must be in this direction (Khamenei, 2001 AD/1380 SH: Khamenei. ir). Therefore, in the approach to political excellence, Velayat-e Faqih is not an absolute and self-governing executive but a macro-policymaker of the country and a factor in creating unity among the three separate forces.

Ayatollah Khamenei believes that a transcendent and advanced government

is the *Karimeh* government; this government has a new message for the people of the world and is a symbol of religious democracy (Khamenei, 2001 AD/1380 SH: Khamenei. ir). In his view, the *Karimeh* government is dear and proud and has a firm belief in how the constitution and the duties and policies of the system have been set before it. It is impenetrable and does not see his property as light to make others light (Khamenei, 2001 AD/1380 SH: Khamenei. ir). This *Karimeh* government has some characteristics, including being active and practical, has attention to all dimensions and capacities of the country to create self-sufficiency, justice-making, making efforts to reduce and eliminate poverty and deprivation in the country, being trustworthy and honest through non-personal abuse of job opportunities and unnecessary squandering and unruly employment of relatives and preparation of formal documents, avoiding political turmoil and trying to establish peace and security in the country, having coordination and coherence in tasks and programs, and most importantly, pay attention to spirituality and morality (Khamenei, 2001 AD/1380 SH: Khamenei. ir).

Conclusion

Political development in Western thought and schools differs significantly from political progress based on Islamic-Iranian propositions. Conventional political development is rooted in material theology. God Almighty is the origin and basis of political progress in political transcendence and Islamic-Iranian progress; therefore, power, government and rulers are accepted and approved by religious standards. Thus, the current political development is fundamentally different and, in some cases, opposed to political excellence and Islamic-Iranian progress. Political excellence and improvement are rooted in the religious principles and teachings of the Islamic school, in line with the goal of creation, guidance and salvation of human beings. Political excellence and progress in its Islamic-Iranian model and framework are formed under the Islamic theoretical foundations that lead to improving a political system with transcendent goals under the monotheistic school. In fact, because of the importance of the principles in development models in which pattern differences are derived, the model foundations of political excellence and Iranian Islamic progress are crucial. They have greater priority than in other cases. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a divine and religious system, contrary to the current political development in the world, the theory of political excellence and its development is based on the principle of monotheism and God-oriented and the doctrinal foundations of Islam. It is opposite to

the patterns of political development in the West, where humanism and human-oriented are the basis of the work. The present study aimed to explain Ayatollah Khamenei's view on the idea of political excellence and progress by highlighting these differences between the theoretical foundations of Western political development and the macro approach of the Islamic school. By discussing the views and opinions of Ayatollah Khamenei at different times and situations, this paper concluded that Ayatollah Khamenei's understanding of development and progress is based on the principles and standards of the religion of Islam and society and provides for Islamic-Iranian organisation. This theory has results that can be used as a "Political excellence" concept as a conceptual exploration. In Ayatollah Khamenei's approach to political excellence, components and indicators such as independence, justice, political participation of the nation in the fate and decision-making of the country and the role of elites and rulers of the Islamic system in advancing the goals and aspirations of religious democracy are critical. His theory of religious democracy is also based on Islamic principles in which people have a high status. Therefore, the election of rulers by the people is a matter of Islamic law, and the validity of the people's vote has a religious origin. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the political system of Islam is based on divine and Islamic principles in which the spirituality and materiality of society and individuals are considered together. Therefore, in his opinion, the political system is transcendent, advanced, desirable and legitimate, Islamic and of the Shia type and based on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih. This metaphysical system guarantees excellence in all directions and areas, including material, spiritual, political, cultural, economic and social, by observing indicators based on faith and piety. According to him, faith in God Almighty, purity, cultivation and self-improvement, self-confidence, patience and endurance are among the most important indicators and personal characteristics of agents and officials of the Islamic government that provide the path to political excellence of individuals and society.

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Flowology of contemporary parties with a systemic approach (Case Study: secession MKO from Nehzate-Azadi)

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Abstract

The present study aimed to analyse historically the early activities of the Iranian liberation movement based on Parsons' theory of structural functionalism. Before the founding of this party began in the form of the "National Resistance Movement" and then "Second National Front" and in the process of political events in the early 1940s, activities caused the band's decline and then the split Mojahedin Khalq Organization. In this study, the Freedom Movement Party of Iran as a system has expressed its decisions as output through an internal process after receiving political developments as data. In Parsons' theory, internal and external factors affecting the environment and the order's value system cause disorder. The agreement between the Shah and the US for the fall of Amini, an external environmental factor; leftist revolutions, the outer aspect of the value system; the leaders' arrest of the Freedom Movement for opposing the White Revolution, the internal environmental factor, and Bazargan's scientific-oriented thought as the internal factor of their value system led radical young people to conclude that they could derive the science of struggle from Marxism while religious spirits. The result indicated that the collective construction of the Freedom Movement was one of the factors that did not oppose this internal radicalism and confirmed it. In the collective construction of the Freedom Movement, the gang was formed as a circle of friends, not a professional organisation. Regarding the lack of standardised procedures in political behaviour, failed to institutionalise adherence to the constitutional legal structure as a political model for members.

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Introduction

The establishment of Ali Amini's government in Ordibehesht 1340 provided a relatively favourable atmosphere for the political activity of the nationalist currents after the coup d'état of 28 Mordad 1332. The Iranian Freedom Movement began its activities believing in acting within the framework of the constitution while adhering to Mossadegh's path. But with the fall of Amini and the Pahlavi government's attempt to revise some constitutional principles, the leaders of the Freedom Movement were tried for opposing the White Revolution. Some of the radical youth of the movement, led by Muhammad Hanifnejad, under the suppression of Khordad 15, 1342, used the armed struggle and established the Mojahedin Khalq Organization. The main question is 'How to emerge a group with an armed policy within a party with a conservative approach?' According to the systematic analysis, the hypothetical answer is that the collective and incoherent construction of the Freedom Movement caused a strategic vacuum in this group.

Kazemi stated that using the three-level analysis of Fairclough discourse in three levels of text, production process and social function. He believes that completing the discourses meanings, non-discourses, and the effect of social position on discourse change has been the reason for the split in political factions (Kazemi 2015 AD/1394 SH: 113). Karamipour stated that the social and strategic attractiveness of the select group causes the split and collapse of smaller groups (Karamipour, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 95). Beheshti Seresht analysed the issue of the organisation's religious stream after changing ideology, their division and path (Beheshti Seresht, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 42). Regarding the specific subject of this article, namely the separation of the Mojahedin Khalq from the Freedom Movement, some works and research articles were examined. The most critical work is the three-volume book "Mojahedin Khalq Organization, Emergence to Fate" (2005 AD/1384 SH) by the "Institute of Political Studies and Research." The difference between the present study and previous examples is the modelling of Parsons' theory of structural-functionalism for political rheology of the Iranian Freedom Movement and the systematic analysis of the factors that split the Mojahedin Khalq Organization from this group.

1. Theoretical Framework: Structural Functionalism

Talcott Parsons, an American thinker in political sociology, proposed the theory of structural functionalism. His central idea is how to balance a social system. He approached Pareto in his critique of utilitarianism. Pareto wanted to analyse all aspects of social and economic activities in

proportion to their position as volatiles within a balance acceptance system (Hamilton, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 75). That is, the political decision is analysed not due to its result but how it is adopted. Parsons avoids classical positivism, which treats the social sciences as the natural sciences. Accordingly, influenced by Max Weber and in his empiricism critique, he highlights the role of social systems in expressing actions. According to him, the system concept indicates the complex dependencies of coherent and interconnected set members. This theory evaluates the conditions of survival, operation, change and system perfection. In this perspective, functionality is the variety of solutions that a system finds to survive a set of specific problems. This function makes sense in socially active systems and constant contact with their macro environment. A dynamic system in interacting with the environment has four elements: data or what enters the system; yield or something that goes out of the system; the process that converts data into product and yields feedback in the form of subsequent data that intensify the process of system performance or reduce it (Bashirieh, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 84).

At this level, the actor's action is like a bridge that approaches the two aspects of static (structure) and dynamic (function). Therefore, the role concept position in Parsons's thought appears as a factor for linking the action of system actors and the balance of the general environment in a specific and organised pattern. Thus, an act in Parsons theory consists of four elements (Hamilton, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 87):

1) Subject or actor;
2) The goal or the desired situation of the actor;
3) The normative approach or tendency of the actor;
4) The state in which the action takes place includes changeable or immutable elements.

The activist approach expresses the concept of socialisation, which outlines the conventional acting way in the social environment. The sociability of the cultural patterns that determine the value or horror of an action plays an essential role in balancing a political system. It caused the evolution in the context of maintaining the system foundation. So, a change in the value system makes the system unbalanced. This point explains positive action means maintaining the balance of the system, which is reflected in the fourth element. According to the fourth element, the action system means the interaction relations and rules between the actor and the situation. We should say that the actor acts inside the case or social environment, not outside and in front of it. Because, his action is regarding the signs meanings understanding that finds and responds to as data in the background.

To explain the structural aspect of the system, Parsons borrows the two

concepts of community and group. He defines variables as structural variables that determine a specific actor's characteristics in society's two components. These variables are the same patterns that provide the structural order and static aspect of the system, and each social system chooses one of the dualities of this variable and rejects the other (Roche, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 70-71):

1) Populism versus specialism: The actor makes decisions based on general criteria generalised to a set of cases or judges only based on criteria. Like the difference between parents' actions with unknown children or when they encounter their children;

2) Acquisition versus attribution: The actor can calculate the action subject according to his achievements or pay attention to the nature of purchases such as degrees and business efficiency versus attributes such as gender and race;

3) Neutrality versus emotional: In the first case, he puts aside his emotions and feelings, and in the second case, he acts based on emotional relationships. The first case is like the doctor-patient relationship and the second case is like the father-child relationship;

4) Specialism versus multilateralism: The actor can choose to have a comprehensive relationship with other actors only in certain aspects. For example, a father looks at his child and life comprehensively, but the doctor's attachment to his patient is only related to his illness.

Populism, acquisition, neutrality and specialism are the characteristics of society and specialism, attribution, emotional, and multilateralism are the components of the group. The systems function also corresponds to the activities that provide the system needs. These functions are used to maintain the internal stability of the system in the face of internal and external challenges and to achieve the system goals to environmental changes (Hamilton, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 133):

1) Compatibility: Obtaining resources or facilities from the environment and redistributing them. In other words, it takes feedback or sources in the form of data from the environment and produces the desired return. This function adapts the system to its environment, requirements, bottlenecks and limitations;

2) Achieving the goal: Actions that, after determining a plan, motivate them to achieve it. This function mobilises and manages resources to achieve the goal;

3) Unity: It is Functional about maintaining coherence in subsystems and disruptive prevention. This component protects the system against sudden changes and significant disruptions;

4) Invisibility: The term refers to motivating the actor to move, which Parsons calls the preservation of cultural patterns.

In this study, the Iranian Liberation Movement is seen as a system that operates per Parsons' approach in interacting with the Iranian political environment in the 1340s. The research hypothesis is that the value system of the freedom movement youth changed regarding the social events. This change was based on the legal construction of the constitutional system activities in the denial of the former value system of the freedom movement, which eventually led to the establishment of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization. The methodological strategy of this research is close to Parsons' macro strategy. He seeks to present an organised plan to explain how to maintain coherence and balance in a political system because the function of the Freedom Movement has been to create balance, stability and a gradual movement towards reform in the Iranian political space.

2. Establishment of the Iranian Freedom Movement

After the coup, Mosaddegh's supporters tried to continue the nationalisation of the oil industry by establishing the "National Resistance Movement." (Nejati, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 306-307) Differences arose between the conservative and radical sides over their participation in the 18th National Assembly elections. Some parties opposed running in the election, claiming it was illegitimate, but some were satisfied to participate in the polls (Sahabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 71-72). The subsequent dispute occurred after the dismissal of Zahedi in Farvardin 1334 and the installation of Hussein Ala (Abrahamian, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 384). At this time, the conservative faction led by Allahyar Saleh, to gain the government's trust, proposed the idea of separation from Mosaddegh. But the radical section, with Ayatollah Taleghani and Bazargan, emphasised continuing to support Mosaddegh (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 122-125). As the first nationalist organisational system after the coup, the National Resistance Movement stagnated considering the contradiction of the value system, the contradiction between the resistance idea and the political reality based on the establishment of the coup government. This conflict led to internal disputes and then to disfunction, resulting in the dissolution of the system.

At the end of 1338, with the approaching twentieth parliamentary elections, the Shah sought a more accessible space for elections under US pressure, which encouraged Mosaddegh's supporters to revive the National Front. This front started its activity on Tir 30, 1339 (Nejati, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 346). Shortly afterwards, the John F. Kennedy government sought economic reform in underdeveloped countries to prevent the spread of communism. It caused the appointment of Ali Amini as the Prime Minister of Iran, who

also selected people close to the Tudeh Party and the National Front to the Ministry to attract the attention of critics of the government (Abrahamian, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 386-385). Mahdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi, and Sayyed Mahmoud Taleghani decided to form a new party in this favourable political situation. Adopting a more radical approach compared to the conservatism of the National Front leaders was their motivation, which showed the continuation of the National Resistance Movement differences (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 212). According to the structural functionalism theory, the National Front system could not maintain its unity in the face of the macro-political environment. It occurred because of the invisibility absence in its function. That is the absence of differences coverage and the failure to internalise the political model after the coup. Thus, the loss of these two internal functions of the system caused the National Front to fail in two external parts: adapting to the environment and achieving political goals, and more critical, parliamentary competition. This failure in functional features stemmed from the structural characteristics of the National Front. The founders of the National Front derived from the National Resistance Movement and inherited the divisions and differences of that group. According to a review of the National Front system based on Parsons's four components, the main actors, some opposed the coup government and others, conservatives, believed in overcoming the coup. The goal of the first group was to fight against tyranny and colonialism, but the purpose of the second group was to get closer to the United States and gain a parliament. The radical reformers acted only to declare allegiance to the monarchical legal system, while conservatives legitimised the Shah's intervention's genuine construction. Thus, the system became disordered in its external function, i.e., adaptation to the environment.

Regarding the two factors of religious thought and political radicalism in the separation of the Freedom Movement from the National Front, formed two factions in the Freedom Movement. Religious parties, including religious students and activists from Islamic associations, became members influenced by the spiritual approach of the Freedom Movement leaders. The national faction includes radical activists of the Resistance Movement who joined the movement considering the idealism of the Freedom Movement leaders. According to Bazargan, people had no religious motives and mostly came for political reasons (Keshavarz Shokri, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 148). The first systemic feature of the movement was that it had not an organisational structure but a club structure because the members came together because of the old friendly relationship. Some, such as Mostafa Chamran, Muhammad Tavassoli, and Saeed Mohsen, became members of the Freedom Movement regarding their student background of Bazargan at

the Faculty of Engineering, and others, such as Ebrahim Yazdi, Muhammad Hanifnejad, and Abdolreza Nikobin considering their experience in Islamic associations. Some also became members of the movement due to kinship. Rahim Ataei and Mansour Ataei were the nieces of Bazargan, and in addition, Rahim Ataei was the brother of Sahabi. Muhammad Bastengar later became the son-in-law of Ayatollah Taleghani. Bazargan and Taleghani were charismatic leaders for religious students. Bazargan was the professor of the Engineering Faculty, a modernist speaker at the meetings of the Islamic Association, and an idealistic political fighter. Ayatollah Taleghani was also a radical fighter and a religious leader who learned his spiritual teachings during the Qur'anic exegesis meetings. Therefore, the primary recruitment of the Freedom Movement was among religious students, and it was less influential among the working class or the market (Keshavarz Shokri, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 142). Accordingly, the characteristics of the congregation in the structure of the Freedom Movement are as follow:

1) Specialism: Focusing on students through the charisma of leaders among academics;
2) Ascription: The effect of kinship, training and friendship relationships on membership;
3) Atefi: The structure of the movement was formed based on the interest of the leaders;
4) Multilateralism: The comprehensive role of movement leaders as political, religious, and intellectual leaders.

The figure below shows the internal factionalism of the Freedom Movement in its early formation.


Figure 1: Internal Factionalism of the Freedom Movement

The value system of the Freedom Movement was defined based on Islamism, nationalism, loyalty to Mosaddegh and adherence to the constitution (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 379-380). The first two principles are the conditions for membership in the movement. The third principle contains the prevailing tendency on most movement members as a continuation of Mosaddegh's policies. The fourth principle is the only practical principle of the movement and expresses their activities limitations. Therefore, according to its only pragmatic principle, this system's political action has moved in the parliamentarism style. According to Parsons's definition, four characteristics of this political action are as follows:

1) The activists of Bazargan are Ayatollah Taleghani and Dr Sahabi, along with their followers in the Freedom Movement;
2) The goal is to hold free parliamentary elections and achieve civil liberties such as press freedom;
3) The way of action, peaceful strategies such as statements issuance and holding political meetings;
4) The action state, the limited political space created by the pressure of the US Democratic government.

According to Parson's explanation of the fourth component of action definition, the state of action, especially in politics, is volatile. It is especially true of the Freedom Movement political activities during the short period of Ali Amini's rule. The fragility of Iran's political situation stemmed from eight years of suffocating atmosphere following the coup. On the other hand, Amini lacked partisan support and a clear social standing and was a politically conservative politician. He grew up only based on individual sports policies. So, he tried to gain the support of workers and students by appointing three people close to the Tudeh Party and the National Front.

Regarding Amini's goal of implementing the land reform plan, left-wing parties seemed more satisfied. Still, the National Front and the Freedom Movement of Iran announced their goal of having free elections and put pressure on Amini to dissolve the parliament. Amini did not want to hold elections considering the conservatives and significant landowners in parliament (Amini, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 402).

In a statement against Amini's government in Tir 1340, the Freedom Movement stated that "The government claiming to be a reformer should be tested against the nation." (Collection of Documents, 1982 AD/1361 SH, vol. 1, no. 17) The purpose of this statement was not to put pressure on Amini's government in line with confronting the Shah, which Amini

had no desire and will to do. Sometime later, on the eve of Tir 30, 1340, the Freedom Movement asked the people to gather in honour of Dr Mosaddegh and Dr Fatemi (Collection of Documents, 1982 AD/1361 SH, vol. 1, no. 19). Amini opposed this accumulation, which led to the arrest of several members of the Freedom Movement (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 181). In conclusion, the relationship between the Freedom Movement and Amini's government became strained, and the Freedom Movement attacked Amini in a statement entitled "Freedom Trick" calling him a "Consortium Broker and Zahedi Crimes Partner." (Collection of Documents, 1982 AD/1361 SH, vol. 1, no. 21) On the first of Bahman 1340, Tehran University students protested against the closure of the parliament, which was suppressed simultaneously with the army entering the university (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 189). In its protest statements, the Freedom Movement believed the government guilty for presentation or informing of the attack and strongly condemned it (Collection of Documents, 1982 AD/1361 SH, vol. 1, no. 26). It caused the reduction of Amini support and facilitated his removal by the Shah.

Regarding the political acts of the freedom movement during the short period of Amini's rule, we should say that the Movement had problems from the beginning with the political environment in the first function, i.e., adaptation. They committed themselves to the legal building of the public system of Iran, i.e., the constitutional constitution. But they had no obligation to the actual installation, i.e., the Shah's rule, but opposed Shah by stating the third principle, allegiance to Mosaddegh.

3. Freedom Movement and Islamic Uprising

When Assadullah Alam became Prime Minister, peaceful actions gradually became demanding. On Mehr 16, 1341, the government approved the bill of state and provincial associations. The condition of Islam was removed from the elected in this bill, and swear to the Qur'an was changed (Jafarian, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 370). Following the publication of this news, a group of Qom authorities such as Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Golpayegani and Shariatmadari expressed their concern in separate letters addressed to the Shah (Institute of Political Studies and Research, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 167). In a statement in Azar 1341, while supporting the authorities, the Freedom Movement emphasised the common goal of the struggle for fundamental and parliamentary freedoms (Collection of Documents, 1982 AD/1361 SH, vol. 1, no. 40). The minority union of the Freedom Movement, which was more inclined towards the National Front, disagreed with supporting the clergy. But the religious faction believed that a comprehensive struggle against

the Shah's rule requires the presence of the mullahs (Sahabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 251). This religious spirit and Bazargan's friendly relations with religious scholars were among the reasons for the members of the Freedom Movement tendency to the religious movement. The bill of state and provincial associations ended with the withdrawal of the government on 9 Azar (Institute of Political Studies and Research, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 170). But the Shah announced on Dey 19, 1341, that he wanted to put the six principles of the White Revolution to a referendum (Jafarian, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 370). Imam Khomeini, in response to a referendum (Istifta') on the 2nd of Bahman, recalling the Shah's opposition to Mosaddegh's referendum on the dissolution of the 17th parliament, wrote: "Voting should be free and done without any pressure, coercion, threat or bribery. In Iran, it is not practical, and most people are intimidated by government organisations in all parts of the country and put in pressure and hardship" (Mousavi Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 136). The Freedom Movement makes a fundamental objection to the validity of the referendum in a statement entitled "Iran on the Eve of a Great Revolution:" "Today, the governing body and a system are making a revolution, which until yesterday, through the owners and government officials, were the only supporter of the feudal system and the cause of all pressures and corruption. They put Amini's government to work. American politics has no interest in the individual or the class. They wanted land reform and the fight against corruption to stop communism. Therefore, simultaneously with a trip to the US, a promise was made that the country's first-person would be the first and last person, and the appearance and inner executor. The prime minister [Amini] left and was replaced by a ring servant [Alam]. Revolution must be from inner, not outside" (Nejati, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 389). Simultaneously with the publication of this statement on Bahman 4, SAVAK arrested Ayatollah Taleghani, Bazargan, and Dr Sahabi (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 214-216).

The relations between the Shah and religious scholars were severe crises from the beginning of 1342. On the second day of Farvardin, the Assembly of Rouzeh Feyziyeh in Qom, in the martyrdom of Imam Sadegh (AS), was attacked by government forces, and some scholars were injured (Jafarian, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 371). In a message addressed to the Tehran clergy on Farvardin 13, Imam Khomeini announced: "I have now prepared my heart for the bayonets of your agents, but I will not accept your coercion and cruelty" (Mousavi Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 178-179). These statements deepened the Freedom Movement's connection with religious scholars. In this regard, members of the Islamic Students Association, most

of whom were also Movement members, visited some jurisprudents. In this meeting, on the 10th of Ordibehesht, Imam says to the students: "We want to preserve the parliamentary system. Now, the freedom of the pen, expression, thoughts and even the right to life has been taken away from the people" (Mousavi Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 191-192). Imam Khomeini's emphasis on fighting tyranny and colonialism and defending political and constitutional freedoms caused the religious party of the Freedom Movement to be more interested in him. Simultaneously with Muharram, the crisis accelerated. On Khordad 13, coinciding with Ashura, Imam Khomeini addressed the Shah at the Feyziyeh school: "Do not oppose the clergy so much, they want the nation expediency. I swear God, Israel does not want your well-being. What is the connection between the Shah and Israel that the security organisation says do not talk about Israel, do not talk about the Shah? Somehow convey this information to this gentleman, he may wake up" (Mousavi Khomeini, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 245-247). At midnight on Khordad 15, Imam Khomeini was arrested at his home and transferred to Tehran. The news publication caused widespread public protest severely suppressed by the army (Nejati, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 234-235). The Freedom Movement issued a statement entitled "Dictator Sheds Blood:" "It is the first time in the history of Iran that dares to successor position of Imam Zaman (AS). Jurisprudent Khomeini is stolen and imprisoned, and the scholars of Tehran, Shiraz, Qom, Mashhad, Tabriz and other cities are imprisoned enmasse" (Yahosseini, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 676).

The imprisonment of the freedom movement leaders, the lack of relationship with youths, and the effect of the Khordad 15 incident on the political atmosphere of Iran, strengthened the radicalism of the youth who were members of the Freedom Movement. Bazargan says in court: "They were prejudiced, and we were symmetrical. We forced them to follow the legal path and the public interest" (ibid., 336). Gradually, the young people moved away from the Bazargan conservative position. The system of the Freedom Movement in the output caused a conflict between the value system and the political environment. While the data was a harbinger of political radicalism, the value system insisted on maintaining the legal structure of the constitutional monarchy. To resolve this conflict, the movement system in the internal process emphasised confronting the natural form of the Pahlavi government while adhering to its legal structure. But the Pahlavi tyranny caused the feedback of this output to the Freedom Movement system not appropriate to its value system. In his last defence, Bazargan warned the

Shah: "If you openly condemn the Freedom Movement, which explicitly says that it is in favour of the constitution and the constitutional monarchy, after this, if formed a court, it will deal with a population that is really against this regime" (Nejati, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 560-561).

The most important effect of the Khordad 15 uprising was changing the political atmosphere of the Shah's opponents to the military phase. Religious groups and Marxist groups turned to armed fight, which showed that the legal battle and the attempt to achieve free parliamentary elections were ineffective. In addition to internal factors, external motives such as the victory of the Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro and Chegoara and the success of the Algerian liberation revolution led the Iranian Marxist and Islamist currents to armed struggle (Meysami, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 159-160). Thus, after eliminating the National Front and the Freedom Movement of Iran in 1341 and then suppressing the uprising of Khordad 15, 1342, the young members of the Freedom Movement led by Muhammad Hanifnejad began to study the armed struggle. Together with Saeed Mohsen and Abdolreza Nikbin, in Shahrivar 1344, he formed a group to conduct scholarly studies regarding armed struggle (Institute of Political Studies and Research, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 294). According to Hanifnjad and his companions, there are some reasons for battle failure. These are the existence of colonial imperialism, the compromise of nationalist parties such as the National Front and the Freedom Movement, the lack of organised fighters and scientific struggle (Institute of Political Studies and Research, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 292-293). In their opinion, the weakness of educational and organisational issues were the most critical weaknesses of the Freedom Movement (Sahabi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 297). In other words, the collective structure of the movement, which turned it into a friendly club rather than a political and ideological organisation, was the criticism basis of the Mojahedin Khalq founders. They wanted to establish a system with radical and revolutionary content and a structured form with individuals' membership based on their ideology and function toward their goal. Therefore, the unit of action had changed as follows:

1) Activist of radical and religious youth with a scientific approach;
2) Target; the overthrow of the Pahlavi government;
3) The action way; armed struggle in the style of an urban uprising;
4) The state of the environment regarding the increasing activities of SAVAK and the establishment of an authoritarian government.

The following figure shows the four components of data, process, output, and feedback of the actions of the Freedom Movement political

system based on Parsons's functionalism theory.

Figure 2: Components of action in the political system of the Freedom Movement from the establishment to the split of the Mojahedin Khalq

According to Parsons's systemic theory, the reason for the separation of the Movement's youth from the pragmatic principle of the Movement, that is, adherence to the constitutional constitution is the internalisation of cultural patterns. The Freedom Movement leaders failed to institutionalise the implementation of the constitution in the members of this group; with tyranny and repression, they understood the legal strategy was ineffective. Hanifnejad explained why he was inclined to armed struggle during SAVAK interrogations: "We practically saw that everyone who acted legally was repressed. The best example is the National Front and the Freedom Movement of Iran" (Institute of Political Studies and Research, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 667).

Conclusion

According to Parsons' theory, the disorder occurs when the order value system is inconsistent with environmental realities. The atmosphere of repression in 1341 and 1342, which eventually led to the arrest of the Freedom Movement leaders, pushed the younger members of the movement more and more towards radicalism. Based on the functional characteristics of the Freedom Movement, the early founders had radical tendencies towards the actual construction of the ruling regime. It had an essential effect on promoting the political radicalism of the younger members. At the same time, the value system of the youth changed regarding changes in Iran's internal and external environment. Therefore, organised the internal process of the Freedom Movement towards criticism of the Pahlavi government. The failure of the Freedom Movement in two instrumental functions, namely adaptation to the environment (conflict of a value system with the power realities) and preservation of cultural patterns (lack of institutional commitment to the constitutional constitution), led to failure in two purposeful functions, i.e., achieving external goals (free parliamentary elections) and unity (organisational cohesion). It caused a split in the

Freedom Movement. Inconsistency factors have been superficial and internal factors affecting the value system and external and internal factors affecting the system. The internal factor influencing the change of the order value system was the scientific thinking of Bazargan, which ruled the morale of the youth members of the Movement. They concluded that the previous failures were regarding the unscientific nature of the struggle and can earn struggle science from Marxism. The external factor influencing the value system was global events such as the leftist struggles in Latin America or the Algerian revolution. The Shah's agreement with the United States to implement land reform and set aside Ali Amini were external factors influencing the environmental change. The internal factor affecting the transformation of the social system was political repressions.

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The Roots of Cultural Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran: In the Speech of Three Scholars of Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Shariati, Motahari and Fardid)

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Abstract

The present study aimed to identify the roots of cultural policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article has used a thematic content analysis with a historical approach and a "Content Coding Technique" to review the works of three Islamic revolutionary scholars whose views have been frequently used as references to many cultural policy-makers before and after the revolution. The results indicated that the sharing feature of these three views, albeit from different ideas, is the two following lines "Confrontation with Westernization" and "the Priority of Reform, and the Development of Thought and Culture." Another result is the influence of the document "The Country's Principles of Cultural Policy" through the views from these scholars. At the end of this article, it is claimed that the Islamic Republic of Iran's cultural policies (elective and compound) are rooted in cultural theorists. It also claims that it cannot be accepted that the Islamic Republic of Iran, in its fortieth year, departed from the first designed artistic principles. It is a form of early thought that has been recognized and formed as usual.

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Introduction

Cultural policy is one of the branches of public policy. Cultural policy is a part of government strategies and actions to enhance the activities: production, publishing, marketing and artistic consumption (Mulcahy, 2006: 320). The sociological interpretation of cultural policy refers to the general principles and operating strategies that dominated the active type of the social institution in cultural affairs (Gholamreza Kashi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 54).

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, from the beginning of its formation to all the years of establishment, policy-making and planning for cultural excellence and development have been the official declared priorities. Suppose we accept the narrative that the Islamic Revolution of Iran is essentially a cultural revolution (Ashtarian, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 54). In that case, we must also think about the fundamentals of the ideals and cultural values. Since ideals and ideologies are essential variables in determining issues, issues of intervention, and cultural policy-making (Ashtarian, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 51), the cultural values of the revolution must determine cultural policy priorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sound of these cultural values can also be found in the writings and sayings of revolutionary thinkers. Indeed, the culture sought by the revolution is embodied in the speech of its thinkers. According to Bourdieu, it can be said that those scholars who have a prominent place in the social space form the cultural field of the new system (Mitten, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 109). On the other hand, these scholars with diverse intellectual backgrounds and social experiences have shared their interpretations of values considered by the revolution and culture with their audience as a symbolic dimension of suitable social life. However, the variations cannot be taken equally.

Meanwhile, the very concept of culture has not yet been clarified. Under the social origins and ideas, different groups derive their own priorities of meaning and value and then form their desired social structure. Therefore, it is worth discussing the features and coordinates between the cultural discourse and the cultural policy-making of the Iranian Islamic Republic in the form of politic-based order, with the revolutionary cultural values and aspirations that led to its establishment.

Therefore, to study cultural policies, we should study the "Cultural Values of Political Power" (Ashtarian, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 34) and the thinking origin of these values. The results of this study may help to clarify further the differences and similarities of the concept of culture to the scholars of the Islamic Revolution and policy-makers and agents of the Iran Islamic Republic. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to infer the key propositions that shape the cultural values of the revolution and identify

the points of difference and similarities of diverse approaches to the concept "culture" in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second aim of this research is to discover the trace of these values in the country's cultural policy principles.

1. Methodology

Given that the present research has a qualitative and exploratory nature, it does not represent a theoretical basis and framework for the analysis. On the other hand, according to its aims, this research has adopted a historical, sociological approach. Our approach is historical since we seek the roots of cultural policy-making in the views of the chosen scholars of the Islamic Revolution. Dealing with "Current Processes through Time" and paying attention to "Structural Contexts" to understand the "Desired and Unintended Consequences" are features of historical- sociological studies (Skocpol, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 8).

The selected method of this approach is based on thematic content analysis that is a data reduction and analysis strategy, and it is also one of the qualitative content analysis types.

Thematic Content analysis is one of the content analysis methods that resemble "Content Analysis" in recognizing common data themes. But the researcher uses it based on an objectivist epistemology. Unlike content analysis, interpretation is used as little as possible in thematic content analysis and is merely used for naming and grouping themes. In analyzing the thematic content analysis, the researcher's feelings and thoughts about the themes are ignored. For this reason, the researcher avoids any interpretation and explanation of the meaning of the themes and only briefly explains themes in the conclusion part. In general, thematic content analysis is primarily descriptive analysis, while Content analysis is interpretive analysis (Anderson, 2007: 1).

In this study, we will extract cultural policy-making knowledge from selected sources by thematic content analysis.

Therefore, the thematic content analysis of the texts refers to three leading thinkers of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 who were known as main references and successful, influential intellectuals in forming the cultural policies of Iran Islamic Republic during or after the revolution. An indicator of the superiority of these thinkers is their influence over the two main political currents of the Islamic Republic (Left and Right wings). Ali Shariati is the most crucial left-wing ideologist, and Sayyed Ahmad Fardid is the most essential right-wing ideologist. Morteza Motahari, meanwhile, is a thinker who has influenced the formation of cultural stands on both sides of the political spectrum.

In this study, content analysis units include the published works of the three scholars above. To sample these units of analysis, according to the principle of "Accuracy and Competence" (De Vaus, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 80), the method of "Purposeful or Judgmental Sampling" (Babaie, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 417) has been used. The judgment basis in selecting the samples has, on the one hand, been theoretical and experimental knowledge of Islamic Revolution scholars (1979) and, on the other hand, consulting with the experts of this field. Accordingly, the three books are: "Return" by Ali Shariati (reprinted in 2005 AD/1384 SH). "The Future of Iran Islamic Revolution" by Morteza Motahari (reprinted in 2015 AD/ 1394 SH) and the second edition of "Meetings of Farahi and Apocalypse Conquests" (2014 AD/1393 SH) which is a collection of Sayyed Ahmad Fardid's speeches and compiled by the efforts of Muhammad Madadpour.

Technically, this research exposure to content analysis units has been formulated by "Value Coding". In this technique, codes are applied to the values, beliefs, views, and worldviews (Saldena, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 170). Using the value coding technique, we have extracted concepts from which cultural policy principles can be applied.

2. Data Collection and Thematic Content Analysis

This study examines the views of three scholars of the Islamic Revolution (1979); Ali Shariati (1977-2003), a historian and sociologist who is a leading thinker of the Islamic Revolution (Abrahamian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 571; Abrahamian, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 257; Fouran, 2003 AD/1382 SH; Mirsepahi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 67; Boroujerdi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 162). Morteza Motahhari (1919-1989) was the essential clerical thinker of the revolution while holding the position of professor of theology at Tehran University (Abrahamian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 585; Bahrami Komil, 2013 AD/1393 SH: 293; Boroujerdi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 143). Ahmad Fardid (1910- 1994), the philosopher Heidegger (1889 -1976) before revolution added the concept of "Westernization" to Iranian philosophical literature (Ashouri, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 7; Bahrami Komil, 2013 AD/1393 SH: 174; Abdul Karimi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 44; Ashouri, 2014: 4) and after the victory of the Islamic Revolution based on its excellent foundations and critical view of the West (Abdul Karimi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 44) joined the ranks of supporters of the revolution.

2.1. Ali Shariati and "Return to the Self"

In the 1961s, Jalal Al Ahmad (1923 - 1969) and in the 1971s, Shari'ati led to Weststruckness and Return to the self, the central discourse topics of the intellectual flow (Boroujerdi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 162). Culture and the

idealistic portrayal formulated by Islam were the focus of Shariati's debates about **"The Return"** (Roshan, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 340). His aim of bringing up **"The Return"** discourse was to "Overcome the Cultural Uncertainty in Daily Routine" (Mirsepassi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 87), in which "Cultural Imperialism and Westernization Weststruckness" (Abrahamian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 57) played a significant role in its creation. He did all of the above by playing an intellectual role by forming Islamic Protestantism and ultimately presented revolutionary ideology by reading Shiite genealogy. Shariati's ideas about this subject have been published in his book" The Return" (collection of four works) (2005 AD/1384 SH), which contains two books, "Return to the Self" and "Return to Which Self. "The first book is the transcript of Shariati's lecture (Ahvaz Jundi-Shapur University), whose exact year is not known (Dr Ali Shariati Cultural Foundation Web site: Revision Date; Fall 2019; http://drshariati.org). His second book is a long description of his life, listed in the first edition in 1977 and published in the final years. The analysis results of **"The Return"** book that aimed at extracting statements of cultural policy categories are as follows (Table 1):

Table 1: Excerpts of Shariati's Return Book and Cultural Policy-making categories

Number	Excerpt from the Book
1	..."The problem is" return to the self" ... If you have heard I rely on religion, my reliance is on a reformed and revised Islam and is based on an Islamic Renaissance movement. "(P. 22)
2	...His history and culture must enlighten every society, and it must play his intellectual and missionary role by relying on history, culture and the common language." (P. 23)
3	..."When it comes to the issue of return to the self, religious or non-religious both share the same social responsibility and have reached a common understanding. There comes up with a question of returning to the self and our own culture and knowing who we are." (Pp. 23 and 24)
4	"...Returning to Islamic Culture and Islamic Ideology and Islam, Not as a Tradition, Inheritance, System or Belief in Society ..." (p. 24)
5	..."To be wild or to become a Western civilized! These are the two destinies that every human being must choose. All the efforts of the West over the last two centuries have been made to build this faith in the West and the disbelief in the self." (P. 25)

Number	Excerpt from the Book
6	..."And because civilization means Western consumption, so whoever consumes the West becomes civilized, and to become a consumer of Western production. Everyone must believe that their own indigenous culture, or independent personality, has no meaning and cannot build culture and civilization themselves. And they have to accept Western tools, forms, and values as civilized. In our society, a civilized man is the one whose consumption, not his intelligence, has gone up."(P. 26)
7	"It is a lie that until a nation has not reached the level of intellectual and cultural production, it can reach the level of economic and industrial production, and even if it reaches it, it is still at the level of a Western imposition." (p. 29)
8	..."It does not tell us that you are not a culture maker, it even gives a lot of compliment... it has negated African's past culture and has deprecated our past culture, which is worse than negation ... He says you have everything, but it depicts despicable faces in my eyes to escape to western culture." (p. 32)
9	"If the eastern wishes to associate himself based on humanistic, Western human originality, he has drowned into a fictitious and fantasy system of humanism and has negated its existential personality and authenticity, and as long as we are indigenous to them, and they are human beings, any humanistic partnership with them is a betrayal of our existence." (P. 36)
10	"If I go back to my racial self, I have become fascinated by racism, fascism, ethnic and racial ignorance, and this is a reactionary return." p. 37
11	"The scissors of Islamic civilization have come and gone between our pre-Islamic and post-Islamic self, which pre-Islamic of ours is only visible in scholars and specialists that are in museums and libraries, our people remember nothing of it. This return to the historical self, which we say is not a return to the wildlife, is a return to the actual self, existing in the soul and conscience of society."(p. 38)
12	..."We rely on our Islamic cultural self, and we must return to our self because this is the only self-esteem that is close to us, and the superior culture and civilization that is alive

Number	Excerpt from the Book
	now. Islam must be raised in the form of repetitive and unconscious traditions that are the primary cause of degeneration, as a progressive protestant awareness Islam and as an enlightening ideology." (pp. 39-40)
13	"Cultural alienation is worse than any other forms of treatment, and it is more challenging to treat with. ... One who mirrors another's personality and culture and different spiritual values ... finds this transformation uplifting and pretending. It even strives to realize this cultural or historical reincarnation as much as possible. Even colonialism, with all its material and scientific power, helps him in this transformation." (P. 98)
14	"The first thing Colonialism did, especially in societies with rich and deep-rooted historical civilization was to cut off the present generation from history." (p. 99)
15	"The historical conscience is a unique civilized spirit ... It makes the historical connection of the present generation with its past in which is formed the personality." (pp. 103 and 104)
16	"Colonialism has carried out very sophisticated and profound scientific and sociological efforts to construct its quasi-civilizations in the civilized countries of Islam, India, and China in a way that regards progress and modernity inconsistent with tradition and history." (p. 104)
17	..."The intellectual is committed as the conscious element of society, and his commitment is clear: self-awareness of the Society." (p. 138)
18	..."Islam has two vital and urgent social missions in time. On the one hand, it is because of its particular political and revolutionary spirit and, on the other hand, because it has life and movement that builds our life, culture, spirit, conscience, and social relations of our nation. Now those two missions are as follows: 1 - Establish a direct cultural relationship. The gap is between the ordinary people and the intellectuals in our new culture, this vacuum will be filled with this spiritual power. 2. We must admit that our present society is a religious one."(Pp. 169 and 170)
19	"All our misfortune is that our old generation is suffering from concretion and the new generation is null and void." (p. 215)

Number	Excerpt from the Book
20	..."The new generation is in vain: neither pious nor impious. Unbiased, without ideology, inexperienced in belief, characterless, biased, aimless, none." (p. 215)
21	..."The assimilation of the intellectuals (the saviors and prophets of their nation) is a catastrophe in which the question about death, life, existence and absence of a nation is raised with all its material and spiritual resources." (p. 219)
22	"We don't understand the true meaning of many of the social and religious issues of the past (that we raise today as opposed to or disapproved of), because we abstract it from its living body, the social environment, the temporal atmosphere, the conscience and the periodic spirit. And these elements are integral to it, and we look at it as an independent scientific abstract."(P. 237)
23	"One of the ugliest and utterly deviant works of thought is that when we say religion is a single abstract concept, as it does for non-religion. While it must be said: there are religions and non-religions." (p. 248)
24	"Political and social issues, in contrast to philosophical and scientific ones, are relative, and what has at one time or society, or produced constructive or progressive effects, are meaningless and ineffective at another time and has devastating effects, and It is degenerate." (p. 261)
25	"What goes in European society, culture, and philosophical, social and political thought is the natural and logical birth of Europe's historical and social conditions. Its transition to society also has another history, culture and social needs, just as deceptively attractive for the superficial eye between the modern and the sensual one. It is nothing but a waste of the best opportunities, the best human talents, native values and themes."(P. 261)
26	..."That's right: the ancient culture of Iran, the collection of religion, literature, art are for us and is one of our" deeply rooted, noble and glorious and spiritual cultures. But the question is, 'where this cultural self is?' There is no doubt that this brilliant and original culture exists only in history and not in society! But 'can the community be known without the help of history?' No, but history is of

Number	Excerpt from the Book
	two kinds: the discrete and continuous flow of history. Therefore, culture and civilization and the historical reality of ancient Iran exist and will exist for the historian. Because nothing was destroyed in the past, but for sociology, it has been a reality. That is, there is no community." (p.p. 270 and 272)
27	"In my school of thought, man represents God, his successor, like him, and has the moral attributes of God and his trustee, the truths taught by him, all attribute of the great and small angels and the whole being. The earth and the sky are all ridiculed by his will and science. The technique is ultimately the inherent kin of God. It is the only possession of God's four privileged attributes: 1) Consciousness, 2) Will (freedom, authority, and choice power), 3) Ideal, 4) Creativity!" (P. 330)
28	"The worldview is based on universal monotheism. It shows the belief in a powerful creator and logical conscious will that dominates the being. The human dialectic dualism believes that man has a will and consciousness. This worldview, like materialism, believes in the scientific fate and historical determinism governing human nature and destiny. It also considers human nature as material realities subject to causality, logic and constant scientific laws, and existentialism and humanism at the same time. And consider power as a choice, the real objective responsibility, but not a sentimental responsibility, human responsibility against the will and conscience of being. They are the criterion of the belief that justifies "the unity of man and man", "the unity of man and nature," and "the unity of man and God." (pp. 334 and 335)

A total of 28 propositions, extracted from Shariati's book "The Return", were used to elicit their main themes to make some headlines and inference for cultural policy-making. The present study's central themes of the used cultural policy making are classified into ten main propositions. The topics in these themes are listed in Figure 1.

Reformed Ideological Islam: A return to the Reformed Islamic Self that has taken on the form of culture and ideology. This Islam plays two roles in society: filling the gap between the populace and the intellectuals,

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and the second: providing the religious content of community (inference from propositions 1 - 4 - 12 - 18).

The State of Cultural Dissent: The West recognizes its culture and civilization as authentic and has devoted all its efforts to depersonalize, alienate, and dissociate the Eastern and Islamic nations from their own culture and history (inference from propositions 5 and 6 – 8- 13 - 14 - 16).

Priority of Cultural Development: Development and cultural production take precedence over economic and industrial development (inference from proposition 7).

Return based on Historical Conscience and Connected Culture: Societies must enlighten and return to their self-consciousness based on their historical conscience and connected culture distinct from Western-oriented approaches, racial ignorance and archaism (inference from propositions 2- 9 - 10 - 11 - 15 - 26).

Historical and non-Abstract Issues of the Humanities: philosophical, social, cultural and political issues are historical and non-abstract, relative, temporal, and non-transferable to time and another society (deducing propositions and categories 22 - 24 - 25).

Intellectual Social Responsibility: Community Self-Awareness; assimilating an intellectual means the death of a nation with all its assets and its responsibility, making society self-conscious (deducing propositions 17-21.)

Scientific, Humanistic, Deterministic and Monotheistic Worldview: Shariati's monotheistic worldview elements include human-centred (human conscious, willful, romantic, creative and responsible), historical algebra and human nature of scientific logic and fixed laws (deduced from propositions 27 and 28).

Intellectuals Agree on the Necessity of Returning while Understanding the Difference of Return: Religious and non-religious intellectuals have an understanding of returning to their culture, although they differ on what culture they want to return to (Inference from Propositions 3 and 10 - 11 – 12;

Anti-Concretion while Emphasizing the Necessity of Ideology; our misery is due to the concretion of the old generation and the absurdity of the new generation (deducing propositions and categories 19 – 20).

Religions and non-Religions: Religion and non-religions are not absolute, and we have religious and non-religious (inference from propositions 23).

In his book (Return), Shariati is a bellman of Islamic Protestantism, believing that religion and non-religion are not unrecognizable; a reformed Islam that encompasses humanism, historical determinism, and Scientifics is represented in the place of historical conscience and the connected

culture of society. Proponents of Shariati's Islamic ideology are intellectuals whose primary mission is to counteract revenge, save the new generation from nothingness, and make the community aware of cultural demagoguery. In Shariati's view that the humanities issues are historical and non-abstract in form and meaningful in their particular time and place, cultural development and production are based on internal possessions and take precedence over other types of development.

Chart 1: Cultural Policy Lines in Shariati's Views

The priority of cultural development	Historical and non-abstract humanities issues	east's cultural betrayal by the West	Opposition to concretion while emphasizing the necessity of ideology	Intellectuals agree on the need to return while understanding the difference	Intellectual Social Responsibility: Community Self-Awareness	Return based on historical conscience and connected culture	The humanistic, deterministic monotheistic worldview	Ideological reformed Islam	Religions and non-religions

2.2. Morteza Motahari and "The Future of the Islamic Revolution of Iran"

Morteza Motahari, as a prominent intellectual of the Ayatollah Khomeini's disciples' group, was one of his most critical clerical figures (Kamali, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 175; Abrahamian, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 585). Motahhari, as "the Most Prominent Thinker of Islamic Jurisprudence" (Bahrami Komil, 2014AD/1393 SH: 293) was an academic scholar who, during the time of Ayatollah Boroujerdi (1944-1961) in the Qom seminary, was allowed to experience academic life. In addition to traditional knowledge, learn new knowledge too. As a preeminent figure, he reformed the clerical body, he saw it as "Demagogic" (Boroujerdi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 130) and converted Islam to a political religion (Bahrami Komil, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 293). Although Mutahari Islam, like Shari'at Islam, had many distinctions with traditional Islam, he spoke to his audience at the Hosseinieh Ershad intellectual forum, but he did not condone Shariati anti-clerical thought. In a letter to the scholars of Najaf in 1968, they demanded their position against Shari'ati. Ayatollah Khomeini did not meet a request (Abrahamyan, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 591). As stated in the preface to the book "The Future of the Islamic Revolution of Iran" (2015 AD/1394 SH), in this book, debates have

initially been in the form of interviews and lectures during the months leading up to the Revolution victory and afterwards, and was his most comprehensive and profound work. It is about the "Intellectual Issues" of the Islamic Revolution. The results of the thematic content analysis of the book "Forthcoming of the Islamic Revolution" aimed at extracting propositions from which cultural policy categories can be applied and described in Table 2. It is worth noting that in analyzing the content of this book, only the most prominent and policy-making material has been highlighted so that more specific topics, such as clergy and women, have not been addressed.

Table 2: Extracted Propositions from Book "the Forthcoming of the Islamic Revolution of Iran" by Motahari and the Cultural Policy Issues

Number	Excerpt from the book
1	"This movement has achieved great success, and it is that self-defeat against the West means taking away (a Western bloc and an eastern bloc) from our nation and telling our country that you have an independent school and thought. You can stand on your feet; you have a different identity and character." (p. 71)
2	..."any society that has a culture and that culture constitutes the spirit of that society ... It has been two or three centuries, especially in the last hundred years, when the confluence of West and East has been found, that the people of the East, the people of the world Islam felt inferior when they saw themselves in front of the West."
3	..."All our great values have been demanded by our society in the shadow of Islam and with Islamic spirituality." (p. 94)
4	"We have to respect the future freedoms in the true sense, that if the Islamic State, the Islamic Republic, the Islamic State wants to create the ground for suppression, it will undoubtedly fail. Freedom, of course, is other than chaos. Everyone has to be free in the first place; his expression and his pen must be accessible." (p. 94)
5	"Lies and betrayals must be censored. Lying should not be spread among the people like the freedom of thought and opinion. " (p. 106)
6	"The central and essential point of the Islamic Revolution of Iran is that it is an ideological revolution, not merely a material class revolution or a liberal and libertarian revolution." (p. 126)
7	"Islam is a comprehensive school. The Islamic Revolution means a revolution that was all-embracing and Islam had influence in all its aspects." (p. 126 and 129)

Number	Excerpt from the book
8	..."If we have seen people who have not found a fundamental change in their spirits, we have the right to doubt their social revolution, or not much hope for the future of their revolution." (p. 132)
9	"The Pillars of the Iranian People's Spiritual Revolution: 1. Promoting virtue and the Jihad in them, 2. The Feeling of Personality." (p. 133 and 134)
10	"The ancient sages have a term called" freezing. "In some animals, such as rabbits ... If the lion falls into its eyes, the animal becomes freeze ... he loses his ability to escape and knocks to the ground. It is called westernization, loss of self, morale, and loss of confidence and self-belief." (p. 136)
11	"Sometimes a society loses itself in front of another society... The great deception of colonialism with colonial countries is to disbelieve a nation in its personality and social identity. This nation changes in a way that prefers "bad" one of imperialism to "good" one "of himself. (P. 137)
12	..."The three main pillars of the Islamic Revolution of Iran: namely social justice, independence, and Islamic spirituality ..." (p. 147)
13	..."We have cultural colonization that is more dangerous than political and economic colonization, and it is impossible to have economic colonization without political and cultural colonization. The basis of political colonization and economic colonization is cultural colonization." (p. 162)
14	"Although the natural and mathematical sciences are the same in the Soviet Union and America, the school is two, the principles of life differ entirely in them. Every nation has a school of its own and does not fall under the burden of foreign schools; it has the right to life." (p. 165)
15	"With an ecclesiastical school, two words from this, two words from that, and three words from Islam. We do not attain school independence, and if we do, we are doomed." (pp. 165 & 166)
16	..."I rely heavily on the issue of independence, political independence, economic independence, cultural independence, and especially cultural independence. Cultural independence, in particular, school independence. What a disease that some people even want to apply Islamic worldview to one of the Western or Eastern worldviews." (p. 166)

Number	Excerpt from the book
17	..."There must be a great circle in the promoting virtue and forbidding the wrong: the process of guidance, the direct and direction of the people, the circle of Islam propaganda, the circle of doubts elimination, the circle of Islamic construction of the people, but it is dependent on the clergy and Independence of Government, even in Islamic State." (p.197)
18	"In Islam, there is freedom of thought and freedom of thought based on thought, but freedom of opinion that is not the basis of thought [freedom of opinion that is the basis of imitation, belief, coercion or habit] never exists in Islam." (p. 307)

Extracted from Motahari's book "The Future of the Islamic Revolution of Iran," a total of 18 statements could be interpreted or directly used as headings and conceptions for cultural policy-making. The main themes of cultural policy-making are summarized in the following eight statements. The topics in these themes are given in Chart 2.

Getting Rid of National Westernization and Gaining Cultural Independence: The Islamic Revolution caused freedom from the sense of inferiority and national westernization against the East and the West, and gained identity, intellectual, cultural, and school independence (Inference from Propositions 1 and 2 - 10 - 11 – 16).

Excellence of the Islamic School and Islamic Spirituality: All the supreme values of Iranian society lie in the shadow of the Islamic school and Islamic spirituality, one of the essential pillars of the Islamic Revolution (inference from propositions 3 - 7 – 12).

The issue of personality and promoting virtue are the two pillars of the Islamic Revolution; the main characteristic of the Iranian Revolution is its ideological character**.** If people's mood does not change through this revolution, there is no hope for its continuation. The issue of promoting virtue and the prohibition of evil, jihad and the sense of personality are pillars of this spiritual revolution (Inference from propositions 6 - 8 – 9).

Commitment to Freedom of Thought, Opinion and Pen: The Islamic Republic commits itself to freedom of thought, opinion and pen (inference from propositions and statements 4 to 18).

Censorship of Lies and treachery: Lies and betrayal must be censored (inference and propositions 5).

The Primacy of Cultural Colonization: the basis of political and economic colonization is cultural colonization (deducing propositions and categories 13).

Uniqueness of the schools and negation of the eclectic school: Contrary

to the universal rules of the natural and mathematical sciences, schools are limited to societies, and diversity cannot be achieved (inference from propositions and categories 14-15) .

Creating a Circle of Promoting Virtue and Forbidding Wrong: There is a need to establish a circle of promoting virtue and forbidding wrong, independent of the state and under the clergy's authority to guide and dispel the doubts (inference from proposition 17).

Much of the debate in Motahari's book (The Future of the Islamic Revolution in Iran) can serve as a basis for cultural policy in the Islamic Republic. In Mutahari's view, the eclectic schools lack the necessary capacity to achieve artistic independence. He emphasized the necessity and liberation of self-esteem from the East and West and Islamic form of all values; he insisted on the warning to a continuation of the revolution as well. If the spiritual process did not occur among people, it was characterized by promoting virtue and forbidding wrong and acquiring personality. The commitment to freedom of thought and belief is one of the axes that can be deduced from policy-making.

Chart 2: Cultural policy lines in Motahari votes

Getting rid of national westernization and gaining cultural independence	The Value of Islamic Comprehensive School and Islamic Spirituality	promoting virtue and forbidding wrong and personality sense, two pillars of the Islamic Revolution	Commitment to freedom of thought, opinion and pen	Censorship of lies and treachery	The primacy of cultural colonization	The specificity of the schools and the rejection of eclectic school	Creating a circle of promoting virtue and forbidding wrong

2.3. Sayyed Ahmad Fardid and "Meetings of Farahi and Apocalypse Conquests"

Sayyed Ahmad Fardid, professor of philosophy at the University of Tehran, has been considered the most influential contemporary Iranian philosopher (Boroujerdi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 103). As Ashouri, one of Fardid's students has put it; he has impacted "the Mentality of an Important Part of Our Intellectual Community" (2014, 5). In the late 1950s, Fardid played a significant role in the evolution of the intellectual discourses that led to

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the 1979 revolution (Mirsepassi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 53) and "Still", many Iranian intellectuals consciously or unconsciously move within the framework of his discourse (Mirsepassi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 55). Despite being no revolutions before the Islamic Revolution, by winning it and performing as a "Divine Sage," he was able to gather a large number of revolutionary Muslim youth in his debate and become the "Greatest Source of Inspiration" for the ideologues of the Islamic Republic (Ashouri, 2014: 53). Fardid has not written much of his work, which is why many call him an "Oral Philosopher" (Ghaeminik, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 233). But in the meantime, the book "The Visit of Farahi and the Apocalypse Conquests" (1393 - 2014) was first compiled in a volume by Fardid. Although this book does not mention the year of the lectures, Ashouri (2014: 11) considers that most of the book's contents refer to the years 1981 and 1982, the same years that influenced the minds of the revolutionary Muslim youth. As noted earlier, Fardid is one of the influential intellectuals in the Islamic Republic's cultural policies. The book "the Farahi Meeting and Apocalypse Conquest" emerged in the early years after the Islamic Revolution and is the most important source for his views on this subject. The results of this book's thematic content analysis aimed at extracting propositions from which cultural policy categories can be applied and summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Proposals Derived from "Farahi Meetings and Apocalyptic Conquests (Fardid's Lectures) and Mentioned Cultural Policy Issues

Number	Excerpt proposition of the book
1	"Today both thought and economics are the same, and even though is important than economics, and if thought is right, the economy will be fine." (p. 32)
2	"Whatever is today is civilization and not culture. Humanity has become homeless today because of civilization. Urbanization has rendered non-cultivation of humankind, this civilization has destroyed and rendered homeless, and there is no sky, So it does not have a sanctified body. (p. 44)
3	Westernization has conquered us for a hundred years, and evil has destroyed us for 2500years." (p. 73)
4	"In humanism, what is not traceable is human. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not affect humanity. 'What is an obsolete human being, slavery, brotherhood, equality and freedom in the self-image and unity of all in one?' (p. 76)
5	"These Jews would destroy it if there were works of God in psychology and philosophy and in scientific and sociological methods, such as Durkheim, Goodrich, Bergson, Popper, and Eric

Number	Excerpt proposition of the book
	Freud. A revolution can be found when these go away." (p. 78 and 79)
6	..."They have gone to study science, and then Western science has interpreted itself as Qur'an science and Qur'an insight and the word of Allah. See what confusion is and what is wrong. These apocalyptic fights are from evil." (p. 89)
7	"One Hundred Years of Westernization prevails over us." (p. 103)
8	..."God willing, all fundamental issues of our country will be laid out, the universities of humanities and philosophical sciences closed and reopened. It is a movement; these are gradual but not incremental politics. Step by step means defending American politics, which results from unconsciousness." (p. 113)
9	"We are proud of many historical honors. One said that the Europeans have taken it away from us, If the Europeans have taken anything, they have taken a comment and interpretation. They have said a lot about self- fundamentalism. In our books, especially the new preachers have said a lot." (p. 138)
10	"This kind of human science is a sign of human illness. Today, human beings are paying attention to these sciences defending human diseases with painkillers that do not cure human pain, And tomorrow it begs the question."(P – 154)
11	..."None of today's humanities treat human pain. ... if it is natural and mathematical sciences it is true, but the human sciences is different from natural sciences like physics and ... " (p. 222)
12	"The true freedom of man, the horizon of all humanity, is in future, but the promise and thought of today's society is freedom. Absolute freedom is freedom from Jean-Paul Sartre, and this freedom is Sartre's escape from freedom." (p. 261)
13	"The moment that man finds death on his own, Rumi takes it in art, the complete human perfection is the pursuit of righteousness; mystical is monotheistic mysticism." (p. 283)
14	..."But the new art that is all about lust. ... in essence, the new art is "debauch" (p. 283)
15	..."Art means that we are trained to go and find true monotheism and become an artist. So this is the condition of the way." (p. 288)
16	"Our poetry, art, and politics are all in the hands of Freemasonry and imperialism, especially after the constitution ..." (p. 353)
17	..."This new sociology and its utopia and the examples they give are all from sewage, even the quasi-Islamic utopia" (p. 358)

Number	Excerpt proposition of the book
18	"I want to compare censorship with self-calculation. I say the difference between man and beast is that man must be a seeker. A double-minded search, one searching for evil and the other self-confident; search for Censorship that promotes virtue and avoids wrong." (pp. 408 and 409)
19	"The human science is invalid. Science is mathematic, and natural sciences, which is in the hands of the humanities, and the soul itself is in the hands of the politicians." (p. 417)

A total of 19 statements were extracted from the book "The Farahi Visit and the Conquests of the Apocalypse" that can be interpreted or directly used as headings and interpretations for cultural policy-making. The crucial point about Fardid's discussions is the expression of repetitive content and propositions that have been attempted to address only the more prominent themes in the present thematic Content analysis. Regardless of this, Understanding Fardid's arguments require familiarity with his concepts' specific language and meaning. All his topics can be interpreted under these terms: "Yesterday,"[1] "the Day before Yesterday," "Today,"[2] "Tomorrow"[3] and "Aftermath"[4] and also the fundamental concept of "Westernization.[5]" The main themes of cultural policy-making are summarized in the following 12 main propositions. The topics in these themes are given in Chart 3

Non-Civilization of Civilized Man: Civilized humanity is uncultured (inference from the proposition and category 2).

Westernization of Iranians: Iranians, mainly since The Constitutional Period, are engaged with westernization (inference from propositions and categories 3 – 7).

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[1]. "Fardid considers past(yesterday) society a divine in which monotheism was ruled and the people in that community were a united nation and lived in this spiritual East without any straggle. Yesterday's society is the era of metaphysical reign.

[2]. Today is a time when man is born of a self-centered and Cartesian subject, such a man has entered the age of ignorance and eats his divine age from morning to night.

[3]. Tomorrow is the phase of struggle and transition.

[4]. Aftermath is the era of the Imam of time and the creation of a divine community and the formation of a united nation" (BahramiKomil, 2014 :173).As stated, Fardid concern is yesterday regret and a wish for the future.

[5]. "Westernization" was, in his term, a literal and philosophical interpretation of a general and inclusive form, referring to the general condition of mankind in the modern world and in the age of modernity. In other words, what the late master meant by westernization was the foundation of human self-centeredness in the present apocalypse" (Farno, 2007: 156).

Opposition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its values symbolized humanism and sensuality dominance on humans (inference from proposition and category 4).

Opposition to Western Humanities: Humanities and, above all, sociology and psychology against God are symptoms of human illness; they are also useless to him and originate from the wasteland of Western humanism (inference from propositions 5 - 10 - 11 - 17 – 19).

The Necessity of a Cultural Revolution: A cultural revolution with the aim of transformation in humanities and philosophical sciences (inference from proposition 8).

Rejecting Islamic-based Science: Western Science's Interpretation to Quran Science and Insight is Misleading [for example Islamic Humanities] (inference from proposition 6).

In the Dream of the Old Art, Rejecting the New Art: It means the death of right, an instrument of lust (deducing propositions and categories 13 - 14 – 15).

Freemasonry's Dominance over Art, Literature and Politics: Since the Constitutional Period, freemasons have dominated our arts, literature and politics (deducing proposition and category 16).

The Priority of Correcting Thoughts: If thoughts are right, economics will be corrected (inference from proposition 1).

In the Dream of Future Libertarian: The true liberty is after tomorrow and freedom from western freedom (deducing proposition and category 6).

Evil Interpretation of Islamic Science and Culture in the West: Modernist palpitations have neglected that even if Islamic science and culture have been exported to the West, Westerners will interpret it as evil (inference from proposition 9).

Rejecting Censorship in the Sense of Enjoining to Vice: Censorship is good if it means exploring self-consciousness and directing it to virtue. It is terrible to explore the confident self and refer it to evil (inferred from Proposition 18).

Fardid can be considered a thinker who has seized the opportunity of the Islamic Revolution to redo his ideas. The ideas developed around west stuckness are philosophical and intellectual enmity with the new civilization and its enterprising spirit (humanities). For Fardid, the current state of society's thinking and culture is the product of Western dominance over Iranian minds and thoughts. He believes any improvement in economic affairs requires reforming the thought and culture first. He clarifies the points that need revision and returns throughout his discussions by distinguishing

empirical and mathematical sciences from the humanities and philosophies. A return to sensuality is everywhere in the world. It rests on the loss of humanity self-confidence and past spirituality. Fardid is thinking of achieving a future world through tomorrow. A future world in the emergence of the absent Imam (AS) highlights the notion of Shi'a return and references the past world. In fact, in the coordinates of Fardid's thought, all the world's human and cultural features and achievements are negated yesterday and today. That is why he is denounced by the universal declaration of human rights, new art and the humanities and the attempt to link this science and Islamic science. In the meantime, Fardid considers censorship as seek, and he denounces any search for self-confidence that ultimately leads to self-deprecating "The Self" and denying it.

Chart 3: Cultural Policy Lines in Fardid's Views

Priority of thought correction	The rejection of Islamic-based science	Opposition to Western Humanities	Freemasonry's mastery of art, literature, and politics	Westernization of Iranians	The non-civilization of civilized man
Reject the new art and dream of the old art	Opposition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights	The Interpretation of Islamic Science and Culture in the West	Reject censorship in the sense of denying	In the wish of future freedom	The Necessity of the Cultural Revolution

Conclusion

As we have seen in the thoughts themes of the three thinkers of the Islamic Revolution, the origins of Shariati, Motahari and Fardid have many different points of view. As a social reformer, Shariati represents a reformed Islam that is intertwined with humanism, historical determinism, and scientism. In Mottahari view, blending Islam and Western concepts and approaches is useless, and Fardid rejects Western humanities. Shariati also believes in the relativity, place-relatedness and time-relatedness of social and political issues. Therefore the idea of returning to self cannot be regarded as a fundamentalist one. In his view, facing the material world,

religion would take a social-political role. In other words "Religion," in Shariati's view, has a secular form. Faith with an ideological face that tends to respond to social and political questions of the world. Instead, he speaks of the need for Islamic reform and Protestantism, and that reformed Islam specifies the content of a return to self. Shariati should be considered a religious reformer where it shames the concretion of the old generation and complains about the futility of the new generation. Shariati speaks of Islam to get rid of this situation, as an ideology, is consistent with the time requirements. Motahari is also a religious reformer who, like Shariati, is striving for cultural reform of society. Unlike Shariati, who has understood the early months of the Islamic Republic's establishment, he believes that the ultimate and lasting victory of the movement depends on the cultural (spiritual) transformation of society. For Mottahari, the critical element in this transformation is liberation from the spirit of "Lack of National Self-esteem," another interpretation of Shariati's concept is "Weststruckness." "But Fardid, who is a preacher of "Westernization," uses this concept to refer to everything that goes back to the civilized world of thought and culture. Fardid agrees with the empirical and mathematical sciences and considers the western humanities decadent and the gateway to the West. Based on these differences, one cannot provide a unified view of their thinking, claiming that the same or similar headings and interpretations of their opinions can be used for cultural policy-making.

But what is noteworthy is that the cultural policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran are rooted in the minds of these three thinkers.

Specifically, he puts forward a form of government guidance, where Motahari accepts the censorship of lies and betrayals as broadly interpretable concepts (despite the genuine freedom of thought). Then he provides a theoretical basis for operationalizing this idea; this idea has been rejected in Fardid's opinion, and it is not explicitly used in Shariati's opinion. Or a prominent westernization in the views of Fardid and Shariati, without Motahari's approval stamp, provides the necessary basis for its acceptance as a suitable platform for implementing and formalizing this policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Supreme Council approved the Cultural Revolution as a document of "Principles of Cultural Policy of the Country" in 1991 (Web site of Islamic Parliament Research Center, 2017: http://rc.majlis.ir); synthesis of thinkers opinions have the hegemony of the revolution. As stated in the Preamble of Cultural Policy: "Cultural policy is the formal agreement and consensus of officials in identifying, formulating, and defining the most important principles and priorities of a cultural movement". In this definition, the use

of the notions "Formal Agreement" and "Consensus" most clearly reflects the multiple hegemony and recognition of policy-makers over the "Recognition" of cultural issues, values, and priorities. This divergence goes back to different thinking styles of main post-revolutionary political flows. The document "Principles of Country Cultural Policy" is an attempt to overcome it.

But, as we have said, at the same time, we can have a more cohesive understanding of Shariati's, Motahari's and Fardid's common ideas and the distinct lines of the cultural policy principles of these three thinkers. With such an approach, the common principles of cultural policy-making with the mainstream scholars of the Islamic Revolution of Iran include a confrontation with Westernization and the priority of reform and development of thought and culture. Of course, it is necessary to explain that each of the strands and lines inferred from their votes alone or jointly can be based on the cultural policy of the Islamic Republic in different periods of the Islamic Republic. However, the most important result of this study is the identification of two plausible themes in cultural policy-making that, albeit with a different context, are shared between Shariati, Motahari and Fardid.

Chart 4: The Common Principles of Cultural Policy-making among **the Scholars of the Islamic Revolution**

Priority of reform and development of thought and culture	Confront with the West

In the document "Principles of Cultural Policy in the Country" (1991 AD/1370 SH), which considers the cultural policy of the country as a revolutionary policy, the following goals are considered as cultural goals of the Islamic Republic:

1. The growth and excellence of Islamic human culture and the spread of the message and culture of the Islamic Revolution in world society;

2. Independence and deterioration of degenerate manifestations and inaccurate foundations of alien cultures and degeneration of perverse customs and superstitions;

3. Fulfill the creative and competent powers of human beings in all dignities, and activate the divine talents, and obtain the intelligence of human beings and their existential reserves;

4. Adorned with moral virtues and God attributes on the way to attain transcendent human status;

5. The total realization of the Cultural Revolution to establish the values of Islam and the Islamic Revolution in community and individual life and to observe them and to continue the cultural movement for achieving desired society;

6. Understand the requirements and developments of time and critique and integrate human societies' cultural achievements and results consistent with Islamic principles and values.

And the study of these goals shows that confronting Westernization and priority of reform and development of thought and culture are two common principles inferred from Shariati, Motahari and Fardid's views. They are among the foundations of cultural policy-making in the Islamic Republic, and other headlines have also been taken into account. However, it cannot be asserted that the opinions of any of the three examined thinkers are entirely the basis of cultural policy-making in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, it seems that the Islamic Republic's cultural goals are set out in the principles of the country's cultural policy and the views of prominent scholars of the Islamic Revolution. It has followed a trajectory before and during the early years of the revolution by thinkers; and the gap between the theorists and the realized concept (in practice and formalization), lacks casual reasoning and specification. And it is not even noteworthy.

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The West's Attempt to Weaken Iran's Deterrence Power from JCPOA Entrance

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Abstract

The goal of countries in concluding treaties in international relations is to increase and ensure national security. Each country is trying to maximize its safety in the global environment. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abbreviated as "JCPOA," resulted from 12 years of negotiations between Iran and the West, which formalized, after being signed by the P5 + 1 countries and ratified by UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Political and legal experts have considered the effects of JCPOA and related resolutions, including Resolution 2231, on national interests from various dimensions. The present study aimed to analyze the West's attempt to reduce Iran's conventional deterrence power from JCPOA entrance. The main question is 'In addition to restricting Iran's nuclear industry, what other goals did the United States pursue in JCPOA?' The article hypothesizes that one of the goals of the US-led West has been to weaken Iran's conventional deterrence capability through JCPOA. This hypothesis is tested based on a deterrence strategy. Therefore, while proposing a deterrence strategy, the present study analyses JCPOA and its consequences (Resolution 2231) and its impact on the conventional deterrence capacity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The result of this article is the confirmation of the hypothesis above.

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Introduction

The issue of peaceful nuclear activities in Iran is one of the tremendous and protracted crises in the history of Iran, which has gone beyond the national level and has gained international dimensions. Based on international treaties and the importance of this industry in developing the country, Iran considers peaceful nuclear technology legal and natural right. The main goal of governments in joining international treaties is to increase and maximize national security and interests. The present study aimed to evaluate the effect of "JCPOA" on Iran's defensive and deterrence ability based on "Deterrence Theory." The deterrence strategy results from the evolution of the different individuals' theories based on the governing facts of the relations between states. The basic premise of deterrence theory is that if country A intends to attack country B, it will not attack if the cost of the attack exceeds its achievement. The famous French strategist "Buffer" believes that if a country can destroy 15% of another country's population or industrial centres, this country has a deterrent power (Collingri, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 304). Therefore, the result is an increase in defence authority to deter and respond effectively to threats, secure national interests and public security, support foreign policy, and promote peace and security in the region by using all means. The deterrence strategy has different levels and is not limited to nuclear weapons. "Deterrence" in this study means conventional deterrence because unconventional deterrence and nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defence doctrine.

JCPOA is an international treaty that has a close connection with Iran's national interests and security. Therefore, we should consider this treaty from various dimensions and aspects, especially defence and security. The hypothesis is one goal of the US-led West has been to weaken Iran's conventional deterrence capability through JCPOA. This hypothesis is evaluated based on the "Deterrence Strategy." The general purpose of this article is to show the weaknesses of JCPOA and finally explain that contracts similar to the conditions of JCPOA do not serve the interests of Iran.

1. Research Background

Numerous works have been published about JCPOA and its benefits. Hossein Pourahmadi and Ali Akbar Bazoobandi have analyzed why the JCPOA agreement is based on a two-level metaphor (Pourahmadi and Bazoobandi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 79-120). Investigating why nuclear conflict is resolved using the theory of maturity is the title of a study by Kolaei and Soltaninejad. This study has concluded that the two sides have inevitably negotiated and agreed regarding the impasse of the problem and

the lack of other solutions (Kolaei and Soltaninejad, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 97-126).

Farzad Rostami and Massoud Naderi, in their article "JCPOA, the Nuclear Case and the Security-making and non-Security-making Platforms" have tried to show that JCPOA has led to the promotion of Iran's position in the region and the world (Rostami and Naderi, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 187-218). In a book entitled "Step by Step with JCPOA from Beginning to End," Hamid Baeidinejad presents a documentary report on the process of the Geneva negotiations to the final agreement (cf: Baeidinejad, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 1-396). "The Impact of JCPOA on the Security Cooperation of European Union and Iran" is the title of an article published by Nessa Zahedi and Saeed Amini.

The authors have predicted that JCPOA will improve the EU's security relations with Iran (Zahedi and Amini, 2016 AD/1395 SH:1).

Saleh Rezaei Pish Robat, in an article, examine the issue of inspection of Iran's military bases by the International Atomic Energy Agency based on JCPOA and the Additional Protocol (Rezaei Pish Robat, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 1). Muhammad Sadegh Koushki et al., in an article entitled "US Withdrawal from JCPOA and Confronting the Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran," have tried to analyze the US withdrawal from JCPOA to counter Iran's asymmetric deterrence (Kushki et al., 2017 AD/1398 SH: 322-348). This article differs from previous research in that the present paper, with a critical perspective, has read this agreement in the framework of "Deterrence Theory" and from influencing the country's defence capabilities. The present study is practical research with the descriptive-analytical method and using documental, libraries and news sites instruments.

2. Theoretical Framework

Achieving lasting security and a life free of war and bloodshed and the absence of threat has been one of the concerns of humanity throughout history. There is a two-way relationship between threats and security in various fields. Where there is a threat, there is no security, and on the contrary, where there is no security and have weakness, society does not move towards the country's ideals (Nezami and Mehri, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 187). According to the classical realist view, the international system is a chaotic system in which the actors choose the self-reliance strategy to maintain their interests and existence. Classical realist theory, like other theories, has evolved in such a way that today, we can discuss neorealism in both defensive and offensive terms. In 1979, Kenneth Waltz, the famous realist

theorist, presented the theory of neo-realism by writing his book, "Theory of International Politics" (Fathi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 824-825). Neo-realism adheres to classical realism's central principles and assumptions, such as country-oriented, power-oriented, balance of power, international anarchy, and countries unity and rationality (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 33). Neo-realists believe that governments maximize their profits by using domestic and foreign tools (Bosz, 2017: 200-201). In a world with increasing threats and demands, small and large powers increasingly produce and multiply destructive weapons (Momtaz, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 7). world peace take place when everyone can defend.

Regarding the above mentioned, the theory of deterrence is based on realism and against the ideas based on idealism. This theory is a completed version of the view of Power Balance. During the second half of the twentieth century, relying on conventional and unconventional weapons could explain international relations (Seifzadeh, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 178). People like Bernard Brodie and Liddell Hart can are its commentators.

Deterrence means the one-sided attempt to influence the other to prevent him from taking an action that involves damage or expense to the first one (Elliott, Robert, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 370). Characteristics such as the political environment inside and outside, the political goals nature, relationship between the government, elites and the people are the requirements of deterrence (Lane et al., 2004 AD/1383 SH: 198). The critical point in deterrence is that if a country can convince an opponent that its costs in the attack outweigh its benefits, it will secure itself against that country. Deterrence is often used to prevent an enemy military attack or to prevent the deployment of military force and to stop unacceptable civilian activities and is based on the second blow (Lotfian, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 172).

To ensure a deterrence policy, a country must have the power of a "Second Blow" to ensure its survival and defeat the other side (Deutsch, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 223).

Waltz says that the power of the second blow has two states. The first is that the deterrence power must survive after enduring the first blow or preventive, and the second is that it must show complete and sufficient ability to strike the double blow and prevent the other side (Waltz, 1995: 9). The deterrence system has two critical theoretical foundations, structural theories and rational actors. Accordingly, if power is concentrated, it causes stability and power breakdown and instability (Askarkhani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 46). The deterrence strategy is not used to fight but is used to maintain peace and psychologically prevent aggression (Collins 1991 AD/1370 SH: 161). In other words, deterrence results from the strategic

resources available to an organization and its ability to turn resources into coercive power so that this coercive power is adequate before using.

2.1. Deterrence Factors and Assumptions

The deterrence theory assumptions are as follows:

1) Existence of two rival actors who have a positive or negative connection of interests;
2) Being rational and intellectual (instrumental rationality) of both parties;
3) Intolerance of damages caused by possible war;
4) The effect of military power on changing the decision of the attacking actor (cf: Seifzadeh, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 181-182).

The basic concepts of deterrence are capability, validity, communication and stability.

2.2. Capability

Capacity is the ability to inflict a "Second Blow" on a potential attacker (Amir Moeini, 1977 AD/1356 SH: 20). A situation in which one side has a vast and invulnerable force that, after enduring the "First Blow," can inflict a second blow in a reciprocal and compensatory manner and inflict general damage on the other party. The deterrence force must be able, if necessary, to implement the appropriate punishment to the attacking party (Omidvarnia, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 44). Deterrence is effective when sufficient capacity to respond to the threat (ibid., 45). Hence, war is considered a great disaster for the aggressor. The attacking actor will never attack, knowing that the hostile country will not be destroyed and will strike back with the first blow.

2.3. Validity

Convincing the opponent about the existence of "Capability" and the power of the second blow is a necessary condition of deterrence, but it is not sufficient. The enemy must be "Convinced" that this deterrence force can inflict irreparable damage (Gray, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 32). There is also the necessary political will to do so. Henry Kissinger says: "According to the deterrence, a move with bluff aim suppose seriously is much more effective than a threat that is real but not construe seriously." (Deutsch, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 223) The deterrence strategy is successful when the hostile parties make sure that each one can deliver a second blow, and this action creates damage that is more than the benefits of the first attack. Each will not hesitate to execute a penalty and enter a second blow. Therefore, no one act to inflict the first blow. Thus, "Validity" is accepting the reality of capability and "Ability" is capability itself.

2.4. Communication

Deterrence is effective when the deterrence force transmits its intent to the

other party and determines attack consequences to the aggressor. Deterrence is a strategy with military equipment; therefore, governments must reveal their real intentions by publishing official announcements, sending messages, and announcing their plans. Otherwise, if the country can strike a second blow and the will of use validity, the necessary communication is not created. Or some reasons caused the opponent's misunderstanding of what the other side means, an attack takes place, and the deterrence loses its meaning.

2.5. Stability

Effective deterrence does not merely have a robust military force; it must also be stable (Omidvarnia, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 46). In addition to being aware of each view, stability in deterrence means that the parties do not take drastic and unforeseen actions for small and insignificant issues (Amir Moeini, 1977 AD/1356 SH: 26). Instability in the parties' will, small activities, and the normal movement of forces or weapons testing may be considered the beginning of an attack. In response, a pre-emptive strike may take place and reject deterrence. However, the other side did not intend to do so. Stability also depends on interests. The conflict parties must agree on "Survival." Failure to share interests can lead to deterrence failure.

3. Types of Deterrence
3.1. Deterrence Regarding Tools and Instruments

According to the role of tools and instruments, researchers have enumerated two general types of deterrence.

3.1.1. Conventional Deterrence

In this method of deterrence (which is the subject of this article), conventional weapons play a significant role and are the most common type of deterrence globally. Ballistic missiles have characteristics that make them ideal for traditional deterrence, such as the ability to penetrate the enemy defence network, maintaining ability before firing, relatively long-range and high speed, which reduces their vulnerability to air defence systems (Taremi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 183). The mobility of missile launchers and the lack of runways and ancillary formations increase the deterrence capability in combat situations. Ballistic missiles can hit targets at a very far distance from the borders. It may be impossible by air force fighters or with many risks (ibid., 184). So, Iran has tried to increase its deterrence power by expanding the range and accuracy of its missiles.

3.1.2. Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear weapons play a crucial role in nuclear deterrence (it is not the article's subject). Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was able to prove its effectiveness and prevent the conflict of powers with atomic

weapons (Rahimi Roushan 2016 AD/1395 SH: 390). Experts have considered other divisions in parallel with the deterrence division due to tools, deterrence in terms of goals, regional and global deterrence (cf: ibid., 393).

4. The Beginning of the Iran-West Nuclear Crisis

Following reports by the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) about the activities of the secret nuclear forces in Natanz and Arak formed intense propaganda in the Western media and political circles against Iran. Phrases such as nuclear Iran is a threat, Iran is part of the axis of evil, etc., were raised every day (Rostami and Naderi, 2016 AD/1395 AH: 196). The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany sent a joint letter to the Iranian Foreign Minister on Tir 18, 1382, requesting that Iran suspend all enrichment activities and accept the Additional Protocol (Rahimi Roushan, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 307). In response to this letter, Iran formally declared its readiness to negotiate with the Agency on the Additional Protocol on Shahrivar 21, 1382. The negotiations between Iran and three European countries (Mehr 29, 1382) led to the Saadabad agreement. The provisions of the Saadabad Treaty were followed by the Brussels Agreement on Esfand 4, 1382 and the "Paris Agreement" on Aban 25, 1383, with the acceptance of further commitments by Iran. However, none of Iran's confidence-building measures led to the three European countries' recognition of Iran's rights, which provoked Iran's dissatisfaction and was reflected in a letter from the Iranian chief negotiator to the Europeans (Rouhani, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 321).

In Mordad 1384, the nuclear activities (which had been suspended) were resumed in the then President presence and broke the seal of the UCF factory in Isfahan. The ninth and tenth governments formed an unprecedented leap in nuclear energy (cf: Rahimi Roushan, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 341-344). The rapid development of Iran's peaceful atomic industry has elevated Iran's position in the negotiations to such an extent that it has forced the West to accept the principle of enrichment and the repeal of sanctions on Iran. Therefore, the only option for the United States was to negotiate a political and logical solution with Iran (Jalali et al., 2019 AD/1398 SH: 133). On the one hand, Iran's insistence on accepting the right to enrichment and the failure of unprecedented US and European sanctions to halt Iran's nuclear program led Obama to make a proposal that was unthinkable in the past. In this proposal, the United States accepted the principle of enrichment in Iran and was careful not to adopt an issue that would publicly imply a rejection of enrichment. Officials in the Obama administration carefully stated that their goal was to prevent Iran from building a nuclear

weapon, not to block the capability of Iran's nuclear program, which implicitly implied the acceptance of the right to enrichment (Pourahmadi and Bazoobandi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 101). After implementing the JCPOA and when Iran lost its leverage, the West did not predictably fulfil its obligations in JCPOA. Because Iran had unilaterally fulfilled all its commitments, the Western side, which had achieved its goal, had no incentive to meet its obligations.

4.1. Continuation of Negotiations with the Development of the Nuclear Industry

Negotiations between Iran and the West continued during the Ninth and Tenth Governments. After numerous and fruitless meetings, after the level of enrichment reached 20% according to the needs of the country and the number of centrifuges set up and built reached 27,000, the Western side decided that it should meet the minimum requirements of Iran. Therefore, in the meeting (Istanbul 2) held on Farvardin 26 and 27, 1391, the following preliminary agreements were reached, which showed the first glimmers of hope to solve the problem:

1. Iran will continue to enrich uranium by 3.5 per cent;
2. The P5 + 1 Group accepts Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities;
3. Iran will provide the necessary guarantees for the inactivity of the military atomic;
4. The negotiations framework at the next meeting will be the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NPT.

However, at the next meeting in Vienna, on Ordibehesht18, 1391, and then the talks in Baghdad, on Khordad 3 and 4 of the same year, the Western group could not conclude Iran's proposals. Thus, it explicitly revealed the process by which the West agreed to the minimal acceptance of Iran's demands and its signs at the Istanbul Summit (Farvardin 26 and 27, 1391 SH). Simultaneously with the end of the tenth government, it transferred to the eleventh government (cf: Rahimi Roushan, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 355-367).

4.2. Negotiations in the Eleventh Government and the Geneva Declaration

During Hassan Rouhani's visit to New York to attend the UN General Assembly, the sidelines held preliminary talks with the Western group, which paved the way for new discussions called Geneva 4 in Mehr 1392. Further negotiations "Geneva 6" began on Aban 29, 1392, in Geneva and continued to the morning of Azar 3. These discussions caused an agreement called the Geneva Declaration. The general principles of the Geneva Declaration were:

- Guarantee Iran not to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons proliferation (under any circumstances);

- The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes per the relevant provisions of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and act its obligations under the NPT;

- This comprehensive solution will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to have nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant clauses in the NPT and following the tasks set out for it in these clauses;

- This comprehensive solution will include a mutually defined enrichment program that provides for practical constraints and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program;

- "Until all of it is not agreed" means that no agreement has been reached.

Iran's concessions in the Geneva agreement included no new sanctions for up to six months, the suspension of the precious metals embargo, the release of part of its blocked assets, the lifting of sanctions on the automotive industry, and the export of petrochemical products. On the other hand, Iran must store half of its 20% enriched uranium to produce fuel for Tehran's research reactor and dilute the rest. For these six months, do not enrich uranium to levels above 5%. Do not expand the Natanz, Fordow or Arak nuclear fuel facilities and do not build new facilities. Allow daily and unrestricted inspections to the International Atomic Energy Agency at all levels, from mines to workshops, etc. After the Geneva agreement, negotiations continued in Esfand 92 and Aban 93 in Oman (cf: Rahimi Roushan, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 355-367). These intensive negotiations paved the way for the extension of the Geneva Declaration.

5. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action[1] (JCPOA)

Negotiations between the two sides continued in Ordibehesht and Khordad 1394. The final round of the talks to draft a so-called "Vienna 9" agreement with the P5 + 1 group began at the Coburg Hotel, and the conclusion of the Vienna talks was published on 23 Tir.

5.1. An Overview of the Commitments of the Two Sides in "JCPOA"

According to the paper title, which examines the West's efforts to weaken Iran's deterrence ability from JCPOA entrance, a brief look at the parties' commitments is necessary. JCPOA has been compiled in about 160 pages (including the text and appendix). The text of JCPOA and the fifth appendix includes five-time periods for implementing the agreement. These periods are the day of negotiations finalization, ratification, implementation, transfer and the end of the Security Council resolution. Iran and the P5 +

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[1]. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was the name of a statement or agreement reached between Iran and the West in the government of Dr Hassan Rouhani to resolve the nuclear issue, abbreviated as "JCPOA."

1 have tasks and responsibilities at any given time. The finalization of the negotiations day is when the nuclear talks were concluded.

This incident took place on Tuesday, Tir 23, 1394, in Vienna that based on the Security Council would approve the JCPOA in a resolution. The details of this resolution are in paragraph "N" of the JCPOA. According to it, the Security Council resolution will repeal all previous resolutions from the day of its implementation. It will impose some special restrictions and termination of the UN Security Council's review of the Iranian nuclear issue 10 years after the date of the JCPOA agreement (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: 4). The draft resolution was submitted by the United States and approved by the Security Council under No. 2231.

5.2. The Mechanism for the Sanctions Return

One of the US goals in concluding the JCPOA was not to solve the Iranian nuclear problem and lift sanctions but to freeze as an introduction to entering other areas of US claims, including Iran's defence program. Therefore, included the mechanism for the return of sanctions in the JCPOA. This mechanism empowers the signatories of the JCPOA; whenever they wish, they can return the sanctions through the predicted legal process. Paragraphs eleven and twelve of Resolution 2231 describe the mechanism for the sanctions return. These clauses, which are based on Articles 36 and 37 of the JCPOA, state that in a dispute between Iran and the P5 + 1, the Security Council must, within 30 days of receiving the complainant's statement of "Lack of Basic Adherence" opposite side, must vote on "The Continuation of Lifting Iran Sanctions." (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: Paragraph 11&12) In this case, if the US or any of the permanent members of the Security Council want the sanctions against Iran to come back, they can use their veto power to prevent the resolution approval "on the Continuation of the Lifting of the Sanctions." And they can cause previous resolutions and related sanctions to be fully revived automatically.

According to paragraph 14 of appendix 5, the implementation day shall begin when Iran has fulfilled its obligations and the Agency has verified them. This paragraph reads: "On the day of implementation, following the implementation of the relevant actions of the Iranian nuclear authorities referred to in paragraph 15 and verified by the Agency and simultaneously with the adoption of measures referred to in paragraphs 16 and 17 by the P5 + 1 group and the occurrence of actions referred to in paragraph 18 at the United Nations, it will be following the resolution of the United Nations Security Council." (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: 119) The above

sentences about the related actions of Iran's nuclear program mean the eleven commitments that Iran must fulfil in essential areas such as the level and capacity of enrichment, Arak, Fordow, uranium reserves, and so on. Eight years after the date of "Ratification Day" or the report of the Secretary-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency that the IAEA has reached a broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran is used in peaceful activities is called "Transition Day." (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: 119)

5.3. End Date of Security Council Resolution

According to paragraphs 23 and 24 of the fifth appendix, the end day is the day when the provisions and measures imposed in the Security Council resolution will end. In that time, the Security Council will no longer check the issue of Iran's nuclear program (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: 123). Accordingly, Iran will be excluded entirely from Chapter 7 of the UN Charter on the date of termination.

After the JCPOA agreement, formed a special commission to review it in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The "Special Commission of JCPOA" report was read in the parliament on 7/12/94, which examined JCPOA from the political, security, defence, economic and legal aspects. The commission's report has not to desire to the JCPOA. Still, with the arrangements of the parliament boss, implemented another plan in the National Security Commission. The government didn't need to send JCPOA to the parliament as a bill. In conclusion, the report of the Special Commission was rejected, while according to the Parliament regulation, it had to be voted on. However, the parliament introduced another plan called Iran's proportionate and reciprocal action to implement "JCPOA" and approved it on Tuesday, 7/21/94.

6. JCPOA Analysis Based on Deterrence Strategy

Realists believe that the domestic society of countries is under the control of superior power (government). This supreme power is the ultimate source of authority and domestic policy-making. The same powerful actor in the domestic arena is also the leading actor on the international scene. This view of the government has led the realists to consider the government as a source of national security (Abbasi Shavazi, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 80). Regarding the unique position of the government in the domestic and foreign policy, nuclear developments have a direct impact on the Iranian government and national security (ibid., 75). Therefore, it must be considered from different political, economic and security dimensions and aspects.

Regarding the security aspect of JCPOA, present the issue of the JCPOA

effect on the Iran deterrence power. Some believe that the Western side, based on the JCPOA content, seeks to reduce Iran's deterrence power in other areas. We can analyze one of the main reasons for the European Union's opposition to Iran's nuclear program based on civilizational cultural views (preventing the civilizations war) and Iranophobia and Islamophobia (Khoshandam, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 68). The governing spirit of the nuclear agreement in the eyes of Western powers was to counter Iran's deterrence power in West Asia and the Persian Gulf, and lead Iran's political behaviour in the region to "Normalization." (Kushki et al., 2019 AD/1398 SH: 372) According to the U.S, JCPOA creates a suitable platform to put regional issues and crises such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and other matters on negotiations with Iran. Therefore, finally, force Iran to be flexible about its positions or retreat from them in the region (Koushki et al., 2019 AD/1398 SH: 373). Western officials have repeatedly stated that the nuclear industry is not their main problem. IAEA Director-General George Friedman says: "Our problem with Iran is not its nuclear activities, but Iran has shown that without US support and even in conflict with the United States, it can become the most significant technological and military power in the region. This phenomenon has turned Iran into a model for Islamic countries" (ibid.). Thus, JCPOA is not merely an economic and political agreement, but according to the West's, it was an agreement encompassing all political, economic, ideological, military, and geopolitical aspects. Iran saw the agreement as an entrance to clear charges and lift sanctions. The West saw it as an opportunity to slow Iran's development and as a prelude to limiting Iran's defence capabilities and sphere of influence in the region. As a result, JCPOA has had a direct and indirect negative impact on Iran's deterrence power. In the following, we will examine and apply JCPOA and its consequences with the main principles of deterrence, namely capability, validity, communication and stability.

6.1. Capability

According to the theoretical framework, having a certain amount of military and technological capabilities is necessary to provide deterrence. Without them, it is impossible to reach the next stage, which is effective in the mind and beliefs of the other party (Lotfian, 1997AD/1376 SH: 214). One of the essential deterrence materials is the issue of "Capability." Capability means that the deterrence power must execute an appropriate punishment for the attacker in necessity. Therefore, although JCPOA is not directly related to reducing Iran's defence capability. According to Europe and the US, JCPOA severely limited Iran's nuclear power and

provided a socio-political and social context that eliminated Iran's missile capability, which is Iran's most crucial defence advantage. It is implicitly stated in the JCPOA and more explicitly in Security Council Resolution 2231. After Iran deprivation from the JCPOA benefits even in the Obama administration, Western political propaganda focused on the fact that if Iran did not enjoy the benefits of JCPOA, it was because of failure to complete the JCPOA process, and Iran did not act in the spirit JCPOA. If Iran limits its missile capability, then it will achieve tangible results from the JCPOA agreement! By instilling this issue in the international community and public opinion inside Iran, the West is trying to provide social and psychological pressure against the Iranian government. Therefore, from this view, JCPOA is a ground for reducing Iran's deterrence capability.

On the other hand, even JCPOA has affected the reduction of Iran's missile and space capability. A satellite was stopped to cut off the enemy's excuse, ready to launch from the launch pad (www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/876528/).

The general conclusion of the JCPOA Inquiry Commission in the Islamic Consultative Assembly was that the set of weaknesses of JCPOA and Resolution 2231 was the product of US efforts to turn JCPOA into a tool for strategic control of Iran and to create infrastructure for influence in the country under the pretext of the post-JCPOA atmosphere (Report of the Special Commission of JCPOA, 2015 AD/1394 SH: Section B: Paragraph 5). According to paragraph 5 (a) of the JCPOA, Iran shall, under its long-term plan, for 15 years carry out uranium enrichment-related activities, including research and development under its supervision, solely at the Natanz enrichment facility. It will maintain its uranium enrichment level up to 3.67%. In Fordow, it will refrain from any uranium enrichment and research and development of uranium enrichment and storage of any nuclear material (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: 7). The third paragraph restricts this research and development to enrichment in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium for ten years, including only IR-4 to IR-8 machines as described in appendix 1 (ibid., 6). Therefore, the apparent acceptance of the right to enrichment in Iran in JCPOA was not goodwill to accept Iran's request for nuclear power but to limit it to the level of laboratory capacity and a prelude to entering the next JCPOA. This issue becomes even more critical when we consider the implicit limitation of Iran's missile capability in JCPOA and more explicitly in Resolution 2231. According to JCPOA, the Arak heavy reactor has not yet been redesigned and is not fulfilled. If it did, it could not have the benefits of destroying heavy reactors using natural uranium as a raw natural fuel. The weaknesses of JCPOA, which regarding the

deterrence is considered reduction and limitation, are as follow: "Long-term commitment not to develop and complete the heavy water reactor, or its accumulation in Iran for 15 years and dedication to export additional heavy water according to paragraph 10 (a) of JCPOA (ibid., 8) and limiting Iran's uranium reserves based on paragraph 7 (a) of JCPOA, up to a maximum of 300 kg" (ibid., 7). Therefore, in addition to arms embargoes and implicit restrictions on the missile industry, severe restrictions on the nuclear industry are aligned with reducing deterrence capability. It has no relation to nuclear weapons because any level of the nuclear fuel cycle and having a nuclear power plant can create a level of deterrence.

6.1.1 Reducing Iran's Capabilities Based on JCPOA in the Word and Actions of Western Officials

JCPOA and the restrictions imposed on Iran were a great success for the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry held a special celebration for the success of the JCPOA negotiation, in which "Obama" also participated *(Farsnews.com/news/*13940627000165). The US presidential decree temporarily suspended western commitments in the JCPOA, but it has not benefited Iran in practice. In contrast, before the conclusion of the JCPOA and until 2015, three times, to show good faith and transparency about its peaceful nuclear programs, Iran allowed permission to visit the Parchin military site (Rezaei Pishrobat, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 67). With this agreement, the United States, on the one hand, stopped Iran's nuclear program. On the other hand, through the obtained information from the International Atomic Energy Agency from nuclear and non-nuclear facilities, it can enter into military operations against Iran with more accurate information (Khalili et al., 2019 AD/1398 SH: 110). Despite the claims of Iranian officials who blamed JCPOA for sanctions eliminations, in the first days of JCPOA signing and even during the negotiations, US officials insisted on maintaining the sanctions structure. Adam Zubin, US Deputy Treasury Secretary, said in a vote of confidence from the Senate Banking Committee: "With the cooperation of the allies, we will maintain the pressure of sanctions against Iran." He said: "Washington will continue to impose anti-Iranian sanctions on terrorism, missile proliferation and human rights". He claimed: "Iran's foreign exchange reserves will be more vulnerable to future sanctions, not less" (https://www.farsnews.ir/news/13940626000844). According to these statements, the US strategic goal was to limit Iran's power in various dimensions and consider JCPOA as a tool for this purpose. In appendix B of Resolution 2231, there are a series of commitments and recommendations beyond the JCPOA, referring to Iran's arms embargo, Iran's missile activities.

In the sixth paragraph of section B, member states are required to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of weapons or related materials from the territory of Iran by nationals or ships and aircraft under their flag (https://www.mfa.ir/files/mfa/pdff.pdf: Paragraph 6 (b)). In this statement, Iran's regional policies are tied to the nuclear issue. The conventional arms embargo mentioned in this paragraph comes when terrorism in the region has grown significantly in recent years, and ISIS is considered a serious threat to Iran's security. Under such circumstances, the Americans, with their vast power in international institutions such as the UN Security Council, can accuse Iran of documenting the sale and purchase of arms and military equipment in the region and caused the JCPOA to remain incomplete. In other words, using JCPOA limits Iran's defence capability. In case of Iran's non-acceptance, they will deprive Iran of the minority benefits of JCPOA and legally citing JCPOA introduce Iran as violating its obligations. Secretary of State John Kerry wrote in a confidential letter to Republican Sen. Marco Rubio. Whereas the Security Council requested Iran to do no ballistic missile-related activity, therefore, such actions are contrary to the Security Council resolution and will be a severe matter for consideration by the UN Security Council. He says the resolution does not allow Iran's ballistic missile program to be comfortable (Kayhan newspaper, 2015 AD/1394 SH, 1). Some JCPOA supporters considered Resolution 2231 to be its strength. However, paragraph 3, the ban on ballistic missiles, provided for the design of a nuclear warhead, which included the phrase "Designed to Carry a Nuclear Warhead," caused different interpretations by the West. Every time Iran missile tests US and Europe, citing it introduce Iran as violating the resolution. In addition, the imposition of a five-year restriction on Iran's arms imports and exports has directly affected Iran's deterrence capability. Thus, according to West, JCPOA was an entrance to other areas, including defence. Trump withdrew from JCPOA on the same pretext because he claimed that it is incomplete and should also cover Iran's spheres of regional influence and defensive deterrence; now, the Biden government is making the same demand in other literature.

6.2. Validity

JCPOA has harmed Iran's deterrence capacity in terms of "Validity." By accepting its commitments - which were clear and explicit, and the International Energy Agency is verifying its implementation - Iran, in return for the duties of the West without the necessary executive guarantees, indirectly sent the opposite message that it is ready to accept the unilateral commitment. This unilateral acceptance of obligations was also objected to by the

Special Commission of JCPOA (Report of the Special Commission of JCPOA. 2015 AD/1394 SH: Section (b), paragraph 6). Acceptance of the restrictions imposed by JCPOA, despite the experience of non-fulfilment of obligations by the West, indicates "Validity Weakness" among Iranian decision-makers and caused more pressure. However, according to the investigations carried out in the Special Commission of JCPOA in the Iranian Parliament, the threat of aggression and military confrontation with it in case of non-acceptance of JCPOA was a baseless and prominent bluff. Because according to the text of JCPOA and the additional protocol, access to Iran's military facilities as possible, and Iran was obliged to provide access to any facility, including military and security, within a maximum of 24 days (ibid., section (D), paragraph 3).

Accepting the Additional Protocol voluntarily and allowing the Agency access to any claimed location (Report of the JCPOA Special Commission, 1394: Section (d), paragraph 3), partially neutralized the positive effect of the abolition of PMD[2].[3]

On the one hand, by accepting the announcement of the PMD, the West abandoned its previous claims in this regard. Still, according to the Additional Protocol, it paved the way for monitoring and inspecting Iran's military bases. Therefore, JCPOA had significant gaps and weaknesses in the military and security fields, which caused the weakening of Iran's deterrence power by accepting inspections of the military, defensive and security centres, both psychologically and objectively. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of Resolution 2231, as approved JCPOA by the Security Council, based on JCPOA text, each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council can refuse to fulfil obligations and return sanctions to normal by resorting to any "Excuse" and without providing documents that show their dissatisfaction with the JCPOA process (https://mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/31178: Paragraphs 11&12). Does the Security Council minus Iran's verification criterion mean that the Islamic Republic of Iran has accepted that the Western parties, especially the Americans, are "Plaintiff," "Accused," "Witness," "Judge," and "Arbitrator" in the execution process of JCPOA? According to the Resolution 2231 and paragraphs 36 and 37 of JCPOA, if one of the parties (Iran or a member of the P5 + 1) believes that the other

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[2]. Possible Military Dimensions.

[3]. The PMD, or "Claim Study," is a Western claim that Iran's nuclear program is militarized, dating back to previous years (2003). The US and Western intelligence services have repeatedly accused Iran of being involved in a large-scale covert nuclear weapons project in the years before 2003. According to the JCPOA agreement and then the resolution of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, this case was closed in December 2015.

party has not complied with its obligations, it must first inform the "Joint Commission" and request a dispute resolution process. Examination of the commission members shows that the western side always has the majority (Habibi and Amiri, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 1218). There are two crucial points about the joint commission; the composition of the members and the need to obtain the plaintiff "Consent." The majority of the commission is in the other party's hands, and using the word "Satisfaction" is very broad and interpretable. The plaintiff must obtain the consent of the plaintiff within 30 days. Otherwise, the matter is recognized as an example of non-compliance to JCPOA and will be referred to the UN Security Council within five days. The West can lift all sanctions in a short period, provided that Iran has fulfilled all its obligations and is free from negotiation benefits. Acceptance of such conditions indicates that Iranians have no will to counter the West's extravagances in the form of (validity) as one of the deterrence principles. In the end, the function of this resolution is: "To limit the military and defensive power of the country," "to endanger the independence and security of the country" and "to expel legal institutions and structures, including the parliament and the Supreme National Security Council." Simultaneously with resolution adoption, the country accepted the obligation that some of its clauses were contrary to its stability and independence and had no authority to repeal it.

6.3. Communication

Instead of sending strengths, the signals sent by Iran to the West during and after the JCPOA negotiations showed confusion and conflicting positions to the West. For example, during the negotiations and when no agreement had been reached yet, the highest influential official in Iran's foreign policy said: "We will reach an agreement" (http://rouhani.ir/event.php?event_id=648). This sentence was repeated many times by the First Vice President, Foreign Minister, Deputy Foreign Minister etc.

Continuation of negotiations between Iran and the great powers manifested optimism for cooperation and negotiation from Iran (Rostami and Nadari, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 211).

This one-sided optimism continues after the initial violation of JCPOA under Obama up to now (2021 AD/1400 SH). When the first sanctions were imposed by the United States and the European Union after implementing JCPOA, regardless of commitment, Iran's response and its decision-making credibility were so weak that the West continued its behaviour without any fear of reaction. After the US withdrawal from the UN Security Council, the Iranian president gave Europe a few weeks to

fill the US vacancy in the JCPOA. After a year later (until implementing the reduction commitments began), Iran did not react. While the JCPOA should be sent to the Parliament as a bill, but the government avoided this (Report of the Special Commission of JCPOA. 2015 AD/1394 SH: section (z) paragraph 1). At the same time, it did not condition its approval like the US Congress in the Iranian Parliament. The JCPOA Commission evaluated the issuance of Resolution 2231 before JCPOA passed the Islamic Consultative Assembly or removed its legal obstacles to the voluntary acceptance of the Additional Protocol as severe weakness in the course of the nuclear negotiations in the past two years.

In contrast, government officials declared that they would not adhere to some critical parts of Resolution 2231 that undermine defence and security. It does not diminish the legal burden of the requirements of this resolution for the country. Violation of this resolution, on the other hand, will have additional consequences. It has sent a negative message in terms of (communication) and reveals that Iran, on the one hand, is in the process of negotiating and giving concessions; on the other hand, it officially sends a message that it will not implement the resolution. It has committed to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily from the day of implementation of the agreement. In contrast, it has committed to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily from the day of agreement execution. This situation contradicts the principle of "Communication" in the deterrence strategy that the messages should be clear, unambiguous and without contradiction.

6.4. Stability

The last important and influential factor in deterrence is "Stability." Stability means that the parties, in addition to being aware of each other, do not act drastically and unforeseen for small and insignificant issues (Amir Moeini, 1977 AD/1356 SH: 26). The principle of deterrence stability is closely related to the (doctrine of faithfulness to the covenant). On the other hand, we can discuss proving the commitments of both parties. Iran, without exception, has already fulfilled all its obligations to the West, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly confirmed it.

In contrast, the Western side has not (stability) in any of its obligations, and Iran has acted passively opposite this Western instability. In addition, the JCPOA agreement has no legal guarantees other than non-binding Security Council Resolution 2231, and any party to the agreement can suspend its implementation at any time and reinstate sanctions against Iran. While the United States quickly withdrew from the JCPOA at no cost and reinstated all the sanctions, which had not been lifted in practice. Europe

also did not want to fulfil its obligations or fill the American vacancy in the JCPOA. For example, despite the removal of the Swift sanction on entities removed from the list of asset freezes, on the day of implementation, the legal infrastructure of the Swift embargo will remain until the day of the transfer - eight years after the approval of Resolution 2231 - and on that date will be suspended - not lifted. It means that adding any natural or legal person to the list of asset freezes during this time will automatically be subject to Swift's embargo. Something that happened between the JCPOA approval until the US withdrawal and more intensely after the US withdrawal! Here, if we mean stability in fulfilling obligations, its function is reversed, and stability has been in maintaining sanctions.

On the other hand, the fulfilment of the two sides' commitments in the JCPOA was inconsistent, and the Western side's actions in suspending sanctions (not the promised lifting) were postponed to fulfilling Iran's commitments and verification by the IAEA; which was not implemented to the same extent! In this case, if the International Atomic Energy Agency, as an international arbiter responsible for overseeing Iran's commitments, does not approve Iran's obligations, the other party is not obliged to lift sanctions. When the IAEA submits a report on Iran's non-compliance, it will trigger sanctions. However, no third party arbitrator or international institution body has been appointed to oversee the fulfilment of the other party's obligations, i.e. the lifting of sanctions. Therefore, despite fifteen times the IAEA confirmation that Iran has fulfilled its obligations, the West has not fulfilled its obligations! So, there is no element (stability) as one of the basic deterrence principles in qualitative correspondence of the duties of both parties. Because in implementing Iran's commitments, the sanctions of the Congress and the United States and the European Union were not lifted and were suspended.

Regarding the lifting of US congressional sanctions is not in the hands of the US government; there was no guarantee that the next US administration would not repeal the executive order of the former president. The European Union, on the other hand, refused to lift the sanctions and suspended them. The Iranian government could not take any reciprocal action here. According to the provisions of articles 36 and 37 of the JCPOA, the negotiating countries can return their sanctions and complain to the Security Council, claiming that Iran has not fulfilled its obligations in the JCPOA. They can complain to the Security Council re-impose Security Council sanctions within 30 days.

These materials caused Iran to refuse to complain to the Joint Commission after repeated violations by the West. These reasons caused Iran to decline

to complain to the Joint Commission after repeated violations by the West. It is the first time we have seen the establishment of such a complex, multi-layered, multi-step mechanism in international law. An instrument in which the first layer is the Joint Commission and the last is the Security Council (Habibi and Amiri, 2020AD/1399 SH: 1221).

Although apparently, Iran is a partner in the mechanism before the complaint is referred to the Security Council and, like other members, can vote. But if the plaintiff is Iran itself and the case eventually goes to the Security Council, Iran has no right to vote in that council. Since the "Continuation of the Sanctions Lifting" is voted on, not to sanction Iran, the veto of the committee one member is enough to cause returning all sanctions. Hence, despite the non-implementation of the JCPOA and the U.S withdrawal, Iran has not used this mechanism because the result is already known. In contrast, the US goal of pressuring Iran is to postpone Iran's nuclear program and show it as a security threat to justify its presence in the Middle East. It wants to make the region insecure about selling weapons and imposing economic costs on Iran, and prevent Iran from infiltrating the area as much as possible (Rostami and Nadri, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 214).

On the other hand, an over-optimism in the Iranian government caused the JCPOA to be basically founded on the premise that the United States would no longer seek to continue hostile action against Iran. At the same time, Westerners based their work on distrust .According to the text of JCPOA, Iran has been excluded from the NPT until the international community gains confidence in its program. One of the mistakes of the Iranian government was that it considered JCPOA as a model for reaching an agreement on other areas of dispute with the West and spoke of JCPOA 2 and 3. In comparison, the West considered the achievement of JCPOA as the first step and an entry for direct entrance into the Iranian defensive field. According to mentioned above, the Iranian government began negotiations with the slogan of lifting sanctions in exchange for accepting some restrictions on nuclear activities but eventually agreed to suspend the sanctions instead of raising them. In the end, even the suspension of sanctions did not materialize.

Conclusion

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abbreviated as "JCPOA," was signed between Iran, the European Union and the P5 + 1 Group on Tuesday, Tir 23, 1394 (Juan 14, 2015) after lengthy negotiations in Vienna,

Austria. Among the various political, economic, cultural and legal aspects of JCPOA, the focus of this paper was on the direct and indirect effects of JCPOA on the country's defensive capability. Therefore, in this study, we tried to evaluate JCPOA regarding the direct and indirect impact that it may have on the country's defensive ability. The main question was 'What effect did JCPOA have on Iran's defensive capabilities?' The research hypothesis is JCPOA has hurt Iran's defensive capability.

The deterrence theory was chosen as a theoretical framework. Therefore, first, a summary of deterrence theory was presented, and the negotiation process leading to JCPOA was read. Then, focusing on the main elements of deterrence such as "Capability," "Validity," "Communication" and "Stability," we evaluated JCPOA based on the above factors. As a result, JCPOA harmed defensive power and Iran in the above four dimensions. In terms of "Capability," it was concluded that although JCPOA did not directly address the military capabilities of Iran's armed forces, by limiting Iran's nuclear power, it provided a political, psychological and social ground for reducing Iran's defensive ability. With JCPOA negative effect on the economy and the living conditions of the people conveyed the message to the society that achieving JCPOA benefits depends on Iran taking the following steps to accept the limitation of missile power and the influence of Iran's regions! On the other hand, according to Resolution 2231, as a confirmation of JCPOA, Iran will not even be allowed to test its ballistic and strategic missiles for eight years, which provide a significant part of its current deterrence power. Therefore, JCPOA is a ground for reducing Iran's deterrence capability.

Accepting the restrictions imposed by JCPOA, despite the West's previous promises to fulfil its obligations, was seen as a sign of a lack of "Validity" (which in deterrence means the will to reciprocate) among Iranian decision-makers and caused further pressure. Passive reaction to Western actions, according to the Western strategists, is interpreted that Iran's threats to react to the other side activities do not have the necessary validity and should not be taken seriously.

Another principle of deterrence is "Communication." The deterrence force must inform the other party. In compliance with this principle with JCPOA, the signals sent by Iran to the West during and after the JCPOA negotiations showed confusion and conflicting positions to the West. On the other hand, JCPOA had pledged to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily. Although it had accepted the principle and generality of JCPOA, it had its interpretation of JCPOA and Resolution 2231, which the West interpreted as an incomplete implementation of JCPOA.

The concept of "Stability" in deterrence is based on both deterrence parties will. It is a kind of commitment to the principle of fulfiling the covenant. Here, stability means consistency of JCPOA parties in implementing its provisions. Hence, Iran fulfilled all its obligations without exception and before the West, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly endorsed it. Still, the West has not been consistent in any of its commitments. Eventually, with Donald Trump's decision, all the sanctions that had been suspended on paper were reinstated.

In comparison, no rule of international law restricts the number of conventional arms of a country and is based on the right of legitimate defence. Strengthening the defensive capability in any country is directly related to its sovereignty and survival. But JCPOA, as a particular treaty and only for Iran, has been a ground for limiting Iran's deterrence power. JCPOA limited the achievement of peaceful nuclear energy technology, which was a vital deterrence capability without achieving from the West in return. In addition to losing these essential deterrence capabilities, it also sent messages to the West in the form of "Stability," "Credibility," which gave rise to further pressures.

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