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A Comparative Study of the Status of National Identity and Ethnic Identity

in Two Discourses: Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic

Case Study: The Kurdish Ethnicity in Iran

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ABSTRACT

Objective: The main objective of this research is a comparative study of the status of national identity and ethnic identity in the two discourses of Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also examines the relationship between the central government and the Kurdish ethnicity during these two periods through a case study.

Method: The present study was conducted using a comparative method and a library-documentary approach, along with descriptive analysis. Historical sources, especially works related to Kurdish nationalists and researchers with a sympathetic approach toward them, were used as the basis for data collection and analysis.

Results: The research findings indicate that the Pahlavi government's adoption of an antagonistic approach, which aimed at achieving national unity and strengthening national cohesion, led the central government to attempt to eliminate ethnic identities. In contrast, the cultural policy of the Islamic Republic adopted an agonistic approach, accepting the concept of ethnic identities as an inalienable reality of Iranian society.

Conclusions: The antagonistic approach of the Pahlavi monarchy not only failed to preserve the cohesion and solidarity of Iranians but also caused tension in the relations between ethnic groups and the central government. This tension was particularly evident in the relations between the Kurds and the Pahlavi government, which led some Kurdish nationalist parties to threaten the territorial integrity of the country. This issue prompted the central government to adopt an agonistic policy, considering the inalienable reality of ethnic and local identities in Iranian society. While emphasizing the necessity of preserving national cohesion, it incorporated respect for ethnic identities into the constitution and the micro and macro policies of the central government.

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Introduction

The land of Iran has been the home of various ethnic groups from ancient times to the present. Each of these groups has lived with a single nationality and in a cohesive identity called "Iranian" while preserving their own ethnic identity. Therefore, the national identity of Iranians throughout the ancient history of this land has been composed of different religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups. These groups have cooperated and united with each other to defend the territorial integrity of the country against external threats (Ahmadi, 2012: 3).

Iranian identity was a concept that encompassed all Iranians regardless of any ethnic, racial, or linguistic diversity. No Iranian ethnic group, with any language or religion, felt alienated from the country as a whole. However, the macro-cultural policy during the Pahlavi era, especially during the time of Reza Shah, challenged Iranian ethnic groups regarding the preservation of their culture and ethnic identity, causing them to diverge from the central government. In this context, Kurdish political elites created an artificial "Other" by defining "Self" against the "Iranian Other." (Rezaei et al., 2024 AD/1403 SH: 59)

In fact, the central government's exclusionary approach to the identity of Iranian ethnic groups provoked a reaction from them. They neglected their Iranian identity by adopting a confrontational or antagonistic approach. This situation intensified after the fall of the first Pahlavi government, ultimately leading to the establishment of the autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan (Ansari, 2017: 123), and subsequent political, military, and security problems.

With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 (Bahman 1357), a great transformation occurred in the relations between the central government and the country's ethnic groups. The recognition of ethnic identities was manifested in the constitution and the country's macro-cultural policies (Torabi, 2009 AD/1377 SH: 153). In fact, it was after the Islamic Revolution that the antagonistic policy of the Pahlavi government was replaced by the agonistic policy of the Islamic Republic.

The existence of ethnic and linguistic diversity in the country necessitates the adoption of logical and wise cultural policies and the avoidance of irresponsible behaviors. Proper and wise policies for managing this issue are only possible by correctly understanding and evaluating past solutions and adopting their positive aspects. Therefore, it is inevitable to refer to the history of the last hundred years of Iran and neutrally evaluate the solutions offered during the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic eras. Only in this way can the issue of ethnic

diversity in the country be properly managed and an environment be created where all Iranian ethnic groups and races, as in the past, live together in complete peace and free from the unpleasant feeling of discrimination or injustice.

The present study aims to answer the question of what place national and ethnic identities held in the two discourses of the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In other words, the present research was written with the aim of showing the difference in the cultural policymaking of the governments before and after the Islamic Revolution regarding the issue of ethnic identities. It is clear that achieving this goal depends on a detailed description of each of the mentioned discourses. However, it should be noted that the main goal of the present research is not merely to point out the discursive components of the two governments, but to point out two distinct approaches. These are two approaches that originated from two different worldviews and brought their own consequences to Iranian society. Therefore, the following will first discuss the interaction of the Pahlavi government with Iranian ethnic groups, especially the Kurds. Then, by referring to the provisions of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding Iranian ethnic groups and the macro-cultural policies related to ethnic identities, the transformation of the antagonistic approach before the Islamic Revolution to agonism after it will be examined.

1. Theoretical Foundations

1.1. Agonism and Antagonism

Chantal Mouffe's concept of "Agonistic Pluralism" can provide a suitable theoretical framework for the present research. In her book "On the Political," she considers a key feature of modern democracy to be the recognition and legitimization of political conflicts and the refusal to suppress them through the imposition of an authoritarian order. In modern democratic societies, other societies are not seen as an organic whole. For this reason, the existence of various conflicts is recognized, and institutions are formed that make it possible to express these conflicts in an agonistic manner (Mouffe, 2011 AD/1391 SH: 37). In the agonism Mouffe has in mind, the recognition of the opposing party exists. In contrast, antagonism is governed by hostility and enmity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 27).

If a country's macro-policy is such that it neglects the pluralistic identity of Iranian ethnic groups, the dynamics of pluralistic agonism are eliminated, and democratic relations between

ethnic groups and the central government are replaced by hostile confrontation and antagonistic relations between the parties. This is what happened in the formation of the two autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and other ethnic regions. In this state, other types of political identity formation based on nationalist, ethnic, linguistic, racial, or even religious components are formed. Hostilities can take various forms, and the belief that they can be eliminated forever is nothing but an illusion. Therefore, these hostilities must be resolved through a pluralistic democratic system and in an agonistic manner (Mouffe, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 37). Hence, the most rational way to manage ethnic diversity in the country is to accept the cultural plurality of different ethnic groups and respect ethnic identities while using all their capacities to achieve national cohesion and the unity of Iranians.

1.2. Identity

Identity refers to a set of mental beliefs that create a difference between "Self" and "Other." (Fakouhi and Amousi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 58) This concept, as an emotional or conscious, real or imaginary, existing or fake matter, is related to answering the question of what and who people are, individually and collectively. The two main components in the discussion of identity are "Self-knowledge" and "Other-knowledge," which are measured by various criteria, whether scientific or unscientific, neutral or biased, emotional and superficial or biased and deep (Maqsoudi, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 210). Identity is not a fixed thing and can be defined in different dimensions. Multidimensional identity is known as the multifaceted manifestation of an individual's or society's identity (Azad Armaki, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 153). Therefore, the identity of an individual or society can originate from various sources. For example, having a specific ethnic identity does not mean not having or rejecting the national identity of a particular person or group. Similarly, having a national identity does not mean rejecting or opposing ethnic identity. The denial of different identities not only does not create the conditions for the creation of a consensual and mature type of society, but it has the opposite result and leads to divergent biases (Pourzaki, 2018 AD/1398 SH: 238).

1.3. Nation, Nationality, and Nationalism

Many thinkers believe that nationality or national identity was formed when people were able to rise above the concept of ethnicity and reach the concept of nation. However,

distinguishing between these two concepts is a very difficult task. In the 18th century, the word "Nation" was simply defined as the state (from the perspective of the governed and not the governors) (Hutchinson and Smith, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 360). Initially, the word "Nation" had a religious meaning for Iranians, and later its conceptual path gave it meaning to the inhabitants of a region. With the emergence of the constitutional movement, the nation, which had a religious meaning and cultural identity for Iranians, also took on a modern meaning in the form of new political texts.

Morteza Motahhari (1919-1979 AD/1298-1358 SH) presented a relatively detailed discussion about this word in his book titled "The Mutual Services of Islam and Iran." He mentions "Nation" as an Arabic word meaning "Path" or "Method" and says:

"This word is also mentioned in the Holy Quran with the same meaning. He continues: "But the concept that this word has in the Holy Quran is different from the concept that is common among Persian speakers today and from which the word "Nationality" is derived". In the terminology of the Quran, "Nation" means a path and method that has been offered to people by a divine leader. For example, it says: "The path of your father, Abraham." Or it says: "The path of Abraham, who was a monotheist." Therefore, from the perspective of the Quran, a set of intellectual and scientific ideas and a method that people should act according to is called a nation." (Motahhari, n.d.: 53)

According to Motahhari, the word "Nation" is synonymous with "School" in the new sense, and today this word has generally acquired a different concept from its original meaning.

In today's political terminology, the word "Nation" refers to a social unit that has a homogeneous historical past, a similar law and government, and common hopes and goals. Today, instead of the people of Germany, England, and France, the nation of Germany, the nation of England, and the nation of France are mentioned, and probably this word is not applied to all those people, but only to one class of people. For this reason, they are divided into two groups, a group that governs and exercises sovereignty, and a group that is subject to sovereignty. The first group is called "State" and the second group is called "Nation." In past centuries, this word was not used in Persian in this wrong sense. He mentions the Arabic equivalent of what is today called "Nation" by Persian speakers as the concept of "*Qawm*" or "*Sha'b*." However, Motahhari also ultimately considers the new meaning of "Nation" and says: "We, who are using the words nation and nationality in this discussion, have the new and modern Persian concept in mind, whether it is wrong or right." (Motahhari, n.d.: 54)

According to many thinkers, nationalism is equivalent to patriotism; while each of these concepts has a different semantic meaning in the course of history. Many researchers who should use concepts with the utmost care consider these two different concepts to be equal and use them on a similar level. Both of these words are usually used in such a vague way that any definition of them can be questioned. This confusion of meanings has also led to a confusion of concepts. When we talk about patriotism, we mean complete devotion to a specific place or a specific way of life that the individual believes is the best way in the world; but there is no desire or wish to impose it on other people. However, nationalism is inseparable from the desire for power. George Orwell (1903-1950) brings this up in his book "Animal Farm" in the form of an ironic and humorous sentence that was written by his fictional animals on the wall, and he writes: "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others." (Orwell, n.d.: 95) Orwell tries to distinguish the difference between nationalism and patriotism, but he also becomes confused in defining the boundaries and words. Liah Greenfeld (1954) believes: "The reason for the perpetual failure of researchers to define the concept of nationalism is its elusive and complex source." While researchers with a positivist view are futilely trying to define this concept with the help of one or more objective factors (Hutchinson and Smith, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 253-260). Despite the importance of nationalism in contemporary history, there is no consensus on its nature, and like many concepts in the humanities, any attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of it is fruitless. The author, aware of this, and contrary to the positivist approach, is not trying to provide a precise definition of this concept. This is what Walter Bagehot (1826-1877) believed in. Although he considered the nineteenth century to be the century of nation-building, he considered its definition to be easily difficult and said: "If you do not ask, we know what it is, but we cannot immediately explain or define it." (Bagehot, 1887: 21)

1.4. Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups

The concept of "Ethnicity" is derived from the Greek word "Ethnos," meaning a nation, which is equivalent to a group with a common race. American sociologists have used the word "Ethnicity" to refer to a group with common cultural characteristics and a type of identity that exists as a subgroup in a larger society (Hutchinson and Smith, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 78). This

definition placed the ethnic group next to the minority and in practice used it for any religious, linguistic, and other minorities in the United States.

The definition of an ethnic group by American sociologists violated its original meaning in at least two ways. First, in the traditional understanding of an ethnic group as a unit with a clear racial connection, an ethnic group does not have to be a subordinate part of a larger political society, but may be a dominant element within a state. Like the Chinese, English, or French. Or, like the Arabs, it may encompass several states. Second, the unconditional application of the ethnic group to a variety of these groups blurred the fundamental distinctions between different forms of identity (Hutchinson and Smith, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 79).

Anthropologists, ethnologists, and researchers engaged in global comparative studies use the terms "Ethnicity" and "Ethnic Groups" more in their pure sense, which is related to the sense of kinship. However, as mentioned, there has never been a consensus on the meaning of ethnicity.

Hamid Ahmadi believes that the main reason for the difficulty in defining ethnicity is that this word is a new term among the terms of social sciences, and its meaning has changed with the expansion of the scope of social science studies. The definition of ethnicity or ethnic group at the end of the nineteenth century had criteria that were completely different from its criteria in the second half of the twentieth century (Ahmadi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 29). These criteria in one period become a cultural criterion, and in another period, they take on a racial or even religious color. The type and number of characteristics considered to define ethnicity or ethnic group depend on what the researcher's goal is in using it. Since researchers define ethnicity and research around it with multiple goals, this concept is defined with a multitude of definitions and multiple characteristics, some of which are mentioned below.

Max Weber (1864-1920) defined ethnic groups and ethnicity as follows: "Human groups that believe in having a common lineage and ancestors." This belief may be due to physical similarities, common customs, or a similar memory and memories (Hutchinson and Smith, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 80). Anthony Smith also considered an ethnic group to be a specific human population with a common myth and lineage, a common historical memory, similar customs, and a connection to a homeland or territory (Smith, 2022 AD/1401 SH: 185).

Finally, Roland Bertin (1931-2016) also introduced ethnicity as a cohesive and distinct social group from other groups that have stability. Ethnic groups assume their background in legendary pasts and usually have a common name, customs, values, and linguistic

characteristics (Bertin, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 235). The multitude of definitions of ethnicity, which often have deep differences with each other, shows that there is no theoretical consensus on the definition of this concept, just like the concept of nation, and a precise definition of it is not possible. Inevitably, one must, with tolerance, combine the various definitions and define ethnicity as follows: "A group that has a common language, history, customs, myths, and perhaps a common lineage and race."

1.5. Comparative Method

The analysis of the data in the present research will be done through the comparative method. The comparative method is one of the most important and widely used research methods in the humanities. Although some, like Richard Rose, believe that comparison should only be between countries, others, like Tom Mackie and David Marsh, believe that the comparative method can logically be used for comparisons within a country or over time (Marsh and Stoker, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 282). Today, comparative studies are generally done in two ways: "Quantitative variable-based and qualitative case-based." In a quantitative variable-based study, the researcher seeks to test the theory in question in the form of a deductive strategy and moves toward analyzing the relevant data using a specific theory. But in a qualitative case-based study, a social phenomenon is first observed, then placed in a specific historical context, and finally, the historical process and the sequence of events that led to the occurrence of that phenomenon are sought (Saei, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 207). The present study considers the second type of comparative study.

The main goal of the comparative method is to explain macro-realities. In general, comparison plays an important role in all humanities, especially sociology. The main subjects of study of these sciences are very complex, different, and new structures that have common characteristics and unique aspects and dimensions. In these sciences, to understand any structure, it must be compared with ideal categories, typological types, or with other structures (Nozari, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 238). To understand historical events, the time conditions and the juxtaposition of events that help to understand the formative chains and relationships between events must be considered (Mahoney and Lueschemeyer, 2003: 11).

In general, the comparative method can be used in two ways: "Internal comparison and external comparison." In the internal comparison method, the changes of a certain reality,

such as the institution of marriage, are identified over time and in different cultures or spaces. In the external comparison method, the changes of two or more realities are examined over one or more periods and in one or more societies. These changes will show patterns of difference or similarity between the realities under study (Ghaffari, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 86).

2. Research Background

Valuable research has been done on ethnic identities in Iran and the interaction of the central government with them. Allen Hassaniyan (2021) in a book titled "Kurdish Politics in Iran: Cross border Interactions and Mobilization since 1947" concludes that the establishment and leadership of Kurdish groups in the twentieth century was aimed at freeing them from the neglect of their governments regarding the political and cultural rights of the Kurdish people. The continuous militarization of Iranian regimes in the Kurdistan region since the establishment of the modern Iranian nation-state in 1925 has institutionalized a deep-seated feeling of deprivation among Iranian Kurds and consequently politicized the social identity of the Kurds.

Faramarz Taghiloo (2007 AD/1386 SH) in an article titled "Ethnic Diversity: Multicultural Politics and the Citizenship Model: A Case Study of Contemporary Iran" acknowledges the need to use a new method for the proper management of ethnic and cultural diversity. This is a method that, instead of rejecting ethnic-cultural diversity, is based on respect for citizenship rights and the definition of national identity based on unity in diversity.

Ebrahim Hajiani (2008 AD/1387 SH) in an article titled "The Relationship between National Identity and Ethnic Identity among Iranian Ethnic Groups" examines the relationship between the tendency of Iranian ethnic groups toward national identity and ethnic identity. He concludes that despite the combined and multidimensional identity of Iranians, there is no contradiction between the sources from which the identity of Iranian society originates due to the gradual and continuous process of the formation of their collective identity.

Sayyid Reza Salehi Amiri (2012 AD/1391 SH) in the book "Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Iran" believes that, apart from the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution and the eight-year imposed war, the interaction of ethnic identities and central governments in Iran has faced multiple issues. Thus, the issue of preserving, continuing, and strengthening national

cohesion and solidarity has always been considered one of the most important strategic goals by the central governments of Iran.

Ja'far Haghpanah (2015 AD/1394 SH) in an article titled "Ethnic Policy-making in the Islamic Republic of Iran: How, Process, and Effective Factors on Drafting" considers the most important issue in the field of a country's policy-making to be the management of ethnic diversity. Assuming the continuity of the identity of Iranian ethnic groups, he examines the process of ethnic policy-making between 1979 and 2005. His research concludes that despite the many successes achieved in this field, due to the influence of the internal and external security atmosphere and the lack of a strategic view on policy-making regarding Iranian ethnic groups in the first two decades of the revolution and the existing disharmony in the implementation of the macro-strategies and policies of the system in the next decade, a favorable result has not been reached.

Sadegh Zibakalam and others (2019 AD/1398 SH) in the article "Ethnic Divide and its Impact on the Formation of the Political Discourse of Iranian Kurds during the Pahlavi Era" state that the dominant discursive system of Kurdish politics at that historical juncture was a result of the deepening of the ethnic divide due to the nation-state-building plan of the first Pahlavi government. They believe that the change in the political discourse of the Kurds in their confrontation with the central government of Iran was a result of the change in the type of nationalism that was pursued by the central government.

Among the studies that have discussed the priority of national identity or ethnic identity and how this issue was managed by the central government of Iran, this research is considered an innovation in terms of using a comparative approach and also examining the position of each of the two concepts mentioned in the two periods of Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic.

3. The Pahlavi Government's Policy on Iranian Ethnic Identities

With the rise of the Pahlavi government, extensive efforts were made to achieve a unified state and national solidarity in the country. In this context, the intellectual community also tried hard to achieve this goal. At that time, several influential magazines expressed the general demands of the intellectual community. One of them was "Iranshahr" magazine. One of the topics raised in this magazine was the harmful consequences of regionalism and the existence of multiple ethnic identities, which needed to be resolved as soon as possible

(Abrahamiyan, 2010 AD/1389 SH (a): 153). Local groups, local dialects, local clothing, customs, and local feelings had to be eliminated in order to create national solidarity. This magazine, by considering the unity of race, religion, and language as one of the most important factors for the progress and independence of any country (Kazemzadeh, 1984 AD/1363 SH: 218) to be permanent and realized, had a special emphasis on preserving the unity of Iranians. As in the article "Religion and Nationality," while expressing regret that whenever an Iranian traveler is asked about his nationality, he will say the name of his birthplace and neighborhood, not the name of his country, it introduces the problem of regionalism as one of the most important problems of the country (Kazemzadeh, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 42).

Another magazine that was published with the aim of creating a modern state and eliminating ethnic identities in Iran was "Farangestan" magazine. The friendly relations between Germany and Iran at that time caused this magazine to also describe racist ideas in Western philosophy, especially the ideas of Gobineau. In the first editorial of this magazine, Iran is described in such a way that only a revolutionary dictatorship can turn it into a modern country (Abrahamiyan, 2010 AD/1389 SH (a): 155).

The magazine "Ayandeh" also had a high importance at that time. This magazine used articles by writers such as Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Mahmoud Afshar Yazdi, Mohammad Ali Foroughi, Abbas Iqbal, Ali Asghar Hekmat, Ali Akbar Davar, Ali Dashti, Fereydoun Keshavarz, Gholamreza Rashidi Yasmi, and many other nationalist thinkers. In one of his articles titled "The Issue of Nationality and National Unity of Iran," Afshar Yazdi, while referring to the fact that the national unity of Iran is based on racial unity, writes: "It is completely clear that the land of Iran was inhabited by the Iranian race in the era before the Arab invasion and the Mongol invasion, and the Turks, who are of the yellow race, and the Arabs, who are of the Semitic race, were mixed with the Aryan nation, not that they took their place." If the Arabic and Turkish languages are spoken in some parts of Iran, including Azerbaijan and a part of the coasts of the Persian Gulf, by the people there, it is accidental (Afshar Yazdi, 1926 AD/1306 SH: 560).

Some of Afshar Yazdi's solutions for preserving national unity include: promoting and popularizing the Persian language and the history of Iran in all parts of the country, especially in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, and Balochistan ; building railways and connecting different parts of the country to each other ; resettling some of the tribes and clans of

Khuzestan and Azerbaijan to inner Iran and taking the Fars tribes and clans from inside the country to ethnic regions ; and prohibiting Iranian citizens from speaking in their local language in courts, schools, government offices, and the army (Afshar Yazdi, 1926 AD/1306 SH: 567 AND 568).

Afshar Yazdi believed that the Lurs, Kurds, Qashqais, and others should not be different from each other, wear their own special clothes, and speak in multiple non-Persian languages. All the people of Iran must try to make the Persian language popular throughout Iran and gradually replace the local languages (Afshar Yazdi, 1924 AD/1304 SH: 4).

The purification of language was derived from the ideas of people like the German Johann Gottlieb Fichte. He considered language to be the complete mirror of a nation's soul and considered its purification to mean protecting the nation from being polluted with foreign elements (Breuilly, 1993: 60). The issue of language purification also had a special place among Iranian thinkers, including Taghi Arani. Due to his strong interest in ancient Iran and the Persian language, he was inclined toward chauvinism and, like many of his contemporaries, advocated for the purification of the Persian language from foreign words. Arani also, in an article titled "Azerbaijan, a Vital Problem of Iran," supported the complete elimination and destruction of the Azeri language, which was his own mother tongue, and claimed that the Mongols had imposed their Turkish dialect on the people of Aryan descent in that region (Abrahamiyan, 2010 AD/1389 SH (a): 195). This issue was also emphasized by Kasravi. In his article "Azari or the Ancient Language of Azerbaijan," he considered the Azeri language to be the product of the domination of Turkish invaders and claimed that they had destroyed the original Aryan language of his birthplace. Therefore, the Turkish language had to give way to the Persian language (Abrahamiyan, 2010 AD/1389 SH (a): 156).

The formation of the ideas of extreme Iranian nationalism caused many measures to be taken to standardize the language and race of ethnic groups in Iran. Abdullah Mostofi, the governor of Azerbaijan, for example, forbade speaking Turkish and said to the people there: "You who are the children of Darius and Cambyzes, why do you speak the language of Afrasiab and Genghis?" He considered these actions necessary to create a sense of national unity (Bigdelou, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 175). Thus, teaching and publishing in local languages, including Turkish and Kurdish, were banned.

4. Antagonistic Policies of the Pahlavi Government toward the Kurds

With the approval of the law to standardize clothing in 1928 AD/1307 SH, wearing Kurdish clothing was declared illegal. This caused an uprising in Kurdistan (Sardarabadi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 165). The main goal of the government in standardizing clothing was to strengthen national identity instead of ethnic identity (Abrahamiyan, 2010 AD/1389 SH (b): 157). This act, which was implemented with force and military power in different parts of the country, faced serious opposition among the Kurds. This opposition was especially evident in the uprising of Mullah Khalil and the Manguris in northern Iranian Kurdistan. Mullah Khalil was a well-known cleric of Mahabad who considered changing people's clothes and dressing them in European and foreign clothes to be blasphemy (Samadi, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 91). After the uprising of Mullah Khalil, the clergy of Kurdistan stood against the Pahlavi government. Future developments also added to the growing dissatisfaction, and this issue became so widespread that the Kurdish clerics, immediately after the fall of Reza Shah from power, founded the first Kurdish nationalist party called the "Kurdish Revival Society." (Borzouei, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 259)

In addition, extensive changes were made in the country's educational system. The new educational system emphasized the integration of Iranian identity and the elimination of ethnic identities, and had a common educational program and curriculum in the Persian language throughout the country. Teaching in the languages of ethnic minorities, which was previously permitted, was declared illegal. In fact, the general policy of the educational system at that time was the Persianization of ethnic minorities (Abrahamiyan, 2010 AD/1389 SH (b): 158). In this regard, more educational budget was allocated to regions that hosted ethnic minorities. In 1925 AD/1304 SH, the acting minister of education demanded an increase in the budget in Border States and provinces such as Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan (Bill and report of Mr. Kefil, Minister of Education, 1924 AD/1304 SH: 24). The first Pahlavi government did not only establish new schools to promote the Persian language in Kurdish-speaking areas. It also imposed many restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in those schools. For this purpose, non-native teachers who had no familiarity with the Kurdish language were used for teaching in schools, and the employment of Kurdish teachers and employees in Kurdistan schools was declared illegal. Also, in several circulars to

schools, the necessity of care and attention to promoting the Persian language was mentioned and speaking it was emphasized (Rasouli et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 85).

Reza Shah, after returning from Turkey in 1934 AD/1313 SH, ordered that from then on, all Iranian ethnic groups should refrain from reading and writing in their mother tongue, and that the Persian language should be spoken in all government offices. In all schools and government offices, the phrase "Speak Persian" was installed (Qasemlou, 2000: 23). This action of the government had a great negative impact on the Kurdish people and led to their further separation from the Iranian national identity. Sayyid Mohammad Amin Shaykh al-Islami Mokri, known as "Heimen," one of the famous Kurdish poets during the Pahlavi era, writes about the prohibition of using the Kurdish language in schools:

"I have seen many bitter and dark days in my life, but I do not remember a day bitterer and darker than the day I went to school. Our teacher, who was a Kurd himself and I later found out that he did not speak Persian well either, spoke to me in Persian, and I did not understand anything. My classmates, whose situation was a little better than mine, made fun of me. I was very embarrassed. For a while, I would cry under the quilt at night for fear of going to school, and in the morning I would go to school by force and dragging my feet. I had become a laughingstock and entertainment for the children." (Shaykh al-Islami, n.d.: 6)

After the fall of Reza Shah in September 1941 AD/1320 SH and the opening of the country's political space, the Kurds emphasized the use of the Kurdish language as the language of writing. This was while Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi also emphasized the compulsory nature of the Persian language in administrative and educational matters and wanted to prevent the promotion of the Kurdish language (Intesar, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 61); but during the short period of the Republic of Kurdistan, the use of Persian books in schools was banned, and extensive efforts were made to print textbooks in the Kurdish language. Even by order of Qazi Muhammad, an attempt was made to find authentic Kurdish equivalents for a number of common Arabic and Persian words in Kurdish (Rasouli et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 90). This action was a reaction to the central government's attempt to completely eliminate ethnic and linguistic identities in the country. This was an issue that could not be accepted by Iranian ethnic groups in any way.

In the field of foreign relations, the negative effects of the policy of cultural standardization were also significant. Throughout history, the Kurds had always viewed Iran's rival countries, especially the Soviet Union, as the "Other" and considered themselves to be among the "Us"

of Iranians; but the antagonistic policies of the Pahlavi government caused the Kurdish "Us" to be placed against the "Them" or the "Iranian other" and, in the course of competition with it, to resort to a foreign country like the Soviet Union (Bouzhmehrani and Pour Islami, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 98). The Soviet Union also made good use of these conditions in its own interest and introduced the Russians as supporters of the Kurdish people and enemies of the Persian exploiters.

The open political space in Kurdistan did not last long, and once again, with the fall of the Republic of Kurdistan, it faced strict control by the central government (Foran, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 415). In this period, the policy that the government adopted toward the Kurdistan region, and especially Mahabad, was a complete military occupation. Thus, the Kurdistan region was completely put under the control of the army, and the officials who were sent there were below average. In the sixteenth session of the National Consultative Assembly, which reopened in 1949 AD/1328 SH, the city of Mahabad had no representative (Mohammadiyani et al., 2019 AD/1398 SH: 137). In the seventeenth session of the National Consultative Assembly, a person who was not at all familiar with the political atmosphere of Mahabad was elected as a representative by the central government (McDowell, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 428). This issue had a significant impact on deepening the divide between the central government and the Kurds and made them one of the supporters of Dr. Mosaddegh during his conflict with the Shah (Mohammadiyani, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 138; McDowell, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 428).

Although the tension between the central government and the Kurdish political elites was reduced to a great extent during Dr. Mosaddegh's era, with the occurrence of the coup of August 19, 1953, and the return of Mohammad Reza Shah to power, the tension between the two sides increased again.

After the coup of August 19, all traces of freedom movements were erased from the political life of Iran. In Kurdistan, the second Pahlavi government declared the Democratic Party illegal, and this party continued its activities secretly. During a conference that was held in a secret location outside Mahabad, the Kurdistan Democratic Party announced its priorities as follows: "Overthrowing the monarchy, establishing a Kurdish government with its own elected government, and freeing all of Kurdistan." (McDowell, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 428) Therefore, the tension between the central government and the Kurdish political elites continued during the second Pahlavi era as well

5. The Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Transformation in the Relationship between the Central Government and Iranian Ethnic Groups

The issue of ethnicity and language was not considered important in the periods before the Pahlavi government and was not a central part of the country's macro-policies (Rezaei et al., 2024 AD/1403 SH: 46). For this reason, it was not addressed in the Constitutional Law. After the chauvinistic activities of some Iranian nationalists and the adoption of a cultural homogenization policy by the Pahlavi government, attention to ethnicity and language became one of the important cultural issues in the country. The Pahlavi government, by adopting an antagonistic policy, sought to eliminate ethnic and linguistic diversity in the country. However, the passage of time showed that the policy based on ethnic and cultural homogenization not only failed but also caused ethnic crises and violence in various parts of the country, especially in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. This showed that cultural homogenization in a country like Iran, which has long been the home of various ethnic groups, is a futile and impossible task.

After the Islamic Revolution of Iran, extensive efforts were made by the Islamic Republic of Iran to de-escalate tension and transition from an antagonistic policy in relation to Iranian ethnic groups. This issue was emphasized in many articles of the constitution. In fact, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while accepting the reality of ethnic, racial, and linguistic diversity in the country, provided solutions for creating a bond and solidarity between the central government and the various ethnic groups living in the country (Haqpanah, 2014 AD/1394 SH: 72).

Article 15 of the constitution explicitly states:

"The official and common language and script of the people of Iran is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, texts, and textbooks must be in this language and script, but the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and mass media and the teaching of their literature in schools, alongside the Persian language, is permitted." (Fathi and Kouhi Esfahani, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 18)

It is worth noting that addressing the issue of ethnicity and language in a separate chapter and specific articles of the constitution indicates the high importance of these issues to the experts of the constitution. This article has paid attention to two undeniable realities in Iranian society: First, the issue of the common language and script of Iranians, which must be

protected by all people of Iran. This is something that is rooted in the history of this land and has always been respected by all Iranian people;¹ Second, the issue of local languages, which shows the importance of the status of ethnic groups and local languages in the social structure of Iran. The inclusion of this section in Article 15 indicates the realism of the constitutional experts who have recognized the existence of different ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups in the country. A brief review of the history of Iran shows that the various ethnic and cultural and linguistic groups in Iranian society, in addition to being familiar with and using the Persian language, also had local and native languages, and there has never been a conflict between the two (Houshang, 2019 AD/1399 SH: 17). Therefore, the adoption of any policy that has the scent of intolerance toward ethnic and linguistic groups is doomed to failure.

The logic governing Article 15 of the constitution indicates that the only suitable model for good governance in the country is the "Multiculturalism" model and paying attention to all ethnic and linguistic groups in the country. According to multiculturalists, recognizing cultural differences helps preserve national solidarity. While the cultural homogenization model leads to the deprivation of those who are not in harmony with the dominant identity and culture (Nash, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 222). The main reason for the constitutional experts' adherence to the multiculturalism model is to ensure and strengthen the national solidarity of Iranians by paying attention to ethnic and linguistic diversity (Taghilou, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 13).

One of the most important political presuppositions in using the multiculturalism model is the possibility of minorities diverging if ethnic and cultural diversity is not paid attention to in societies that have multiple ethnic identities. Thus, multiculturalism is not just a moral ideal emphasized by various minorities to protect their rights, but a realistic policy that is paid attention to by central governments and with regard to the inalienable reality of identity differences (Ommen, 1997: 25-28).

6. The Agonistic Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Kurds

A quick look at the relevant documents shows that in the period after the Islamic Revolution, special attention was paid to the issue of selecting native officials for Kurdistan. The central

¹ For further reading on this topic, refer to the book "The Role of Kurds in Preserving Iranian Culture and Civilization" by Mohammad Ali Soltani.

government, immediately after the start of the conflict in Sanandaj, chose Dr. Ebrahim Younesi, a Sunni Kurd, as the first governor of Kurdistan on March 21, 1979. The next governors were Mohammad Rashid Shakiba, Hossein Shah Oveisi, and Mohammad Ali Mehrasa, all of whom were Kurds, and Mr. Mehrasa was a Sunni Kurd. However, due to the exclusionary approach of left-wing nationalist parties, insecurity and chaos spread to many parts of Kurdistan (Houshmand, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 30). The mentioned individuals and many other Kurdistan officials, even though they were Kurds, were introduced as "Kurdish Enemies" by Kurdish nationalists (Ghaneifard, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 223). This situation, by prioritizing the issue of preserving the country's territorial integrity and preserving Iran's national cohesion in the country's macro-policies, slowed down the process of convergence between the central government and Kurdish nationalist parties. It is necessary to mention that the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran was accepted by the central government because of its more cautious method of struggle compared to other left-wing parties. Even in the midst of the three-month war in Kurdistan and despite the non-return of the Mahabad army garrison and the sabotage that took place by that party, it was still allowed to operate freely (Kouchira, 2008: 197). Imam Khomeini had agreed to the free activity of the Democratic Party with the insistence of liberal nationalists, including Engineer Bazargan, Dariush Forouhar, and a number of their friends (Blouriyani, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 377). Despite this, the method of struggle of radical left-wing groups such as the Peykar group, the Komala party, and the Kar group was such that it challenged the cautious policy of the Democratic Party (Grouhkar, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 45). Therefore, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, under the influence of the atmosphere prevailing in the region and the method of struggle of other groups based in Kurdistan, also turned to extremism and armed struggle.

Any attempt to solve the Kurdistan crisis through cooperation with the Islamic Republic was met with strong opposition from Komala, the Democratic Party, and other left-wing groups. In the meantime, the followers of the Fourth Congress of the Democratic Party, who had separated from it due to the inclination of other members of the party toward extremism and fighting the Islamic Republic while cooperating with the Iraqi Ba'athist regime (Blouriyani, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 397-399; Keykhosrawi, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 134), encouraged Mullah Karim Shahrikandi, who was a famous cleric of Kurdistan, to negotiate with the Islamic Republic to solve the Kurdistan problem. Mullah Karim was a person who was accepted by both the Kurds and the central government. He immediately agreed to negotiate with the

Islamic Republic. For this purpose, he prepared a text and went to Tehran to negotiate with the leaders of the Islamic Republic. There, Mullah Karim was told that the government accepts his plan, but it is necessary for the members of Mullah Karim's delegation to go to the Kurdish-inhabited region and get their opinion and then return to Tehran. The goal of the Islamic Republic was to form a new composition of representatives of different strata of the Kurdish people to somehow reach an agreement with them and save itself from the Kurdistan crisis. But when Mullah Karim returned the supporters of the Democratic Party and Komala killed him (Blouriyan, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 429).

Today, this type of behavior toward those who, while belonging to the Kurdish ethnicity and Sunni religion, cooperate with the Islamic Republic government and follow up on solving various problems in Kurdistan through this way, still continues. For example, one of the opponents of the Islamic Republic, in criticizing Dr. Arash Zerehatan Lahouni, who is a young Sunni Kurd and has recently been introduced as the governor of Kurdistan, writes: "Over the decades, we have seen many of these Shi'a Sunni types who are more loyal than the king in Balochistan and Kurdistan." (Doshoki, 1403/06/29)

The establishment of provincial networks that deal with local and regional issues is another clear example of Article 15 of the constitution. Regionalism and coordination with the cultural and social characteristics of the target audience's geographical environment are among the prominent features of these networks. Provincial networks are related to a specific geographical or cultural location and raise their local issues in the local language and for the local audience. These networks help their audience understands the social environment and identifies their issues and problems and interact more with other people in society (Kothari and Azari, 2014 AD/1394 SH: 12). Given the existence of various ethnic groups and widespread identity diversity in the country, provincial networks have a high capacity to secure the rights of minorities and respect their ethnic identity, and in this way, they can play a significant role in solving issues and problems related to the ethnic groups living in the country.

Aside from the positive functions of provincial networks, their *raison d'être* is what the author has in mind. The activity of these networks shows that ethnic identities have a special place in the discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran pursue national cohesion and solidarity not through an antagonistic policy and the elimination

of identity diversity in the country, but through an agonistic policy that puts respect for different identities on its agenda.

Conclusion

One of the very important issues in countries with ethnic diversity is creating a balance between national identity and ethnic identity in macro-cultural policy. In Iran, in the last century, there have been two completely different approaches to managing this issue. One, by emphasizing the necessity of preserving national cohesion and the unity of Iranians and by adopting an antagonistic approach, sought to completely eliminate ethnic and local identities. This approach not only failed to preserve the cohesion and solidarity of Iranians but also created tension in the relations between ethnic groups and the central government of Iran. This tension was especially evident in the relations between the Kurds and the Pahlavi government and led to the threat to the country's territorial integrity by some Kurdish nationalist parties. The other approach, by taking into account the inalienable reality of ethnic and local identities in Iranian society, adopted an agonistic policy and, while simultaneously emphasizing the necessity of preserving national cohesion and recognizing ethnic identities, incorporated this into the constitution and the micro and macro policies of the central government. Of course, the ethnic movements and crises that occurred in the early years of the revolution in Kurdistan and some other ethnic regions of the country caused the preservation of national unity and cohesion and territorial integrity to be prioritized in the country's policy-making for a short period of time. Fortunately, today this obstacle has been removed, and in parallel, the efforts of the Islamic Republic to respect the ethnic identity of the people of Kurdistan have increased. But this does not mean that the issue has been resolved and the efforts are sufficient. Therefore, in order to completely resolve the issues and problems of Kurdistan, paying attention to the following points is of great importance.

In the political dimension, without the active participation of all ethnic groups in the political structure of a multi-ethnic country like Iran, one cannot witness national cohesion and solidarity in that country. This issue is of high importance, especially in Kurdistan. The continuation of the feeling of lack of active participation in the country's political structure by ethnic groups can lead to a recurrence of insecurity in Kurdish-inhabited areas and cause serious challenges for the society of Kurdistan and the country's political system.

In the economic dimension, today, economic reforms and moving toward economic development in ethnic regions are considered one of the most important criteria for the central government's attention or lack of attention to ethnic identities. The fact that Kurdistan and several other regions are among the deprived regions of the country is in complete contradiction with the *raison d'être* of the Islamic Revolution and the main goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although the destructive effect of the activities of Kurdish nationalist parties in creating this problem cannot be ignored, now that these parties have been rejected by the society of Kurdistan, it is the best time to move toward economic progress and development in Kurdistan. The rule of "Winning hearts," which is emphasized in the Holy Quran, can be a solution to this problem. Based on this, it should be known that allocating more financial resources to Kurdistan compared to non-deprived areas is considered a religious duty. In the field of social development in Kurdistan, valuable steps have also been taken, but these actions are very insignificant compared to the existing social problems. The occurrence of the security crisis in the years after the Islamic Revolution led to the securitization of the political and social atmosphere of Kurdistan. The reality is that many Iranians still do not have a favorable view of the security of the Kurdistan region; this view, more than being a result of the current reality of Kurdistan society, is rooted in the insecurities and violent conflicts of the early revolution. The development of tourism and cultural exchange between the two sides can play an effective role in creating friendly relations between them. The Kurdistan region, in terms of natural geography, has a pristine and beautiful nature, and this advantage, along with the rich culture and ancient civilization of the Kurdish people, can help the prosperity of tourism in Kurdistan, which is not without effect on its economic prosperity.

Ethical Considerations

Adherence to research ethics principles: The authors have observed ethical principles in conducting and publishing this scientific research, and this has been confirmed by all of them.

Authors' contributions:

Data collection: Reza Rezaei, Ghorbanali Ghorbanzadeh Savar.

Preparation of the research report: Reza Rezaei.

Data analysis: Reza Rezaei.

The authors' contribution to the article extracted from the dissertation is approximately as follows:

First author: Preparation and readying of samples, conducting experiments and data collection, performing calculations, statistical data analysis, analysis and interpretation of information and results, preparation of the article draft.

Second author: Thesis advisor, research design, supervision of the research stages, review and control of the results, revision, editing, and finalization of the article.

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Motahhari's Vision for an Islamic Economy in the Context of the Revolution: Insights from "An Introduction to Comparative Economics"

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ABSTRACT

Objective: The present study aims to examine Motahhari's unique contribution to Islamic economic thought, with a special focus on his analysis in the book "An Introduction to Comparative Economics." This research attempts to show how Motahhari's economic philosophy critiques Western economic schools while also presenting a unique Islamic approach, particularly within the ideological framework of Iran's Islamic Revolution.

Methodology: This study was conducted using a qualitative and analytical approach, relying on Motahhari's lectures in the aforementioned book. The present research examines Motahhari's economic ideas within the broader intellectual and historical context of Iran on the eve of the revolution.

Results: Our analysis shows that Motahhari's economic thought is distinguished by a precise differentiation between economics as a science and an economic school, an emphasis on justice and ethics, and a holistic view of Islam as a comprehensive way of life. He critiques both capitalism and socialism for their inability to achieve true justice, and instead advocates for an Islamic economic system that establishes a balance between individual initiative and social responsibility.

Conclusions: Motahhari's perspective on Islamic economics remains highly applicable to contemporary debates on social justice, Islamic banking, and the ethical foundations of economic policy in Iran and beyond. His works provide a strong intellectual framework for integrating Islamic values with modern economic challenges, ensuring that the pursuit of material well-being in Muslim societies remains inseparable from the quest for justice and spiritual perfection.

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Introduction

The 1979 Islamic Revolution brought about a fundamental transformation in Iran's political, social, and intellectual spheres, placing the search for an economic system rooted in Islamic values and social justice at the forefront. Among the main architects of this intellectual change was Morteza Motahhari, whose economic thought played a pivotal role in shaping the ideological foundations of the revolution and the subsequent policies of the Islamic Republic. Motahhari's approach to economic issues was characterized by a precise distinction between empirical economics and normative economic teachings, with an emphasis on integrating ethical and spiritual principles into all aspects of economic life. Despite his significant influence, Motahhari's contribution to Islamic economic thought—especially as presented in the lectures compiled in "An Introduction to Comparative Economics"—has not been systematically studied within the context of its impact on revolutionary ideology and contemporary policy debates. The present study aims to fill this gap by analyzing Motahhari's critique of Western economic schools, explaining his unique Islamic alternative, and examining his enduring legacy in the discourse on justice, development, and social responsibility in Iran. To achieve these goals, this study will first review the relevant literature and explain its methodological approach. It will then introduce Motahhari as a scholar and a revolutionary thinker before analyzing the core elements of his economic philosophy and its relationship with the ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution. The study also examines Motahhari's theoretical distinctions, his ethical framework, and his comparative standing among other Islamic economists. Finally, the article assesses the significance of his thought in the contemporary world, concluding with reflections on his lasting impact and areas for future research.

1. Literature Review

Islamic economics as an independent discipline may not have a long historical background, but economic discussions among Islamic scholars and thinkers have been a significant part of the Islamic intellectual tradition. These discussions have historically been scattered and primarily focused on jurisprudence, centering on specific issues and problems. However, the emergence of a more comprehensive and systematic approach to Islamic economics can be traced in the works of some pioneering researchers. One of the most influential figures in the development of Islamic economics is the Iraqi scholar Muhammad Baqir Sadr, who is widely

considered the first to seriously and systematically address economic issues within the framework of Islamic sciences. His groundbreaking book, *Iqtisādunā* (Our Economics), revolutionized the field and established his position not only among Shi'a scholars but also among Sunni scholars. Sadr's contributions laid the foundation for a more comprehensive understanding of Islamic economics and highlighted its specific principles and values (Sadr, 1980: 2).

The book *Iqtisādunā* was written at the height of the confrontation between capitalist West and socialist East, in a climate where the question of Islam's ability to confront economic and social dilemmas was very serious. The book is organized into three parts: the first two parts provide a scientific critique of capitalism and Marxism. The third part is dedicated to explaining Islamic economics and reflects Sadr's greatest value and innovation. In this section, he presents the theory of distribution before and after production and explains the position of production and the role of the state in Islamic economics. The method of argumentation and the use of authentic Islamic sources are among the strengths of this work.

Sadr outlines three fundamental principles for Islamic economics: "A pluralistic ownership system (private, public, state) that, unlike other systems, has a balanced and hybrid nature; limited economic freedom, which, constrained by ethics and public interest, distances itself from the absolutism of capitalism; and social justice, which is divided into the two principles of public mutual responsibility and social balance." Sadr distinguishes between economics as a science and an "Economic School," stating that Islamic economics is not an empirical science but a school with value-oriented and social goals. According to him, the role of the Islamic economic school is not to explain the current situation but to present a desired model based on Sharia. In explaining ownership, he emphasizes the limitations of private property, the continuous obligation to work, and the vital role of justice. Factors of production such as land, mines, water, and natural resources each have specific religious and social rules. The role of the state is very important in Sadr's thought. He uses the famous theory of the "Zone of the Void," according to which the state can intervene in areas where there is no religious text to achieve balance and social welfare, thus preventing the exacerbation of class divisions. This work, with its ecumenical and cross-denominational approach, examines the views of Sunnis alongside Shi'a jurisprudence, paving the way for a deep economic dialogue among elites in the Islamic and Western worlds. Today, *Iqtisādunā* is one of the main references in universities and Islamic circles for Islamic economics (Barri, 2007 AD/1386 SH).

In Iran, before the Islamic Revolution, several scholars and thinkers also contributed to economic discussions from an Islamic perspective. Among them were Mohammad Beheshti and Morteza Motahari, both of whom presented various topics and ideas on Islamic economics. Their contributions played a significant role in strengthening the discourse on Islamic economics in the Iranian context. Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti is one of the prominent thinkers in Islamic economics who believed the Islamic economic system is based on principles and components that must evolve in light of social and historical conditions. In his collection of lectures, especially in the book "The Economic System in Islam (Practical Discussions)," he examined the theoretical and practical foundations of this system. From Beheshti's perspective, the Islamic economic system is based on several fundamental pillars: first, the originality of anthropology and a realistic understanding of human nature, which is selfish yet capable of productive work. Second, the originality of ownership based on work and production; that is, true ownership is the ownership of the work a person does, not merely the ownership of capital or means of production. In this regard, he emphasizes that the Islamic economic system must define ownership based on work and avoids the unlimited private ownership that exists in the capitalist system. Beheshti also highlights the key role of the state in guiding and supervising the economic process to establish justice and prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. Other principles he mentioned include an emphasis on economic justice, the fight against corruption, and the return of public property to the treasury. Economic independence and the endogenous nature of production and consumption in accordance with the needs of society are also central to his thought. He has a serious critique of both capitalist and socialist economies, believing that both systems have fundamental differences with Islamic views on ownership and justice, and therefore a replacement based on Islamic ethics and justice must be offered. In the discussion of wealth distribution, Beheshti emphasizes that economic activities should not consume all of a person's time so that there is an opportunity for spiritual growth and self-improvement, and social justice should be manifested through the realization of public mutual responsibility and social balance (Beheshti, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 11-28).

2. Research Background

Numerous studies have been conducted on Motahari's thought in various fields. In the economic sphere, from Farahani's (2003 AD/1382 SH) perspective, Motahari's economic

thought is a combination of Islamic teachings, moral philosophy, and an effort to present a comprehensive and coherent model that responds to the worldly and spiritual needs of Islamic society. Qalabch's (2010 AD/1389 SH) comparative study of the criteria for distributive justice in the views of John Rawls and Motahhari shows that Motahhari proposed a distribution system in three stages: "Equal distribution of initial opportunities, distribution proportional to individuals' deservingness in the income generated, and redistribution of assets to create social balance." Kalateh (2014 AD/1393 SH) compares Motahhari and Sadr's views on the relationship between science and school in Islamic economics, showing that Motahhari, by distinguishing between credit relations and natural relations in economics, believed that natural relations are about general economic laws that are not limited to a specific school. In contrast, credit or contractual relations are linked to laws within a specific school or philosophy. Kashian (2023 AD/1402 AH), by comparing Sadr and Motahhari's views on economic justice from a systems theory perspective, showed that by considering the four components of goal, parts, basis, and relationships as the main pillars of a system, Sadr and Motahhari's systemic theories of economic justice have significant similarities in terms of goals and basis. However, there are notable differences in the parts and relationships that drive the system toward justice.

A review of the conducted research indicates that the main focus of researchers has been on the professor's theories in the book "A Look at the Islamic Economic System," and despite Motahhari being recognized as one of the main architects of the intellectual foundations of the Islamic Revolution, a focused academic study on the book "An Introduction to Comparative Economics" has not been undertaken, not only in English but even in Persian academic literature. As far as we know, this article is the first comprehensive and scientific analysis of this work. Previous research on Motahhari has usually addressed his philosophical, theological, or socio-political thoughts, often neglecting his specific economic thinking and its implications for post-revolution Iran. By systematically examining "An Introduction to Comparative Economics," this study fills a significant gap in the research literature. This research places Motahhari's economic philosophy in both the broader context of Islamic economics and the unique context of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, offering new perspectives on the role of his thought in the development of policy and discourse on Islamic economics in Iran. This approach not only highlights Motahhari's innovation in addressing

economic issues but also provides a basis for further comparative and interdisciplinary research in Islamic economic studies.

3. Research Method

This research employs a qualitative-analytical methodology to examine Morteza Motahhari's economic thought, with a special emphasis on his lectures compiled in "An Introduction to Comparative Economics." The study is primarily based on a careful textual analysis of Motahhari's main works, including published books and post-mortem lecture compilations. These primary sources are examined to clarify his conceptual distinctions, theoretical frameworks, and normative positions on Islamic economics. This analysis places Motahhari's thought within the broader intellectual and historical context of Iran before and after the revolution. By tracing the development of his ideas in light of the Islamic Revolution and its consequences, this study shows how Motahhari's economic philosophy contributed to the ideological foundations of the new Islamic Republic and continues to influence contemporary debates on economic justice, social responsibility, and policymaking in Iran. Through this multifaceted qualitative approach, the article seeks to provide the first comprehensive and scientific analysis of "An Introduction to Comparative Economics" and offers new perspectives on Motahhari's enduring legacy in Islamic economic thought.

4. Theoretical Foundations

4.1. Motahhari as a Scholar and Revolutionary Thinker

Morteza Motahhari, known as Professor Motahhari, was recognized as one of the prominent Shi'a scholars, and his legacy shines in a treasure trove of valuable works that he created during his short but fruitful life. Each of his works demonstrated a meticulous and systematic research approach, designed to address the urgent needs of his time. Motahhari's academic efforts were accompanied by an unparalleled commitment to discipline, which distinguished him in the field of research and study; his precise research notes, which were meticulously organized and categorized both alphabetically and by topic, reflect his systematic approach and commitment to academic excellence (Vatheghi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 223).

One of Motahhari's most notable characteristics was his exceptional ability to diagnose and differentiate issues with astonishing precision. With a keen eye for detail, he would find the gaps, branches, roots, and consequences of every topic, thereby accurately pinpointing the core essence of every idea and argument. Another striking feature of Motahhari was his unwavering sense of justice, especially when dealing with opponents. In presenting the claims of his opponents, he often surpassed them in clarity and precision, never allowing their ideas to be distorted in the slightest. Motahhari believed that the authentic and profound ideas of thinkers should be recognized and respected, and he rejected baseless opposition and denial, which went against the spirit of scholarship. He did not adhere blindly to clichés but rather sought to harmonize them with the principles and foundations of Islamic teachings. Motahhari's commitment to fairness and accuracy, even when facing opposing views, demonstrates his deep respect for intellectual rigor and his steadfast adherence to the pursuit of truth (Karami, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 337).

Motahhari was a prominent and unique figure in the world of Islamic scholars who left a profound impact on Iran's academic and religious landscape. Before the 1979 AD/1357 SH Islamic Revolution, he was one of the few clerics who successfully taught and conducted research at the university level, considered a pioneer in integrating Islamic thought with modern education. Motahhari was known for his unique approach to teaching and discussion; an approach characterized by an emphasis on the historical context of concepts and ideas. Before delving into any topic, he would first provide his students with a comprehensive understanding of its historical roots and evolution. This method allowed them to grasp the value of the topic more deeply and understand its relevance and importance in a broader context. Motahhari believed that understanding the historical context of a concept was essential for engaging in meaningful and insightful discussions. By explaining the origins and evolution of a concept, he helped his students see the connection between the past and the present and understand how ideas and beliefs have been shaped and have evolved over time. This approach not only deepened their understanding of the subject but also helped them appreciate the complexity and subtlety of Islamic thought (Sayyid Naseri, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 225).

4.2. Motahhari's Economic Thought and the Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution

Morteza Motahhari's economic thought holds a central place in the intellectual architecture underlying the 1979 AD/1357 SH Islamic Revolution. As one of the key ideologues of the revolution and a close associate of Imam Khomeini, his engagement with economic teachings was not merely academic but fundamentally intertwined with the movement to establish an Islamic social order in Iran. His economic views expressed in works such as "A Look at the Islamic Economic System" and in lectures compiled in the book "An Introduction to Comparative Economics" before his martyrdom, provided a framework for the nascent Islamic Republic to align modern economic challenges with the ethical and legal principles of Islam.

One of the main pillars of Motahhari's economic thought is the concept of justice, which he considered an inseparable part of Islamic governance and social life. In the pre-revolutionary era, his critique of capitalism and socialism was rooted in their failure to achieve true justice, as defined by Islamic values. He rejected the materialistic and exploitative tendencies of capitalism and the atheistic and collectivist excesses of socialism, advocating instead for an Islamic economic system that harmonizes individual initiative with social responsibility. This vision was directly reflected in the revolutionary slogan "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic," where economic independence and distributive justice were presented as prerequisites for true freedom and sovereignty.

Motahhari's economic thought continues to shape contemporary debates in Iran about the compatibility of Islamic values with modern economic development. His subtle approach—which strikes a balance between tradition and innovation—remains a reference for those seeking to address issues of poverty, inequality, and social justice within an Islamic framework. By outlining a vision of an economy that is inseparable from the ethical and ideological goals of the revolution, Motahhari ensured that the pursuit of economic justice would remain at the heart of the Islamic Republic's identity and mission.

Morteza Motahhari, a prominent Islamic scholar and theologian, was a staunch advocate for the expansion and influence of Islam on all aspects of human life. He firmly believed that Islam is not merely an individual and devotional matter but a comprehensive and realistic school that addresses all human needs, both in this world and the hereafter. According to Motahhari, Islam has a holistic approach to human existence that provides for physical,

spiritual, intellectual, emotional, individual, and social needs. He rejected the belief that the scope of religion is limited to personal and otherworldly matters, considering such a view narrow-minded and a failure to grasp the true essence of Islam. Motahhari's view of religion is deeply rooted in the belief that Islam is a complete way of life that provides guidance and support for individuals and societies. He emphasized the importance of understanding and applying Islamic principles in all aspects of life, from individual and spiritual rituals to social and political structures.

In general, Motahhari's teachings and writings emphasize the importance of recognizing the breadth of Islam and its ability to transform individuals and societies. In refuting those who limit the scope of religion to individual and otherworldly matters, he noted that those who believe life and religion should be separated make a fundamental error by assuming that the various aspects of life are disconnected. In reality, all dimensions of life are interconnected, and the health or corruption in one area inevitably affects other areas. A society cannot have a clean religious foundation while having a corrupt culture, politics, judicial system, ethics, education, or economy, and vice versa. If religion is limited solely to devotional acts such as going to the mosque or church, praying, and fasting, the separation of religious matters from other aspects of life might seem justified, but this separation is not true for Islam. In Islam, teachings and rituals encompass all aspects of life and emphasize the integration of religious principles into every aspect of human life (Motahhari, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 16).

He further believed that the relationship between Islam and economics is deeply intertwined and has two key dimensions that are closely connected. The first dimension is the direct link between Islam and economic regulations, which includes a wide range of issues such as ownership, transactions, taxes, and other economic matters. This direct connection is reflected in the Islamic principles governing economic activities to ensure that these activities are conducted in a fair, just, and equitable manner. The second dimension of the relationship between Islam and economics is the indirect link through the moral principles that form the foundation of Islamic teachings. These principles include trustworthiness, justice, benevolence, and the prohibition of theft, betrayal, and bribery. By promoting these values, Islam seeks to foster ethical behavior in all aspects of economic life, from production and distribution to consumption. In essence, Islam's approach to economics is comprehensive and integrated, recognizing the importance of both direct and indirect links between religious principles and economic activities. By emphasizing the necessity of ethical behavior and fair

economic regulations, Islam seeks to create a just and equitable economic system that benefits all members of society (Motahhari, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 16).

Although Motahhari's entry into economic discussions may have occurred late in his life, the views and opinions he expressed in his final years were full of wisdom, depth, and a profound understanding of the subject. The discussion of Islamic economics is a topic of interest to economists and those who seek to explore the integration of religion into various dimensions of life. In this debate, there is a group that questions the concept of Islamic economics, either due to insufficient familiarity with religious principles or by comparing it to other disciplines. They argue that just as there is no Islamic physics or Islamic geometry, there should not be an independent field called Islamic economics. Their view stems from the belief in the separation of religious teachings from scientific disciplines; they believe that although Islam can provide guiding principles for economic behavior, it does not constitute an independent scientific discipline like economics itself. At the core of their argument is the view that economics, like physics and chemistry, is an empirical science that seeks to understand and explain human behavior through observation and hypothesis testing. They believe that the nature of empirical sciences, especially those related to human behavior, is based on objective evidence and the verification of hypotheses through observation and analysis. On the other hand, figures like Mohammad Baqir Sadr believe that entering the fields of economics or mathematics as independent sciences is not within the scope of Islamic teachings.

4.3. Economics as a Science versus Economic School

Morteza Motahhari, just like Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, believed that Islam has a distinct economic school and doctrine, which stands in contrast to economics as an empirical theory. In distinguishing between economic doctrine and economics as a science, Motahhari explains that there are two types of economic relationships: natural and contractual. Natural relationships are a series of cause-and-effect relationships that occur automatically in economic matters, such as supply and demand, inflation, unemployment, and economic crises. In this context, economics as a science is the study of natural laws and is considered a theoretical science. Disagreements in this area are similar to those in other empirical sciences and are less likely to arise.

On the other hand, contractual relationships are rules related to individual or collective rights and properties. From the perspective of contractual relationships, economics is the science of

how relationships should be. In this view, issues such as justice and injustice, good and evil, and proper and improper are raised. This perspective emphasizes the importance of ethical considerations and principles in the study of economics and highlights the necessity of a normative approach to economic relationships (Motahhari, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 32-33).

Therefore, Morteza Motahhari considered the field of economics as a realm for evidence and analysis with a positive view, while the school or doctrine focuses on normative issues. He emphasizes that in Islam, the focus is on ethical economic behavior. Morteza Motahhari's economic ideas are mainly derived from his book "A Look at the Islamic Economic System;" this book is actually a collection of his notes published after his martyrdom. This book is considered the main source for understanding the professor's views on Islamic economics. The book "The Problem of Usury and Banking with an Appendix on the Problem of Insurance" is one of Professor Motahhari's prominent works, in which he addresses the issue of usury and provides a comprehensive analysis of interest rates. This book demonstrates Motahhari's mastery of the legal and economic principles that form the basis of his views on usury. In the section on usury, Motahhari provides a comprehensive explanation of its concept and effects and presents his criticisms of the conventional banking system. He also outlines the necessary prerequisites for implementing an interest-free Islamic banking system. In the field of insurance, Motahhari viewed the insurance contract as a tool that has no precedent in the legal contracts of the Islamic world. He compares the insurance contract to similar contracts and ultimately concludes that insurance is a new contract that reinforces the trust of the insured (Motahhari, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 68 and 190). The two books mentioned above are among Motahhari's earlier works that have been previously addressed in various studies and are not the subject of this article. The goal of this study is to review the analysis of the professor's later work, "An Introduction to Comparative Economics."

5. Research Findings

The book "An Introduction to Comparative Economics," published in two volumes in 1400 SH (2021 AD), contains 28 sessions held by Morteza Motahhari with a group of economists and master's students from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tehran. These weekly sessions took place from July 23, 1978, to April 21, 1979, three days before Professor Motahhari's martyrdom. The main focus of the discussions was the text of the book "A History of Economic Doctrines" by Charles Gide and Charles Rist, which had been translated

into Persian by Karim Sanjabi (cf. Gide and Rist, 1975). In each session, one of the participants would usually present a report on a specific topic from the book, and then Professor Motahhari would offer his opinion, and the discussions would continue. This series of sessions originated from a proposal by students of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tehran to create a new field of study called Islamic economics, a proposal that was accepted by the faculty officials. These students asked Motahhari to collaborate in teaching this new field. Given the importance of interacting with professors of economics, Motahhari emphasized holding discussions on various economic schools, and these sessions were formed. Throughout these discussions, both the audience and Morteza Motahhari offered valuable opinions and insights. Motahhari introduced novel and precise economic, social, and philosophical views into the discussion, enriching the dialogue.

The first volume of the book examines the Physiocracy and Classical schools, analyzing the ideas of economists such as Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Thomas Malthus. The second volume continues the discussion on the Classical school, including Ricardo's theories, as well as unconventional schools, and examines the theories of cooperative socialists like Owen and Fourier. Despite the professor's heavy workload in the months leading up to the Islamic Revolution, these sessions continued. The book was published for the first time in 1400 SH (2021 AD), with the delay in publication due to the effort to find the audio files of the lectures and improve their quality using new technologies. In this book, Motahhari did not merely limit himself to critiquing or presenting Islamic principles in opposition to economic schools, but most of its content revolves around dialogues and exchanges of views among different schools of economic thought.

5.1. A Common Error in Most Schools of Thought

One of the general topics Morteza Motahhari addresses in the first volume of his book is the common error found in many schools of thought, including economic schools. According to Motahhari, when a person studies different schools in any field, they usually find that each school has its own strengths and may even contain some correct points. However, the problem arises when a school, upon discovering a part of the truth, assumes it has found the entire truth. This belief causes the school to justify everything based on that single point, even though that point may not be applicable in all cases. Motahhari believes this tendency to rely solely on one aspect of the truth is problematic because it often overlooks the complexities

and subtleties of issues. When a single viewpoint is assumed to explain everything, schools of thought may omit important factors or perspectives, leading to an incomplete or incorrect understanding. This limited focus can lead to the justification of ideas or behaviors that are not valid or appropriate in a broader context. In summary, Motahhari's critique of this common error in schools of thought highlights the importance of a precise and comprehensive approach to complex issues. By recognizing the limitations of each viewpoint, scholars and thinkers can achieve a more complete and accurate understanding of social issues.

An example of this phenomenon is visible in moral philosophy. In this field, Motahhari states that different thinkers present varying views on the nature of virtue and ethics. For instance, Plato considers virtue the basis of ethics, believing all aspects of morality revolve around virtue and the pursuit of moral perfection. On the other hand, Aristotle emphasizes the concept of moderation, viewing it as the core of ethics. For Aristotle, achieving moderation in all matters is the key to a moral life, and he recommends solving ethical problems through a balanced approach. Another group highlights the importance of self-sufficiency and the soul's transcendence over the body, believing true ethics lie in the soul's independence and self-sufficiency. In contrast, some prioritize a strong will, emphasizing the power of will and the ability to resist external influences. For this group, ethics are synonymous with the perseverance and resilience of the will in the face of challenges. These diverse views demonstrate the multifaceted nature of moral philosophy, where each school of thought provides unique insights into the foundations of virtue and ethical behavior. By examining different dimensions of ethics, these thinkers enrich the ethical discourse and provide valuable insights into the complexities of human behavior and decision-making (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 81).

Motahhari believes that each school has found a part of the truth, but the main deviation occurs when it tries to justify everything based on that one point alone, which is not entirely correct. In his critique of the Physiocrats, he points to their tendency for over-generalization and making broad claims based on a limited perspective. He critically notes that the Physiocrats place too much emphasis on land as the sole factor of production, which he considers a fundamental error in their economic framework; while Motahhari acknowledges the value of understanding naturalism and the distinction between agricultural, livestock, and industrial production, he disagrees with their belief that production only originates from land and that industry is inherently unproductive. The Physiocrats' attempt to build a

comprehensive economic system based on this single principle is the point Motahhari takes issue with. They try to justify other economic concepts, such as ownership and the role of industry, solely from the perspective of this fundamental belief, but Motahhari believes this approach is no longer valid and fails to accept the complexities of economic reality. Motahhari shows that the Physiocrats' strict adherence to a simplified explanation of economic processes causes them to overlook the multidimensional aspects of production and the interdependence of different economic sectors (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 17).

5.2. The Difference between the Concept of Ownership in Jurisprudence and the Capitalist System

In his analysis of the Physiocracy school, Motahhari distinguishes between the concept of ownership in jurisprudence and the ownership prevalent in capitalist systems. He believes that the understanding of ownership in Islam is fundamentally different from ownership in capitalist societies. He states that ownership can be likened to the relationship between God and man, where creation belongs entirely to the Creator. This developmental view gives the owner absolute authority over their property, including the right to destroy, wastes, or transfers it to anyone or even a pet. However, the concept of ownership in Islam is completely different. Although an individual is considered the owner, they do not have unlimited authority and do not have the right to use their property in any way they desire. In Islam, the owner is absolutely forbidden from wasting or destroying property and does not have the right to transfer property to an ignorant person or a pet, because the Islamic framework imposes limitations on the use of property. The rights and responsibilities of the owner in Islam are not absolute but are subject to ethical and religious considerations. This stands in contrast to the concept of ownership in the capitalist system, which grants the owner broader authority.

Citing the jurisprudential principle "*al-Nās Musallaṭūn ‘alā Amwālihim*" (The people have authority over their properties) (Majlesi, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 273), Motahhari emphasizes that this rule does not mean absolute authority but that property must be used in a rational, legal, useful, and constructive way for the individual and society. Therefore, he considers ownership a kind of right to use property. In examining the Physiocracy school's view on ownership, Motahhari finds common ground with the Islamic jurisprudential approach, including attention to land reclamation and its consequences. However, he disagrees with the core belief of the Physiocrats that value is only in the agricultural sector and that they consider industry

unproductive. He believes that the origin of value is in both nature and industry and rejects the Physiocrats' limited view of agriculture as the sole source of economic value (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 18).

5.3. Ownership of Means of Production in the New Era

Within the framework of the Physiocracy school's views on ownership, Motahhari also addresses the issue of industrial rights, such as inventions and their effects on the ownership of the means of production in the modern era. He believes that the inventor should not be recognized as the sole and exclusive owner of the invention. According to Motahhari, every invention is the result of a collective process in which the inventor has only taken the final step based on the accumulated knowledge in that field. Therefore, an invention is not solely the product of the individual inventor's efforts but the result of collective knowledge and progress in that field. Motahhari's view shows that the ownership of the means of production in the new era should not be attributed only to the individual inventor. He emphasizes the collective nature of knowledge and the gradual progress that leads to innovations, challenging the idea that the inventor is the primary or sole owner of the means of production. This analysis highlights Motahhari's precise and complex understanding of ownership issues in the context of technological advancements and the evolution of the means of production in the modern era. His view offers a more comprehensive and inclusive perspective on the ownership of the tools and resources that drive economic and social development.

Therefore, Motahhari states that the main challenge is the ambiguity regarding the inventor's ownership. When the inventor's ownership is unclear, with whom does the capitalist prefer to do business? It must be made clear to the inventor that their contribution is only the final touch on a collective effort that generations have advanced, and this is a shared achievement of humanity. Therefore, the concept of ownership of the means of production in the new era diverges from traditional jurisprudential criteria. This new perspective creates a specific paradigm shift in this area, which is different from the usual understanding of jurists who view the means of production like a property rental (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH).

5.4. The Scope of *Zakāt*

In the study of the Classical school, and specifically the ideas of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the theory of value and its origin were discussed and debated. In this context, Motahhari believes that the issue of whether the categories of wealth subject to *Zakāt* are fixed or variable has been widely discussed. Many argue that these limitations are not absolute and point to instances where the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) exempted specific individuals or properties from *Zakāt*. They believe that this act of exemption demonstrates the system's flexibility and the Prophet's authority, as the guardian of the Muslim community, to make exceptions when necessary. They say that the existence of these precedents refutes the idea that the categories of *Zakāt* are unchangeable. This debate continues as scholars examine the historical context and principles of Islamic jurisprudence to determine the scope of *Zakāt* and how it can be adapted to changing times and conditions (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 94). Motahhari also emphasizes that Imam Ali (AS) mandated *Zakāt* on horses, contrary to the view of jurists who considered it optional, which shows a difference of opinion in their views. This difference of opinion does not concern the acceptance of *Zakāt* on horses. In this regard, Motahhari believes that perhaps during wartime, when horse breeding was common and horses were as prevalent as cattle, sheep, and camels, Imam Ali (AS) used his authority to impose *Zakāt* on horses (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 92-93).

5.5. The Philosophy of the Prohibition of Usury

When examining Ricardo's theories in the Classical school, the concept of the time value of money becomes a focal point. Motahhari believes that the essence of usury lies in the application of profit and loss (with actual loss, not merely a decrease in price) to the subject of the transaction. In this regard, he states that when a commodity like money, wheat, or currency is loaned to another, the ownership of that asset is completely transferred to the borrower, and from the moment of delivery, they are considered its legal owner. The previous owner may have benefited from advantages like an increase in the commodity's value or related returns, such as the offspring of an animal, but at the same time, they also bore the risks associated with the commodity being damaged or destroyed. Therefore, by lending, both the potential benefits and the potential risks related to that asset are transferred to the borrower (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 80).

Motahhari believes that the nature of a loan lies in the fact that one party gives money to another, thereby creating a debt obligation. In other words, the lender provides a sum of money, and in return, the borrower assumes a responsibility. Motahhari states that when money is given as a loan to someone, its ownership is temporarily transferred to the recipient of the loan, and the lender gives up ownership of it, but in return, the recipient of the loan is obligated to return a fixed amount to the lender. This debt usually remains constant, and its amount does not change regardless of the passage of time. In some cases, this relationship can change in a way that a transaction similar to a sale occurs instead of a loan. This means that money is exchanged for receiving a commodity, such as gold coins, and the repayment obligation also relates to the same commodity or its equivalent. In this case, even if the price of the commodity changes in the market, the repayment obligation remains fixed, and price fluctuations do not affect the principal of the debt. In this way, the nature of the transaction changes from a loan to a sale, and the financial obligations are determined precisely and specifically based on the agreed-upon commodity.

Here, Motahhari explains the difference between money given for *Muḍārabah* (profit-sharing) and money given as a loan. He explains that if my money is in your possession, it is like a contract in which you act as the agent and I act as the investor, and the capital is actively employed. In this situation, the capital may suffer losses for a period, but these losses are my responsibility as the owner of the capital, not yours as the agent. I have invested a sum and expect the same amount or an equivalent profit to be returned, regardless of whether the entire capital is lost at once or a profit is made. As the owner of the capital, I have the right to both receive the profit and accept the risk. However, if I lend the money to you, I am no longer its owner from the moment of delivery, and your subsequent profit or loss is of no importance to me (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 81).

5.6. Islamic Socialism

The second volume of the book delves deeper into heterodox schools by carefully examining the views of cooperative socialists. After extensive analysis, Motahhari suggests a kind of ethical socialism, a socialism based not on legal compulsion but on spiritual kinship and faith. He quotes Ghazali, who advocates a type of socialism that emphasizes the priority of individual choice over coercion. According to Ghazali, attempting to impose a communal structure through legal decrees and compulsion is neither just nor logical. He states that

everyone has the right to use their property, and this right should not be forcibly taken from them. Instead, Islam intends to educate individuals to willingly participate in creating a communal society. Islam does not seek to abolish ownership or deprive individuals of their rights; such actions are considered unjust. Rather, Islam encourages individuals to voluntarily share their wealth and promotes a spirit of collective responsibility and cooperation.

Motahhari, referring to a narration from Musa ibn Ja'far (AS), recounts that a guest from a distant land came to Musa ibn Ja'far (AS) and asked about the state of Muslims and Shi'as. The guest praised their state and said they were doing great. Musa ibn Ja'far (AS) then posed a scenario: are you in a situation where you can freely and without any worry take what you need from a shop or another's pocket?. The guest admitted that their state had not reached such a level of trust and generosity. Musa ibn Ja'far (AS) concluded that their state had not reached the peak of excellence. This anecdote highlights Islam's ideal of fostering a society characterized by deep trust, self-sacrifice, and mutual support (Motahhari, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 274).

After participating in numerous sessions to examine the ideas of cooperative socialists, Professor Motahhari's life was tragically cut short just three days after the last discussion, as he was martyred in May 1979. This untimely event brought a sudden end to the opportunity for further examination and expansion of these thought-provoking dialogues.

5.7. The Relevance of the Discussions to the Contemporary Era

Motahhari's engagement with the dominant economic ideologies of the 20th century—capitalism and socialism—was not merely theoretical; it was deeply influenced by the ideological and social currents that culminated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Through his comparative analysis, particularly as expressed in

"An Introduction to Comparative Economics," Motahhari positioned Islam as a distinct "Third Way" capable of addressing the shortcomings of both systems while aligning with the revolutionary ideal of justice and independence.

In this context, Motahhari presented Islamic economics as a comprehensive system that incorporates the strengths of both capitalism and socialism while avoiding their respective problems. He emphasized the importance of individual rights and social obligations, advocating for a balanced approach that fosters economic initiative within a framework of justice, compassion, and accountability. This perspective played a crucial role in shaping the

ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, Motahhari's economic philosophy provided a blueprint for the post-revolutionary Islamic Republic and influenced policies aimed at reducing poverty, promoting social justice, and resisting Western capitalism and Eastern socialism. His insistence on ethical economic behavior, the prohibition of usury, and the promotion of Zakāt and charity became core principles of the new economic order.

Motahhari's insights remain highly relevant to contemporary debates in Iran and the Muslim world, especially in the fields of Islamic banking and social justice. His critique of interest-based financial systems provided the intellectual groundwork for the development of Iran's interest-free banking system after the revolution. By framing usury as an economic and ethical problem, Motahhari underscored the need for financial practices that are not only efficient but also just and spiritually sound. Furthermore, his emphasis on distributive justice and the ethical responsibilities of the wealthy continues to influence discussions on poverty reduction, welfare policies, and the government's role in ensuring economic fairness. In an era grappling with rising economic inequalities and the search for alternative models of development, Motahhari's vision of an Islamic economy—rooted in justice, ethics, and social solidarity—offers a compelling framework for addressing contemporary challenges.

Conclusion

This study has sought to illuminate Professor Morteza Motahhari's unique engagement with economic thought, particularly as reflected in his discussions and comments in the book "An Introduction to Comparative Economics." By placing Motahhari's contributions within the broader context of Islamic intellectual history and the dynamic environment preceding the Islamic Revolution, this article has shown how his approach to economics was both systematic and deeply rooted in Islamic ethical and philosophical principles.

Motahhari's methodology—characterized by fairness, intellectual precision, and a commitment to historical context—enabled him to critically evaluate Western economic schools while articulating a distinct Islamic alternative. His subtle distinction between economics as a science and as an economic school provided a conceptual framework that continues to influence debates about the legitimacy and scope of Islamic economics as a scholarly discipline. Furthermore, his insistence on integrating ethical values into economic life and his critique of capitalism and socialism positioned him as a pivotal figure in shaping the ideological foundations of post-revolutionary Iran.

Through his analysis of concepts such as justice, ownership, usury, and social responsibility, Motahhari not only addressed the immediate challenges of his time but also laid the groundwork for ongoing discussions about Islamic banking, distributive justice, and the role of religion in public policy. His legacy endures in the continued relevance of his thought to contemporary debates in Iran and the wider Muslim world, where the search for just and ethical economic systems remains pertinent. In sum, Motahhari's engagement with economic thought exemplifies the potential of Islamic scholarship to offer meaningful alternatives to dominant economic paradigms. His works invite scholars and practitioners alike to further explore the intersection of faith, ethics, and economics, ensuring that the pursuit of material well-being remains inseparable from the quest for justice and spiritual perfection.

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The Structuration of Revisionism in Great Revolutions: A Comparative Study of France, Russia, and China

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ABSTRACT

Objective: The present study aims to introduce and examine revisionism in the world's great revolutions.

Method: Using a comparative study method and within the theoretical framework of Giddens' "Structuration," we examine the interaction of "Agency" and "Structure" that leads to the formation of revisionism in these revolutions.

Results: The study of these revolutions shows that the trend of revisionism forms and strengthens when, firstly, the agency of the people decreases and the agency of those in power increases; and secondly, egalitarianism as a structure is weakened and the structure of power-seeking becomes prominent. In the French Revolution, power-seeking politicians had agency, and the prevailing structure of elitism led to revisionism. In the Russian Revolution, when monopoly became the dominant pattern of social communication, a new class took power, and revision of revolutionary ideals and methods occurred. The Chinese Revolution experienced revisionism when technocrats gained agency and developmentalism became the dominant structure.

Conclusions: The article suggests that to reduce the potential for revisionism in revolutionary systems, it is necessary to maintain and strengthen the presence and influence of the people in the political arena. Additionally, various tools should be employed to weaken the structure and pattern of power-seeking among revolutionary politicians.

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Introduction

"Revisionism" is a concept opposed to "Remaining Revolutionary." This term carries a negative value judgment and, in practice, becomes a derogatory word. Therefore, an individual labeled a revisionist by revolutionaries is branded with betrayal and opportunism. Few individuals would call themselves revisionists or accept this label.

In the literature of political science, "Reformism" is also used in opposition to being revolutionary; however, we must be careful not to conflate these two concepts. Reformism and revisionism have similarities and differences in the intellectual and political spheres (Fletcher, 1988: 360). Revisionism lies in wait for all revolutions, and understanding this blight is essential for preserving the revolutionary path. The Islamic Revolution of Iran also faces this phenomenon and can be threatened by it. This paper attempts to derive a model for this phenomenon by reviewing revisionism in the world's major revolutions to aid in the protection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

This research uses library resources for data collection and the "Comparative Method" for data analysis. In the comparative method, macro-social units over a specific period are compared using secondary data. Comparative research typically compares macro-phenomena across different countries. In this study, the units of analysis are the revolutions of France, Russia, and China, and the aim is to examine the interaction of "Agency" and "structure" in these revolutions that leads to the formation of the phenomenon of revisionism and a retreat from the revolution.

1. Theoretical Foundations

This article examines the topic of revisionism within the theoretical framework of Anthony Giddens' "Structuration." Various theories sometimes favor the "Agent" and at other times consider "Structure" as the main factor in social transformations. Giddens, moving beyond this dichotomy, introduces the theory of structuration. The theory of structuration seeks to reveal the dialectical and dual reciprocal relationship between agency and structure. According to Giddens, every social action involves structure, and every structure requires social action. Therefore, agency and structure are inseparably intertwined in daily activities. He believes that agency and structure are not two separate existing phenomena but rather exhibit a dual unity (Tahmasebi et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 396).

One of the main goals of structuration theory is to overcome the opposition between the individual and society in social theory; that is, to replace it with a model that attends to their mutual interweaving (Giddens, 1991: 202). The "Hermeneutic" and "Subjectivist" approaches are built on the empire of the mind, while "Functionalism" and "Structuralism" support the sovereignty of social objectivity. Giddens wants to end this conflict. In structuration theory, the main field of study for the social sciences is not the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, but rather the social practices ordered across time and space (Giddens, 1984: 2). Among the wide range of sociological theories, from individualistic and interpretive sociology to functional and structural sociology, structuration theory should be considered an intermediate theory that neither votes for the absolute primacy of the agent nor considers structure as the dominant ruler over the agent (Pirbabaei and Iranshahi, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 229).

In Giddens' view, the issue is not about the primacy of structure or the independence of the agent. He believes that phenomena are the result of the direct and mutual influence of the agent and structure. This process originates from both the context and the actor; both elements constitute each other (Bagheri Dolatabadi and Fakhraei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 5). Giddens states: "Every social action involves a structure, and every structure requires social action; therefore, agency and structure are inseparably intertwined in everyday activity." (Aghamohammadi, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 14) In his view, structure and agent are two sides of the same coin, between which there is a flow of mutual dependence and internal connection (Nouri Asl et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 156). "Agents draw upon rules and resources in diverse contexts of action, but these rules and resources are also the means of reproduction of the social structure." (Giddens, 1979: 66)

1.1. Agency

According to Giddens, the concept of action lacks sufficient capacity to refer to human conduct in social life, and this issue must be expressed with another concept. For this reason, Giddens uses the concept of "Agency." He says: "The concept of agency, as I use it, refers to the continuous flow of action; a flow through which social actors sustain social interactions." (Giddens, 1976: 75) Agency is a relative characteristic. An individual can possess this quality to varying degrees, more or less. Some individuals, due to reasons such as their position in the social system, skills, talents, etc., have more agency than others (Lakzaei, 2010 AD/1389 SH:

77). Agency primarily means the ability of individuals to perform actions. This is why agency implies power. Agency relates to events for which an individual is responsible, in the sense that the individual could have acted differently at any stage (Lakzaei, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 78). In structuration theory, we are not concerned with the intentions of actors, but rather with what they do in practice (Siddiqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 150). With this in mind, in examining the phenomenon of revisionism, we will not focus on the intentions of the agents. Instead, the intended and unintended consequences of their actions will be considered. For example, technocrats were likely not seeking to overthrow the revolution, but the result of their actions and governance is the weakening of the revolution and the intensification of the revisionist trend.

1.2. Structure

According to Giddens, structure is the pattern of social relations (Lakzaei, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 79). Giddens does not believe in the metaphysical existence of structures, as did thinkers like Freud, Lacan, Strauss, Marx, Durkheim, and Saussure. He generally believes that the social system does not have a structure but rather exhibits structural properties. In fact, from his perspective, social systems that provide the context for social practices and give order to the relations of agents do not possess structure in and of themselves, independent of the agents and their social conduct. Rather, they become structured through the repetition of agents' conduct in different temporal and spatial conditions, which is why this theory is called structuration theory (Siddiqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 152).

One of the core concepts of Giddens' theory is the duality of structure. The duality of structure means that social structures simultaneously affect action and are the result of human action. Action and structure must be seen as a duality (Giddens, 1983: 75-80). Structure exists where people perform actions under certain conditions, either consciously or unconsciously (Lakzaei, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 83). Giddens distinguishes between system and structure. A system is observable to all, and everyone provides a more or less identical account of it, but this is not the case with structure. Structure is an analytical category that the sociologist imposes on the system, and therefore, different sociologists may impose different structures on the same systems. For example, everyone observes that when several Iranians reach a doorway, they do not pass through first themselves but ask others to go first (the system). Observing this fixed pattern, one might conclude that the structural rule this pattern follows is

that passing through the door is considered dangerous by them; another might attribute it to the rule of

Ta'arof (ceremonious politeness); another person, using an anthropological method, might consider passing through the door to be unlucky in the eyes of Iranians (Siddiqi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 153).

For Giddens, social structures refer to two concepts: rules and resources. In other words, structures are composed of constraints (rules) that enable agents (resources). This duality can be observed, for example, in language. On one hand, language has rules that are binding for its users and, on the other, provides words that enable users to speak and communicate. This contrasts with structuralist views that attribute only a constraining character to structures; thus, "structure is simultaneously both enabling and constraining." (Giddens, 1984: 169)

2. Literature Review

Despite its importance, the topic of revisionism in revolutions has received little attention. However, some works and research can be found in this area. The book

Typology of Revisionism is organized within the theoretical framework of Karl Mannheim, focusing on ideology and utopia (Radadi, 2023 AD/1402 SH). The author identifies and introduces the major revisionist currents in the Islamic Republic. Prior to this book, Olfatpour had addressed the causes and factors of revisionism in his work. He centered his discussion on the events of 2009 AD/1388 SH and delved into the personalities of revisionist elements (Olfatpour, 2014 AD/1393 SH).

Another important source written on revisionism in the Islamic Revolution is

Revisionist Reformists..., which specifically focuses on reformists. The author distinguishes between reformism and revisionism and examines the roots of revisionism within a segment of the reformists (Amiri, 2007 AD/1386 SH). In the field of revisionism, the Borhan Think Tank published a book examining the secular and revisionist turn of some radical reformists (Borhan Think Tank, 2018 AD/1397 SH). The Basij Student Organization has also published a book to understand and analyze revisionism (Akhavan and Shahnazari, 2009 AD/1388 SH). These last two books have a weaker theoretical basis and are written with a practical approach.

The aforementioned sources have examined revisionism during the period of the Islamic Revolution. However, Anvar Khamei wrote a book about revisionism among Marxists

(Khomei, 2002 AD/1381 SH), which shows that revisionism was a significant current within Marxism. It is clear that little research has been conducted on revisionism. Furthermore, a comparative perspective is lacking, and the commonalities of revisionism in the world's major revolutions have not been addressed. This article attempts to extract a model of revisionism through a comparative lens.

This article uses the "Structuration" theoretical framework. It is worth noting that other authors have previously used this framework for revolution studies. For example, one article attempted to compare the structuration of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Egyptian Revolution based on this theory (Sahami et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH).

3. Conceptualizing Revisionism

When we speak of revisionism, we mean questioning the "Ideas and Goals" of the revolution. Revisionism occurs when individuals turn back from their former intellectual-political beliefs and path and move in an opposing direction. Typically, revisionism is meaningful in relation to very important intellectual-political matters; minor and temporary changes are not called revisionism. Revisionism can be defined as: the revision and rejection of established and inviolable revolutionary principles by individuals who were considered revolutionaries.

With this description, it becomes clear that we do not call every type of rethinking, course correction, method change, or tactical retreat revisionism; rather, we define revisionism only as the abandonment of established and unquestionable revolutionary principles and beliefs. Moreover, revisionism occurs among revolutionary individuals; those who were anti-revolution from the beginning do not fall within the scope of revisionism.

The most potent use of the term "Revisionism" was for Eduard Bernstein and his followers, who, in the late nineteenth century, deviated from Marxist thought and chose social democracy (Fletcher, 1988: 347). Bernstein attempted to revise some of the most important tenets of Marx, rejecting the labor theory of value, economic determinism, and the concept of class struggle. Although the most significant application of revisionism is in the domain of Marxist thought, if we focus on the concept of revisionism rather than the word itself, we can find more revisionist beliefs and behaviors throughout history. Such events are not unprecedented, especially in the great revolutions of the world. Reviewing this type of revisionism is useful because it shows that revisionism in the Islamic Revolution is not a

unique or strange phenomenon; almost all the world's revolutions have nurtured revisionism within them.

The hypothesis of this research is that the trend of revisionism in revolutions takes shape when two processes occur simultaneously:

- The agency of the people decreases while the agency of those in power increases;
- In the revolutionary society, egalitarianism fades, and in parallel, the structure of power-seeking increases.

4. Revisionism in the French Revolution

The French Revolution was formed against the dictatorship of the monarchy, with the goal of setting aside the "Aristocracy" and achieving "Liberty, equality, and fraternity" for the common people of society. After the revolution, a parliament was formed, and the people, by establishing a republic, tried to play a more effective role in running the country; however, after a short time, the power of the revolutionaries and the people began to wane. With the rise of "Napoleon Bonaparte," whatever remained of the revolution's ideals was destroyed, leaving only a shell and a name of the revolution. During his time, the legislative assemblies of France passed a bill establishing Napoleon's empire (Durant & Durant, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 249), which signified a complete return from the revolution's ideals.

4.1. Agency

In the French Revolution, the people were gradually pushed out of the scene, and power became monopolized by politicians. For example, on August 22, 1795, the French Constitution, known as the Constitution of Year III, was approved, placing executive power in the hands of a five-person group called the Directory. According to this law, the universal suffrage that existed in the revolutionary constitution was abolished, and only property owners had the right to vote in elections. One representative, justifying the violation of equality in the new constitution, said: "Absolute equality is an illusion... We must be governed by the best... Therefore, you must guarantee the political rights of the wealthy... and refuse to grant unconditional political rights to men without property." (Kurzin, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 137)

It seems that the people themselves had consented to the reduction of their agency. For this reason, when a vote was held to transform the republic into an empire, 3.5 million French people were in favor, and only 2,500 opposed the destruction of the republic (Durant and Durant, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 249). After the people were excluded from the political and governing scene, power-seeking politicians gained agency. At the head of these individuals was Napoleon Bonaparte, who ruled in complete opposition to the ideals of the French Revolution. In any case, Napoleon's dictatorial government was established, which was considered a retreat from the revolution's ideals and revisionism (Palmer, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 1, 648). Napoleon did not call the French people "Citizens" but referred to them as "my subjects." (Durant and Durant, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 250) After becoming emperor, he issued a general amnesty and invited all royalists and counter-revolutionaries to return to the country, because his sole aim was to rule (Palmer, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 1, 650).

4.2. Structure

The norms that existed in French society led to the structuration of elements that prepared the ground for revisionism in the revolution. One of these structures was the "People's desire for comfort" resulting from disillusionment and fatigue. The revolutionary people of France were on the streets for five years, striving to establish equality and freedom, but in the end, they found themselves entangled in a chaotic economic, political, religious, and moral situation: blockaded ports, roads controlled by bandits, an empty treasury, suspended public education, religion and priests under pressure, and families shattered by sexual freedom, divorce, and unstable marriages (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1147). This situation made them doubt the ideals of the revolution. Consequently, they distanced themselves from politics. In fact, the fatigue and declining interest of the people in politics and their inclination towards pleasure-seeking caused the social roots of the revolution to weaken (Kurzin, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 139).

Simultaneously with the decline of popular agency, politicians gained more power and even tended towards aristocracy. Josephine, Napoleon's mistress, appeared at operas and on the streets so adorned with jewels and in such a magnificent carriage that she was reminiscent of Queen Marie Antoinette, who was hated by the people at the time (Palmer, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 1, 247). Aristocratic titles such as "Grand Keeper of the Seals," "Grand Chamberlain," "Grand Master of Ceremonies," and "Grand Huntsman," which belonged to the monarchical

era, were revived, and extraordinary financial benefits were allocated for each of the holders of these aristocratic titles (Hakimi, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 84). Napoleon tried to cultivate a completely obedient populace. Therefore, a new educational system was formed under government supervision, with the aim of creating blind obedience to the emperor (Hakimi, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 83). In this educational system, there was heavy supervision over the teaching of philosophy and history, and sometimes these subjects were banned altogether (Palmer, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 888). In effect, the structures were organized in a way that would lead to revisionism and the distancing of the people from the ideals of the revolution.

5. Revisionism in the Russian Revolution

The Russian Revolution, led by the Bolshevik Party, triumphed in October 1917. The Tsarist regime, which in addition to its inefficiency in governing the country had placed a heavy financial burden on peasants and workers due to its participation in World War I, fell during the revolution. Lenin, as the leader of the revolution, declared a communist government in Russia. The plan was for the will of the people to govern the country after the revolution. However, gradually, the Soviet government distanced itself from its revolutionary nature. The new Russian government gradually took the form of a dictatorship based on the monopoly and power-seeking of the Bolsheviks. In this respect, a form of revisionism can be seen in the Soviet Union. According to many Marxists worldwide, such as European and Chinese Marxists, the power-seeking and party dictatorship in the Soviet Union was a form of deviation and revisionism. Mao, the leader of the Chinese people, called Khrushchev a revisionist and believed that the Soviet Union had abandoned socialism and adopted a "Social-bourgeois" system (Kolaei, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 271).

5.1. Agency

The role of agency in the revisionism of Soviet Marxists was evident. The fluctuation of two types of agencies caused the revolution in the Soviet Union to stall and a revisionist trend to emerge within the ruling structure:

- 1) **Technocrats:** After the revolutionary system in the Soviet Union was consolidated, bureaucrats and technocrats gained the most influence and power. These bureaucratic managers had lost their faith and belief in Marxism and the principles of the revolution

(Rahimkhani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 73) and served merely to maintain their welfare, benefits, and privileged positions (Vaezi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 24). Marxist ideology became a tool to persuade the people to obey the ruling authorities (Kolaei, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 191). According to Lenin's directive, party members were not to receive more than one and a half times the prescribed salary. Furthermore, private apartments for party members were forbidden. But from the 1930s onwards, as inflation increased in the Soviet Union, this directive was ignored, and high-ranking officials received exorbitant salaries and benefits. According to reports, special stores were established for this small group, selling goods to them at fixed prices (Rahimkhani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 74). In addition, these individuals benefited from exclusive hospitals, special resorts, and so on (Medvedev, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 736). To cover up these astronomical salaries, amounts exceeding their official salaries were given in envelopes at party and government gatherings, often exceeding their actual salaries (Medvedev, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 737). None of this behavior was compatible with the revolution.

- 2) **The People:** As the agency of technocratic officials increased, the agency of the "revolutionary people" diminished. The "ignorance and weakness of the people" and their lack of power (Russell, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 99) led to a decrease in their agency. As a result, the people lacked the ability to change the ongoing practices within the government. They were aware that Soviet officials were straying from revolutionary ideals and saw their revisionism firsthand. The new generation in the Soviet Union began to whisper in opposition to government officials and demanded change. "Samizdat" (самиздат) publications channeled the criticisms of this new-thinking generation (Bulliet, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 401). Moral socialists, Christian socialists, the New Left movement, and many other Marxist groups in the Soviet Union protested against the revisionism of Soviet officials. They demanded the implementation of true Marxism and a return to the ideals of October 1917; but because the agency of the people had decreased, they could not stop the revisionist trend.

5.2. Structure

The "Party" and its exclusive power was one of the important structures that fostered the growth of revisionism in the Soviet Union; whenever the will of the people and the will of the party conflicted, revolutionary officials prioritized the will of the Communist Party. This

became apparent in the early days of the revolution and marked the revisionism of the revolution's ideals. One of the important slogans of the Bolsheviks before the victory of the revolution was the "Formation of a Constituent Assembly" and entrusting the future form of government to the people's representatives. In January 1918, the Constituent Assembly was inaugurated with a statement prepared by Lenin; however, because some members of the Assembly disagreed with certain provisions of this statement and the Bolsheviks felt that the outcome of this assembly would not be their desired government, they dissolved the Constituent Assembly with the help of the Red Guard (Showkat, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 45). This undemocratic action by the Bolsheviks provoked protests from other labor leaders in Europe, including Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky (Kolaei, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 15).

In place of the Constituent Assembly, the Third Congress of Soviets, whose members were undemocratically elected and whose resolutions were controlled by the Bolsheviks, was convened. It confirmed the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and declared the new Russian government a "Republic of Soviets" (Showkat, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 46). The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the disregard for the people's vote was the first step in the deviation of the Russian Revolution and prevented the formation of a democratic government based on the revolution's ideals.

Another structure that weakened the revolution and gave rise to revisionism was the "Privilege-seeking and corruption" of Soviet officials. From top to bottom, officials were plagued by corruption and elitism. For example, the head of the revolutionary government of Russia, Stalin, had a more ceremonial and luxurious life than the president of the capitalist country of America (Medvedev, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 738). After the October 1917 revolution, the capitalist class and other old social classes were destroyed; but a "New class" took their place, which, by seizing power, allocated numerous welfare and economic privileges to itself. Milovan Djilas called this new class the "political bureaucracy" and believed that this new class was not seeking to overthrow the unequal economic and political relations before the revolution, but rather to dominate society and establish an aristocracy (Djilas, 1974 AD/1353 SH).

In response to increasing corruption, the "Perestroika" (перестройка) program was designed during Gorbachev's time, with the stated goals of fighting corruption, reforming the economy, and establishing democracy (Russell, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 186). These reforms were too late and too slow and could not return the government to the path of the revolution in time. The

people of Russia wanted the overthrow of this government, and Yeltsin's words were more appealing to them. Yeltsin criticized the privileges that government officials had granted themselves (Pietroza, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 115).

6. Revisionism in the Chinese Revolution

The Chinese Revolution triumphed in 1949 with the rise to power of the Communist Party of China. The peasant revolution in China sought to establish Marxist justice throughout the country. Expelling European and Japanese aggressors and preserving independence were other goals of the revolution. Mao Zedong was the leader of the Chinese Revolution, who remained at the head of the People's Republic of China until his death in 1976.

Revisionism in China differs from revisionism in the French and Russian revolutions. First, this country is in the Third World, and the exigencies of the Third World, such as economic constraints, affected the course of the revolutionary society in China. For this reason, most of China's revisionism is in the economic sphere, whereas revisionism and deviation from revolutionary principles in France and Russia were in the political sphere and the return of dictatorship. Second, in Chinese revisionism, the leader of the revolution played an effective role. In the French and Russian revolutions, the revolutionary leaders did not have such a role. Mao, on the one hand, believed in advancing the revolution by appealing to the masses, and on the other hand, compromise to strengthen the foundations of the government and maintain order was also important to him. Therefore, during Mao's rule, we witness great waves of revolutionary fervor and enthusiasm, followed by tactical halts or even retreats from revolutionary plans at the peak of a crisis (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1147).

The contradictory policies adopted during Mao's time showed their results immediately after his death. Specifically, it can be said that revisionism occurred in China in the 1980s, and the communist government, contrary to all its initial ideals and Marxist teachings, transformed into a state-capitalist economy.

6.1. Agency

1. **The Leader:** Revolutionary leaders always play a very important role in keeping the people on the path of the revolution. The leader of the Chinese Revolution, through his actions, paved the way for revisionism. For example, the Chinese Revolution was fiercely

anti-imperialist and identified the United States as imperialism's most important capitalist government and its permanent enemy. However, the first step towards reconciliation with imperialism and the normalization of China's relations with the West was taken by Mao himself during his lifetime. In the early 1970s, the United States still recognized Taiwan, or Nationalist China, which was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek, as the official and legal China, and China's seat in the United Nations was also held by Taiwan. In February 1972, US President Richard Nixon, along with Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, flew to Beijing and began negotiations with Zhou Enlai and Mao. After these talks, it was announced that China and the United States had normalized their relations (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1168). In 1978, full diplomatic relations were established between China and the United States, which was a deviation from the slogans of the Chinese Communist Revolution. The leader of the Chinese Revolution also initiated some unpleasant experiences that made the people and government officials cynical about the revolution. For example, the economic-cultural program "Great Leap Forward," which Mao had planned, caused famine and the death of about 35 million Chinese between 1958 and 1961. The failure of this revolutionary idea led the leaders of the Communist Party of China after Mao to avoid the revolutionary model for development and show more interest in the capitalist model. Therefore, the leader of the Chinese Revolution also indirectly strengthened the revisionists.

2. **The Developmentalist Faction of the Central Committee:** A portion of the members of the "Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" had revisionist tendencies and changed the revolutionary path of China. Zhou Enlai, the first premier of China, was one of these individuals. He explicitly declared that the country's main goal was now to reach the developed world by the end of the century by focusing on the Four Modernizations: modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1166). In the vision and rhetoric of this group of revisionists, revolutionary ideals had no place, and despite their apparent commitment to revolutionary slogans, they were more interested in China's economic development than in creating revolutionary equality and freedom.

Another of the most important Chinese officials who accelerated revisionism was Deng Xiaoping, who succeeded Mao after his death. A famous quote is attributed to him: "As long as our production increases, we can turn to private business. It doesn't matter if a good cat is

black or white, as long as it catches mice..." (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1155) In his view, in the path of China's development, capitalist or communist tools were not important. Consequently, wherever Mao's teachings or Marxist principles conflicted with development, they were easily set aside. From his era onwards, the name of communism and the image of Mao were preserved, but none of the principles and contents of Marxism and Maoism were observed. This signified revisionism in the Chinese Revolution.

The last attempts to prevent the destruction of the Chinese Revolution were made by Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and her three colleagues, known as the Gang of Four. These individuals tried to show that the revolution could not have "Coexistence" with hegemonic superpowers and capitalist governments. These individuals were arrested and tried by the party's revisionists. Mao's widow, at her trial, passionately defended the principles of the revolution, saying: "You cannot have an ideology of peaceful coexistence in this era... You coexist, they will corrupt you." (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1172) She was sentenced to life imprisonment and killed herself, leaving a note beside her body that read: "The revolution has now been stolen by the revisionists!" By the mid-1980s, most of the revolutionary members of the party had retired to create less of a nuisance for the establishment of "Socialist Capitalism."

6.2. Structure

The most important pattern that led to the structuration of revisionism in the Chinese Revolution is "Developmentalism." After Mao's death in 1976, the concepts of "Socialism" and "Revolution" gave way to the idea of "Modernization." Class conflicts were removed from the official culture, and even capitalist experiments were encouraged (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1148). Gradually, eliminating injustice and inequality was removed from the agenda of the revolutionary government of China, and modernization was emphasized as the most important national goal.

The Chinese people had been under the pressure of foreign colonialism for many years and hated the colonizers; for this reason, fighting against foreign colonizers was among the goals and slogans of the revolution. In the early years of the People's Republic of China, foreigners, including advisors, teachers, and religious missionaries, were quickly expelled from the country (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 169). China's revolutionary foreign policy led it to enter the Korean War in November 1950. But after the revisionist trend gained power, this

situation changed; in the late 1980s, "Special Economic Zones" were established in some Chinese cities like Shanghai. In the socialist country of China, these economic zones were special hubs for capitalism, serving as gateways for the entry of Western technology and capital. The Chinese Revolution was formed by expelling Westerners who, having received concessions, had settled in Chinese cities and ports and were engaged in the colonization of the Chinese; but in later years, the communist government of China opened its arms to bring Westerners back to the Special Economic Zones. The first and most important Special Economic Zone is in the port of Shenzhen, which is adjacent to the port of Hong Kong. Cheap Chinese labor and Western technology were successfully combined for the first time in this region (Grenoble, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 1174).

There is no doubt that the Chinese people now have a much better life than before. Not only do the Chinese people not die of hunger, but goods like refrigerators and televisions have made their way into ordinary rural homes. But it is undeniable that the oppression the communist rulers of China inflict on the working class today does not even occur in capitalist America! The free exploitation of Chinese workers has led American investors to prefer producing many of their goods in China, because lower wages are paid to workers, and labor laws offer less protection to the worker. The revolution that began in the name of peasants and workers for equality and the elimination of injustice from the deprived classes, in a revisionist move, changed its goal and declared development as its main objective. The result is that the lower classes suffer the most in this social-bourgeois system. Moreover, the party dictatorship prevents the free circulation of power.

Conclusion

This article approached the topic of revisionism from the perspective of structuration. In this framework, the trend of revisionism is formed based on the interaction between agency and structure and comes into conflict with revolutionary processes. In Table 1, the agency and structure in the revisionist trend of the world's revolutions are compared. The common trend that emerges from this comparison can be considered a model for revisionism. This model is the result of two processes:

1. The decrease in the agency of the people in parallel with the increase in the agency of those in power: Revisionist currents gained strength when the agency of the people decreased. In this situation, the influence of the people in governance diminished. During the revolution,

the agency of the people determined the trends, and the direction of decision-making was shaped by the opinion and will of the people. But with the decline of revolutionary fervor and the appearance of signs of revisionism, the agency of the people decreased, and in turn, the agency of those in power increased. This means that these special and privileged individuals in society had more influence on trends than others and made decisions instead of the people. In all these revolutions, the agency of the people is reduced to the point of being ineffective. In contrast, another political-social force gains agency: politicians in France, the new class in Russia, and technocrats in China.

2. The decrease in egalitarianism in parallel with the increase in the structure of power-seeking: Structure means the pattern of social relations, and during the revolution, the dominant structure is "Egalitarianism." But when the structure and pattern of social relations turn into "Power-seeking," and revolutionaries engage in intense competition to gain and maintain power, the ground for revisionism is prepared. In the revolutions of France, Russia, and China, a part of the revolutionaries sought to acquire and consolidate their power, and the common feature of the structures of "Elitism," "Monopolism," and "Developmentalism" is a strong tendency to acquire power. This very issue created the context for revisionism.

In the theoretical section, it was mentioned that the duality of structure is one of the main concepts of Giddens' theory, meaning that social structures simultaneously influence action and are the result of human action. This situation is also seen in the model of revisionism: power-seeking leads to a decrease in the agency of the people, and on the other hand, the decrease in the agency of the people strengthens power-seeking (which is manifested in the structures of elitism, monopolism, and developmentalism).

Table 1: Analysis of Revisionism in World Revolutions from a Structuration Perspective

Revolutionary Country	Agency of Revisionism	Structure of Revisionism
France	Power-seeking politicians	Elitism
Russia	The New Class	Monopolism
China	Technocrats	Developmentalism

The conclusion that can be drawn from these analyses is that moving away from people-centric governance and the spread of power-seeking behaviors among government officials leads to the formation and strengthening of revisionism. In this situation, even if there is a pretense of being revolutionary among political officials, the revisionist trend will ultimately prevail, and revolutionary processes will be abandoned. This is the experience gained from studying the revolutions of France, Russia, and China.

Ethical Considerations

Adherence to Research Ethics Principles

The author has complied with the principles of ethics in the conduct and publication of this scientific research, and this is affirmed by him.

Conflict of Interest

According to the author's declaration, this article has no conflict of interest.

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The Securitization of Women of the Islamic Revolution in the Arena of National Order (An Analysis of the Content of the Statements of the Supreme Leader)

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ABSTRACT

Objective: The securitization of women, as one of the key components of social and national security, plays an effective role in sustainable development and social cohesion. The present study aims to explain the strategies for the securitization of women in the sphere of national order, with an emphasis on the statements of the Supreme Leader, in order to clarify the theoretical and practical dimensions of this issue from the perspective of the Leader's views.

Methodology: The present research has used the thematic analysis method to examine the statements of the Supreme Leader. Data were collected from a set of relevant statements, coded, and analyzed in the form of basic, organizing, and overarching themes.

Results: The research results show that the securitization of women in the intellectual system of the Supreme Leader can be analyzed in three dimensions: "Self-building," "Society-building," and "Civilization-building."

Based on the analyses performed, a conceptual model can be presented to show the "Relationship between constructs and their role" in the securitization of women. This model includes five main constructs (individual, familial, socio-cultural, economic, and political-civilizational), each of which acts as an independent axis while simultaneously playing a complementary role in interaction with other constructs. The main themes include the empowerment of women, human dignity, the role of women in the family, women's social and political participation, and providing legal and cultural support for women's security. Also, the emphasis on preserving the religious and cultural identity of women as an important factor in achieving social security has been considered.

Conclusions: The securitization of women in the sphere of national order requires a multi-dimensional and integrated approach that covers the individual, familial, and social dimensions. The findings of this research can be used as a basis for policymaking and planning in the field of women's security and contribute to the promotion of social security indicators and sustainable development.

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Introduction

The securitization of women, as one of the key dimensions of social and national security, has always been of special importance in different societies, especially in value-based and religious systems.

In Islamic societies, the role of women is recognized not only in the family structure but also in the social and cultural structures as one of the fundamental pillars of the security and progress of society (Mottahari, 2010 AD/1389 SH; Javadi Amoli, 2016 AD/1395 SH).

According to the statements of the Supreme Leader, women's security in the sphere of national order not only means eliminating direct threats against them but is also considered a platform for realizing social justice, sustainable development, and strengthening the moral foundations of society.

The main research problem in this regard is the lack of a coherent framework for explaining the position of women in the securitization process, especially from the perspective of the Supreme Leader's statements, which is one of the fundamental challenges in macro social and cultural policymaking and planning.

This gap has caused practical solutions and executive policies in this area to face numerous problems.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine and analyze the statements of the Supreme Leader as one of the rich and inspiring sources, using the thematic analysis method, in order to extract and present precise and applicable solutions for the securitization of women. The importance and necessity of this research can be examined from several perspectives.

From a social perspective, the securitization of women helps to strengthen family foundations and reduce social harms.

In the cultural dimension, this research can lead to the promotion of Islamic and native models of women's securitization as a solution to counter the cultural onslaughts of the West.

From a political perspective, the securitization of women leads to their increased effective participation in policymaking and national security processes.

Finally, from an economic perspective, enhancing women's capabilities in various fields can help reduce economic inequalities and pave the way for sustainable development.

In this regard, this research endeavors to answer the following fundamental questions:

1. What are the key themes related to the securitization of women in the statements of the Supreme Leader?

2. How can these themes be explained in the form of a coherent framework for social and cultural policies?
3. What solutions exist for improving the process of women's securitization based on the statements of the Supreme Leader?

Given these questions, the present research is based on hypotheses that state:

4. The statements of the Supreme Leader contain fundamental and practical themes in the field of women's securitization.
5. The themes extracted from the statements can be used as executive strategies in social and cultural policymaking.
6. The securitization of women, with an emphasis on religious teachings and the guidance of the Supreme Leader, can help strengthen the foundations of social security.

In sum, this research, with the aim of explaining the key themes of women's securitization from the perspective of the Supreme Leader's statements, seeks to present a coherent framework for policymaking and developing practical solutions for promoting women's security in the sphere of national order.

The results of this research can be used as an effective model in macro social and cultural policymaking and be an effective step towards achieving sustainable security and social development.

1. Research Background

A review of the existing literature shows that while studies have been conducted on the role of women in securitization, a study that comprehensively and multi-dimensionally examines their role in relation to national order was not found.

However, studies that have addressed some related dimensions are as follows:

Domestic studies have shown that women have been influential in social security, the law enforcement role of the police, crisis management, and increasing the public's sense of security.

The research by Bavi et al., (2018 AD/1398 SH) addressed the role of women in social security based on Islamic teachings and presented a model for their participation in improving social spaces.

Pourmoazzen (2009 AD/1388 SH) examined the role of social police in strengthening the security of families and concluded that the social interactions of the police increase public security.

Dehghan et al., (2022 AD/1401 SH) addressed the participation of women in sustainable social security in rural areas and showed that the role of women is effective in creating a safe environment, reducing social harms, and social stability.

Also, Zarvandi (2005 AD/1384 SH) examined the role of women in managing political-security crises and emphasized the importance of their participation in reducing tensions.

Foreign studies have also addressed similar dimensions. Smith (2022) showed that African women play an important role in ensuring security by managing local resources and creating social groups.

Andersen (2020) in his research emphasized the presence of women in security decision-making and its impact on increasing public trust.

Johnson (2018) also showed that the participation of women in peace negotiations has led to increased stability and reduced violence in societies.

1.1. Analysis of Background and Research Innovation

Previous studies have mainly focused on specific dimensions of women's role in security, such as their role in the family, social security, or crisis management, but the link between women's role and national order has not been examined.

The innovation of this research lies in its analytical approach and methodology;

Unlike past research that focused on sociological or descriptive approaches, this study examines the role of women from the individual to the civilizational level in securitization by analyzing the statements of the Supreme Leader and presenting a multi-dimensional model.

From a methodological perspective, this research provides a comprehensive model for women's participation in national order by using the thematic analysis method and qualitative data.

This research tries to fill the existing research gaps by providing a comprehensive and multi-dimensional view of the role of women in securitization and to offer practical solutions for utilizing their capacities in the national order.

2. Theoretical Framework of the Research: The Securitization of Women in the Sphere of National Order

2.1. Theoretical Foundations of Women's Securitization

Security, as one of the basic human needs, is considered in various economic, social, cultural, and psychological dimensions.

In this context, women, as half of the society, play a pivotal role in achieving and consolidating social and human security.

The theoretical framework of this research is based on three main theories in the field of women's securitization:

2.1.1. Human Security Theory

The Human Security Theory (UNDP, 1994) holds that security is not merely confined to the military and political dimensions, but its social, economic, cultural, and psychological dimensions are also of special importance.

In this framework, women are recognized not only as recipients of security but also as key actors in the process of creating and maintaining social security (Kaldor, 2007).

Women's security not only means immunity from violence and discrimination but also includes access to equal opportunities, education, and economic and political empowerment.

2.1.2. Women's Empowerment Theory

The theory of women's empowerment (Nussbaum, 2000; Kabeer, 1999) emphasizes enhancing the individual and social capabilities of women.

This theory, as a tool for achieving women's security, addresses the increased participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes.

Empowering women by providing educational, economic, and social opportunities enhances their role in the securitization process and moves society towards stability and sustainability.

2.1.3. Gender Roles Theory

The theory of gender roles (Eagly and Wood, 2012; Connell, 2002) deals with the differences and similarities in the roles of women and men in society.

In this framework, women are recognized as the axis of peace and stability in the family and society, and by fulfilling their educational, familial, and social roles, they contribute to strengthening social and cultural security.

This theory emphasizes the complementary nature of women's and men's roles in the securitization process and considers any inequality in this field as an obstacle to achieving sustainable security.

2.2. Religious and Islamic Foundations in Women's Securitization

In Islamic teachings, women's security holds a special place, and specific principles and foundations have been drawn for its realization.

These foundations are considered not only as religious instructions but also as practical frameworks for policymaking and implementation:

2.2.1. Human Dignity in Islam

Islam emphasizes the inherent dignity of all human beings, both women and men, and rejects any instrumental view of women (Mottahari, 2010 AD/1389 SH; Javadi Amoli, 2016 AD/1395 SH).

The human dignity of women in Islamic teachings is the basis for their psychological, social, and cultural security in society.

In this view, a woman, as an independent human being, has rights equal to men, and her participation in the securitization of society is considered essential.

2.2.2. The Position of Women in the Family and Social System

The family, as the fundamental institution of society, has an irreplaceable role in securitization.

Women, as the axis of tranquility in the family and transmitters of cultural and moral values, have a pivotal role in the strength and security of the family (Qara'ati, 2011 AD/1390 SH; Sobhani, 2013 AD/1392 SH).

Islam considers the roles of women in the two spheres of family and society to be complementary and harmonious and emphasizes the necessity of their active participation in social and political arenas.

2.2.3. The Islamic View on the Rights and Duties of Women and Men

In the Islamic system, women and men have equal rights and duties, and both have the responsibility to participate in the securitization process (Tabataba'i, 2012 AD/1391 SH; Hosseini, 2015 AD/1394 SH).

This view holds that women, while preserving their dignity and human status, can actively participate in social, political, and cultural fields, and these roles not only do not conflict with their family roles but are complementary to each other.

3. Linking the Theoretical Framework with the Research

The theoretical framework of this research, by integrating scientific theories and Islamic principles, seeks to explain the securitization of women as a multi-dimensional and integrated process.

This process is achievable not only in the family sphere but also in the social, political, and cultural dimensions.

Women, as key actors in social security, play a pivotal role in achieving sustainable security and social development by fulfilling their educational, training, and social roles.

Meanwhile, Islamic teachings, as a comprehensive framework, also provide clear principles and foundations for achieving this goal.

This theoretical framework coherently and integrally explains the scientific and religious foundations related to the securitization of women and provides a basis for a more precise analysis of the research findings.

4. Research Methodology

This research has been conducted with the aim of analyzing the themes in the statements of the Supreme Leader regarding the securitization of women in the sphere of national order.

The research approach is qualitative, and its method is thematic analysis. This method, as a scientific strategy, allows the researcher to identify, interpret, and analyze key patterns and themes by examining the content of the statements.

Thematic analysis, while being an independent analytical method itself, can also be used in other qualitative analysis methods such as narrative analysis, semiotic analysis, grounded theory, etc.

Qualitative approaches are very diverse, complex, and subtle and thematic analysis should be considered a fundamental method for qualitative analysis.

(Khonifar and Moslemi, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 51)

In the technique of thematic analysis, information is classified into meaningful categories based on the subject. The process of thematic analysis begins when it considers meaningful patterns and topics that have potential appeal. This process involves a back-and-forth movement between the dataset and the coded summaries and analysis of the data that emerges (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 7).

For the researcher to become familiar with the depth and breadth of the data content, it is necessary to immerse oneself in them to some extent; immersion in data usually involves rereading the data repeatedly and reading the data actively (i.e., searching for meanings and patterns).

After familiarization with the data, initial codes are generated from the data. Codes are the main components of thematic analysis and are in fact names or labels that are applied by the researcher to a part of a sentence or paragraph of the data and are highly related to the research questions.

By studying the text of the data, if a part of the data has meaning and concept for the research question, the researcher names that part under a specific title or name (Ruhode, 2016).

Table 1- Sample initial table showing the relationship between code and data text in Ruhode's research (2016)

Theme	Text Analysis	Extracted Text	Policy Document
The final chosen theme	The author's analysis of the text	The part of the text used for coding	Title of Policy Document

After coding the text, the next step is to categorize the different codes into potential themes and to arrange all the coded data summaries into a specific theme.

In fact, the researcher begins to analyze their codes and considers how different codes can be combined to create an overall theme (Braun and Clarck, 2006: 18). Finally, the overarching and general themes that have been actively identified through the interpretation and reporting of the initial codes in relation to the basic themes must be evaluated to be sufficiently specific, distinct, non-repetitive, and sufficiently macro.

5. Data Collection Method and Sampling

In thematic analysis, like other qualitative methods, various information sources are used. The range of these methods includes interviews, observational techniques such as participant observation and fieldwork, to documents, records, reports, and manuscripts. In general, these sources are divided into two categories: primary sources, including interviews, participant and non-participant observation, and memoirs, and secondary sources, including personal experiences and existing literature.

Research literature is usually divided into technical and non-technical literature; technical literature includes research studies, philosophical, and theoretical articles.

These are the items with which the researcher can compare their findings.

Non-technical literature includes biographies, daily memoirs, documents, reports, and catalogs. In this method, theoretical sampling is used in the research. Decisions about sampling are formed during the research process.

Theoretical sampling simply requires the collection of data based on themes.

The criterion for judging when to stop theoretical sampling is the theoretical sufficiency of the theme. When theoretical sufficiency is achieved, no additional data can be found by which the researcher can formulate the properties or characteristics of a theme. Charmariz believes; we use theoretical sampling to develop emerging categories and to finalize and make them more useful.

Therefore, the purpose of this type of sampling is not to refine ideas to increase the initial sample size.

Theoretical sampling helps the researcher to identify conceptual boundaries and determine the conformity and suitability of themes.

(Charmaz, 2005: 519) In the end, data analysis was performed using the method of coding and classifying themes, and the results have been interpreted based on the extracted themes

6. Analysis of Research Data

The data for this research were selected purposefully and based on their relevance to the topic. The selection of the Supreme Leader's statements was done by searching for relevant keywords on the official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader, and speeches and messages that had the most relevance to the research topic were analyzed as the main sources. The analysis process was carried out in three main stages. In the first stage (initial coding), the collected statements were carefully studied and key related concepts were identified.

Each important concept or point was recorded as an initial code, and an effort was made for these codes to clearly and transparently express their specific meaning and concept. In the second stage (extracting organizing themes), the initial codes were classified into conceptual groups based on similarities and semantic affinity, and each group was defined as an organizing theme. In this stage, the relationship between codes and themes was carefully examined, and the organizing themes were consolidated as broader conceptual categories than the codes.

In the third stage (determining the overarching theme), the organizing themes were integrated with each other, and the overarching theme was identified and defined as the central and core message of the research.

The overarching theme is considered the core of the analysis, and other themes have been analyzed and interpreted in relation to it. To ensure the validity and reliability of the analysis, various strategies were used. In the first step, content validity was used by having experts in the field of women's studies review and confirms the themes. Subsequently, the reliability of the analysis was assessed by having two researchers perform independent coding and comparing their results.

In the end, the transparency of the analysis process was guaranteed by accurately documenting the research stages and maintaining the auditability of the analyses.

Also, to increase the reliability of the research, in addition to comparing the coding results by two researchers and transparently recording the analysis stages, an inter-coder agreement index was used to assess the degree of consistency of the extracted codes.

Also, the main researcher conducted a re-review of the codes and themes after the coding stage to ensure the coherence and accuracy of the analysis process. To increase transparency, examples of initial codes and organizing themes have been presented as examples in the findings section.

These measures have significantly contributed to enhancing the reliability and trustworthiness of the research results.

The analytical process undertaken has provided a basis for producing well-founded and reliable findings and has been able to extract and interpret the key themes and semantic structures related to the securitization of women from the statements of the Supreme Leader.

The research data have been collected from the statements of the Supreme Leader in the form of the following speeches:

Row	Audience of the Statements	Date
1	Statements at the gathering of Khuzestan women	20/12/1375 (March 10, 1997)
2	Statements in a meeting with various groups of women on the eve of the birth of Lady Zahra (peace be upon her)	27/9/1403 (December 17, 2024)
3	Statements in a meeting with members of the Women's Cultural and Social Council, a group of female medical specialists, and officials of the first Islamic Hijab Congress, on the occasion of the birth of Lady Fatimah Zahra (AS)	4/10/1370 (December 25, 1991)
4	Statements in a meeting with members of the Women's Cultural and Social Council	16/10/1369 (January 6, 1991)
5	Statements in a meeting with elite women	10/3/1390 (May 31, 2011)
6	Statements in a meeting with the families of the martyr commanders of Tehran province	17/2/1376 (May 7, 1997)
7	Statements in a meeting with a large group of women	30/6/1379 (September 20,

Row	Audience of the Statements	Date
		2000)
8	Statements in a meeting with a group of female doctors from across the country	26/10/1368 (January 16, 1990)
9	Statements in a meeting with elite women	1/3/1390 (May 22, 2011)
10	Statements in a meeting with a group of female Quran researchers of the country	28/7/1388 (October 20, 2009)
11	Statements in a meeting with the President and members of the cabinet	2/6/1387 (August 23, 2008)
12	Statements in a meeting with a group of elite women on the eve of the birth anniversary of Lady Zahra (AS)	1/4/1386 (June 22, 2007)
13	Statements in a meeting with a large group of women	30/6/1379 (September 20, 2000)
14	Statements in a meeting with a group of women on the occasion of the blessed birth of Lady Zahra (AS) and Women's Day	25/9/1371 (December 16, 1992)
15	Statements in a meeting with a group of elite women on the eve of the birth anniversary of Lady Zahra (AS)	13/4/1386 (July 4, 2007)
16	Statements in a meeting with a group of nurses	20/7/1373 (October 12, 1994)
17	Statements in a meeting with eulogists on the occasion of the birth of Lady Fatima (AS)	17/5/1383 (August 7, 2004)
18	Statements on the anniversary of the birth of Lady Fatima Zahra	5/5/1384 (July

Row	Audience of the Statements	Date
	(AS)	27, 2005)
19	Statements at the grand gathering of women at Azadi Stadium on the occasion of the Kowsar birth celebration	30/7/1373 (October 22, 1994)
20	Statements in a meeting with the organizers of the second national congress in commemoration of the martyrs of Hamedan	5/7/1402 (September 27, 2023)
21	Statements in a video conference with eulogists	15/11/1399 (February 3, 2021)
22	Statements in a gathering of women	29/2/1392 (May 19, 2013)
23	Statements in a meeting with various groups of women	6/10/1402 (December 27, 2023)
24	Statements in a meeting with various groups of women	14/10/1401 (January 4, 2023)
25	Statements in a meeting with women	30/6/1379 (September 20, 2000)
26	Message to the seminar on the personality of women from the perspective of Imam Khomeini (may his secret be sanctified)	3/8/1368 (October 25, 1989)
27	Message to the great Hajj congress	8/11/1382 (January 29, 2004)

7. Findings

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
The family as a golden opportunity for self-building and alter-building (other-formation)	The educational and constructive role of women in the family	Realizing the securitization of women through the equality of men and women in achieving a pure life, women playing a pivotal role in family education and transmitting cultural identity, active participation in social, political, and scientific arenas, strengthening the economic and legal independence of women, modeling after Lady Zahra (AS), consciously confronting the instrumental policies of the West, preserving hijab as a factor of social security, and effective presence in macro decision-making processes.
The social duties of men and women are the same, but the roles are different	Shared social duties, different roles	
Jihad is obligatory for both men and women, but its form is different		
The role of women in the Holy Defense is equal to and sometimes superior to that of men	Women's participation in jihad and social arenas	
Enjoining good and forbidding evil is obligatory for both men and women	Shared social duties, different roles	
Division of roles between men and women in social and family arenas		
Islam's view of women is progressive and just	The progressive and just view of Islam towards women	
Scientific and specialized achievements of women in the Islamic system	Scientific and specialized achievements of women in the Islamic system	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
Women are present at the highest levels of science, jurisprudence, and philosophy		
Existence of female scientific and religious role models in Iranian-Islamic history		
The progress of women is a source of pride for the Islamic system		
The pioneering role of women in the spiritual movement and proximity to God	The pioneering role of women in spirituality and divine proximity	
Equality of women and men in spiritual and human values		
Breaking the idol of patriarchy in social and political arenas	The formalization of women's political and social roles in Islam	
Formalization of the right of allegiance for women in Islamic governance		
Equality of women and men in social and political responsibility		
Emphasis on the dignity and authenticity of	The inherent dignity and original status of women	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
womanhood as an intrinsic value	in Islam	
Shared responsibility of women and men in the progress of society	The shared responsibility of women and men in advancing society	
Equal role of men and women in designing and managing social and economic affairs		
The right to ownership and economic independence for women in Islam	Economic independence and financial rights of women in Islam	
The right to choose a spouse as an inalienable right for women	The right to choose and independence in women's decision-making	
The pivotal role of women in managing the family and raising children	The pivotal role of women in the family and child-rearing	
The role of women in transmitting culture and religious values to the next generation		
Partnership of men and women in the family based on respect and justice	Participation and justice in the relationship between men and women in the family	
Balance and equilibrium		

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
in the rights of men and women in the family		
Rejection of the absolute subservience of women to men and emphasis on mutual participation		
Women's own responsibility in realizing their original status and dignity	Women's individual responsibility in realizing their original status	
Women's familiarity with the Quran and its impact on raising children and society	The impact of women's familiarity with the Quran on raising a generation and society	
The need to rewrite and review the Islamic perspective on the dignity of women	Reviewing and rewriting the Islamic perspective on women and their dignity	
Promoting the spiritual and moral growth of women as a social necessity	Promoting the spiritual and moral growth of women	
The necessity of reforming laws related to the rights of women and men	The necessity of reforming and implementing supportive laws for women	
Legal and strict dealing with violations of women's rights		

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
The need for legal and executive support to realize women's rights in the family		
Emulating Lady Zahra (AS) in cognitive, moral, and social dimensions	Emulating Lady Zahra (AS) in moral and social dimensions	
The role of men's moral refinement in establishing justice in the family	The role of men's ethical conduct in achieving family justice	
The wise use of others' experiences and the rejection of ignorant imitation	The conscious and wise use of the experiences of others	
Acquiring knowledge and specialization for women as a religious and social obligation	The obligation of acquiring knowledge and specialization for women	
Women's responsibility in recognizing and defending their Islamic dignity	Women's responsibility in defending their Islamic dignity	
Not surrendering to the seduction of Western culture and its instrumental view of women	Countering the Western instrumental culture towards women	
Distinguishing between the status of women and		

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
the instrumental view of women in Western culture		
Eliminating false Western cultural beliefs about hijab and fashion	Cultural reconstruction and eliminating false Western beliefs	
The role of women in changing social culture through cultural and intellectual work		
Reforming consumption patterns and avoiding extreme consumerism	Reforming consumption patterns and combating extreme consumerism	
Adopting an active stance on the issue of women, human rights, and freedom	An active and assertive stance against the West's approach to women	
Challenging the West on the issue of women's rights and their dignity		
Standing against the humiliating logic of the West on the issue of women		
An offensive spirit in defending Islamic values regarding women		
Holding the West accountable for the		

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
historical humiliation of women		
A precise and complete understanding of Islam's view on women	A complete and comprehensive understanding of Islam's view on women	
The role of historical female role models like Lady Zahra (AS) in the Islamic system	The role of historical female role models in the Islamic system	
The role of women in the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the Holy Defense	The role of women in the victory of the revolution and the Holy Defense	
Women's participation in social and political arenas while preserving innate characteristics	Women's participation in social and political arenas	
The impact of women's faith and patience in advancing the goals of Islamic society	The impact of women's patience and faith in achieving the goals of Islamic society	
The lofty identity of the Islamic woman as a global model	The Islamic identity of women as a global model	
Muslim women as role models for other women in the world		
The advancement of		

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
women in spiritual, political, and social arenas while preserving female identity	women in spiritual, political, and social arenas	
The role of martyrs' mothers in the resilience and victory of Islamic society	The role of mothers in the resilience and victory of Islamic society	
The necessity for women to act based on the model of Lady Fatima Zahra (AS)	Emulating Lady Fatima Zahra (AS)	
The destruction of the family foundation through extreme sexual freedoms	Countering Western policies of humiliating and corrupting women	
Western policy on the issue of women is based on profiteering and hedonism		
The necessity of women's active participation in the fundamental destinies of the country	Women's participation in the fundamental destinies of the country	
The role of women in childbearing and raising the next generation	The pivotal role of women in childbearing and raising the next generation	
Islam's sensitivity	Preventing the pitfalls of	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
towards the pitfalls of sexual attraction	sexual attraction	
The role of hijab as a factor of security and social protection	Hijab as a factor of security and social protection	
The role of women in elections as an effective factor in guiding society	The effective role of women in electoral and political processes	
Utilizing the capacity of wise women in macro-level decision-making and policy-making	The presence of women in macro-level decision-making and policy-making in the country	
Avoiding following the Western view on the issue of gender	Avoiding the Western view on the issue of gender and women	
Exposing the catastrophic nature of the Western cultural view of women		
The role of mothers in transmitting national identity and cultural values		
Faith and morals as a growth that is transmitted from mother to child	The faithful and moral upbringing of the next generation by women	
The role of women in the faithful upbringing of the next generation		
The obligation of hijab as	The religious obligation	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
a religious necessity	and protective role of hijab	
The role of women in resisting the onslaught against hijab		
The necessity of strengthening laws to prevent injustice against women in the family	Strengthening laws to prevent injustice against women	
Paying attention to the capacities of female seminary students in cultural and social affairs	Utilizing the capacities of female seminary students in cultural and social affairs	
Women as successful commanders and managers in sensitive situations	The leadership and managerial role of women in sensitive situations	
Avoiding waste and supporting domestic production as a social responsibility	The social responsibility of women in supporting national production and avoiding waste	
Women's participation in commanding good and forbidding bad	Women's participation in commanding good and forbidding bad	
The role of women in scientific, cultural, and social arenas	The role of women in advancing scientific, cultural, and social arenas	
Honoring the mothers and wives of martyrs as unparalleled role models	Honoring and emulating the mothers and wives of martyrs	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
ﻥThe role of the family as a human-building educational base	The family as the main center for human education	
The third model of the revolutionary Muslim woman as a global model	The Islamic identity of women as a global model	
Muslim women as role models for women in other societies		
The importance of facilitating marriage as a social necessity	Facilitating marriage and solving the population issue	
The role of women in solving the population issue and increasing fertility		
The place of the family in cyberspace and its impact on raising a generation	Managing cyberspace to preserve the family foundation	
The necessity of employing capable women in the decision-making and policy-making ranks of the country	Employing capable women in decision-making and policy-making	
Lady Zahra (AS) as the perfect model of a Muslim woman in all aspects of life	Lady Zahra (AS) as the perfect model of a Muslim woman	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
Western policies on the issue of women are based on political and colonial interference	Criticizing the colonial and hypocritical policies of the West on the issue of women	
Criticizing the hypocrisy and dishonesty of the West on the issue of women's rights		
The issue of couplehood as the basis of the family in Islamic thought	The issue of couplehood as the foundation of the family in Islamic thought	
The family as the third and fundamental unit of society	The family as the fundamental unit of society and transmitter of culture	
The family as the third and fundamental unit of society		
The equality of men and women on the path to achieving a pure life	The equality of men and women in achieving perfection and a pure life	
Equal intellectual and spiritual talents in men and women	The equal intellectual and spiritual abilities of men and women	
The obligation of women's participation in scientific, political, economic, and cultural arenas	Women's participation in scientific, political, economic, and cultural arenas	
The difference in the	The difference in the roles	

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
roles of men and women in the family without one being superior to the other	of men and women in the family without one being superior to the other	
The equality of the rights of men and women in the family according to the Quran		
Emphasis on the importance of the emotional role of women in the family	The emotional role of women in the peace and upbringing of the family	
The role of women as a manifestation of peace in the family		
The importance of maintaining boundaries in the interaction between men and women based on Islamic teachings	The importance of maintaining boundaries in the interaction between men and women	
Motherhood as a spiritual and honorable value for women	Motherhood as an honorable and spiritual role for women	
The status of the mother as the axis of transmitting culture and identity		
The necessity of honoring and respecting mothers in society		

Initial Codes (Basic Themes)	Organizing Themes	Overarching Theme
The effective presence of women in social, political, and scientific arenas after the Islamic Revolution	The effective presence of women in social arenas after the Islamic Revolution	
The progress of women in scientific, cultural, and social fields thanks to the Islamic Revolution		
The enemy's soft war to divert women from Islamic values	Countering the enemy's soft war against the Islamic values of women	
The duty of women to counter the enemy's soft war and preserve values		

7.1. Discussion and Analysis

In this research, thematic analysis was conducted based on the overarching themes extracted from the statements of the Supreme Leader.

The overarching themes, as the main structures of the analysis, specify the relationships between concepts and provide a framework for explaining the role of women in securitization and national order.

Initial Conceptual Model of Overarching Themes: Based on the thematic analysis, five overarching themes were extracted from the statements of the Supreme Leader regarding the role of women in securitization and Islamic civilization-building:

- Individual Construct; Modern Self-Building;
- Familial Construct; Motherly Alter-Building (Other-Formation);
- Socio-Cultural Construct; Security-Inducing Society-Building;
- Economic Construct; Correct Economic Behavior;

- Political-Civilizational Construct; Women's Civilizational Responsibility.

These overarching themes represent the conceptual model of women's role in securitization from the perspective of the Supreme Leader, and in the following, each of these themes is explained and analyzed with reference to his statements.

7.1.1. Individual Construct; Modern Self-Building

1) Basic Themes

Preserving chastity, hijab, and honor as models of Islamic identity;

Emphasis on the independence of women and not resembling men;

Strengthening faith and moral refinement as a prerequisite for individual growth;

Participation in scientific and spiritual activities.

2) Organizing Theme

The necessity of women's individual growth within the framework of an Islamic and spirituality-centered identity.

3) Overarching Theme

Realizing the securitization of women through the equality of men and women in achieving a pure life, women playing a pivotal role in family education and transmitting cultural identity, active participation in social, political, and scientific arenas, strengthening the economic and legal independence of women, modeling after Lady Zahra (AS), consciously confronting the instrumental policies of the West, preserving hijab as a factor of social security, and effective presence in macro decision-making processes.

4) Analysis

The Supreme Leader has introduced the self-building of Muslim women as one of the requirements for individual and social securitization.

Based on this view, a Muslim woman must progress in spiritual, moral, scientific, and social fields, while preserving her religious identity and chastity. This not only helps to elevate her individual personality but also has a direct impact on culture-building and social security. He states: "A Muslim woman must preserve her religion, her hijab, and her chastity and progress in the field of science and research." (Supreme Leader, 13/4/1386) He also said: "If women

become familiar with the Quran, many of society's problems will be solved." (Supreme Leader, 28/7/1388) This viewpoint shows that women's self-building is not only an individual responsibility but also a social strategy for promoting security and cultural stability.

The Supreme Leader's emphasis on the link between scientific progress and the preservation of religious identity indicates that social security is achieved by strengthening the intellectual and spiritual foundations of women.

7.1.2. Familial Construct; Motherly Alter-Building (Other-Formation)

1) Basic Themes

The role of motherhood as the supreme role in raising children;

Creating peace and psychological security in the family;

Transmitting culture, faith, and morals to the next generation;

Strengthening the spirit of patience and resilience in family responsibilities.

2) Organizing Theme

Family-centeredness as the hub of generational upbringing and social securitization.

3) Overarching Theme

Realizing the securitization of women through the equality of men and women in achieving a pure life, women playing a pivotal role in family education and transmitting cultural identity, active participation in social, political, and scientific arenas, strengthening the economic and legal independence of women, modeling after Lady Zahra (AS), consciously confronting the instrumental policies of the West, preserving hijab as a factor of social security, and effective presence in macro decision-making processes.

4) Analysis

The Supreme Leader has introduced the family as the main axis of social securitization.

The role of motherhood, in this context, is recognized as the most fundamental factor in raising faithful children and transmitting cultural values. Also, women, with their patience and resilience in managing family challenges, create a solid foundation for emotional and social security. He states: "The woman is the great one of the house; the peace and tranquility of the family space is due to the blessing of the woman." (Supreme Leader, 25/9/1371)

He also said: "Mothers are the cultivators of faithful children, and this is the art of woman."
(Supreme Leader, 20/12/1375)

This viewpoint indicates that social security begins with the family, and women, by playing their central role in raising children and managing the family's emotions, form the foundation of social cohesion.

The Supreme Leader's emphasis on the role of mothers in raising a faithful generation committed to Islamic values indicates that sustainable security is not possible without strengthening the institution of the family and the active presence of women in this arena.

From this perspective, empowering women in the cultural and educational fields is considered a key strategy for consolidating social security.

7.1.3. Socio-Cultural Construct; Security-Inducing Society-Building

1) Basic Themes

The obligation of shared duties (commanding good and forbidding bad);

Hijab as a factor of social security;

The effective presence of women in decision-making and cultural processes; Countering propaganda for homosexuality and deviant cultures;

Raising a security-building generation.

2) Organizing Theme

A woman's role-playing in the cultural and social construction of Islamic society.

3) Overarching Theme

Realizing the securitization of women through the equality of men and women in achieving a pure life, women playing a pivotal role in family education and transmitting cultural identity, active participation in social, political, and scientific arenas, strengthening the economic and legal independence of women, modeling after Lady Zahra (AS), consciously confronting the instrumental policies of the West, preserving hijab as a factor of social security, and effective presence in macro decision-making processes.

4) Analysis

The Supreme Leader has introduced women as key agents in social securitization.

He emphasizes the necessity of women's participation in cultural and social activities and introduces hijab not only as a factor for preserving individual security but also as a platform for social security.

In addition, the role of women in countering deviant propaganda and raising a security-building generation is an essential part of this process.

He states: "In the social, political, and cultural arenas, the Muslim woman must be a model for others." (Supreme Leader, 17/5/1383)

He also said: "Hijab is a religious necessity that brings about social security." (Supreme Leader, 14/10/1401)

This view shows that social security depends on the conscious presence and active role-playing of women in the cultural and social fields.

The Supreme Leader's emphasis on the responsibility of women in role-modeling and countering deviant propaganda indicates that security is strengthened not only through formal structures but also through social participation and the cultural commitment of women. From this perspective, the hijab and Islamic identity of women are considered not only as an individual factor but also as a tool for maintaining social cohesion and countering cultural threats.

7.1.4. Economic Construct; Correct Economic Behavior

1) Basic Themes

Managing consumption and preventing wastefulness;
Strengthening the national economy through the consumption of Iranian goods;
Promoting a spirit of production in the family.

2) Organizing Theme

Encouraging Islamic and production-oriented economic behavior.

3) Overarching Theme

Realizing the securitization of women through the equality of men and women in achieving a pure life, women playing a pivotal role in family education and transmitting cultural identity, active participation in social, political, and scientific arenas, strengthening the economic and legal independence of women, modeling after Lady Zahra (AS), consciously confronting the

instrumental policies of the West, preserving hijab as a factor of social security, and effective presence in macro decision-making processes.

4) Analysis

The Supreme Leader considers economic management as one of the important duties of women in line with familial and national securitization.

Women play a key role in the economic stability of the family and society by managing consumption correctly and avoiding consumerism.

Also, the emphasis on consuming Iranian goods and promoting a culture of production are other key focuses in his statements.

He states: "Consuming Iranian goods and avoiding unnecessary luxuries is a national and religious duty." (Supreme Leader, 1/1/1394)

He also said: "Women can help the national economy with proper management in the family." (Supreme Leader, 30/7/1376)

This viewpoint shows that the role of women in securitization is not limited to social and cultural dimensions, but that managing the family's economy and promoting a correct consumption model are also part of this responsibility.

The Supreme Leader's emphasis on avoiding consumerism and supporting national production indicates that women can play a role not only in the economic sustainability of the family but also in making the national economy resilient by reforming their lifestyle. From this perspective, empowering women in the field of economic literacy and raising awareness about the consequences of consumption patterns is considered a key factor in the country's economic security.

7.1.5. Political-Civilizational Construct; Women's Civilizational Responsibility

1) Basic Themes

Participation in the fundamental destinies of the country;

The role of women in raising a resilient and civilization-building generation;

Confronting the instrumental policies of the West.

2) Organizing Theme

The role of women in Islamic civilization-building.

3) Overarching Theme

Realizing the securitization of women through the equality of men and women in achieving a pure life, women playing a pivotal role in family education and transmitting cultural identity, active participation in social, political, and scientific arenas, strengthening the economic and legal independence of women, modeling after Lady Zahra (AS), consciously confronting the instrumental policies of the West, preserving hijab as a factor of social security, and effective presence in macro decision-making processes.

4) Analysis

The Supreme Leader introduces women as key elements in building the new Islamic civilization. He emphasizes the necessity of women's participation in macro-level decisions and raising resilient generations.

Confronting the instrumental policies of the West is also part of this civilizational responsibility, which requires the awareness and active role-playing of women.

He states: "The Iranian Muslim woman should be proud of her lofty identity and become a model for the women of the world." (Supreme Leader, 17/5/1383) He also said: "The Muslim woman is neither a tool for misuse nor a means of enjoyment; she is an active element in the construction of Islamic civilization." (Supreme Leader, 3/8/1368)

This viewpoint shows that women have a key role not only in social securitization but also in the process of civilization-building.

The Supreme Leader's emphasis on the independent identity and lofty model of the Muslim woman indicates that the active participation of women in and macro decision-making arenas is necessary for the realization of the new Islamic civilization. Confronting the West's instrumental view of women is considered not only a cultural necessity but also a civilizational strategy that requires the awareness, self-belief, and constructive role-playing of women in Islamic societies.

7.2. The Relationship Between Different Constructs According to Basic and Organizing Themes

1) Individual and Familial Construct

Women's individual self-building through strengthening faith and morals provides the necessary ground for fulfilling the role of motherhood and raising faithful and moral children.

This link between individual self-building and motherly alter-building leads to the creation of strong, value-based families.

2) Familial and Socio-Cultural Construct

The family, as the center for raising a generation, is the foundation of social security. The mother's role in raising children with an Islamic identity has a direct impact on the cultural and social security of the society.

This relationship shows that women's social participation leads to more sustainable results by strengthening the institution of the family.

3) Socio-Cultural and Economic Construct

Social and cultural security is a basis for strengthening healthy economic behaviors. Women who have effective participation in cultural activities can play a key role in strengthening the national economy by promoting the consumption of domestic goods and managing the family economy.

4) Economic and Political-Civilizational Construct

The economic independence of women and their role in the proper management of resources helps to empower them for participation in the country's macro-level decisions. This interaction shows that correct economic behavior is the foundation of civilizational development and participation in the fundamental destinies of the country.

5) Individual and Political-Civilizational Construct

Women's individual self-building by strengthening Islamic identity and personal independence paves the way for their conscious participation in civilization-building processes and confronting global cultural challenges.

This relationship shows the importance of individual self-building in macro-level civilizational role-playing.

7.3. Presenting a Conceptual Model for the Findings

Based on the analyses performed, a conceptual model can be presented to show the relationship between the constructs and their role in the securitization of women.

This model includes five main constructs (individual, familial, socio-cultural, economic, and political-civilizational), each of which acts as an independent axis while, at the same time, playing a complementary role in interaction with the other constructs.

1) Individual Construct

This is the most fundamental level of the model, which emphasizes the self-building of women. Individual self-building strengthens the religious, moral, and scientific identity of women and prepares them to play larger roles in the family and society.

Role: Strengthening individual faith, morals, and knowledge.

Relationship: The foundation for family upbringing and social participation.

2) Familial Construct

The family axis is defined based on the role of motherhood and the alter-building (other-formation) of women. This construct plays a key role in transmitting cultural and religious values to the next generation.

Role: Raising faithful and identity-oriented children.

Relationship: The foundation of social and cultural security.

3) Socio-Cultural Construct

Social and cultural security is strengthened through the active participation of women in society and confronting cultural threats.

Role: Creating social security through the promotion of values and participation in culture-building.

Relationship: Facilitating economic behaviors and civilizational development.

4) Economic Construct

Women play an important role in economic security through managing consumption and promoting national production.

This construct helps to strengthen the financial and economic independence of women.

Role: Supporting the economy of the family and society.

Relationship: Providing the ground for women's participation in macro-level decisions.


5) Political-Civilizational Construct

It is the highest level of the model, which introduces women as civilization-building elements. This construct shows the participation of women in the fundamental destinies of the country and their role in building the new Islamic civilization.

Role: Cultural leadership and civilization-building.

Relationship: The result of the interaction of all constructs.

Diagram 1: Conceptual Model



Conclusion This research was conducted with the aim of examining the role of women in securitization from the perspective of the Supreme Leader.

The main research question was how Muslim women can play a role in national order and securitization. To answer this question, a qualitative method and thematic analysis were used, and data were collected by examining the statements of the Supreme Leader. The findings show that women, as one of the fundamental pillars of society, have an irreplaceable role in ensuring and maintaining individual, familial, social, economic, and civilizational security. In this regard, the following key points are extracted as the main results of this study:

1) Individual Securitization

The spiritual, moral, and scientific self-building of women is a prelude to their effective role-playing in other social and cultural domains.

Islamic identity and commitment to religious values are considered the main axis of women's individual security.

2) Familial Securitization

Women, as the main axis of the family, have a fundamental role in creating psychological peace, raising children, and transmitting cultural and identity values to the next generation.

3) Social and Cultural Securitization

The active presence of women in cultural and social arenas and their participation in decision-making processes pave the way for sustainable security in society.

Hijab, as a religious necessity and a factor of social security, plays an important role in this field.

4) Economic Securitization

The economic independence of women and their participation in managing the resources of the family and society is an effective factor in sustainable development and economic security.

5) Political and Civilizational Securitization

Women, as civilization-building elements, have a key role in macro decision-making processes and the new Islamic civilization-building, and their presence in the fundamental destinies of the country is inevitable.

The findings showed that the Supreme Leader considers the self-building of Muslim women in spiritual, scientific, moral, and social dimensions as one of the requirements for individual and social securitization. Based on this, the role of women in securitization extends from the individual to the civilizational level and includes strengthening the family foundation, social participation, cultural promotion, and influencing macro-security policies.

This viewpoint shows that sustainable security requires the active and conscious presence of women in society along with the preservation of religious and cultural identity.

Ultimately, the securitization of women in the sphere of national order requires serious attention to Islamic teachings, promoting the model of the Muslim woman, and adopting strategic policies based on the statements of the Supreme Leader.

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The Concept and Process of Leadership Oversight in Iran

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ABSTRACT

Objective: In the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the 1357 SH/1979 AD Revolution, the political system brought about a structural transformation in leadership accountability by establishing the institution of the Leadership (alongside the three branches of government) and abolishing the absolute immunity of the monarch. This article examines the concept, significance, and mechanisms for overseeing the Leadership and its associated institutions within the framework of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Method: The overall approach of this article is descriptive-analytical. Given the diversity of its content, three research methods have been employed: First, a comparative research method is used to analyze the foundations of political legitimacy in the theory of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) and the issue of oversight from the perspective of these foundations. The second method is used in documentary reviews, which are confined to legal subjects and legislative texts. The third method is "Discourse Analysis," which broadly governs the article. From this perspective, the oversight of the highest authority in the political system before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution is generally compared.

Results: This article analyzes the three main theories of legitimacy in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the theory of appointment (divine legitimacy), the theory of election (popular legitimacy), and the divine-popular theory (a combination of both). Despite differences in their theoretical foundations, these three perspectives emphasize the necessity of oversight over the Leadership and its associated institutions. Accordingly, the Constitution of Iran and statutory laws have provided for the necessary mechanisms for oversight.

Conclusions: This article demonstrates that, despite systematic provisions for overseeing the Leadership, the oversight system in Iran faces structural challenges. The dispersion and overlap of jurisdictions among multiple oversight institutions can lead to parallel efforts, overlapping functions, and ambiguity in responsibilities. Overcoming existing challenges is possible through strengthening coordination among oversight bodies, clarifying laws and resolving ambiguities, guaranteeing the independence of oversight institutions, utilizing new technologies, and fostering a culture of accountability.

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Introduction

The Islamic Revolution of 1357 SH/1979 AD brought about three fundamental changes in Iran's political system: first, the monarchy was replaced by a republican system; second, a secular system was transformed into a religious one; and finally, in addition to the three main branches of government, the institution of the Leader, with significant powers, was added to the structure of the state. These major changes are rare in contemporary political systems, both in comparison to other systems and to Iran's pre-1357/1979 political system.

The political system before the Revolution, which was based on a monarchy with a 2500-year history, was redefined within the framework of the Constitutional Law of 1285 SH/1906 AD, following the Constitutional Revolution. However, despite the separation of powers, the vast authority of the monarch made him absolute, and according to Article 27 of the Supplement to the Constitutional Law, the executive power was exclusively held by the monarch. Nonetheless, according to Article 44 of the Supplement to the Constitutional Law, the monarch was immune from accountability, and no oversight existed over him. The monarchy was for life and, according to Articles 36 and 37; it was hereditary, with the throne passing to the closest male relative in the royal family in the absence of a son.

Now, following the 1357 SH/1979 AD Islamic Revolution, which created extensive changes in the power structure and added the institution of the Leader to the three other branches, various issues can be raised. One of the most important issues is the oversight of the Leader and their related institutions—an issue whose absence in the previous political system is considered one of the most important factors that led to the 1357 SH/1979 AD Revolution. Therefore, given the experience of the revolutionaries in 1357 SH/1979 AD, the question arises: "Has the new political system devised a solution for overseeing political power, especially the highest political authority, the "Institution of the Leader"? This key question is the central problem addressed in this article."

Of course, other topics are raised under this main question that is important for formulating the final answer. For example, the issue of oversight from the perspective of the political legitimacy foundations of the Islamic Republic is one of them. In this regard, the theories of political system legitimacy are reviewed and the issue of oversight over the institution of the Leader is analyzed from the perspective of these theories. The next important step is to examine whether and how oversight over the Leader is addressed in the legal structure of the Islamic Republic, including the Constitution and other laws. The article concludes with an

analysis of the challenges of overseeing the Leader in the political system of the Islamic Republic.

1. Research Background

Academic written works published directly on the oversight of the Leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran are very limited, consisting of one book and two articles. There are, of course, non-academic works such as interviews, short notes, and chapters or sections of other works that address the topic of leadership oversight, which are not listed here but were used in the preparation of this article.

1.1. Books

The only book published on this subject is "The Selection and Oversight of the Leader in the System of the Islamic Republic of Iran" by Hossein Javan Arasteh, published in 2009 AD/1388 SH, which has also reached its second edition. As the title suggests, this book focuses on the selection of the Leader and their oversight by the Assembly of Experts. The author analyzes how the Leader is selected from the perspective of the theories of appointment and election but does not express the views of these two theories on oversight. It examines the oversight of the Assembly of Experts in two scopes: a minimal scope (oversight over the continuity of the Leader's criteria and attributes) and a maximal scope (oversight over the organizations under the Leader's supervision). Other topics in the book include the judiciary's duty to oversee the Leader's assets according to Article 142 of the Constitution, the trial of the Leader if necessary according to Article 107, and the possibility of the Islamic Consultative Assembly's oversight over the Leader according to Article 76, which grants it the right to investigate and scrutinize all affairs of the country. The lack of a review and analysis of other important oversight capacities that exist in the Constitution is one of the shortcomings of this book.

1.2. Articles

- "Oversight of Institutions under the Leader's Supervision in the Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran." (2018 AD/1397 SH) This article examines the authority of various oversight bodies over institutions under the Leader's supervision and emphasizes that no institution is completely exempt from oversight. With a legal approach, the authors try to resolve the ambiguities in this area and show that oversight mechanisms also exist for these institutions. As its title indicates, this work

focuses on a specific topic and cannot be expected to address all aspects of the oversight of the Leader.

- "The Assembly of Experts and Oversight: A Jurisprudential-Legal Review of the Role of the Assembly of Experts in Overseeing the Leader." (1999 AD/1378 SH) This article answers four fundamental questions about leadership oversight. First, is the religious leadership subject to oversight? The author answers in the affirmative from a Shi'ite perspective, using narrative sources, without considering the theoretical and political foundations of the theory of *Velayat-e Faqih*. Second, can oversight over the Leader be institutionalized? This question seems unjustified because the third question is its own answer. In any case, the author uses some of the answers provided for the first question to answer the second and considers institutionalization not only possible but necessary. Third, has the Constitution provided for oversight of the Leader? The author cites the oversight of the Assembly of Experts, which is enshrined in Article 111, as the answer to this question. And finally, what is the role of the Assembly of Experts in this oversight? In response, the author discusses the debate on the oversight of the Assembly of Experts in two scopes: minimal and maximal. One of the shortcomings of works on the oversight of the Leader in the Islamic Republic is the lack of attention to the views of the theories of *Velayat-e Faqih* on the subject of oversight, which this article addresses as an innovation. Another point not seen in other works, which this article tries to include for non-Persian-speaking readers, is addressing all aspects of the topic of leadership oversight in the Islamic Republic. These include: "A comparison of the highest political authority before and after the 1979 Revolution from the perspective of the scope of powers and oversight, an introduction to the institution of the Leader in the Islamic Republic, the foundations of this institution's legitimacy and the differences in this regard, an analysis of the issue of oversight from the perspective of these theories, and finally, how the Leader is overseen, both by the body that elects the Leader, the Assembly of Experts, and by other governmental bodies belonging to the legislative, judicial, and even executive branches." The article concludes by addressing the challenging aspects of leadership oversight.

2. Research Methodology

The overall approach of the article is descriptive-analytical, and given the diversity of the content, three research methods have been used. The first is the comparative research method, used to analyze the foundations of the political legitimacy of the theory of *Velayat-e Faqih* and the issue of oversight from the perspective of these foundations. Among the two comparative methods, "Causal" and "Descriptive" (Costello, 2023), the descriptive comparative method has been used in this article. Key variables such as divine legitimacy, popular legitimacy, minimal oversight, and maximal oversight were considered to highlight the similarities and differences between the various theories. The second method was used in the documentary reviews, which are limited to legal topics and legal texts. Among the multiple and complex methods of this research, the "Textualism and literal interpretation" method has been used. This approach prioritizes the plain, ordinary, or literal meaning of words in legal texts as they would have been understood at the time of enactment. This method is based on the assumption that the legislature's intent aligns with the public's understanding of the language, and it is especially important for constitutional norms because the constitution is a product of the people's choice and should be accessible to them (Nunes Madeira, 2024). In this article, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supplement to the Constitutional Law, ordinary laws, and the detailed records of the proceedings of the Final Review Assembly of the Constitution (1985 AD/1364 SH) and the Constitutional Review Council (1990 AD/1369 SH) have been analyzed using this method. The third method is "Discourse Analysis," which broadly governs the article. From this perspective, the way the highest authority of the political system was overseen before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution is compared in general terms. The data collection method is library-based and involves legal documents, specifically constitutional law. The discussion begins with an introduction to the institution of the Leader in the Islamic Republic.

3. The Institution of the Leader in the Islamic Republic

The Leader in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the most important political authority in the country. According to Article 5 of the Constitution, this position holds the "Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and Leadership of the Community" during the absence of the 12th Imam, appointing a just, pious, well-informed, courageous, resourceful, and capable

jurist. According to Article 107, the Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts, who are themselves elected by the people. The qualifications and attributes of the Leader, based on Article 109, include the necessary scholarly and spiritual qualifications for religious jurisprudence and authority, sound political and social insight, resourcefulness, courage, management skills, and sufficient power for leadership. If there are multiple qualified individuals, the one with stronger jurisprudential and political insight takes precedence.

The duties and powers of the Leader are outlined in Article 110 of the Constitution as follows: "Determining the general policies of the system after consultation with the Expediency Discernment Council, overseeing the proper implementation of these policies, commanding the armed forces, declaring war and peace, and mobilizing forces, appointing and dismissing the jurists of the Guardian Council, the head of the judiciary, the head of the state radio and television organization, and high-ranking military and law enforcement commanders, resolving disputes and regulating relations between the three branches of government, resolving systemic problems through the Expediency Discernment Council, signing the presidential decree after a popular election and the approval of the candidates' qualifications, dismissing the president after a ruling by the Supreme Court for legal violations or a vote of no confidence by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and pardoning or commuting the sentences of convicted individuals. The Leader can delegate some of their duties and powers to another person."

According to Article 107, the Leader is equal to all other citizens of the country before the law. According to Article 111, whenever the Leader becomes unable to perform their legal duties or loses any of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it is discovered that they lacked some of the qualifications from the beginning, they will be removed from office. In case of dismissal by the Assembly of Experts or inability to perform duties, a council will temporarily take over their responsibilities. Thus, unlike the previous political system, the leadership is neither for life nor hereditary, and their dismissal by the Assembly of Experts, which is elected by the people, is also provided for. In addition to the Assembly of Experts, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic provides for other ways to oversee the Leader and related institutions. We will first discuss the importance and objectives of oversight over the Leader.

4. Importance and Objectives of Oversight

Oversight of the Leader and any other political institution is carried out with at least two objectives: "To increase efficiency, and second, to increase political legitimacy." We will discuss each of these two objectives in turn.

4.1. Efficiency

The concept of oversight of political power is a fundamental topic in political philosophy. In this context, oversight is defined as an activity that compares "What is" with "What should be" (Izadi, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 214-216). Effective oversight, by increasing transparency and reducing corruption, directly contributes to the efficiency of the political system. This improves the quality of public services by making officials accountable for their performance. The modern purpose of oversight goes beyond merely controlling and restraining the power of rulers; it emphasizes increasing the efficiency of the behaviors and actions of government officials. This approach considers oversight not just as a tool for discovering violations but as a strategic mechanism for optimizing the performance of political systems and ensuring alignment with public expectations and legal standards. It seeks continuous and proactive improvement.

The efficiency of any political system is defined and evaluated based on its specific value framework. Oversight of the performance of various institutions, including the Leader, is a tool for upholding legal principles and ensuring the accountability of high-ranking officials to oversight bodies and the people. This oversight, especially in areas that directly affect people's lives (such as judicial, economic, and defense policies), plays a vital role in maintaining public trust. In Iran's political system, oversight, particularly by an institution like the Assembly of Experts, is the backbone that paves the way for its increased efficiency and stability.

4.2. Legitimacy

Political legitimacy, the cornerstone of governmental stability, can be analyzed from two perspectives: the philosophy of governance (normative-legal) and the sociology of power (empirical-public acceptance). In the second or functional aspect, citizen satisfaction is the

criterion for legitimacy. Citizens pay more attention to the impact of rulers' decisions on their social, economic, and cultural lives (Bashiriyeh, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 17-19). This view links legitimacy to political efficiency. Increasing government efficiency, which is a result of effective oversight, directly helps strengthen political legitimacy (Shafi'i Far et al., 2016 AD/1395 SH: 192-194). Seymour Martin Lipset defines efficiency as "The system's actual performance or ability to fulfill the basic functions of a government." (Lipset, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 10) Increasing efficiency leads to greater public satisfaction and, consequently, greater legitimacy. A system may have normative legitimacy but lack popularity (non-normative legitimacy), or vice versa.

In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, oversight of the Leader encompasses both normative and functional legitimacy. The Leader's normative legitimacy stems from the "Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and Leadership of the Community" and specific qualifications (Article 5 of the Constitution). The Assembly of Experts, which is elected by the people, selects the Leader based on these qualifications and oversees the maintenance of them (Articles 107 and 109 of the Constitution). Although the initial legitimacy is normative, its survival and strengthening also depend on efficiency. The Leader's duties, such as "Determining the general policies of the system" and "Overseeing their proper implementation" (Article 110 of the Constitution), directly affect the government's performance. The oversight of the Assembly of Experts on the Leader's "Political and social insight, resourcefulness, courage, and management" (Article 109 of the Constitution) implicitly refers to his ability to manage the country. If these conditions are lost, the Leader is dismissed by the Assembly of Experts (Article 111 of the Constitution), which indirectly strengthens the system's accountability and functional legitimacy. Therefore, oversight of the Leader in Iran has a deep connection to both normative legitimacy (adherence to principles) and functional legitimacy (impact on public needs).

5. Theoretical Foundations of Oversight over the Leader and Related Institutions

Disagreement over the oversight mechanisms for the leadership structure and governmental institutions has always been at the center of academic disputes and contemporary political discourse. These analytical conflicts are rooted in fundamental differences in various interpretations and understandings of the concept of "Political Legitimacy" in political

systems and, of course, in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Given this intellectual challenge, we will first attempt to re-examine the theoretical foundations of legitimacy in this political system.

5.1. Different Theories on the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The concept of legitimacy, which comes from the word "Legitimacy" and the Latin root "Lex" or "Leg" meaning law, expresses the legality of a political system. Such an interpretation of "Political Legitimacy" provides a basis for the rational justification of the ruler's exercise of power (Larijani, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 51). In this aspect of legitimacy, because a political system has political, religious, and secular presuppositions, it addresses fundamental questions such as what a government is, whether a government is necessary, what the scope of government's authority is, what the types of governments are, who should rule and with what characteristics, and what their duties and responsibilities are. The answers to these questions are influenced by the value system on which the foundations of political philosophy are based. In religious systems, in addition to political philosophy, political theology and political jurisprudence also play a decisive role in answering these questions (Hatami, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 14).

In a religious system like the Islamic Republic, according to the theory of *Velayat-e Faqih*, the normative legitimacy of the political system is conditioned on the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader, and it is he who, through the Guardian Council, the endorsement of the presidential decree, and the appointment of the highest judicial authority, grants legitimacy to the three branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial. The selection of the Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts is also based on criteria, some of which are derived from religious values, such as jurisprudence and justice (Javadi Amoli, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 137-138). On the other hand, in this aspect of the political system's legitimacy, one cannot ignore the role of popular acceptance and only suffice with the normative criteria explained and described in political philosophy or political theology and jurisprudence, because these people must be ruled.

Given this introduction, which bases legitimacy in the Islamic Republic on religious criteria and popular acceptance, three narratives of the foundation of legitimacy can be assumed, which have been produced in political literature so far: the theory based on divine legitimacy,

the theory based on popular legitimacy, and the theory based on divine-popular legitimacy. We will explain them in order.¹

5.1.1. The Theory of Appointment

The theory of appointment, as one of the oldest theories of political legitimacy in Shi'a thought, is based on the belief that the legitimacy of government is granted by God Almighty. According to this view, the right to rule fundamentally belongs to God, and any human authority must originate from divine permission and authorization. This theory, by emphasizing the existential and legislative guardianship of God, considers legitimacy to be a divine matter and not merely arising from the will and desire of the people. This view challenges theories of legitimacy based on the mere will of humans and seeks the source of political power in the divine realm.

The antiquity of the theory of appointment can perhaps be traced to the opinions and views of well-known Shi'ite jurists during the Great Occultation. Kulayni (873-941 AD/250-319 AH) and Shaykh Saduq (906-980 AD/296-370 AH) were the first famous Shi'ite jurists, who were more like narrators of traditions, to collect and categorize the traditions received from the Prophet (PBUH) and the Shi'a Imams (AS). Of course, in this categorization, they enumerated duties and rights for Shi'a jurists regarding the affairs of guardianship and imamate in the era of Occultation, which had just begun, such as paying the *Khums*, leadership over spoils of war, establishing Friday prayers, and the recourse of believers to jurists for judgment instead of to the judges of the oppressive government, among other things. In this categorization, despite the discretion that was necessary during the rule of the Abbasids, the political purpose is clear, but they preferred to provide reference books for subsequent generations of Shi'ites without going into detail² (Alimohammadi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 18-20).

Shaykh Mufid (942-1010 AD/323-401 AH) is the first jurist who, with a correct and realistic understanding of the era of the Great Occultation, explicitly addressed the issue of the jurist's deputyship from the impeccable Imam (AS) (Mufid, 1992 AD/1413 AH: 675). After him,

¹. Since the subject of this article is the issue of oversight of the Supreme Leader and related institutions, we will briefly address the theoretical foundations of the legitimacy of the Velayat-e Faqih theory, only to show how the issue of oversight is viewed from these three perspectives.

². "*Uṣūl Kāfī*" by Kulaynī and "*Man Lā Yaḥḍuruḥu al-Faqīh*" by Ṣadūq are two of the four major Shia Hadith books, which, after the Quran, are considered the primary source of Shia beliefs and laws."

other Shi'ite jurists until the Constitutional Revolution entered this topic with relatively similar theological, jurisprudential, and rational arguments, and they are implicitly considered to be proponents of the theory of appointment. This is because until the Constitutional Revolution, there was no notion of the practical participation of Shi'ite jurists in a government where the will of the people had a serious effect on its establishment and continuation.

However, from then on, Ayatollah Na'ini (1862-1936 AD/1239-1315 SH), by confirming the role of the people in the form of a consultative assembly in a government that jurists oversee, brought about a transformation in the theory of appointment. As a result, some have considered him a supporter of the theory of appointment (Khosropanah, 2004 AD/1383 SH) and others a supporter of the theory of election (Firahi, 2016 AD/1395 SH). With the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the duality of "Appointment" and "Election" was raised more than ever in the debates related to the foundations of the political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Here, without intending to enter into these debates, we will briefly discuss the views of one of the most famous proponents of the theory of appointment in the present era, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, with respect to the main purpose of this article.

He begins the discussion on the foundation of the legitimacy of the *Velayat-e Faqih* by raising the topic of "Legitimacy". In his view, in both ancient democracies, such as the Greek city-states, and new democracies, the opinion of the majority of the people is the basis of legitimacy and popular acceptance. When the people accept someone, the government is legitimate and legal. He raises numerous criticisms of the mentioned theory, some of which are based on the oppression of the minority by the majority (Mesbah Yazdi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 1, 24-26).

He then considers God, who is the creator of man, to be the best and most superior source for enacting laws, and the most rational way to explain the legitimacy of earthly rule is to submit to the rule of prophets and divine saints, because they have been appointed by the Lord. God is not only the existential Lord but also the legislative Lord, and this is a necessary belief for a Muslim. Therefore, the requirement of God's legislative Lordship dictates that the management of society and government should be in the hands of those appointed by God. During the Occultation, this duty falls to the jurists of Islam (Mesbah Yazdi, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 56-57).

Ayatollah Mesbah, by raising the necessity of government to prevent chaos, provides rational arguments to prove the "Most prudent government" is in the hands of a jurist. He also

considers the narrative arguments to be valid. In this path, the continuity of Islamic rulings from a Muslim's perspective leads to the rule of the most competent person during the Occultation, namely the jurist with all the necessary qualifications, who is the most competent person in implementing the rulings of Islam (Mesbah Yazdi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 187-203).

The appointment of jurists by the Impeccable Imams (PBUH) is a general appointment and does not specify a particular individual, but rather enumerates attributes. In Mesbah Yazdi's view, the selection of the jurist by the Assembly of Experts is merely an act of discovery and nothing more. That is, the jurist gains authority and legitimacy through appointment by God and the Impeccable Imams (PBUH), and our duty is to discover and identify the qualified jurist (Mesbah Yazdi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 217-218). However, in his view, the jurist in the very establishment of his government never resorts to force or coercion, but like all prophets and imams, he will only form a government if the people themselves show a desire for his rule (Mesbah Yazdi, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 73-74).

5.1.2. The Theory of Election

This theory, like the theory of appointment, believes in the general appointment of jurists by the Imams (AS) during the Occultation, but considers it only a suggestion to the believers. The beginning of this theory goes back to the Constitutional Revolution, where Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hossein Na'ini's book, *Tanbīh al-Ummah*, was the first step to justify and explain the involvement of citizens in government and politics. However, considering Ayatollah Na'ini as a theorist who supports election is a matter of serious doubt (Qasemi, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 85-89; Zarafshan, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 105-124).

The most important theorist of the theory of election is Ayatollah Montazeri. He acknowledges that this theory is innovative: "It is clear that the discourse of the elders and prominent figures in their works has a tendency towards the appointment, and the path has been shaped exclusively in this direction. They did not pay attention to the election of the community. In their view, the jurists are appointed by the Impeccable Imams through general appointment, and for this, they cite the *Maqbūla* of 'Umar ibn Ḥanzala and many traditions that have been narrated about the status of scholars, jurists, and narrators of traditions." (Montazeri, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 2, 194)

Ayatollah Montazeri first raises the necessity of government in Islamic societies from a rational and logical perspective and then proves the necessity of a religious government. What is important in his theory is the way the Islamic ruler is determined during the Occultation. In his view, despite the negation of the rule of one person over another, God Almighty, who is their creator, has legislative authority and, out of necessity, has transferred some of his authority to the Prophet (PBUH) and then to the impeccable Imams (AS) and jurists. This transfer of authority to the jurists, in order to spread the rulings of Islam, is due to man's need for guidance and the attainment of happiness, which proves the *Velayat-e Faqih*. He then challenges the narrative arguments for the theory of appointment of jurists and considers them flawed, concluding that there is no other way but the election of jurists by the people during the Occultation of the Impeccable Imam (AS). He provides several reasons for this, including rational arguments and some verses and traditions and the conduct of the Prophet (PBUH), Imam Ali (AS), and Imam Hassan (AS) in consulting the people. In this way, if the community voluntarily entrusts the matter of guardianship to someone, it will certainly follow and even strive to strengthen his rule. If the elected ruler loses the qualifications of leadership or violates his duties, he will be removed from power by the same people (Montazeri, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 2, 192-204).

Thus, the people are responsible for the election, continuation, and dismissal of the Islamic ruler. Regarding the scope of the jurists' powers, although he initially considered the jurist to have the status of giving fatwa, judging, and executive power, he gradually changed his mind and considered only a supervisory status for the jurist, moving from *Velayat-e Faqih* to the "Guardianship of Jurisprudence" and "Oversight of the Jurist." (Montazeri, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 14, 25)

5.1.3. The Divine-Popular Theory

This theory is a combination of the theories of appointment and election, or divine-popular. Works published on this topic consider the views of Imam Khomeini (Hatami, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 457-468) and Ayatollah Khamenei (Khoramshad and Amini, 2018 AD/1397 SH) to be based on this theory. In this theory, the *Velayat-e Faqih* has divine legitimacy from the perspective of its essence (*Thubūt*) and popular legitimacy from the perspective of its manifestation (*Ithbāt*). Like the theory of appointment, the ruler's qualifications are based on

being the most competent person and on the criteria that are mentioned in the traditions attributed to the Imams (AS), not on the people's choice.

Below, we will limit ourselves to the views of Ayatollah Khamenei, which are more recent. In Ayatollah Khamenei's view, "In the Islamic system, the person who is designated as the Supreme Leader, since his responsibility is fundamentally based on criteria, if he loses these criteria, he automatically loses his position... he does not need to be dismissed; he becomes dismissed on his own." (Khamenei, 1998 AD/1377 SH) He adds that "He loses his legitimacy and obedience to him is no longer obligatory, but rather not permissible." (Khamenei, 2006 AD/1385 SH) This means that one cannot make the people's desire and vote the criterion for being the "Most Competent" and being "Competent". Rather, the Supreme Leader must always be the most competent person, but the actualization of his rule, which is part of the legitimacy of the Islamic government's rule, is the people's acceptance. In fact, the lack of a "Public" opinion, while not actualizing the rule of the jurist, also leads to a lack of legitimacy. Conversely, the people's acceptance both actualizes and legitimizes the rule of the jurist.

In this explanation, "Republicanism" is derived from the essence of Islam. "In the Islamic system, coercion and force have no meaning... authority has meaning, but authority that arises from the people's choice and election; the authority that is based on force, coercion, and weapons has no meaning in Islam... The power that comes from the people's election is respected." (Ayatollah Khamenei, 2014 AD/1393 SH) Thus, in this combined view, legitimacy serves two purposes. First, the legitimacy of the ruler, who must be chosen based on criteria. "In Islam, the people are one pillar of legitimacy, not the entire foundation of legitimacy. The political system in Islam, in addition to the vote and will of the people, is also based on another fundamental foundation, which is called piety and justice. If the person who is chosen for government lacks piety and justice, even if all the people agree on him, from the perspective of Islam, this government is an illegitimate government." (Mohajernia, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 315)

Second is the legitimacy of the government, which must be based on the people's vote. "In the Constitution, power is distributed logically and correctly, and all centers of power are directly or indirectly related to the people's votes, and the people are the determiners and decision-makers; if the people do not want a government, this government has in fact lost its foundation of legitimacy." (Khamenei, 1998 AD/1377 SH)

Of course, the attribution of the divine-popular theory to Imam Khomeini (Akbari Moallem, 1994 AD/1373 SH) and Ayatollah Khamenei is doubtful to some (Mousavi et al., 2022 AD/1401 SH). In their view, they are also among the theorists of appointment.

5.2. The Three Theories of Legitimacy and Oversight

The three theories on the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic were explained. The important question now is whether these three theories support oversight of the Leader and related institutions? And do their differences and disagreements affect the nature of oversight over the Leader and related institutions?

5.2.1. The Theory of Appointment and Oversight

Based on the explanation of the theory of appointment with reference to the works of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, we will also look for the issue of oversight in his views. Although it might initially seem that according to the theory of appointment, the oversight of the Leader by the Assembly of Experts is limited to overseeing the continuation of the necessary conditions for leadership, such as justice, piety, ability, and other matters, according to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the oversight of the Assembly of Experts goes beyond this. In this regard, he refers to two duties of the Assembly of Experts:

1) The Selection and Dismissal of the Leader

If the Leader, due to old age or other events, cannot perform his duties properly, or becomes afflicted with forgetfulness, or loses his moral qualifications, the Assembly of Experts must, after diagnosing his unsuitability for leadership, announce his dismissal.

2) Oversight of the Leader's Actions to Prevent Possible Errors

The Assembly of Experts performs the task of control and oversight by forming a "Research Board" to prevent any potential error or mistake from the very beginning. In fact, the task of the Research Board is, based on the rule "What is obligatory to be removed after its occurrence, is obligatory to be prevented before its occurrence," to prevent disruptions in the Leader's activities (Mesbah Yazdi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 341-342).

An analysis of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi's view shows that he considers the supervisory role of the Assembly of Experts to be more than the mere duty of maintaining the qualifications of the Leader. His emphasis on announcing the Leader's unsuitability if he loses his qualifications, and especially on proactive and preventive oversight through the "Research Board," indicates a comprehensive and responsible approach to this important duty. His view, which is explained within the framework of his belief in the theory of appointment, emphasizes the importance of helping the elected Leader to maintain the correct path and prevent errors. This view, while respecting the divine legitimacy of the leadership, also emphasizes the active role of the Assembly of Experts in ensuring the correct and effective performance of this influential position. Given the wide range of views on the supervisory role of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi's view, with its emphasis on preventing errors, can be presented as a distinct and noteworthy approach in this discussion and can be influential in how this important institution interacts with the leadership in the future.

5.2.2. The Theory of Election and Oversight

Oversight of the Leader and related institutions in the theory of election is a self-evident and certain matter, because this theory considers the basis of the Leader's legitimacy to be the people's election. This "Basis" gives the people the right to also oversee. By referencing the theory of election to Ayatollah Montazeri, we will also look for the issue of oversight in his works.

Popular oversight of the Leader and related institutions is not explicitly stated in Ayatollah Montazeri's most important work, "The Jurisprudential Foundations of Islamic Government." However, an analysis of Ayatollah Montazeri's views in the second volume of this book, in the chapters "Qualifications of the Islamic Ruler" and "How the Imamate is Established and the Leadership is Determined," indicates a type of oversight. In these two sections of the book, he mentions the qualifications, criteria, and attributes of the Leader and how he is elected by the people. He argued that the Supreme Leader must have specific characteristics, including justice, piety, jurisprudence, and resourcefulness, and if he loses these characteristics, he will be dismissed from leadership (Montazeri, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 2, 390). This view is shared with the theory of appointment and is, in a way, considered a form of pre-

emptive oversight over the leadership. This is because, unlike most prevalent theories in political thought, such strict criteria place the Leader's actions and behavior under scrutiny.

He also emphasizes popular satisfaction and the people's right to dismiss a Leader who lacks the qualifications. "When the community voluntarily entrusts the matter of guardianship to someone, it will naturally become his defender and executive force, and as a result, the guardianship will be strengthened, the system will be integrated, corruption will be repelled, and the unworthy will be expelled from the government. And the community can also dismiss the elected ruler if he loses the qualifications of leadership or violates his duties, which will be discussed in detail in future chapters." (Montazeri, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 2, 204)

In the changes that occurred in Ayatollah Montazeri's thought, where *Velayat-e Faqih* was replaced by "Oversight of the Jurist," the issue of oversight became apparent in his views. "The elected experts will have the right to question, impeach, dismiss, and appoint him under specific conditions—which are provided for in the Constitution as a condition of the contract—in addition to having the duty to oversee his performance." (Montazeri, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 8, 264) Even during these theoretical changes in his thought, "Everyone has the right to oversee, criticize, or protest against the performance of the Islamic ruler and other officials of society. Rather, it is their duty to do so based on the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil and giving advice to the imams of the Muslims and by establishing organizations and parties." (Montazeri, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 8, 263-264) Thus, from Ayatollah Montazeri's perspective, whether in the theory of election or the theory of oversight, he emphasizes the importance of the Leader's oversight and accountability in a way that is compatible with the foundation of popular legitimacy and provides for various mechanisms for it.

5.2.3. The Divine-Popular Theory and Oversight

According to the combined theory, which in a way separates the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader from the legitimacy of the political system, oversight of the Supreme Leader and related institutions by the Assembly of Experts is also necessary. This is because just as the people provide the ground for the rule of a legitimate and qualified Leader, they can also oversee him, whether directly or through the Assembly of Experts, who are their representatives. Thus, the legitimacy of the political system is also guaranteed by the

legitimacy of the leadership. Ayatollah Khamenei, who is introduced in some academic articles as one of the representatives of this view, has explicitly mentioned the oversight of the Leader and related institutions.

He believes in self-oversight before anything else, just like the theories of appointment and election: "If the position of the Leader loses its justice, it automatically, and without the need for any other factor, loses its leadership." (Khamenei, 1998 AD/1377 SH)

He then addresses external oversight and considers oversight to be necessary in general. "I love oversight, and I am extremely displeased with anyone and anywhere that avoids oversight. The more I am overseen, the happier I am." (Khamenei, 2000 AD/1379 SH) Regarding the duties of the Assembly of Experts, he also emphasizes the Assembly's oversight of the Leader. "My point about the Assembly of Experts is that, well, the Assembly of Experts has the most important task. This 'designation of the Leader' and 'oversight of the preservation of the Leader's qualifications' are among the great tasks; that is, perhaps the greatest task in the management of Iranian society in the Islamic Republic." (Khamenei, 2023 AD/1402 SH)

Ayatollah Khamenei does not stop at the oversight of the Leader and also refers to the oversight of the organizations and institutions under the Leader's supervision. "No one is above oversight. The Leader himself is not above oversight; let alone the institutions related to the Leader. Therefore, everyone must be overseen. Oversight of those who govern—because government naturally means the accumulation of power and wealth; that is, public assets and social and political authority are in the hands of a part of the rulers—is a necessary and obligatory task to ensure that they are trustworthy, do not abuse their power, and do not become rebellious, and it must exist." (Khamenei, 2000 AD/1379 SH)

Thus, the combined theory, by distinguishing the legitimacy of the leadership from the legitimacy of the political system, also emphasizes the necessity of oversight over the institution of the Leader and its related structures. It seems that all three theories of legitimacy—appointment, election, and divine-popular—each from its own perspective, emphasize the necessity of oversight over the Leader and their related institutions. Their common point is that the Leader must have qualifications such as justice, piety, and management ability, and the Assembly of Experts plays a central role in overseeing the maintenance of these qualifications. We will now examine how these views are manifested in the legal structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Next, the oversight mechanisms over the Leader that are provided for in the Iranian Constitution will be analyzed in detail. This review will show how the theoretical foundations related to oversight have in practice been transformed into specific institutions to ensure accountability.

6. The Constitution and Oversight of the Leader and Related Institutions

According to Article 44 of the Supplement to the Constitutional Law before the Islamic Revolution, the head of state, the monarch, was immune from responsibility and was not accountable for any of his actions. The victory of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 AD/1357 SH opened a new chapter of political and social developments in Iran and established a new government based on Islamic and democratic principles. The new Constitution set a clear framework for the oversight of the head of state, the position of the Leader, through the Assembly of Experts and other oversight bodies. This section of the article will discuss this topic. According to the Constitution, oversight over the Leader is carried out in five ways:

6.1. Pre-emptive Oversight

According to Articles 5 and 109, which state the conditions and qualifications of the Leader, a form of pre-emptive oversight is exercised over him, as was also mentioned in the theories of political legitimacy in the Islamic Republic. Article 5 of the Constitution refers to the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and Leadership of the Community during the absence of the 12th Imam and enumerates the general qualifications of the qualified jurist, including justice, piety, being well-informed about the times, courage, management, and resourcefulness. However, in Article 109, these qualifications are repeated with more detail. These are:

- The necessary scholarly qualifications for issuing fatwas in various chapters of jurisprudence;
- The necessary justice and piety for the leadership of the Islamic community;
- Sound political and social insight, resourcefulness, courage, management, and sufficient power for leadership. It adds that if there are multiple qualified individuals, the one with stronger jurisprudential and political insight takes precedence.

These conditions and qualifications make pre-emptive oversight possible in two stages. First, in the stage of electing the Leader, in that one cannot elect any individual with only a political, religious, or moral condition or qualification, but rather a set of conditions that, while making "Election" difficult, increase trust and confidence. On the other hand, in the second stage of pre-emptive oversight, the loss of any of these conditions and qualifications during the performance of duties leads to the dismissal of the Leader. In other words, these three-faceted conditions and qualifications—religious, moral, and political—must always be combined in the person and character of the Leader. Of course, the diagnosis of this is with the members of the Assembly of Experts, the details of which are specified in Article 111 of the Constitution.

6.2. Public Oversight

According to Article 8 of the Constitution, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, enjoining good and forbidding evil is a public and reciprocal duty of the people towards each other, the government towards the people, and the people towards the government. This article has its roots in Islamic religious teachings and law, which institutionalizes public oversight, both individually and collectively, among all members of society or towards the government. Based on this very article, the law on the protection of those who enjoin good and forbid evil was approved in 2015 AD/1394 SH. Based on this article, oversight of rulers and leaders has a solid foundation.

The principle of "Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil" is a fundamental duty for all Muslims, especially towards those in power. This principle not only includes inviting people to do well and avoid evil at the individual level but also applies in the social and political spheres and justifies the oversight of rulers' performance from this perspective. The concept of "Advice" to leaders also has a special place in Islamic teachings. Providing sincere and benevolent advice to leaders is considered one of the important duties of scholars and elites of the Islamic community. The first Imam of the Shi'ites, Ali (PBUH), says: "O! People! I have a right over you, and you have a right over me; as for my right over you, it is that you remain loyal to your oath of allegiance and offer sincere advice in both secret and public." (Sharif al-Radi, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 35)

The history of early Islam also testifies to the existence of procedures for overseeing the performance of caliphs and rulers. From a jurisprudential perspective, oversight of the Leader is not only permissible but also seems necessary to preserve the interests of Islam and the Islamic community. "Enjoining good and forbidding evil has various fields and the most important of them is the field of officials." (Khamenei, 2000 AD/1379 SH) Political parties, social elites, mass media, and even ordinary citizens can also, according to this article, use this opportunity to engage in it. The reality of Iranian society today also attests to the implementation and application of this article of the Constitution.

6.3. Financial and Judicial Oversight

In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, oversight of the Leader from a financial and judicial perspective has been considered. First, according to Article 142 of the Constitution, the assets of the Leader, their spouse, and their children are subject to review by the head of the judiciary upon entering and leaving the responsibilities of leadership, to determine if these assets have increased illegally. According to the authors of the Constitution, this was intended to prevent officials from abusing power and state resources, and even when there was a Leadership Council, the necessity of overseeing these individuals was considered essential to preserve the sanctity and legitimacy of the system (Detailed Records of the Proceedings, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 2, 1287-1289).

On the other hand, this oversight is not limited to the financial aspect. Article 107 of the Constitution explicitly emphasizes that the Leader is equal before the laws and regulations to any other citizen and does not enjoy any form of judicial immunity, whether substantive or procedural. This is an important basis for the possibility of judicial oversight over the Leader's performance. In this regard, Imam Khomeini also emphasized this principle in his decree to the Revolutionary Council for the establishment of the Office of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil. He said: "Even if, God forbid, the Leader of the Revolution or the head of government commits something that requires a legal punishment, it must be carried out against him." (Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 9, 213)

6.4. Oversight by the Assembly of Experts

One of the most important forms of oversight over the Leader and related institutions in the Constitution is the oversight of the Assembly of Experts. Article 111 addresses this important matter. However, the word "Oversight" is not mentioned in this article, which has led to ambiguities and disputes. A part of this article states: "Whenever the Leader becomes unable to perform his legal duties or loses any of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it is discovered that he lacked some of the qualifications from the beginning, he will be removed from office. The diagnosis of this matter is the responsibility of the experts mentioned in Article 108".

According to a group who infer the oversight of the Assembly of Experts over the Leader and related institutions from this article, the explicit mention of the Leader's dismissal in this article is based on preliminaries that must be carried out by the Assembly of Experts before dismissal, and that is nothing but oversight. This is because with pre-emptive oversight, potential errors can be prevented. Also, reaching a point where the dismissal of the Leader becomes necessary requires pre-emptive oversight, because otherwise, there is a possibility of error and a lack of compassion and justice towards the dismissed authority. In other words, it is not possible to implement this part of Article 111 of the Constitution—the dismissal of the Leader—without oversight of the Leader. On the other hand, oversight should not always be a prelude to dismissal, because oversight can also be a prelude to improvement and efficiency. This point was made by some members of the Constitutional Review Council in 1989 AD/1368 SH: "In Article 111, we have in any case given the experts permission to dismiss the Leader when necessary, and it is not right for us to say that the experts have no authority and should just sit there. Is it really possible for the experts to have no oversight at all and suddenly decide to dismiss him?!" (Detailed Records of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Review Council, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 1264) They also said: "This issue [oversight of the Leader] strengthens the leadership." (Detailed Records of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Review Council, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 1273)

It seems that oversight of the Leader has two aspects:

- The first is the diagnosis of the continuation of the Leader's qualifications and attributes, such as jurisprudence, justice, piety, resourcefulness, and ability to perform the assigned duties. The power to dismiss the Leader requires a mechanism for evaluating and diagnosing the loss of qualifications, which is the essence of oversight. In this aspect of oversight, there is a kind of consensus, and no disputes have arisen.

To perform oversight in this aspect, the Assembly of Experts has formed a Research Commission. This board consists of 7 main members and 4 alternate members from the Assembly of Experts, who are elected by a secret vote of the members for a period of 2 years. This board has the following characteristics: The presiding board cannot be part of this commission. The members of the board must not be relatives of the Leader and must not hold executive or judicial positions on behalf of the Leader. The members of the board must have sufficient free time to perform their duties. If the board's report concerns the implementation of Article 111, namely the inability to perform duties and dismissal, the presiding board must convene the Assembly of Experts at the earliest opportunity, where the Leader can also defend himself (Habibnejad, 2013 AD/1392 SH). In this aspect of oversight, according to Article 41 of the internal regulations of the Assembly of Experts, in addition to addressing received reports and investigating their validity, it also pays attention to the administrative structure of the leadership and assists the Leader in preventing the infiltration and interference of undesirable elements in the structure of the leadership institution.

- The second aspect is oversight over the institutions under the Leader's supervision, for which direct or indirect responsibility is placed on him in Article 110. Examples include the appointment of the jurists of the Guardian Council, the highest judicial authority in the country, and the head of the state radio and television organization, and so on. Of course, regarding the appointment of related institutions, one cannot just rely on Article 110 of the Constitution. Other institutions, such as the Headquarters for the Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order, the 15 Khordad Foundation, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the Foundation of the Oppressed, and the administrations of holy shrines, and other institutions that are not mentioned in the said article, must also be added (Rostami and Qotbi, 2014 AD/1393 SH).

Regarding this aspect of the oversight of the Assembly of Experts over the institutions under his supervision, there are ongoing discussions and disputes in the country's academic and executive spheres, both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. Of course, the Assembly of Experts has not denied its oversight in this aspect. However, according to some members of the Assembly of Experts, the duty of this Assembly is limited to overseeing the

Leader's ability and the continuation of his qualifications.³ However, Ayatollah Mesbah, one of the theorists of the theory of appointment, provides for maximal oversight for the Assembly of Experts: "One of the duties of the experts is to oversee the Leader's actions so that the matter does not lead to his dismissal. The Assembly of Experts performs the task of control and oversight by forming a "Research Board," and it may even be that a gradual process occurs. Therefore, one can start from a point where there is a possibility of error and close the path to error. Thus, the Research Board, based on the rule, what is obligatory to be removed after its occurrence, is obligatory to be prevented before its occurrence, prevents disruptions in the Leader's activities." (Mesbah Yazdi, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 341-342)

Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, who is also a theorist of appointment, while emphasizing public oversight, i.e., the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil, raises the supervisory duty of the Assembly of Experts in a general way and has not limited the dismissal of the Leader to the Leader's inability and the lack of continuation of his qualifications (Javadi Amoli, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 496-497).

From an executive perspective, due to the diversity and differences in how the institutions related to the leadership are appointed, the scope of the Assembly of Experts' oversight over these institutions has faced challenges. These institutions are divided into several categories:

- Organizations like the armed forces that are managed directly and with all details by the Leader;
- Organizations like the judiciary, the Expediency Discernment Council, the state radio and television organization, the Foundation of the Oppressed, and the Headquarters for the Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order, where the Leader has no involvement in their management and only appoints or dismisses their head;
- Organizations whose approvals must be confirmed by the Leader, such as the Supreme National Security Council and the Expediency Discernment Council;
- Institutions with the presence of the Leader's representative or representatives in them, such as the Guardian Council, the Martyrs Foundation, and the Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization;

³. Ayatollah Alamolhoda, representative of Khorasan province in the Assembly of Experts, see: <http://www.ghasednoor.ir/fa/tiny/news-391>

- The appointment of all members by the Leader, such as the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (Rostami and Qotbi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 72-74).

Given their specific characteristics, oversight of each of these organizations and institutions cannot be carried out in a similar manner by the Assembly of Experts. Therefore, according to the Constitution, other oversight bodies, according to laws approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, oversee these organizations.

6.5. Oversight by Other Oversight Institutions

The Islamic Consultative Assembly, according to Article 76 of the Constitution, which grants it the right to investigate and scrutinize all affairs of the country, can perform the oversight assumed for the Leader and the institutions under his supervision. According to Note 7 of Article 212 of the internal regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the investigation and scrutiny of the Assembly do not include the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Discernment Council, ongoing judicial cases, and the substantive judicial affairs. In the case of institutions under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, the possibility of investigation and scrutiny by the Assembly exists with his permission. In addition to the Assembly as an oversight body, the Article 90 Commission, which is one of the Assembly's commissions and has a supervisory role, can also independently perform the supervisory duty over the institutions related to the leadership.⁴

In Ayatollah Khamenei's view, "The investigation and scrutiny of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of various state bodies is one of the suitable tools for maintaining the health of these bodies. Certainly, the existence of this principle in the Constitution is one of the strengths of this solid and comprehensive law." (Khamenei, 2001 AD/1380 SH) Therefore, the investigation and scrutiny of some of the institutions under the Leader's supervision, such as the judiciary, the state radio and television organization, and the Foundation of the

⁴. "Article Ninety of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states:

Anyone who has a complaint about the conduct of the Parliament, the Executive Branch, or the Judiciary " Branch, may submit their complaint in writing to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The Parliament is obliged to investigate these complaints and provide a sufficient response, and in cases where the complaint relates to the Executive or Judiciary Branches, to investigate and request a sufficient response from them, and to announce the result within a reasonable time, and in cases that concern the public, to inform the public. "

Oppressed, by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, has been carried out, although with some opposition from these institutions.

The second institution is the Court of Audit, which, with the interpretation of the Guardian Council under Article 55 of the Constitution, can oversee all institutions under the Leader's supervision, despite their legal and structural differences. This is because the oversight of this institution includes all state and public non-state institutions that use the country's public budget (Fathi, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 27). The oversight of the Court of Audit has no exceptions for institutions related to the leadership or otherwise. The type of oversight of the Court of Audit is purely in financial matters.

The General Inspection Organization of Iran is the third institution mentioned in the Constitution. According to Clause A, Article 2 of the Law on the Formation of the General Inspection Organization of Iran, it has the right to inspect organizations where all or part of their capital or shares belong to the government or where the government supervises or assists them in any way. However, the report on addressing the violations of officials and employees of the judiciary and legislative branches, the armed forces, the Guardian Council, and the institutions under the supervision of the Leader, is an exception to this article to respect the independence of the branches and is not provided to the president (Rostami et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 76).

The fourth oversight institution is the Administrative Justice Court. This institution was formed based on Articles 173 and 196 of the Constitution to address people's complaints and grievances about the decisions and approvals of state units. Based on the "Law on the Organization and Administrative Procedure of the Administrative Justice Court" approved in 2013 AD/1392 SH, it consists of branches and a general board. The decisions and approvals of ministries, state institutions, state-owned companies, and public non-state institutions can be challenged in the court. Institutions under the supervision of the Leader can also be a party to a complaint in the Administrative Justice Court if they fall under one of the four aforementioned titles, and being under the supervision of the Leader (regardless of any considerations we might have for being under the supervision of the Leader) does not prevent a complaint from being filed against the decisions and approvals of the institutions in the Administrative Justice Court (Rostami et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 74).

Some institutions are explicitly excluded from the scope of this law in the notes to Article 12 of the said law: "The Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme

National Security Council, the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace." Of course, the exclusion of these institutions in all cases cannot be linked to being under the supervision of the Leader, but rather the decisions of these institutions are usually of a legislative or high and final sovereign nature, not executive or administrative decisions. The Administrative Justice Court was fundamentally established to address complaints about the decisions and actions of executive and administrative bodies and to uphold the rights of the people against them (Rostami et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 75).

The last oversight institution is the Audit Organization, an institution affiliated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of Iran. Its charter was approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in 1987 AD/1366 SH based on the "Law on the Formation of the Audit Organization". This organization, as the largest state auditing institution in the country, provides specialized financial services mainly to the state and public sectors. According to Article 7 of this charter, the scope of the Audit Organization includes many state bodies and executive institutions, including the institutions under the supervision of the Leader. Article 4 of this charter stipulates that this organization can, to perform its duties, establish separate auditing and financial services institutions. Based on this, the Mofid Rahbar Audit Institution was established in 1992 AD/1371 SH under this article, and the auditing of the institutions under the supervision of the Leader was entrusted to this organization. This organization is a member of the Society of Certified Public Accountants and is also a trusted body of the Securities and Exchange Organization in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it is ranked in Group One among 270 auditing institutions (Rostami et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 78-80).

7. Challenges of Oversight

Various challenges may arise in the field of oversight of the Leader and related institutions. One of the most important is related to the decentralization and distribution of oversight authority and bodies over the Leader and related organizations. At first glance, the decentralization of these institutions in the Constitution, such as the Assembly of Experts, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Article 90 Commission, the Court of Audit, the General Inspection Organization, the Administrative Justice Court, and the Audit Organization, may be considered a challenge. This is because some of these institutions have overlapping

responsibilities in areas such as overseeing executive performance or addressing complaints. This leads to duplication of work, wasted resources, and confusion for people and institutions when they need to seek recourse. In particular, the dispersion of resources (financial, human, and specialized) among multiple institutions reduces the oversight power of each one. A violation may be overlooked by one institution, or the institutions may act in isolation, making it difficult to focus on major violations or pursue them consistently. If a case is referred between different institutions, the process of handling it becomes long and complicated. Thus, the multiplicity of reports and oversight bodies makes it difficult for the public to understand the performance of the oversight system and to find the correct authority to pursue complaints.

To prevent such occurrences and increase the efficiency of oversight organizations, a council called the Council of Oversight Bodies was formed in October 2008 AD/Mehr 1387 SH. It includes a representative of the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, a representative of the president, the head of the Administrative Justice Court, the Minister of Intelligence, the head of the Court of Audit, and the head of the General Inspection Organization. The council meets at least once a month, and its performance report is sent to the Leader and the heads of the three branches of government (Nikounahad, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 2).

It seems that from a legal and administrative perspective, the challenge of the decentralization of oversight institutions has been resolved, but the Assembly of Experts, as one of the most important oversight institutions, is not included. On the other hand, it might be thought that this centralization would have a negative impact on oversight, but it must be remembered that this mechanism is not centralization but rather coordination among different organizations, even those belonging to different branches of government.

Another challenge and criticism raised regarding the oversight of the Leader by the Assembly of Experts and related institutions is the oversight of the Guardian Council's jurists on the election of the members of this assembly by the people. According to some, the appointment of the Guardian Council's jurists by the Leader and the review of the qualifications of the Assembly of Experts' candidates by the Guardian Council's jurists can affect the impartiality of the elected members of the Assembly of Experts and, in other words, create a circular logic (Montazeri, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 31). In response to this objection, three points can be made. First, if this is a circular logic, it is not a philosophical circle of cause and effect, which is a

rational impossibility and is void. That is, its realization is not possible because in political and social matters, the existence and non-existence of a circular logic has no meaning.

The second point is that what is ignored in the critics' statement is the election of the representatives of the Assembly of Experts by the people. That is, it is not the case that the Guardian Council, whose six jurists are chosen by the Leader, chooses the representatives of the Assembly of Experts themselves. Rather, this institution only reviews the qualification of the candidates—an important part of which is "Jurisprudence"—through a process whose basis is a specialized exam. Third, such circular logic can be found in various political systems, and such circular logic is unavoidable, because governance becomes intertwined and cannot be untangled without such circular logic. Two examples of such circular logic exist in different political systems: "One is constitutional councils, the most famous and similar of which is the "Constitutional Council" of France. The French "Constitutional Council" is one of the most similar examples to the Guardian Council, with the difference that the French Constitutional Council has a completely appointed composition, unlike the Iranian Guardian Council, which is a combination of appointment and election." The appointed members of the Constitutional Council are 9 people: "Three are appointed by the president, three by the Speaker of the National Assembly, and three by the Speaker of the Senate for a period of 9 years. Every three years, each of the three appointing bodies appoints a new member." Lifetime membership for former presidents is also allowed if they request it. In the Guardian Council, six jurists are appointed by the Leader for a period of 6 years, and six jurists are chosen by the representatives from a list of candidates introduced by the judiciary for a period of 6 years. Every three years, each of the two bodies appoints or suggests new members for election. The chairman of the Constitutional Council is appointed by the president for a period of 9 years, while the secretary of the Guardian Council is elected from among the members for a period of one year (Fereshtian, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 114-119). The duties of the two mentioned bodies are also very similar in various areas, such as defending the jurisdiction of the institutions and organizations related to the three branches of government, reviewing the conformity of approved laws with the constitution, referendums, constitutional changes, international treaties, and overseeing elections and giving consultative opinions to the president (Fereshtian, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 121-125).

Another example exists in the judicial systems of various countries. However, in Iran, due to the appointment and dismissal of the head of the judiciary by the Leader, this circular logic

does not exist, and it can be said that the judiciary in Iran is completely independent of the other two branches of government. In some countries, high-ranking judges are appointed by the head of the executive branch. These judges may later rule on the legality of the actions of the same head of the executive branch or the parties that support him. They may also decide on the eligibility of opposition party candidates. Some important examples are the United States, India, France, Turkey, and Hungary. For example, in the case of the United States, federal Supreme Court justices are nominated by the president (executive branch). The final appointment requires confirmation by a majority of the US Senate (legislative branch). This process is often highly political and partisan. The challenge of conflict of interest arises when Supreme Court justices may rule on cases related to the president's actions, such as executive orders, or the parties that support him. For example, in the George Bush and Al Gore election case, the Supreme Court's vote influenced the results of the presidential election, or in the Supreme Court's opinion on Obama's health policies, the partisan affiliation of the court's justices has often been criticized (Epstein, 2013).

Conclusion

This article has examined the concept and process of oversight of political power, with a special focus on the position of the Leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It emphasizes that effective oversight is not only a theoretical necessity but also a practical requirement for any efficient political system. The main goal of oversight is to ensure the conformity of "What is" with "What should be" to prevent corruption, increase the efficiency of governance, and strengthen political legitimacy. Public trust and accountability are strengthened.

Following the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran created a fundamental transformation in its accountability structure by establishing the institution of the Leader alongside the three branches of government and revoking the absolute immunity of the monarchy. The Leader, as the highest political authority, is elected by the Assembly of Experts (which is itself elected by the people) and is equal before the law to all other citizens of the country. The Constitution also provides for the possibility of dismissing the Leader if he loses the necessary qualifications, which itself emphasizes the importance of oversight.

This article has analyzed three main theories of legitimacy in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Theory of Appointment (divine legitimacy), the Theory of Election (popular legitimacy), and the Divine-Popular Theory (a combination of both). The findings of the research show that

despite the fundamental differences in these theories, all of them confirm the necessity of oversight over the Leader and his affiliated institutions. The theory of appointment considers the oversight of the Assembly of Experts to be necessary for the continuation of the Leader's qualifications and even for the prevention of errors. The theory of election, based on the popular foundation of legitimacy, considers the right of oversight and dismissal for the people and their representatives to be self-evident. The divine-popular theory, despite the Leader's divine legitimacy, considers the actualization of his rule to be conditional on public acceptance and considers oversight to be vital for preserving the Leader's qualifications and the system's accountability to the people's needs.

However, the oversight system in Iran faces structural challenges. The dispersion and overlap of the authority of multiple oversight institutions (such as the Assembly of Experts, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Article 90 Commission, the Court of Audit, the General Inspection Organization, the Administrative Justice Court, and the Audit Organization) can lead to parallel work, overlapping duties, and ambiguity in responsibilities. This situation, especially concerning the "Institutions under the supervision of the Leader," for which the definition and scope of oversight are sometimes ambiguous, can create oversight gaps and reduce accountability.

In conclusion, this study emphasizes that regardless of the theoretical foundations of legitimacy, efficient and comprehensive oversight of the Leader and related institutions is necessary for stability, efficiency, and gaining public trust in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Overcoming the existing challenges through strengthening coordination among oversight institutions, clarifying laws and removing ambiguities, ensuring the independence of oversight institutions, utilizing new technologies, and strengthening the culture of accountability are vital steps for improving the country's administrative and financial health and ensuring the stability of the system. Also, in this coordination mechanism, a place must be made for the Assembly of Experts.

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A Study of the Dimensions of Corruption in the Pahlavi Regime from the Perspective of Imam Khamenei

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ABSTRACT

Objective: Impartial scholars believe that pervasive corruption was a key characteristic of the Pahlavi regime. While extensive research has been conducted on this topic, it has not been thoroughly examined through the lens of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution. This article aims to address this gap by asking: ‘What is Imam Khamenei’s definition of corruption, and how does he view its depth and breadth within the Pahlavi regime?’

Method: To answer this question, a content analysis and documentary study approach were used. The research examined and compiled a collection of statements from the Leader of the Revolution.

Results: Within the framework of his thoughts and with the aid of historical documents, court insiders’ memoirs and writings, and existing research, this study presents examples and evidence of the court’s corruption in each area.

Conclusions: The findings indicate that, in Imam Khamenei’s view, the Pahlavi regime was afflicted by corruption in its moral, financial, managerial, and political aspects, and that this corruption was widespread. The Shah himself was the core of this corruption, and the closer individuals were to this core, the more corrupt they were.

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Introduction

There are various perspectives when examining the factors and indicators of political decline. Naturally, each approach based on its own epistemological and ontological foundations, points to different factors and defines the direction of decline within that framework. One of the political and social indicators of decline on which there is nearly a consensus is corruption. There is no major and influential political school of thought that does not consider corruption as a sign and cause of decline. The difference lies in the definition of corruption and its indicators.

Virtually all impartial researchers, whether left-leaning or right-leaning, opponents or proponents of the Islamic Revolution, Western or Eastern, and with different political approaches, admit to the serious corruption within the Pahlavi regime. However, these individuals do not agree on the depth and extent of the corruption or its role in political decline and public discontent. This article, based on the ideas of Ayatollah Khamenei, will first define corruption and its dimensions, and then describe the Pahlavi regime's situation on various indicators based on different documents and sources.

1. Research Background

Numerous studies have been conducted on the issue of corruption in the Pahlavi regime, but almost none have been based on the views of the leaders of the Revolution or presented examples and documents within that framework.

- Katouziyan (2001 AD/1380 SH), in "The Pahlavi System in Iran," exposed some of the corruption within the court.
- Mohammad Qoli Majd (2009 AD/1388 SH), in his book "The Great Plunder," used U.S. State Department documents to report a significant portion of the court's corruption, which he attributed to its dependence on foreigners.
- Mahdi Salah (2005 AD/1384 SH), in his book " Unveiling: Contexts, Consequences, and Reactions," analyzed the moral corruption of the Pahlavi regime and its role in the decay of society.
- Zohairi (2000 AD/1379 SH), in "The Pahlavi Era as Narrated by Documents," used a wide range of authentic and diverse documents to provide a cohesive analysis of the Pahlavi regime's corruption in various dimensions.

- The multi-volume book "The Court as Narrated by the Court" (2004 AD/1383 SH) examines the corruption in different parts of the Pahlavi apparatus, offering a clear picture of the actions of this dynasty and how the country was run.

Other similar works could be mentioned, but they are omitted here due to space constraints.

2. Research Methodology

Without a theoretical framework, any form of corruption could be considered reform and any reform could be considered corruption. This research first establishes a theoretical framework. The study examines and categorizes almost all of Imam Khamenei's statements on this topic, extracting his views and analyses regarding Pahlavi corruption. Then, through content analysis and by referring to multiple sources, the study presents documented evidence of corruption in each section. These sources include: comprehensive studies and research on the state of corruption in the Pahlavi regime, memoirs and notes from various individuals and personalities, especially those close to the Pahlavi court, and some statistical and field sources. It is clear that this article does not have the space to refer to all the findings in this area and only points to some of this documentation.

3. Main Question

The main question of this research is: How does Imam Khamenei evaluate the state of corruption in the Pahlavi regime in its various dimensions?

4. Theoretical Framework and Definition of Corruption

In the Dehkhoda dictionary, corruption is defined as "Decay," "Wickedness," "Sin," "Immorality," and "Turmoil." (Dehkhoda, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 17150) Gunnar Myrdal believes that corruption can be applied to all forms of deviation or the exercise of personal power and the illegal use of one's position or job (Abbaszadegan, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 14). Abbaszadeh Vaqefi et al., (2017 AD/1396 SH), under the concept of administrative corruption, provide a suitable summary of the definitions in this field. According to them, most researchers and international organizations, especially the World Bank and

Transparency International, define administrative corruption in its simplest and most common form as the "abuse of public power for private gain."

The World Bank (2000) also defines administrative corruption as the abuse of public power for personal gain. Windsor views corruption as an "Intercultural Disease" or a reflection of a moral failure (Mirsardo, 2018 AD/1398 SH).

A significant aspect of corruption highlighted in this article is political corruption. Political corruption is a part of corruption as a whole, and the definitions related to it vary. Some analysts of political corruption have focused on the abuse of law and power. According to Paul Heywood, political corruption refers to the use of political power for personal and illegal ends. Political corruption means gaining illegitimate personal benefits through political power or government position. This definition varies with time, place, and different cultures (Heywood, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 60).

The same diversity and multiplicity of views can be seen in explaining the causes of corruption, especially political corruption.

According to Ackerman, political corruption occurs when political decision-makers, either independently or in collusion with corrupt officials, change the course of public resources in a way that reduces the welfare of society (De Graaf et al., 2015 AD/1394 SH: 53).

Some also consider self-interest and tyranny to be the most important characteristics of political corruption. Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi called the tendency toward tyranny and the monopolization of power by a single group and the exercise of dominance over the people a "Deviant Policy." Its purpose is to enslave people, and its consequence is misery and condemnation. He believed such politicians consider their subjects to be slaves and servants of their desires, filling society with evils such as fear, anxiety, conflict, oppression, greed, violence, deceit, betrayal, ridicule, and backbiting (Tusi, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 301). According to Khajeh, the sickness of society stems from two contradictory issues: tyranny and chaos. Tyranny is inherently ugly and makes corrupt and lowly individuals appear good (ibid: 302).

Paul Heywood believes there are two main approaches to the emergence and deepening of corruption: the micro-level approach and the macro-level approach. The micro-level approach focuses on examining the behavior of political actors, their interactions, and their relationship with the formation of corruption. This approach sees corruption as the result of the rational calculation of costs and benefits by government officials. This approach assumes that politicians and bureaucrats seek political and financial power, and if their goals are purely

political, they disrupt the healthy process of political competition, decision-making, and political views, and use the resources of the political system to achieve their own goals.

The macro-level approach is an alternative to this and argues that corruption is more influenced by the macro-structures of society. Corruption is a consequence of the underdevelopment of political and economic systems, which provides a suitable ground for the unbridled exploitation of public resources for personal gain. According to this theory, in any society where supervisory institutions, political parties, and civil and professional organizations are unable to supervise, influence, and modify government policies and decisions, and where judicial and intelligence institutions are under the influence and control of the supreme political power, the conditions for the deepening and stabilization of political corruption are more readily available (cf. Heywood, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 10-12).

In this article, the main framework of the discussion is the views of Imam Khamenei, and the nature and dimensions of corruption are explained based on his views. He has a comprehensive approach to corruption. In this approach, he pays attention to both the nature of corruption and its indicators and factors. It can be said that in Ayatollah Khamenei's theory, all that researchers have focused on is included in his view of corruption: tyranny and self-interest, abuse of political power, disregarding the law, sacrificing public interests for personal interests, and so on. He even defines dependency as a type of political corruption.

Imam Khamenei defines corruption as any kind of "Ruin" or "Deficiency." The examples of these ruins and deficiencies are very extensive: "Discrimination, bribery and graft, illegal acquisition of wealth, exclusive privileges, a growing consumerist tendency, preferring brokerage over production, lawbreaking, the spread of moral vices, and so on (Khamenei, 26/01/1379). Moral corruption, professional corruption, a lack of a sense of duty in providing public services, and a lack of a sense of responsibility toward public opinion and people's minds are other branches and forms of corruption." (Khamenei, 03/05/1379)

In his view, corruption means moral corruption, professional corruption, a lack of conscience in providing public services, and a lack of responsibility toward public opinion and people's minds (Khamenei, Address to the people of Ardabil Province 03/05/1379). In another place, under the concept of revolutionary reform and reformism, he defines corruption in its most comprehensive form, in a way that can include all dimensions of political and social life. The lack of fair regulations, discrimination, blocked ways of acquiring legitimate wealth,

opportunism, lack of job security; a growing consumerist trend, irresponsibility, lack of discipline, and a long judicial process are all parts of the dimensions of corruption.

He states, "We need our administrative apparatus to have regulations that are the same for everyone and in which there is no discrimination. If there is, it is a corrupt point... There must be no bribery and graft; if there is, it is corruption... If some people acquire wealth through illegitimate means, this is corruption... If some people use undue privileges, acquire windfall wealth, and impoverish others at the price of their own enrichment, this is corruption... If exclusive privileges are created in society and not everyone can use equal opportunities, this is corruption... If there is no job security and stable regulations; if a person who wants to work in society is tied down and not given the opportunity to strive, these are corruption... If there is a growing consumerist trend in society, this is corruption... If there is no access to fair judgment; if judicial proceedings are lengthy and files remain for a long time, these are corruption." (Khamenei, 26/10/1379)

5. Dimensions of Pahlavi Regime Corruption

In Imam Khamenei's view, the Islamic Revolution was a massive popular movement against a government that had almost all the characteristics of a bad government in four dimensions: "Corruption, dependence, being imposed and coup-based, and incompetence." (Khamenei, 13/11/1377) All other negative characteristics of this political structure can be defined under these four dimensions. Widespread corruption was the source of many of the Pahlavi era's misfortunes and problems. In Imam Khamenei's thought, this characteristic has a very important and decisive position and is sufficient on its own to determine the condition of a political structure (Khamenei, 28/07/1368).

The Pahlavi government was in a state of decline in all its dimensions. Therefore, it had all the indicators of a corrupt structure, and this corruption was widespread and comprehensive, encompassing the entire system from top to bottom. The basis of the government and politics was corruption. All government dependents, even dependent clerics, were corrupt, although some healthy people were also seen among them.

He said: "From Mohammad Reza himself and his close associates down to the lower levels... one sees what corruption and what infection existed inside them; from there down to the lower levels of their dependents, the security agencies, the police and military agencies, those who were dependent on them, all were corrupt. Of course, some were also inside the agencies

and were good and healthy people. That is, their dependency on them was less. We had healthy military men, healthy police... There were not few good people; but those heads and dependents were corrupt. Their dependents among the clergy were also corrupt. There were mullahs dependent on them... In fact, anyone who was even slightly close to the monarchy was corrupt; the closer, the more corrupt. When you reached its core, it was the center of corruption and infection." (Khamenei, 26/05/1371)

This corruption was seen in all aspects and areas: sexual and moral corruption, financial and economic corruption, cultural corruption, political corruption, and drug addiction (Khamenei, 19/11/1369). He described it as "An incompetent, corrupt, dependent, irreligious, opportunistic, and selfish regime with other ugly characteristics." (Khamenei, 15/11/1381)

In this section, some documents regarding the corruption of the court in various dimensions are referenced. In his notes, Asadollah Alam repeatedly refers to the corruption of the ruling class and describes them as opportunistic and greedy vultures. He wrote: "Oh, how corrupt and wicked the ruling class is and how it fools people." (Alam: 1, 128) He also wrote: "A bunch of scoundrel vultures have nothing but demands." (ibid: 6, 483) "The privileged class, or as I call it, the corrupt class, of which I am one, has endless greedy demands." (ibid: 4, 414) "I myself am unprincipled." (ibid: 2, 46) "The upper class is corrupt and the lower class is mostly honorable and honest." (ibid: 2, 157) "Truly, our upper class is the most corrupt people, and the people in the streets and villages are very noble." (ibid: 5, 151) "Truly, our ruling class is corrupt and should only be spoken to with force." (ibid: 5, 283)

We see that Alam considered all the courtiers to be corrupt and described them as vultures. He considered himself to be one of the vultures and believed there was no other way to be. He concluded that the situation was such that it had to lead to a revolution (ibid: 440). "I see the situation as explosive and am very worried." (ibid: 3, 114)

The following section discusses the various dimensions of this corruption.

A) Financial Corruption

Political corruption has consequences everywhere, including in rent-seeking, the formation of mafias, the plundering of public property, and other areas. According to Imam Khamenei, the financial corruption in the Pahlavi regime was not just at the intermediate levels, where it could happen at any time, but existed at the highest levels of the country. From Mohammad Reza himself and his entourage, the highest levels of financial corruption, the biggest bribes,

the worst encroachments, and the most malicious pressures on the nation's financial resources were created. He spoke of the accumulation of wealth for oneself at the cost of impoverishing and wretchedizing the people (Khamenei, 17/10/1393). He also mentioned a departure from justice and a habit of freeloading, over-consumption, plundering national resources, and the illegitimate use of all the country's facilities (Khamenei, 22/12/1379).

Regarding their financial corruption, it is enough to say that the Shah himself and his family were involved in most of the country's major economic transactions. He and his brothers and sisters were among those who accumulated the most personal wealth. Reza Khan accumulated a huge fortune during his sixteen or seventeen-year reign. It is interesting to know that some cities in the country, according to documents, belonged entirely to Reza Khan. For example, the city of Fariman was entirely the property of Reza Khan! The best properties and lands in this country belonged to him. When they left the country, billions of dollars of their wealth were accumulated in foreign banks. It is likely that you know that after the revolution we asked for the Shah's wealth to be returned to us, and of course it was natural that they would not respond (Khamenei, 13/11/1377).

Reza Shah's \$500 million in cash in foreign banks was only a part of the legendary wealth of a man who was extremely poor before his reign. After becoming king, he owned more than 44,000 ownership deeds for fertile properties in Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, Gonbad, East Azerbaijan, and other parts of the country, which he had registered in his name by intimidating, threatening, imprisoning, and exiling their owners. As a result, Reza Shah was not only the largest landowner in Asia but also the largest landowner in the entire world (Majd, 2016 AD/1396 SH: 32, 33 and 507).

Reza Shah would see anything and say, "It's mine," and the roads were also intended to connect his properties. It's interesting that Reza Shah was not satisfied with just seizing lands. He also had various sources of income for himself. Mohammad Qoli Majd believes that Reza Khan can rightly be called the "father of modern theft in Iran". According to U.S. State Department documents, not including accounts in New York, Switzerland, and London, the balance of Reza Khan's bank accounts was at least \$200 million, which was ten times the budget of the Iranian government in 1925 AD/1304 SH (Majd, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 51).

Mohammad Reza Shah also followed this same practice. According to Ardeshir Zahedi, His Majesty had taken \$31 billion out of the country before his departure from Iran (Zahedi, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 313).

In addition to the palaces and gardens that were directly in the name of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his family, the Shah also had many properties abroad, including: "The most expensive house and park in the suburbs of London, the palace and gardens of Estill Mans where Queen Elizabeth II was born, the most expensive garden and a luxurious villa in Capri, the purchase of an old palace known as the "Palace of the Pink Rose" in Geneva, a luxurious palace in St. Moritz, Switzerland, the purchase of an island in Spain for \$700 million, etc.." (Deldam, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 888)

Farah Pahlavi was also known as the "Queen of Embezzlement." (Fardoost, 2016 AD/1396 SH: 313) The financial record of the Pahlavi family includes partnership and ownership in more than 150 banking and insurance companies, as well as metal, textile, service, and construction industries. Other members of the royal family, especially Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, his brothers, children, sons-in-law, and all the courtiers, participated in this widespread corruption.

B) Moral and Behavioral Corruption

The leaders and close associates of the Pahlavi regime were also morally corrupt. Criminal gangs involved in smuggling were under the control of Mohammad Reza Shah's brothers and sisters (Khamenei, 13/11/1377).

"The promotion of addiction and industrial narcotics was initiated and took place in Iran by the main elements of the government of that day." (Khamenei, 17/10/1393)

The Shah had daily contact with girls he was interested in, Swedish, German, American, English, and others. A heavy price was paid for his relationships with some Western actresses. Ali Shahbazi, the head of the Shah's bodyguard team, writes in his memoirs: "After Alam became minister, he created a special organization in the Ministry of Court for the Shah's entertainment." "The job of that organization was to bring married women, unfortunate girls, or the wives and daughters of those who wanted to get a position, for the Shah." (Shahbazi, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 82)

Some army officers would offer their honor to the Shah for a promotion (Deldam, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 2, 884 and 885).

Other high-ranking officials and, consequently, the general public were also led toward corruption and prostitution.

Jean Lories, a French journalist, believes that "if you ask Iranians in the streets and alleys why they criticize and condemn the regime and you collect their answers, the corruption and moral decay of the regime will be at the top of their responses." (Lories, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 103)

C) Administrative and Political Corruption

Administrative corruption is the decay and misuse of official and organizational positions and posts for personal gain and interests. In the Pahlavi system, all types of administrative corruption existed in various forms. According to Imam Khamenei, the Pahlavi regime and its dependents were also heading toward decay in terms of administrative corruption. "In their management, they did not observe competencies; they made their dependencies and the instructions of foreign intelligence and security services the criteria and brought people to power." Bribery at the head of the government, smuggling deals, and betraying the people are indicators of administrative and organizational corruption (Khamenei, 13/11/1377), as is "Selfishness and personal profiteering instead of paying attention to the rights of the people." (Khamenei, 04/03/1378)

The disorganization and disorder of affairs is an important dimension of this corruption. Asadollah Alam repeatedly refers to this issue in the fifth volume of his notes: "Last night, Hushang Ansari, the Minister of Economy and Finance, was with me. He gave a strange account of the lack of coordination between government agencies and economic plans, the disarray of work, and strange and peculiar purchases without study. Among them was that due to the lack of a port, about one and a half billion dollars worth of goods were held up in the middle of the sea for three to four months. The shipping costs and the losses from late unloading amounted to a strange figure. Since he is my friend, I asked him, "Are you the minister of other planets that you don't take any action or at least report the matter to the Shah?" He said, "The Prime Minister won't allow it, because he's afraid the Shah will get upset with him." (Alam notes: 5, 255)

Scholars have stated that tyranny is both an important indicator and a cause of corruption. Ayatollah Khamenei also accepts this approach. The tyrannical system was a despotic one that wanted everything for itself and its dependents, and no one had the power to resist and confront the Shah and his relatives and affiliates. For this reason, the exercise of influence and the misuse of position in the Pahlavi regime knew no bounds.

Ashraf was a dominant force in this area as well: "Her Highness Ashraf, through her eldest son, managed to receive a large commission for contracting with several international consortiums, the sales of the French company "Dassault" to Iran, the project of the thermal power plant built by the Swiss company "Brown Boveri," and the contract for the Chabahar port facilities by the company "Brown & Root." (Hoveyda, *ibid*: 146)

Shams was also one of the leading figures of the Pahlavi era in this field. Shams used her influence to divert the route of the Tehran-Karaj highway so that it would pass through the middle of her properties, enabling her to sell her lands to well-known buyers at several times the usual price (Courtiers according to SAVAK documents, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 19, Introduction).

Shams, along with her husband and children, was the owner or major shareholder of several large economic institutions and companies (Bakhtiyari, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 68).

The court's corruption also tempted international brokers and heated up the market for illegitimate transactions. Hoveyda believes that with the flood of money into Iran, a flood of international traders and merchants descended upon Iran like flies on sweets, and a number of courtiers gathered around them, hoping to get a piece of the action. Brokerage grew like a cancer, and large sums of money were exchanged this way so that foreigners unfamiliar with Iran could establish contact with high-level officials. In the meantime, the families of deposed European kings, thanks to their acquaintance with the Shah, entered the field of brokerage and were able to get rich this way, brokering staggering contracts between Iran and Europe (Hoveyda, 2009 AD/1377 SH: 78).

Mohammad Reza Shah's showcase projects led to many people gathering around him in the hope of profiting, and the spirit of flattery increased, leaving him without honest and competent men (Keddie, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 226).

The main source and origin of all administrative corruption in the despotic system was the court's lack of belief in scientific and technical merit. According to Alam, the Shah had no faith in scientific consultation and management:

"The work of our country is of a special kind, and the Shah has his own special way of managing the country... For example, why should the head of the oil company not be involved in the oil negotiations? God knows, and the Shah, that's it!" (Alam *notes*: 3, 41)

Not only did the Shah not believe in experts, but he also treated the officials he appointed in various fields with disrespectful and humiliating language:

"I said that in Algiers, an informed delegation consisting of the Minister of Economy, the Head of the Central Bank, Dr. Fallah, the Minister of Interior (responsible for OPEC), and a number of experts should be present. He said, 'What good are these asses?' (ibid: 4, 386-387)

"The President of the University of Tehran wrote a letter to me saying that because the professors had complained about their low salaries to His Imperial Majesty, the Prime Minister was complaining. He said, 'The Prime Minister has no business complaining.' (ibid: 5, 132)

According to Graham, the Shah's autocratic behavior went so far that he strictly avoided involving government officials in politics. As a result, the participation of the people in politics and government was a very remote possibility (Graham, 1979: 172).

The regime's dependence on the dominant system and the full support of the US for the Shah increased the Shah's tyranny and, consequently, his corruption. The Shah, who would not consult with his own country's officials and even drove them away with foul language, was obligated to report to the Americans daily. Sullivan states that he met with the Shah every ten days (Salivan, 1981: 71). Zonis confirms the view of Mohammad Reza Shah's opponents who considered him a puppet and a dependent and spineless individual of the US (Zonis, 1991: 242).

Gasiorowski believes that the level of suppression and torture by the regime's security agencies with US support reached a point where, according to Amnesty International in 1975, no country in the world was worse than Iran in terms of human rights (Gasiorowski, 1991: 157).

The violent and brutal nature of the Pahlavi regime continued until the final days of the revolution, contrary to the claims of some who are trying to prove that the regime did not want to kill people. Armstrong refers to a letter in which Brzezinski strongly urged the Shah to use armed forces to suppress the protesters (Armstrong, 1981 AD/1360 SH: 50). A letter that was never sent to Iran and its draft text was also removed from access by the White House (ibid: 52).

In general, corruption that relied on the Shah's self-centeredness and the support of the dominant system was considered a natural matter, and the Shah and the court did not consider it illegitimate. In fact, they would even make excuses for it. The Shah's mother believed regarding bribery:

"It is customary for foreign companies to pay commissions. These poor people have not taken anything from the country's budget. If foreigners want to give a few million to our officials, why should we be narrow-minded and stop their generosity?" (Ayromlou, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 441)

Fereydoun Hoveyda also addressed this issue in his book and shows that the Shah also considered the corruption, wheeling and dealing, influence, and bribery of his entourage as "A Kind of Right to Transact Business."

"A French journalist (Olivier Warren) asked the Shah: "It is said that corruption has not spared some of your entourage; and the Shah replied, anything is possible; but in this particular case, I must say that this is not corruption; rather, it is behaving like others, meaning like those who have every right to work and transact." (Hoveyda, *ibid*: 92)

Analysis and Conclusion

In any political system, there is a possibility of error and corruption. However, when corruption becomes "Systemic" and involves all the pillars and elements of the system, it creates the grounds for deep and widespread dissatisfaction. The most important aspect of corruption becoming systemic is the political system being founded on the pillars of oppression and its direction toward discrimination, injustice, and disregard for the rights of the people, especially the deprived masses.

The tyrannical system was a tyrannical one that paid no attention to the people's consent and had no respect for Islamic values. On the contrary, it moved in the direction of secularization and opposition to religious laws. Such a system possessed the characteristics of a corrupt system in every way, and as a result of this corruption, all classes of people were dissatisfied and could no longer tolerate the existence of the regime.

Michel Foucault believes: "The Iranians, by their uprising, said to themselves, and this is perhaps the spirit of their uprising; we must definitely change this regime and get rid of this man, we must change the corrupt employees, we must change everything in the country, including the political organization, the economic system, and foreign policy." (Foucault, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 60)

Even stranger, according to Foucault, was the strike of departments like customs, which were symbols, personifications, and tools of corruption. The uprising of these institutions meant the uprising of corruption against corruption.

The main pillars of the Pahlavi system were corrupt, and the direction of the regime was toward decline and decay. In contrast, the main pillars of the Islamic system are righteous and healthy, and the system's direction is toward justice and health. Most importantly, in the Islamic system, corruption is not considered a natural and tolerable matter. In the thought of Imam Khamenei, "Economic, moral, and political corruption is a cancerous tumor for countries and systems, and if it affects the body of governments, it is a devastating earthquake and a blow to their legitimacy. He states that this is much more serious and fundamental for a system like the Islamic Republic, which needs legitimacy beyond conventional legitimacies and a foundation more profound than social acceptance, than for other systems." (Second Phase Statement of Islamic Revolution, 22/11/1397)

This kind of view is very different from the view of a person who considers corruption to be a kind of "Right" to activity and work.

Nevertheless, "The temptation of wealth, position, and power led some people astray even in the most righteous government in history, the government of Imam Ali (AS). Therefore, the risk of this threat appearing in the Islamic Republic, whose managers and officials once competed in revolutionary asceticism and simple living, has never been and is not unlikely." (ibid.) These stumbles and mistakes and the existence of weak-willed individuals who are tempted and fall into the abyss of corruption are not a reason to consider the Islamic system corrupt. The level of corruption in the Islamic system should be compared with other governments and systems, and in this regard, the Islamic system is not comparable to any other government. Most importantly, the ratio of corruption among the officials of the Islamic Republic's government is far less compared to many other countries and especially compared to the tyrannical regime, which was corrupt from top to bottom and fostered corruption." (ibid.)

In summary, it can be said that one of the important dimensions of the inefficiency and decline of the Pahlavi regime was its deep and widespread corruption. This research has attempted to analyze and explain the corruption of the Pahlavi regime based on the views of Imam Khamenei. It is clear that there is no room to cover all aspects, either theoretically or in terms of examples. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to clarify the main elements of his view, especially regarding corruption and its dimensions.

The results of the research show that Imam Khamenei considers corruption to be a kind of disease in one or more parts of the social organism. Political corruption, like corruption in the

body, can be limited to one part, but if this corruption spreads to different parts, it will be cancerous and deadly. Corruption also includes any kind of self-centered activity that uses power to achieve personal goals and exploit public resources by setting aside the law. Irresponsibility, lawbreaking, opportunism, lack of discipline, tyranny, and dependence on the dominant system are considered the most important indicators and dimensions of corruption, especially in the political arena. He believes that the Pahlavi regime was afflicted with corruption and decline in all its ideological, intellectual, moral, economic, and managerial aspects. This corruption also had a cancerous and incurable status, which is why it led to severe public dissatisfaction and paved the way for the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution. Numerous and diverse historical documents also confirm this point.

The data shows that the country's top official, the majority of his blood and in-law relatives, the absolute majority of the regime's leaders, and government appointees were afflicted with all kinds of corruption: bribery, gang activity, rent-seeking, misuse of position, embezzlement, wheeling and dealing, violation of rules and laws, complete immorality and prostitution, gambling, dog-keeping, foul language and cursing, etc. The leaders of the court, due to a lack of belief, disbelief, or lack of religion, did not set any boundaries for their material and sexual desires and violated all moral, legal, and administrative rules to satisfy their animal instincts.

According to Imam Khamenei, the main source of this widespread decline was the disbelief and tyrannical nature of the regime's leaders, and their dependence on greedy foreigners increased this corruption. Based on his view, the main center of corruption was the Shah himself, and he was the most polluted and corrupt person, in fact, the most corruptor. Other courtiers and dependents were also involved in corruption, and the extent of people's corruption and integrity could be measured by their proximity to or distance from the court. The closer a person was to the court and the Shah, the more corrupt they were.

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