

Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution



University of Tehran
Higher Studies Center Islamic Revolution

ISSN 2676-7368



Quarterly Scientific Journal



Vol.7, No.26, October 2025

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The Islamic Revolution as a Value-Oriented Movement: A Case Study: An Explanation of Events during the Premiership of Jamshid Amouzegar

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Article Info

Article type:
Scientific Research

Article history:
Received: 2025/4/26
Received in revised form: 2025/7/21
Accepted: 2025/10/19
Available online: 2025/10/19

Keywords:

Islamic Revolution, Jamshid Amouzegar, Mostafa Khomeini, Religious Value, Social Action.

ABSTRACT

Objective: Impartial scholars believe that pervasive corruption was a key characteristic of the Pahlavi regime. While extensive research has been conducted on this topic, it has not been thoroughly examined through the lens of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution. This article aims to address this gap by asking: 'What is Imam Khamenei's definition of corruption, and how does he view its depth and breadth within the Pahlavi regime?'

Method: The research method is qualitative of a historical type, and the analysis is documentary and qualitative. Data collection was conducted through library research and note-taking, and the explanation is provided with a sociological approach centered on religious values.

Results: Within the framework of his thoughts and with the aid of historical documents, court insiders' memoirs and writings, and existing research, this study presents examples and evidence of the court's corruption in each area.

Conclusions: The findings indicate that, in Imam Khamenei's view, the Pahlavi regime was afflicted by corruption in its moral, financial, managerial, and political aspects, and that this corruption was widespread. The Shah himself was the core of this corruption, and the closer individuals were to this core, the more corrupt they were.

Imam Khomeini's educational approach, through the revival of religious rites, played a decisive role in the general mobilization against the Pahlavi regime. The research findings indicate that the Goethe Poetry Nights, the martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini, the death of Dr. Shariati, the insulting article in the Ettela'at newspaper, the Cinema Rex fire, and the fortieth-day mourning ceremonies inspired by religious values and derived from the 40th of Sayyid al-Shuhada (Imam Hussein) were among the most important events that acted as carriers of religious values and had sociological impacts on the course of the revolution and the regime's collapse.

Conclusion: The results of the study of historical events during the prime ministership of Jamshid Amouzegar showed that the Islamic Revolution was a movement focused on values. The popular movement at the end of the Pahlavi regime was rooted in rational action focused on values, and collective behavior and social movements were formed on this basis; this led to the victory of the Islamic Revolution.

Cite this article: Ghasemi&B (2025). The Islamic Revolution as a Value-Oriented Movement: A Case Study: An Explanation of Events during the Premiership of Jamshid Amouzegar. Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution, 7 (26), 1-21. <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcrir.2025.394167.1702>



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DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcrir.2025.394167.1702>

Publisher: University of Tehran.

Introduction

The main issue of the present research is to analyze the origin and meaning of key political and social events during the premiership of Jamshid Amouzegar, focusing on how these events reflected and instigated religious and revolutionary values in Iranian society. The reasons for the Shah's dismissal of Amir Abbas Hoveyda after a long tenure as prime minister were to solve the country's problems, control inflation, manage the economic recession, and more importantly, silence political opponents. On the other hand, with the change of power in the United States and the Democrats coming to power, the Shah was forced to replace Hoveyda's government with a new one in the resulting "Open political atmosphere." In response to internal and external pressures, the Shah initiated a policy known as the "Open political atmosphere." Some political prisoners were released, and permission was granted for meetings and scientific and literary forums. During this period, the Goethe Poetry Nights were held, and criticism of the regime intensified. Amouzegar's premiership, which lasted less than 400 days, witnessed significant events such as the martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini, the publication of the insulting article, the Cinema Rex fire, and the 40th commemorations for martyrs. Imam Khomeini's leadership approach led to an increase in public awareness and mass mobilization. The central problem and innovation of this article is the explanation of events based on value-rational action.

The research aims to analyze the role of religious values in shaping popular protests during Jamshid Amouzegar's premiership as a reflection of the nature of the Islamic Revolution. This study seeks to answer the question: 'What role did Islamic values play in the events leading to the Islamic Revolution during Jamshid Amouzegar's premiership?' The article aims to explain and argue the hypothesis that the role of religious values in the revolution was of special and distinguished prominence. The impact of the significant events during the studied period on the acceleration and speed of the Islamic Revolution was inevitable; but its cause was oriented towards values and the performance of duty, which does not fit into a mechanical or materialistic analysis. The research method is qualitative-historical, employing documentary and qualitative analysis. Regarding the importance of the article, it is noteworthy that the Islamic Revolution, before and more than any other factor, was value-oriented, and Imam Khomeini, with his divine leadership style, was able to mobilize the people on the path of revolution through enlightenment, like a teacher. Consequently, the benefit of this topic is the explanation of events based on values and the understanding of the revolution's character. Its

necessity lies in explaining the revolution within a scientific framework; if it is not explained in its true and real form, it will be reduced to Marxist, economic, and materialistic analyses and conventional Western theories of revolution. In this respect, it is also considered a critique of other Western theories of revolution.

The innovation of the article lies in the precise explanation of the significant events of the Pahlavi regime (from August 7, 1977, to August 26, 1978) within the framework of religious-revolutionary values. This article uses logical reasoning and analysis of the events of the last days of Pahlavi, a critique of Western theoretical approaches and theories of revolution, a critique of non-religious approaches, and a focus on religious values. It has been attempted to explain the movement's progression during the studied period from discontent and protest to eventual unrest as being oriented towards values, which was accomplished through the mobilizing power of the revolution's leadership. The research method is fundamental-applied in type, using a qualitative method and a case study approach. The temporal scope covers the days of Amouzegar's premiership. Data collection methods include library research, credible sources, newspapers, and documents. In addition to quoting narratives and providing a thick description of historical events, the article performs content analysis and causal explanation within the framework of a value-oriented movement.

1. Literature Review

Within the books and articles written about the Islamic Revolution and the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty, there are references to the government of Jamshid Amouzegar. Among these studies are:

- Soheila Nazari Ghanbari and Fouad Pourarian (2022 AD/1401 SH), "The Causes and Consequences of the Publication of the Article of January 7, 1978." Conclusion: The publication of the insulting article led to unity among opposition political forces and helped the revolutionary ideology, with intelligent leadership, to become the spark that ignited the revolution.
- Mohsen Beheshti Seresht and Rasoul Saber Damirchi (2008 AD/1387 SH), "The Spark of Revolution: An Analytical Study of the Article by Ahmad Rashidi Motlagh." Conclusion: It accelerated the revolution and was the spark of the revolution.

- Gholamreza Kharkouhi (2017 AD/1396 SH), "The Martyrdom of Haj Agha Mostafa Khomeini." Conclusion: As a factor accelerating the struggles of the Islamic Revolution, the martyrdom of the Imam's eldest son was not considered a simple event but a joint conspiracy by the Iraqi intelligence organization (Estekhbarat) and the Iranian security organization (SAVAK). Iraqi doctors also stated the cause of death was poisoning, which consequently led to the formation and acceleration of the movement.
- Fouad Pour Arian and Arastoo Khodaparast (2012 AD/1391 SH), "The Endeavors of Jamshid Amouzegar's Government to Prevent the Islamic Revolution." Conclusion: They consider the selection of Amouzegar as prime minister an attempt to consolidate the Shah's power and create stability, which was unsuccessful. This trick by the Shah, due to Imam Khomeini's intelligence in leading the movement, actually accelerated the revolution.
- Ali Shirkhani (1998 AD/1377 SH), "The Uprising of January 9, 1978, in Qom." Conclusion: This work is mostly a compilation of memoirs, experiences, and field observations of individuals present in the uprising and is primarily a collection of the event's facts.
- Safa al-Din Tabraian (2002 AD/1381 SH), "The Explosion of an Article and Its Aftershocks." Conclusion: It caused an earthquake in the Pahlavi regime, and the subsequent events were like aftershocks that brought the regime closer to collapse, leading to many protests and uprisings.
- Abbas Naimi, Shahnaz Karimi, and Ali Morshedizad (2013 AD/1392 SH), "Iran: Red and Black Colonialism as an Accelerating Factor in the Islamic Revolution Based on Chalmers Johnson's Theory of Revolutionary Change." Conclusion: They seek to explain the article's subject within the theoretical framework of revolutionary change, explaining the continuous and repeated uprisings and demonstrations in the final days of the Pahlavi regime as a result of this article and within Johnson's theory, thereby highlighting the acceleration of the revolution.

The distinguishing feature of the present article compared to previous research is that, while confirming that the developments during the premiership period accelerated the revolutionary current and the regime's collapse, its new aspect lies in explaining the most important events

of the Amouzegar period in terms of value-rational action and a value-oriented movement. The article intends to explain a new aspect of the Islamic movement's issue that occurred during Amouzegar's premiership within the framework of value-based rational action. In other words, it seeks to explain the cause of the acceleration and speed in the last days of Pahlavi and the development and deepening of the revolution from the perspective of the revolution itself (the strength of the Islamic movement), not the Pahlavi regime. Consequently, it demonstrates the role and position of revolutionary values and the "Value-oriented movement." It goes beyond the usual previous analyses that "If the Shah had done this or that, he would not have fallen," and explains popular actions, the collective action of the people, and their focus on duty within the framework of values. To be clear, the innovation and advantage of this article lie in analyzing the role of religious values in the formation of popular protests during Jamshid Amouzegar's premiership as a reflection of the nature of the Islamic Revolution.

2. Conceptual Framework: The Value-Oriented Movement

The choice of the theoretical framework of value-oriented action is due to the religious-value-based nature of the Islamic Revolution and the sociological effects of values in the revolutionary process; it is the most suitable framework for analyzing the Islamic Revolution and the developments of the Amouzegar period. The Islamic Revolution was one of the most important political phenomena of the twentieth century, referred to as the "Last great revolution," (Wright, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 32-36) the "Revolution in the name of God," (Pierre Blanchet and Claire Brierre, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 11-32) the "Presence of religion and the school of Islam in the equations of the international system," (Foucault, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 24) "Imam and Shi'a," (Eshghi, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 63) and the "Proof of the emergence of religion as a major political force," (Stempel, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 43) and has been described with an emphasis on religion, sect, and Shi'a leadership. The Islamic Revolution has been studied based on various theories. Here, the developments of the Amouzegar period are evaluated based on the concept of a "Value-oriented movement" and a movement directed toward a transcendent goal. In the final years of the Pahlavi regime, Islamic values were transformed into generalized and developed beliefs, becoming a factor for stimulation, excitement, and acceleration in the Islamic Revolution, distinguishing it from other

revolutions. In this research, the approach of "Value action" and "value-oriented movement" is evaluated and explained, drawing respectively on the theoretical views of "Max Weber" (Parkin, 2005 AD/1384 SH; Raymond, 2011 AD/1390 SH) and the theory of collective and value-oriented movement by "Smelser" (Smelser, 2001 AD/1380 SH; Sabbagh Jadid, 2007 AD/1386 SH), in addition to summarizing the essence of the views mentioned above.

In this article, the concept of value-rational action from Weber's perspective and Smelser's theory of collective behavior and social movements are used to apply theories to the Islamic Revolution and the developments of the Amouzegar period. Weber's theory is at the individual (actor) level, while Smelser's theory is at a macro level (social and structural); these two were used complementarily in analyzing the developments of the Islamic Revolution. Weber proposed four types of social action:

1. Instrumental-Rational Action; an action in which the actor has a clear goal in mind and employs all means to achieve it, even at personal risk.
2. Affective Action; arises from specific inclinations and emotional states. If this behavior is consciously controlled, it takes on a rational aspect, but it inherently stems from conscience and internal feelings.
3. Value-Rational Action; rational action based on values and norms not only has roots in history, culture, and ideological values but also has innate roots. This action is internal; the actor behaves rationally while accepting risks and threats.
4. Traditional Action; springs from customs, behaviors, and beliefs that have become habitual. Here, there is no need for reason, logic, goals, or understanding of value; rather, it is shaped by habit and practice over time. The interpretive (*verstehen*) method seeks to understand the mind of the actor. All actions have a subjective dimension and possess value. Rationality is a tool for calculation (Raymond, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 566). Value rationality is a conscious belief in ethical, aesthetic, or religious values. This type of rationality is not oriented toward external success or a mere goal. The meaningfulness of value-rational action has a prominent obligatory aspect (religious duty); in value-based action, the meaning and purpose are embedded in the actor's behavior.

Smelser defines collective behavior as the non-institutionalized (informal) mobilization to reconstruct a part of social action. Here, social action is a rule-governed effort by an actor in an environmental or situational context to achieve a desired goal or goals. Collective action

has various components, the most important of which are values, norms, mobilization of motivation in organized action, and situational facilities. Among social actions, "Values" hold the highest position and a distinguished role, while "Objective facilities and capabilities" have the lowest role. According to Smelser, a revolutionary movement can be the most complex type of value-oriented movement. He posits that a revolution occurs in a society when:

1. Structural conditions in the society are conducive and the ground is prepared.
 2. Multiple structural strains arise and become active.
 3. A belief oriented towards redefining or transforming values exists in the society and gains general and public acceptance.
 4. Accelerating and precipitating factors occur, which cause the value-oriented belief to become established and, by delegitimizing the previous or existing regime, prepare and mobilize the people for revolutionary action.
 5. Effective mobilization and efficient organization of actors for participation in the revolutionary movement take shape; in other words, leadership is actively present and takes control of mobilization and organization in the movement.
 6. Agents and organizations of social control become incapable of containing, controlling, and suppressing the movement.
- The theory of value-oriented action in the views of Weber and Smelser has the ability to explain, to some extent, the developments during Amouzegar's premiership, which played a significant role in the process of the revolution and the collapse of the regime—but not all of it. The fundamental weakness of non-religious and materialistic theories is that they view all factors as linear and of equal importance, whereas this does not seem to be the case. The Islamic Revolution movement was a value-oriented action that, with the presence of leadership, was able to progress from the stage of dissatisfaction and protests to unrest. The reason for the evolution of this process was the presence of an active and teacher-like leadership in the revolution. Consequently, value-oriented goals were formed through stages of education, evolution, and transcendence, and the revolutionary individual acted according to his religious and value-based duty (i.e., made a revolution). In this research, value-oriented events refer to actions and incidents that lead to change, consolidation, or crisis in the values governing the socio-political sphere.

3. Descriptive-Explanatory Data and Research Text: The Amouzegar Period and Value-Oriented Events

Considering that the analysis of the role of religious values in the formation of popular protests during Jamshid Amouzegar's premiership as a reflection of the nature of the Islamic Revolution has been the focus of explanation, this research defines value-oriented events as actions and incidents that lead to change, consolidation, or crisis in the values governing the socio-political sphere at the individual and social actor levels. Among the events of the Amouzegar government, the most important ones, in chronological order, are the Goethe Poetry Nights, the martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini, the publication of the insulting article in the Ettela'at newspaper, the gatherings and Arba'een commemorations in Qom on January 9, Tabriz on February 18, and Yazd on March 29-30, 1978, and finally, the significant incident of the Cinema Rex fire on August 19, 1978, which have been considered and analyzed.

3.1. Goethe Poetry Nights

The Goethe Institute's program, executed by the Writers' Association of Iran and the literary guild, had its roots in the Nima and Khusheh poetry nights (Sepanlou, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 81; Baraheni, 1990 AD/1369 SH: 228). It also aligned with the direction of the Islamic movement. In the autumn of 1977, from October 10 to 19, the Writers' Association, in collaboration with the Goethe-Institut in Tehran, held a 10-night program where poets and writers presented poetry and speeches that were a critique of the atmosphere of repression and censorship. The said program was organized by the Writers' Association of Iran in coordination with Dr. Hans Becker, the director of the Goethe Institute in Tehran, for ten nights in the garden of the German Embassy in Iran. Although Hans Becker announced the program's limitations beforehand and applied necessary censorship to the texts before their performance, significant criticism and protest were directed at the Pahlavi regime (E'temadzadeh, 1992 AD/1371 SH: 69; Nogrehkar, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 117). With such actions, the Shah intended to align the thoughts, pens, ideas, and poems of literary figures with the regime's interests and goals (Bigdelou, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 375), but he had no success in this endeavor. Although the most important participants in such associations were, respectively, members of the Tudeh Party, socialists, and nationalist parties, it ultimately contributed to creating dissatisfaction and shaping the subsequent protests at the universities

of Tehran, Sharif University of Technology, and Amirkabir University of Technology, leading to unrest (Baraheni, 1979 AD/1358 SH: 230) and mobilizing the people towards the Islamic Revolution. The most important impact of the poetry nights was supplementary to the value-oriented protests; its significance lay in the fact that the speeches and poetry readings arose from within the intellectuals, academics, students, and artists, representing a kind of emotional sentiment based on value and social action against the regime.

The most significant reflection of the Goethe Poetry Nights was on the revolutionary situation and the weakening of Amouzegar's premiership, consequently accelerating the revolutionary process. The peak of the protests in October 1977 was a result of the promotion of resistance and perseverance literature in the form of poetry and speeches during these ten nights. It was a defense and resistance through culture, art, the creation of artistic ideas and paintings, writing literary stories, and resistance plays against oppression, and composing odes and ghazals by artists and literary figures. The poetry nights sought to reawaken the spirit of vigilance, perseverance, endurance, and continuous struggle against tyranny. Consequently, revolutionary values transformed from an individual form at the Goethe Poetry Nights into a social movement and, ultimately, a collective action.

It is worth mentioning that the Goethe Poetry Nights occurred after Carter came to power in January 1977 and the creation of an "Open political atmosphere" in Iran that winter, which was an important test for the Shah, the results of which became clear a year later. Studies conducted on the ten nights of poetry and speeches at the Goethe Institute show that the prevalence of protest against the regime outweighed its professional guild nature. The concepts used during this period focused on "Westoxification," "anti-Westernism," and "Islamism," which were employed in poems related to the Imam of the Time (Imam Mahdi) and the issue of Palestine (Ebrahimi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 21). The most important reflection of the Goethe Poetry Nights was in the form of resistance and perseverance literature. The most important components and indicators identified from the ten nights of performance included concepts such as praise of freedom, Mujahidin, and martyrs; calls for empathy and unity for resistance against the regime; attacks on the Shah's internal despotism; rebellion against mercenaries and traitors; exposing colonialism and global arrogance; praising the people and their valiant defense of values; presenting revolutionary role models; attention to the ancient history of Iran and Islam; condemning censorship and praising freedom of the pen, speech, and thought (Ebrahimi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 22). During the poetry nights, poets with

religious inclinations such as Garmaroudi, Saffarzadeh, and Bahmani were present, and it took on a value-based and critical nature. On the tenth night, all participants poured into the streets and clashed with the police.

3.2. Martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini:

The Imam's eldest son passed away on October 23, 1977. His untimely death was called martyrdom from the beginning. The Pahlavi regime considered it a natural death due to a heart attack. In any case, the untimely death of Mostafa Khomeini was a suspicious death that stimulated the people's religious values in the revolution. The martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini is important because its consequences were oriented toward religious and Islamic values. The prominent role of the Imam's eldest son in the struggle, planning for the Islamic movement, managing Imam Khomeini's office and household, and more importantly, his efforts to expand Imam Khomeini's thoughts and ideas were significant. Specifically, Mostafa Khomeini sought to combine Imam Khomeini's propaganda and awareness-raising ideas in the Islamic movement with armed struggle and combat (Rouhani, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 1, 932). In addition to awakening, religious awareness-raising, and preaching, Mostafa Khomeini considered learning military science and arts and guerrilla-partisan warfare necessary and essential. In this regard, he equipped revolutionary individuals and militant clerics and was in the process of providing equipment (Rouhani, 1982 AD/1361 SH: 1, 933). He believed that military training was an unavoidable necessity. Mostafa Khomeini believed that it was not possible to confront and overthrow a 2500-year-old regime with political work alone; therefore, arming prominent figures of the movement and armed struggle was a necessity. This issue was also monitored and observed by the regime's intelligence and espionage apparatus (Mohtashami, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 294). With this description, his suspicious death was part of the regime's goals and plans to extinguish the movement after his martyrdom. As stated in SAVAK documents, clerics opposed to the regime and supporters of Khomeini's movement in Iran, Iraq, and abroad were trying to elevate Mostafa Khomeini to the level of Imam Khomeini so that he could be his successor after his death. SAVAK and the regime's effort was to prevent the rise of a second Khomeini; the assumption was that with the untimely death of Mostafa Khomeini, all the plans of the revolutionaries, clerics, and supporters of the Imam would be thwarted (Document No. 13026, Oct. 30, 1977, SAVAK

Iraq Branch). The regime's analysis of this action was mistaken, and its results were the opposite because this movement was oriented towards religious values and not material calculations. Thus, with the martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini, the movement accelerated and, in fact, became a fire to a powder keg. After his martyrdom, the people mourned, and his untimely death was considered for the Imam as Ishmael was to Abraham. The Imam's steadfastness and patience in the face of his son's tragedy did not halt the movement, and the Imam's resolve on the path of the movement astonished everyone.

In the first days after Mostafa's martyrdom, the seminary classes were suspended, and from the very first hour, Imam Khomeini's house became a place for comings and goings, offering condolences, and mourning recitations. Grand Ayatollahs, sources of emulation, scholars, and various strata of people constantly came to the Imam's house (Neda Magazine, 1997 AD/1376 SH: No. 22, p. 23). This event led to a greater recognition of the Imam's personality and his ideas and the promotion of the Islamic movement. The seminary of Najaf was closed after the martyrdom of the Imam's son, and mourning ceremonies were held for him in Iraq for three nights in the largest mosque of Najaf. It was even decided that the closure would continue until the fortieth day (40th) of Mostafa Khomeini's martyrdom; however, the Imam started his classes on the tenth day so that other scholars could also resume their lessons (Mohtashami, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 1, 181). In holding various ceremonies, even up to the fortieth day, the regime's security forces were on full alert and in fear, and political speeches were delivered in all these ceremonies (Scientific Committee of the Martyr Mostafa Khomeini Congress, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 17). The most important demands in all the ceremonies were based on political and religious requests.

In the demonstrations after the martyrdom of the Imam's son, the people demanded: the Imam's return to the homeland, the release of political prisoners, the reopening of the Feyziyeh School in Qom for scholars and the resumption of classes, the freedom of assembly for religious clerics, confrontation with anti-religious manifestations, the reprimand of those responsible for arrests related to the hijab of female students and the prevention of such anti-Islamic and anti-value acts, the severing of cooperation and political relations with the Zionist regime, and the return of the country's official calendar to the Islamic Hijri calendar (15 Khordad Magazine, 1991 AD/1370 SH: No. 4, p. 562). The most important consequences of Mostafa Khomeini's martyrdom were the promotion of Imam Khomeini's name and the

strengthening of his leadership position. The impact of individual-social action at the societal level led to a value-based transformation and revolutionary acceleration.

3.3. The Article "Iran: Red and Black Colonization"

On Saturday, January 7, 1978, an article penned by Ahmad Rashidi Motlagh was printed and published in the official *Ettela'at* newspaper. The actual author of the article is not definitively known and it was published under the pseudonym Ahmad Rashidi Motlagh (Milani, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 211); it is suspected that the Shah himself may have written it. The article insulted the clergy and Imam Khomeini (RA). The article was published with the following content: "Red and black colonization, both old and new, possesses the spirit of aggression, domination, and plunder, which is consistent with their intrinsic nature. It has seldom happened that these two recognized colonial forces of history have cooperated with one another, except in specific cases; at the beginning of the Shah and People's Revolution on the sixth of Bahman, 2520 [Imperial Calendar], the red and black colonizers of Iran, who ostensibly each had their own specific plans and programs in our country, united with each other. The manifestation of this sincere cooperation became apparent in the turmoil of the fifteenth of Khordad, 2522, in Tehran." (*Ettela'at* newspaper, No. 15506, 2536 [1978]: 7) In addition to insulting the clergy and Imam Khomeini, this newspaper article attributed the 15th of Khordad 1342 (June 5, 1963) uprising to an alliance of landowners and clerics. It claimed that only Imam Khomeini opposed the Pahlavi regime, proposing Islamic laws and inciting landowners whose interests were threatened; it alleged that other clerics were not aligned with Imam Khomeini. It also stated that landowners and clerics saw their plans thwarted after the land reforms and resorted to rioting against the "White Revolution," attempting to unite and reclaim their lost lands (*Ettela'at* newspaper, No. 15506, 2536 [1978]: 7). The published article portrayed the Imam's actions as fame-seeking and indicative of a lack of faith in his character, whereas the Imam had dedicated his entire life to the service of Islam and the people. Furthermore, the article depicted the Imam as an agent of colonialism and an "Indian Sayyid." (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 242) It accused clerics who opposed the regime of secretly collaborating with communists to neutralize and nullify the achievements of the Shah's White Revolution (Abrahamian, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 624). The article was published at a very sensitive time and triggered value-based actions, provoking the religious and

revolutionary sentiments of the people and causing the revolution to gain twofold speed and acceleration. Moreover, this article coincided with the celebrations for women's liberation and the unveiling, as well as the recent passing of the Imam's eldest son. All of these factors led the Imam to repeatedly herald the imminent downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty (Navid newspaper, 1978 AH/1356 SH: No. 15, p. 2).

That the article's publication led to the expansion of protests and widespread unrest is confirmed in most sources. Why this article was published in this manner and with the Shah's insistence remains a question. Some sources attribute the cause to the elevation of the Imam's status and prestige after the martyrdom of his son, which the Shah sought to diminish (Milani, 2001 AD/1380 SH; Naraghi, 2019 AD/1398 SH), and that it was done after the issue of *Velayat-e Faqih* was raised and the monarchy was declared illegitimate. The Pahlavi regime's legitimacy was undermined by the theory of *Velayat-e Faqih*. The increasing power of the Imam and the weakening of the Shah's authority prompted the regime to confront Imam Khomeini (Masoud Ansari, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 75; Fardoust, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 1, 575). Furthermore, it appears that after the martyrdom of Mostafa Khomeini and the holding of various ceremonies and 40th (fortieth-day mourning) events following his passing, the political speeches delivered at these gatherings caused Islamic groups, elites, and intellectuals to unite with the clergy and show a greater interest in struggling against the regime. This issue multiplied the regime's anger (Tolu'i, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 755). Some trace the root to the personal animosity of Dariush Homayoun, the Shah's Minister of Information at the time, who used this to expand unrest against the regime (Lewis, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 62; Keddie, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 265; Gharabaghi, 1986 AD/1365 SH: 14). Tolu'i also considers the motive for publishing the article to be Hoveyda's hostility towards Amouzegar, aiming to topple his government (Tolu'i, 1993 AD/1372 SH: 754; Milani, 2001 AD/1380 SH). Whatever the reasons for the article's creation, the reaction of the Iranian people reinforced their orientation toward religious values and the performance of their duty. The cause—the insult to sacred figures and religious leadership—led not only to the fall of the government but to the collapse of the entire regime in the near future.

Jalal al-Din Madani, in his book "Contemporary Political History of Iran," believes that the article was published in the context of American human rights discourse and aimed to spread false propaganda against the Islamic movement, demean its leadership, and destroy its standing. However, it had the opposite effect: "They plotted, and Allah plotted, and Allah is

the best of plotters." The regime wanted to use the opportunity of American human rights discourse to its advantage, to target and humiliate the leadership of the Islamic movement at an opportune moment, to make people doubt the Imam, and to create a rift between the Imam and other clerics (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 245). The Islamic movement led by Imam Khomeini was an Islamic movement and a religious uprising oriented toward values and authentic Islamic culture. Immediately after the article's publication and distribution in the *Ettela'at* newspaper, it was met with a severe reaction in Qom and throughout the country, causing a vast wave of anger and hatred against the regime.

The most significant consequence of the January 7th article was the increased speed and violence of the protestors against the regime. Numerous 40th commemorations took shape in Qom, Tabriz, Yazd, and other cities. The most important outcome of this insult was the highlighting of the Imam's position as the religious and political leader of the movement. In Shi'a culture and tradition, holding a fortieth-day ceremony for the slain is of great importance and happens spontaneously and popularly without the need for political mobilization or leadership (Moadel, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 182). The roots of such religious behaviors are embedded in religious values, which constitute collective action and value-oriented social action. The author of "Inside the Iranian Revolution" noted that such events, which would be considered ordinary in the West, caused a revolutionary storm in Iran—a country based on traditional-religious values—and had severe consequences (Stempel, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 135). Some are of the opinion that the Shah did not imagine that the society's religious values had the capacity to confront and overthrow the regime; however, the most important result of this article was the awakening and revival of the society's religious values, causing the masses to stand against the regime (Foran, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 559) and act on their religious duty. Social events influenced by religious values led to a value-based transformation and revolutionary acceleration.

4. Marches and 40th as Social Action

From late 1977 and throughout 1978, demonstrations and marches across Iran were carried out as a value-oriented social action, ultimately leading to victory. On January 9, 1978, the bloody uprising of Qom began. On Monday morning, many clerics, based on coordination from the previous night, began demonstrating at the Khan School and Astaneh Square. With

the closure of the bazaar, a large crowd gathered, and the people of Qom's march continued until noon on Monday. Ayatollah Golpayegani praised the sense of responsibility among the clergy and called this action unifying. Ayatollah Shariatmadari deemed the defense of religious authority a sacred value. Near noon, the crowd moved towards the homes of Ayatollah Najafi Marashi and Haeri. After that, clashes with the regime's security apparatus and SAVAK began and continued until 9 p.m. It is reported that nearly 90 people were killed that night. Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khoei issued declarations, and Islamic countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan declared solidarity with the Iranian people (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 247).

Following the 40th for the martyrs of Qom, the people of Tabriz rose up, and the movement continued. On February 18 of that year, the people of Tabriz declared a day of public mourning. Ayatollah Qazi and Shariatmadari endorsed the closure of businesses on February 18 in Tabriz for a memorial service to commemorate the 40th of the Qom martyrs. On the morning of Thursday, February 18, various strata of people gathered at the mosque. The presence of police and the firing of warning shots provoked the people, leading to an attack on a police kiosk and chants of "Death to the Shah" and "Long live Khomeini." These protests and clashes continued until midnight (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 249; Foran, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 563).

On March 29 and 30, 1978, the people of Yazd rose up to hold the 40th for the martyrs of Tabriz. This event caused the uprising to spread to other cities. They boycotted and canceled the Nowruz (Persian New Year) celebrations of 1978, an ancient festival rooted in historical-civilizational culture, and acted in accordance with their religious beliefs and values. On Wednesday, March 29, after a mourning sermon, the people of Yazd took to the streets, chanting "Allahu Akbar, La Ilaha Illa Allah," "Long live Khomeini," and "Death to the Shah." During their march, they smashed the kiosks of the *Ettela'at* and *Rastakhiz* newspapers. Ayatollah Sadoughi declared the following day, Thursday, a public holiday in Yazd. On this day, large-scale demonstrations were held, demanding the release of political prisoners, especially Montazeri and Taleghani (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 248). After May 19, 1978, came the 40th of the martyrs. The 40th always evoked the martyrdom of Sayyid al-Shuhada (Imam Hussein), which not only recalled the greatness of the Hussein 40th but also empowered and expanded the popular demonstrations against the Pahlavi regime. In the march of May 19, the slogan "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Government" became a public

anthem. Although flyers and declarations mentioned issues like the abolition of class oppression, bread, housing, and freedom, the dominant theme was Islamic values.

In a new form of social action, people devised a novel way to oppose the regime: not leaving their homes. By staying indoors, they drew attention and showed their protest. This negative action by the people was effective, and with public silence, they further isolated the regime (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 253). After that, on July 21 of the same year, on the occasion of the birth of the Imam of the Time (Imam Mahdi), and during Ramadan of 1398 AH/August 1978 AD, the Imam published his 8-point message. At this time, large-scale demonstrations occurred in most cities. In addition to the aforementioned cities, protests took place in Isfahan, Najafabad, and Shahreza. On August 17, the Imam once again emphasized the call to struggle and demanded a decisive fight against the regime until its overthrow (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 256). The religious and monotheistic nature of the movement, oriented towards Islamic values, was constantly expressed in the Imam's statements, speeches, and declarations (Imam Khomeini, 2008 AD/1378 SH: 8, 76; 2, 153). The presence of an aware and awakened populace in the movement, the 40th, and the protests was a result of religious values (Imam Khomeini, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 2, 153).

Cinema Rex

The regime had just weathered a domino-like series of unrest and was preparing for a new 40th. A very shocking and accelerating event occurred that overshadowed all previous developments. On August 19, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the August 19, 1953 coup, the Cinema Rex in Abadan, located in a working-class area, was suspiciously set on fire, and more than four hundred men, women, and children were burned alive. Official sources announced the number of victims of the Cinema Rex tragedy as 377 (*Keyhan* newspaper, 1978 AD/1357 SH: No. 10551, p. 2). The Pahlavi regime, seeking to exploit the situation opportunistically, immediately recalled recent popular attacks on cinemas and blamed the opposition for the fire. On the other hand, the opposition accused the regime and SAVAK of orchestrating a Reichstag-style fire, locking the cinema doors, and obstructing the timely response of the local fire department. They also pointed out that demonstrators only attacked empty cinemas showing "Obscene" foreign films, whereas Cinema Rex was showing an Iranian film that was openly critical of the regime and contemporary Iranian society. Whatever the truth, the day after the fire, several thousand people from the victims' families

and relatives gathered for a large funeral procession, all holding SAVAK responsible for the incident. The mourners marched through the streets of Abadan, shouting slogans like "Death to the Shah, Down with the Pahlavi monarchy," "The army is our brother, Khomeini is our leader." In sum, the demonstrations after the cinema tragedy were similar to the protests and unrest of the previous nine months, with a nature oriented towards religious values and, in a word, that the Shah must go (Abrahamian, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 633). This demand indicated that the regime was the culprit, even though the definitive identity of the perpetrators was never established. The reality is that the local police and fire department were openly involved in the matter, preventing the large crowd present at the scene from opening the cinema doors. The fire was brought under control with a four-hour delay, or they arrived at the scene late. Throughout Iran, the regime and SAVAK were recognized as the main culprits. At this time, people were shouting, "Death to the Shah, we will set him on fire." The grieving crowd drove the police out of the cemetery. In the last ten days of the holy month of Ramadan, between 50 and 100 people were martyred in clashes with the police in 14 Iranian cities. After this event, Jafar Sharif Emami replaced Amouzegar (Foran, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 561). In 1978, the day of the martyrdom of Imam Ali coincided with the seventh day of mourning for the fire victims, and demonstrators organized a massive protest (*Keyhan* newspaper, 1978 AD/1357 SH: No. 10544, p. 2; Avery, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 561). A gathering of representatives from the workers' organization called the incident a major national tragedy (*Ettela'at* newspaper, 1978 AD/1357 SH: No. 15691, p. 3).

Some link the cinema fire incident to a speech by the Shah one day earlier, on August 18. They say that after the Shah praised his own services and spoke of Iran's future, claiming he would lead Iran to a "Great Civilization" and contrasting it with the "Great terror" of others—referring to Imam Khomeini's messages recommending continued struggle—hundreds were burned in the cinema the very next day. Details of the incident revealed several suspicious facts: "The cinema's exit doors were locked; the type of flammable materials was identified; there was a ten-minute delay in notifying the fire department and a four-hour delay in their arrival; the fire hydrants at the scene were dry, in a city that was home to the world's largest oil refinery; the cinema was located near the police headquarters; and officials prevented people from breaking down the cinema doors. The newspapers also reported that the cinema doors were locked from the inside during the fire. Afterward, the manager, guard, and janitor of the cinema were arrested and imprisoned (*Keyhan* newspaper, 1978 AD/1357 SH: No.

10544, p. 2). Following this, the people of Khuzestan province seriously joined the revolutionary current (*Keyhan* newspaper, 1978 AD/1357 SH: No. 10546, p. 1). On the 21st of Ramadan, coinciding with the martyrdom of Imam Ali (AS), the demonstrations peaked and became international headlines (Madani, 1983 AD/1362 SH: 2, 256). The Associated Press reported, "The syndicate of Iranian cinema owners announced that they will refrain from reopening cinemas until reliable protection for them is provided." (*Ettela'at* newspaper, 1978 AD/1357 SH: No. 15691, p. 2)

Conclusion (Conclusion and Applied/Strategic Results)

The research findings show that the revolutionary situation in Iran during the final days of the Pahlavi era, specifically the "Premiership of Jamshid Amouzegar," was oriented toward religious values. The collective action of the people was the result of value-rational action and was inspired by the uprising of Sayyid al-Shuhada (Imam Hussein). Before the Islamic Revolution intensified and led to victory, Imam Khomeini, by re-articulating the ideals of the Islamic movement, provided the theoretical and value-based foundation for revolutionary action. Approximately three years after Reza Shah was deposed by the Allies and succeeded by his son, Imam Khomeini published his first writings that had a political and insurrectionary nature. The Imam cited this verse from the Quran: "Say, "I only advise you of one thing: "That you rise up for Allah, in pairs or individually" (Surah Saba: 46). This message from the Imam was revolutionary in nature. This statement was emphasized from the beginning of Mohammad Reza Shah's rule. The Imam explained that the Prophet (PBUH) himself, who was immersed in contemplation and thought, rose up for God and fought to change and reform the socio-political situation. As long as Muslims rise up for worldly material interests, it will not yield results.

On the 15th of Khordad, during Ashura, the Imam declared the Shah's government to be against Islam and religious values, highlighting its relationship with the Zionist regime and its enmity towards the Quran. Subsequently, demonstrations in 1964, 1970, and 1975 occurred with a similar orientation toward religious values. What gained more strength during the premiership of Jamshid Amouzegar and accelerated the revolution was the formation of groups based on religious values, such as the "Abuzar Revolutionary Group," "Mahdiyyoun," "Allahu Akbar Group," and other Islamic currents with a religious and ideological nature. This issue peaked when the Imam's son passed away under suspicious circumstances. After

that, the publication of the insulting article against the Imam in January 1978 was interpreted as a symbolic action against religious values and, according to Smelser's theory, played the role of a structural strain and emotional mobilization. Other events, such as the uprisings of January 9 in Qom and February 18 in Tabriz, and uprisings in at least 50 other large and small cities, led to the holding of 40th ceremonies for the martyrs. All these uprisings and mourning ceremonies were religious in nature and oriented toward the authentic values of the revolution. In August 1978, the people's anger reached its peak, heralding the end of Amouzegar's premiership.

The findings indicate that the domino-like fall of governments one after another as the regime neared its collapse made the victory of the Islamic Revolution inevitable. Consequently, the Islamic movement, Imam Khomeini's religious uprising, and the factors that led to the victory of the Islamic Revolution were oriented toward values and the performance of religious duty. As pointed out in the theories of Weber and Smelser, firstly, the Islamic-religious value nature ("Value-rational action") caused the revolutionary presence of the people. Secondly, as Smelser indicated, the existence of revolutionary conduciveness, strain, a generalized belief, popular mobilization, and the helplessness and desperation of the ruling regime led to action based on religious duty.

Applied and Strategic Results of the Research:

- An innovative explanation of the nature of the Islamic Revolution, the roots of the collapse, and the role of values and Imam Khomeini's religious education in society, which strengthened and matured policies and systems. Its continuation will ensure dynamism. Specifically, the research results indicate that adherence to religious values in the Islamic Revolution brings about dynamism.
- Presenting the experiences of the Islamic Revolution to Islamic movements and uprisings in the Islamic world and the resistance. Because it is Islamic and value-oriented, this experience serves as a strategy. The research results show the impact of religious values at the individual and social levels in creating movements, dynamism, and revolutionary mobilization. The diplomatic apparatus and bodies dealing with revolutionary movements can practically use the role of value-based action at the individual and social levels in Islamic countries.
- Presenting the distinguishing feature and unique characteristic of the revolution to other Islamic and transnational governments: that they will not succeed as long as they

are not value-oriented. The strategy of applying political Islam is practically usable for revolutionary institutions and the foreign policy apparatus.

- For Islamic and liberation movements disillusioned with Eastern and Western models: presenting the model of the Islamic Revolution based on the innate nature of justice-seeking and progressive values.
- It is recommended that future researchers meticulously investigate the role of innate and divine (religious) values in the events after 1963 in a detailed, case-study manner.

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Analysis and Critique of Imamate and Community Leadership in the Thought of Sayyid Muhammad Nurbakhsh

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Article Info

Article type:
Scientific Research

Article history:
Received: 2024/5/26
Received in revised form: 2024/6/18
Accepted: 2024/8/11
Available online: 2025/10/21

Keywords:

Real Imamate, Relative Imamate, Pious Scholar, Juridical Mysticism, Mystical Jurisprudence.

ABSTRACT

Objective: The enduring discourse on Imamate and leadership in Islam has underexplored mystical perspectives. This article analyzes how Ibn Arabi's and Nurbakhsh's thought expanded guardianship (Vilayah) from spiritual to political authority, intellectually underpinning the Safavid dynasty's rise.

Method: Using historical, comparative, and analytical methods within the History of Thought framework, the study conducts an intra-textual analysis of Nurbakhsh's works to evaluate mystical interpretations of Imamate and their socio-political implications.

Findings: Mysticism presents three frameworks for reconciling religious law (Sharia) and spiritual reality (Haqiqa): Reality without Law (transcending legal constraints), Reality within Law (spirituality confined to jurisprudence), Law within Reality (jurisprudence subordinated to mystical truth).

Ibn Arabi's reinterpretation of *ijtihad* (independent legal reasoning) and *jihad* (struggle), later systematized by Nurbakhsh, crystallized the third framework. This redefined guardianship as both inner and outer authority, elevating exoteric *ijtihad* to "Revelatory *Ijtihad*" and positioning the Imam as harmonizer of the "lesser *jihad*" (physical struggle) and "greater *jihad*" (spiritual struggle).

Conclusion: Nurbakhsh categorizes Imamate into "Real Imamate" (saints embodying all ideal traits) and "Relative Imamate" (partial manifestation of traits). Most Shi'a Imams, lacking comprehensive qualifications per "Mystical Jurisprudence," fall under "Relative Imamate." This critique of conventional Shi'a narratives legitimizes Sufi-inspired political models, exemplified by the Safavids' fusion of spiritual and temporal power, demonstrating how mystical reinterpretations enabled enduring theological-political innovations.

Cite this article: Mousavi Hashemi & A, Asgari Yazdi & A, Mir & M, Malekmakan & H (2025). Analysis and Critique of Imamate and Community Leadership in the Thought of Sayyid Muhammad Nurbakhsh. *Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution*, 7 (26), 22-47. <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcir.2024.377080.1626>



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DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcir.2024.377080.1626>

Publisher: University of Tehran.

Introduction

The issue of Imamate and community leadership is the most enduring and debated intellectual topic among Muslims (Shahrastani, 1985 1364 SH: 1, 24), from the era of the noble Prophet of Islam to the present day. It encompasses a wide range of disciplines, including jurisprudence (Fiqh), philosophy, theology, mysticism, history, and more, with scholars from each field addressing it according to their respective intellectual frameworks.

Within this discourse, the perspective of mysticism on Imamate and community leadership has received less attention. This is despite the fact that many social movements and uprisings after the 6th century AH occurred within a mystical context, led by mystics, Babas, and shaykhs of various orders (Salasel). Indeed, the first national government in Iran after the advent of Islam was established based on a mystical approach to Imamate and leadership.

A major reason for this oversight is the neglect of the evolution of the relationship between religious law and reality in mystical thought and perspectives. It is as if everyone has assumed that the domain of the mystical path is the inner dimension of religion, and the mystic's role is solely to engage with the sacred and spiritual, thereby remaining connected to God but detached from creation and society (Tabataba'i, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 206-211). However, an examination of the lived history of mystics, their orders, and their mystical viewpoints reveals three distinct perspectives on the relationship between Law and Reality:

- Reality without law in this view, attaining reality is considered to mean transcending the law and becoming independent of it. This is either because law is seen as the lower station and reality as the higher (a vertical relationship) (Hajviri, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 499), or because immersion in divine ecstasy and inner intoxicants leads to a deep slumber that causes an absence from the sensory world, thereby lifting the obligation of religious duties (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 69 L), or some of its preliminaries like ablution, from the mannerfarer (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 8 R).
- Reality within the framework of law; according to this viewpoint, the mannerfarer considers himself in need of the Law and adherence to it at all stages of the spiritual journey. Any negligence towards the Law is seen as a deviation from the path and a failure to reach reality. Thus, the mystic essentially subscribes to a form of "Juridical Mysticism," as many mystics, despite being shaykhs of a spiritual path, followed one or more schools of jurisprudence in matters of law (Dara Shokouh, 12th cent. AH: 10 R, 19 L, et al.; Najjar, n.d.: 90). Some, like Junayd al-Baghdādī (d. 297 AH) and Ibn Arabi (d.

638 AH), wore both the cloak of mysticism and the mantle of jurisprudence (Qushayri, 1911 AD/1290 SH: 430; Jahangiri, 2015 AD/1395 SH: 543).

- Law within the framework of reality. From this perspective, the mystics are the ones who truly know the "Reality of things as they are." The footing of the people of philosophy, theology, jurisprudence, hadith, and other Islamic sciences is considered wooden, and their ultimate effort is acquisition, whereas the mystic's foundation is presence and witnessing, and his ultimate station is annihilation of the self and subsistence in God. At this stage, the mystic is a manifestation of the divine names and attributes and a "World-revealing cup" of the realities of the universe. Therefore, understanding the reality of the law and the right to spiritually guide the people belongs to the perfected saints, who are simultaneously mujtahids in law, strivers on the path, and have attained reality (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 107 R). It is based on this outlook that the presence of mystics in all individual and social spheres becomes tangible, especially after the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate. The emergence of Ibn Arabi (d. 638 AH) and the widespread acceptance of his ideas, coupled with the expanded influence of mystics resulting from the social transformations of the Mongol era—such as the lack of political legitimacy, social instability, and widespread tolerance—created a unique environment for the propagation of mystical ideas and views among the spiritual orders and their masters (Bashir, 2001: 88).

By redefining the concepts of Law and Ijtihād (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 270) and by legitimizing and applying unveiling, witnessing, dream interpretation, and astrology alongside other conventional sources in the formal sciences, they produced a mystical interpretation of those sciences and their issues, which was previously rare and sometimes entirely unprecedented. One mystic who re-envisioned and analyzed Law within the framework of the mystical path was Sayyid Muhammad Nurbakhsh (d. 869 AH), a Shaykh of the Kubrawiyya order and the leader of one of the socio-political revolutions of the 9th century AH. This issue had a precedent among earlier Kubrawi Shaykhs, and its comprehensive initiator in the fields of both jurisprudence and theology can be considered ‘Ala al-Dawla Simnani (d. 736 AH). For this reason, Nurbakhsh pays special attention to the views and opinions of Simnani in his works (Nurbakhsh, 1003 AH: 107 L).

Studying the views of Nurbakhsh (d. 869 AH) on the concept and status of Imamate and leadership, and the characteristics and duties of the community's Imam, makes the results of

this mystical approach accessible to researchers. It also clearly demonstrates the evolution of Ibn Arabi's ideas as reflected in the works of one of his main proponents in the 9th century—who considered his own ideas to be an elaboration of Ibn Arabi's thoughts (Nurbakhsh, 1262 AH: 127 R). Ultimately, it provides a basis for understanding the role of the teachings of this mystical perspective in shaping the developments after the Mongol conquest of Islamic societies, the emergence of numerous social uprisings led by mystics, and its influence on the formation of political and social traditions within Iranian society, particularly the structure of subsequent political powers from the Safavids to the present day.

1. The Concept of Mystical Jurisprudence

Although works and sayings on matters of jurisprudence and theology have been left by earlier mystics, they generally cannot be formulated within the conventional structures of these disciplines as they existed in the formal sciences. They are typically nothing more than esoteric interpretations of religious rituals and beliefs. Even the exegetical and ethical works of mystics, who fit into the conventional formats of these two sciences and gave rise to the branches of mystical exegesis and mystical ethics, are often of this nature. Works such as *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) and *Kīmiyā Sa'ādat* (The Alchemy of Happiness) by Muhammad Ghazali (d. 505 AH), and the book *Rawḍat al-Farīqayn* by Abū al-Rajā' Khumrakī (d. 516 AH), can be considered among the first attempts to present a mystical account of jurisprudential issues in the conventional style of the formal sciences.

On this basis, Sayyid Muhammad Nurbakhsh should be regarded as the first mystic to have authored a complete course on the principles of faith and a complete course on jurisprudence in 53 chapters, following the customary method of theologians and jurists, but based on unveiling and witnessing and their authority in understanding correct beliefs and deriving jurisprudential rulings. This can be termed "Mystical Theology" (as distinct from theological mysticism) and "Mystical Jurisprudence" (as distinct from juridical mysticism, which is a manner within the framework of law). According to this perspective, everything, even the law, is represented and defined within the context of a mystical worldview.

2. The Relationship of Imamate with Prophethood

Guardianship or Vilayah is the essential core and marrow of mysticism, to the extent that it has been said: "The foundation and basis of the path of Sufism and gnosis rests entirely on Vilayah and its affirmation," (Hajviri, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 265) and "The axis of Sufism and the path revolves around the spiritual master." (Mihani, 1988 AD/1367 SH: 46)

Linguistically, Vilayah means "Support," and with a fatha (Valayah), it means "Authority" or "Rule." (Raghib Isfahani, 2007 AD/1428 AH: 547) These two have also been considered to convey a single reality, which is the assumption of command, supervision, and guidance (Hajviri, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 266).

In the terminology of mystics before Ibn Arabi (d. 638 AH), Vilayah typically meant the proximity and closeness that a servant finds to God. As a result of this closeness and the annihilation of one's desires and wants in the desires of God Almighty, one is honored with the station of supervision and guidance. This definition is more concerned with the inner dimension (spiritual guardianship) than the outer dimension of Vilayah. However, mystics like Hajviri (d. 470 AH), after providing an inner definition of Vilayah, turned their attention to the issue of authority in mysticism and enumerated three important characteristics and functions for the possessors of this type of guardianship:

- 1) Impeccability and protecting servants from sins;
- 2) Vicegerency and supervision over others and control in human affairs;
- 3) Love, based on the verse "He loves them, and they love Him," (Qur'an 5:54) by which God has specified His saints for His friendship (Hajviri, 1996 AD/1375 SH: 266-7).

This expression of Vilayah and the station of the master and saint gives manner in the school of Ibn Arabi and Nurbakhsh to the "Muhammadan Reality" and the "Perfect Man," acquiring a broader meaning than before.

From this perspective, the fixed archetype of the all-comprehensive divine name is considered the essential and inner reality of the Seal of the Prophets (PBUH), as he himself stated: "I was a prophet while Adam was between water and clay." (Ibn Shahrashub, n.d.: 1, 214) In this saying, the Prophet (PBUH) is referring to his essential reality, which is the fixed archetype of the all-comprehensive name of God and which precedes the matter of creation. For this reason, that reality which possesses the quality of being a locus of manifestation for the all-comprehensive divine name is termed the "Muhammadan Reality." Therefore, the Muhammadan Reality does not specifically refer to the noble Prophet of Islam (PBUH) but is

a transcendent reality and an effect that is equivalent to the First Intellect of the philosophers (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 1, 94). This reality is a pre-eternal and post-eternal matter, as it resides in the divine realm. It is a universal reality that is at the same time concrete and possessing of levels. Thus, it is not a mental or conceptual matter (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 1, 94). Accordingly, the first determination that became determined from the Undetermined was the Greatest Spirit and the Universal Intellect, which is the Muhammadan Light. That light is the vicegerent of God, the absolute Imam, and the purpose of the cosmos; just as grace and support flow from Allah to all universal and particular names, so too do grace and support flow from the Muhammadan Reality to all other existent beings (Lahiji, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 272).

However, the external manifestation of the Muhammadan Reality comprises the levels of prophethood, messengership, and universal guardianship. In terms of the level of prophethood and messengership, it manifests in every age in the form of one of the divine prophets. This evolutionary progression in the manifestation of that reality continued until the time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), with whom that reality has a complete correspondence and is, in principle, his inner reality (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 1, 144). In terms of the level of guardianship, it manifests in the form of saints, and this manifestation will endure and continue until the Day of Resurrection.

2.1. Analysis and Critique

Some are of the view that in explaining the relationship between guardianship and prophethood, mystics have given preference to guardianship, meaning that the station of sainthood—even that of a non-infallible saint—takes precedence over the station of prophethood (Qummi, 1956 AD/1336 SH: 164; Majlisi, 1994 AD/1373 SH: 51-2). However, this view does not seem correct, because mystics have made a detailed distinction between prophethood, messengership, and guardianship. In this formulation, prophethood is the intermediary and isthmus between guardianship and messengership, because prophethood consists of receiving news of divine realities (the essence, names, and attributes of God) and knowledge of the rulings of law through revelation. This reception of news takes two forms:

- A) Receiving news of the gnosis of the essence, attributes, and names. This is the station of Vilayah (guardianship), whether it appears from a prophet or a saint. This form of receiving news is called "Inner prophethood," "Derivative prophethood," or "Absolute prophethood." (Lahiji, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 232) Inner prophethood is not subject to

termination and will endure until the Day of Resurrection, because divine revelation and divine sending-down are not subject to cessation (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 285).

In every era, a saint is standing; until the Resurrection, the trial is lasting (Roomi, 1997 AD/1376 SH: Book II, 214)

B) Combining the reception of news of the gnosis of the essence, attributes, and names with the propagation of the rulings of Law, inculcating ethics, teaching wisdom, and undertaking political leadership. This is specific to messengership and is called "Outer prophethood" or "Legislative prophethood." (Lahiji, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 232) In outer prophethood, messengership is a temporal attribute (#divine) and a created state of the prophet, not his station. Therefore, unlike prophethood and guardianship, it is subject to cessation and vanishes with the end of the era of legislation (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 2, 256-7).

From this perspective, Vilayah is more general than prophethood and messengership; and prophethood is more general than messengership but more specific than Vilayah (Lahiji, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 232). Therefore, Vilayah is the inner dimension of prophethood and messengership. This is because there is no prophet or messenger who has not first been honored with the station of Vilayah. Then, according to the vastness of his Vilayah, he receives prophethood and messengership. From this standpoint, the prophetic station of the prophets has two aspects relative to their station of guardianship:

- 1) **Inner and Ontological Aspect:** Their station of guardianship is superior to their station of prophethood and messengership.
- 2) **Aspect of Attaining Stations:** The station of messengership is the highest rank, the station of prophethood is the next, and the station of guardianship is subsequent to those two (Kashani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 344).

On this basis, the prophethood and messengership of a prophet hold superiority over the guardianship of a non-prophet. Despite the majesty of the station of guardianship, it is derived from prophethood, and the sign of the validity of a saint's guardianship is his following of the prophet (Sha'rānī, n.d.: 2, 435). Therefore, the comprehensive, perfect, and all-inclusive Muhammadan Reality manifests in this elemental world in the form of both prophets and saints. Its manifestation as prophets is for teaching rulings and guiding servants, and its

manifestation as saints is for making people aware of the secrets of God Almighty (Jahangiri, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 497).

Consequently, Vilayah is the continuation of prophethood. Through inner prophethood, it is the inheritor and guardian of the reality and essence of the monotheistic sciences that were conveyed and explained by outer prophethood. For this very reason, recognizing the saints after the sealing of prophethood has been deemed a duty and obligation for all (Nurbakhsh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 69).

3. The Position of Imamate and Community Leadership

In the intellectual system of the mystics, the spiritual guidance of the members of society is an affair that is not possible except through a saint. Therefore, the spiritual guidance of the community has long been an established matter for the masters of the path. "To undertake the spiritual journey without a guide who has traversed the path and seen its manners is a mistake... The saying, "He who has no shaykh, his shaykh is Satan," is a point of consensus among all spiritual masters" (Nurbakhsh, 13th cent. AH: Mi'rājiyyah, 126 L).

Do not travel the path alone, without a guide,

And do not enter this sea with blind eyes. (Attar Nishapuri, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 307)

This form of guardianship, which mystics have long ascribed to themselves, in reality, possesses a "God-to-creation" identity. This means that from the perspective of the mannerfarer, it requires acquisition and the traversing of spiritual stations, and from the perspective of God, it is the bestowal of effulgence. Therefore, such guardianship is in a sense an acquired matter and is accessible to all who can set foot on the path of manner and traverse its stations, ultimately becoming the spiritual leader of others by receiving the cloak (the designation of a shaykh) and establishing their chain of transmission. In contrast, the exoteric affairs of society rested upon the shoulders of kings, rulers, and scholars of the religious law (Law).

However, the rethinking of the concept of independent legal reasoning and the concept of struggle by mystics such as Ibn Arabi, and its detailed representation in the thought of Nurbakhsh, paved the manner for the expansion of the scope of Vilayah from inner guardianship to outer guardianship.

4. Rethinking the Concept of Ijtihād

From the perspective of Ibn Arabi's mysticism, the vicegerents of God on earth are the prophets (Kashani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 408). Among the prophets, the Seal of the Prophets (PBUH) is distinguished by his comprehensiveness, uniting prophethood, messengership, vicegerency, sovereignty, knowledge, and wisdom (Kashani, 1383 SH: 406). It was this very characteristic of the Prophet (PBUH) that caused his community, through the permissibility of ijtihād in the Law, to be distinguished from and superior to the communities of past prophets (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 400).

Ijtihād in the Prophet's community does not mean the creation of a new religious law; rather, the authority of ijtihād is confined to operating within the scope of the Law. Therefore, the view of Ibn Arabi and Nurbakhsh is one of adherence to ijtihād for the understanding of the Muhammadan law, not a transgression beyond the Prophet's law or the attainment of a station parallel to the Prophet, as has been noted in various statements: "And we have only said this so that no deluded person may imagine that I and those like me are claiming prophethood. No, by God, nothing remains but inheritance and journeying upon the path of Muhammad, the Messenger of God, specifically." (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 456).

Therefore, from the perspective of the proponents of mystical and revelatory jurisprudence, two types of ijtihād exist:

A) Exoteric / Transmitted Ijtihād

This is an ijtihād in which the legal reasoner, by seeking the aid of transmitted proofs—the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus—derives the ruling of the law (Kashani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 408; Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 2, 162). He is considered correct in his derivation of the legal ruling because that which is commanded in the law is the act of ijtihād itself, not the ijtihād of the correct ruling. Such a matter itself gives rise to a type of legislation that is called "Contingent law." (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 400). On this basis, the error of the mujtahid is not a transgression against the ruling of God, but rather a matter of its non-correspondence with the preceding ruling (the ruling of the Prophet). Thus, he only benefits from the reward of the effort of ijtihād, whereas if his ijtihād had corresponded with the Prophet's ruling, he would have received two rewards (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 142).

B) Esoteric / Revelatory Ijtihād

This is an ijtihād in which the source of the mujtahid's ruling is the same as the source of the ruling of the Messenger of God (PBUH). That is, both take from God, with the difference that the mujtahid is a follower of the Prophet's ruling in his own ruling. This means his connection to the divine source is for the purpose of unveiling the very essence of the Prophet's ruling. Hence it has been said: "With us, ijtihād is the exertion of effort in acquiring the inner preparedness by which one accepts this special descent, which in the time of prophethood and messengership is only accepted by a prophet and a messenger." (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 270) Therefore, the mujtahid in this sense is free from error, because he witnesses the real and objective ruling of the prophetic law (Kashani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 408; Nurbakhsh, 13th cent. AH: Mi'rājiyyah, 124 L).

For this reason, the revelatory mujtahid, in the language of revelation, is the "Vicegerent of God" and in the language of the exoteric, the "Vicegerent of the Messenger of God." (Kashani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 408-10) The true inheritors of the divine prophets are such mujtahids: "The scholars of God, of God's rulings, and of the path of arrival to God, because he (PBUH) said, "The scholars are the heirs of the prophets," not the ignorant prattlers, the formalists, those whose tongues resemble the scholars." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 76 L). Therefore, the word scholars, when used absolutely, refer to the pious scholar, who is the gnostic of God (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 233 R). The exoteric mujtahids are, in reality, the judges of religious law in jurisprudential matters (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 188 L). However, the ultimate reference and resolver of disputes in the community after the Prophet is the pious scholar: "And that he should not be audacious in matters upon which the Islamic community does not agree and in matters whose reality he does not know with certainty, but rather he should refer in its verification to a pious, active, and eternal scholar, who is endowed with laudable morals and free from blameworthy morals." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 114 L)

4.1. Analysis and Critique

The proposition that the revelatory mujtahid takes from God within the scope of the Muhammadan Law, and that his legal judgment in fact unveils the Prophet's view, necessitates that the revelation of the mujtahid does not contradict definitive texts, namely the Book and the definitive Sunnah. However, Ibn Arabi considers contradiction with a hadith

whose chain of transmission is sound not as a contradiction of a text, but as a matter of ascertaining through revelation (kashf) that it was not stated by the Prophet (Kashani, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 410).

Accepting such a status for kashf, in addition to removing the revelatory mujtahid from being a follower of the Prophet, has three major problems:

A) Disregarding the Nature of Kashf

The foundation of kashf for the mujtahid is an acquired matter (Kashani, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 405), and this necessitates that it be personal, hierarchical according to the stages of the spiritual path (Nurbakhsh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 100), and intermittent rather than constant. Ibn Arabi himself, in various statements, speaks with uncertainty and doubt about the authenticity of hadiths when citing them: "And if the report transmitted concerning Salman Farsi is authentic, then he has this rank." (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 1, 196) This is a confirmation of the aforementioned characteristics of kashf, for if it were an impersonal, constant, and permanent matter, what room would there be for doubt in the certainty of the transmission of reports? In contrast, the Prophet's Sunnah, whose certainty of transmission is established through soundness of the chain, widespread transmission, multiple lines of transmission, and other validation methods in the science of hadith, has a factuality that is public, constant, accessible, and not acquired.

B) The Demolition and Disintegration of the Transmitted Sciences

Many human sciences, including history, hadith studies, Qur'anic sciences, etc., are founded upon the principles and methodology of the transmitted sciences. The absolute authority of Kashf and its ascendancy and precedence over an authentic report necessitates the invalidation of these sciences and their academic credibility. Moreover, the extension of such a view would also encompass the Qur'an and Qur'anic sciences, whereas the mystics have not involved Kashf in establishing the certainty of the Qur'an and have generally contented themselves with seeking aid from transmitted methods in discussions of Qur'anic sciences.

C) The Prophet as Interpreter

The fact that the Prophet is the interpreter and that his words are integral to the correct understanding of the Qur'an necessitates that a definitively transmitted report, like the Qur'an, be the criterion for the soundness and authority of kashf, not that kashf be the criterion for establishing the definitive Sunnah.

5. Rethinking the Concept of Jihād

In mystical jurisprudence, the lesser and greater jihād are mentioned, and by articulating the necessary characteristics for leadership in each, it paves the manner for the convergence of both in a single individual—an individual who can in reality be comprehensive of both jihads and the leader of both the exoteric and esoteric dimensions of religion.

On this basis, the most entitled individuals for the leadership of the community are the revelatory mystics and the esoteric men who, like the Prophet, are both champions in the field of the greater jihād and possess the characteristics for the lesser jihād. "And know that jihād is of two types, the greater and the lesser, and both are the craft of men... So he who is a man in both the exoteric and esoteric, it is his craft... for he [the Prophet] said, "I have two crafts; whoever loves them has loved me, and whoever detests them has detested me: poverty and jihād," meaning the greater and the lesser." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 106 L)

Therefore, after the prophets, the most entitled individuals for the Imamate and leadership of the community are the saints: "The most entitled to the Imamate are the prophets, then the saints, then the scholars." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 42 R; Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 70)

This is because the divine saints are the pious scholars and the most perfect exemplars of the Perfect Man after the Prophet (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 3, 270; Nurbakhsh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 96). However, since they have different states, and the difference in the classes of saints at any given time is according to their ranks (Nurbakhsh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 100), the most worthy individuals among the divine saints for the leadership of the community are those who are simultaneously revelatory mujtahids in the law, strivers on the path, and knowers of the reality." The Imam ought to be a mujtahid in the law, a striver on the manner, and one who has attained the reality with the knowledge of certainty, the eye of certainty, and the reality of certainty." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 107 R)

Such an individual from among the saints, who is the most complete of the men's men in every age and the comprehensive locus of manifestation, is called the heir of the Chosen One

(Mustafa), the Imam of the Saints, the Greatest Succor, the Pole of the World, the manifestation of the whole, and the guide of the paths (Nurbakhsh, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 103).

5.1. Analysis and Critique

Ibn Arabi, by explaining the concept of the Pole, examines it within the structure of the Prophet's vicegerency (the revelatory mujtahid). In his view, the Pole sometimes possesses both exoteric and esoteric vicegerency simultaneously, and sometimes possesses only esoteric vicegerency. Ultimately, he draws attention to the fact that most Poles are not commissioned with exoteric vicegerency: "But the Poles in the technical sense... there is only one of them at any time, and he is also the Succor (al-ghawth)... and he is the master of the group in his time. Among them are those who have manifest rule and for whom exoteric vicegerency is permissible, just as esoteric vicegerency from the standpoint of the station was permissible, such as Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, 'Alī, and al-Ḥasan. And among them are those who have esoteric vicegerency specifically and have no rule in the exoteric, such as Aḥmad ibn Hārūn al-Rashīd al-Sabtī and Abū Yazīd al-Baṣṭāmī. And most of the Poles have no rule in the exoteric." (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 2, 6)

However, Sayyid Muhammad Nurbakhsh addresses this issue with a focus on the lesser and greater jihād, and describes the Imam and leader as the individual who is comprehensive of both the exoteric and the esoteric. Contrary to the view of Ibn Arabi that most Poles are not commissioned with exoteric vicegerency (Ibn Arabi, n.d.: 2, 6), he believes that with the existence of an Imam who is comprehensive of law, manner, and reality, others will not have the worthiness for the Imamate and leadership of the community except with his permission: "The Imamate of the inferior is not permissible except by the will of the superior." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 43 L)

Furthermore, citing the precedent of the prophets and saints before him, he considers the combination of formal and spiritual sovereignty to be worthy of the Poles of every age and a cause for success and otherworldly felicity: "The ignorant of the age imagine that sovereignty and dominion are contrary to piety and purity, and this false notion stems from extreme foolishness. This is because the greatest of prophets, such as Enoch, Joseph, David, Solomon, Moses, and the Chosen One, and the most perfect of saints, such as al-Ṣiddīq, al-Fārūq, Dhū al-Nūrayn, and al-Murtaḍā, engaged in formal sovereignty... If formal sovereignty were contrary to spiritual sovereignty, the greatest of prophets and the most perfect of saints would

not have engaged in it. Since they undertook sovereignty and the administration of dominion, worthy kings and princes should have high aspirations and combine formal sovereignty with spiritual sovereignty by strengthening the Law and cultivating the manner, gnosis, and reality, so that on the market day of the great resurrection, they may be successful and honored." (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 95)

Nurbakhsh criticizes the exoteric scholars who have named jurisprudence, teaching, and giving fatwas in contentious disputes and theological debates "Knowledge," and have made the absurdities of logic and the ravings of philosophy a means to fame and status, while turning a manner from the realities of religion (Nurbakhsh, 1397 SH: 264). He accuses them of having sold their religion for the world in their association with oppressors and princes, and of having cast useless disputes and corrupt fanaticism among the community of the Messenger (Nurbakhsh, 13th cent. AH: Nūriyyah, 87 R). Therefore, he emphasizes the necessity of the existence of a ruler, Imam, and leader whose nature is kneaded with virtuous morals and who is removed from reprehensible morals... who spreads the carpet of law with true justice among the community, who does not mix certainties with the agreed-upon conjectures of the ignorant and the divisive disputes of sects and religions, who permits nothing but truthfulness, and who appoints none but the truthful over the community of Muhammad, so that the lamp of the Law is not extinguished and the foundation of religion does not falter (Nurbakhsh, 13th cent. AH: Mi'rājiyyah, 138 L).

On this basis, Nurbakhsh considers the purpose for the necessity of the saints of God taking control of the community's Imamate not to be the love of status, but to liberate society from the ideas of the formalist scholars and corrupt, oppressive rulers, and to bring society to the prophetic utopia. "Indeed, I shall remove contention from among this community, firstly in the branches [of law] and I shall clarify the Muhammadan law as it was in his time, without addition or subtraction, and secondly in the principles of religion." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 2 R).

In effect, he considers his mystical jurisprudence and theology to be responsible for realizing the prophetic utopia. Accordingly, neither the philosophers with their philosophical utopia, nor the jurists with their jurisprudential utopia, have the capacity for the vicegerency of the Prophet and the prophet-like leadership of society. It is only the mystic who has striven in the field of the greater jihād and possesses the characteristics of leadership in the lesser jihād who can, by virtue of possessing designation in the manner and having the characteristics of the

leaders of the law, both be the spiritual guide for the individuals of society and elevate and perfect the affairs of their lives. This is because only by placing such a comprehensive Imam at the head of society can the Prophetic Virtuous City be revived and "the universal purpose of the mission of the prophets and the companionship of the saints, which is finding the straight path and attaining the proximity of the mercy of the All-Merciful," be realized (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 256).

6. Characteristics of the Community's Imam

Despite the many differences among Muslim thinkers regarding the various issues of Imamate, the absolute majority of them have had a uniform definition and understanding of the concept of Imamate, to the extent that some researchers have considered it a matter of consensus (Fayyaz Lahiji, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 462). Among them, some have defined Imamate in a manner that includes both the prophet and the saint: "Imamate is a general presidency in religion and the world for a person from among persons." (Razi, 2015 AD/1436 AH: 4, 321; Taftazani, 1991 AD/1412 AH: 5, 232) Others, by adding "By manner of succeeding the Prophet," have limited its semantic scope to the saint: "The truth is that Imamate consists of the vicegerency of a person from among persons for the Messenger in establishing the laws of the Law and protecting the domain of the religious community." (Amidi, 2002 AD/1423 AH: 5, 121; Iji, n.d.: 395)

However, what is understood from the viewpoint of the absolute majority of scholars in defining Imamate is that the intended meaning of Imamate is not merely a political affair and social leadership that is in opposition to or indifferent to religious teachings, but rather it is the "General presidency of Muslims in the affairs of the world and religion by manner of vicegerency and deputyship from the Prophet." (Fayyaz Lahiji, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 461-2)

From the perspective of mystical jurisprudence, in addition to the Imam's simultaneous possession of exoteric and esoteric vicegerency, numerous characteristics have been described for each of these functions.

In his works, Nurbakhsh has presented various and somewhat different classifications of the characteristics of Imamate and their number. However, based on the book *Risālat al-I'tiqādiyyah*, which is among his last written works, and despite variations in the book's manuscripts, the characteristics of Imamate are presented in three groups: conditions, formal and spiritual attributes, and pillars (Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 23 L).

A) Conditions of Imamate

Masculinity, freedom, sanity, courage, being Muslim, justice, piety, being of Qurayshi descent, and having reached puberty are considered conditions of Imamate (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 46 R; Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 23-4).

6.1. Analysis and Critique

Masculinity excludes women; freedom excludes slaves; sanity excludes the insane and the foolish; courage excludes the coward; being Muslim excludes the non-Muslim; justice excludes the corrupt; piety excludes the non-believer; Qurayshi descent excludes the non-Qurayshi; and puberty excludes pre-pubescents from the scope of Imamate. From Nurbakhsh's perspective, religious obligation does not apply to the pre-pubescent. "Obligation only pertains to the one who has reached puberty." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 70 R) He states the age of puberty and the start of obligation for boys as 12 to 15 years, and for girls as 9 to 15 years (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 187-8). However, he considers the age of puberty for the obligation of the greater jihād to be 20 years (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 108 L). The existence of these conditions necessitates the exclusion of some of the Twelver Shi'i Imams from the station of Imamate, as they reached Imamate before puberty, just as some of the earlier prophets, such as John (Qur'an 19:12) and Jesus (Qur'an 19:30), would be. In addition, he himself in another of his works has considered the criterion for the maturity of the "Men of God" to be their spiritual intellect and their gnosis of the realities of monotheism (Nurbakhsh, 1397 SH: 251). However, it must be noted that he stated these characteristics for the Imamate of the lesser jihād (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 107 R). The mention of being of Qurayshi descent implies assuming the authenticity of the reports transmitted on this matter. The statement of this characteristic excludes many of the shaykhs of mysticism, including the shaykhs of Nurbakhsh's own chain, from the scope of exoteric and esoteric guardianship, because in all cases of Imamate, Nurbakhsh has included the condition of being Qurayshi or Fatimid. However, it seems he himself was aware of this problem and, to solve it, considered the non-Qurayshi and non-Fatimid shaykhs of the path to be the children of the esoteric and spiritual loins of the Prophet, and in a manner, subscribed to an esoteric Siyadat (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 108 L).

B) Formal and Spiritual Attributes

Knowledge, piety, generosity, and being of Fatimid descent are the formal and spiritual characteristics of Imamate (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 73; Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 234).

6.2. Analysis and Critique

In explaining "Being of Fatimid descent," Nurbakhsh has written: "The Sayyids, and they are the Bani Hashem, and in this time of ours none are found among them except the Bani Ali, the Bani Ja'far, and the Bani Abbas." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 77 R) In another place, he has considered the Sayyids and Sharifs to be the descendants of Imam Ḥasan and Imam Ḥusayn and all of the Bani Hashem, upon whom charity is forbidden (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 233 R). However, in the chapter on jihād, he states an important point about sayyid-hood in mystical jurisprudence that can resolve the ambiguities surrounding the claim of sayyid-hood by many shaykhs and Sufi orders. In Nurbakhsh's view, possessing Qurayshi and Fatimid lineage is a condition for the greater jihād. However, he explains that if the Imam in the greater jihād does not have this condition, there is no deficiency in his guardianship, because through the path of the sperm of the heart and of reality, he is a Sayyid and among the progeny of the Prophet (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 108 L).

C) Pillars of Imamate

Perfect knowledge, perfect guardianship, legitimate authority, and a vast dominion are considered the pillars of Imamate (Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 23 R).

6.3. Analysis and Critique

Nurbakhsh does not provide an explanation for these conditions after mentioning them; however, by examining his works, one can arrive at his intended meaning for each of them. The meaning of perfect knowledge is the saint's possession of revelatory ijtihād and connection to the prophetic source of reception, receiving the real and objective rulings, alongside the completion of the spiritual path and the ability to guide disciples. "A gnostic, a monotheist, a verifier of the realities of things by direct vision, not one content with eavesdropping." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 107 R) "A mujtahid in the law, a striver on the manner, and one who has attained the reality with the knowledge of certainty, the eye of

certainty, and the reality of certainty, certain in its principles and branches, its universals and particulars." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 107 R) The meaning of perfect guardianship is considered expertise in the sciences of law, manner, and reality, alongside the completion of the stages of the spiritual journey: "A guiding saint, perfect and perfecting, deeply versed in the sciences of the law, the manner, and the reality, combining the branches of guardianship such as the cardiac states, the unseen lights, the angelic unveilings, the unveilings of the realm of power, and the divine self-disclosures, annihilated in God, subsisting by God, a locus of manifestation for all His attributes and names, like the Adam of His saints, he was light upon light." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 46 R)

Of course, in another place, Nurbakhsh, in addition to these conditions, has considered the possession of revelation (Kashf) and the ability to perform miracles (Karāmat) as signs of perfect guardianship (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 51 L).

The meaning of Karāmat is that an act proceeds from the saint that is not within the capacity of the general public, such as giving news of the unseen world by divine notification (Nurbakhsh, 1397 SH: 103). "The saints of God... if you wish to know them, then know them by the miracles whose validity is indicated by the Qur'an and the lives of the prophets, such as news from the unseen, because none knows the unseen except God. So if someone gives news from the unseen, know that it is from God, so he is a saint of God." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 76 L) The designation of authority and leadership is one of the characteristics of the Imam. Nurbakhsh, after stating that the Imam of the Saints is in reality the comprehensive locus of manifestation of the exoteric and the esoteric, relies on Kashf to establish the designation for the guardianship of the comprehensive locus of manifestation from the perspective of spiritual comprehensiveness, and seeks aid from transmission from the perspective of the formal and the establishment of the chain: "As for its spiritual comprehensiveness, in this age, from east to west, a formal and spiritual search was conducted, and the unveilings, cardiac states, and realities were not found complete in anyone except a manifestor from the chain of the Second Ali, Sayyid Ali Hamadani. As for its formal comprehensiveness, regarding the "Rope of God" where He commanded, "And hold firmly to the rope of God all together," the soundest of the commentators' sayings are four:

1. The rope of God is the Word of God;
2. The rope of God is the scholars of the law;
3. The rope of God is the Shaykhs of the manner;

4. The rope of God is the progeny of the Messenger of God, as the Prophet said: "I am leaving among you two weighty things: the Book of God and my progeny. If you hold fast to them... they are two ropes that will not be severed until the Day of Resurrection." Meaning, "I leave among you two precious things, the Book of God and my children."... Since the soundest sayings of the people of exegesis and interpretation are four and they were present in the noble person of the Second Ali, without a doubt he is the rope of God, and his chain is stronger than all the chains of the saints." (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 108)

In another place, he has stated explicitly, "The rope of God in reality refers to the chain of the perfect shaykhs, and for the people of faith and all Muslims, holding fast to the rope of God is obligatory and necessary by the ruling of the explicit text, "And hold firmly to the rope of God all together." (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 220) He has also considered the exemplar of the "Most trustworthy handhold" to be the chain of Shaykhs (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 222). The meaning of a vast and expansive dominion is the breadth of the Imam's sphere of authority and power. There is no clear statement in his works as to whether Nurbakhsh's intended meaning of "vast dominion" is limited only to the physical world, or whether it also includes the five realms (the divine essence, the realm of power, the angelic realm, the physical world, and the realm of dominion). But given his view that the saints are the heirs of the prophets, the unveilings transmitted from him, and the explanations given under the characteristic of perfect guardianship, the probability seems strong that his intended meaning of vast dominion includes the five realms and all of existence. On the other hand, the condition of a vast dominion, whether it be all five realms or just the physical world, confronts Nurbakhsh's view that the only exemplar who possessed all the attributes of Imamate was Ali (AS) with a problem, because Ali (AS) for a part of his life—during the caliphate of the caliphs before him—did not possess the characteristic of a vast dominion.

7. Real Imamate and Relative Imamate

Nurbakhsh ultimately divides the Imamate of the community into two types: real Imamate and relative Imamate. He considers the saint who possesses all the characteristics of Imamate to be the holder of "Real Imamate," and a saint who possesses some of these characteristics he considers an Imam to the extent of his possession of those attributes, calling his Imamate "Relative Imamate." (Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 23 L)

7.1. Analysis and Critique

This view of Nurbakhsh incorporates the chain of shaykhs, in the form of relative Imamate, into Imamate in its theological and jurisprudential sense. This is the first time that the shaykh of the manner, in addition to his spiritual station, also acquires a jurisprudential and theological dimension, to the extent that belief in the saints of the manner, like belief in the prophets of the law, is considered obligatory for all (Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 21 L). From Nurbakhsh's perspective, the sum of the attributes of Imamate, up to his time, had not been combined in any individual except 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (AS) (Nurbakhsh, 12th cent. AH: 24 R). On this basis, the Imamate of all the Shi'i Imams except for 'Alī (AS), would be of the relative Imamate type. Likewise, some Shi'i Imams who had not reached puberty at the time of the start of their Imamate would, on this basis, have relative Imamate.

Furthermore, given that Nurbakhsh considered the station of the "Adam of the Saints," 'Alī (AS), to be accessible by manner of being a locus of manifestation—"Annihilated in God, subsisting by God, a locus of manifestation for all His attributes and names, like the Adam of His saints, he was light upon light." (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 46 R)—and alongside the fact that he limited the statement of 'Alī (AS) being the sole exemplar of real Imamate to his own time, not for all time, it seems that the position of real Imamate, in Nurbakhsh's view, is a station. Although 'Alī (AS) is its perfect exemplar, he is not its only exemplar. In other words: just as in the Muhammadan Reality the matter was not exclusive to the noble Prophet (PBUH), so too is it in the 'Alawī Reality.

8. Duties of the Community's Imam

In Nurbakhsh's view, the Imam of the community supervises and leads a set of general duties within the context of society, and in the chapters of jurisprudence, he also has duties on his shoulders as appropriate. However, most of the Imam's duties within the context of the chapters of jurisprudence are carried out through the governors of the cities, the judges of religious law, and the deputies and representatives of the Imam. For this reason, the most fundamental duty of the community's Imam is to guide everyone toward the realization of the prophetic ideal society. In this manner, the comprehensive Imam, by witnessing the realities of the world as they are, paying attention to the two elements of time and place (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 52 R), and correctly understanding the interests of Islam and the Muslims (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 110 L), can, by suppressing innovations (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent.

AH: 127 R) and eliminating disputes (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 2 R), provide the means for strengthening the religion and the growth of the Islamic community (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 95), keep the Islamic rites alive (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 20 L), and fortify the foundations of Islam (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 264). He can provide the context for the elevation of receptive souls (Nurbakhsh, 2017 AD/1397 SH: 95) and, through that, honor the Islamic community with its flourishing in the Prophetic Virtuous City, which is the utopia and ultimate goal of religion (Nurbakhsh, 11th cent. AH: 127 R).

It is based on such a view of society that he considered the entire historical mission of the prophets and saints to be summarized in one thing: commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong. "It is one of the greatest principles of religion, because the call of the prophets is a species under its genus, and the guidance of the saints is a species of it, and jihād is a species of it; rather, its genus encompasses all affairs, whether good or evil." (Nurbakhsh, 2018: 159)

Nurbakhsh organized the book *al-Fiqh al-Aḥwaṭ* into 53 chapters, which begins with the Chapter of Purity and ends with the Chapter of Exclusion from Inheritance. In this book, he has stated numerous duties for the community's Imam, the governors of the cities, the judges of religious law, and the cultivators of souls and saints, which are of great importance from the perspective of mystical jurisprudence. Among these, the most important duties of the Imam within the context of the chapters of mystical jurisprudence are arranged and examined in three sections: "Acts of worship, contracts and unilateral declarations, and rulings."

Worships

Acts of worship fighting against those who combat the rites of Islam; establishing the Friday prayer and appointing the imams of the cities; managing charities, zakāt, land grants, spoils of war, and the public treasury, and receiving the poll tax (Jizyah); delivering the sermon for the pilgrims before the station at ‘Arafāt; leadership in the lesser jihād and the greater jihād and calling to both; offensive jihād against idolaters and polytheists; fighting against rebels against the Imam; distributing spoils; managing conquered lands; issuing a general amnesty.

Contracts (‘Uqūd)

Guardianship in contracts; dealing with hoarding and usury; managing uncultivated lands.

Rulings (Aḥkām)

Implementing prescribed punishments and discretionary punishments, and issuing and implementing legal verdicts; guardianship in retaliation and blood money.

Conclusion

An examination of the lived history of mystics and their mystical viewpoints reveals three perspectives on the relationship between religious law (Law) and spiritual reality:

- A) Reality without law;
- B) Reality within the framework of law;
- C) Law within the framework of reality.

The rethinking of the concept of *ijtihād* and the concept of *jihād* by mystics such as Ibn Arabi, and its detailed representation in the thoughts and works of Nurbakhsh, gives rise to the third perspective, which paved the manner for the expansion of the scope of *Vilayah* from inner guardianship to outer guardianship.

Furthermore, by legitimizing and applying unveiling and witnessing alongside other conventional sources in the formal sciences, they produced a mystical interpretation of those sciences and their issues, which was previously rare and sometimes entirely unprecedented.

In this respect, the works of Nurbakhsh acquire a particular importance. He should be regarded as the first mystic to have authored a complete course on the principles of faith and a complete course on jurisprudence in 53 chapters, following the customary method of theologians and jurists, but based on unveiling and witnessing and their authority in understanding correct beliefs and deriving jurisprudential rulings. This can be termed "mystical theology" (*kalām-i 'irfānī*, as distinct from theological mysticism) and "Mystical Jurisprudence" (as distinct from juridical mysticism, which is manner within the framework of law).

According to this view, *Vilayah* is the continuation of prophethood and, within the context of inner prophethood, is the inheritor and guardian of the reality and essence of the monotheistic sciences that were conveyed and explained by outer prophethood. For this very reason, recognizing the saints after the sealing of prophethood has been deemed a duty and obligation for all. After the prophets, the most entitled individuals for Imamate and leadership are the saints, because the divine saints are the pious scholars and the most perfect exemplars of the Perfect Man after the Prophet. Therefore, the most worthy individuals among the divine saints

for the leadership of the community are those who are simultaneously revelatory mujtahids in the Law, strivers on the manner, and knowers of the reality.

Furthermore, citing the precedent of the prophets and saints before them, they considered the combination of formal and spiritual sovereignty to be worthy of the Poles of every age and a cause for success and otherworldly felicity.

On this basis, Nurbakhsh considers the purpose for the necessity of the saints of God taking control of the community's Imamate not to be the love of status, but to liberate society from the ideas of the formalist scholars and corrupt, oppressive rulers, and to bring society to the prophetic utopia.

From this perspective, in addition to the Imam's simultaneous possession of exoteric and esoteric vicegerency, numerous characteristics have been described for each of these functions.

Masculinity, freedom, sanity, courage, being Muslim, justice, piety, being of Qurayshi descent, and having reached puberty are considered conditions of Imamate.

Knowledge, piety, generosity, and being of Fatimid descent are the formal and spiritual characteristics of Imamate.

Perfect knowledge, perfect guardianship, legitimate authority, and a vast dominion are considered the pillars of Imamate.

Nurbakhsh ultimately divides the Imamate of the community into two types: real Imamate and relative Imamate. He considers the saint who possesses all the characteristics of Imamate to be the holder of "Real Imamate," and a saint who possesses some of these characteristics he considers an Imam to the extent of his possession of those attributes, calling his Imamate "Relative Imamate." On this basis, some of the Shi'i Imams, due to not having some of all the stated conditions, are placed in the category of relative Imamate.

This view of Nurbakhsh incorporates the chain of shaykhs, in the form of relative Imamate, into Imamate in its theological and jurisprudential sense. This is the first time that the shaykh of the manner, in addition to his spiritual station, also acquires a jurisprudential and theological dimension, to the extent that belief in the saints of the manner, like belief in the prophets of the law, is considered obligatory for all.

Furthermore, the position of real Imamate, in Nurbakhsh's view, is a station that, although 'Alī (AS) is its perfect exemplar, he is not its only exemplar. In other words: just as in the

Muhammadan Reality the matter was not exclusive to the Seal of the Prophets (PBUH), so too is it in the ‘Alawī Reality.

The Imam of the community supervises and leads a set of general duties within the context of society, and in the chapters of jurisprudence, he also has duties on his shoulders as appropriate. However, most of the Imam's duties within the context of the chapters of jurisprudence are carried out through the governors of the cities, the judges of religious law, and the deputies and representatives of the Imam. For this reason, the most fundamental duty of the community's Imam is to guide everyone toward the realization of the prophetic ideal society.

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Analysis of the Features of Jihadi Management in the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution with an Emphasis on the Intellectual System of Imam Khamenei

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Article Info

Article type:
Scientific Research

Article history:
Received: 2025/7/26
Received in revised form: 2025/9/14
Accepted: 2025/10/19
Available online: 2025/10/21

Keywords:
Imam Khamenei,
Indefatigability, Haste
Combined with Prudence,
Second Phase of the
Revolution, Jihadi
Management.

ABSTRACT

Objective: To select competent managers, there must be indicators by which managers can be evaluated. Imam Khamenei defines and interprets Jihadi management as a spirit of struggle, a culture of combativeness, and conscious activism. The goal of this research is to explain the characteristics of Jihadi management based on the scholarly statements of the Supreme Leader and to present them to the country's management community to promote, apply, and implement his guidance in Islamic society. The question is: 'What are the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution, with an emphasis on the intellectual system of Imam Khamenei?'

Method: The hypothesis states that paying attention to the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution, with an emphasis on the intellectual system of Imam Khamenei, is effective. The researcher used thematic analysis to conceptualize the data obtained from the statements of Imam Khamenei.

Findings: Based on these concepts, primary themes (familiarity with the Quran and prayer, helping God's servants, firm resolve, strong will, being hardworking, vigilance, insight, not knowing day and night, following through on work, recognizing threats, the real face of the enemy) and organizing themes (divine intention, service to the people, resilience, tenacity, mujahid-like action, enlightenment, foresight, industriousness, movement combined with prudence, knowing the enemy's goal, anti-arrogance) were obtained, leading to overarching themes

Conclusion: Finally, by combining and merging similar overarching themes, five dimensions were extracted with an emphasis on Imam Khamenei's thought: "Faith and work for God, seriousness and indefatigability, insight in carrying out assigned tasks, haste combined with prudence, and enemy recognition.

Cite this article: Rajabi Dehborzoei & A (2025). Analysis of the Features of Jihadi Management in the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution with an Emphasis on the Intellectual System of Imam Khamenei. Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution, 7 (26), 48-66. <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcrr.2025.399454.1725>



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Publisher: University of Tehran.

DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcrr.2025.399454.1725>

Introduction

What plays a fundamental role in the prosperity of a society is the competence and eligibility of its managers and officials. In organizations, too, the success of the organization in achieving its goals and missions is contingent on having competent and worthy managers. Therefore, the selection of qualified officials and managers deserves great attention and consideration, and criteria must be established to evaluate individuals and choose them. The criteria for evaluation in any society must, of course, be defined in accordance with that society's values and worldview. Although not all experts agree on the definition of management, and there is even disagreement on whether it is a science or an art, all of them consider management to be a human process. In other words, a successful manager, with a proper understanding of their organization, sets the best course of action towards the goal. Management is the process of designing and maintaining an environment and conditions in which individuals and groups work effectively and with motivation to achieve selected group objectives. Management is the coordination of human and material resources to achieve a goal.

Jihadi management is a product and fruit of the Islamic Revolution, and at various junctures, it has been able to compensate for the inefficiency of the bureaucratic system. Jihadi management is in fact the same as scientific management, which is based on the formulas and laws of the science of management (Eftekhari et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 2). Jihadi management was the art of being able and presenting a new plan that took shape with the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Latifi & Sa'dabadi, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 99). The Supreme Leader states: "Jihadi management is the work and effort with a divine intention and based on knowledge and sagacity, in conditions of malicious pressures from global powers and in other conditions, for the continuation of the country's forward movement." (Statements of the Supreme Leader on 23/10/1392)

Jihadi management is one of the most important approaches to advancing the goals of the Islamic Revolution. Imam Khamenei considers Jihadi management to be the way to achieve the goals and objectives of the Islamic Revolution, so much so that he believes this cannot be achieved with laziness and weakness. On the other hand, the Statement of the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution serves as a guide to achieving this goal. Given the changing generations and the various threats from the enemy to the identity, foundations, and principles of the revolution, it is necessary today, at the beginning of the Second Phase of the

Revolution, to institutionalize the engine of the revolution among different segments of society, especially teenagers and young people, and to introduce a complete and comprehensive model, a model that has unfortunately been neglected due to the influence of Western and non-Islamic models in the humanities (Alipour, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 72).

The main concern of the researcher is how the characteristics of Jihadi management from the perspective of Imam Khamenei should be presented so that it can be used by strategic managers at the national level. In other words, ‘What are the characteristics of Jihadi management that can lead to dynamism, mobility, growth, vitality, creativity, and innovation while preserving and strengthening divine and human values in society, and can serve as a guiding light for dedicated and serving managers of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran?’

Regarding the analysis of the features of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution, no related background was found in terms of theory and research. However, the following studies have separately analyzed some of the research variables:

- The first article, "Identifying the Dimensions and Components of Jihadi Management in the Martyr Foundation of Tehran Province," by Sedigheh Tootiyan Isfahani, Hajieh Rajabi Farjad, and Gholamreza Siahpour, used a qualitative research method and mixed-method data collection in 2021 AD/1400 SH. The results showed a consensus on six components: (the spirit of self-sacrifice, double work and effort, responsibility, meritocracy, work ethic, and self-confidence). The responsibility component, with the highest average, was the most important component of Jihadi management, followed by meritocracy in second place. The self-confidence component was in third place, and finally, the double work and effort component was ranked last in importance.
- The second article, "Explaining the Jihadi Performance of Managers with Emphasis on the Holy Quran, *Nahj al-Balāghah*, and the Scholarly Statements of Ayatollah Imam Khamenei," by Majid Ahmadi and Alireza Roustaei, used a descriptive-correlational method in 2021 AD/1400 SH. The findings of this research showed that the responsibility and accountability of managers, meritocracy, and commitment to obligations, good and strong relationships between managers and employees, and needs-based supervision affect the Jihadi performance of managers.
- The third article, "Investigating the Effect of Jihadi Management on the Organizational Performance of Islamic Azad University Employees," by Seyedeh Niloufar Shamoradi and

Mojtaba Moazzami, used a descriptive-survey method in 2021 AD/1400 SH. The research results show that value-orientation, Jihadi spirit, and adaptability have a significant and positive effect on Jihadi management. Also, a reduction in conflict has a significant and positive effect on employees' organizational performance. Employee motivation has a significant and positive effect on employees' organizational performance. It was also confirmed that role clarity has a significant and positive effect on employees' organizational performance.

- The fourth article, "The Relationship of the Components of Jihadi Management in the Statements of the Supreme Leader with the Popularity of Commander Soleimani and Their Prioritization," by Afsaneh Akbari, used a descriptive-correlational Delphi research method in 2022 AD/1401 SH. The findings showed that 5 of the Jihadi management components selected by the research experts are related to Commander Soleimani's popularity. Among the multiple components of Jihadi management from the Supreme Leader's point of view in Commander Soleimani's popularity, the dimensions of service with divine intention, expertise, knowledge, and sagacity, eagerness for service and the spirit of selfless service, insight and not being oblivious to the existence of an enemy, and continuity and steadfastness in work are prioritized from first to fifth, respectively.

As can be seen, research on Jihadi management has been conducted by various researchers, but the present study specifically analyzes the features of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution with an emphasis on the intellectual system of Imam Khamenei.

1. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

1.1. Management

Management is the process of the effective and efficient application of material and human resources based on an accepted value system, which is carried out through planning, organizing, mobilizing resources and facilities, guiding, and controlling operations to achieve predetermined goals (Rezaeiyan, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 8). Management has a very ancient history, and a review of the history of ancient nations such as Egypt, China, Iran, Rome, and Greece shows that without precise management, it was not possible to administer the great empires in these lands (Hatami & Sarmadi, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 3). Management is a process by which individual and group efforts are coordinated to achieve a common goal (Moghadass

& Sadeghpour, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 50). A manager can be described as an individual who influences others and guides them to act towards achieving a specific goal or goals.

1.2. Islamic Management

Islamic management is the art and science of the correct use of people and facilities to achieve organizational goals, in a way that does not conflict with Islamic law (Nabavi, 2013 AD/1392 SH: 33). The management system in Islamic thought originates from its fundamental beliefs. Therefore, managing a human group and an organization is in line with the management of the universe. With this characteristic, it introduces management as a vision, and the manager is also a member of creation who must be in harmony and alignment with its general rules and regulations, because the organization entrusted to him has a purpose that is in line with the general order of the world and for advancing human activities to achieve ideal levels.

Management is a service, not a rule. In the Islamic worldview, an Islamic manager never seeks management for his own authority; because in such a case, he is a ruler, not a servant. Management is service before it is leadership. As Imam Ali (AS) says: "...By God, this patched and worn-out shoe is more beloved to me than ruling over you, and I have accepted the rule only to establish the truth and abolish falsehood." (Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 33) Imam Reza (AS) says in this regard: "The ruler of the Muslims is like the central pillar of a tent, on which all the weight of the roof is supported, and secondly, like the central point of a circle, his influence is equal in all directions, so that anyone at any time and from any direction can reach him." (Majlisi, 1984 AD/1403 SH: 49, 165)

1.3. Jihadi Management

Jihadi management can be defined as the process of work and effort with a divine intention, based on knowledge and sagacity, in the effective and efficient application of material and human resources to fight the enemy and remove obstacles to moving forward in all cultural, social, scientific, economic, and political fields, with the goal-setting, planning, organizing, guiding, and controlling to achieve goals, based on the Jihadi culture of Islam (Rashidzadeh, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 224). Jihadi management can be considered one of the new concepts in the science of management that is suitable for the social, cultural, economic, political, and security conditions of Iran (Farzad & Kavousi, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 43). Jihadi management is in fact a style born from local thought and suitable for our cultural and social needs. Other

management schools may also have similar teachings, but these teachings are technical and empirical, meaning they are a method, approach, and work model that do not differ much in human societies. However, each of these styles has different efficiencies, and the intensity and weakness of their effects differ in different cultures.

It seems that if the demand of the Supreme Leader, Imam Khamenei, was the familiar concept of Islamic management, there would be no need to use the less-known term Jihadi management. Therefore, it seems that the category of Jihadi management has a more specific meaning than Islamic management.

1.4. The Statement of the Second Phase of the Revolution

The Second Phase of the Revolution is a statement issued by the Supreme Leader on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution on Bahman 22, 1397. In it, he explains the achievements of the past forty years to continue the path of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The glorious revolution of the Iranian nation, which is the greatest and most popular revolution of the modern era, is the only revolution that has passed a proud forty-year period without betraying its ideals and has protected its dignity and the authenticity of its slogans against all temptations that seemed irresistible. It is now entering its second phase of self-building, society-building, and civilization-building. In this statement, Imam Khamenei provides recommendations for the great jihad to build a great Islamic Iran (Nouri Goljaei et al., 2022 AD/1401 SH: 27).

2. The Necessity and Importance of Management

Since humans are naturally social beings and are influenced by their nature and disposition in social life, they seek a significant part of their happiness in the light of such a pull. One of the pillars of social life is management, because in a community, the interests and goals of individuals and the fate of people are interconnected and shared. Management is one of the most important factors of development in human societies. How many countries have had favorable conditions in terms of financial and human resources but have not reached the desired level of development due to a lack of proper management and optimal use of these resources (Makarem Shirazi et al., 1996 AD/1375 SH: 10, 21).

To employ people, managers must define the type of interaction with them, and it is through this interaction that people are employed (Aghapirooz & Rostaminia, 2020 AD/1399 SH:

162). Imam Ali (AS) considered one of the fundamental duties of a manager and leader to be the realization of public welfare (Hasanzadeh et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 2).

The religion of Islam has such a coherent value system that it influences the management of managers and directs their movement. Islam speaks about all aspects of human life, including community leadership and micro-management, and its highest role as a religion is to influence through its value system (Mesbah Yazdi, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 264).

3. The Difference Between Jihadi Management and Western Management

The main difference between Jihadi management and other management systems is in its assumptions and ideological foundations. In this management system, the rules of the religion of Islam are considered a strategy for life and a criterion for evaluating a desirable life. Islamic management is linked to the entire Islamic system, so the nature of management methods in the Islamic system originates from its Islamic nature (Sarmadi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 40).

Simon considers management to be the process of decision-making, and Peter Drucker considers management to be the ability to work through and with others (Rahmanseresht, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 181). The difference between Western and Jihadi management is that Western management is more limited to social behavior, but Jihadi management is sensitive to human ethics before social behavior. In Western management, it is said that the manager must win the hearts of their employees. If these employees feel alienated, they will not consider the interests of the organization as their own. Therefore, to get the employees to cooperate with the company's interests, they must be respected. This way of functioning is the result of paying attention to social behavior. Western management wins the hearts of its employees for greater exploitation.

In Jihadi management, in addition to education, training, management, supervision, and accountability, one must care about the employees. Not only because of social behavior but also because of human and Islamic ethics, because we are all human beings and servants of God. It is true that one gives commands and the other obeys, but in reality, we are brothers. Just as you are concerned about your own rights and interests, you should be concerned about the interests of your employees. If we behave in this way, they will work more, but note that you should not behave this way so that they will work more. In fact, the purpose is different

from the result. The purpose is the manager's intention and motivation. The result or benefit is the output of the work, even if it was not the main goal.

Another difference is that in Western management, the human being is a means, but in Islamic and Jihadi management, the human being is the goal. In this management, the growth of the human being is the goal because the human being has authenticity. God says the whole universe was created to train humanity. This is the philosophy of the creation of the universe.

Another difference is that in Western management, the goal is only comfort. The goal of Islamic and Jihadi management, before comfort, is perfection and peace. In Western thought, teaching competence is the goal. In Islamic thought, in addition to competence, and even before competence, virtue is considered. In Jihadi management, the work and goals of the organization and individual and group duties and responsibilities are also carefully pursued, and wrongdoers and abusers are dealt with (Jajarmizadeh, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 25).

4. Research Method

The present study is qualitative in terms of the type of data used, developmental in terms of outcome, and exploratory in terms of purpose. This research is a type of theoretical research in which the researcher, without a specific applied goal, studies merely to develop knowledge. Given the necessity of inferring from the most important narrative source in the field of Jihadi management (the statements of the Supreme Leader), the documentary method and theoretical study were first used. Next, from among the various qualitative research strategies, the thematic analysis strategy with the Attride-Stirling style was used. To systematically perform the stages of thematic analysis, the MAXQDA software, which is qualitative analysis software, was used. The unit of analysis in this research is the speeches and statements of the Supreme Leader, Imam Khamenei, related to the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution.

An inductive approach was used to extract the relevant data and present it in a table, and then the related concepts were expressed by a short and descriptive phrase (code).

Table 1: A part of the main themes extracted from the statements of Imam Khamenei regarding the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution

Statements of Imam Khamenei (Text/Theme)	Primary	Organizing
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	(Main) Theme	Theme
Having a divine intention to serve the people as God's servants and solve their problems, and being familiar with the Quran and prayer, his recommendation to the government. Statements of the Supreme Leader during a meeting with the President and members of the government on 8/26/2017.	Familiarity with Quran and prayer Helping God's servants	Divine intention Service to the people
To make the country's economy flourish, we need work that is both mujahid-like and knowledgeable. With laziness, with lethargy, with a lack of motivation, the country's economic problem will not be solved. Jihadi work must be done, Jihadi managements must have an all-encompassing grasp of the country's economic issues and make decisions; Jihadi work. Jihadi work means work that involves effort, indefatigability, and sincerity; one understands that one is not working for oneself, to fill one's own pocket, but is working for the people, for God; and also knowledgeably; meaning they should sit down and find the right ways with scientific standards, with a precise, knowledgeable method; they should be knowledgeable, efficient, and have various facilities; they should sit down and work; the country's economy will certainly flourish. Statements of the Supreme Leader at the gathering of pilgrims and neighbors of the holy shrine of Imam Reza on 3/21/2019.	Firm resolve Strong will Hardworking	Resilient Tenacity Mujahid-like action
Maintaining motivation, maintaining vigilance, maintaining unity, removing any dangerous residue, enlightening cultural work, and in short, not forgetting all-encompassing readiness. The Supreme Leader's response to Major General Qassem Soleimani's letter on 11/21/2017.	Vigilance Vision	Enlightenment Foresight
Being hardworking, moving with prudence, not knowing	Not knowing	Industriousness

day and night, and following through on work, this is the meaning of Jihadi management. Statements of the Supreme Leader during a meeting with the people of East Azerbaijan on 2/18/2018.	day and night Following through on work	Moving with prudence
The enemy wants the young people of our country to be unmotivated, to be faithless, to be hopeless, to be slaves to their desires, to be lazy, to be idle, to complain, not to work, to be addicted, to be fragile; they want the young people of the country to be like this. This is the goal of the things they are doing to our young people; it is the exact opposite of what we need. Statements of the Supreme Leader during a meeting with the Basijis on 11/27/2019.	Recognizing enemy threats The real face of the enemy	Knowing the enemy's goal Anti-arrogance

Table 2: A part of the organizing themes and their corresponding codes extracted from the statements of Imam Khamenei regarding the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution

No.	Organizing Themes	Corresponding Codes to the Leader's Statements
1	Divine intention	9/20/2023, 8/30/2022, 3/10/2019, 1/1/2022, 4/25/2015
2	Service to the people	4/25/2015, 8/27/2013, 7/14/2013, 2/22/2012
3	Resilient	12/23/2023, 1/9/2024, 6/4/2022, 7/8/2022, 7/19/2021
4	Tenacity	7/12/2020, 11/27/2019, 2/5/2020, 3/3/2020, 10/13/2019
5	Sincere action	10/22/2018, 11/13/2017, 5/3/2016, 1/1/2022, 9/21/2016
6	Enlightenment	1/3/2024, 2/5/2024, 9/20/2023, 10/11/2022, 10/30/2022
7	Foresight	5/9/2018, 8/24/2016, 5/24/2019, 7/11/2015, 6/14/2012
8	Industriousness	7/12/2023, 8/17/2023, 6/28/2021, 2/11/2019, 3/21/2019
9	Moving with prudence	9/21/2016, 11/20/2013, 2/2/2010, 9/15/2009, 10/10/2006
10	Knowing the enemy's goal	8/17/2023, 9/11/2023, 3/12/2022, 10/14/2022, 3/22/2020, 1/8/2020
11	Anti-arrogance	4/25/2022, 4/18/2023, 2/8/2023, 8/30/2022, 11/26/2022


Table 3: Overarching themes in the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution

Characteristics of Jihadi Management in the Second Phase of the Revolution	Overarching Themes	Organizing Themes
	Faith and work for God	Divine intention
		Service to the people
	Haste combined with prudence	Industriousness
		Moving with prudence
	Insight in carrying out assigned tasks	Enlightenment
		Foresight
	Seriousness and indefatigability	Resilient
		Tenacity
		Mujahid-like action
	Enemy recognition	Knowing the enemy's goal
		Anti-arrogance

5. Pattern Tracing

After the coding stages and the selection of primary, organizing, and overarching themes, the pattern of Jihadi management features in the Second Phase of the Revolution, based on the statements of Imam Khamenei, is presented in the following figure.

Figure 1: Model of the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Revolution



6. The Characteristics of Jihadi Management in the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution in the Intellectual System of Imam Khamenei

A study of the history of our predecessors makes us aware of the role and influence of management in the rise or fall of nations. How many nations have lacked nothing in terms of material resources, favorable intellectual backgrounds, and rich cultural foundations, but because of a lack of a sagacious manager and an aware leader who could, with proper planning and solid organization, use the available forces to achieve a goal, they have found themselves on a downward slope of decline and defeat. Jihadi management is not a simple approach; rather, this type of management has many characteristics that must be analyzed and

examined by referring to the statements of the Supreme Leader. Therefore, it can be said that Jihadi management is software for implementing the goals of the Second Phase of the Revolution at the management levels of the country in the coming decades.

With the effort made and the analysis of the texts of the Supreme Leader's statements within the mentioned theoretical framework, the characteristics of Jihadi management in the Second Phase of the Islamic Revolution have been extracted. These include: "Faith and work for God, seriousness and indefatigability, insight in carrying out assigned tasks, haste combined with prudence, doing work based on knowledge, and enemy recognition, each of which will be explained."

6.1. Faith and Work for God

Regarding the meaning of faith, it has been said: Faith is the establishment of a belief in the heart and is taken from the root of security, as if the believer, by having faith in something, provides it with security and immunity from doubt and uncertainty, because doubt and uncertainty are the scourge of belief (Tabatabai, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 1, 72). The first characteristic of an Islamic manager is being a monotheist and having faith in the One and Only God. In the Islamic system, management is entrusted to those who, in their thoughts and actions, accept Islam. We know such people by titles such as the righteous, the pious, the truthful, and so on. In an Islamic society, the most fundamental condition for a manager is faith in the Almighty God, the Holy Prophet (PBUH), and the Day of Judgment (Ahmadi, 2016 AD/1395 SH: 133). In fact, what is the criterion for selecting managers in the Islamic system is their superior qualities compared to others, the most important of which are faith in the Almighty, obedience to religious commands, performing obligations, and avoiding forbidden things. A manager whose serious and sensitive duties include guiding others must first be a doer himself, and this will not be possible except through faith and righteous deeds. The Supreme Leader, Imam Khamenei, regarding faith and work for God, made recommendations to the President and members of the government: "Having a divine intention to serve the people as God's servants and solve their problems," and "Being familiar with the Quran and prayer" were among his recommendations (Statements of the Supreme Leader during a meeting with the President and members of the government on 04/06/1396).

6.2. Seriousness and Indefatigability

Being indefatigable in work, working for the benefit of the people and the nation, and having perseverance in the face of problems are among the characteristics of a Jihadi manager. The statements of the Supreme Leader have always been decisive and problem-solving, and his remarks have paved the way for the country's movements. He emphasized the very important reason for tireless management in how officials should confront the country's economic problems to reduce the people's livelihood issues. The word "Jihad" inherently implies a great deal of work and effort. According to the Leader, an extraordinary and extensive effort is a Jihadi effort and is based on the spirit of jihad. A Jihadi manager performs work with seriousness, enthusiasm, and indefatigability.

A review of the events of the early years of the Islamic Revolution and a re-examination of what happened to some of the early revolutionary managers is a testament to this (Safaei Haeri, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 65). Of course, it is obvious that the guarantee of success and the support for any great Phase are scientific analysis and having a proper plan, which a Jihadi manager possesses (Eftekhaari et al., 2018 AD/1397 SH: 69).

Imam Khamenei says in this regard that for the country's economy to flourish, we need work that is both mujahid-like and knowledgeable. The country's economic problem will not be solved with laziness, lethargy, and a lack of motivation. Jihadi work must be done, Jihadi managements must have an all-encompassing grasp of the country's economic issues and make decisions; Jihadi work. Jihadi work means work that involves effort, indefatigability, and sincerity; one understands that one is not working for oneself, to fill one's own pocket, but is working for the people, for God; and also knowledgeably; meaning they should sit down and find the right ways with scientific standards, with a precise, knowledgeable method; they should be knowledgeable, efficient, and have various facilities; they should sit down and work; the country's economy will certainly flourish (Statements of the Supreme Leader at the gathering of pilgrims and neighbors of the holy shrine of Imam Reza on 01/01/1398).

6.3. Insight in Carrying Out Assigned Tasks

Insight is a word with a rich and respectable religious value and sacredness in Islamic and Alavi culture. Possessing insight is necessary in all aspects of life, but it seems more essential in some areas, such as managers having insight and vision in management. In today's changing and volatile world, a manager, in addition to management knowledge, needs

enlightenment, insight, and vision that enable him to play the appropriate role in any situation. A society without insight is blind and, like the blind, exhibits contradictory behaviors; it is never trustworthy. At the most critical moments, due to a lack of understanding of its situation, it leaves its insightful leader alone. Insight is one of the most important prerequisites of management. An Islamic manager must have complete insight and depth himself and also guide his followers with insight towards the set goals. The breadth of vision and awareness of the manager of an Islamic society must be so great that he can even recognize the trail of a plot and the plotters and make a correct and decisive decision against them: "So He came upon them from behind." (al-Anfāl: 57)

Imam Khamenei, regarding the spirit of insight, says: "Maintaining motivation, maintaining vigilance, maintaining unity, removing any dangerous residue, enlightening cultural work, and in short, not forgetting all-encompassing readiness should not be forgotten." (The Supreme Leader's response to Major General Qassem Soleimani's letter on 30/08/1396)

6.4. Haste Combined With Prudence

Prudence and planning in life's affairs are matters that intellect deems necessary, and the Imams (AS) have also made recommendations in this regard. Prudence in language means foresight. Timely prudence and haste in work are the guarantors of a Jihadi manager's success in his assigned duties (Firoozabadi, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 81).

Imam Khamenei, regarding haste combined with prudence, says: "Being hardworking, moving with prudence, not knowing day and night, and following through on work, this is the meaning of Jihadi management" (Statements of the Supreme Leader during a meeting with the people of East Azerbaijan on 29/11/1396).

6.5. Enemy Recognition

One of the values in the view of Shi'ism is not accepting the arrogance and dominance of disbelievers. Therefore, Shi'ites and believers should not accept the dominance and arrogance of disbelievers over themselves but must stand against and resist the arrogance and dominance of the disbelievers (Masoudnia et al., 2014 AD/1393 SH: 39). Enemy recognition is about identifying the true face of the enemy, strategy, and examining the principles and foundations of fighting the enemy. Enemy recognition is about knowing the goal and discerning the path and identifying the function of the enemy. It is a practical strategy of insight, so that a timely

counter-strategy against the enemy, along with theoretical and practical counter-solutions, can be developed and implemented. It is natural that a society that cannot recognize its enemy and become aware of its threats cannot have a correct plan to counter it and adopt a suitable defensive policy. For this reason, enemy recognition has a special place in the Leader's guidance, and he considers it one of the characteristics of Jihadi management.

Regarding enemy recognition, he says: "The enemy wants the young people of our country to be unmotivated, to be faithless, to be hopeless, to be slaves to their desires, to be lazy, to be idle, to complain, not to work, to be addicted, to be fragile; they want the young people of the country to be like this. This is the goal of the things they are doing to our young people; it is the exact opposite of what we need" (Statements of the Supreme Leader during a meeting with the Basijis on 06/09/1398).

Conclusion

The Islamic Revolution of Iran, after overcoming many ups and downs, has reached a stage of maturity where it now plays a decisive role as a pole in global equations. Management in Islamic thought originates from its fundamental beliefs, which means that piety and faith are observed at all levels. When we talk about management in Islam, we mean managing affairs at all individual and social levels. It is clear that, given the immense importance and problem-solving nature of Jihadi management for strengthening the country's internal power structure and also the regional power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such a management style is very necessary and essential, and not paying attention to it will cause us irreparable problems. Therefore, the way out of the country's current problems is to have Jihadi management and revolutionary education.

In Jihadi management, the effective and efficient use and organization of human resources through the science and art and laws of management to achieve desirable goals is within the framework of the existing value system, which is pure Muhammadi Islam (PBUH). Jihadi management is an example of management in which the organizational culture is formed to achieve the organization's goals, and the organization's goals are in line with the needs and values of the environment. The experience of the holy defense showed us that Jihadi management is effective in achieving the impossible. The conducted analysis determined that to achieve Jihadi management at the societal level, not only must officials as agents institutionalize Jihadi management within themselves, but the governing structures must also

be based on Jihadi management, in a way that the governing structure not only encourages and supports individuals with a Jihadi spirit but also causes other employees to be drawn to this matter.

In this article, using the thematic analysis method, the data obtained from the statements of Imam Khamenei were conceptualized. Based on these concepts, primary themes (familiarity with the Quran and prayer, helping God's servants, firm resolve, strong will, being hardworking, vigilance, insight, not knowing day and night, following through on work, recognizing threats, the real face of the enemy) and organizing themes (divine intention, service to the people, resilient, tenacity, mujahid-like action, enlightenment, foresight, industriousness, moving with prudence, knowing the enemy's goal, anti-arrogance) and overarching themes were obtained. Finally, by combining and merging similar overarching themes, five dimensions were extracted with an emphasis on Imam Khamenei's thought: "Faith and work for God, seriousness and indefatigability, insight in carrying out assigned tasks, haste combined with prudence, and enemy recognition."

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An Analysis and Explanation of the Relationship between "Islam and Politics" in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli (with an Emphasis on Political Theology)

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Article Info

Article type:
Scientific Research

Article history:
Received: 2025/1/27
Received in revised form: 2025/3/18
Accepted: 2025/4/13
Available online: 2025/10/21

Keywords:

Javadi Amoli, Political Thought, Political Theology, Islam and Politics and Government, Velayat-e Faqih, Skinner.

ABSTRACT

Objective: Ayatollah Javadi Amoli has a relative comprehensiveness in theology and also in dealing with issues of political kalām, including the areas of political kalām, which has made him a prominent figure. The aim of the article is to analyze the relationship between Islam and politics based on Skinner's intentional hermeneutic method with some appropriations; and based on "political kalām" as a theoretical framework to explain Javadi Amoli's perspective. On this basis, the main question is what is the type of relationship between religion and government in Javadi Amoli's view?

Method: The research uses Quentin Skinner's hermeneutic method, which is a moderate method compared to text-centric and context-centric, with selection, intervention, and manipulation to analyze the issue.

Findings: Some findings include: The religious state is not incompatible with the active role of the people, but it is not the only exclusive component; the government as a religious office; the role of reason in political legitimacy; the separation of legitimacy in the position of proof from legitimacy in the position of proof; the Islamic ruler has not a mandate over society but a guardianship, and the people accept his divine guardianship through expert experts; the people have a fundamental role in the position of proof, but they do not have any role in the position of proof; the nature of Islamic rulings explains the necessity of forming a religious state; neither in the principle of religion is imposition permissible, nor can a religious state be compulsory; man, by law, must accept religion and divine sovereignty;

Conclusion: On this basis, Javadi Amoli is one of the serious theorists of the integration of religion and politics and religion and government based on rational and legal arguments, which is considered his intention, and in this regard, he is considered an opponent of the ideology of secularism and liberal democracy.

Cite this article Aghajani & A (2025). An Analysis and Explanation of the Relationship between "Islam and Politics" in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli (with an Emphasis on Political Theology).

Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution, 7 (26), 67-95. <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcir.2025.389508.1677>



© The Author(s).

DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcir.2025.389508.1677>

Publisher: University of Tehran.

Introduction

The relationship between religion and politics is one of the most important components of political thought and the primary issue in political theology, serving as a focal point for theorizing, political action, and a battleground of ideas. Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi Amoli is a contemporary thinker who has spoken and offered views in many different fields of Islamic humanities and political thought. Among these, he has diverse and profound works and opinions in the domain of political-theological teachings, which deserve analysis, investigation, and critique for the advancement of knowledge, especially in the field of Islamic political science. On the other hand, political theology, which as a field of knowledge is still undeveloped and in its emergent and formative stages, is one of the main areas of political thought in Islam that covers many fundamental intellectual issues, both historically and ideologically. The personality of Javadi Amoli and the political theology derived from him are significant for several reasons: "his relative comprehensiveness in religious studies, his diverse and numerous works on various aspects of political theology, his involvement in practical and theoretical politics in the capacity of a religious and seminary scholar, being alive and living a fruitful life, and being a distinguished jurist possessing the "Greater Jurisprudence" (fiqh al-Akbar), a significant part of which consists of political-theological discussions." He has numerous works in various fields, including very good quantitative and qualitative works on different issues of political theology. Accordingly, this research has selected Ayatollah Javadi Amoli as one of the greatest active theorists of political theology who has presented important and influential views. Based on a modified version of Skinner's intentionalist hermeneutics, it analyzes the relationship between religion and government in his political theology.

Based on this, the main question is: 'What is the nature of the relationship between religion and politics in Javadi Amoli's perspective?' The hypothesis is that, within the framework of political theology and based on subjective and objective contexts and prevailing norms in this field, Javadi Amoli, by rejecting the notion of the separation of religion and politics, believes in the integration and amalgamation of religion and politics, and religion and government. He grounds the connection between religion and politics on two fundamental principles: the absolute sovereignty of God and the creational right to choose and freedom, and emphasizes several points such as the non-compulsory nature of religious government, the purity of the politics and governance of the prophets (PBUH), and governance as a divine position.

1. Research Background

Regarding the research topic, no work has yet been done on the influence of rival intellectual currents on the political theology of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, and this research is the first work with this title and content. In terms of Javadi Amoli's thought in general, some works exist under the title of his political thought. Also, in some works related to the analysis of the political thought of seminaries or post-revolutionary political thought, such as some works by Abdolvahab Farati and Yahya Fowzi, some objective and environmental dimensions and contexts of political theology from the perspective of Javadi Amoli's political thought have been addressed. Among the published works, the following titles can be mentioned: "The book A Survey of the Political Thought of Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi Amoli" (Mansournejad, 2011 AD/1390 SH); theses: "A Study of the Social-Theological Discussions of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli" (Amiri, 2012 AD/1391 SH); "The Political Thought of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli" (Mojtabazadeh, 2010 AD/1389 SH); "The Exigencies of the Presence of Demonstrative Reason in the Political Epistemology of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli" (Alavian & Zarepour, 2018 AD/1397 SH); "The Convergence of Reason and Politics in the Transcendent Wisdom of Javadi Amoli based on Skinner's Epistemological Hermeneutic Theory" (Abbastabar & Zarepour Naghibi, 2019 AD/1398 SH); however, none of these works have directly investigated the relationship between religion and politics based on Skinner's hermeneutics, which constitutes the novelty of this research.

2. Concepts

A) Political Theology: Several definitions have been proposed for political theology. The definition chosen for this article is: the understanding, explanation, proof, systematization, organization, correction, justification, functionalization, and defense of political doctrines and belief systems, which is carried out through various rational and textual methods with a religious concern (Aghajani, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 97).

B) Politics: This concept does not have an official and exclusive definition, and everyone has defined it from a specific standpoint. Therefore, these definitions have relative value because politics has a particular breadth and complexity. Among the four categories of definitions—state-centric, government-centric, power-centric, and behavioral—behavioral definitions are generally superior to the others (Iskandari, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 87). Accordingly, the chosen definition of politics is the exercise of influence to secure social objectives. With this

definition, political theology extends beyond the mere domains of the state, government, and even institutional power, and acquires a broader meaning (Aghajani, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 51).

3. Method: Skinner's Intentionality Hermeneutics

The research utilizes the hermeneutic method of Quentin Skinner (born 1940), which is a moderate approach compared to text-centric and context-centric methods, with certain selections and modifications for analyzing the issue. The constant variable of this research is that the intellectual, subjective, scientific, and social environment of the political theologian and his familiarity with various sciences are, on the whole, effective in his understanding of political theology. The intellectual foundations of this view can be traced in the discussions related to the science of hermeneutics. Various definitions of hermeneutics have been presented (Balkhari, 1992 AD/1371 SH; Palmer, 1998 AD/1377 SH; Bleicher, 2001 AD/1380 SH; Vaezi, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 27). For example, Schleiermacher considered it the art of understanding and believed that the interpretation of a text is constantly at risk of being misunderstood. Therefore, hermeneutics should be employed as a set of methodical and instructive rules to eliminate this risk.

Using Skinner's method is possible in research on past historical thought as well as in the present day and for contemporary thinkers or thoughts. In some articles, certain topics of Javadi Amoli's thought have been examined based on Skinner's method (Abbastabar & Zarepour Naghibi, 2019 AD/1398 SH). Skinner pays attention to two points regarding the understanding of political thought (Skinner, 2014 AD/1393 SH; Javid, 2014 AD/1393 SH). First is what meaning the thinker has in mind, which is usually achievable by studying the author's writings or statements.

The second point is to discover and know the purpose that the thinker intended by writing. Skinner has used hermeneutics at this stage of the discussion. According to him, to understand the author's intention, one must pay attention to the debates, controversies, and questions that were raised in the thinker's time and in that atmosphere, the thinker's participation in that atmosphere, and his effort to say something in that context. Therefore, one must be familiar with the prevailing atmosphere of that era and the intellectual currents that occurred during the author's time (Skinner, 2014 AD/1393 SH).


Based on this, among the various hermeneutic methods, Skinner's method is a moderate one between text-centrism and context-centrism and is classified among author-centric

hermeneutic methods. According to this method, a proper understanding of categories such as the living environment, political atmosphere, language, intellectual context, and on the other hand, the works and writings of the individual in question, are used simultaneously to explain his thought (Javid, 2014 AD/1393 SH).

This method encompasses four general stages:

1. The influence of objective contexts;
2. The influence of subjective contexts;
3. Prevailing norms;
4. The thinker's manipulation of norms.

Stages of Skinner's intentionality Hermeneutic Method in the Research



In this method, the main emphasis is on discovering the author's intention, and the social context of the text is effective in clarifying the author's motive, not in discovering his intention (Skinner, 2014 AD/1393 SH). In this method, the text is transformed from an autonomous object to an object related to the subject or to the creator of the work.

4. Theoretical Framework

In this research, political theology is considered the theoretical framework. Political theology in the domain of knowledge (and not content) is a newly established field, and the necessary investigation and research have not yet been conducted. Of course, to some extent, but not completely, it can be considered analogous to political theology in the West. There are not

numerous and diverse definitions of it, and it consists of two parts: traditional theology and modern theology, each of which has several definitions and approaches. There is no consensus in the definition of theology among scholars of this science, both in the past and present.

It seems that among the definitions, defining the science of theology as the science that undertakes the rational defense of religious beliefs is not far from reality. The meaning of "Rational" is broad, so that it also includes citation from tradition if the principle of citation is corrected and justified by reason. The meaning of "Defense" is also something that is more general than "Proof," "Strengthening," and "Justification," and more general than "Explanation" and "Interpretation" of religious concepts. Therefore, it should be noted that theology has a defensive, mediatory, and explanatory nature, as some experts believe (Qaramaleki, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 120). In modern theology, the preferred view distinguishes between the station of definition and the station of realization and believes that in the station of definition, the issues, method, subject, and foundations have evolved—while preserving past principles. But in the station of realization, theology consists of various geometric systems, many of which have no affinity with each other or with traditional theology. The chosen definition of political theology is the one that was mentioned in the concepts section (Aghajani, 2019 AD/1398 SH: 97).

5. Discussion: Objective and Subjective Contexts of Islam and Government in the Political Theology of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli

5.1. Objective Contexts

The influence of objective contexts on a thinker's thought is one of the components of Skinner's hermeneutic method, which plays a significant role in the formation of ideas in his view. The environment is one of the elements of objective contexts, which includes the family environment to the living and educational environment and encompasses the natural, cultural, and social environment. Also, the socio-political transformations concurrent with the thinker's life are another part of the objective contexts.

In the first instance, the family environment plays an indescribable role in shaping his scholarly personality. Abdullah Javadi Amoli was born in 1933 in Amol, after his parents had lost sons, and following a vow they made to Imam Reza (AS) (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 21). His grandfather, Mulla Fathullah Amoli, had a great interest in the science of

theology and for this reason; he had acquired the book "Gawhar Murad" by Lahiji and even endowed it, giving its custodianship to Mirza Abulhasan, Javadi Amoli's father, which ignited the sparks of interest and connection to theology in him (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 20). His father's maternal uncle, Mirza Ahmad Derka'i (d. 1347 AH), was also a mujtahid and a famous student of Akhund Khorasani (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 23).

On the other hand, in the geographical environment, Amol is the first city that shapes his scholarly personality as his birthplace and homeland. Amol is famous in history for nurturing scholars and intellectuals and has been a center of social transformations in northern Iran. Amol was the capital of Iran during the Ziyarid and Alavid dynasties and was one of the centers of Iran during the Parthian era, and from the time of Fereydun until the time of Bahram Gur, Amol was the seat and capital of the inhabited quarter (Nasri Ashrafi, 2020 AD/1399 SH: 40; Yazdanpanah Lamouki, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 150). Javadi Amoli has described his days in Amol in considerable detail, and there are good points in connection with the research discussion. He attended a private national elementary school until the fourth grade and spent the fifth and sixth grades in the public "Farhang" elementary school, and he also reports on the activities of the Tudeh Party in Amol (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 22).

For this reason, the cultural environment of Amol and its historical background are effective in the formation of Javadi Amoli's personality; especially the seminary of Amol, which brings deep and strong sprouts to fruition in the young Javadi's being and leaves an unforgettable impact on Javadi's soul. So much so that Javadi finds the sweetness of studying in the Imam Askari seminary of Amol incomparable to anywhere else. He was taken by his father to two of the great clerics of Amol, Ayatollah Abolqasem Farsio and Ayatollah Gharavi, and began his seminary studies in Amol (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 23). He first entered the seminary of the Jame' Mosque school in Amol and studied there for four years, and he spent the last year of his presence in Amol at the Imam Hasan Askari school, until September 1950. In terms of learning, the lessons and conduct of his Amoli teachers, especially Aqa Zia Amoli in exegesis and theology, have a lasting effect on his scholarly future. Aqa Zia Amoli plays a special role in the growth of Javadi's scholarly personality. The serious beginning of Javadi Amoli's familiarity with exegesis, the Quran, theology, and rational sciences starts from the Amol seminary and especially in his presence. Forming private sessions and teaching hadith,

exegesis, and Quran memorization were among the initiatives of Haj Aqa Zia Amoli (1904-1982) (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 38).

The second living and educational environment of Javadi Amoli is Tehran, which had a diverse and contradictory environment in that era and covers a relatively long period of his education. In Tehran, Javadi is taught by the most elite and special professors of theology, wisdom (philosophy), and exegesis. Mohammad Taqi Amoli, Sha'rani, Elahi Qomshe'i, and Fazel Tuni are the most prominent among them. In Tehran and the Marvi School, Javadi reviews the different branches of religious studies and clarifies his future (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 56-60). In Tehran, he pursues wisdom, theology, and exegesis in a special way and chooses his path. The Marvi School plays a fundamental role in his inclination towards Quranic exegesis because, in that school, students are obliged to engage with the Quran daily (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 54-57).

Qom is the last city to have an effect on Javadi Amoli, which, of course, has a completing and decisive impact. If Javadi sprouts in Amol and his scholarly stem gains strength in Tehran, in Qom it expands, matures, and branches out, finding new life (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH, 6: 417). His companionship and discipleship with Allameh Tabatabai in private teaching sessions on exegesis and philosophy, and the Allameh's research-oriented and critical approach, create a scholarly depth in him and, in particular, nurture and blossom his talent in exegesis, theology, and philosophy (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 127). So much so that he himself refers to it as the beginning of his studies. His acquaintance with the personality of Imam Khomeini arouses in him a social comprehensiveness and a capacity for application (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 43), and the jurisprudential circle of Mohaqqueq Damad teaches him jurisprudential depth (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 137).

Teachers and professors everywhere and at all times have a major and fundamental share in the formation of the various dimensions of people's personalities. This issue is doubly true for Javadi Amoli, who has spoken in considerable detail about his professors and their roles. Javadi's professors, according to seminary tradition, have been effective in both his scholarly development and his spiritual training, which we comprehensively call personal character. Honesty, courage, humility, wit, wisdom, passion, and compassion are the traits of character as a collection of moral characteristics that were present with varying degrees of intensity in his professors and were, in the same manner, transmitted to him.

Among Javadi Amoli's professors, Allameh Tabatabai (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 127) and Mohammad Taqi Amoli (Javadi Amoli, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 1-3, 383), as is evident in his words, have had the most comprehensive and all-encompassing scholarly and personal impact on him. Elahi Qomshe'i nurtured the sprouts of inclination towards Quranic exegesis in him (Javadi Amoli, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 6). Sha'rani strengthened his inclinations towards theology (Javadi Amoli, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 5). Fazel Tuni ignited the flame of philosophizing in his being (Javadi Amoli, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 2-5, 145). Imam Khomeini, in addition to principles of jurisprudence, was effective in shaping his social and outward-looking political personality (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 43). Mohaqqueq Damad built his jurisprudential foundation (Javadi Amoli, 1985 AD/1364 SH: 5), and Mirza Hashem Amoli refined it (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 153).

The political-social transformations and conditions during Ayatollah Javadi Amoli's lifetime are another dimension of the objective contexts, which can be enumerated and examined in the periods of pre-Islamic Revolution socio-political conditions, post-Islamic Revolution socio-political conditions (1979-1989), socio-political conditions in the period (1989-2009), and socio-political conditions in the period (2009-2022). Before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he actively participated in the revolutionary-Islamic struggles. The signature of Ayatollah Javadi is also present under the declarations and telegrams issued by the scholars of the Qom seminary on various occasions, in which regard 16 declarations can be mentioned, and he was repeatedly summoned to SAVAK and the police station and banned from the pulpit (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 196-198).

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, along with continuous and uninterrupted support in academic and research communities for the intellectual foundations of the Islamic movement, has had an active presence in various political-social responsibilities when needed. Responsibilities such as the presidency of the Revolutionary Courts and being the Sharia judge of Amol (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 200), membership and active participation in the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution (Detailed Proceedings of the Constitution, p. 344), drafting the Retribution Bill (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 203), and delivering Imam's message to Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 208 and 248).

In the period (1989-2009), the most important impact of Javadi Amoli can be seen in these cases: missionary trips (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 250), holding the position of

Friday prayer leader of Qom, supporting Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri in the 1997 presidential election, speaking at the Great Mosque and defending the Guardianship of the Jurist in 1997 (Saturday, September 12, 2009, Raja News / www.rajanews.com/news/20832), attending and speaking among the sit-in protesters at the A'zam Mosque of Qom in 1999 (February 5, 2000/ www.irna.ir/news/5702470), and decisively supporting Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the 2005 presidential election (08/06/2005 / www.irna.ir/news/5158033/).

In the period (2009-2022), his most important socio-political actions include stepping down from leading Friday prayers (November 27, 2009 - www.khabaronline.ir/news/26940), supporting the JCPOA negotiations and warning against the US (<https://www.taghribnews.com/fa/note/530404>), praising Hashemi Rafsanjani (javadi.esra.ir/fa/w), opposing the attack on the Saudi embassy (<https://www.khabarfoori.com/-46/8299>), reacting to the hijab issue (<https://fararu.com/fa/news/576349>), and commenting on the Cyberspace Protection Bill (<https://www.etemadonline.com-23/588225>).

5.2. Subjective Contexts

Political theology, like other branches of science, is based on pre-existing subjective assumptions, a significant part of which are knowledge-based elements. This issue becomes more important when it concerns a specific thinker. Abdullah Javadi Amoli is among the thinkers whose range of sciences influencing his political theology is diverse and can be evaluated in two parts: aligned and rival (opposing) knowledge streams. In the aligned knowledge streams, three domains and sides can be specifically mentioned: Transcendent Political Wisdom, jurisprudence, and the Quran-by-Quran exegesis; these are the intellectual currents and sciences that have prepared the ground for his discourse in political theology.

Javadi Amoli has pre-existing assumptions and also views in all three sides, which directly and indirectly affect the shaping of his political theology or its explanation and exposition, and he is nourished by them. From Javadi Amoli's perspective, Transcendent Wisdom is the chief of all sciences (Javadi Amoli, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 1-1, 13) and is a sound combination of theology, philosophy, and mysticism that has built a suitable and comprehensive worldview (Javadi Amoli, 1997 AD/1376 SH: 13-26). This perspective is demonstrated in the influence of the discussion on the gradation of being on topics such as the generic political vicegerency of man from God (Javadi Amoli, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 3, 39-40); or, this approach,

which emphasizes the illuminating and revealing nature of reason and the guardianship of Sharia, extends into political theology, resulting in political legitimacy being with the Lawgiver and acceptability with the people, and a law established by the people without Sharia is described as a body without a soul; also, the preference of the majority's opinion over the minority's passes through the orbit of the Lawgiver and the confirmation of reason (Javadi Amoli, 2010 AD/1389 SH:19, 387).

Jurisprudence in Javadi Amoli's view means comprehensive religious knowledge and is not limited to particularistic conventional jurisprudence, which has no conflict with wisdom and philosophy (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 251). Javadi's approach can be called non-rigid traditional jurisprudence (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 4, 162). Based on his view of jurisprudence, Javadi Amoli understands the meaning of the deputyship of the jurist who meets the scholarly and practical conditions from the impeccable Imam (AS) as, in addition to the principle of administering the affairs of the nation, the necessity of receiving the principles governing politics and laws from divine guidance (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 4, 499-500).

In his exegetical method, from his perspective, the Quran is an interpretive methodology and not just a religious source; and the exegesis of the Quran by the Quran has "actual" authority, not adjunctive authority (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 61). And the authority of the Quran takes precedence over the word of the infallible (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 64). Based on this, Javadi Amoli's political theology is based on the duality of reason and tradition, not reason and religion, and on a comprehensive theology, comprehensive jurisprudence, and the superiority of the Quranic perspective, which is reflected in the system of issues of political theology. These components have had a great reflection on Javadi Amoli's political theology and the processing of its issues.

Rival intellectual currents are considered one of the elements and parts of the discussion of subjective contexts that influence the formation of a thinker's thought. This influence is sometimes even stronger and more prominent than the aligned subjective contexts in the formation and crystallization of the thinker's views. In this regard, Javadi Amoli is a comprehensive thinker who has an active encounter with different levels of rival and opposing thoughts and is up-to-date in their analysis and criticism. There is no prominent intellectual topic in which he does not have a detailed engagement. Seven knowledge-value currents—Humanism, Liberalism, Secularism, Pluralism, Marxism, Hermeneutics, and the theory of the

Contraction and Expansion of Sharia—are the most important rival intellectual currents that are reflected in the views and works of Javadi Amoli and have influenced his political theology.

The highest level of his qualitative and quantitative engagement is with the discussion of hermeneutics and, of course, under it, with the theory of Contraction and Expansion; and the least engagement is with Marxism. With an analytical-critical perspective, Javadi Amoli understands humanism as the centrality of man and the orbit of human desires and disregard for the transcendent, which leads to a tendency towards animalism and the complete self-sufficiency and independence of man, both of which are reprehensible (Javadi Amoli, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 2, 108). He also considers liberalism a tragic event and a hollow mirage (Javadi Amoli, 2005: 154). His accepted definition of secularism is the "Separation of religion from social affairs" (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 18), and he considers the comprehensive boundary of its definitions to be the rejection of religious government (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 33). From his perspective, a secular state, society, and religion are possible, but science is either atheistic or divine and cannot be secular (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (c): 167).

Soteriological pluralism (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 6, 212), political pluralism, and social pluralism are acceptable from Javadi Amoli's perspective, and he explicitly states this (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 6, 212). But he does not accept epistemological pluralism at all and does not consider it correct (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 185). In his view, "Marxism" and "Humanism" are also considered religions and schools of thought for themselves (Javadi Amoli, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 89).

In relation to hermeneutics, Javadi Amoli is a flexible author-centrist who does not accept the death of the author, especially in sacred texts (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 228). From his perspective, interpretation without pre-understanding is impossible, but the text's response is not always an endorsement of the presupposition (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 227). While he defends not imposing the mind's and intellect's opinion on the religious text, he considers the interpretive operation devoid of presuppositions to be sterile and impossible and even considers the existence of some presuppositions to be useful and necessary (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (c): 197). He also considers the hypothesis of Contraction and Expansion to have many flaws and strongly emphasizes the need for its refinement and revival. He considers a minimalist religion incapable of civilization-building

to be the fruit of the theory of Contraction and Expansion and has a serious critique of it (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (b): 108; Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 (a): 4, 89).

Ontology, epistemology, and anthropology can be considered as foundations. From Javadi Amoli's perspective, philosophy can be defined as ontology, because ontology includes the conceptual and demonstrative-affirmative knowledge of the existence of things. In Javadi Amoli's view, the ontological source of religion is the eternal will and knowledge of God (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 430).

In epistemology, Javadi Amoli has examined, criticized, and evaluated several theories about the nature of knowledge, such as the theory of "Approval," the materialist theory in interpreting the nature of knowledge, and the theory of considering the nature of knowledge to be empirical. He considers the best theory in explaining the essential criterion for the truth and falsehood of knowledge to be the correspondence of thought with the thing-in-itself (Javadi Amoli, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 98-106). In his view, epistemology as a science does not have the ability to judge jurisprudential issues (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (b): 50).

In anthropology, he believes in the possibility of anthropology with numerous proofs and enumerates the importance of anthropology from multiple aspects, such as anthropology as a prelude to theology; the path of self-purification; liberation from the calamities of self-forgetfulness; and the role of anthropology in other sciences (Javadi Amoli, 2005 AD/1384 SH (b): 63-70). The role of anthropology in other sciences is also through two paths: being the principles of other sciences and being the subject of the human sciences (Javadi Amoli, 2005 AD/1384 SH (b): 73). In explaining the nature of man and in defining it, Javadi Amoli holds that according to the Quran, the ultimate limit of man, which is his final differentia, is a "Theomorphic living being." (Javadi Amoli, 2005 AD/1384 SH (b): 164) Based on this, in Javadi Amoli's view, man is composed of two forces: "Nature and innate disposition." (Javadi Amoli, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 10, 439)

The primary and original creedal beliefs form another part of the subjective contexts. Accordingly, political monotheism, political justice, political prophecy, political imamate, and political resurrection can be considered as the primary and original creedal beliefs. Based on this, one of the most frequent concepts in Javadi Amoli's works is the concept of Tawhid. Javadi Amoli equates wisdom with monotheism and believes that a rational person is one who is a monotheist. He believes that the main element among the four elements of concern for God, solving the difficulties of the Islamic nation, meeting the needs of the human society of

Muslims and non-Muslims, and preserving dignity against a tyrannical ruler is the very concern for God and seeking His pleasure, in the shadow of which the other three elements will be secured (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH (b): 29).

The most important part of monotheism is Lordly Monotheism, according to which the administration of all general and particular affairs of the universe is directly in the hands of God, and the entire world of possibility is channels of His grace and His signs. Javadi Amoli also calls "Lordly Monotheism" the axis of the prophets' preaching and the center of their conflict with their enemies (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 353).

Javadi Amoli holds that divine justice, meaning the manifestation of truth and the implementation of widespread truth, includes the entire universe of creation (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (a): 4, 385). On the other hand, God's justice is an attribute of action, not an attribute of essence, but due to its attribution to the eternal power, it is not violable (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (a): 4, 385); from his perspective, the concept of justice is absolute and, like the concept of equality, does not have degrees of less and more to be relative and additional (Javadi Amoli, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 19, 587).

In Javadi Amoli's explanation, the proof of the necessity of revelation and prophecy is the delivery of God's message in the principles and branches of religion to the people (Javadi Amoli, 1999 AD/1378 SH: 1, 74). Javadi Amoli considers prophecy and government to be identical and integrated and holds that government is a part of the divine mission of the prophets (Javadi Amoli, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 6, 454-461).

Contrary to some theorists, he considers the imamate to be a continuation of prophecy in this regard and considers holding the position of government to be part of the essence of imamate, and he regards socio-political leadership as the comprehensive measure of imamate (Javadi Amoli, 2006 AD/1385 SH: 6, 454-61). In Javadi Amoli's view, the current of the imamate of the impeccable Imams (AS) is, like the current of the prophethood of the messengers, a divine position, and other than designation and appointment, there is no way for the proof of the principle of that position, and the people's pact and allegiance mean acceptance and taking on the guardianship (Javadi Amoli, 2007 AD/1386 SH (a): 4, 431).

In his view, only the principle of resurrection is a necessary belief, which can be proven with textual evidence and rational proof, but its details and derivatives, such as the vastness of paradise, the number of stations of judgment, etc., are not necessary beliefs of the religion, and it is possible that all their characteristics do not fall within the realm of reason (Javadi

Amoli, *ibid*: 20, 81). Javadi Amoli mentions several proofs and arguments for resurrection, which are: the proof from motion, the proof from truthfulness, the proof from innate disposition, the proof from motion and purposefulness, the proof from wisdom, the proof from mercy, the proof from reality, and the proof from the immateriality of the soul (Javadi Amoli, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 4, 156).

6. Findings

6.1. Prevailing Norms about Islam, Politics, and Government

The relationship between religion and politics is one of the most central normative disputes in political theology. The norm of their amalgamation or the norm of their separation is a battleground of ideas. In the contemporary era, the revisionist and rethinking views of some thinkers have once again turned it into a major macro-dispute and, in a specific sense, produced its own literature, an affair that opens up new intellectual and scientific fields and answers. In this matter, we face different views and norms, some of which are relatively simple and some relatively complex.

The definitions of religion and politics vary. But regardless of the definitions, it can be pursued at two levels: at the level of theory and at the level of the institutions of religion and politics, which are religion and the state. Various classifications of the relationship between religion and politics have been made. Some have divided it into two areas: the separation of religion from politics and their combination (Bashiriyeh, 1999 AD/1378 SH). Some have spoken of six models; the scope of religion over politics, the scope of politics over religion, congruence, overlap, tangency, and disjunction of religion and politics (Qaderi, 1999 AD/1378 SH). Another classification is amalgamation, denial, alliance, exclusion, and independence. Some have considered four forms: complete unity, mutual support, separation, and mutual support (Shojaee Zand, 1997 AD/1376 SH). Some have also spoken of seven models (Vaezi, 1999 AD/1378 SH).

Some others have examined the relationship between religion and politics in two categories of proponents and opponents (Haghighat, 2004 AD/1383 SH). In the category of proponents are the maximalists, the "Area of Void" proponents, and the minimalists. In the category of opponents are the religionists and the anti-religionists. But the relationship between the institution of religion and the state is explained in three forms: "Integration, interaction, and independence." Interaction has three forms: supervision of the state by the institution of

religion, supervision of religion by the state, and cooperation between the institution of religion and the state. Independence is also conceivable in three forms: separationist, distinctionist, and adversarial.

Based on this, the question of the nature of the relationship between religion and politics and their dependence and connection or lack of dependence and connection, and which one has priority, are the most important questions in the realm of religion and politics. Imam Khomeini (1902-1989) is a serious theorist of the correlation of religion and politics and makes the most effort to establish it: "Islam is the religion of politics, a religion in whose rulings, in its positions, politics is clearly seen." (Khomeini: 9, 333)

"Was politics separate from religion during the time of the Prophet (PBUH)? Were there a group of clerics and another group of politicians and rulers in that period?" (Khomeini: 22). "By God, all of Islam is politics. Islam has been poorly introduced. The politics of cities originates from Islam." (Khomeini: 1, 270)

Motahhari (1919-1979), who arose from the seminary and blossomed among the university-based religious intellectuals, supports the dependence of religion and politics based on his cosmology and anthropology and writes in its explanation: "This dependence means that the Muslim masses consider intervention in their political destiny a religious duty and an important responsibility. The correlation of religion and politics does not mean the dependence of religion on politics, but rather the dependence of politics on religion." (Motahhari: 24, 39)

Motahhari holds that from the perspective of Islam, politics is not separate from religion and religion is not separate from politics. Therefore, the correlation of religion and politics must be explained to the people (Motahhari: 24, 35). Of course, he also pays attention to the point that the mixing of religion and politics should not lead to religious despotism (Motahhari: 24, 39).

From the perspective of Seyyid Kazem Shariatmadari (1906-1986), who had a clear difference with Imam Khomeini (1902-1989) in the seminary atmosphere of that day but was considered a modernist yet cautious authority, the relationship between religion and politics is a strong and clear relationship that cannot be separated: "Islamic rulings are not subject to suspension, so an Islamic government must be established and its constitution must be organized in the light of Islamic laws. Two things become clear from this statement: that the formation of a government is one of the fundamental issues of Islam, and a separation cannot

be made between religion and politics, unless politics means trickery, or the intended meaning of religion is not true Islam." (*Al-Hadi Magazine*, 1972 AD/1392 SH: 9-25)

Mahdi Bazargan (1907-1995), who was raised in a middle-class religious family and matured at the university while also benefiting spiritually from the religious scholars of Tehran, considers religion as the principal and politics as the subordinate. He believes that although religion should intervene in politics and determine its main lines, "Politics should never interfere in religion because it leads to polytheism. Religion determines the goals and principles of government, while politicians should never distort religion to pursue worldly goals." (A Group of Scholars, 1962 AD/1341 SH: 117) Bazargan, who was in the midst of the currents of the 1950s and the movement for the nationalization of the oil industry, points out the incompatibility of separating politics from religion and writes: "If religion—hypothetically—leaves politics alone and does not concern itself with it, politics will not leave religion free in any way whatsoever. On the contrary, the more indifferent religion is towards politics, the more politics will fundamentally interfere in all aspects of religion." (Bazargan, 1962 AD/1341 SH: 6-7)¹

Thus, by establishing the above premise as a cornerstone, he believes that religion must intervene in politics. And to strengthen and consolidate his theory, he resorts to evidence from the Quran and Sunnah (Bazargan, 1962 AD/1341 SH: 35-39). He also refers to the conduct of the Shia Imams (AS) (Bazargan, 1962 1341 SH: 33-34). In addition, in this part, he refers to the concepts of expectation and occultation, trying to prove that believers must intervene in politics (Bazargan, 1962 AD/1341 SH: 45).

From this perspective, Ali Shariati (1933-1977), like Bazargan, holds that the separation of religion from politics is alien to the spirit of Islam. He considers the separation of the prophetic aspect from the leadership aspect of the Prophet a Christian interpretation and does not accept the separation of religion from politics. In his view, the infallible Imam holds both religious authority and the presidency of the state (Shariati, 1978 AD/1357 SH: 155-165).

The *Ommat* newspaper, the organ of the Movement of Militant Muslims, speaks of political Islam and the imperialists' fear of it and criticizes the efforts of liberals to reduce religiosity to a personal connection with God and a purely moral matter, while Islam is a fully-fledged

¹. Of course, in later periods, Bazargan apparently reaches another reading of the relationship between religion and politics, which is crystallized in his speech "God and the Hereafter, the Goal of the Prophets' Mission." Although there are different opinions about the complete change in his view. This issue will be addressed in its place in the fourth chapter.

political school of thought for responding to all the needs of the age. This group holds that Islamic ideology is capable of solving all fundamental human problems in any age and time. Therefore, it strongly rejects the separation of politics, economics, and judiciary from religion (*Ommat Newspaper*, issue 8, 06/06/1979).

Kadivar also holds the view of the independence of the domains of religion and politics from each other. He considers politics a rational matter and political management a human endeavor. In his view, a religious person must also consider religious standards and criteria in the various spheres of his life. But observing these general lines and broad criteria does not negate the rationality of the principle of political management (Kadivar, 11/24/2002). Kadivar's preferred model of government is a secular democratic government, meaning that all its institutions, officials, laws, and decisions are determined democratically without any exception; they come with the people's vote, they go with the people's vote, they are placed in a glass room under the institutionalized supervision of the people. In his view, in this system, no privilege or special right is accepted for any individual, guild, or class. There is no lifetime or above-the-law official in it. All laws are enacted, interpreted, and repealed with the consent of the people's representatives. The basic rights of all citizens are guaranteed, rights that are absolutely inviolable under any circumstances. Kadivar holds that in this model, one of these rights is the possibility of the minority becoming the majority, and freedom is observed within the limits of international human rights standards (Human Rights and Religious Intellectualism from the Perspective of Mohsen Kadivar, 2005 AD/1384 SH: <http://aftabnews.ir>).

Mahdi Haeri Yazdi (1923-1999), from the position of a seminary scholar but with a philosophical-theological perspective, criticizes religious government and proposes the theory of the agency of joint owners, expressing his reading of the relationship between religion and politics, which is based on their separation. Of course, his proposal is more philosophical and has serious flaws and has been criticized from various angles, but his proposal also has theological aspects. He considers governmental rulings as clear and decisive evidence for the separation of politics from religion. Haeri holds that "government" is neither in the essence of Islam, nor in the core of prophecy, nor in the foundation of imamate. Rather, it is a conventional matter and, as is subtly indicated in the title of Haeri's book, it must be established based on rationality, wisdom, and logic, not with emotions and excitements (Haeri, 1995: 218). In Haeri's opinion, religion is inherently different from government

(Haeri, 1995: 150-176). He argues that government, by its nature, is a conventional matter and can only have legitimacy in people's social life through agency. In this way, people consciously and freely elect and appoint individuals as their agents to organize their social life (Haeri, 1995: 177-178).

Habibollah Peyman (b. 1935) does not consider religion synonymous with government or leadership, although he believes that religion has given its opinion on how to manage the leadership of society and regulate the relationships among people. He believes that according to the Quran, the political system must be based on the free and conscious participation of all believers, and social relations must be established on the basis of equality, cooperation, and mutual assistance, and the Quran recognizes the individuality of man, and his conscience and will are free from any constraint except what he has consciously and freely accepted (Peyman, 1998 AD/1377 SH).

6.2. Javadi Amoli's Reconfigurations of the Relationship between Islam and "Politics and Governance"

Javadi Amoli's perspective on the issue of Islam and secularism is an outcome of subjective and objective contexts and an analysis of conventional norms, which culminates in his intellectual reconfigurations. Accordingly, the aim of this section is to trace these influences and norms, and to delineate his formulation of the focal points of conventional norms and his definition of secularism.

Javadi Amoli (b. 1933) is a major proponent of reconfigurations that emphasize the amalgamation and integration of religion and politics, the necessity of divine law, and the need for religion. He has engaged in a systematic and profound critique and review of conventional norms, offering his own elaborations and theorizations. In his view, if a law only considers the natural and practical aspects of human beings and ignores their moral or creedal dimensions, it cannot lead them to ultimate felicity (Javadi Amoli: 52).

Based on this, he believes in humanity's need for religion in all individual and social dimensions of life (Javadi Amoli: 129). In his opinion, the very nature of Islamic rulings clearly illustrates the necessity of forming a government, because a collective spirit is diffused and embedded throughout all of Islam's rulings (Javadi Amoli: 68). It is from this perspective that he highlights the socio-political spheres of Islam—such as supervision, guidance,

enjoining good and forbidding evil, jihad, and defense—and underscores its comprehensive social regulations, ordinances, and laws (Javadi Amoli: 75-76).

Influenced by subjective and objective contexts—especially his subjective foundations rooted in Transcendent Theosophy, the Quranic exegetical tradition, and comprehensive religious understanding, as well as Islamic principles based on a monotheistic ontology, a revelational-rational epistemology, a theomorphic anthropology, and precepts like absolute divine lordship and the unity of divine governance—he maintains that government plays a valuable role in religion. He considers it an affair without which religion cannot achieve many of its major objectives in the individual and social arenas. Thus, although government is an instrumental and non-independent goal for achieving major religious objectives, it is of paramount importance because it is the sole path to attaining those individual and social goals, for which there is no reliable substitute (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH (b): 22).

In his view, to understand the relationship between religion and government, one must pay attention to two fundamental principles: the absolute sovereignty of God, which stems from political monotheism and especially the unity of divine lordship, and the right to choose and ontological freedom, which originates from a rational epistemology based on Transcendent Theosophy (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH (b): 23).

Based on the first principle, from a religious perspective, governance and the administration of society belong solely to the absolute manager and governor of existence; "Sovereignty is for none but God." Furthermore, only those who are chosen directly or indirectly by God can assume this position.

Based on the second principle, man is created ontologically free and is never compelled to accept any sovereignty, whether divine or otherwise. Therefore, neither is coercion permissible in the principle of religion—"There is no compulsion in religion"—nor can a religious government be compulsory, even though man is legislatively obligated to accept religion and divine sovereignty.

Based on this, the non-compulsory nature of religious government is founded upon the established divine tradition that God bestows His blessings upon His servants only when they have prepared themselves to receive them; "Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves." (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH (b): 23)

Consequently, the establishment of divine government in society depends on collective desire and readiness. Such a government is imposed, neither in its formation nor in its continuation;

it is formed and sustained solely through the will and volition of the people. Thus, the decision to implement or not implement divine commands and laws in society rests with the people. It is they who manifest their will to form a religious government and live a divine life, allowing such a government to be established and maintained through their support (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH (b): 23).

On this basis, Javadi Amoli rejects the notion that incorporating the opinions of the people necessitates setting aside the sovereignty of God, as is emphasized in a theocracy. He does not consider the two to be mutually exclusive. His reasoning is that, firstly, religious government does not entail the tyrannical supremacy of religion and the disregard of any role for the people. Secondly, unlike in liberal-democratic governments, the opinion of the people is not the sole axis in a religious government, where rulers would think of nothing but following their views, and governance would be considered an unquestioning subordinate to public opinion, even in its transient and temporary forms (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH (b): 24).

Javadi Amoli analyzes the various groups that have developed conventional norms regarding the relationship between religion, politics, and government based on their different motives, goals, and methods. In harmony with his teacher, Imam Khomeini, Javadi Amoli affirms the correlation of religion and politics. He aligns with Motahhari's view on the dependence of politics on religion (not vice versa) and agrees that the intermingling of the two should not lead to religious despotism. He does not disagree with Mehdi Bazargan of the 1960s-1980s or Ali Shariati regarding the incompatibility of separating politics from religion and the non-interference of politics in religion. However, he opposes Bazargan's perspective from the 1990s, which limits the purpose of religion to God and the hereafter.

While he does not oppose Kadivar's view on the rationality of the principle of political management, he vehemently rejects the acceptance of a secular state and the notion of popular sovereignty. He seriously confronts the opinion of Haeri Yazdi—that "Government" is neither in the essence of Islam, the core of prophecy, nor the foundation of the Imamate, but is a conventional matter—and engages in a written debate with him to refute his arguments.

In this context, Javadi Amoli also responds to two fundamental questions and objections concerning the separation of religion and politics:

First Objection: The station of "Spiritual Imamate" is always pure, whereas the position of government and political leadership has been at times pure and at other times impure. This indicates a separation between religion and politics (Javadi Amoli: 25).

Response: He identifies the politics and governance of the prophets as an ever-pure politics. Although they were human—"Say, I am only a man like you"—they were always righteous because they were supported by divine revelation. Furthermore, the purity or impurity of politics and governance cannot be considered evidence for the separation of religion and politics. This is because anything that enters the physical realm, if not accompanied by impeccability, can be either pure or become impure. This is similar to acts of worship, which in the spiritual realm are not tainted by ostentation, but in this world, prayer, charity, etc., can be of two kinds. Governance is the same. Therefore, one should not expect the physical realm to be as immaculate as the spiritual realm. Moreover, the possibility that an individual or group of functionaries in a religious government led by a prophet or an Imam might not refrain from corruption does not harm the purity of the original government attributed to the infallible leader (Javadi Amoli: 25).

Diagram of the process of forming Javadi Amoli's views on Islam and politics



Second Objection: If the Prophet (PBUH) and the Commander of the Faithful (Ali) governed, they did not have a divine duty to form a government. Rather, they consented to it because the people considered them the best individuals for governance. God was also pleased with this popular election and allegiance. Therefore, the responsibility for implementing the rulings of religion lies with the people themselves and their practical reason (Javadi Amoli: 3, 16).

Response: Javadi Amoli considers this statement incorrect, the falsehood of which becomes clear by examining the verses of the Quran and the conduct of those great figures. He maintains that the Messenger of God (PBUH) began his mission by inviting people to monotheism, prophecy, and the hereafter, demanding obedience. He then went to Medina and, by God's command, established a government and called everyone to obey God's religion. Therefore, the issue raised is not related to mere popular choice (Javadi Amoli: 3, 16).

He considers the legitimacy of government to be derived from divine appointment (Javadi Amoli: 390), which the experts discover. He posits that the Quran presents two types of guardianship (*wilayah*): guardianship over the legally incompetent and guardianship over the wise. Therefore, the Islamic ruler holds not agency over society, but guardianship of the second type. The people, through expert specialists, identify the best and most capable jurist from among those who meet all conditions and accept his divine guardianship. They have a fundamental role in the station of proof/realization (*maqam al-ithbat*), but no input in the station of essence (Javadi Amoli: 402).

By distinguishing between agency and guardianship, as articulated in the words of Haeri Yazdi, he maintains that in agency, a person performs some tasks themselves and delegates others to an agent. In guardianship, however, it is as if the person has no authority, entrusting all matters at all stages to their guardian, like the guardianship of a father over his minor child. Therefore:

1. The legitimacy and acceptability of agency depend on the principal's permission. In guardianship, however, only its acceptability comes from the ward; its legitimacy comes from God. This is why an agent is dismissed by the principal, but a guardian is removed from office upon losing the required conditions.
2. The scope of agency is determined by mutual agreement, whereas the scope of legislative guardianship is determined by God (Javadi Amoli, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 1, 370).

Conclusion

The author's intent is the focal point of Skinner's method, upon which this research is based. Accordingly, Javadi Amoli is a major theorist of the integration of religion and politics and of religion and government, based on rational and religious evidence, which is considered to be his intent. In this regard, he is an opponent of the ideas of secularism and liberal democracy.

He does not consider the idea of a religious state to be contradictory to the active role of the people, but neither does he see popular will as the sole and exclusive component or primary criterion. He believes in governance as a divine office.

This perspective is largely influenced by his subjective and objective contexts. In the objective context, the influence of his teachers like Mohammad-Taqi Amoli, Allamah Tabataba'i, and Imam Khomeini, who held anti-secularist ideas, as well as his participation in the struggles against the Pahlavi regime and the conditions that led to the collapse of that secularist regime, are notable. In the subjective context, aligned and opposing ideas, as well as his foundational principles, have each played a proportionate role.

Among the aligned ideas, Transcendent Theosophy is a sound synthesis of theology, philosophy, and mysticism. The approach of emphasizing the illuminating and revealing nature of reason alongside the guardianship of the Shari'ah extends into his political theology. As a result, political legitimacy lies with the Lawgiver (God), while acceptability lies with the people; a law enacted by the people devoid of the Shari'ah is described as a body without a soul. Furthermore, the preference for a majority opinion over a minority must pass through the orbit of the Lawgiver and the confirmation of reason. Additionally, based on his approach to comprehensive religious understanding, Javadi Amoli understands the deputyship of the fully qualified jurist from the impeccable Imam (AS) to entail not only the administration of the nation's affairs but also the necessity of deriving the principles governing politics and laws from divine guidance.

Diagram of the hierarchical process of Javadi Amoli's thought on Islam and politics based on Skinner's method



Regarding opposing or rival ideas, he identifies the common ground between secularist thought and humanist thought as the Pharaonic claim to lordship and the Nimrodic claim to divinity, in opposition to divine guardianship. He also considers the theory of Contraction and Expansion to be fraught with errors and views a minimalist religion incapable of civilization-building as its fruit, offering a serious critique of it.

In his foundational principles, the source of the ontology of religion is God's eternal will and knowledge, which is in conflict with secularism. A comprehensive epistemology that includes reason, sense-perception, and intellection leads to the rejection of a secular approach in all fields. Defining man as a "Theomorphic living being" clearly targets the foundations of secularist anthropology. His emphasis on the unity of divine lordship—according to which the administration of all universal and particular affairs is directly in God's hands—is in complete contradiction with secularism. Furthermore, unlike some theorists, he considers the Imamate a continuation of prophecy and holds that occupying the office of government is an intrinsic

part of the Imamate, identifying socio-political leadership as its comprehensive measure, which shatters all the premises of secularism.

Javadi Amoli also extends the role of reason to political legitimacy. By distinguishing between essential and proven legitimacy, he believes that essential legitimacy is the designation of religious sovereignty by God, but acceptability pertains to the people. Unless they desire it and are present, neither prophecy, Imamate, special deputyship, no general deputyship can be realized in the external world.

In discussing the proofs for the Guardianship of the Jurist (*Wilayat al-Faqih*), Javadi Amoli argues with three categories of evidence: purely rational proof purely transmitted (textual) proof, and a composite proof. The composite proof from reason and transmission is an argument in which some premises are supplied by reason and others by transmitted texts.

Chart of Javadi Amoli's actions on the issue of Islam and politics



Based on this, Javadi Amoli is a major theorist of the integration of religion and politics, and religion and government, based on rational and religious evidence, and an opponent of the ideas of secularism and liberal democracy. Some of his views include: a religious state is not incompatible with the active role of the people, but this role is not the sole, primary, or exclusive component; governance as a divine office; the role of reason in political legitimacy; the distinction between essential and proven legitimacy; the separation of legitimacy in the

station of essence from legitimacy in the station of proof; the Islamic ruler has guardianship, not agency, over society, and the people accept his divine guardianship through expert specialists; the people have a fundamental role in the station of proof but no input in the station of essence; the nature of Islamic rulings explains the necessity of forming a religious government; neither is coercion permissible in the principle of religion, nor can a religious government be compulsory; man must legislatively accept religion and divine sovereignty; the non-compulsory nature of religious government; the decision to implement or not implement divine commands and laws in society rests with the people; in a religious government, unlike in liberal-democratic governments, the opinion of the people is not the sole axis; the politics and governance of the prophets is an ever-pure politics; the Quran presents two types of guardianship: over the legally incompetent and over the wise; the Islamic ruler has guardianship of the second type, not agency; an agent is dismissed by the principal, but a guardian is removed from office upon losing the required conditions.

Conflict of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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The Era of Hyperreality and Strategies for Realizing a Desirable Political Attitude in Contemporary Iran

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Article Info

Article type:
Scientific Research

Article history:
Received: 2025/5/15
Received in revised form: 2025/9/17
Accepted: 2025/10/19
Available online: 2025/10/21

Keywords:
Strategy, Hyperreality,
Political Attitude,
Representation,
Contemporary Iran.

ABSTRACT

Objective: In the contemporary world, media do not simply reflect events and realities; they have become active agents in reproducing and constructing social reality. This condition, explained in Jean Baudrillard's theory of the "Era of hyperreality," represents a fundamental transformation in citizens' perceptual patterns and the profound influence of media representations on their cultural, social, and political beliefs and attitudes. In Iran, these developments have confronted the process of realizing and sustaining attitudes aligned with the ideals of the Islamic Revolution with significant challenges, such as the distortion of goals and slogans, the creation of unrealistic narratives, the widespread dissemination of false information, selective representation of historical realities, the formation of media-based movements, and the proliferation of organized propaganda.

Method: Drawing on Baudrillard's theoretical framework of hyperreality and using a semi-structured interview method, the present study investigates the strategies that the Islamic Republic of Iran should adopt to achieve a desirable political attitude in the era of hyperreality.

Findings: The findings indicate that a deep understanding of the new transformed world, the design and use of public symbols appropriate to the logic of hyperreality, intelligent interaction with new cultural authorities, the power of narrative-building and the priority of presenting the first narrative, attention to media balance and honesty, the creation of narrative synergy and coordination among media outlets, and the institutionalization of behavioral and verbal integrity among officials are among the key requirements for achieving a desirable political attitude in the context of hyperreality.

Conclusion: These results suggest that the realization of a desirable political attitude in Iran, consistent with revolutionary ideals, depends on adapting to the media logic of hyperreality and developing coherent, value-based, and coordinated media strategies that can sustain authenticity and public trust in an era where reality itself is mediated and reconstructed.

Cite this article: Pashaei Alizadeh & M, Ranjbar & M (2025). The Era of Hyperreality and Strategies for Realizing a Desirable Political Attitude in Contemporary Iran. *Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution*, 7 (26), 96-121.

<http://doi.org/10.22059/jcir.2025.395361.1710>



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DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcir.2025.395361.1710>

Publisher: University of Tehran.

Introduction

In contemporary political sociology, the fundamental role of a desirable political attitude in strengthening the pillars of the nation-state, solidifying the foundations of social cohesion, and stabilizing the legitimacy of political systems is considered self-evident not only by researchers but by all actors in the political and social spheres. This concept encompasses a coherent set of beliefs, values, and behavioral patterns that organize the complex interactions between citizens and the structure of power, and, as a solid foundation, it decisively shapes the quality of the effectiveness and efficiency of political systems.

However, at the dawn of the third millennium and in an era dominated by media, rapid development of communication technologies, and the hegemony of the phenomenon of hyperreality—where the boundaries between reality and media representation are increasingly blurred, and reality itself becomes a media artifact—the realization and stabilization of a desirable political attitude among citizens have been fundamentally transformed and challenged. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a political system born of the Islamic Revolution and possessing a critical and confrontational approach to the dominant global order, faces far more complex and profound issues and obstacles in this turbulent media landscape.

The unprecedented and widespread penetration of social networks in the daily lives of more than 60% of Iranian citizens (Jamaran, 2024 AD/1403 SH) has created serious challenges in the formation and stabilization of a desirable political attitude. The increasing addiction to the internet among different social strata, the rapid virtualization of educational and cultural fields, and the emergence of media-based riots and unrest all point to a deep crisis in the interaction between society and media. In addition, the relentless onslaught of toxic propaganda and destructive indoctrination, the emergence of new and sometimes unconventional citizen demands and norms such as organized civil resistance against the hijab law, and the creeping attempts to institutionalize the "White Marriage" lifestyle are serious challenges to maintaining social cohesion and a political attitude aligned with the ideals of the Islamic Republic and the values of the Islamic Revolution. These signs indicate the problematization of a desirable political attitude in the face of relentless media influence and the emergence of a complex and contradictory "hyperreal" space, which requires a rethinking and presentation of intelligent solutions. In this regard, the central question of this research is: ‘What strategies should the Islamic Republic of Iran adopt to recreate a desirable political attitude in the era of hyperreality?’

1. Literature Review

To clarify the position of this research, a comprehensive review of related works was conducted. A selection of the most important of these works is analyzed below:

1. Jean Baudrillard (1929), in his book *Simulacra and Simulation*, introduces the concept of "Simulacra" as copies without an original and "Simulations" as imitations of real processes. He believes that contemporary society is a place where "Simulations" have overtaken reality and original meanings have been lost. This view provides a philosophical framework for understanding "Hyperreality" and the media's impact on political attitudes, and it is the theoretical foundation of this research.
2. Robert M. Entman (2009), in "The Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy," with a "Heideggerian" approach and analysis of political events in the U.S., shows how media have penetrated democratic structures and changed the direction of public opinion. This work provides an important conceptual framework for analyzing the complex space of media and politics in the present era.
3. Manuel Castells's (2001 AD/1383 SH) book "The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society," with a focus on concepts like "Network society" and "Mediated politics," collects and analyzes the trends of social, political, and cultural changes of the information age. This work provides a valuable framework for understanding the impact of information technologies on the structures of human societies and political issues.
4. Ameli et al. (2024 AD/1403 SH), in their article "Dual-Spacing and the Representation of National Identity on Instagram," use a critical and data-driven discourse analysis approach to show the conflict and interaction between Iranian and Islamic identities in this space, emphasizing that national cohesion requires a balanced approach to identity representation.
5. Shaykh Ansari (2021 AD/1400 SH), in an article that performs a secondary analysis of social science research, examines the impact of Web 2 technologies on Iranian society. The findings show that these technologies have weakened national-religious identity and family values but have strengthened political participation and social relationships.
6. Basiriyani and Khaniki (2015 AD/1400 SH), in their research "Iranian Policymakers and Social Media Policymaking," address the challenges of social media policymaking

in Iran. The results indicate the inefficiency of structures, scattered decision-making, and a lack of coordination among institutions, which makes the policymaking process difficult.

7. Qasemi et al. (2020), in their article "The Desirable Model for Media Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Confronting the U.S. Media War," offer a proposed model that includes adherence to the leadership, preservation of Iranian-Islamic identity, confrontation of ethnic divides, strengthening of security structures, and support for cyber infrastructure.

In contrast to these studies, the present article focuses on the concept of "Hyperreality" as a mechanism for the production and representation of realities by the media; a concept that has been less thoroughly examined in Iranian social sciences. In addition to explaining the related challenges, the main goal is to provide practical solutions for recreating and strengthening a desirable political attitude in the new complex space. This research, with its novel theoretical framework and strategic suggestions, assists policymakers in the path of achieving a desirable political attitude.

2. Overview and Theoretical Foundations

2.1. Conceptualizing a Desirable Political Attitude

In political sociology, a desirable political attitude is defined as a normative system of beliefs, values, orientations, and behaviors of citizens toward the political system, power structures, and civil institutions. Its realization has a direct and undeniable link to the stability of the political system, the strengthening of social cohesion, the enhancement of political participation, and the achievement of good governance (Almond & Verba, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 27). In the Islamic Republic of Iran, a desirable political attitude has several fundamental characteristics and components rooted in Islamic teachings and the goals of the revolution:

First, obedience to the leadership, which is the basis of the legitimacy of the Islamic system and obedience to the leadership, is a religious, national, and revolutionary duty (Imam Khomeini: 12, 250). Second, religious faith and practical adherence to the Sharia are presented as the fundamental identity of the Islamic society. Practical adherence to the Sharia in individual and social dimensions is considered a manifestation of being a Muslim and a commitment to divine values (Khamenei, statements, 19/04/1392).

Third, national unity and Islamic cohesion, which are the secrets to the system's stability and strengthening it and avoiding division is a religious and national duty. Cohesion with the Islamic Ummah worldwide is also recognized as an Islamic ideal and necessity (Khamenei, Unity Week message, 24/09/1394). Fourth, anti-arrogance and resistance against dominance, which introduces the fight against global arrogance as the permanent policy of the Islamic Revolution and resistance against dominators as a revolutionary and human duty (Khomeini: 13, 427). Fifth, self-confidence and reliance on internal capabilities, which are recognized as the strategy for the country's progress and independence; it considers the effort for self-sufficiency and the interruption of dependency a national and revolutionary necessity for citizens and officials (Khamenei, statements, 14/05/1397). Sixth, preserving the values of the Islamic Revolution, 'Which are a valuable heritage and identity-giving element of Islamic society?' Guarding and institutionalizing them is a religious and revolutionary duty (Khamenei, statements, 03/03/1395). Seventh, hope for the future and effort for progress, which are considered the axis of the Islamic society's movement and a national and religious duty for all (Khamenei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 8).

Therefore, in the intellectual and political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a desirable political attitude is defined as the behavioral and value compass for citizens in the political and social arena, playing a central role in realizing the ideals of the revolution, preserving and enhancing the system, and advancing the grand goals of the Islamic society. This indigenous attitude is derived from Islamic teachings and values, and its main indicator of desirability is its alignment with Islamic principles, the ideals of the revolution, and the interests of the system.

2.2. Theoretical Framework: Jean Baudrillard's Hyperreality

In the postmodern intellectual system, the concept of "Hyperreality," derived from the ideas of the French philosopher and sociologist Jean Baudrillard, holds a special place. Baudrillard presented this concept to explain the profound transformations resulting from the hegemony of media and new communication technologies in contemporary life. The focal point of his thought is a condition where the boundary between "Reality" and "Representation" has fundamentally collapsed, and representations shape the world of human experience.

According to Baudrillard, today media technologies, by producing models and images of reality that gradually replace reality itself, shape human experience; to the extent that the

media's influence on how we view the world is far beyond short-term effects or minor control, and it transforms worldviews and human life (Giddens, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 66). In this context, media representation is no longer a passive reflection of reality but an active force that self-founding produces and reproduces our perception of reality (Baudrillard, 1993: 185). Thus, hyperreality does not mean the complete destruction of objective reality, but a change in the nature of our perception and experience of it in the media age. Reality is now experienced through media intermediaries and representations, which gain such authority that they decisively shape our perception and even replace reality (Lyotard, 1995 AD/1374 SH: 59).

To explain this transformation, Baudrillard identifies four historical stages in the relationship between reality and representation:

- **First:** "Representation as a reflection of reality," where representations act as a faithful mirror to reality.
- **Second:** "Representation as a distortion of reality," where representation moves away from transparency and changes reality, but a trace of the original reality still exists.
- **Third:** "Representation as a cover for reality," where representation conceals reality and masks its absence.
- **Fourth:** "Hyperreality: signs instead of reality," where representation is completely separated from reality and proceeds to create a new, independent reality in which the signs are the original reality itself (Baudrillard, 1993: 185).


In this unprecedented condition, media signs and images are no longer merely a reflection of external reality but rather they construct and redefine "Reality Itself." More precisely, hyperreality represents a world where media representations and images appear so real, influential, and pervasive that they seem to be an inseparable part of the realities we perceive (Lash, 1990: 38). Baudrillard explicitly states in this regard: "One can no longer speak of representations as if they were a reflection or a reaction to the world; they are the world itself." (Baudrillard, 2001: 45)

By reflecting on the relationship between the phenomenon of "Hyperreality" and the issue of a "Desirable political attitude" in contemporary Iranian society, we find that the context for the formation and widespread activity of hostile Persian-language media networks outside the borders, in alignment with the dominant Western origin of media and information flows in the domestic media sphere, has doubly provided the grounds for the formation and strengthening

of factors that weaken the political attitude in Iranian society. In this process, on the one hand, by selectively and exaggeratedly highlighting existing problems and shortcomings and systematically disregarding the country's tangible progress and achievements, there has been a continuous and purposeful effort to represent an utterly negative and caricatural image of the internal situation of Iran in the minds and consciousness of the Iranian society. On the other hand, these media repeatedly use biased and demeaning comparisons between Iran and developed countries—especially in the crucial areas of economy, society, and politics—to systematically inject and reinforce a "Sense of inefficiency and weakness" among various social strata. This purposeful and continuous media atmosphere gradually leads to the formation of a deep gap between objective and tangible realities and the dominant media representations, and ultimately, it fuels the weakening of a desirable political attitude and the fundamental values of the political system in Iranian society. In such conditions, public belief in the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system—especially among young and aware generations—is sharply declining, and the country's political and social space is increasingly under the influence of the severe waves of negative media pressure.

From this perspective, given the objective of this article—to gather strategies for recreating a desirable political attitude in the era of hyperreality through interviews with experts—it is necessary that the theoretical basis of these interviews be the identification of strategies that can rebuild social cohesion and repair public trust in the current complex media environment. These interviews must explain the importance of understanding the transformations of the new communication ecosystem and intelligently utilizing media capabilities, and provide sustainable and effective solutions for achieving a desirable political attitude.

Figure 1: Conceptual Model of the Research



3. Methodology

This research, which falls into the category of applied research, was conducted with the aim of identifying policies for realizing a desirable political attitude in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the era of hyperreality. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews; a method that, while answering the main questions, also allows for attention to the dimensions raised by the interviewees (Mirmohammadi & Talaneh, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 168). The statistical population included 12 experts in political science, sociology, and media. The questions were structured based on theoretical foundations in two axes: explaining hyperreality and its consequences, and identifying proposed grand policies. Data analysis was based on the thematic analysis method, which, through stages such as transcription, coding, organizing, and refining themes, led to the extraction of final patterns and their interpretation (Clarke & Braun, 2006: 23).

4. Research Findings

The research findings, titled "Policies for Recreating a Desirable Political Attitude in Today's Iran," are presented below. These findings, which are the result of thematic analysis of expert interviews, are organized in the form of 8 tables (Tables 1 to 8). Each table, to provide a clearer and more focused presentation of the findings, includes three main columns: interview snippets (as examples of the data), basic themes (extracted from the coding process), and the overarching theme (as the final outcome of the analysis in each table). In essence, the structure of each table demonstrates the process of extracting one of the grand policies for realizing a desirable political attitude, from the interview text and basic themes, to reaching the overarching theme. Below each table, a detailed text is provided to explain the themes, dimensions, and various angles of them more precisely.

Table 1. The Policy of the Necessity of Understanding Today's Transformed Iranian World

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	Unfortunately, our officials still do not have a precise understanding of the rapid	Officials' cognitive weakness regarding	The Necessity of Understanding

	impact of new technologies on people's political behavior and attitudes, and this has led to the adoption of ineffective policies that are inconsistent with current conditions.	technological developments and their consequences.	the Bio-Evolved World of Iran Today
2	Traditional definitions of justice and freedom no longer meet the needs and expectations of the young generation in the digital and hyperreal space, and this gap has led to distrust and dissatisfaction. Policymakers must understand this transformation.	The ineffectiveness of traditional definitions of justice and freedom in the digital space.	
3	Officials of official media, with old and incoherent approaches, are unable to counter the scattered and contradictory narratives of social media, and this fuels public confusion, especially in the era of hyperreality.	The lack of coordination of official media in countering social media narratives.	
4	The absence of specialized tools and appropriate technology in policymaking institutions has caused the management and analysis of the complex media space to fail, and distorted narratives have become dominant.	The lack of specialized tools for analyzing and managing the complex media space.	
5	The insufficient mastery of officials and policymakers over the digital space and new media has led to a reduction in the effectiveness of cultural and political policies and an increase in the influence of opposing movements.	Policymakers' inability to effectively utilize the digital space and new media.	

The presented table clarifies the necessity of understanding today's transformed Iranian world. The social, cultural, and technological changes of recent decades have led to a fundamental transformation of Iranian society; transformations that, under the influence of the rapid growth of communication and media technologies, have redefined not only the lifestyle but also the attitudes and interactions of people with the political system. Also, paying attention to the changes in values and norms and the redefinition of fundamental value concepts shows that these transformations are not merely technological and have moved beyond the level of lifestyle change; rather, fundamental values and concepts such as justice, freedom, and political legitimacy have also been redefined in the digital and media context (Ayazi, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 58). Justice is interpreted as equal access to digital services, and freedom is interpreted as active participation in online public discourse. Identity is also redefined under the influence of globalization and the acceptance of diverse values, and political legitimacy is linked to the government's adaptation to new developments.

Consequently, a deep understanding of this transformed world is an essential prerequisite for formulating effective media and cultural policies. To this end, it is necessary to launch systems for monitoring attitudes, media campaigns based on digital justice and freedom, platforms for public participation, training media experts, and formulating indicators for measuring the effectiveness of policies. These actions will help align with developments, strengthen social cohesion and public trust, and pave the way for realizing a desirable political attitude.

Table 2. The Theme of Employing Public Symbols

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	In today's world, where even human identity is in a conflict with media narratives and has become pluralistic and scattered, we must design symbols that can represent all segments of society.	Designing symbols that represent all segments of society.	Designing and employing public symbols.
2	In the era of hyperreality, the government must use symbols and	Using all-encompassing symbols and values in	

	values that are able to cover all social strata in the pluralistic media space.	government.	
3	Public symbols must be able to represent the social, cultural, and religious diversity of society in a balanced way.	Balance and representation of social, cultural, and religious diversity.	
4	Neglecting all-encompassing symbolization strengthens identity gaps and feelings of social exclusion and jeopardizes a desirable political attitude.	The consequences of neglecting all-encompassing symbolization on political attitude.	
5	Public symbols must have visual appeal and inclusivity. These two features can empower the symbols against the currents of hyperreality.	The importance of the inclusivity of symbols in confronting hyperreality.	
6	If we cannot create common symbols that strengthen the sense of belonging among different ethnic groups and communities, the media that seek to create division will exploit this void.	Strengthening the sense of belonging and preventing the exploitation of divisive media.	

Based on the overarching theme of designing and employing public symbols, in the era of hyperreality and alongside rapid social changes and the expansion of new communication technologies, the national identity of Iranians—which has always been multi-faceted, consisting of Islamic, traditional, Iranian, and modern elements and provided a context for social cohesion—is now in a process of diverse and sometimes contradictory media representations. The themes in the table above show that in the space of hyperreality, national identity is no longer static; rather, it is constantly being constructed and reconstructed by the media. This space is highly susceptible to exploitation by hyperreality-creating media, such as hostile media and divisive movements. These media, by focusing on identity gaps and feelings of exclusion and with the power of media representation, destroy public trust, create

dissatisfaction, and intensify social polarization. By constructing their own desirable realities and through biased representations of national symbols or the lack thereof, they play a significant role in creating undesirable political attitudes.

Therefore, in the new conditions, creating symbols that represent the ethnic groups, tastes, and the cultural, social, and religious diversity of Iran has become more necessary than ever. What this research means by public symbols are those symbols that are able to reflect a wide range of tastes and social and cultural diversity in a balanced way and act as a comprehensive mirror. These symbols, by creating a sense of belonging and a shared destiny, are an effective tool for strengthening national cohesion, reducing political polarization, and facilitating the achievement of a desirable political attitude (Barzegar & Tanhaei, 2018 AD/1397 SH: 152).

As a result, the intelligent design and use of public symbols provide an unparalleled opportunity to strengthen national identity and social cohesion in Iran's multicultural society. Practical examples include producing balanced television programs and digital content about different cultures and ethnic groups, holding national festivals focused on local arts and rituals, and creating media campaigns with all-encompassing symbols and slogans to strengthen citizens' sense of belonging and solidarity.

Table 3. The Theme of Intelligent Interaction with New Cultural Authorities

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	Today, in the era of hyperreality, we are witnessing a fundamental change in cultural and political authority. It is no longer just scholars and intellectuals whose words are valued, but artists and athletes have also become very influential in cultural and political arenas.	Transformations in cultural authorities.	Intelligent interaction with new cultural authorities.
2	Utilizing the capacity of new cultural and media authorities is a necessity for political governance in today's societies due to their widespread access to the audience.	The influence of new authorities on public opinion.	

3	Celebrities and new cultural influencers, due to their high capacity to attract an audience, can transmit official messages in a way that is credible and effective in the hyperreal space.	The high capacity of new actors to attract an audience and make official messages credible.	
4	In my opinion, the government and responsible institutions must interact with new authorities in a way that, while utilizing their capacity, also prevents their negative effects.	The necessity of a balanced interaction between the government and new authorities.	
5	The participation of these groups in producing and re-sharing content strengthens social cohesion and public trust in the political goals of the system in the face of hyperreality.	The necessity of intelligent cultural policymaking.	
6	Overall, using new cultural authorities increases the possibility of countering the rapid spread of false narratives and guiding public opinion towards a desirable political attitude in the era of hyperreality.	The role of new cultural authorities in creating a political attitude.	

According to the theme of "Intelligent interaction with new cultural authorities," in the media-driven era of hyperreality and the fundamental transformations in Iran's social structure, we are witnessing a change in the prevailing paradigm of traditional cultural authority. Traditional authorities, who previously included intellectuals and religious elites, have gradually given way to groups such as athletes, cinema and television artists, and singers. These new authorities, due to their widespread influence in the media space and their direct access to a wide range of audiences who are deeply affected by the construction and production of media representations, have gained significant capacity to shape public opinion and form social norms and values (Abbasnejad et al., 2024 AD/1403 SH: 4). In the world of hyperreality, these media figures are not only intensely exposed to the effects of this space

and various media representations and influenced by the formation of its fluid and changing realities but also simultaneously act as creators and builders of reality and social norms. Especially in the process of transmitting political and social values to the young generation, who are deeply engaged with media and virtual spaces, the role of these new authorities has become increasingly prominent. Through the content they produce, their comments, and the lifestyles they display, they actively participate in the construction and reproduction of hyperreality and the shaping of this generation's perceptions and attitudes.

Given the necessity of purposeful interaction with new cultural authorities, which is emphasized in Table 3, it is suggested that coordination committees with celebrities be formed, workshops and consultation sessions be held to train them in responsible content production, and online platforms for their direct participation in cultural projects be created. Also, monitoring mechanisms for the activities of these authorities should be developed. The implementation of these measures will lead to the intelligent utilization of celebrities' capacity, the strengthening of social cohesion and public trust, and the prevention of the deviation of political attitudes.

Table 4. The Theme of the Power of Narrative-Building

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	In today's world, the principle of storytelling and how it is told has become more important than the event itself. The way a narrative is constructed can guide public opinion towards a desirable political attitude.	The importance of narrative-building in today's world.	The power of narrative-building.
2	Narratives, because they act as frameworks that allow society to analyze events and guide its behavior towards specific goals, can resist hyperreality like a strong fortress.	The role of narratives in framing events.	
3	An effective narrative must be both accurate and real, and also be able to	The attractiveness of presenting a	

	connect with people's language. Simply telling the truth is not enough; it must also be attractive. Otherwise, merely stating factual information will not be effective in guiding political attitudes, especially in the era of hyperreality.	narrative.	
4	We are in a war of narratives. If we don't tell our own story correctly and credibly, others will impose their stories on us and will direct our citizens' attitudes, especially their political attitudes, in their favor.	The importance of a correct and credible narrative.	
5	Officials must realize that successful narrative-building can be effective not only in creating and maintaining a desirable political attitude but also in legitimacy, increasing social cohesion, and preserving the authority of the political system.	The positive effect of narrative-building on the system's legitimacy and social cohesion.	

According to the table above, in the media-driven space of Iranian society, where the narrative-building of events is increasingly influenced by transnational actors and social networks, the importance of presenting transparent, convincing, and reality-based narratives is increasing exponentially.

Given the necessity of paying attention to the "features of effective narratives," which is considered one of the main pillars of success in narrative-building in the table, narratives must, in terms of content, be accurate, credible, and consistent with objective realities, and in terms of linguistics and structure, they must have the ability to attract a wide range of audiences. These narratives must not only effectively reflect official viewpoints but also be in harmony and consistent with the objective expectations and needs of society. Especially in a situation where the media landscape, by using emotional representations and deceptive attractions, presents a distorted and caricatural image of official policies and functions and, by

promoting false news and biased analyses, ultimately leads to the weakening of political trust and the spread of social anomie, if official narratives cannot adapt themselves to the new demands of this transformed space, they will fail in the competition of narratives and will be marginalized (Amiri et al., 2024 AD/1403 SH: 4).

To practically utilize the importance of narrative-building in today's media world, government institutions and cultural policymakers must take actions such as publishing accurate and documented narratives of realities, making extensive use of digital platforms and social networks to distribute narratives, and forming specialized media teams to produce attractive and convincing content. Also, holding workshops and training courses for narrative-building experts and media activists in the fields of linguistics, visual design, and audience engagement skills, as well as formulating indicators for measuring the effectiveness of narratives and continuously monitoring audience feedback, should be prioritized.

Table 5. The Theme of Presenting the First Narrative

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	In this world full of diverse news, whoever tells the story first has a greater impact on the audience's mind.	The importance of the first narrative in analyzing events.	Presenting the first narrative of community events.
2	When the first narrative is presented by credible and official sources, it increases public trust in domestic media and helps to stabilize a correct political attitude among the people.	The role of official sources in legitimizing the first narrative.	
3	Timely presentation of the narrative provides an opportunity for public orientations to be shaped positively and prevents the penetration of distorted narratives.	The role of the first narrative in preventing the dominance of distorted narratives.	
4	If we, as domestic media, do not convey the news quickly and correctly, people will turn to foreign media, and they will be the ones	The threat of fake news and its effect on political attitude.	

	who shape the society's mindset.		
5	Not presenting the first narrative and the dominance of foreign media can lead to a reduction in legitimacy and the weakening of a political attitude based on the country's domestic realities.	The effect of the first narrative on the legitimacy of the system.	
6	The initial narrative acts as the basis for subsequent analyses and provides the ground for stabilizing a political attitude based on domestic realities.	The first narrative is the basis for the formation of subsequent analyses.	

Continuing the discussion on the grand policy of the power of narrative-building in the era of hyperreality, the policy of "Presenting the first narrative of community events" has been given priority in the table above. This policy emphasizes the necessity of active and proactive action in the field of narration and the presentation of timely, accurate, and documented narratives of events in the competitive space of hyperreality.

When a narrative is published for the first time by official and trusted domestic sources, it creates a strong barrier against the penetration of counter-narratives and biased discourses. The rapid drafting of the first narrative by domestic media makes it possible to actively guide the cognitive space of society towards the desired narrative and prevent the flood of distorted and falsified narratives in the hyperreal space. In contrast, hesitation and delay in presenting the first narrative by domestic sources create a dangerous information vacuum that inevitably drives the audience toward foreign media. This paves the way for the rampant spread of fake news, parallel narratives, and the distortion of reality, which severely undermines the foundations of a desirable political attitude and threatens the legitimacy of the political system.

The neglect of this vital matter in Iran's media space has allowed hostile media to repeatedly exploit this strategic weakness and, with biased and tendentious representations of the country's conditions, hold public opinion hostage. The attractive and emotional narratives of foreign media, which are in tune with the emotions and momentary desires of the Iranian

audience, by presenting selective and tendentious representations of reality, cast a heavy shadow over official narratives and weaken their authority (Ismaili, 2022 AD/1401 SH).

Finally, to achieve this goal, government institutions and cultural policymakers must create specialized media teams to produce accurate, documented, and timely narratives. Digital platforms and social networks should be actively used for the immediate publication of the first narrative. Also, holding workshops and training courses for journalists and media activists in the skills of rapid narrative-building, data analysis, and audience persuasion is essential.

Table 6. The Theme of Adopting a Balanced and Realistic Media Perspective

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	If our media only talk about successes and ignore people's problems, people will feel they are being lied to and will lose their trust.	The inverse effect of an idealist approach.	Adopting a balanced and realistic media perspective.
2	We must show the realities of society as they are; we must both talk about our strengths and bravely admit our weaknesses. This honesty is the key to gaining people's trust.	The consistency of the media approach with social realities.	
3	When media only present an ideal and unrealistic image of society, people turn to other media to find reality, and this is dangerous in today's era of hyperreality.	The public's reliance on hostile media due to the unbalanced approaches of state-affiliated media.	
4	State-affiliated media must, while reflecting tangible successes in various fields alongside existing challenges and problems create a compassionate and balanced atmosphere in society.	Simultaneously reflecting successes and problems.	
5	Media must show their credibility and	Confronting the	

	honesty by observing realism and a balanced representation of achievements and problems.	social atmosphere of despair and distrust.	
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According to the concept of adopting a balanced and realistic media perspective, which is emphasized as a key policy in the table above, in the era of hyperreality, although at first glance the exclusive focus of official and government-affiliated media in Iran on representing the achievements and strengths of the political system might seemingly lead to improved attitudes and assessments by citizens, this selective approach, when it ignores the bitter realities of society and refuses to bravely admit existing shortcomings, quickly becomes a destructive factor in the hyperreal space and leads to severe consequences.

In reality, this obvious inconsistency between the image presented by state-affiliated media and the tangible realities of people's lives not only fails to create hope and social cohesion but spreads the seeds of despair and distrust in society. This is because in such an environment, the media, which were supposed to be the architects of a desirable political attitude, become tools in the hands of those accused of lying and distorting reality and, unintentionally, reinforce destructive elements in the fabric of society's political attitude (Khalilzadeh, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 37). The continuation of this situation not only reduces public trust in official media but also challenges the legitimacy of the government's narrative of reality. A vivid example of this claim is the current situation in Iran, where state-affiliated media and their managers, by disregarding bitter realities and political, economic, and cultural failures and presenting a caricatural and one-dimensional image of society's conditions, have dragged political attitudes into a quagmire of distrust and despair. Practical measures in this regard include holding specialized workshops and training courses for journalists and media activists on realistic narrative-building, training in the skills of producing accurate and documented content, data analysis, and audience persuasion skills.

Table 7. The Theme of Synergistic and Frontal Activity

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	In today's media space, if the messages and actions of different institutions are not	Audience confusion in the absence of	The necessity of coordinated,

	coordinated, the audience becomes confused, and the field of narrative-building is practically handed over to media competitors.	coordination.	synergistic, and frontal activity.
2	Individual or isolated activities, even if they are correct, have a limited impact against organized media movements.	The limited impact of isolated actions.	
3	We should not have a single, soulless voice, but rather we should be a unified media front that, while having diverse voices, all move in one direction.	The necessity of creating a unified front with diverse voices.	
4	The lack of coordination in media policymaking sometimes causes the actions of one institution to practically neutralize or weaken the message of another institution.	The neutralization of messages due to a lack of coordination.	
5	For example, large media outlets should determine the main framework of the messages, and other media should retell them in a simpler and more attractive way for different audiences. This is how we can succeed in this complex media space.	Determining the main framework and retelling messages attractively.	
6	When institutions follow a common roadmap, even heavy media attacks cannot destroy the coherence of the message.	Maintaining message coherence with a common roadmap.	

The policy of the "Necessity of coordinated, synergistic, and frontal activity" as the seventh central theme of this research is considered an essential prerequisite for realizing a desirable political attitude in the era of hyperreality. Unfortunately, in Iran, a desirable level of coordination and cohesion among various media outlets, both official and unofficial, is not observed as it should be. Most media outlets operate separately and without a common strategy in transmitting messages. This lack of cohesion not only leads to audience confusion

in the face of different media representations but also weakens the position of the official discourse and reduces the effectiveness of the narratives presented by the political system. Therefore, in the current media space, achieving a desirable political attitude requires a more coordinated and integrated approach among different media outlets than ever before. This strategic coordination acts not only as a means to repair public trust and realize a desirable political attitude but also as a powerful lever for strengthening declining social capital and building positive and constructive discourses in the era of hyperreality (Bostanpira et al., 2024 AD/1403 SH: 91).

In this regard, each media outlet must take on a specific role. For example, large and official media outlets can be responsible for the main task of "Grand narrative-building" and "Narrative framing" of fundamental and grand messages, while social networks and digital media can expand the scope of their influence among audiences by representing these messages in a simpler language and in more attractive formats. It is only through this type of collaboration and coordination that it is possible to overcome the challenges of contradictory media representations in the era of hyperreality and strive to build a desirable political reality.

Table 8. The Theme of Institutionalizing Responsible Behavior in the Media Society

Row	Sample Interview Snippets	Basic Themes	Overarching Theme
1	In conditions of hyperreality, merely taking correct actions is not enough; rather, it is necessary that these actions be represented in a professional manner consistent with the rules of media communication to prevent the distortion and substitution of narratives.	Representing correct actions in a way that is consistent with the conditions of hyperreality.	The necessity of institutionalizing responsible behavior in the media society.
2	Creating clear and binding behavioral protocols for officials can minimize the scope of exploitation of mistakes by opposing media.	Creating clear and binding behavioral protocols.	
3	The absence of a clear educational system and behavioral frameworks for officials provides the ground for scattered and	The behavioral and verbal integrity of officials.	

	uncoordinated behaviors to emerge, which can be represented in the media as a sign of institutional disorder and incoherence.		
4	Part of the media crises originates from minor behavioral or verbal errors that, if there were sufficient awareness and sensitivity, would not have reached the media level in the first place.	Countering the exploitation of hostile media.	
5	The institutionalization of responsible behavior must be considered a stable norm and an organizational culture, not just a temporary reaction to crises, because in the era of hyperreality, the possibility of media issues arising on a daily basis exists.	Institutionalizing continuous and daily responsible behavior.	

The overarching theme of the necessity of institutionalizing responsible behavior in the media society refers to the behavioral requirements and necessities for officials. In today's societies, where media are considered the watchful eyes of society, the attempt to conceal the performance and even the statements of officials from public opinion has become almost impossible. In this era, every slip-up or improper behavior by officials quickly becomes the focus of public attention and turns into a hot topic for media representation. The importance of this reality is doubled in Iran's challenging media landscape, where opposing media are constantly seeking to distort the fabric of a desirable political attitude. As has happened many times, a small mistake, immature comments, or any irresponsible behavior or word can turn into an opportunity and an excuse for opposing media to use its media representation to fuel a wave of public distrust toward government institutions and the ruling system and to confront the grounds for legitimacy with serious doubts.

This situation causes the wrong actions and behaviors of officials, especially in areas such as financial corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, or overt and covert violations of laws, to be quickly revealed and attract public opinion. These cases become the main material for negative narratives and, consequently, the creation of undesirable realities in the arena of public opinion.

Therefore, understanding the role of media in the era of hyperreality and its effect on constructing realities through representation, along with awareness of the dangers of this process and promoting appropriate behaviors and positive models, is a necessity for preserving a desirable political attitude and the legitimacy of the government (Mahooshi, 2021 AD/1400 SH: 49). Institutionalizing responsible behavior through the formulation and implementation of transparency and accountability guidelines, continuous training in professional and media ethics, the creation of systems for monitoring and publicizing performance reports, and the design of rapid response protocols for errors strengthens public trust and provides the ground for realizing a desirable political attitude and preserving the government's legitimacy in the era of hyperreality.

Conclusion

In summary, the present research, by analyzing the various dimensions of the phenomenon of hyperreality in Iran's media-driven society, reached the central conclusion that realizing a desirable political attitude in this era requires a paradigm shift in media and cultural policymaking approaches. It is no longer possible to guide public opinion and create the desired political attitude in the hyperreal space by relying on traditional methods based on one-way information dissemination. The era of hyperreality is an era of the war of narratives and the competition for reality, and victory in this field requires a deep understanding of the media mechanisms for constructing reality and their strategic application.

The research findings revealed eight main axes as the fundamental requirements for policymaking in the era of hyperreality: First, a deep understanding of the transformation of the world and the essential difference between today's society and the past; second, the intelligent design and application of public symbols that reflect the diversity and pluralism of Iranian society in the hyperreal space; third, a purposeful and nuanced interaction with new cultural authorities and influential media figures, with a compassionate approach. Fourth, gaining the skill and ability in narrative-building that is attractive, credible, and consistent with the hyperreal space and the fundamental values of society; fifth, prioritizing the presentation of the first narrative of events as the key to dominating the space of collective perception and preventing the formation of rival narratives; sixth, emphasizing honesty, transparency, and avoiding one-sided and unrealistic approaches in representing achievements and challenges, in order to repair and strengthen public trust; seventh, creating a coordinated

and synergistic front among like-minded media outlets, with an emphasis on diversity within unity and avoiding a single and monotonous voice; eighth, the practical commitment of officials to accountability, transparency, and behavioral integrity.

Ultimately, it can be stated that recreating a desirable political attitude in the Iranian society of the hyperreality era requires a firm resolve, intelligent prudence, and a transformative approach in the realm of media and cultural policymaking. It is hoped that the results of this research will take a small step in realizing this important matter and will illuminate the path for policymakers and those in charge in this critical journey.

Research Limitations

Despite the effort to provide a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of hyperreality in Iran's media-driven society, this research faced limitations whose nature is mostly related to the characteristics of the topic and the research conditions. One of the limitations was the conservative responses of some interviewees, which reflected the sensitivity of the topic and the need to adhere to institutional frameworks and limited access to some details. Also, there were few previous sources and studies that had directly examined hyperreality in the political arena, which limited the possibility of drawing on the research context and comparing the results, a matter that is inherently related to the nascent topic and rapid media developments. These limitations, at the same time, add to the value and necessity of the research and show the innovative position of the research in examining a less-studied phenomenon.

Suggestions for Future Research

It is suggested that future research be conducted with a more detailed focus on specific dimensions of this topic; including investigating the role of public symbols in political-cultural identity, the design and function of media symbols in a pluralistic society, the interaction of official institutions with cultural authorities and influential figures, the role of transparency in strengthening public trust, the management of a diverse yet coordinated media front, how to create strategic unity among media outlets, and the use of the experience of countries that have successfully dealt with the phenomenon of hyperreality.

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Scenarios of the Islamic Revolution Influenced by the Megatrends of the New World Order in the 2035 Horizon

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Article Info

Article type:
Scientific Research

Article history:
Received: 2025/2/24
Received in revised form: 2025/5/28
Accepted: 2025/8/4
Available online: 2025/8/4

Keywords:
New World Order; Islamic Revolution; Future, Scenario; Megatrend.

ABSTRACT

Objective:: The purpose of this research is to identify the scenarios for the Islamic Revolution as influenced by the megatrends of the new world order in the 2035 AD/1414 SH horizon.

Methodology: This study employs a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. It utilizes futures studies methods such as balanced cross-impact analysis and scenario writing, supported by Scenario Wizard and Micmac software.

Findings: From initial 1,536 scenarios generated by the software, seven core scenarios were selected based on expert opinion: "Rise of Resistance, end of resistance, fall of the eagle, new American era, and coalition against Iran, everyone's failure, and order in disorder."

Conclusions: Seven core scenarios of rise of resistance, end of resistance, fall of the eagle, new American era, coalition against Iran, everyone's failure, and order in disorder were identified and confirmed by experts as the primary scenarios.

Cite this article: Zare Sari, A & Voghoufi, O & Eyvazi, M & Haghgoo, J (2025). Scenarios of the Islamic Revolution Influenced by the Megatrends of the New World Order in the 2035 Horizon. *Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution*, 9 (25), 141-169 <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcrr.2025.391072.1687>



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DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22059/jcrr.2025.391072.1687>

Publisher: University of Tehran.

Introduction

The Islamic Revolution of Iran, as one of the most influential events in contemporary history, not only transformed the political and social structure of Iran but also has served as a strategic model in confronting the dominant global order. For the past forty-five years, this revolution has remained steadfast in the face of complex international developments, based on principles such as independence, justice-seeking, Islamism, resistance against arrogance, and paving the way for the ideal of a new Islamic civilization.

One of the influential international components in the realm of international relations is the world order. World order refers to the structures, rules, and relationships that regulate international interactions among states, organizations, and non-state actors globally. This concept includes the distribution of power, the norms governing state behavior, international institutions, and legal frameworks that shape cooperation or competition between countries. World order does not necessarily mean stability or justice, but rather reflects the balance of power and a relative consensus among major actors in a specific historical period. It is necessary to clarify here that although the international order is different from the international system, in this research, we consider order in the sense of the system and focus on changes in the structure of international relations. Wherever order is mentioned, the system is intended. Since the world order affects the destinies of countries and, consequently, the fates of individuals in society, its effective arrangements and direction are of great importance.

The world order itself is influenced by megatrends in various fields, which are long-term transformation processes with a broad scope and profound impacts. Megatrends are powerful forces that shape the future and can have deep transformative effects in various dimensions such as political, social, or economic, severely impacting a wide range of actors like governments, societies, companies, and organizations. Therefore, although various internal and external factors affect the Islamic Revolution, given the importance of the world order and the megatrends influencing it in international relations and its role in the destiny of countries and their future, the goal of this research is to examine the future of the new world order and the international and peripheral environment of the Islamic Revolution.

1. Theoretical Foundations

International order, like international relations, can be defined in various ways depending on the type of actors involved. In one definition, international order is considered synonymous with the international system. In this sense, the international order is defined as a set of activities and actions that characterize the reciprocal behavior of states. In another definition, international order is defined as patterned combinations and behaviors. These patterns are based on principles and structures that indicate this type of order is purposeful, voluntary, and self-aware. International order is also sometimes defined as the rules and regulations governing the relations of international actors. Shared values and norms are at the core of this definition (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2015 AD/1394 SH).

Different theoretical schools of thought each emphasize a specific dimension of the world order.

Realists emphasize the axis of security; they believe a fundamental structure of anarchy exists in the international system, and this primary structure is not easily changeable, even in the long term (Waltz, 2002).

While a broad spectrum of realists incorporates various dimensions of power in their discussions, liberals emphasize governance networks, especially international institutions and the cross-border relationships formed through them. The more centralized and binding the networks of institutions and common rules, the greater the possibility of creating a world order (Cohen, 1989; Inkberry, 2001: 54).

The third theoretical tradition concerning world order is constructivism in its broad sense, where ideas or systems of meaning are considered the basis for analyzing order in the global structure (Wendt, 1999: 74).

The fourth and final theoretical tradition is the International Political Economy perspective. Theorists of this school are a diverse group, but they all emphasize the creation and maintenance of a global capitalist economic system in their discussions of the international order (Wallerstein, 1979: 55; Hauguel, 2001: 76).

The following table is presented to articulate the differences between the macro-level perspectives of international relations regarding the international order.

Theory	Main Component of International Order	Possibility of Transforming the International Order and Alternatives
Realism	State-centrism, distribution of power among states	Pessimistic view on fundamental change; possibility of structural change through power transition among great powers.
Liberalism	State-centrism, pivotal role of international institutions and regimes	Optimistic view on transformation based on strengthening democratic peace, transnationalism, trade, and institutional development.
English School	Importance of shared goals, rules, institutions, values, and norms within an international society	Concern with change in the international order. Alternatives: survival of the state system without a societal element; survival of states without a system; world government; emergence of a new medievalism.
Constructivism	Simultaneous influence of material and ideational structures, emphasis on international society	Possibility of systemic change in order through changes in practices, rules, and norms. Three natures of order: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures.

Table 1: Differences between Macro-Level International Relations Perspectives on International Order

While we face a multitude of theories in international relations, due to following the mainstream in this field, we have primarily chosen realist approaches, specifically Morton Kaplan's systemic perspective. Kaplan names three types of international systems with historical equivalents:

1. Inflexible Bipolar System;
2. Flexible Bipolar System;
3. Flexible Multipolar System.

Flexibility or inflexibility refers to the degree of rigidity the two poles exhibit in maintaining their positions and interests, or generally what they consider to be related to their ideological and economic concerns. The lower this degree of rigidity, the more flexible the system will be, and naturally, the opposite is also true. The inflexible bipolar system has many similarities to the flexible bipolar system, but the key feature that distinguishes the inflexible model is that in the flexible model, all countries, whether from the Third World or Western and Eastern Europe, are in some way absorbed by one of the two poles. Furthermore, the characteristic of inflexibility regarding ideology and security, which is specific to the bipolar system, spreads throughout the world (Azqandi, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 10).

Structure, as an expression of how power is distributed among units and as the shaping element of the international system, is considered the most important variable in the formation of various systems in the arena of international relations. Based on this, Kaplan proposes the following systems:

1. Flexible Bipolar International Systems;
2. Inflexible Bipolar International Systems;
3. Balance of Power Multipolar Systems;
4. Hierarchical Hegemonic (Directive and Democratic) Systems;
5. Unit Veto Systems;
6. Universal International Systems.

Kaplan believes that four of these systems do not actually exist, and for the other two—the balance of power and the flexible bipolar system—historical evidence can be cited: the classic example of the balance of power existed in 18th and 19th century Europe, and the flexible bipolar system emerged as a result of the transformation in the power distribution process after World War II (Qawam, 2005 AD/1384 SH).

Therefore, Morton Kaplan introduces six models of the international system, each describing a specific structure of interactions among states and international actors. These models are used as a framework for analyzing the dynamics of power, alliances, and conflicts in the international system and serve as the theoretical basis for this article.

2. Literature Review

Regarding the literature, several studies and books related to the topic of this article were found, which are mentioned below.

2.1. Foreign Studies

- A 2020 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled "Four Scenarios for Geopolitical Order in 2025-2030: What Will Great Power Competition Look Like?" presents four possible scenarios for the geopolitical order between 2025 and 2030, focusing on the competition between great powers. The four scenarios are:

Business as Usual: Competition between the US and China continues without leading to direct military conflict. International cooperation is maintained in areas like climate change, though tensions in security and economy persist.

China Ascendant: China surpasses the US economically and militarily, reshaping the world order in its favor. This could reduce the influence of the US and its allies.

Return to Multipolarity: Regional powers like India, Russia, and the EU play a larger role, creating a multipolar power structure.

Global Disorder: The inability to manage global challenges like pandemics and economic crises leads to widespread instability and conflict, severely weakening international cooperation. This study focuses heavily on the US-China rivalry and neglects potential wild cards or surprise factors. The present research attempts to be more comprehensive by considering various factors with different probabilities.

- A 2022 study by the Brookings Institution titled "Perspectives on the future of the global order" describes the current world order as facing tensions and multiple forces. Bradford argues the world is transitioning from a West-led unipolar order to a multifaceted one where diverse cultural voices play a greater role. The study focuses too much on the role of G20 countries and shows an optimistic bias towards global cooperation. Our research aims for a more comprehensive view of all powerful global dimensions to derive diverse scenarios.
- The Atlantic Council's report, "How Iran's Interpretation of the World Order Affects Its Foreign Policy," argues that Iran's foreign policy is heavily influenced by its ideological and strategic view of a world order it sees as dominated by the US. Iran perceives the existing order as unjust and has adopted a confrontational, revisionist approach. The report overemphasizes Iran's ideological interpretation and internal factors, relying more on qualitative analysis than quantitative modeling, which may reduce the credibility of its predictions. This research seeks to fill these gaps by using expert opinions and a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.
- The report "Autocrats United: How Russia and Iran Defy the U.S.-Led Global Order," published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2024, examines the strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran in challenging the US-led order. It argues that despite historical rivalries, their shared adversary (the US) has brought them closer. The analysis is personality-driven, focusing on current leaders, and is written from a Western perspective, framing the Iran-Russia cooperation mainly as a threat. Our study tries to rectify these shortcomings.

- The UK Ministry of Defence's 2024 document "Global Strategic Trends: Out to 2055" examines key global trends up to 2055 to help policymakers prepare for an uncertain future. It outlines four future order scenarios: multilateral cooperation, continued Western hegemony, a participatory world, or widespread instability. Given its source, the report has a defense and security bias and does not comprehensively address all dimensions of the future order, ultimately presenting only four scenarios. This study aims to provide a more comprehensive and pluralistic view of the possible future orders.
- The book "Iran in an Emerging New World Order: From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani" by Ali Fathollah Nejad examines Iran's foreign policy and its place in the emerging new world order from 9/11 to the late Rouhani presidency. The book focuses on a specific period and its framework of an "inter-polar empire" is heavily reliant on critical perspectives of US hegemony, possibly reflecting a Western-centric view.
- Noam Chomsky's book "Old and New World Orders," translated by Mahbod Iranitalab in 2008 AD/1387 SH, examines the changes in the world order from the Cold War era to the post-Soviet Union collapse, based on three lectures he delivered at the American University in Cairo in 1993. In this book, Chomsky criticizes the policies of the countries of the North, especially the United States, regarding global issues, and compares these policies with the old and new world orders. He introduces the United States and its supporters as lawbreakers and violent actors, and analyzes the events of global crises such as the Middle East and Latin America (Chomsky, 2008 AD/1387 SH). This book provides a good understanding of American policies in the world. It also presents a narrative of changes in the world order, but it does not seek to provide future scenarios regarding the world order. In the present study, in addition to explaining the theories of various thinkers regarding the world order, the various trends affecting the formation of the order and its future scenarios are described. Also, the opportunities and threats of the Islamic Revolution will be examined in each scenario.
- Luimi and colleagues (2021), in their research "Analysis of the Role of the New World Order in the Middle East," by explaining the various dimensions of the New World Order, propose hypotheses that the application of the New World Order policy by the United States after the Cold War has led to the expansion of American

influence in the Middle East. In this research, the researchers focus on examining the Middle East region and rely on the behavior of the United States. They consider the New World Order plan by the United States to be the cause of the development of American presence and influence in the region. The current research, while examining the various powers, examines the scenarios of the future order and offers suggestions for using opportunities and dealing with the threats of the Islamic Revolution.

- Salahi (2019), in his research "Areas of Conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States in West Asia and its Impact on the New International Order," states that after analyzing America's goals, he has concluded that this conflict has been ongoing in three strategic, economic, and cultural areas. Undoubtedly, America's victory in this conflict would lead to the country's global hegemony, and its defeat would lead to the emergence of a major Islamic power center and the formation of a multipolar system in the world. This research, focusing on the areas of conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic in the West Asia region, enumerates its effects on the global order. In this regard, the details have not been well examined, and the conclusion has been drawn in a general manner. The current research focuses on the details of the international scene and the formation of future scenarios of the global order.

2.2. Domestic Studies

- The book "Discourse of the Islamic Revolution and Regional and Global Trends" is written by Sayyid Abbas Hassanniya Moghadam. Discourses emerge, compete with each other, become dominant, and undergo various trends in regional or global balances. However, the dominance of a discourse in a region, such as the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, depends not only on the power of that discourse but also on the trends of the international system and the trends that rival discourses undergo. For this reason, the book "Discourse of the Islamic Revolution and Regional and Global Trends" attempts, while examining the precise content of the discourse of the Islamic Revolution and the content of the Axis of Resistance, to examine the secular Ikhwani discourse of Turkey and the Salafi-Wahhabi discourse of Saudi Arabia as rival discourses to the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, and also examines global trends to find out what the international system will look like in 2030 and where it will move.

In this path, the book not only benefits from the analysis of the political situation but also grounds its political analysis in the economic situation of Iran, the region, and the world, and uses the SWOT method to conduct future research on the three discourses in the Middle East and the future of the international system. (Hassanniya Moghadam, 2024 AD/1403 SH) In this book, the researcher focuses on the discourse of the Islamic Revolution and also addresses regional and rival discourses. In addition, global trends in various fields have also been examined in detail. This book examines the rival discourses of the Islamic Revolution with extensive explanation and explores various trends and global powers. In terms of methodology, this book uses various methods such as SWOT, but does not engage in scenario writing, and the text of the book is also long.

- The book "International Order and Future Scenarios" is written by Alireza Khosravi and Ali Akbar Asadi. In this book, while highlighting the concept of complexity and the characteristic of uncertainty in examining order, an attempt has been made to discover future scenarios of international order and define its guiding indicators by relying on the methodology of strategic foresight. To this end, by focusing on the role and position of major powers and issues related to the international order in their relations, the driving forces involved as well as key uncertainties have been identified and narrated in the form of three scenarios: the American World, the Return of the Dragon, and the Eagle and Dragon Conflict (Khosravi, Asadi, 2024 AD/1403 SH). Despite its strengths, such as examining the situation of powers from various political, economic, and social aspects, this book has shortcomings in terms of its future research method. Among these is that the drivers have not been carefully considered and the application of the method has not been done correctly. In the present study, an attempt has been made to cover the weaknesses of this research and to apply the methodology correctly. Also, the drivers and possible futures in the field of world order are comprehensively examined.
- In their article "The Inception of a New World Order and Scenarios for the Future Geometry of the World," Mohammad Shamseddini and Mohammadreza Arab Baferani conclude that ultimately eight different scenarios are identified and introduced for the international order. Considering that the current situation is a "Moment of Multiplicity," the dominant form of future scenarios will focus on

plurality and multiplicity in power centers in each of the dimensions mentioned. Ultimately, considering the formulation of the scenarios, redesigning the grand strategy of the Islamic Revolution in accordance with current conditions, and moving away from geostrategic introversion under the idea of "Revolution Effusion" based on the "Emergence of Revolution trickles in the region and beyond the region" was proposed. The focus of this research is not on presenting a scenario, which will be examined in the present study.

- In his article, "The Future of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Future Conflicts of the World," Mohammad Rahim Eyvazi, in response to the question of the future challenges of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, concludes that in analyzing the developments and conflicts of Iran in the future, the general policy of the international system and regional rivalries, as well as the internal developments of countries, should be considered. Also, in its analysis, the strategy of each of the rival powers in the world, and especially in the region, should be examined in order to explain the nature of future conflicts of the revolution (Eyvazi, 1388). In this article, in addition to examining the Islamic Revolution, the future conflicts of the world and the region have been discussed, but the global order and future scenarios and the state of the Islamic Revolution in it have not been considered, which are examined in this research.
- Amin Ravanbalad, Hadiseh Koulai, and Ali Mohammad Haghighi, in their article "Drivers Affecting the Structure of the International System Using the ISM Model," concluded that political, economic, military, and cultural power is the most influential drivers. The emergence of significant events with global impact, climate change, institutions, accepted international laws, war and conflict, the entry of technology into the realm of international politics, the growth of the global middle class, infectious diseases, and population each contribute to the process of changing the power structure in the international system. The main issue of that article was the effective driver, and it did not address scenarios, which are comprehensively addressed in this research.
- In their article "The Islamic Revolution and the Formation of Discourses of Power in the International System," Sayyid Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi and Alireza Esmaeili Mazger conclude that the ascending trajectory of the discourse of political Islam can

be mapped and explained within the geometry of global power. The othering of political Islam in relation to both hegemonic discourses of the international system, namely communism and liberalism, and consequently with the dependent sub-discourses of the West Asia region, has led to the decline and fall of a number of dependent sub-discourses of the West Asia region. While this article examines the discourse of the Islamic Revolution and competing discourses, it does not address the drivers and factors influencing the future global order and its scenarios, which is one of the points of distinction from the present research, which comprehensively addresses the influential factors and macro-trends of the new order.


- In their article "Explaining Change in the Structure of the International System Facing the Islamic Republic of Iran," Hadiseh Koulaei, Amin Ravanbod, and Ali Mohammad Haghighi conclude that the current structure of the international system cannot be defined by the concept of polarity. China, with its miraculous growth, is likely to be the world's largest economy in the future, but the power gap in military and technological dimensions between China and the United States is very deep, and there are serious obstacles to filling this gap. The current structure of the international system includes a superpower (the United States) alongside China as a challenger and candidate for becoming a superpower in the future, and several major powers (the European Union, Russia, Britain, and Japan), and this structure will continue in the short term. In order to optimize the fulfillment of national interests in such a system, the Islamic Republic of Iran can, while trying to maintain close relations with China and Russia, adopt a "neither friend nor foe" stance towards other major powers. While examining the structure of the international system and its changes in recent years, this article does not discuss the future situation and scenarios of the global order, and this is the point of distinction with the present study.

3. Research Methodology

For this research topic, we initially conducted a literature review through library studies to examine the existing theoretical foundations. In the next stage, to identify the key and important drivers, we needed to perform trend analysis and cross-impact analysis of trends. The subsequent stages, up to the writing and development of scenarios, were carried out with

the help of experts through an iterative process, as well as by using software such as Scenario Wizard. Therefore, the main research method employed is scenario planning.

Figure 1: Research Process Stages



4. Research Findings

To begin this section, it is necessary to provide a definition of megatrends. A megatrend refers to regularities formed from the combination of several smaller, subsidiary trends. Thus, the most important characteristics of a megatrend are its high significance, high probability, and persistence over time; that is, factors that will occur under any scenario (Toivonen, 2004).

By reviewing various sources and searching through different global reports that have examined megatrends on various horizons, and by focusing on the future world order, we compiled a list of megatrends based on the PESTEL model.

To proceed, this list needed to be refined based on expert opinions. Therefore, the items were presented to experts in the form of a questionnaire. The table below shows the aggregated scores from experts for the most important items.

Macro Trends
Political
Global power shift
Rise of emerging powers
Increased diversity of governance approaches and formation of regional alliances
Social
Ideological conflicts
Demographic changes
Lifestyle changes
Social changes and global movements
Economical
Emergence and development of the digital economy
Growth of the global economy
Environmental
Climate change
Resource scarcity
Technological
Growth of technologies
Competition for superior technologies


Table 2: Aggregated Expert Scores for the Most Significant Megatrends

In order to answer the main research question, "What are the future scenarios of the Islamic Revolution influenced by the macro trends of the new world order in the horizon of 1414?" we need drivers with the highest importance and greatest uncertainty based on the extracted macro trends. Accordingly, 133 factors were identified, and a questionnaire was developed, and its validity and reliability were confirmed. Experts and specialists in the field were asked to score the factors in two dimensions: the degree of importance in the subject under investigation and the degree of uncertainty in that subject. The method comprised a 5-point scale from 1 to 5 (corresponding to the intensity of importance or uncertainty). Subsequently, in order to determine the most important and uncertain factors influencing the macro trends affecting the new world order, a descriptive analysis was performed by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the given scores, resulting in 17 factors that were also confirmed by experts. To identify the key factors among the 17 factors, the cross-impact analysis method was used. A 17*17 matrix questionnaire was prepared according to the number of drivers, and experts judged it based on valuation with a number on a scale of zero to 3 (the number zero: no effect, the number 1: low effect, the number 2: medium effect, and the number 3: shows a high effect).

Factors with high importance and uncertainty	
Political, security, and military alliances like NATO	Resistance discourse
Military capability of the resistance axis	Power transition from West to East
China-US technological competition	Role and status of the United Nations
US hegemony in the world	Power status of the Islamic resistance front
Emergence of potential global poles	US power in global norm-setting (liberal order)
Political situation in resistance countries	Global financial and economic system
US policies towards the resistance axis	US domestic political, cultural, and social situation
Russia's power level	US economic capacities
	China's power level

Table 3: Drivers with the Highest Importance and Uncertainty

To determine the key drivers among the 17 factors, the cross-impact analysis method was used. A 17x17 matrix questionnaire was prepared and judged by experts on a scale of 0 to 3 (0: no influence, 1: low influence, 2: moderate influence, 3: high influence). This matrix was then entered into the Micmac software.



	1:1	2:2	3:3	4:4	5:5	6:6	7:7	8:8	9:9	10:10	11:11	12:12	13:13	14:14	15:15	16:16	17:17
1:1	0	1	2	1	2	0	2	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
2:2	3	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	1
3:3	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
4:4	1	2	3	0	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	2
5:5	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
6:6	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	1
7:7	2	1	0	2	1	2	0	1	3	1	0	1	1	1	3	0	1
8:8	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	1	0
9:9	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
10:10	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
11:11	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	0	1	1	1	2	1	1
12:12	1	1	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	0	1	1	2	0	1
13:13	3	1	3	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	0	3	1	1	1
14:14	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	2	0	1
15:15	1	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
16:16	2	1	3	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	0	1
17:17	2	1	3	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	0

Influences range from 0 to 3, with the possibility to identify potential influences:
 0: No influence
 1: Weak
 2: Moderate influence
 3: Strong influence
 P: Potential influences

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Figure 2: Cross-Impact Matrix in Micmac Software

Following the analysis of the data from the table above in MicMac software, the following data are noteworthy: According to the table below, the matrix dimensions were set to 17*17, and based on the results, the matrix filling rate is 72.3 percent, which indicates that the selected factors have influenced each other in more than 72 percent of cases. Out of a total of 209 evaluable relationships, 80 relationships were zero, meaning that the factors did not affect each other or were not affected by each other. On the other hand, according to the table below, the matrix, based on statistical indicators with two data rotations, has 100 percent desirability and optimization, which also shows the high validity of the questionnaire and its responses

Indicator	Value
Matrix size	17
Number of iterations	2
Number of zeros	80
Number of ones	137
Number of twos	57
Number of threes	15
Number of P	0
Total	209
Fillrate	72/3%

Table 4: Data analysis of the matrix and its statistics

The influential variables are the most critical components. Given that the system in this study is considered unstable, the key factors, according to the software results and expert opinion, are:

1. **Power transition from West to East**
2. **Power status of the Islamic resistance front**
3. **Emergence of potential global poles**
4. **Russia's power level**
5. **US hegemony in the world**
6. **China's power level**

To answer the main research question, after identifying the six key drivers from the Micmac software output, Scenario Wizard software was used to develop the scenarios.

First, different states for each key driver were extracted through expert interviews and subsequently validated. Experts were then asked to rate the impact of one state on another using a scale from -3 (strongly constraining effect) to +3 (strongly reinforcing effect). The six drivers had 2, 3, 4, 4, 3, and 4 states respectively, resulting in a total of 1,152 possible scenarios ($2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 4 \times 3 \times 4$).




Figure 3: Extreme States of Each Key Driver

Based on the principles of morphological analysis, there are 1152 probable scenarios from the combination of states of these 6 uncertainties. To reduce the number of scenarios, a cross-impact matrix of states was formed, and the results were analyzed with software. Scores were entered as follows, with the presence of experts in a panel that was formed:

- Strongly limiting effect = -3
- Moderately limiting effect = -2
- Weakly limiting effect = -1
- No effect = 0
- Weakly reinforcing effect = 1
- Moderately reinforcing effect = 2
- Strongly reinforcing effect = 3


Based on methodological recommendations, scenarios with a consistency of zero to approximately 2 are usable. Accordingly, 7 reliable scenarios were selected; ultimately, with the experts' opinion, 7 scenarios with higher consistency and value were chosen, and all experts approved them. Then, names were suggested for each scenario, and after the final summary, the name of each scenario was also determined.

Therefore, with the experts' opinion, 7 scenarios with higher consistency and value were chosen, and all experts approved them. Then, names were suggested for each scenario, and after the final summary, the name of each scenario was also determined. The final names of the 7 scenarios are listed below, along with a description of the story for each scenario.

- **Rise of Resistance**
- **End of Resistance**
- **Fall of the Eagle**
- **New American Era**
- **Coalition Against Iran**
- **Everyone's Failure**
- **Order in Disorder**

5. Scenario 1: Rise of Resistance

Consisting of the limit states of the propellants as follows:



Scenario Synopsis:

In the year 2035, the Islamic Resistance Axis has become a major pole in the global multipolar order. The United States, facing widespread crises and strategic failures, has lost its former power, and the dollar is no longer the dominant global currency. China has become the world's leading economy but lacks effective soft power. Russia is in effective interaction with the Resistance Axis. The collapse of the Zionist regime and the liberation of Palestine marked the turning point for the victory of the resistance. This axis now inspires global movements, and a new world order based on justice and independence has taken shape.

6. Scenario 2: End of Resistance

Composed of the limit states of the promoters as follows:




Scenario Synopsis:

By 1414 SH (2035 AD), the Resistance Axis has collapsed due to internal problems, external pressures, and sanctions. The United States, through reforms and new technologies, has re-emerged as the dominant global power, expanding its influence in the Middle East and elsewhere. China and Russia have grown but have not been able to replace the West. Iran, weakened by internal crises and external pressure, has lost its ability to support the resistance front, and groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have been neutralized. Using soft power and advanced technology, the US has established a new form of colonialism, effectively silencing

the voice of resistance. The world is moving towards a multipolar order, but one dominated by the United States.

7. Scenario 3: Fall of the Eagle

Composed of the limit states of the promoters as follows:



Scenario Synopsis:

In 2035, the world order is transformed. The US has lost its hegemony, the dollar is no longer the dominant currency, its economy is in recession, and its military influence has ended in the Middle East and Asia. China, having surpassed the US economically and dominating global trade, has become the world's foremost power, with the yuan replacing the dollar. Russia, with a weak economy, has become an ally of China, but its global role has diminished. Iran, after joining BRICS and with China's support, has become a regional power with significant missile and economic capabilities. The resistance front is united and stronger than ever. Israel, without US support, has retreated and is weakened against the resistance axis. In this new multipolar world, the slogan on the streets of Tehran is: "New World, New Order".

8. Scenario 4: New American Era

Composed of the limit states of the promoters as follows:



Scenario Synopsis:

The US revitalizes its economy by investing in advanced technologies like AI, clean energy, and robotics. Major tech companies dominate global markets. The dollar maintains its status with the support of the Federal Reserve and the European Union. China, facing an economic crisis (property bubble, aging population, internal unrest), retreats from global projects and becomes a marginal regional power. Russia faces economic collapse due to falling energy prices and declining regional influence. Iran is weakened by severe sanctions, cyber-attacks, and an anti-Iran coalition (US, Israel, Saudi Arabia). The Islamic resistance front, with reduced support from Iran, is relegated to a limited local force. A new global structure is formed by a Western alliance including the US, EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, and India.

9. Scenario 5: Coalition Against Iran

Composed of the limit states of the promoters as follows:




Scenario Synopsis:

In 1414 (2035), an unprecedented anti-Iran coalition forms, including the US, Israel, Arab countries (like Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Turkey, the UK, and other Western allies. This coalition is created in response to Iran's growing regional influence and its military and nuclear advancements. The consequences include the weakening of the resistance front, China and Russia retreating from active support for Iran, the reconstruction of the international order with a new Security Council dominated by Western allies, and Iran's relegation to a marginal regional power.

10. Scenario 6: Everyone's Failure

Composed of the limit states of the promoters as follows:




Scenario Synopsis:

China as a major power By 2035, the world is witnessing the simultaneous collapse of all power poles and international institutions. This global breakdown leads to civilization regressing to a tribal and chaotic state. Key features include the collapse of global powers, the disintegration of the economic and financial order, the breakdown of social and security structures, the collapse of global infrastructure, and the demise of international institutions.

11. Scenario 7: Order in Disorder

Composed of the limit states of the promoters as follows:



Scenario Synopsis:

In this scenario, the world is in the midst of a multi-layered crisis stemming from climate change, economic instability, and the collapse of the traditional international order. The world is moving toward a new but fragile order. The US, against expectations, has forged a new order amidst the disorder. Other powers are either weakened (China) or marginalized (Russia, UK). The Middle East is in turmoil, and nation-state structures are collapsing. This scenario represents a global transition from a liberal order to a decentralized and crisis-ridden one, where order and leadership emerge from disorder.

Conclusion

This research, aimed at identifying scenarios for the Islamic Revolution influenced by the megatrends of the new world order in the 2035 horizon, resulted in the seven detailed scenarios described above. Each of these scenarios presents opportunities and threats for the Islamic Revolution. By monitoring the signs of each scenario's realization, one can achieve a precise prediction of the most probable scenario and take appropriate measures accordingly.

The Islamic Revolution, as the beating heart of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the driver of the resistance front, possesses numerous actual and potential capacities in various cultural,

economic, and geopolitical domains. Considering these capacities in line with the global situation in each of the world order scenarios is the key to achieving an acceptable status for the Islamic Revolution to play a maximum role in the new world order. Key capacities include:

- People-based military forces with revolutionary morale and faith
- Possession of indigenous and modern weapons technology
- Access to international waters
- A large number of neighbors with high populations (650 million people)
- Strategic location on communication and economic crossroads
- Difficulty of a territorial conquest of Iran
- Security dependence of China and Russia on Iran's security
- The system of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) and a religious government
- Strong logic in global issues
- Capacity of the Persian-speaking population
- Capacity of the Shia population in the region
- Young and specialized human resources
- A motivated and faithful young generation
- Energy and mineral capacities
- Suitable strategic and maritime access
- Adequate agricultural capacity

Finally, considering the mentioned capacities, the following recommendations are presented as a summary, tailored to the situation of the Islamic Revolution in the areas discussed:

- Establishing joint political, security, and economic institutions among countries and resistance groups.
- Strengthening regional trade with friendly countries and creating economic corridors (such as the North-South corridor between Iran, Russia, and India).
- Strengthening the spirit of active anticipation in society, focusing on justice and fighting against oppression.
- Redefining relations with the West and emerging powers based on the principle of "constructive engagement without compromising principles" to reduce international pressures.
- Maintaining and developing missile and cyber capabilities as the main means of deterrence against foreign threats.

- Establishing joint technology parks with aligned countries (such as Russia and China).
- Strengthening cooperation with powers challenging the order to confront the Western axis.
- Developing cyber capabilities to counter electronic attacks and enemy espionage.
- Strengthening Islamic unity as a foundation for confronting common threats.
- Reducing inequalities and increasing public satisfaction within the country.
- Focusing on self-sufficiency in key sectors such as agriculture, industry, and technology.
- Increasing transparency and government accountability to improve the legitimacy of the political system.
- Explaining the intellectual and philosophical foundations of resistance as a global discourse that applies not only to Iran but to oppressed nations around the world.
- Shaping and developing regional and international coalitions with countries and movements that share common goals to create an international network of resistance.
- Strengthening the defense and deterrence capabilities of oppressed nations and those interested in the discourse of resistance by developing and exporting missile and cyber capabilities as deterrents against US threats.
- Exposing America's double standards by using public diplomacy and media to reveal human rights violations, interventionism, and America's warmongering policies on a global scale.
- Strengthening anti-war and justice-seeking movements in America by supporting social movements that oppose American interventionism in the world.
- Strengthening regional cooperation through the establishment of regional alliances such as cooperation with Russia, China, and member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
- Strengthening financial cooperation outside the dollar system by using national currencies in international exchanges and developing alternative financial systems such as cryptocurrencies.

Acknowledgment

We express our gratitude to the management of the Research Institute of Hazrat Vali-e-Asr (AJ) of Imam Hossein University for their spiritual support and cooperation in conducting the present research.

We thank Dr. Voghoufi, Dr. Eyvazi, and Dr. Haghgoo for reviewing the article text and providing structural comments.

We express our gratitude to the esteemed reviewers for providing structural and scientific comments.

Support for alternative financial institutions by strengthening institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the New Development Bank to reduce dependence on Western-dominated institutions.

- Supporting social and cultural development in the countries of resistance by providing economic, technical, and educational assistance to countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to strengthen their internal stability.
- Strengthening social and cultural solidarity by creating cultural and social networks between the countries of resistance to strengthen the sense of solidarity and shared goals.
- In addition to strategic plans, programs, and projects, strategic initiatives should be considered.
- Economic self-sufficiency and food security in the sphere of cultural influence.
- Development of people-to-people communication.

Ethical Considerations Adherence to the principles of research ethics the authors have observed ethical principles in conducting and publishing this scientific research and this is confirmed by all of them. The contribution of the authors in the article extracted from the thesis should be approximately as follows:

First Author: Preparation and preparation of samples, performing experiments and data collection, performing calculations, statistical analysis of data, analysis and interpretation of information and results, preparation of the article draft
Second Author: Thesis supervisor, research design, supervision of research stages, review and control of results, correction, revision and finalization of the article
Third Author: Thesis advisor, participation in research design, supervision of research, reading and reviewing the article
Fourth Author: Thesis supervisor, research design, supervision of research stages, review and control of results, correction, revision and finalization of the article

Conflict of Interest According to the authors, there is no conflict of interest in this article.

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Contemporary Researches on Islamic Revolution



University of Tehran
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ISSN 2676-7368

Quarterly Scientific Journal

Vol.7, No.26, October 2025

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